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GENERAL  GEORGE  H.  THOMAS 


A  CRITICAL  BIOGRAPHY 


BY 


DONX   PIATT 


WITH    CONCLUDING    CHAPTERS 


BY 


HENRY   V.   BOYNTON 


CINCINNATI 
ROBERT    CLARKE    &    CO 

1893 


COPYRIGHT,  1893, 
BY  ELLA  KIRBY  PIATT. 


CONTENTS. 


PREFACE 13 

THE  WAR— INTRODUCTION 22 

CHAPTER  I. 

Early  life— The  Child  is  Father  to  the  Man— Home  Life  in  Old  Vir- 
ginia— West  Point  and  what  it  did  not  Teach,  but  what  Young 
Thomas  Learned 47 

CHAPTER  II. 

West  Point  and  After — Services  Preceding  the  Mexican  War — Its  Ori- 
gin and  Infamy— Sam.  Houston — Distinguished  Dash  at  Monterey — 
Resolutions  and  the  Sword 63 

CHAPTER  III. 

Thomas  Announces  His  Allegiance  to  the  Government — Loyal  from 
the  First — Difference  in  Temperament  that  Made  His  Course  the 
Reverse  of  that  of  Lee— Question  of  the  Right  to  Secede 80 

CHAPTER  IV. 

Promoted  Through  Colonelcy  to  a  Brigadier  Generalship— Skirmish  at 
Falling  Waters— "  Stonewall "  and  "Rock"— First  Bull  Run— Vin- 
dication of  General  Patterson 92 

CHAPTER  V. 

Thomas  Proposes  to  Sever  the  Main  Artery  of  the  Confederacy  by 
Taking  Chattanooga— Andrew  Johnson's  Potent  Influence — Buell 
Placed  in  Command— Battle  of  Mill  Springs 106 

CHAPTER  VI. 

The  Proposed  Campaign  to  Chattanooga,  as  viewed  in  the  Light  now 
Given  Us — Fremont  and  the  Gunboats  he  Furnished — Capture  of 
Fort  Donelson 129 


iv  Contents. 

CHAPTER  VII. 

Nashville  the  Political  Objective  Point— Shameful  Surprise  and  Useless 
Slaughter  at  Shiloh— Reorganization  of  the  Forces  at  Corinth — 
Thomas  Given  Command  of  the  Right  Wing— Asks  to  be  Relieved 
and  Reassigned  to  His  Old  Command— Difficulties  in  the  Route 
from  Corinth  to  Chattanooga— McMinnville— Army  of  Ohio  Moved 
Back  to  Louisville— Thomas  Appointed  to  Succeed  Buell,  but  De- 
clines— Second  in  Command — Perry ville 140 

.       CHAPTER  VIII. 

The  Buell  Court  of  Inquiry — Thomas  Shows  that  had  his  Suggestion  of 
Concentrating  the  Army  at  Sparta  been  acted  on  Bragg's  Advance 
would  have  been  Checked 177 

CHAPTER  IX. 

Treason  in  the  Head-quarters  at  Alexandria— Preparations  for  the  Re- 
moval of  McClellan — Pope  Put  in  Command  of  the  Forces  Defend- 
ing Washington— The  Shameful  Story  of  the  Second  Bull  Run — 
The  Fitz  John  Porter  Case — Lee's  Invasion  of  Maryland— McClel- 
lan Relieved  of  Command 182 

CHAPTER  X. 

Rosecrans  given  Command  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland — Thomas 
Protests  against  his  Junior  being  placed  over  Him— Takes  Com- 
mand of  the  Center — Advance  upon  Chattanooga— Battle  of  Stone 
River— Thomas  opposes  Retreat 196 

CHAPTER  XL 

Immediate  Effect  of  the  Stone  River  Victory— Review  of  the  Opera- 
tions During  the  Six  Months  following  the  Army  of  the  Potomac— 
Burnside  takes  up  McClellan's  Cry  of  "  On  to  Richmond  "—Disaster 
of  Fredericksburg— Hooker  Succeeds  Burnside— Meade  put  in  Com- 
mand—Invasion of  Pennsylvania  and  Battle  of  Gettysburg 214 

CHAPTER  XII. 

The  Campaign  at  the  West— Grant  and  Sherman  Prepare  for  the  Descent 
,  Upon  Vicksburg— Three  Months  Lost  in  Getting  Rid  of  a  "  Politi- 
cal General "— Washburn's  Support  of  Grant— Sherman's  Forces 
Landed  at  the  Mouth  of  the  Yazoo— Defenses  of  Chickasaw  Bluff. .  230 


Contents.  v 

CHAPTER  XIII. 

Assault  of  Vicksburg  from  the  River  given  up  as  Hopeless — "  Employ- 
ment for  Superfluous  Troops  "  in  a  Campaign  against  the  Vexatious 
Waters  of  the  Mississippi — Details  of  Four  Thousand  kept  con- 
stantly at  work  in  an  attempt  to  change  the  River's  Current — The 
Laborers  exposed  to  Fevers,  Dysentery,  Malaria,  and  a  deadly 
Artillery  Fire  from  the  Enemy — Deaths  by  Thousands  in  the 
Ditches— The  Project  a  Failure— Lake  Providence  Canal  Scheme 
Tried  and  Abandoned — Co-operation  with  Banks 250 

CHAPTER  XIV. 

The  Port  Hudson  Plan  of  Escape  from  before  Vicksburg — Running 
Steamers  Past  the  Batteries — McClernand  Forces  the  Evacuation  of 
Grand  Gulf  and  Port  Gibson— Grant  Fails  to  Follow  up  the  Ad- 
vantage, and  Moves  Off  in  a  Raid  on  Jackson — Pemberton  Moves 
Out  of  Vicksburg,  Intending  to  Form  a  Junction  with  Johnston 
and  Attack  Grant's  Rear— Bloody  Battle  of  Champion's  Hill— 
Pemberton  Retreats  into  Vicksburg — The  Assaults  and  Horrible 
Loss — The  Wounded  Left  to  Die  and  the  Dead  to  Rot — Pemberton 
Surrenders — Fearful  Cost  of  the  Questionable  Advantage 267 

CHAPTER  XV. 

Preparations  for  the  Advance  on  Chattanooga — Concentration  and  For- 
tification of  Supplies — Impatience  of  the  War  Department  at  the 
Delay  —  Reinforcements  and  Supplies  Forwarded  Reluctantly — 
Treachery  to  Rosecrans  in  his  Chief  of  Staff— Testing  the  Front  of 
the  Enemy — Training  Raw  Recruits  into  Veterans 326 

CHAPTER  XVI. 

The  Tullahoma  Campaign— Impatient  Orders  from  Washington  for  an 
Immediate  Advance — Catholic  Influence  Sustains  Rosecrans — The 
Natural  Defenses  of  Chattanooga — Bragg  Flanked  Out — Battle  of 
Chickamauga — Thomas  Holds  the  Center  and  Saves  the  Army — 
Retreat  to  Rossville — In  Possession  of  the  Granite  Gateway  to  the 
South 352 

CHAPTER  XVII. 

Edwin  M.  Stanton,  his  Character  and  Temperament — His  Intense  Dis- 
like for  Rosecrans  and  its  Causes — A  Manly  Remonstrance  that 


v-  Contents. 

amounted  to  Insult-Bragg  Changes  his  Intended  Assault  on  Chat- 
tanooga into  a  Siege-Rosecrans  Relieved  and  Thomas  put  in  Com- 
maud 

CHAPTER  XVIII. 

Siege  of  Chattanooga-Terrible  Suffering  from  Lack  of  Supplies- 
Thomas  Opens  up  a  Route  Affording  Relief-A  Brave  Order  Meant 
only  for  Effect  at  Washington— Thomas  Commissioned  Brigadier- 
General,  U.  S.  A.— Burnside's  Movements  at  Knoxville— Sherman 
and  his'  Forces  Join  Grant  and  Thomas-The  Plan  of  Battle- 
Attack  Postponed  from  Day  to  Day-Thomas's  Troops  Take  and 
Hold  the  Enemy's  Works  on  Orchard  Knob— Hooker  Captures 
Lookout  Mountain— Army  of  the  Cumberland  Takes  the  Heights 
of  Missionary  Ridge— The  Gross  Injustice  done  Thomas  in  Lying 
Memoirs 

CHAPTER  XIX. 

The  Ignorance  at  Washington  Enlightened  by  General  Grant— The  War 
of  Attrition— Both  Sides  in  the  Conflict  Running  to  Exhaustion, 
Neck  and  Neck— Failure  of  the  Draft— Thomas's  Plan  of  Prose- 
cuting the  War  to  a  Speedy  and  Successful  Close 509 


BOYNTON'S  PRKFACK 515 

CHAPTER  XX. 

THE   ATLANTA   CAMPAIGN. 

General  Thomas  Preparing  for  a  Spring  Campaign — Notified  by  Grant 
that  he  Contemplated  Marching  through  to  the  Sea— Reconnoiters 
Johnston's  Position  at  Dalton — Finds  it  Impregnable,  but  Discovers 
Snake  Creek  Gap  to  the  Right  of  it  Undefended — Proposes  an 
Atlanta  Campaign  with  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland — Sherman, 
his  Junior,  Assigned  to  Command — Thomas's  Proposition  to  Turn 
Dalton  by  Way  of  Snake  Creek  Gap  Rejected — A  Direct  Attack  on 
Dalton  Decided  on — After  some  Days  of  Assaulting  Precipices,  Plan 
Abandoned,  and  Thomas's  Adopted— Too  Late,  as  Johnston,  fully 
Warned,  was  Able  to  Withdraw  to  his  Works  at  Resaca,  and  After 
Battle  to  Safely  Cross  the  Oostenaula 516 


Contents.  vii 

CHAPTER  XXI. 

From  Resaca  to  the  Etowah— Thomas's  Boldness  Causes  Johnston  to 
Retire  to  Allatoona— The  Enemy  Flanked  out  of  Allatoona— Union 
Advance  to  Kenesaw — Sherman's  Secret  Attack  upon  his  Com- 
manders— Ite  Gross  Injustice  Shown  by  his  own  Dispatches 532 

CHAPTER  XXII. 

The  Advance  on  Kenesaw  Mountain — A  Needless  Assault  and  Inexcusa- 
ble Butchery — General  Logan's  Story  of  the  Reasons  for  It— The 
Way  Open  for  a  Movement  on  Either  Flank — A  Final  Flanking 
Movement  Dislodges  the  Enemy  without  a  Battle 540 

CHAPTER  XXIII. 

Hood  Relieves  Johnston — Put  in  to  Fight  instead  of  to  Continue  John- 
ston's More  Prudent  Course  —Two  Bloody  Battles  Follow  at  Once — 
Peach  Tree  Creek  and  the  Battle  of  Atlanta  of  July  22d — General 
Thomas's  Troops  Carry  the  Works  at  Jonesboro — Consequent  Sur- 
render of  Atlanta — General  Thomas  Proposes  with  his  Army  to 
March  through  to  Savannah,  Releasing  the  Union  Prisoners  at( 
Anderson ville  and  Other  Prisoners  on  the  Way 549 

CHAPTER  XXIV. 

Hood  Moves  on  Sherman's  Communications — Sherman  Proposes  Leav- 
ing Thomas  with  Two  Divisions  in  Tennessee  and  Marching  Him- 
self to  the  Sea — Sherman's  Anxiety  to  get  Away  from  Hood — The 
Underlying  Motive  of  Sherman's  March  to  the  Sea — The  Part  of 
the  Plan  which  Sherman  Originated — Grant  Misled  as  to  the  Force 
left  with  Thomas 554 

CHAPTER  XXV. 

THE    NASHVILLE   CAMPAIGN. 

The  Armies  of  Sherman  and  Thomas  Compared — Thomas  left  with 
Fragments  and  Invalids — Sherman  Marches  to  the  Sea  with  no 
Enemy  in  his  Front — Schofield's  Good  Work — The  Disastrous  De- 
feat of  Hood  at  Franklin 558 

CHAPTER  XXVI. 

General  Thomas's  Energy  at  Nashville — The  Completeness  of  his  Prep- 
arations— An  Effective  Army  Organized  from  Two  Small  Veteran 


Contents. 

Corps,  Invalids,  Raw  Recruits,  and  Citizens— Crushing  Defeat  of 
Hood— Destroyed  by  a  Vigorous  Pursuit— Impatience  of  General 
Grant— He  twice  Orders  Thomas's  Removal-Persistent  111  Treat- 
ment of  Thomas— Completeness  of  Thomas's  Victory— Sherman 
and  Grant  Saved  from  Themselves— Hood's  Army,  as  an  Army, 
Disappears  from  the  Theater  of  War 567 

CHAPTER  XXVII. 

The  Cavalry  Corps  of  the  Military  Division  of  the  Mississippi  in  the 
Nashville  Campaign 580 

CHAPTER  XXVIII. 
The  Operations  of  the  Cavalry  Corps  in  Alabama  and  Georgia 593 

CHAPTER  XXIX. 
The  Capture  of  Montgomery,  Columbus,  West  Point,  and  Macon 618 

CHAPTER  XXX. 

The  Capture  of  Jefferson  Davis— The  Summary  of  Wilson's  Operations 
and  their  Influence  upon  the  Collapse  of  the  Rebellion 636 

CHAPTER  XXXI. 

Thomas  after  the  War— His  Rank  Ignored  in  Assignments — Persist- 
ently Pursued — Offered  Grant's  Place  at  the  Head  of  the  Army  by 
President  Johnson,  but  Declines— Refuses  to  have  his  Name  Used 
in  Connection  with  the  Presidency — The  Story  of  his  Death  ;  it  is 
little  less  than  the  History  of  an  Assassination 647 


PREFACE. 


There  is  probably  no  political  disturbance  culminating 
in  an  armed  conflict  so  little  known  to  the  world  as  this  of 
ours  that  from  1861  to  1864  convulsed  the  people  of  a  conti- 
nent. Not  only  is  its  origin  lost  in  obscurity,  but  the 
actual  events  are  so  distorted  that  instead  of  history  they 
make  a  romance  far  more  improbable  than  fictions  evolved 
from  the  brain  of  novelists  and  poets.  To  get  at  the  reason 
for  this  extraordinary  condition,  we  have  to  remember  that 
war  in  its  larger  meaning  was  unknown  to  us  when  this 
fearful  one  broke  upon  us.  For  two  hundred  years  we  had 
been  engaged  in  the  conquest  of  a  continent,  reclaiming  it 
from  the  dominion  of  nature,  and  so  earnest  and  industrious 
had  we  been  that  we  were  lost  to  all  else.  The  conflict  of 
arms  that  won  us  our  independence  was  in  truth  a  war  be- 
tween England  and  France,  in  which  the  thirteen  colonies 
did  little  but  exhibit  an  indomitable  will,  animated  by  the 
loftiest  patriotism.  We  could  have  fought  England  single- 
handed  and  alone  if  need  were,  and  probably  would  have 
been  conquered,  but  France,  for  selfish  purposes  of  its  own, 
did  the  fighting  for  us.  The  infamous  invasion  of  a  sister 
republic,  known  as  the  Mexican  war,  was  a  small  affair  and 
ended  ere  our  people  could  learn  aught  of  arms.  Immersed 
in  labor,  trade,  politics,  and  speculation,  we  were  suddenly 
called  on  to  consider  the  exigencies  of  actual  war  upon 
the  largest  scale.  To  the  masses  it  was  novel  in  the  begin- 
ning and  quite  unknown  in  the  end.  All  that  the  people 

(13) 


14  Preface. 

knew  was  that  the  households  of  the  land  were  filled  with 
mourning  and  the  cemeteries,  the  silent  cities  of  the  dead, 
numbered  their  million. 

We  learn  from  early  travelers  that  nothing  is  so  prolific 
of  distortion  as  the  unknown.  Reputable  explorers  return 
from  unexplored  lands  and  distant  seas  with  accounts  of 
monsters  that  have  existence  only  in  the  imagination,  but 
are  accepted  from  the  proneness  of  poor  human  nature  to 
welcome  the  improbable.  The  brave  men  who  shouldered 
their  muskets  and  fell  into  line  marched  into  the  unknown. 
Campaigns  and  battles  were  heard  of  but  not  understood. 
We  are  not  altogether  alone  in  this.  Historians  who  narrate 
and  artists  who  illustrate  great  fights  are  among  the  class 
that  never  witness  what  they  put  to  record.  The  result  is 
that  truth  gives  way  to  dramatic  effect.  As  probably  there 
never  was  a  campaign  executed  as  it  was  planned,  and  as 
every  battle  is  an  accident  as  to  how  it  is  fought  and  how  it 
comes  to  be  finished,  we  can  see  the  play  given  to  the  mili- 
tary fancy  of  the  generals  in  their  reports  and  the  wide  field 
of  imagination  open  to  more  legitimate  reporters.  As  there 
seldom  was  an  official  report  that  did  not  sacrifice  the  truth 
far  more  fearlessly  than  its  author  did  his  foes,  so  there  never 
appeared  a  pictorial  illustration  of  a  real  battle.  All  the 
fierce  charges,  crossed  bayonets,  hand-to-hand  encounters  in 
the  whirl  of  a  terrible  conflict,  are  the  work  of  the  imagina- 
tion. If  the  historical  journalist  and  artist  could  know  that 
the  element  counted  on  by  officials  in  their  calculation  of 
chances  is  fear,  and  not  courage,  they  would  be  saved  much 
absurd  work. 

"Do  you  mean  to  say,"  asked  a  civilian  of  a  veteran 
officer  who  had  seen  many  fierce  fights  in  Europe,  "  that 
bayonets  are  never  crossed  in  battle?" 

"Oh,  no!  I  don't  say  that.     What  I  asserted  was  that  I 


Preface.  15 

had  heard  of  such  but  never  saw  it,  and  I  have  my  doubts 
whether  it  ever  occurred." 

"  "Well,  when  a  charge  of  bayonets  is  ordered,  what 
happens,  how  does  it  end?" 

"  Why,  if  the  other  fellows  do  n't  run  away,  we  do." 

Reports  of  battles,  then,  were  to  the  people  as  much 
stories  from  the  unknown  as  Stanley's  tales  of  a  dark  conti- 
nent. Not  only  this,  but  the  hearers  had  no  information  by 
which  to  test  their  truth  or  probability.  A  most  ludicrous 
instance  of  this  occurs  when  General  Sheridan's  army  was 
surprised  and  defeated  by  General  Early.  The  commander 
was  asleep  in  bed  at  Winchester,  twenty  miles  away.  He 
would  have  been  called  to  account  for  thus  absenting  him- 
self from  the  front  at  a  time  of  great  peril  to  his  forces  from 
the  immediate  presence  of  the  enemy,  and  had  to  answer  to 
a  court  of  inquiry  or  a  court-martial,  but  for  a  crazy  poet 
and  a  patriotic  actor.  The  very  dereliction  of  duty  was 
made  the  basis  of  a  rhymed  eulogy,  and  instead  of  being 
tried  for  willful  absence,  he  was  glorified  by  the  mob  and 
promoted  by  the  administration.  The  returning  general  is 
pictured  as  galloping  back  to  the  roar  and  rumble  of  a  ter- 
rific fight  and  meeting  his  entire  army  in  full  flight.  Ac- 
cording to  the  wild  fancy  of  the  rhymester,  he  alone  rallies 
the  panic-stricken  thirty  thousand  and  turns  them  back  to 
victory.  The  prosaic  fact  is,  that  General  Wright  had  re- 
formed the  broken  lines  and  was  actually  moving  into  battle 
when  Sheridan  returned.  The  fight  was  made  and  won 
without  half  of  the  army  knowing  that  General  Sheridan 
was  present. 

We  are  not  asserting  that  General  Sheridan  might  not 
have  exculpated  himself  had  a  court  been  called,  but  we  do 
claim  that  it  was  a  case  where  a  court  should  have  been 
called  instead  of  a  crazy  poet  and  a  patriotic  dramatist.  The 


!•:  Preface. 

story  told  that  Sheridan  was  on  his  return  from  Washington, 
where  he  had  been  summoned  by  Secretary  Stanton,  needs 
confirmation.  Secretary  Stanton  was  not  given  to  calling 
commanders  from  the  front,  and  one  naturally  demands  the 
record  at  the  department  of  so  important  an  emergency. 

If  so  absurd  a  story  as  this  can  pass  into  history,  what 
are  we  to  expect  from  the  bulk  of  matter  accepted  by  the 
masses  as  facts.  Fictitious  heroes  have  been  embalmed  in 
lies,  and  monuments  are  being  reared  to  the  memories  of 
men,  whose  real  histories,  when  they  come  to  be  known,  will 
make  this  bronze  and  marble  the  monuments  of  our  ignor- 
ance and  folly. 

There  is  yet  another  reason  for  the  popular  distortion  of 
public  events,  that  is  found  in  the  fact  that  our  disturbance 
was  political,  and  the  politics  did  not  die  with  the  war  of 
arms.  The  fame  of  certain  generals  came  to  be  a  political 
quantity  to  be  claimed  and  built  upon  as  much  as  the  soldier's 
vote  left  over  from  the  conflict.  Any  attempt,  then,  to  in- 
vestigate the  career  of  a  political  general,  and  question  his 
right  to  the  eminence  awarded  him  is  furiously  resented  by 
his  partisans.  Fortunately  for  us,  these  partisans  make  but 
a  small  part  of  the  population  of  the  civilized  world.  The 
truthful  recorders  lie  mainly  outside  our  borders,  and  while 
we  have  the  truly  great  under  epaulets  in  the  persons 
of  Thomas,  Eosecrans,  Buell,  McPherson,  Pope,  Logan, 
Schenck,  McClelland,  and  Wallace,  we  should  hasten  to  re- 
adjust the  record  and  make  our  history.  There  is  danger 
that  pilgrims  to  the  shrines  of  famous  heroism  may  pass 
monuments  now  being  erected  at  the  north  to  place  their  im- 
mortelles on  the  shrine  of  one,  whose  purity  of  character, 
heroism  of  resolve,  and  great  devotion  to  a  cause  that  was  a 
lost  cause  at  its  beginning,  makes  such  a  powerful  appeal  to 
the  world's  sympathy.  It  is  well  for  us  that  we  have  one 


Preface.  17 

man  whose  higher  qualities  must,  when  better  known,  win 
to  us  the  admiration  of  the  world.  No  marble  gleams,  no 
bronze  defies  decay  above  his  narrow  grave,  but  he  was  great 
in  deeds,  and  grand  in  character.  Thanks  to  him,  we  not 
only  won  the  fight,  but  we  won  the  glory  of  that  terrible 
conflict. 

Another  source  of  error  in  our  records  comes  from  the 
press  facilities,  that  edited  events  on  the  wing  in  the  con- 
fusion of  great  fights.  These  editings  are  now  strangely  re- 
garded as  history.  We  had  some  new  features  in  our  war 
unknown  to  those  of  other  lands  in  the  past.  We  had  rail- 
roads, telegraphs,  iron-clads,  and  the  press.  This  last  was 
the  most  novel,  and  in  some  respects,  embarrassing.  True, 
the  London  Times,  during  the  Crimean  war,  gave  an  instance 
of  press  interference,  when  that  journal  took  the  manage- 
ment of  the  conflict  from  an  imbecile  department,  and  carried 
it  out  to  a  triumphant  close.  This,  however,  was  an  excep- 
tion. The  European  press  contents  itself  with  a  report  of 
events  sanctioned  by  the  military.  But  with  us,  all  move- 
ments in  the  field  had  to  receive  the  sanction  of  the  press. 
Campaigns  were  freely  discussed  when  planned,  and  ap- 
proved or  condemned  as  the  editorial  mind  saw  the  proposed 
advantages  or  defects.  Every  head-quarters  from  those  of 
a  colonel  to  a  major-general's  had  its  press  reporter  who  slept 
and  ate  with  the  officer  in  command,  and  never  left  his  side 
until  it  was  necessary  to  go  to  the  front  to  get  the  facts.  It  was 
a  startling  innovation,  and  fiercely  resented  by  West  Point. 
The  editorial  fraternity  was  sneered  at,  but  these  stern  dis- 
ciplinarians accepted  services  so  necessary  to  their  personal 
popularity  with  the  people.  Like  the  ancient  Pistol,  they  ate 
their  leek,  but  grumbled  as  they  ate.  There  was  good  in  this 
innovation,  for  it  not  only  infused  a  needed  quantity  of  in- 
telligence in  the  conduct  of  the  war,  but  it  went  far  toward 


18  Preface. 

making  it  acceptable  to  the  people.  The  brain  of  our 
country  is  in  its  press,  and  on  this  occasion  that  brain  was 
animated  by  the  highest  and  purest  patriotism.  We  fought 
the  war  out  by  volunteers,  and  how  much  we  owe  to  the  press 
and  the  pulpit  for  the  enthusiasm  that  grew  stronger  over 
disasters  than  victories  can  never  be  fairly  estimated.  For 
over  two  years  we  had  little  but  shameful  defeats  and 
fearful  slaughter,  and  yet  the  heavy  reinforcements  kept  step 
to  the  music  of  the  Union,  that  had  for  its  refrain,  "  We  are 
coming,  Father  Abram,  a  hundred  thousand  more." 

These  were  the  advantages  of  a  powerful  and  patriotic 
press.  But  it  had  its  defects,  and  the  more  prominent  is  in 
the  so-called  history  that  it  has  made.  There  is  nothing 
more  fatal  to  a  correct  perspective  than  an  electric  light.  Of 
this  sort  was  the  light  thrown  on  events  by  the  press.  What 
it  shone  on  was  exaggerated ;  what  it  failed  to  exhibit  was 
entirely  lost  in  the  gloom  of  night.  The  very  effort  to  sus- 
tain the  government  in  its  military  management  distorted 
events.  Incapable  men  in  command  were  made  great  cap- 
tains of  until  some  terrible  calamity  made  indorsement  im- 
possible, when  the  pens  that  had  so  liberally  praised  as 
fiercely  consigned  their  hero  to  oblivion. 

The  best  illustration  of  this  uncertainty  of  report  and 
record  is  to  be  found  in  this  volume.  The  war  offered  upon 
the  Potomac  was  accepted  by  our  side,  and  from  the  begin- 
ning to  the  end,  attention  was  devoted  to  that  arena,  and  it 
escaped  public  knowledge  that  the  campaign  which  carried 
the  fortunes  of  an  empire  to  a  triumphant  close  was  at  the 
west.  So  little  was  known  of  the  march  of  the  Army  of  the 
Cumberland  from  Nashville  to  Chattanooga,  that  when  Gen- 
eral H.  V.  Boynton  published  his  admirable  series  of  articles 
devoted  to  its  history,  it  read  to  the  public  like  a  history  of 
a  war  never  heard  of  before. 


Preface.  19 

There  is  much  in  this  volume  that  students  of  newspaper 
history  will  protest  against.  That  we  have  not  confined 
ourselves  to  the  personal  achievements  of  George  II.  Thomas, 
but  given  briefly  a  statement  of  military  movements  else- 
where, will  be  a  subject  of  complaint,  but  we  submit  that 
without  this  view  of  the  entire  field  of  military  operations, 
the  reader  can  not  clearly  comprehend  or  appreciate  what 
was  accomplished  by  our  general.  Indeed,  the  story  of  his 
life  during  the  four  eventful  years  in  the  field  is  a  history  of 
the  war.  It  is  impossible  to  separate  what  he  proposed  do- 
ing and  what  he  did  from  contemporary  events  that  made  or 
marred  his  work.  There  is,  for  example,  no  event  that  so 
clearly  illustrates  his  masterly  knowledge  of  the  situation  as 
the  plan  of  a  campaign  he  submitted  in  the  beginning  of  the 
war,  that  was  adopted  in  the  end,  and  in  its  adoption  made 
that  end  not  only  possible,  but  a  fact  accomplished.  We 
refer,  of  course,  to  that  plan  submitted  to  the  government 
of  moving  a  column  of  twenty  thousand  men  through  Cum- 
berland Gap  to  East  Tennessee  and  Chattanooga.  This  was 
offered  the  War  Department  when  he  was  ordered  to  report 
to  General  Robert  Anderson  at  Bowling  Green,  Ky.  We 
can  not  comprehend  the  value  of  this  without  taking  in 
view  the  entire  field. 

In  every  war  there  is  what  military  men  call  an  objective 
point,  which,  if  secured,  will  go  far  toward  ending  the  armed 
conflict.  With  the  Confederates  this  was  Washington,  for 
the  capture  of  that  capital  meant  the  armed  intervention  of 
European  war  powers.  In  less  than  thirty  days  after  the 
fall  of  Washington,  the  combined  fleets  of  England,  France, 
and  Russia  would  have  been  upon  our  coast,  and  the  repub- 
lic of  the  fathers,  a  dream  of  the  past.  Our  objective  point, 
on  the  contrary,  was  the  capture  of  Chattanooga.  As  the 
Confederate  government  had  gathered,  with  a  heavy  cost  it 


20  Prefniv. 

could  illy  bear,  its  one  geat  array  about  Richmond,  the  losa 
of  Chattanooga  would  have  rendered  their  proposed  field  of 
operation  untenable,  and  turned  them  from  a  defensive  posi- 
tion when  attacked  to  an  attacking  force  to  drive  us  from 
where  our  presence  menaced  their  interior  where  they 
lived.  This  was  as  important  in  the  commencement  of  the 
\vur  as  it  was  when  Lee  hurried  Longstreet  with  the  flower 
of  his  army  to  aid  Bragg  that  they  might  retake  the  great 
gate-way  to  the  South  at  all  hazards. 

Throughout  the  war,  with  one  exception,  our  military 
men  on  both  sides  seemed  to  be  groping  in  the  dark.  They 
marched  without  a  purpose  and  fought  battles  without  other 
result  than  slaughter  to  their  troops.  The  continuous  vic- 
tories of  Lee's  army  are  not  pleasant  to  remember,  and  it  is 
only  a  grim  satisfaction  given  us  to  know  that  we  owe  our 
triumph  at  least  to  his  lack  of  ability.  He  never  could 
realize  on  his  successes  in  the  field  that  were  after  all  defeats 
in  the  end.  The  newly  formed  government  could  riot  bear 
the  awful  drain  of  men  and. means.  He  brought  about  the 
condition  that  enabled  the  iron-willed  Stanton  to  say:  "We 
no  generals  to  maneuver,  but  we  have  men  to  fight,  and 
1  will  crowd  them  in  until  this  treason  is  stamped  out.  We 
<-an  give  three  men  to  their  one  and  win." 

From  this  view  of  the  dark  side  of  our  conflict  we  can 
turn  for  consolation  to  a  memory  of  an  heroic  people  that 
never  hesitated  for  a  moment  in  a  high  resolve  to  restore  the 
Tnion.  We  can  take  pride  in  the  able  statesmen  at  Wash- 
ington, found  in  Lincoln  and  his  cabinet,  who,  through  the 
darkest  hours,  when  shattered  armies  were  drifting  back 
through  the  capital,  and  they  expected  to  hear  the  artillery 
of  Lee  that  would  have  been  minute  guns  over  the*  grave  of 
tho  republic,  yet  never  lost  heart,  and  held  the  people  and 
armies  and  foreign  powers  to  the  line  of  duty  till  the  cause 


Preface.  21 

was  won.  Arid  above  all  we  can  unite  in  doing  justice  to 
the  memory  of  the  one  hero,  who,  neglected  by  the  govern- 
ment, led  into  peril  by  the  blunders  of  his  superior  officers, 
had  yet  the  power  to  render  great  service  to  the  republic  and 
UMNO  us  victories  unmarred  by  wanton  slaughter,  untainted 
by  selfish  ambition. 

Our  work  herein  is  not  in  justification  of  history.  That 
will  in  time  care  for  itself.  Nor  is  it  for  George  H.  Thomas. 
He  is  gone  from  our  midst. 

"After  life's  fitful  fever,  he  sleeps  well ; 
Treason  has  done  his  worst ;  nor  steel,  nor  poison, 
Malice  domestic,  foreign  levy,  nothing 
Can  touch  him  further." 

We  seek  to. hang  immortelles  upon  his  tomb,  not  for 
him,  but  for  ourselves.  His  great  life  is  a  lesson  and  an  ex- 
ample to  the  living — an  example  and  a  lesson  to  the  noble 
youth  of  our  land  for  all  time  to  come.  From  the  career  of 
the  great  soldier,  they  can  learn  the  true  worth  of  a  high- 
toned  integrity  and  a  keen  sense  of  honor  that  never  faltered 
and  never  for  a  moment  forsook  him.  We  know  how  his 
sensitive  nature  suffered  from  the  slights  unjustly  put  upon 
him  and  met  no  retort  save  that  of  a  dignified  remonstrance. 
We  know  how  he  longed  for  command,  feeling  within  him- 
self the  power  to  rectify  blunders,  bring  order  out  of  con- 
fusion, and  lead  our  brave  men  to  victory  without  great  loss ; 
and  yet  when  that  command  was  to  be  reached  over  the  un- 
merited disgrace  of  a  comrade,  he  resolutely  declined.  He 
loved  his  country  much,  but  his  honor  more.  And  yet  we 
see  how  his  very  virtues  are  used  to  deface  his  memory.  It 
is  for  the  true  chroniclers  of  those  troublous  times  to  pass 
the  dear  memory  of  the  dead  hero  from  the  hearts  of  his 
soldiers,  where  it  has  so  long  been  treasured,  to  the  hearts 
of  all  the  people,  that  he  may  live  forever  as  he  was. 


THE  WAR. 

I NTHODUCTION. 

Histories  are  the  annals  of  war.  The  dramatic  effects 
found  in  campaigns  and  startling  results  of  great  battles 
alone  go  to  record.  The  historian  caters  to  the  taste  of  hia 
patrons ;  and  as  the  subtle  origin  of  armed  conflicts  found  in 
antagonistic  elements  of  popular  impulse  are  obscure  and 
make  dull  reading,  they  are  neglected  or  ignored.  The 
active  movements  of  armed  bodies,  the  quick  decisions  and 
dash  of  gold-braided  and  full-feathered  commanders,  attract 
the  attention  of  the  many  and  charm  the  few.  The  artist  pict- 
ures only  the  breakers  coming  along  the  shore — the  thought 
of  the  league-long  roller  that  comes  in  from  a  storm  a  thou- 
sand miles  out  at  sea,  or  the  unseen  gathering  of  sands 
built  up  from  depths  below  the  ocean,  make  no  part  of  his 
picture.  The  oak  felled  by  the  woodsman  loses  in  the  thun- 
dering crash  of  its  fall  all  thought  of  the  slow  growth 
through  centuries  on  the  one  side,  or  the  slower  growth  of 
civilization  on  the  other  that  brought  the  ax  to  its  trunk. 

The  historians  of  to-day  are  only  the  troubadores  of  the 
past,  who  sang  great  deeds  of  arms  to  please  the  ears  of  their 
patrons.  "We  have  whole  libraries  devoted  to  campaigns  and 
battles  that  made  but  a  third  part  of  the  conflict  between 
the  North  and  the  South.  The  statesmen  at  Washington 

o 

who  held  the  people  through  frightful  disasters  to  the  bloody 
issue,  who  warded  off  foreign  intervention,  and  so  managed 
our  finances  as  to  arm,  clothe,  and  feed  a  million  of  men  in  the 
field,  are  all  forgotten  in  favor  of  the  full-breasted  captains 

(22) 


Introduction.  - 

whose  defeats  make  us  shudder  as  well  as  ashamed.  Nor  is 
one  thought  given  to  the  cause  of  this  apparently  unnatural 
and  senseless  fight.  The  ready  chroniclers  either  ignore  the 
subject  or  seize  on  the  nearest  and  most  popular,  as  a  chorus 
to  their  drama  of  blood.  This  cause,  accepted  at  home  and 
recognized  abroad,  is  slavery. 

Abraham  Lincoln  never  uttered  more  wisdom  in  fewer 
words  than  when  he  said  at  Springfield,  in  1861,  that  no 
community  ever  arose  in  wrath  to  grasp  at  each  other's 
throats  on  an  abstract  political  proposition — all  violence 
originates  in  an  antagonism  of  feeling  and  not  in  an  intel- 
lectual difference.  Few  are  aware  of  the  fact — and  their 
number  proves  the  assertion — that  thought  has  little  to  do 
in  shaping  human  events.  The  dim-eyed  delvers  in  libraries 
who  get  faint  glimpses  of  humanity  through  dust-covered, 
cobwebbed  windows,  labor  under  the  strange  delusion  that 
the  leaders  of  men  are  the  kings  of  thought,  and  that 
knowledge  heads  the-  civilization  of  earth.  With  a  self-com- 
placency that  amuses,  we  are  solemnly  warned  against  errors 
of  judgment,  and  given  in  books  histories  of  errors  that 
come  from  false  teachings.  We  are  told,  for  example,  that 
the  great  French  revolution  has  its  origin  in  the  works  of 
Rousseau,  Voltaire,  and  other  intellectual  iconoclasts  of  the 
libraries.  When  one  remembers  the  great  mass  of  ignorance 
that  arose  in  its  wrath  and  smote  down  in  blood  the  social 
and  political  fabric  about  it,  one  is  struck  with  the  absurdity 
of  the  proposition.  The  true  student  turns  from  the  imme- 
diate violence,  to  trace  back  through  a  thousand  years  of  ill- 
usage  and  abuse  awarded  labor,  as  if  the  laborers  were 
beasts,  until  it  culminated  in  blind  violence  that  was  as 
senseless  as  the  tyranny  had  been  cruel.  Thus,  when  Paris 
was  swept  in  a  night  and  day  by  the  mob  on  barricades  and 
with  wild  cries,  it  means  not  that  Paris  has  been  led  astray 


24  The  War. 

by  communistic  doctrines,  but  that  Paris  is  starving.  The 
hungry  masses,  like  the  blind  Samson,  seize  on  the  pillars 
rinm-st  them,  and  hurl  into  common  ruin  not  only  the  po- 
litical but  the  social  structure. 

Our  blessed  Savior,  in  his  mission  of  mercy,  made  no 
appeal  to  the  intellectual  processes.  He  could  easily  have 
demonstrated  his  divine  mission  to  the  few,  by  unfolding  to 
scientific  eyes  the  subtle  mysteries  of  nature ;  but,  putting 
science  behind  him  as  a  vain  Satan  of  temptation,  he  ap- 
pealed to  the  feelings  of  the  masses  and  won  their  love 
through  miracles  of  mercy,  wherein  the  sick  were  cured,  the 
cripples  made  perfect,  and  the  sorrowing  consoled. 

He  sought  no  schools  for  philosophers,  but  selected  his 
apostles  from  among  the  ignorant  tent-makers  and  fishermen 
of  Judea.  The  anxious  student  searches  in  vain  through 
the  annals  of  the  period  for  a  trace  of  the  Messiah.  Art, 
science,  and  literature  are  alike  silent.  And  yet  the  divine 
power  spread  and  gathered  strength  until  culture  came  in  to 
put  to  record  what  it  had  no  hand  in  creating. 

The  currents,  drifts,  pools,  and  eddies  of  human  events 
have  their  laws,  as  all  other  movements  of  creation  have. 
There  is  no  chance,  and  these  efforts  of  our  intellects,  upon 
which  we  so  pride  ourselves,  are  but  the  white-caps  of 
troubled  waves  swelling  to  a  break  from  causes  far  above 
and  beneath  them. 

We  seize  on  some  one  event,  some  one  man,  to  date  our 
worry  from,  as  two-thirds  of  the  good  people  hold  Jeff. 
Davis  responsible  for  the  late  civil  war.  They  can  not  com- 
prehend that  this  Jeff.  Davis  was  bom  some  three  centuries 
since,  in  the  troublesome  times  of  England,  and  was  as  much 
beyond  his  own  or  our  control  as  any  other  wave  that  indi- 
cates a  current. 

To  one  who  doubts  what  is   here  asserted,  because   new 


Introduction.  25 

to  6ucb  doubters,  let  him  consider  that  of  this  sixty  millions 
of  people  filling  our  continent  from  sea  to  sea,  there  are  only 
about  three  millions  who  read  books.  Indeed,  it  may  be 
doubted  whether  there  are  live  millions  of  the  sixty  who  read 
at  all.  Newspapers  so  widely  spread  are,  as  their  name  in- 
dicates, but  vehicles  for  news,  and  tell  in  the  briefest  phrase 
what  has  happened  and  give  us  the  facts  without  the  slight- 
est attempt  at  the  reasons  for  them.  They  make  the  mirror  of 
passing  events.  As  mediums  of  advertising  for  the  business 
classes  upon  which  they  prosper,  they  are  careful  to  please, 
and  thoughtful  speculations  as  to  the  busy  world  are  not 
pleasant. 

It  is  the  pet  craze  of  the  day  to  believe  in  evolution,  and 
this  teaches  that  humanity  is  slowly  evolving  within  itself  a 
higher  plane  of  thought  and  feeling.  This  may  be  true,  but 
it  is  a  mere  speculation  based  on  a  very  slender  thread  of 
fact.  Our  life  on  earth  has  been  very  brief  and  is  without 
a  record,  and  brief  as  it  is,  we  are  forced  to  remember  that 
from  the  death  of  Christ  to  the  invention  of  printing,  this 
great  vehicle  of  thought  and  knowledge,  nearly  all  there  is 
of  Christian  civilization  made  its  spread  and  gained  its  hold 
on  humanity.  How  much  art  and  its  product  of  huge 
libraries  are  doing  for  Christianity,  let  Darwin,  Spencer,  and 
Huxley  answer.  In  their  answer  we  would  learn  that  this 
much  vaunted  engine  of  knowledge  serves  rather  to  arrest 
then  to  advance  the  cause  of  Christ. 

What,  then,  is  humanity  moved  by  ?  It  is  moved  by  its 
stomach  mainly  and  much  by  its  instincts,  but  of  these  come 
the  feelings.  By  these  the  masses,  as  such,  are  influenced. 
Thought,  the  high  product  of  knowledge,  is  the  smallest 
motive  power  of  all.  The  church,  built  on  the  wants  and 
weaknesses  of  the  human  race,  has,  through  centuries,  made 
its  appeal  to  the  Christian  feelings.  The  candles,  lit  by 


26  The  War. 

human  hands  about  the  altars,  have  illumined  our  temples  of 
worship,  and  no  cold  star-eyed  goddess  of  science;  and  poor 
humanity  finds  relief,  not  in  being  lifted  into  dreary  regions 
of  thought,  but  in  grasping  at  the  divine  sympathy  of  Him, 
who,  taking  on  the  semblance  of  man,  shared  his  sufferings 
ami  sought  through  these  to  bring  heaven  to  earth. 

It  has  gone  to  record  in  libraries  and  newspapers  at 
home  and  abroad,  that  the  system  of  slavery  was  the  im- 
ini-liate  cause  of  our  civil  conflict.  To  appreciate  the  ab- 
surdity of  this,  one  has  only  to  remember  that  slavery  was 
not  confined  to  the  South.  The  entire  people  of  the  United 
States  held  the  negro  in  the  bondage  of  legal  enactment  to 
his  unrequited  toil.  The  horrible  system  was  more  popular 
at  the  North  than  in  the  South.  The  North  realized  enor- 
mously in  moneyed  gain  on  the  labor  of  the  slaves.  Cotton 
was  king,  but  the  master  only  made  what  the  merchant  ac- 
cumulated, and  to  attack  the  iniquitous  system  was  to  dis- 
turb the  business  of  the  country. 

Few  obstacles  are  so  fatal  to  reform  of  evils  as  this  busi- 
ness relation.  Our  Blessed  Savior  was  crucified,  not  because 
of  his  heavenly  teachings,  but  for  that  he  disturbed  the  busi- 
ness relations  of  Judea.  He  drove  the  money-changers  from 
the  temple  and  denounced  the  greed  of  gain  through  which 
one  man  accumulated  the  luxuries  of  life  while  thousands 
starved.  Through  all  time  the  money-changers  have  held 
the  temple  and  cried  out  lustily  against  the  fanatics  who 
sought  to  disturb  the  business  relations.  How  property  en- 
ters into  all  our  affairs  of  life,  the  woful  history  of  poor  hu- 
manity tells  us.  Our  principal  business  on  earth  is  to  gain 
u  livelihood  from, its  surface.  The  struggle  for  life  is  an  in- 
stinct, the  lust  of  gain  its  abuse.  A  clever  author  has  called 
our  attention  to  the  fact  that  so  long  as  sacred  shrines  re- 
main such,  the  roads  hither  are  marked  with  human  bones. 


Introduction.  27 

When  such  shrines  become  marts  of  trade,  the  highways  are 
made  safe  and  the  bones  disappear.  Property  is  dearer  to  us 
than  life  itself.  The  iniquity  of  Mormonism  never  struck 
our  religious  sense  so  forcibly  as  when  the  polygamous  fol- 
lowers of  Brigham  Young  became  possessed  of  rich  mines 
and  vast  stretches  of  valuable  lands.  We  murder  the  In- 
dians we  have  degraded  in  the  name  of  Christian  progress, 
and  persecute  the  Mormons  in  the  name  of  God. 

The  delvers  in  the  deep,  rich  soil  of  the  West  found  a 
ready  market  for  their  products  at  the  South,  which  slave 
labor  returned  in  cotton  that,  sold  in  Europe,  returned  to  all 
great  wealth.  To  disturb  this  business  relation  by  cries  of 
"  shame  "  was  simply  abominable,  and  had  its  origin  in  the 
disordered  brain  of  fanatics.  The  press  praised  what  the 
pulpit  blessed. 

Abolitionists,  hung  if  caught  at  the  South,  \v< -re 
mobbed  out  of  Faneuil  Hall,  at  Boston,  and  the  same 
audience  of  respectable  business  men  that  applauded  Yancey 
at  Cincinnati,  hissed,  hooted,  and  rotten-egged  the  eloquent 
Wendell  Phillips  into  silence  a  few  nights  after,  and  that 
only  a  short  time  before  the  firing  on  Sumter. 

The  moral  sense  of  a  community  that  could  fight  the 
extension  of  slavery  to  the  territories  and  speak  with  bated 
breath  and  uncovered  heads  in  presence  of  the  guarantees 
of  the  constitution  that  held  the  sum  total  of  all  villanies 
sacred  in  the  states — nay,  made  such  community  slave 
hunters  over  their  free  territory  for  the  masters  when  the 
poor  wretches  escaped — is  so  thin  that  it  provokes  contempt. 
Let  the  blistering  shame  go  to  record,  that  we  may  be  pun- 
ished for  our  sins  in  recognition  of  the  fact  that  to  call  a 
man  an  Abolitionist  was  to  condemn  him  in  popular  esti- 
mation to  the.  level  of  thief  and  murderer  combined. 

The  truth  is,  slavery  was  more  popular  at  the  North 


28  The  War. 

than  in  the  South.  This  not  only  on  account  of  the  success- 
ful husim-ss  relation  above  referred  to,  that  had  in  the 
Northern  man  a  stronger  instinct  and  a  wider  development, 
but  IH-< -aiiM-  tin-  North  had  all  the  benefits  without  any  of 
the  evils  that  afflicted  the  Southern  planter. 

Wrong  can  not  be  made  right,  though  sanctified  by  cus- 
tom and  sanctioned  by  constitutional  enactment.  The 
justice  of  God  makes  the  criminal  code  the  same  throughout 
the  earth.  The  wrongdoer  makes  his  fight  against  the  law 
of  our  being  and  feels  instinctively  that  retribution  follows 
on  the  track  of  crime  with  unerring  certainty  of  light  after 
darkness.  Fraud  breeds  violence  as  surely  as  poisoned  at- 
mosphere from  swamps  sucked  up  breeds  the  storm.  The 
master  at  the  South  felt  instinctively  that  he  was  allied  with 
hell  in  the  fear  of  that  most  horrible  of  all  violence,  known 
as  servile  insurrection.  At  the  hearthstone  in  the  night  sat 
grim  danger  that  could  not  be  shut  out,  for  in  the  household 
itself  lurked  the  treacherous  animosity  of  the  oppressed. 
The  master  ate  his  meals  in  fear  of  poison  and  got  sleep 
from  the  soothing  presence  of  his  revolver  under  his  pillow. 
This  may  be  denied,  but  we  remember  the  frightful  atrocities 
of  the  Nat  Turner  insurrection  and  the  fear  that  paralyzed 
all  Virginia  when  Ossawatomie  Brown  with  only  thirty 
men  held  Harper's  Ferry.  And  yet,  as  the  subsequent  war 
demonstrated,  no  people  ever  gave  proofs  of  a  higher  courage 
than  those  same  Virginians. 

Again,  if  the  system  of  slavery  was  the  immediate  cause 
of  the  civil  war,  how  did  it  happen  that  the  border  slave 
states  were  so  indifferent  to  the  cause  that  they  only  sympa- 
thized with — a  cause  they  would  not  fight  for?  They  were 
the  immediate  sufferers  from  abolition  aggressions.  It  was 
from  these  border  states  that  slaves  escaped,  and  in  them 
were  the  facilities  of  the  underground  railway  that  stretched 


Introductio  n.  29 

from  slave  territory  to  Canada.  The  remote  cotton  states, 
and  rice  and  sugar  plantations,  where  slavery  was  secure, 
took  the  lead  in  an  appeal  to  arms,  and  fought  the  fight  out 
to  the  bitter  end. 

In  addition  to  all  this,  the  fact  is  of  record  that  when 
the  war  did  come,  the  government  forces  marched  into  the 
South,  not  to  free  the  negro,  but  to  restore  the  Union.  For 
nearly  two  years  the  soldiers  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
were  engaged  in  restoring  to  the  masters  the  wretched  slaves 
that  took  refuge  in  our  camps.  We  burned  dwellings,  we 
robbed  farms  and  towns,  we  laid  waste  wide  fields ;  and  yet, 
obsequiously  returned  the  slaves,  when  we  would  not  give 
back  a  horse,  or  even  a  chicken.  "As  between  the  alligator 
and  the  negro,"  cried  Stephen  A.  Douglas,  while  the  storm 
was  brewing,  "I  am  for  the  negro," — "  as  between  the  negro 
and  the  white  man,  I  am  for  the  white  man."  Abraham 
Lincoln,  the  wisest  of  all,  summed  up  the  situation  in  one 
sentence,  which  he  wrote  to  Horace  Greeley,  that  if  to  save 
the  Union  slavery  had  to  be  maintained,  slavery  would  be 
maintained  ;  if  to  save  the  Union  slavery  must  be  destroyed, 
slavery  would  be  destroyed.  And  when  at  last  the  emanci- 
pation proclamation  was  promulgated,  it  freed  slaves  where 
the  government  could  not  reach  them,  and  held  the  negro  to 
his  unrequited  toil  where  the  government  had  power  to  set 
him  free. 

We  were  Union  savers,  not  abolitionists.  The  South 
plunged  into  an  armed  conflict  to  win  its  independence  from 
a  hated  Union,  and  the  North  accepted  the  issue,  although 
Chase,  Seward,  Greeley,  and  nearly  all  the  abolitionists  cried 
aloud,  "Let  the  erring  sisters  depart  in  peace."  In  the 
lierce  contention  of  arms  that  followed,  slavery  went  to 
pieces.  It  is  pitiful  now,  in  face  of  these  facts,  for  us  to 
claim  a  lofty  philanthropic  intent,  and  "  Praise  God  from 


The  War. 

whom  all  blessings  flow,"  that  we  had  the  manhood  to  knock 
the  shackles  from  four  millions  of  slaves. 

To  get  at  the  real  origin  of  our  civil  war,  we  have  to  go 
back  some  distance  in  the  history  of  our  country.  The 
cause,  although  remote,  is  not  obscure. 

It  was  brought  to  our  shores  mainly  in  the  cabin  of  the 
Muvflower,  and  all  that  was  left  for  transportation  came  in 
crafts  that  carried  adventurers  to  Virginia.  The  fierce  civil 
wars  of  England,  between  the  Cavaliers  and  Roundheads, 
in  which  the  dissolute  Swashbucklers  of  Charles  I  were 
driven  into  holes  by  Cromwell's  Puritanical  Ironsides,  were 
bequeathed  to  us  when  the  pirates  sought  for  plunder  in  Vir- 
ginia, and  the  Puritans  found  refuge  on  the  coasts  of  New 
England.  We,  their  descendants,  have  transformed  the  one 
into  holy  pilgrims  seeking  freedom  of  worship,  and  the 
other  to  blue-blooded  aristocrats  in  search  of  adventure. 
The  truth  is  that  our  Puritans  were  bigots  in  rebellion  to  a 
prescribed  form  of  religion,  who  immediately  made  their 
form  law,  and  hanged  and  burned  all  who  dared  follow  their 
example  in  resisting  the  law.  Many  of  the  boasted  Cava- 
liers were  criminals  escaping  conviction,  and  convicts  es- 
caping punishment.  This,  however,  does  not  militate  against 
the  claim  of  blue  blood  in  the  fugitives. 

It  is  not  necessary  to  dwell  on  these  unpleasant  facts  of 
history.  We  refer  to  them  merely  to  show  the  origin  of  the 
two  peoples,  differing  in  the  first  instance  so  materially,  and 
growing  more  widely  apart  as  time  went  on. 

In  this  same  history,  we  learn  that  state  rights  originated 
in  chartered  privileges  that  enabled  the  Puritans  to  hang 
and  quarter  their  theological  opponents,  and  gave  monopolies 
to  the  middle  and  southern  communities  that  were  as 
precious  to  them  as  persecutions  were  to  New  England. 
From  abstract  political  propositions  they  came,  in  time,  to  be 


Introduction.  31 

superstitions,  underlying  the  social  and  political  structure. 
How  these  rights  weakened  as  they  widened  among  homo- 
geneous communities  and  held  their  own  against  aliens,  how 
after  the  revolution,  and  in  the  seventy-five  years  of  a  com- 
mon government,  the  communities  making  the  eastern,  mid- 
dle, and  western  states,  came  to  be  one,  while  the  south 
grew  into  another,  the  annals  of  the  country  tell  us. 

The  intolerant  bigotry  of  New  England  that  sought  to 
drive  certain  theological  dogmas  down  the  throats  of  other 
than  their  believers,  was  strengthened  by  -the  hardships  that 
made  life  itself  so  barren  and  insecure,  that  it  was  well  to 
keep  heaven  in  view  as  a  refuge.  Reading  the  Bible  of  the 
Hebrews  for  lessons  as  to  how  they  might,  through  fraud  and 
cunning,  get  the  advantage,  and  then  the  extermination  of 
their  first  enemies,  the  Indians,  they  in  the  service  of  a  just 
God  as  readily  exterminated  their  religious  foes.  Their 
force  of  character  was  strengthened  by  the  hardships  they 
endured. 

It  was  the  building  of  a  strong  race  from  the  ground  up, 
and  the  belief  that  they  were  not  only  God's  chosen,  but  the 
select  instruments  of  his  vengeance,  added  to  the  sturdy  self- 
reliance  of  a, race  in  a  region  where  only  the  stronger  born 
survived  to  manhood.  It  is  little  to  be  wondered  at  that 
such  a  people  impressed  itself  upoii  a  civilization  that,  run- 
ning along  Mason  and  Dixon's  line,  filled  the  wide  borders 
of  a  vast  domain  with  all  that  makes  the  material  life  of  to- 
day a  marvel  to  the  more  thoughtful. 

Gradually  nature  reasserted  herself,  and  the  warped  and 
twisted  form  of  intolerant  bigotry  of  the  Puritans  disap- 
peared, leaving  the  better  strains  of  manhood  in  full  force. 
Slowly  but  surely  poor  distorted  humanity  returned  to  that 
health  which  regards  in  its  true  light  the  fatherhood  of  God 
and  the  brotherhood  of  man,  and  is  the  true  foundation  of 


The.   War. 

religiou.  The  perils  and  hardships  of  early  settlements  in  a 
m?\v  country  developed  a  kindly  dependent  feeling  among 
the  settlers.  Such  was  the  history  of  emigration  to  the  wild 
West.  The  pioneers,  in  groups,  exhibited  a  helpful  disposi- 
tion that  found  exercise  in  the  building  of  each  others'  log 
cabins,  clearing  away  the  forest,  and  hewing  the  logs,  fight- 
ing Indians  and  oiitlaws,  while  administering  to  the  sick 
HIM!  burying  the  dead. 

At  a  later  day  the  immense  stream  of  emigration  from 
Europe  helped  on  the  great  work.  Within  the  memory  of 
the  living  man,  the  vast  continent  given  over  to  savage  na- 
tives was  swiftly  reclaimed.  The  tramp  of  millions  was 
heard  scaling  mountains,  felling  forests,  spreading  our 
plains  until  the  song  of  the  wild  bird  and  the  cry  of  savage 
beasts  breaking  the  silence  of  wide  solitudes,  were  changed 
to  the  busy  hum  of  human  industry,  and  the  great  wilder- 
ness bloomed  into  civilized  life. 

Over  all,  through  all,  animating  and  leading,  went  the 
spirit  of  Puritanism.  It  was  a  marked  and  distinctive  civil- 
ization. Its  sturdy  independence  and  force  of  character  were 
equaled  only  by  the  ingenuity  that  molded  and  manipu- 
lated dead  matter  until  it  was  a  living,  and  seemed  a  think- 
ing agent. 

This  civilization,  as  we  have  said,  was  checked  at  the 
border  of  the  Southern  States.  It  fretted  at  without  passing 
this  barrier.  The  bold  adventurers  who  conquered  without 
peopling  the  South  were  no  silken  aristocrats.  At  no  period 
in  the  world's  history  have  such  been  known  to  emigrate  or 
lead  emigration.  The  only  title  the  early  settlers  of  that  re- 
gion had  to  such  appellation  was  in  their  loose  morals  and 
plundering  habits. 

There  was,  in  fact,  too  much  manhood  in  these  hardy 
first  settlers  for  the  blood  that  is  claimed  for  them.  Starting 


Introduction.  38 

originally  from  a  point  widely  differing  from  that  which 
originated  the  Puritans,  they  had  that  easy-going  religious 
belief  which  tolerates  a  difference  in  others;  and  while 
recognizing  God  in  a  denunciation  of  sin,  has  a  kindly  feel- 
ing for  Satan  in  their  love  of  the  sinners.  Blessed  with  a 
deep  rich  soil  and  a  pleasant  climate,  they  were  not  driven 
to  hopes  of  heaven  by  the  hardships  and  uncertainties  of  life 
on  earth. 

To  these  conditions,  in  which  a  nationality  was  molded, 
came  the  system  of  slavery  to  further  stamp  distinctive  traits 
upon  the  people.  Slavery  had  originally  held  all  the  colo- 
nies, and,  after,  all  the  states.  It  was  being  wiped  out  from 
economical  considerations  as  a  sort  of  labor  found  to  be  un- 
profitable when  the  inventions  of  the  cotton  gin  and  spinning- 
jenny  by  two  ingenious  Yankees  arrested  further  emancipa- 
tion by  making  the  worthless  negro  a  valuable  slave.  New 
England  rum  and  Virginia  tobacco  had  worked  in  common 
to  keep  alive  the  slave  trade,  and  it  was  no  conscientious 
scruple  that  left  tobacco  and  cotton  to  continue  their  dealing 
in  human  flesh.  The  system,  however,  strengthened  the 
South  in  its  peculiar  civilization,  and  made  its  people  more 
clearly  and  positively  a  distinct  and  separate  race  from  that 
of  the  North. 

Devoted  to  agriculture,  it  had  no  basis  in  that  toil  which 
goes  to  make  a  nation  of  laborers  and  is  the  true  foundation 
of  a  state.  No  country  on  earth  had  such  an  impassable 
gulf  between  capital  and  labor  aa  the  South.  Before  the 
master  and  the  slave,  the  sturdy  laborers  that  go  to  make  a 
people  disappeared.  The  poor  whites  were  regarded  as  a 
nuisance  by  the  masters  and  despised  by  the  slaves.  They 
were  spoken  of  by  the  one  as  "white  trash,"  and  by  the 
other  as  "  greasy  mechanics  "  and  "  mud-sills."  The  life  was 
3 


U4  The  War. 

more  patriarchal  than  that  of  the  Arabs  and  ae  stationary  as 
that  of  the  Turks.  Divided  into  huge  plantations,  the  mas- 
ter and  his  family  dwelt  on  each  as  old  barons  of  Europe 
were  wont  to  do,  each  the  head  of  a  home  and  a  law  unto 

himself. 

It  is  singular,  looking  back  to  days  before  the  war,  to 
note  how  little  social  intercourse  existed  between  the  North 
and  South.  The  masters  and  their  families  sought  eastern 
cities  and  fashionable  resorts  in  summer,  where  they  were 
welcomed  for  their  courtly  manners  and  lavish  expenditures 
of  money;  but  the  Northern  people  seldom  reciprocated  the 
visits,  and  intermarriages  were  still  more  rare.  There  was 
nothing  in  common  between  the  two  extremes. 

The  planters  despised  their  Northern  neighbors  for  their 
economical  habits  and  love  of  money.  The  Northerners  re- 
taliated by  laughing  at  the  wasteful  habits  and  rude  life  of 
the  South.  Culture  may  grow  out  of  oppression  in  cities 
and  densely  settled  districts,  for  the  splendor  that  makes  dis- 
tinction as  such  finds  expression  in  architecture,  sculpture, 
and  painting,  and  develops  music,  eloquence,  and  poetry. 
But  in  the  isolation  of  a  planter's  life  there  was  no  such 
competition.  The  generous  hospitality  that  distinguished 
the  slave  states  had  its  origin  in  the  easy  life  gained  from  a 
new  soil  and  unrequited  labor.  At  the  North,  where  a  living 
was  wrung  by  hard  toil,  money  gained  its  full  value  and  hos- 
pitality a  cold  form  of  duty  that  nearly  destroyed  its  fascina- 
tion. Charity  at  the  South  was  impulse,  at  the  North  a  re- 
ligious obligation.  The  first  found  expression  in  spasmodic 
gifts  from  individuals,  while  the  second  took  a  business  form 
in  combinations,  or,  if  in  individuals,  it  expressed  itself  in  a 
monumental  shape  that  did  its  good  while  perpetuating  the 
name  of  the  donor. 

This  is  not  altogether  just,  although  true  to  some  extent. 


Introductivn.  35 

Human  nature  is  iafter  all  about  the  same  in  all  extremes. 
Long  training  through  generations  gave  impulse  to  one  sec- 
tion, while  a  widely  different  process  replaced  it  by  a  sense 
of  duty  in  the  other.  At  the  South,  the  stranger  was  seized 
on  and  made  welcome  to  all  the  master  could  reasonably  part 
with.  On  the  contrary,  if  in  any  part  of  New  England  the 
wayfarer  were  seized  with  a  sickness,  or,  falling  down,  broke 
a  leg,  he  would  be  taken  in,  tenderly  nursed  into  convales- 
cence from  a  sense  of  duty,  and  yet  he  could  not  borrow  five 
dollars  or  a  horse  in  any  part  of  New  England  with  which 
to  get  away.  A  story  is  told  illustrating  this  difference. 
During  the  war,  a  family  from  New  Jersey,  living  in  North 
Carolina,  had  their  house  burned  and  farm  despoiled  by  the 
Confederates.  A  captain  of  volunteers,  coming  upon  them 
in  their  distress,  not  only  kindly  shared  his  rations  and  tents 
with  the  distressed  women  and  children,  but  furnished  means 
of  transportation  to  get  them  to  a  place  of  safety.  The 
father  sought  the  first  opportunity  to  thank  the  Good  Samar- 
itan under  epaulettes  for  his  kindness.  The  recipient  of  this 
kindness  was  not  surprised  nor  offended  to  have  a  bill  pre- 
sented him,  in  which  not  only  the  money  expended,  but  the 
time  lost,  was  duly  claimed.  Not  long  after,  this  same 
officer,  stricken  down  with  fever,  was  carried  by  his  com- 
rades to  a  wretched  log-cabin. and  given  in  charge  to  a  shoe- 
less, half-clad  woman.  When  this  ill-clad  nurse,  however, 
was  offered  money  to  repay  her  for  the  care  of  the  sick 
enemy,  she  drew  herself  up  indignantly  and  informed  the 
amazed  men  that  her  father  waa  a  gentleman. 

It  was,  however,  in  the  material  difference  between  the 
sections  that  one  found  the  two  races  most  distinctly  marked. 
With  but  a  river  or  an  imaginary  line  parting  them,  on  the 
one  side  the  observer  saw  the  fierce  competition  of  labor  that 
crowds  the  hungry  generations  down,  and  one  looked  at 


36  The.  War. 

turnpikes,  canals,  railroads,  telegraphs,  while  the  very  air 
was  tremulous  with  the  ceaseless  motion  of  machinery.  On 
the  other,  note  the  profound  quiet  of  primitive  rural  life, 
disturbed  only  by  the  mirth  from  the  idlers  about  a  country 
store,  or  the  cries  of  indolent  slaves  at  slow-moving  oxen. 
The  wide  difference,  however,  can  be  summed  up  in  a  single 
sentence:  on  one  side  a  dollar  represented  a  hard  day's  toil, 
on  the  other,  ten  mint  juleps.  To  comment  on  the  advan- 
tages or  defects  of  either  civilization,  forms  no  part  of  our 
effort  here.  We  might  dwell  upon  the  pleasant  social  life  of 
the  South  and  contrast  it  with  the  hard,  money-getting 
spirit  of  the  North.  On  the  other  hand,  we  could  call  atten- 
tion to  the  intellectual  as  well  as  the  material  progress  of  a 
people  who  gave  us  all  the  science  and  literature  of  which 
we  can  boast.  Our  one  purpose  in  tracing  to  its  origin  the 
cause  of  the  war,  is  to  show  the  union  of  states  held  in  its 
embrace  two  separate  peoples,  born  and  reared  under  two 
separate  and  antagonistic  civilizations,  and  that  a  conflict  be- 
tween the  two  was  sooner  or  later  inevitable. 

We  can  see  that,  when  the  rupture  occurred,  as  a  great 
field  of  ice  cracks  and  separates  from  a  ground  swell,  the 
shallow  causes  for  a  difference  rapidly  disappeared.  The 
South,  making  a  loud  acclaim  in  behalf  of  states'  rights,  re- 
solved itself  into  a  single  military  despotism  with  its  head- 
quarters at  Richmond. 

The  North,  holding  the  doctrine  of  state  rights  high 
treason,  fought  the  war  out  through  state  organizations. 
These  were  the  white-caps  of  a  vexed  sea,  and  not  the  cause 
of  the  commotion. 

Another  cause  for  the  civil  war,  and  one  entirely  over- 
looked, is  to  be  found  in  the  fact  that  our  form  of  govern- 
ment afforded  no  tribunal  to  which  the  contestants  could 


Introduction.  37 

appeal  for  a  fair  settlement  in  a  peaceful  way  out  of  their 
contention.  An  appeal  to  arms  was  a  necessity. 

In  a  pure  despotism,  there  is  a  power  that,  appealed  to 
under  any  exigency,  settles  all  disputes. 

In  a  constitutional  monarchy  there  is  a  sovereign  power 
lodged  in  the  government,  that  administers  through  a  min- 
istry subject  to  the  popular  will.  This  power,  lying  back 
and  above  the  administration  of  its  functions,  holds  all  con- 
stitutional provisions  in  perpetual  trust,  and  forms  a  tribunal 
from  which  there  is  no  appeal. 

This  is  not  our  condition.  The  fathers  meant  that  it 
should  be  such.  It  was  their  intent  that  the  executive 
selected  through  a  delicate,  intricate  electoral  college  should 
be  as  far  removed  from  popular — or,  as  it  is  now  called, 
political  control  as  possible.  The  president  thus  selected 
was  to  be  the  monarch,  and  as  to  popular  or  political  con- 
trol utterly  colorless.  The  office  itself  was  to  be  sovereign, 
and  the  incumbent,  in  the  fact  that  he  was  to  be  taken  from 
the  body  of  the  people  and  return  to  the  condition  of  citizen 
at  the  end  of  his  term  of  office,  was  a  republican  feature. 
The  legislative  department  was  tempered  by  a  senate,  com- 
posed of  representatives  from  the  states.  It  was  to  be  our 
House  of  Lords,  differing  from  that  body  and  made  repub- 
lican in  form,  as  the  executive  was,  by  selections  from  the 
citizens  and  rotative  in  office,  instead  of  born  legislators,  as 
in  England.  To  this  was  added  a  judiciary  appointed  for 
life,  or  good  behavior.  All  this  was  tempered  by  one  demo- 
cratic feature  found  in  the  House  of  Representatives  with  its 
members  returned  every  two  years. 

This  scheme  of  government  had  its  origin  in  the  fertile 
brain  of  Alexander  Hamilton,  who  modeled  it  upon  that  of 
England,  in  his  estimation  the  most  perfect  government  on 
earth.  He  was  aided  in  his  efforts  by  two  elements  then 


38 


War. 


potent  in  the  minda  of  the  fathers.  One  was  the  jealousy 
of  the  states,  that  parted  reluctantly  with  their  power,  and 
that  only  sifter  guarding  the  compact  of  states,  as  it  was  then 
railed,  with  the  most  stringent  and  positive  recognition  of 
state  sovereignty.  The  other  was  a  fear  of  the  people  that 
haunted  the  minds  of  the  government  builders.  The  polit- 
ical fabric  that  was  to  be  "  of  the  people,  for  the  people  and 
by  the  people,"  was  to  be  guarded  by  a  breakwater  of  gran- 
ite and  cement  against  the  people. 

This  form  of  government  lasted  through  the  administra- 
tion of  George  Washington.  The  hold  of  that  great  man 
upon  the  people  of  the  United  States  was  so  powerful  that 
his  clear,  cool  intellect,  purity,  and  force  of  character  silenced 
all  factional  opposition  and  popular  discontent.  For  eight 
years  we  had,  pure  and  simple,  the  government  of  the  fath- 
ers. This  remarkable  man  saw,  or  felt,  perhaps,  our  danger, 
and  in  his  farewell  address  he  warned  us  against  parties  — 
factions  they  were  then  called—  as  one  of  the  great  perils 
that  threatened  our  government.  He  little  dreamed  that 
within  a  brief  period,  measured  by  his  life,  that  this  govern- 
ment would  come  to  be  a  government  of  the  very  factions 
he  denounced. 

After  the  termination  of  Washington's  service  as  presi- 
dent, the  delicate  fabric,  with  its  nicely  adjusted  guards  and 
balances,  went  rapidly  to  pieces.  The  political  parties  came 
to  the  front.  Under  Adams  the  Federalists  organized  to  be 
<»{>]>osed  by  the  Democracy  under  Jefferson,  and  the  presi- 
dent that  was  to  be  a  potent  and  impartial  executive  of  all 
the  people,  resolved  himself  into  the  president  of  a  party, 
and  such  he  remains  to-day. 

This  was  natural,  and  not  only  to  be  expected,  but  a 
political  necessity.  All  issues  agitating  a  people  must  find 
expression  in  the  government,  or  the  power  of  the  people,  is 


Introduction.  39 

set  at  naught  and  the  agitation  is  without  avail.  The 
trouble  with  us  is  that  there  is  no  sovereign  power  in  per- 
petual existence,  holding  the  government  as  a  high  trust, 
administering  its  functions  for  the  good  of  all.  And  above 
all  there  is  no  high  court  of  appeal,  nor  impartial  tribunal 
to  determine  the  vexed  questions  under  the  constitution. 

When  Alexander  Hamilton  modeled  his  government  on 
that  of  England,  he  omitted  the  one  significant  feature  found 
in  a  ministry  subject  to  the  House  of  Representatives.  This 
would  have  left  our  executive  colorless  as  to  politics,  for  the 
president,  elected  for  a  term  of  years  by  one  party,  might 
find  himself  called  on  to  administer  the  government  in  ac- 
cord with  the  will  of  his  political  opponents.  This  is  a 
feature  in  the  constitutional  monarchies  of  Europe,  that 
makes  their  constitutional  despotism  more  democratic  than 
our  boasted  republic. 

As  it  is,  we  have  fastened  upon  us  a  cast-iron,  immovable 
concern  that  is  further  removed  from  popular  control  than 
any  government  on  earth. 

A  president  elected  for  four  years  is  hedged  about  by  a 
senate  representing  states  returned  every  six  years,  and 
against  the  barriers  the  House  of  Representatives,  a  great 
unwieldy  body,  may  beat  in  vain.  It  has  come,  in  fact,  to 
be  a  dependency  on  the  executive  and  the  senate  through 
despotism  of  official  patronage. 

Now,  if  our  divine  Creator  had  so  made  the  human 
mind  that  it  should  be  open  to  change  every  four  years,  this 
strange  government  of  the  people,  for  the  people  and  by  the 
people  would  have  been  subject  to  the  people's  will.  This 
not  being  the  condition,  popular  agitation  of  a  policy  for  the 
better  government  of  a  country,  and  in  accord  with  a  major- 
ity under  the  constitution,  is  in  vain.  The  impulses  of  a  peo- 
ple, unless  crowned  with  immediate  success,  are  short  lived. 


40  The  War. 

It  is  only  at  long  intervale  that  a  presidential  election 
meets  some  great  demand,  and  when  it  does,  the  day  after 
the  inauguration  the  demand  may  cease  or  change  sides — the 
majority,  however  great,  may  swing  from  under  the  admin- 
istration, and  yet  it  is  there,  fixed,  heavy  and  immovable  for 
four  years. 

If  this  resulted  in  the  death  of  all  parties,  it  might  be 
well,  although  in  such  case  we  would  remain  stationary — 
without  progress  through  all  time.  But  the  result  bears  this 
defect  in  a  worse  form.  It  is  the  nature  of  human  beings  to 
lose  in  an  organization  itself  the  purpose  for  which  it  was 
organized.  This  obtains  in  politics  as  in  religion.  Sects 
survive  in  great  vigor  of  existence  when  the  dogmas  on 
which  they  were  founded  cease  to  exist  in  the  minds  of  the 
members.  A  man  will  fight  for  the  mere  name  of  his  sect 
when  the  simplest  proposition  upon  which  it  was  founded 
can  not  even  be  stated,  much  less  explained  by  him.  This  is 
the  same  in  the  political  arena.  There  is  no  question  but 
that  the  two  parties  now  dominating  the  country  had  their 
origin  under  Hamilton  and  Jefferson  on  grave  issues,  affect- 
ing the  nature  of  government  and  the  relations  of  the 
people  to  the  political  structure.  Hamilton  held  the  gov- 
ernment to  be  a  thing  apart  and  above  the  people,  that  was 
parental  and  perfect,  when  it  gave  benefits  to  the  governed. 
Jefferson  guarded  it  simply  as  a  trust,  held  in  obedience  to 
the  popular  will,  and  good  only  so  far  as  it  insured  equal 
rights  under  the  constitution  to  all.  We  have  the  country 
to-day  divided  between  two  hostile  camps,  and  yet  a  micro- 
scope would  fail  to  detect  the  difference  in  principles  between 
the  two.  A  man  can  be  a  republican  and  hold  any  political 
opinions  he  pleases,  provided  he  stands  by  the  camp  and 
votes  the  ticket.  This  is  the  like  condition  of  the  demo- 
cratic organization.  Instead  of  views  being  promulgated  as 


Jjitroduction.  41 

a  test  of  party  fealty,  they  are  avoided  or  concealed.  Suc- 
cess depends  on  the  number  of  votes  obtained,  and  as  opin- 
ions are  apt  to  offend,  they  are  hidden  or  ignored.  Nothing 
is  so  amusing  as  a  platform,  as  it  is  called,  solemnly  pro- 
claimed at  intervals. 

The  evil  of  all  this  is  that  parties  degenerate  into  fac- 
tions— a  party  means  an  organization  called  together  to  sus- 
tain certain  principles.  A  faction  is  the  same  body  that  for 
mere  success  in  obtaining  power,  or  putting  some  man  or 
men  forward,  holds  together  under  a  name  only.  We  are 
called  upon  to  note  in  sharne  that  while  European  communi- 
ties in  their  political  contentions  are  moved  by  the  greatest 
questions  affecting  human  progress,  our  elections  turn  on  a 
personal  feeling  with  an  abuse  that  would  taint  our  pages 
even  to  mention  them. 

However,  it  forms  no  part  of  this  essay  to  exhibit  the 
evils  of  our  system.  We  might  call  attention  to  the  fact 
that  the  deplorable  civil  service  under  which  we  suffer  is  no 
abuse,  but  the  natural  development  of  the  government 
itself.  The  government  is  the  party,  and  in  popular  esti- 
mation, and  properly  so,  the  vote  that  elects  a  president 
elects  the  humble  applicant  for  a  cross-roads  or  water-tank 
post-office.  Public  office  is  a  public  trust,  but  the  success- 
ful party,  in  the  eyes  of  the  people,  as  in  fact,  is  the  trustee. 

Now  there  is  no  tyranny  so  oppressive,  cruel,  and  in- 
tolerant as  that  of  a  majority  in  a  popular  vote.  To  believe 
that  this  may  be  restrained  by  conscience  or  a  paper  consti- 
tution, is  to  set  aside  all  that  is  taught  us  through  experi- 
ence, made  plain  by  the  history  and  character  of  humanity. 
A  paper  constitution  is  an  attempt  to  legislate  on  a  knowl- 
edge of  the  past  for  all  future  exigencies  and  wants  of  a 
people.  To  make  it  perfect  is  to  call  a  halt  on  progress  and 
deny  to  the  future  what  is  relied  on  in  the  past,  and  that  is 


4o  The  War. 

experience.  The  fathers,  for  example,  sought  to  destroy  the 
aristocracy  of  a  class  by  wiping  out  primogeniture  and  entail. 
Th.-y  could  not  see  that  the  corporation  would  come  in  and 
toe  the  old  evil  with  additions  that  made  the  wrong  de- 
stroyed a  light  affair.  The  constitution  legislates  no  remedy 
against  incorporated  power  and  privilege  that  has  come  to 
be,  not  an  abuse  of  the  government,  but  the  government 
itself.  It  is  the  power  behind  no  throne,  for  it  is  the  throne 

itself. 

So  long  as  differences  among  the  people  were  confined 
to  abstract  political  propositions  of  no  grave  importance  in 
their  results,  the  government  of  the  fathers  worked  easily. 
When,  however,  a  great  interest  affecting  the  nation  in  its 
very  existence  came  to  be  considered,  each  side  felt  that 
truth  and  justice,  be  what  they  might,  the  contention  had  to 
be  settled  by  numbers.  The  tribunal  for  eventual  decision 
was  one  party  or  the  other  to  the  contention  such  as  a  bare 
majority  might  secure. 

The  first  grave  symptom  of  this  diseased  condition  was 
manifested  in  a  tariff  for  protection,  when  John  C.  Calhoun 
made  his  appeal  in  behalf  of  a  more  perfect  union  in  his 
plan  of  nullification  that  gave  a  veto  power  to  each  state 
when  its  constitutional  rights  were  involved.  The  Demo- 
cratic party,  under  President  Jackson,  denounced  this  as 
treason,  and  but  for  the  compromise  measure  of  Henry  Clay, 
that  reduced  protection  to  revenue,  the  war  that  followed 
years  after  would  have  been  then  precipitated  on  the  people. 
The  government  virtually  accepted  Mr.  Calhoun's  principle 
of  nullification  by  a  prompt  reversal  of  its  policy  in  the 
presence  of  an  appeal  to  the  states. 

The  government,  therefore,  was  not  framed,  nor  is  it 
fitted,  to  handle  a  great  national  question  agitating  the 
minds  of  the  people.  In  such  contention,  the  successful 


Introduction.  43 

party  becomes  the  government,  and  from  it  there  lies  no 
appeal.  What  would  be  said  of  a  case  in  court  where  the 
tribunal  consisted  of  the  number  of  witnesses  and  not  the 
weight  of  evidence,  where,  having  taken  a  vote,  the  party 
possessed  of  the  larger  number  of  witnesses  should  ascend  to 
the  bench  and  decide  the  case? 

All  the  laws  ever  enacted,  all  the  decisions  ever  put  to 
record,  and  supposed  to  govern  the  court  thus  constructed, 
would  not  make  the  losing  side  content.  This  was  our  con- 
dition that  brought  on  the  clash  of  arms.  The  losing  side 
appealed  from  the  brute  force  of  numbers  that  made  a  court 
to  the  brute  force  of  bayonets. 

This  is  the  lesson  of  the  war,  and  unless  we  can  find 
some  remedy  in  reconstruction  of  our  government,  we  must 
expect  to  have  the  evil  of  violence  repeated  when  a  like  exi- 
gency occurs.  Had  we  a  colorless  executive  put  in  power 
to  administer  under  the  constitution  with  even-handed  jus- 
tice the  power  of  the  government,  and  under  this  a  ministry 
subject  to  the  popular  will  as  demonstrated  in  a  majority  of 
the  House,  we  would  have  our  court  of  appeal  with  its  judge 
unbiased  by  political  feeling  to  admonish  and  restrain  parti- 
san zeal  and  abuse.  We  might  yet  suffer  from  the  tyranny 
of  ;i  majority,  but  such  majority  would  be  based  on  an  appeal 
to  reason,  as  we  see  in  Europe,  that  educates  as  it  agitates, 
and  so  escape  a  senseless  contention  for  mere  power  that  en- 
ables the  successful  party  to  inflict  on  the  land  a  standing 
army  of  inefficient  and  dishonest  office-holders.  The  queen 
of  England  is  said  to  reign  but  does  not  rule.  This  is  true 
only  so  long  as  rights  under  the  constitution  are  respected 
by  the  party  in  power.  Let  these  be  invaded,  and  the  queen's 
rule  begins. 

Alexander  Hamilton,  in  his  admiration  of  the  British 
rule  that  gave  us  our  government,  omitted  the  saving  clause 


44  The  War. 

tiiut  makes  the  government  more  of  a  republic  than  our  own. 
IVrhapB  that  accounts  for  the  omission. 

The  successful  party  with  us  becomes  the  government, 
and  it  is  not  only  despotic,  but  its  displacement,  since  it  has 
come  to  be  hedged  in  by  all  the  material  interests  of  the 
country,  depends  on  casualties,  not  to  be  counted  on  in  the 
ordinary  contest.  The  Democrat  votes  the  Democratic  ticket, 
the  Republican  in  like  manner  supports  his  organization ; 
and  under  this  condition,  the  Republicans,  having  driven  out 
the  Democrats  at  the  point  of  the  bayonet,  might  have  re- 
mained the  government  till  the  end  of  our  political  structure, 
.but  in  the  reconstruction  of  the  South,  it,  unfortunately  for 
itself,  appealed  not  to  the  governing  power  of  the  South, 
found  in  its  intelligence  and  force  of  character,  but  to  the 
ignorance  and  imbecility  of  the  slave  populations.  The  gov- 
ernment gave  the  late  slave  the  ballot  with  a  carpet-bagger 
and  a  bayonet,  and  thus  inaugurated  not  only  a  war  of  races, 
but  a  war  on  civilization. 

When  the  civilization  of  two  different  races  made  their 
appeal  to  the  government  at  Washington,  they  found  there 
the  case  decided  and  judgment  rendered,  based  solely  on  suc- 
cess at  the  polls.  An  appeal  from  the  brute  force  of  numbers 
to  a  brute  force  of  arms  was  a  necessity.  We  could  not  help 
ourselves.  The  unseen  but  not  silent  antagonisms  of  nearly 
three  hundred  years  culminated  in  a  storm  no  earthly  wis- 
dom could  avert.  Our  government  is  a  success  only  so  long 
as  it  remains  untried.  We  are  slow  to  learn  the  lessons  of 
the  past.  It  feeds  our  vanity  to  be  considered  philosophers 
and  philanthropists,  with  our  actions  based  on  the  purest 
reason  and  our  motives  animated  by  the  highest  patriotism 
and  goodness.  Such  conceit  blinds  us  to  our  faults  and  ren- 
ders all  reform  difficult,  if  not  impossible.  Before  the 


Introduction.  45 

physician  can  prescribe,  he  must  truthfully  diagnose  the 
disorder. 

To  the  more  thoughtful  and  patriotic,  the  dangers  that 
menace  our  great  republic  cause  deep  concern.  The  seeds 
of  disorder  and  death  planted  in  the  system  itself  remain  to 
plague  us.  It  was  arranged  by  the  fathers  to  have  the  sov- 
ereignty rest  in  the  people,  with  full  power  to  settle  all  ques- 
tions, but  we  fail  to  see  that  this  will  cut  off  from  all  expres- 
sion through  the  cast-iron,  invisible  condition  of  the  trusts 
called  a  government. 

We  have  a  government  of  parties  without  process 
through  which  the  party  can  find  expression.  The  result 
is  most  deplorable.  Elections  no  longer  turn  on  a  diversity 
of  opinions  or  a  difference  of  policy,  as  to  how  the  govern- 
ment may  be  controlled,  but  upon  a  fraudulent  use  of  money 
at  the  polls.  Of  course,  the  capitalists  thus  investing  in  pol- 
itics, seek  to  recoup  themselves  through  a  use  of  the  govern- 
ment they  control  as  official  agents. 

In  this  condition,  what  are  we  to  expect  when  again  a 
grave  question  such  as  slavery  was,  seeks  solution  at  the 
hands  of  the  government.  The  bayonets  that  drove  the  slave 
power  from  the  capitol  will,  we  fear,  be  once  more  in  demand. 

However,  our  pen  is  with  the  past,  and  not  the  future, 
and  it  is  pleasant  to  turn  from  these  dark  forebodings  to  the 
brilliant  achievements  that  yet  live  to  strengthen  our  self- 
respect,  pride,  and  patriotism,  as  a  people. 


LIFE   OF   THOMAS. 


CHAPTER  I.      . 

Early  Life — The  Child  is  Father  to  the  Man — Home  Life  in  Old  Virginia— 
Wfefit  Point  and  what  it  did  not  Teach,  but  what  Young  Thomas 
Learned. 

The  brightest  name  upon  the  darkest  page  of  our 
country's  history,  gives  title  to  this  book.  The  story  of  that 
life  in  the  four  years  of  a  war  that  made  such  a  crucial  test 
of  vitality  in  the  great  republic,  is  the  true  history  of  our 
country.  From  his  first  fight  to  his  last  great  battle,  we 
have  a  succession  of  victories  in  strange  contrast  to  the  cam- 
paigns of  disaster  and  bloody  defeats  of  others,  above  whose 
graves  are  being  built  lofty  monuments,  while  that  of  George 
Henry  Thomas  remains  almost  unmarked. 

In  one  campaign,  thajt  from  Nashville  to  Chattanooga, 
and  back  to  Nashville  again,  his  army  carried  the  destinies 
of  our  great  republic  to  the  front,  and  its  eagles  swung 
through  the  smoke  of  terrible  battles  to  victories  that  won, 
finally,  the  empire  of  a  continent.  About  his  name  cluster 
all  glories  that  the  republic  can  boast  of  in  the  way  of 
military  ability  and  achievement,  and  yet  so  far  his  memory 
holds  its  monument  only  in  the  hearts  of  the  soldiers  he  led 
on  to  victory.  It  is  well  for  us  then,  who  love  our  land  and 
seek  to  transmit  its  deeds  for  the  love,  admiration,  and  ex- 
ample of  the  coming  generations  to  gather  up  from  the  thin- 
ning ranks  of  veterans  the  memory  of  our  hero. 

All  that  we  have  to  relate  is  of  record,  but  a  record  ob- 
scured, if  not  distorted,  by  partisan  prejudice  that  will  at 
any  time  sacrifice  truth  to  an  ignoble  success  of  party. 

(47) 


4g  Life  of  Thomas. 

Probably  we  are  .not  yet  far  enough  removed  from  a  terrible 
,,'mflict  to  correct  or  destroy  the  false  that  like  clouds  from 
swamps  sucked  up,  are  glorified  by  the  sun,  but  we  are  near 
enough  to  great  deeds  themselves  to  build  our  monuments  to 
the  truly  great.  The  slow  but  sure  decay  that  eats  into  and 
destroys  error,  however  plausible  and  popular,  leaves  un- 
touched the  truth  that  grows  brighter  and  stronger  as  time 
wears  on.  The  monuments  built  of  bones  and  cemented  by 
the  blood  of  butchered  men  in  terrible  disasters,  however 
foolishly  called  victories,  will  be  the  first  to  crumble,  and 
men  will  hasten  to  forget  the  memories  of  shame.  To  cling 
to  such  is  to  condemn  our  race  as  not  only  ignoble,  but  im- 
becile. 

It  is  true  that  some  defeats  have  in  them  higher  merit 
than  many  victories,  but  the  merit  in  this  instance  is  not  in 
the  generals  who  won  disaster  through  their  inability,  but  to 
the  men  under  muskets  who  closed  up  undismayed  their 
thinned  ranks,  and  to  the  spirit  of  a  heroic  people  that  de- 
feat excited  more  than  victory,  and  after  each  disastrous 
campaign  sent  a  hundred  thousand  more  of  their  sons  to  the 
slaughter.  For  the  one  Quintus  Curtius  sacrificed  in  the 
chasm,  we  gave  half  a  million  to  save  our  great  republic. 

There  are  two  types  of  eminent  men  we  are  frequently 
called  upon  to  study.  In  one  we  are  amazed  at  the  man 
having  achieved  what  was  claimed  for  him;  in  the  other  we 
are  astonished  that  he  did  not  accomplish  more.  In  this 
last  class  George  Henry  Thomas  stands  conspicuous.  There 
was  a  reserve  force  about  him  that  impresses  one  as  does  the 
deep  undertone  of  Niagara  that  dominates  the  swash  and 
roar  of  waves  in  that  falling  sea.  One  can  not  contemplate 
General  Thomas  and  not  pass  from  his  brilliant  achievements 
that  made  the  victory  at  Mill  Springs,  our  first  prestige  to 
Union  arms ;  from  his  saving  our  army  at  Stone  River,  again 
at  Chickamauga,  and  the  nation  at  Nashville,  to  the  thought 
of  what  might  have  been  spared  us  in  blood  and  treasure  had 
he  been  put  in  command  of  our  army  at  the  beginning  of  the 
conflict. 

The  impression  he  made  upon  the  great  men  then  in 


Early  Life.  49 

control  of  our  government  waa  in  advance  of  any  achieve- 
ment that  demonstrated  his  capacity.  The  strange,  silent, 
solitary  man  carried  his  God-given  commission  in  his  pres- 
ence, but  he  was  a  native  of  Virginia,  and,  so  intense  was 
the  feeling  at  that  time,  that  both  Lincoln  and  Stanton  dis- 
trusted a  Southern  soldier  of  West  Point  who  would  offer 
his  sword  in  defense  of  the  Union.  "  Let  the  Virginian 
wait,"  said  Lincoln,  and  what  that  waiting  cost  us  we  are 
now  called  upon  to  count. 

To  the  real  student  of  our  war  history,  who,  lifted  above 
partisan  feeling,  sees  events  in  their  true  light,  next  to  the 
fools  who  mistook  vanity  for  genius  and  so  forced  them- 
selves to  the  front  that  they  might  learn  war  through  de- 
feat; the  most  exasperating  are  those  who  since  the  war  have 
gone  about  with  their  button-holeing  memoirs  claiming  vic- 
tories when  they  suffered  defeats,  and  begging  the  world  to 
believe  them  great  men.  Now  this  differs  from  the  great 
man  who  blushed  like  a  girl  when  praised  and  with  calm 
dignity  sought  his  grave  in  silence,  leaving  his  deeds  to  speak 
for  themselves. 

No  man  is  a  truly  great  man  who  courts  applause  and 
seeks  to  bnild  a  monument  to  his  own  memory.  The  con- 
sciousness of  power  carries  in  itself  its  own  reward.  The 
breath  of  popular  acclaim  is  but  a  breath,  vain,  uncertain,  and 
fleeting,  while  all  the  marble  and  bronze  monuments  of 
earth  are  to  the  dead  less  than  the  dust  they  seek  to  com- 
memorate. The  applause  of  multitudes — the  praise  of  the 
world  falls  unheeded  upon  the  cold,  unhearing  ears  of  death. 
The  mortal  remains  molder  silently  and  swiftly  into  dust, 
while  the  spirit  has  passed  into  another  existence  so  far  re- 
moved from  the  brief,  vain  life  of  earth  that  it  ceases  to  claim 
attention  or  even,  probably,  a  memory.  When  one  is  born 
the  world  begins,  and  when  one  dies  the  world  ends.  It  is  a 
weakness  and  not  a  strength  that  makes  one  long  to  live  in 
memory  after  the  grave  claims  its  own.  Nothing  has  more 
marked  the  character  and  career  of  our  great  soldier  than  his 
dignified  indifference  to  the  opinions  of  others  as  to  what  he 
had  achieved. 
4 


50  Life  of  Thomas. 

We  have  said  that  our  story  of  heroic  effort  is  of  record. 
It  is  history  and  a  matter  of  deep  regret  that  it  should  deal 
with  this  great  man  purely  in  his  public  capacity.  It  was  a 
peculiar  trait  of  his  strong  character  to  remove  himself  from 
public  recognition  as  far  as  possible.  He  denied  his  private 
papers  to  his  would-be  biographers  while  living,  and  leaving 
all  such  to  his  dear  wife  after  his  death,  she  carefully  obeyed 
his  injunctions.  "All  that  I  did  for  my  government,"  he 
said,  "  are  matters  of  history,  but  my  private  life  is  my  own, 
and  I  will  not  have  it  hawked  about  in  print  for  the  amuse- 
ment of  the  curious." 

We  refer  to  this,  we  say,  with  regret.  It  was  a  weakness 
in  General  Thomas,  as  there  was  absolutely  nothing  in  his 
private  life  from  which  he  should  shrink;  there  was  no 
reason  why  he  should  disappoint  the  world  that  sought  to 
know,  and  knowing  love,  the  man  so  much  admired.  When 
speaking  of  the  neglect  he  experienced  in  the  wrong  done 
him  by  the  misrepresentations  of  the  envious,  he  said : 
"History  will  do  me  justice."  He  did  not  reflect  that  in  re- 
fusing for  record  his  private  life,  he,  to  a  great  extent,  made 
his  public  career  obscure.  How  much  of  Washington's  life 
is  known  from  his  voluminous  letters,  and  how  clearly  we 
come  to  know  McClellan  through  the  free,  but  unfortunate 
missives  sent  almost  hourly  from  the  front  to  his  wife.  It  is 
the  man  off  parade  we  must  see  to  know,  and  in  knowing 
him  we  can  the  more  correctly  judge  as  to  his  work.  While 
General  Thomas  was  singularly  reserved  he  was  neither  cold 
nor  austere. 

Undemonstrative  as  he  was  under  all  circumstances,  he 
had  the  quiet  of  a  deep,  calm  current — quiet  because  deep. 
No  mere  mannerism  could  conceal  the  sweetness,  the  kindli- 
ness of  his  nature,  and  while  he  stood  before  his  superiors  in 
rank  or  moved  among  his  associates  in  a  way  to  repel 
familiarity  of  manner,  he  had  that  which  won  to  him  in- 
stinctively the  sympathies  of  dogs,  negroes  and  children. 
While  his  brother  officers  were  held  at  a  distance  by  his 
quiet  manner,  the  humblest  private  would  unhesitatingly  ap- 
proach him  with  his  petition  or  grievance,  and  would  receive 
the  kindest  and  most  patient  attention. 


Early  Life.  51 

All  this  would  appear  in  words  and  act?  if  we  had  access 
to  his  private  papers,  but,  as  it  is,  we  must  content  ourselves 
with  such  as  come  to  us  well  authenticated  outside  the 
records  we  long  for.  Among  these  is  a  story  told  us  by  a 
southern  woman,  a  lady  of  high  social  position  and  culture, 
who  tells  of  a  meeting  between  Generals  Thomas  and  Hood 
after  the  war.  These  great  captains  found  themselves  by 
accident  in  the  same  hotel.  At  the  instance  of  Hood,  this 
lady  sought  and  asked  Thomas  if  it  would  be  agreeable  for 
him  to  meet  the  Confederate  he  so  signally  defeated  at 
Nashville. 

"Certainly,  my  dea.r  madam,"  responded  Thomas,  "I 
shall  be  most  happy  to  meet  General  Hood.  Will  he  come 
to  my  room?" 

The  minister  of  peace  carried  her  message  to  General 
Hood,  and  they  returned  together.  Entering  the  corridor 
that  led  to  Thomas'  room,  Hood  clattered  along  on  his 
crutches  without  speaking,  and  as  they  approached  the  door 
it  was  suddenly  thrown  open,  and,  Thomas  appearing,  threw 
his  arm  around  Hood  and  helped  him  in  with  a  tenderness 
that  was  touching.  The  kind  mediator  left  the  two  to- 
gether, and  when  an  hour  after  she  saw  her  friend,  the 
bravest  fighter  of  all  the  Confederate  forces  had  the  trace  of 
tears  in  his  eyes  and  voice. 

"Thomas  is  a  grand  man,"  he  said,  in  a  tone  full  of  emo- 
tion, "he  should  have  remained  with  us,  where  he  would 
have  been  appreciated  and  loved." 

Of  a  deep  religious  nature  that  approached  Puritanism 
in  its  observance,  he  kept  his  faith  strictly,  as  all  else  of  a 
personal  nature,  to  himself.  But  no  exigencies  of  camp  life, 
that  at  times  destroy  privacy,  kept  him  from  prayers  taught 
him  in  his  childhood,  that  brought  him  rest  at  night.  ^ 

He  differed  strikingly  from  his  brother  officers  in  being 
entirely  free  from  profanity.  "An  oath  weakens  an  order," 
he  once  said,  "  for  it  is  an  expression  of  excitement,  and 
takes  from  instead  of  adding  to  the  force  of  a  command,  for 
it  lowers  the  officer  in  the  eyes  of  his  men." 

This  religious  feeling  in  General  Thomas  came  from  his 
Huguenot  blood  on  one  side,  while  his  Welsh  temperament  on 


52  Lif<'  of 

the  other  gave  him  control  of  himself.     This  was  singularly 

marked.     Under  no  circumstances  was  he  known  to  lose  the 

ealm  manner  that  was  his  striking  characteristic.     At 

Stone  River,  when  utter  defeat  seemed  surging  through  his 

I,  he  was  forced  to  change  front  in  the  face  of  the  enemy, 
and  he  was  as  cool  as  if  on  parade.  Again  at  Chickamauga, 
when  the  entire  right  wing  was  crumbled  away,  leaving  the 
road  open  to  his  rear,  and  the  bulk  of  the  Confederate  forces 
were  pounding  on  his  front,  a  most  perilous  condition,  Gen- 
eral Qarfield  found  the  great  commander  in  the  pauses  of  the 
attack  as  cool  and  quiet  as  if  no  monstrous  disaster  to  our 
anus  were  impending. 

There  is  a  striking  illustration  of  truth  in  heredity  pre- 
sented us  by  the  Huguenot  blood  to  which  we  have  referred. 
There  is  probably  no  history  of  a  class  or  race  in  which  blood 
is  more  distinctly  marked  than  in  that  of  the  men  driven 
from  France  in  the  early  part  of  the  seventeenth  century  to 
the  American  continents.  Wherever  found,  the  same  strong 
characteristics  and  high  traits  manifest  themselves.  A  New 
England  Puritan  was  a  fierce  propagandist.  The  Huguenots, 
on  the  contrary,  had  no  creed  to  crowd  down  the  throats  of 
others.  Their  religion  was  a  confidential  matter  between 
God  and  themselves.  They  resented  the  despotic  interfer- 
ence in  their  worship,  not  because  it  was  blasphemous,  as  the 
Puritans  held,  but  for  the  reason  that  it  was  an  insult  to 
their  manhood.  It  was  a  degradation  they  protested  against 
with  their  lives.  After  all  we  are  slow  to  learn  that  it  is  the 
man  and  not  the  creed  that  creates  the  religion*.  The  negro 
makes  a  fetich  of  the  most  elevated  and  refined  religion, 
while  the  Huguenot,  holding  the  darkest  dogmas  that  ever 
depraved  humanity,  lifted  his  belief  into  the  highest  plane 
of  brotherhood  on  earth  and  Fatherhood  in  heaven. 

Be  that  as  it  may,  the  Calvanistic  creed  of  predestined 
damnation  was  but  a  surface  indication  of  a  sturdy  manhood 
that  resisted  interference,  and  lapsed  back  most  generally  into 
the  mother  church  after  the  pressure  was  removed. 

So  far  as  religious  belief  extends,  the  Huguenots  of  the 
United  States  are  such  only  in  character.  In  a  majority  of 
instances  they  are  either  Catholics  or  agnostics,  and  illustrate 


Etirly  Life.  53 

the  truth  of  the  old  maxim  that  "the  blood  of  the  martyrs 
is  the  seed  of  the  church,"  and  makes  persecution  the  cause 
of  growth. 

It  is  not  the  creed  that  is  strong,  but  the  human  nature 
that  is  obstinate.  General  Thomas  was  an  Episcopalian, 
with  a  character  that  forced  itself  into  an  acceptance  of  truth 
whenever  taught  or  found.  His  perfect  temperament,  gener- 
ous impulses,  and  kindly  nature  transmuted  the  narrowest 
creed  he  might  accept  into  the  broadest  plane  of  Christian 
excellence. 

George  Henry  Thomas  was  born  in  Southampton  county, 
Virginia,  31st  July,  1816.  Of  Welsh  extraction,  as  the  name 
indicates,  on  one  side,  he  was  French,  as  we  have  said,  on 
the  other.  The  well  preserved  annals  of  the  family  and 
their  good  sense  saved  them  from  the  weak  pretensions  of  so 
many  American  families  to  aristocratic  origin.  There  were 
no  cavaliers  in  the  Thomas  family  and  not  the  remotest  trace 
of  the  Pocahontas  blood.  This  fact  has  not  prevented  one 
of  his  biographers  from  referring  to  the  cavaliers  in  a  hazy, 
speculative  way.  The  fact  is,  however,  that  the  early  settlers 
of  our  continent  were  hardened  and,  let  us  hope,  honest 
laborers.  The  aristocrats  never  emigrate.  They  may  be 
driven  out  by  political  or  religious  controversies,  but  in  such 
case  they  rapidly  disappear.  The  down-trodden  laborers, 
inured  to  privation  and  toil,  faced  the  dangers  of  an  unknown 
deep,  and  a  struggle  for  life  in  an  almost  untrodden  wilder- 
ness, to  better  their  condition.  The  aristocracy  had  no  such 
incentive  to  change.  The  life  of  ease  and  luxury  they  led  at 
home  neither  trained  them  to  bear  privation  nor  made  any 
other  mode  of  existence  than  their  own  attractive. 

The  zeal  with  which  we  hasten  to  dishonor  the  graves 
of  our  ancestors  is  pitiable.  All  the  parade  of  imaginary 
pedigrees  and  emblazoned  coats-of- arms,  stolen  from  families 
fallen  into  decay,  shame  us  as  a  people.  There  may  be  little 
romance  in  our  conquest  of  a  continent,  but  there  is  much 
honor.  We  owe  our  all  to  the  hard  hands  and  bowed  backs 
of  honest  toilers,  before  whose  high  manhood  and  indomita- 
ble will  a  howling  wilderness  was  changed  to  sunny  fields  of 
industrial  life,  and  a  new  people  came  into  existence,  to  rank 


54  Life  of  Thomas. 

among  the  foremost  nations  of  civilized1  humanity.  There 
is  more  true  pride  in  such  ancestry  than  any  to  be  found 
in  tracing  our  lineage  back  to  thieving  barons,  whose  only 
mission  on  earth  was  to  oppress  and  kill. 

George  Henry  Thomas  had  none  of  this  false  pride  in 
his  nature.  He  was  wont  to  tell  with  glee  how  when  a  boy 
he  made  a  saddle  for  himself,  an  article  he  was  unable  to 
purchase,  by  watching  the  saddler  day  after  day  construct 
i UK-,  he  following  at  home  the  lesson  learned  at  the  shop 
until  the  saddle  was  completed.  That  he  would  have  made 
a  first  class  mechanic  we  can  well  believe,  for  he  had  that  in 
him  which  would  have  insured  success  in  any  walk  of  life. 

The  early  youth  of  our  hero  was  as  quiet  and  uneventful 
as  his  later  years  were  full  of  tumult.  He  retained  to  the 
last  that  quiet  self-poise  which  reminds  one  of  the  eagle 
balancing  his  pinions  on  the  storm-cloud,  while  all  else  is  in 
the  hurried  confusion  of  seeming  destruction. 

The  home  life  of  old  Virginia,  in  its  patriarchal  sim- 
plicity, was  exceedingly  beautiful.  One  acquainted  with  it 
can  picture  the  quiet  old  mansions  gleaming  white  amid 
their  oaks,  rude  enough  in. their  architecture,  but  so  home- 
like in  their  calm.  Generations  of  intermarriage  had  made 
all  akin,  while  the  ties  of  family  strengthened  the  domestic 
bond  that  found  something  nearer  and  dearer  to  live  for  than 
the  mere  pursuit  of  wealth.  Their  homes  were  full  of  sweet 
human  gossip,  and  proud,  yet  kindly,  they  lived  out  the 
quiet  lives  of  brave  men  and  chaste  women,  in  striking  con- 
trast to  the  money-getting  world  around  them. 

Whether  it  is  our  peculiar  climate  or  some  other  subtle 
cause  that  develops  the  nerves  at  the  expense  of  all  else,  we 
are  a  restless,  moving  race,  without  that  sense  of  home 
which  so  distinguishes  Virginians.  We  are  Arabs  in  boots, 
and  our  resting-places  in  life  are  no  better  than  tents,  giving 
us  shelter  and  wanting  in  all  those  sweet  associations  that 
make  of  a  locality  a  fairyland.  And  yet  in  the  home  itself  is 
planted  all  that  makes  a  people  really  great.  In  it  a  mother's 
love  and  a  father's  care  train  good  citizens  and  give  stability 
to  government  that  is  secured  by  no  other  process.  We  are 
enthusiastic  over  common  schools  and  public  institutions, 


Early  Life.  55 

and  firmly  determined  to  make  the  pedagogue  do  the  duty  of 
the  parent.  We  build  houses,  not  for  homes,  but  as  show 
places  to  sell  and  build  again.  Our  very  cemeteries  are  pub- 
lic parks,  in  which  the  sacred  memories  of  the  beloved  dead 
are  lost  in  the  exhibition  of  grand  avenues  and  costly  monu- 
ments. We  cart  our  wealth  to  the  verge  of  the  unknown 
land,  and  leave  its  evidence  to  the  living  in  a  stunning  monu- 
ment. The  mourners  hurry  back  to  business,  to  keep  the 
dead  man's  notes  from  protest.  How  this  sort  of  life  is 
marring  our  destiny  as  a  people,  is  manifest  in  the  frightful 
increase  of  insanity  and  crime. 

The  perfect  and  beautiful  influences  of  home  life  as 
practiced  in  old  Virginia,  make  one  of  the  noticeable  inci- 
dents of  the  late  civil  conflict. 

Virginia,  the  cradle  of  patriots,  presidents,  and  states- 
men, was  not  remarkable  for  either  her  wealth  or  intellectual 
life.  But  few  authors  were  born  to  her,  no  great  books  were 
made,  no  millionaires  larded  the  lean  earth  with  their  ill- 
gotten  gains ;  but  the  standard  of  manhood  was  on  an  aver- 
age so  high,  the  love  and  respect  for  the  old  commonwealth 
so  strong,  that  the  entire  war  centered  around  her  capitol. 
When  Virginia  fell,  the  cause  was  lost. 

I  have  dwelt  upon  this  subject,  because  in  the  home 
training  of  George  Henry  Thomas  may  be  found  so  much 
that  in  subsequent  years  made  him  famous.  He  was  a  man 
of  such  sterling  integrity,  so  frank,  brave,  and  truthful,  so 
tender  in  his  nature,  generous  in  his  impulses,  so  sensitive  to 
the  calls  of  honor,  and  so  true  to  duty,  that  we  are  forced 
back  to  the  early  years  when  such  qualities  were  impressed 
upon  the  plastic  nature  of  youth.  What  a  mother,  what  a 
father  General  Thomas  must  have  possessed. 

George  H.  Thomas  graduated  at  the  Southampton 
Academy,  and  had  entered  upon  the  study  of  law,  when  the 
genial  John  Y.  Mason  offered  Mr.  Rochelle,  George's  ma- 
ternal uncle,  a  cadetship  at  West  Point.  The  place  was  left 
to  the  young  man  to  take  or  refuse,  and  it  was  promptly  ac- 
cepted. Having  passed  the  examination,  George  returned 
home  by  way  of  Washington  to  thank  the  Hon.  John  Y., 
then  his  member  of  Congress,  for  his  kind  patronage.  The 


56  Life  of  Thomas. 

honorable  official  Baid  to  the  youth  :  "  No  cadet  appointed 
tr.un  our  district  has  ever  graduated  at  West  Point,  and  if 
you  fail,  I  never  want  to  see  you  again."  He  spoke  to  one 
whose  lexicon  contained  no  such  word  as  fail.  Could  the 
genial  John  Y.  Mason  have  known  what  that  appointment 
meant  to  the  future  of  Virginia,  he  would  have  rejoiced  at 
the  youth's  failure.  A  bon  vivant  who  found  content,  as 
Benton  said  of  him,  in  a  good  dinner,  and  a  full  hand  at 
poker,  he  had  in  common  with  all  Virginians,  a  blind  infatu- 
ation in  favor  of  things  southern,  that  changed  wrong  into 
right,  and  made  good  out  of  material  that  filled  other  men 
with  horror.  The  Hon.  John  Y.  Mason,  after  holding  many 
high  offices  with  credit  to  himself,  and  of  benefit  to  his  gov- 
ernment, died  in  the  volcanic  eruption  that  buried  state 
sovereignty  and  human  servitude  in  one  common  ruin. 

He  left,  however,  a  nation  of  fanatics,  who  resisted 
the  world's  progress,  and  fought  statistics  as  an  insult  to 
their  peculiar  civilization. 

WEST  POINT. 

This  little  school  upon  the  Hudson  is  popularly  supposed 
not  only  to  give  instruction  in  the  so-called  art  of  war,  but 
to  supply  through  such  process  the  lack  of  brains  found  in 
many  of  its  graduates. 

As  war  is  not  an  art,  reduced  to  rules,  one  is  naturally 
puzzled  to  know  how  it  can  be  taught,  and  if  taught,  how  it 
is  that  instruction  supplies  the  ability  that  seeks  to  be  in- 
structed. The  books  devoted  to  military  formulas  are  few, 
and  when  applied  to  actual  war,  practically  useless.  All 
the  axioms  left  by  great  captains  can  be  counted  on  one's 
fingers,  and,  while  the  condensed  wisdom  of  long  and  varied 
experience  by  master  minds,  are  quite  useless  when  applied 
to  a  school.  Take  for  example,  the  greatest  given  us,  which 
says :  "  War  is  a  calculation  of  chances."  How  can  such 
chances  be  known  to  a  school  ?  They  cease  to  be  such  when 
they  become  sufficiently  known  as  to  be  taught. 

When  we  come  to  analyze  the  institution,  we  find  it  dif- 
fers from  others  devoted  to  education,  in  the  fact  that  the 
students  are  trained  to  the  drill  and  discipline  of  private 


West  Point.  57 

soldiers.  Take  this  out  and  nothing  of  a  military  nature  re- 
mains. Now,  while  training  and  teaching  may  make  a  pri- 
vate, there  is  nothing  whatever  in  it  to  make  an  officer  of  a 
grade  necessary  to  the  command  of  a  brigade.  What  is 
aimed  at  in  creating  armies  has  nothing  in  common  with 
what  goes  to  make  the  general.  To  have  a  body  of  men  so 
drilled  and  disciplined  that  the  mass 'move  efficiently  to  the 
command  of  one  mind  is  possible  to  a  drill  sergeant.  But  to 
create  the  mind  capable  of  such  command,  does  not  lie  within 
the  province  of  an  academy.  Government  makes  the  private. 
God  alone  creates  the  capable  general. 

Even  in  universities  devoted  to  teaching  exact  science, 
it  is  supposed  that  a  brain  able  to  receive  such  instruc- 
tion is  on  hand.  But  war  is  not  an  exact  science,  as  we 
have  said.  It  can  no  more  be  taught  than  thinking,  and  ca- 
pacity in  that  direction  defies  instruction.  If  we  analyze 
this  military  ability  carefully,  we  find  that  very  little  of  it  is 
intellectual.  The  qualities  that  go  to  make  a  successful 
leader  of  men,  either  armed  or  unarmed,  are  not  intellectual, 
but  matters  of  temperament.  The  self-reliant  force  of  char- 
acter that  never  hesitates  and  gives  to  others  the  confidence 
felt  by  its  possessor,  is  not  the  product  of  brain.  On  the 
contrary,  thought  antagonizes  action.  The  more  we  know, 
the  less  confidence  we  have  in  our  knowledge,  and  doubt,  the 
offspring  of  study,  creates  distrust.  In  the  calculation  of 
chances  one  must  be  quick  to  act.  The  road  to  military  suc- 
cess is  lit  by  flashes  of  lightning  on  scenes  that  shift  as  rap- 
idly as  the  sea,  and,  no  time  is  given  the  leader  for  thought 
and  study.  The  prompt  action  that  sends  fools  in  where 
angels  fear  to  tread,  sometimes  leads  on  to  victory.  There 
is  no  place  in  such  a  field  for 

"  The  kings  of  thought  who  wage  contention  with  their  time's  decay, 
And  of  the  past  are  all  that  will  not  pass  away." 

Given  an  army  well  equipped  for  service,  and  a  clear, 
quick  eye  to  the  topography  of  a  country  to  a  man  so  con- 
fident that  he  will  risk  an  empire  in  a  campaign  and  a  cam- 
paign in  a  battle,  and  we  have  the  higher  qualities  of  a  gen- 
eral. In  this  we  find  a  solution  to  a  mystery  that  has  puzzled 


;,8  Life  of  Thomas. 

men  through  the  history  of  all  the  wars,  and  that  is,  that  in 
the  host  of  men  killers  from  Cain  to  Moltke  two  only  have 
gone  to  record  as  thoughtful  men.  These  two  are  Julius 
Csesar  and  Napoleon  Bonaparte.  The  one  left  us  the  Code 
Napoleon  which  he  did  not  compose,  the  other  his  com- 
mentaries. These  throw  gleams  of  thought  upon  the  brutal 
kill'm0"  that  rendered  them  famous.  We  claim  a  like  dis- 
tinction for  our  hero,  George  H.  Thomas,  who  so  permeated 
his  work  with  intellectual  excellence  that  from  this  alone  he 
won  his  place  upon  the  page  of  history. 

There  is  a  popular  superstition,  prevalent  among  the 
masses,  so  strong  that  even  intellectual  leaders  hesitate  to 
attack  it,  and  that  is  that  the  processes  of  instruction  create 
the  mind  that  it  only  helps  develop.  While  recognizing  in 
actual  life  the  inequality  so  varied  and  wide-spread  that  no 
two  men  are  alike  in  capacity,  we  yet  insist  upon  the  ex- 
cellence of  a  machine  that  is  claimed  to  lift  all  to  a  common 
level.  This  in  the  face  of  the  fact  that  after  graduating  a 
thousand,  one  only  is  found  capable  to  take  his  place  as  a 
leader  among  men.  No  man  selects  a  merchant,  physician, 
or  lawyer  because  such  has  graduated  at  any  college  or  uni- 
versity. In  the  keen  test  of  merit  in  the  world's  arena,  such 
indorsement  goes  for  naught. 

True  education  means  that  development  of  the  intel- 
lectual qualities  which  facilitates  thought.  Popular  educa- 
tion is  a  mere  exercise  of  the  memory.  To  store  away  facts 
without  the  power  to  assimilate  them  is  the  grand  elevating 
process  that  is  to  lift  our  youth  by  platoons  to  the  same 
plane.  Now  memory,  however  necessary  it  may  be  in  its 
normal  condition  to  assist  in  securing  information,  is  not 
mind.  On  the  contrary,  when  made  monstrous  by  over  use 
and  stimulation,  it  eventually  destroys  the  intellectual  facul- 
ties it  was  meant  to  aid.  Popular  education  means  an  abuse 
to  the  memory.  The  net  purport  and  upshot  of  success  in 
the  schools  is  to  make  it  abnormal.  They  turn  us  out  the 
learned  fool.  The  impatient  child  of  genius  who  doubts  or 
disputes  the  fact  given  him  to  swallow,  is  plucked  and  ex- 
pelled, while  the  dull,  plodding  fellow  who  pigeon-holes 


West  Point.  59 

away  a  vast  store  of  facts  he  can  not  comprehend  is  grad- 
uated. 

Our  great  republic  solemnly  decrees  that  this  graduated 
dullness  shall  command  its  armies.  As  we  have  said,  the  so- 
called  art  of  war  is  not  taught  and  can  not  be  taught  at  any 
school,  and  we  have,  therefore,  at  West  Point  that  only 
which  makes  the  private.  When  the  war  came,  all  that  is 
taught  through  training  at  this  school  was  turned  over  to 
civilians,  while  that  which  is  not  found  at  West  Point,  the 
ability  to  command,  was  monopolized  by  the  graduates. 
The  officers  from  civil  life  saved  both  sides  from  immediate 
disaster.  Learning  at  night  what  they  taught  next  day  with 
a  facility  peculiarly  American,  they  lifted  the  armies  North 
and  South  from  armed  mobs  to  a  plane  of  efficient  discipline. 
If  the  graduated  dullness  could  have  responded  with  like 
readiness  to  the  high  commands  so  abruptly  given  them,  we 
would  have  been  saved.the  horrible  slaughter  and  shameful 
defeats  that  make  up  in  the  main  the  history  of  our  four 
years'  war. 

These,  however,  are  not  the  worst  failures  of  our  mili- 
tary system.  It  is  copied  after  that  of  the  English,  where  a 
born  aristocrat  makes  the  officer  and  a  peasant  the  private. 
As  we  have  no  aristocracy  of  birth,  we  strive  to  make  one 
by  commission.  This  is  extremely  difficult,  and  depends 
mainly  on  the  haughty  mein  of  the  officer.  He  must  treat 
the  private  as  a  peasant  or  his  rank  is  endangered,  if  not 
lost.  This  is  called  discipline.  The  old  definition  of  prompt 
obedience  to  military  orders  is  shifted  to  the  humble  deport- 
ment of  an  inferior  to  a  superior  being.  What  makes  this 
difficult  and  at  times  melancholy,  is  the  way  in  which  the 
cadets  are  selected.  The  appointment  is  given  to  members 
of  the  House  of  Representatives  at  Washington,  and  as  it  is 
so  much  political  patronage  in  the  hands  of  politicians,  it  is 
used  as  such.  The  member  takes  his  young  man  from  the 
family  of  the  constituent  having  the  most  political  influ- 
ence, and  as  this  is  often  a  saloon-keeper  or  head  of  a  corner 
grocery,  we  get  little  or  no  aristocracy  in  the  selection. 
From  this  class  we  look  for  our  recruits,  and  it  has  happened 
that  from  the  same  family  that  gave  the  aristocratic  officer 


£0  Life  of  Th&mas. 

came  the  peasant  of  a  private.  It  is  no  uncommon  event  for 
some  loving  old  mother  or  father  to  seek  for  and  worship 
naval  or  army  aristocrat  of  her  or  his  household,  and  to  re- 
turn humiliated  by  the  discovery  that  the  boy  was  ashamed 
of  his  parent. 

All  this  is  foreign  to  our  form  of  government,  and  antag- 
onistic to  the  nature  fostered  through  generations  of  demo- 
cratic teachings  and  traditions.  An  army  is  of  necessity  a 
despotism,  but  it  is  possible  here  as  in  France  to  eliminate 
the  social  difference  that  is  the  more  odious.  It  is  possible 
to  maintain  discipline  on  duty  and  be  comrade  when  off. 
When  an  officer  can  not  only  enforce  military  obedience  upon 
the  private  but  menial  service  at  all  times,  the  army  becomes 
odious,  and  no  self-respecting  American  will  enlist.  This 
opens  the  ranks  to  a  low  order  of  foreigners  or  Americans  so 
debased  that  they  are  really  what  the  system  seeks  to  create, 
social  inferiors.  Whether  the  epaulets  adorn  a  gentleman  or 
not  the  muskets  are  carried  by  servants. 

The  result  of  this  condition  is  that  desertions,  at  the 
present  rate  of  increase,  will  soon  equal  the  number  recruited. 
The  remedy  is  in  putting  the  officers  and  men  on  an  equal 
social  footing.  To  do  this  instead  of  graduating  a  cadet  into 
a  commission  send  him  into  the  ranks  to  serve  one  year  as 
a  private.  At  the  end  of  that  time,  if  he  is  qualified,  make 
him  a  corporal.  After  two  years'  service  as  a  corporal  he 
will  probably  be  eligible  to  the  post  of  sergeant.  From  the 
sergeants  select  the  officers. 

We  learn  little  from  our  own  experience  and  nothing 
from  that  of  others.  An  army  means  a  mass  of  men  so 
trained  as  to  respond  to  an  order  as  one  man.  For  a  thou- 
sand years  the  war  powers  of  Europe  have  been  perfecting 
the  private,  leaving  the  Almighty  to  furnish  the  captain. 
We,  on  the  contrary,  devote  all  our  energies  and  means  to 
making  the  officer.  The  way  we  make  him  as  shown  is 
grotesque.  But  when  done  we  point  with  pride  to  the 
product  and  cry:  "Behold  our  army." 

What  George  H.  Thomas  gained  from  West  Point  was 
Hot  what  the  academy  professed  to  teach.  He  accepted  the 
drill  and  discipline,  and  resumed  the  studies  upon  which  he 


Wesf  Print.  61 

had  graduated  at  the  Southampton  Academy.  But  his 
thoughtful  mind  turned  instinctively  to  the  real  meaning 
underlying  a  military  system,  and  that  he  grasped  at  once. 
He  saw  that  what  West  Point  was  giving  him  as  the  forma- 
tion of  an  officer  really  belonged  to  the  private,  and  the 
ludicrous  lack  of  a  logical  sequence  between  the  premises 
and  conclusion  gave  him  a  clear  view  of  what  had  to  be  done 
in  a  military  way  to  be  practical  and  effective.  His  subse- 
quent career  in  the  great  civil  war  illustrated  and  demon- 
strated the  soundness  of  his  conclusions  that  he  did  not  get 
from  West  Point,  because  West  Point  did  not  teach  them. 

"  To  what,  General,"  asked  the  late  President  Garfield, 
"  do  you  attribute  your  uniform  success  ?" 

The  question  brought  a  blush  to  the  cheek  of  Thomas, 
but  it  also  brought  a  reply  that  should  be  engraved  over 
every  door  at  West  Point. 

"  To  my  men.  I  made  my  army  and  my  army  made  my 
success.  I  learned  at  an  early  day  that  a  good  army  with  a 
poor  commander  was  better  than  a  good  general  with  poor 
men.  Now,  most  of  my  associates  in  the  service  seem  to 
think  that  when  one  received  his  commission  that  he  re- 
ceived an  army,  and  he  planned  campaigns  without  the  force 
to  make  the  campaign  effective.  I  took  my  commission  as 
an  order  to  find  an  army,  and  I  began  from  the  first  to 
organize,  drill  and  discipline  the  men  upon  whom  after  all 
falls  the  real  work  of  the  war.  We  had  splendid  material, 
quick  to  learn  and  ready  to  obey;  one  has  only  to  win  their 
confidence  to  secure  that  staying  power  that  makes  it  neces- 
sary  to  kill  a  man  to  effectually  dispose  of  him.  I  began 
with  a  brigade  and  ended  with  the  army  of  the  Cumberland. 
The  brave  fellows  of  that  noblest  military  force  the  world 
ever  saw  made  the  Rock  of  Chickamauga,  not  I.  On  that 
sunny  September  afternoon  as  they  stood  in  a  half  circle 
facing  the  enemy  that  again  and  again  poured  a  superior 
force  three  lines  deep  upon  our  front,  not  a  man  of  them  but 
knew  that  our  right  had  been  shattered  and  our  left  dis- 
organized, and  yet  the  brave  fellows  plied  their  guns  cool, 
firm  and  determined.  They  made  success  possible  under  all 
circumstances." 


62  Life  of  Thoma*. 

lie  taught  in  the  field  all  that  he  had  thought  out  in  the 
academy,  unaided  by  the  drill  sergeants,  called  professors, 
of  that  sickly  imitation  of  a  bad  original.  The  lesson  writ- 
ten in  blood  and  of  record  in  the  acres  of  graves  in  the 
national  cemeteries  that  tell  of  bloody  defeats  and  shameful 
disasters  remains  unheeded.  We  are  building  mighty  monu- 
ments to  heroes  of  defeat  and  leaving  bronze  and  marble  to 
make  our  imbecility  conspicuous  to  an  amused  world  for  all 
time  to  come.  Were  war  to  be  declared  to-day,  our  govern- 
ment would  again  call  upon  the  cotton-breasted,  full-stomached 
young  men  of  West  Point  to  leave  their  drill  rooms  and  be 
great  generals  by  the  grace  of  God  and  the  magic  process 
of  a  commission. 


West  Point  and  After.  6<i 


CHAPTER   II. 

West  Point  and  After— Services  Preceding  the  Mexican  War—  Ite  Origin 
and  Infamy— Sam.  Houston — Distinguished  Dash  at  Monterey — Reso- 
lutions and  the  Sword. 

George  H.  Thomas  entered  the  Academy  of  West  Point 
let  June,  1836,  and  graduated  in  June,  1840.  His  standing 
is  recorded  as  that  of  twelfth,  and  to  demonstrate  the  value 
of  this,  Wm.  T.  Sherman  is  marked  as  sixth.  Thomas  is 
remembered  by  his  associates  at  the  academy  for  the  same 
qualities  that  marked  him  through  life.  He  was  reserved 
without  being  shy,  silent  and  undemonstrative  yet  not  of- 
fensive, earnest  and  studious  with  yet  enough  quiet  humor 
to  make  him  companionable.  The  more  impetuous  qualities 
of  a  healthy  youth  seemed  to  have  exhausted  themselves  in 
his  earlier  years,  and  although  he  had  none  of  that  unpleas- 
ant condition  known  as  an  old  head  on  young  shoulders,  he 
seemed  self-poised  and  strangely  quiet  in  all  his  ways  for  one 
of  his  years. 

He  passed  from  West  Point  to  service  as  second  lieuten- 
ant in  the  Third  Artillery.  In  November  of  1840,  he  was 
ordered  with  his  company  to  Florida,  where  we  seemed  to 
have  an  endless  war  with  a  handful  of  Seminole  Indians.  He 
saw  the  end  of  that  absurd  affair  when  a  few  blanket  savages, 
aided  by  swamps  and  malaria,  had  put  the  army  of  the 
United  States  at  defiance.  Having  taken  part  under  Major 
Wade  in  the  capture  of  seventy  Seminoles,  he  was  bre vetted 
first  lieutenant  for  gallantry  and  good  conduct.  In  January, 
1842,  he  and  his  company  were  transferred  to  Fort  Moultrie, 
South  Carolina.  In  December  of  1843,  he  was  assigned  to 
Company  C,  stationed  at  Fort  McHenry,  Baltimore.  Pro- 
moted first  lieutenant  30th  April,  1844,  in  October  he  joined 
Company  E,  at  Fort  Moultrie.  He  left  Fort  Moultrie  26th 
June,  1845,  with  his  command,  under  order  to  report  to  Gen- 
eral Zachary  Taylor  at  New  Orleans,  and  on  the  24th  July, 


64  Life  of  Thomas. 

under  command  of  General  Taylor,  sailed  for  Texas,  the 
advance  ordered  for  the  invasion  of  Mexico. 

Thus  the  first  real  military  service  that  Geo.  H.  Thomas 
was  called  upon  to  perform  came  to  him  in  the  war  of  inva- 
sion, that  sent  an  armed  force  to  the  conquest  of  Mexjco. 
That  war  was  a  shameful  affair,  of  interest  to  this  narrative, 
for  it  made  the  war  of  secession  possible.  A  people  can  no 
more  lower  its  standard  of  morality  and  justice  without  the 
evil  consequences  that  follow  the  taint  of  character  than  can 
an  individual.  Neglected  wrongs  in  a  nation  breed  violence, 
but  a  premeditated  national  wrong  lives  through  generations 
and  seems  to  be  without  end.  The  story  of  this  infamy  can 
be  briefly  stated. 

The  slave  power  that  poisoned  our  social  existence  for 
two  hundred  years  and  dominated  our  government  for  over 
half  a  century  demanded  new  lands  to  render  barren,  and 
gave  truth  to  the  manifest  destiny  which  meant  that  slavery 
could  not  be  limited  and  live,  and  called  for  the  conquest  of 
a  continent.  The  spirit  was  as  cowardly  as  it  was  criminal. 
When  we  encountered  a  power  such  as  Great  Britain,  or  even 
Spain,  our  manifest  destiny  weakened  to  polite  demands  and 
humble  negotiations  ;  but  when  it  met  an  inferior,  the  wanton 
aggression  was  not  covered  with  even  a  flimsy  pretense  of 
right.  This  last  is  what  happened  in  the  Mexican  War. 
Texas,  a  part  of  Mexico,  had  been  opened  on  liberal  terms 
to  emigration,  and  with  such  emigrants  went  a  small  body 
from  our  Southern  States  led  and  controlled  by  Sam.  Houston. 
No  more  picturesque  and  purely  American  figure  than  Hous- 
ton ever  appeared  upon  our  historic  page.  Born  in  the 
wilderness,  he  was  bred  by  Indians  to  all  the  ways  and 
habits  of  their  free  hunter's  life,  and  through  all  the  tumult 
of  his  stormy  career  carried  the  intense  personality  that 
grew  in  him  from  his  blood  and  early  training.  When  but 
eighteen  years  old,  he  stood  six  feet  in  stature,  a  splendid 
specimen  of  physical  manhood.  Adopted  by  an  Indian 
chief  as  a  son,  he  developed  into  the  soldier  of  fortune,  and 
when  he  returned  to  the  borders  he  carried  with  him  primi- 
tive, half-savage  views,  with  a  force  of  character  that  not 
only  assimilated  such  views  with  his  rough  existence,  but 


Sam.  Houston.  do 

made  him  a  noted  leader.  Returned  to  Congress,  he  carried 
to  Washington  the  reserved,  dignified  manner  of  the  Indian 
that  made  him  conspicuous  in  his  silent,  solitary  ways.  The 
fact  that,  subsequent  to  a  long  service  in  the  House,  he  beat 
a  member  of  that  honorable  body  nearly  to  death  for  per- 
sonal comments  on  Houston's  conduct  as  agent  of  the  Chero- 
kees,  surprised  no  one  acquainted  with  the  assailant.  While 
governor  of  Tennessee,  he  married  a  lovely  girl  in  January 
of  1829,  and  hearing  that  in  the  marriage  she  had  been  sac- 
rificed to  the  ambition  of  her  parents,  he  resigned  the  gov- 
ernorship, parted  abruptly  with  his  wife,  and  returned  to  his 
savage  life  among  the  Cherokees. 

Three  years  after  this  strange  event,  we  find  him  in 
Texas,  leading  the  revolt  against  Mexico  caused  immediately 
by  the  Mexican  government  enforcing  its  laws  against  slav- 
ery, the  emigrants  from  the  South  having  taken  their  slaves 
to  the  territory  the  masters  had  been  invited  to  occupy.  The 
war  that  followed  was  the  most  savage  ever  witnessed  upon 
our  continent,  and  through  it  all  this  remarkable  man  ap- 
peared as  leader.  The  end  came  in  a  signal  defeat  of  the 
Mexican  forces  and  the  capture  of  their  president. 

The  events  that  followed  uncovered  the  treacherous  char- 
acter of  the  entire  movement  from  its  first  conception.  Our 
government  was  swift  to  recognize  this  bastard  of  its  own 
shame  as  a  new  power.  Then,  of  course,  followed  annexa- 
tion, and  as  soon  as  convenient  the  war  with  Mexico.  This  was 
claimed  to  have  originated  in  a  disputed  boundary.  All  that 
strip  of  territory  lying  between  the  rivers  Nueces  and  the 
Rio  Grande  Del  Norte  was  declared  part  of  our  country  upon 
a  shadowy  claim  that  it  was  part  of  the  annexed  state.  It 
was  inhabited  by  Mexicans.  From  side  to  side  along  its  en- 
tire length  there  was  not  a  solitary  citizen  claiming  allegiance 
to  the  government  of  the  United  States.  This  small  body  of 
so-called  emigrants  from  our  country,  armed  and  supplied 
openly  by  our  citizens,  although  victorious  in  their  rebellion, 
had  no  more  right  to  settle  a  boundary  line  with  Mexico 
without  recognition  than  had  the  Czar  of  Russia  or  the 
Emperor  of  China. 
5 


66  Life  of  Thomas. 

However,  we  were  not  nice.  Possessed  of  the  nature 
and  impulses  of  the  bully,  we  who  had  negotiated  boundary 
lines  with  Great  Britain  with  assurances  of  profound  respect 
and  a  submission  to  the  result  in  a  truly  Christian  spirit,  at 
once  declared  war  and  moved  our  armies  to  the  disputed 
boundary  of  a  weaker  power.  This  war  ended  in  a  peace 
dictated  at  Washington,  in  which,  under  a  pretended  pur- 
chase that  had  but  one  party  to  the  contract,  a  large  part 
of  the  Mexican  territory,  with  all  the  people  therein  con- 
tained, was  added  to  the  United  States. 

We  have  dwelt  upon  this  war  with  Mexico  at  greater 
length  probably  than  our  main  theme  warrants,  but,  as  we 
have  said,  this  unholy  war  was  the  pioneer  wrong  that  opened 
the  way  to  the  war  of  secession.  We  who  sought  to  make  trea- 
son odious  forgot  that  we  in  that  Mexican  affair  made  treachery 
acceptable.  The  people  of  the  seceding  states  were  no  more 
bound  to  their  allegiance  as  citizens  of  the  general  govern- 
ment than  were  the  emigrants  subjects  of  the  power  that 
had  kindly  invited  them  to  become  citizens.  But  while 
commending  the  one  we  condemn  the  other,  forgetting  that 
example  is  more  potent  than  precept,  and  armed  Confeder- 
ates only  presented  to  our  lips  the  cup  we  had  held  to  the 
mouths  of  the  sickened  Mexicans. 

The  field  afforded  the  young  lieutenant  of  artillery  was 
not  wide,  and  save  the  record  of  a  prompt  discharge  of  duty 
and  quiet  coolness  under  fire  there  is  nothing  to  indicate 
the  high  qualities  which  subsequently  made  him  so  conspicu- 
ous. He  seems  to  have  been  of  the  command  under  Gen- 
eral Taylor  that  first  occupied  the  soil  of  Texas,  and,  sub- 
ordinate to  Major  Brown,  made  part  of  the  garrison  of  the 
fort  opposite  Matamoras  that  for  a  week  was  besieged  by 
the  Mexicans.  A  fearful  bombardment  of  five  days  resulted 
in  the  killing  of  Major  Brown  and  one  private.  After  this 
achievement  the  siege  was  raised  in  consequence  of  victories 
won  by  General  Taylor  at  Palo  Alto  and  Resaca  de  la  Palma. 

It  was  at  this  bombardment  that  an  incident  occurred 
singularly  illustrative  of  our  heroes  thoughtfulness  and  qual- 
ity of  calm  observation.  When  the  enemy  opened  upon  the 
little  garrison  from  over  the  river  with  artillery  the  garrison 


Dash  at  Monterey.  t)7 

promptly  responded.  While  merrily  loading  and  firing  at 
tlu>  toe  in  the  distance  the  officer  in  immediate  command 
turned  to  a  young  lieutenant  seated  upon  a  keg  looking  on 
with  a  calm  indifference  that  contrasted  strangely  with  the 
excitement  of  his  associates. 

"  "Well,  Tom,"  he  asked,  "  what  do  you  think  of  our 
service;  good,  eh?"  "  Service  excellent,"  was  the  quiet  re- 
sponse ;  "  but  I  am  thinking  that  we  will  need  after  awhile 
the  ammunition  you  are  throwing  away." 

The  hint  was  taken,  and  the  next  day  proved  the  wis- 
dom of  young  Thomas'  suggestion.  The  garrison  was  em- 
barrassed by  a  lack  of  the  ammunition  they  had  been  so  active 
in  wasting. 

Subsequently  in  the  battles  about  Monterey  young  Thomas 
was  brevetted  captain  for  "  gallant  and  meritorious  services," 
and  one  general,  J.  P.  Henderson,  in  his  enthusiasm,  goes 
so  far  as  to  say,  after  complimenting  young  Thomas  and  his 
men  for  their  "  bold  advance,"  that.  "when  ordered  to  retire, 
he  reloaded  his  piece,  fired  a  farewell  shot  at  the  foe,  and  re- 
tired under  a  shower  of  bullets."  George  II.  Thomas  was  a 
young  man  at  the  time  when  this  extra  shot  was  contributed 
to  the  poor  Mexicans,  and  it  may  be  that  for  once  in  his  life 
he  exhibited  a  force  of  impulse  ever  after  so  foreign  to  his 
nature.  We  are  inclined  to  believe,  however,  that  the  noble 
general  of  volunteers  drew  on  his  imagination  for  this  ques- 
tionable act  of  individual  audacity.  The  fame  of  the  young 
officer  thus  made  conspicuous  by  General  Henderson's  ac- 
count of  "another  shot"  and  the  unpleasant  "shower  of 
bullets "  reached  the  home  of  Thomas,  and  the  citizens 
thereof  were  much  excited.  A  meeting  was  called  at 
Jerusalem  and  Captain  James  Magill  was  selected  to  pre- 
side. "Colonel  Wra.  C.  Parker,"  the  rural  press  of  that 
locality  informs  us,  "  in  his  naturally  eloquent  and  happy 
style,  proceeded  to  deliver  a  spirit-stirring  eulogy  upon  the 
character  and  conduct  of  our  hero."  He  then  proposed  "  the 
following  resolutions,  which  were  adopted  by  acclamation," 
and  are  so  dignified  and  forcible  that  we  copy  them  entire : 

"Resolved,  That  whilst  we  glory  in  the  unfailing  fame 
which  our  heroic  army  in  Mexico  has  acquired  for  herself 


68  Life  of  Thomas. 

and  country,  our  attention  haa  been  especially  drawn  to  the 
military  skill,  bravery,  and  noble  deportment  of  our  fellow- 
countryman,  George  H.  Thomas,  exhibited  in  the  campaign 
of  Florida,  at  Fort  Brown,  Monterey,  and  Buena  Vista,  in 
which  he  has  given  ample  proof  of  the  best  requisites  of  a 
soldier— patience,  fortitude,  firmness,  and  daring  intrepidity. 

"Resolved,  That  as  a  testimonial  of  our  high  appreciation 
of  his  character  as  a  citizen  and  a  soldier,  we  will  present  to 
him  a  sword,  with  suitable  emblems  and  devices,  and  that  a 
committee  be  appointed  to  collect  a  sum  sufficient  for  the 
purpose,  and  cause  to  be  fabricated  a  sword  to  be  presented 
to  the  said  George  H.  Thomas,  through  the  hands  of  his 
noble  and  heroic  commander,  Major-Gcneral  Z.  Taylor." 

Fourteen  years  after  this  presentation  of  a  sword, 
Thomas'  neighbors,  friends,  and  relatives  were  startled  by 
his  adhesion  to  the  cause  of  the  government  in  the  war  which 
broke  with  such  violence  upon  the  country.  Their  grief  waa 
only  rivaled  by  their  wrath  and  indignation. 

Of  course  nothing  reached  home  about  young  Thomas 
save  the  report  that  claimed  for  him  the  highest  courage. 
All  the  higher  qualities  that  subsequently  made  him  famous, 
were  quite  unknown.  On  the  contrary,  the  enthusiastic 
brigadier  had  given  him  a  dash  which  he  did  not  possess, 
but  the  bravery  was  sufficient.  This  was  the  one,  and  about 
the  only  quality  popularly  believed  to  be  essential  to  men  so 
ignorant  of  real  war,  that  recruits  armed  themselves  with 
revolvers  and  huge  bowie-knives,  firmly  believing  that  the 
conflict  was  to  be  fought  out  in  personal  encounters,  when 
the  pluck  of  the  individual  was  to  tell  in  the  result.  This 
was  especially  the  condition  in  the  South,  and  after  the  first 
few  months  of  actual  service,  their  revolvers  and  knives 
thrown  away  as  useless  incurnbrances,  marked  the  location 
of  every  deserted  camping  ground. 

The  resolutions,  handsomely  engraved,  and  the  "  fabri- 
cated sword,"  were  duly  forwarded  to  the  young  Virginian. 
The  sword  in  itself  was  well  worth  preservation,  aside  from 
the  kind  motives  that  proposed  its  presentation.  "We  get  a 
description  of  it  from  the  Philadelphia  Bulletin,  while  the 
weapon  was  on  public  exhibition :  "  The  pattern  of  the 


Meritorious  Conduct  at  Buena   Vitta.  69 

Baber,'*  we  are  told,  "  is  that  used  by  the  United  States 
dragoons.  The  blade  is  of  the  truest  and  prettiest  steel,  fin- 
ished in  a  manner  that  defies  superior  workmanship.  The 
scabbard  is  of  solid  silver,  standard  value,  beautifully  en- 
riched with  engraved  scroll-work  encircling  military  trophies 
with  the  words  '  Florida,  Ft.  Brown,  Monterey,  Buena 
"Vista/  and  an  engraved  vignette  of  the  battle  of  Monterey. 
The  hilt  is  of  basket  form,  very  elaborately  chased.  The 
grip  is  solid  silver,  also  enriched  writh  engraved  scrolls.  The 
pommel  is  of  gold,  grasping  an  amethyst,  and  the  rings  and 
bands  in  bas-relief,  and  upon  the  grip  is  engraved  an  ele- 
phant." 

In  the  battle  of  Buena  Vista,  22d  and  23d  July,  1847, 
Lieutenant  Thomas  was  brevetted  major  "  for  gallant  and 
meritorious  conduct  on  the  field."  General  Taylor,  in  his 
official  report  said  in  reference  to  the  subalterns  of  the  artil- 
lery, including  Thomas  by  name :  They  were  nearly  all  de- 
tached at  different  times,  and  in  every  situation  exhibited 
conspicuous  skill  and  gallantry." 

Captain  T.  W.  Sherman  reports:  "I  was  directed  to 
take  my  battery  back  to  the  plateau,  where  I  joined  Lieuten- 
ant Thomas,  who  had  been  constantly  engaged  during  the 
forenoon  in  the  preservation  of  that  important  position,  and 
whom  I  found  closely  engaged  with  the  enemy,  and  that,  too, 
in  a  very  advanced  position.  Lieutenant  Thomas  more  than 
sustained  the  reputation  he  has  long  enjoyed  in  his  regiment, 
as  an  accurate  and  scientific  artillerist." 

General  Wool  gave  to  the  artillery  the  credit  of  having 
gained  the, signal  victory  over  a  force  far  superior  to  ours  in 
numbers.  He  says  in  his  report:  "I  also  desire  to  express 
my  high  admiration,  and  to  offer  my  warmest  thanks  to  Cap- 
tains Washington,  Sherman,  and  Bragg,  and  Lieutenants 
O'Brien  and  Thomas,  and  their  batteries,  to  whose  services 
at  this  point,  and  on  every  part  of  the  field,  I  think  it  but 
justice  to  say  we  are  mainly  indebted  for  the  great  victory  so 
successfully  achieved  by  our  arms  over  the  great  force  op- 
posed to  us — more  than  twenty  thousand  men  and  seventeen 
pieces  of  artillery.  Without  our  artillery  we  could  not  have 
maintained  our  position  for  an  hour." 


70  Life  of  Thomas. 

There  is  good  ground  for  doubt  as  to  the  numerical  su- 
periority of  the  Mexican  force.  It  has  been  learned  through 
fxpi-riem-e  in  our  late  civil  war,  that  this  numerical  superi- 
ority oreatly  depends  upon  which  side  furnishes  the  report. 
Tin  "re  was  not  much  credit  to  be  gained  to  our  little  army 
iu  its  Mexican  war  if  the  estimate  of  Mexican  capacity  in 
.•ampaigns,  and  courage  in  the  field,  is  to  be  accepted  from 
official  reports  on  our  side.  In  this  the  army  does  itself  an 
injustice.  It  marched  triumphantly  from  coast  to  capitol, 
dfU'ating  these  same  Mexicans  who  subsequently  so  gallantly 
held  their  own  against  the  power  of  the  French  army. 

The  battle  of  Buena  Yista  terminated  tbe  services  of 
George  H.  Thomas  in  Mexico.  After  that  war  he  was  on 
duty  at  Brazos  Santiago  until  1st  of  February,  1849.  After 
he  served  at  Fort  Adams  until  12th  of  September  of  the  same 
year,  when  the  interminable  Seminole  war  breaking  out 
airain,  he  was  ordered  to  Florida.  There  was  not  much 
fame  to  be  garnered  from  such  a  war,  and  yet  the  young 
officer  gained  all  that  was  to  be  gathered  in  the  province 
given  him  by  his  superior  officers.  Any  work  calling  for 
prompt  execution  with  an  accompanying  responsibilty  of  a 
separate  command  devolved  upon  him.  The  traits  of  char- 
acter that  subsequently  rendered  him  famous  were  early  well 
developed.  There  was  no  claim  on  his  part  for  service  or 
promotion.  He  was  not  the  man  to  shoulder  his  way 
through  life,  for  he  was  not  only  without  the  selfish  motive, 
but  without  the  necessity.  His  devotion  to  duty,  his  solid, 
sterling  sense  that  made  his  superiors  first  consult  and  then 
employ,  brought  to  him  as  his  right  what  others  had  to 
struggle  for.  No  soldier  ever  .lived  who  had  a  deeper, 
stronger  sense  of  the  discipline  that  is  the  soul  of  the 
service,  than  George  H.  Thomas.  That  he  could  be  advised 
with  by  his  officer  in  command  and  then  ordered  to  execute 
what  probably  he  had  suggested  without  impairing  the  deli- 
cate, yet  well  defined,  relation  between  the  two,  was  a  rare 
excellence  that  all  felt  who  came  in  contact  with  him.  He 
lived  his  life  upon  a  high  plane  that  had  in  it  no  vanity,  no 
self-assertion,  and  was  guided  first  by  his  keen  sense  of  per- 
sonal honor,  and  second  only  to  that  by  his  pride  of  pro- 


Marriage.  71 

fession  that  made  his  calling  as  sacred  to  him  as  if  it  were 
his  religion.  It  was  more  a  matter  of  temperament,  per- 
haps, than  intellectual  conviction.  The  fine,  delicate  and 
yet  healthy,  compact  fiber  that  made  his  manhood  held  him 
to  what  he  was.  He  had  the  strongest  personality  ever 
given  a  man,  and  it  was  built  up  through  generations  of  the 
best  our  American  life  could  give.  The  serious  earnestness 
that  he  shared  with  the  Indian  was  modified  by  a  quick 
adaptibility  gained  through  two  generations  of  life  when 
each  generation  takes  from  our  American  individuality  some 
new  trait  in  its  peculiar  environments. 

An  instance  of  this  prompt  seizure  of  responsiblity  is 
given  at  the  time  we  treat  of.  In  a  voyage  from  Charleston 
to  New  York  in  a  vessel  carrying  the  lieutenant's  troops,  a 
violent  storm  arose  and  Thomas's  attention  was  attracted  to 
the  inebriate  captain  of  the  sloop.  The  wild  orders  of  this 
man  that  the  crew  obeyed  were  endangering  the  safety  of 
the  vessel  and  all  on  board.  The  first  officer  under  the  cap- 
tain admitted  this  to  Thomas,  but  said  that  he  had  to  obey 
orders  or  be  punished  for  mutiny.  Thomas  promptly  took 
the  responsibility  of  imprisoning  the  captain  in  his  state 
room,  and,  turning  the  command  over  to  the  first  officer, 
saved  the  vessel. 

On  the  7th  of  November,  1852,  George  H.  Thomas  was 
united  in  marriage  to  Miss  Frances  L.  Kellogg,  of  Troy, 
New  York.  That  it  was  a  love  match  goes  without  saying. 
The  youthful  lieutenant,  if  aware  of  the  social  privileges  per- 
taining to  his  commission  that  enables  so  many  poor  officers 
to  marry  into  wealthy  families,  set  such  aside  and  attached 
himself  for  life  to  the  accomplished  and  beautiful  woman 
whose  grace  and  dignity  were  such  fitting  additions  to  his 
own  noble  life.  Mrs.  Thomas  was  robbed  of  much  of  the 
happiness  due  such  an  admirable  union  by  her  husband's  ab- 
sorbing devotion  to  military  duty.  But  their  lives — or 
rather  their  life — for  it  was  one  in  both,  proved  prosperous 
in  the  tenderness,  devotion,  and  confidence  that  gave  a  rest 
from  turmoil  of  life  to  our  hero  and  a  home  to  both. 

During  the  administration  of  President  Franklin  Pierce 
with  Jefferson  Davis,  Secretary  of  War,  3d  March,  1855,  two 


72  Life,  of  Thomas. 

regiments  of  cavalry  and  two  of  infantry  were  added  to  the 
regular  army.  To  the  second  cavalry  George  H.  Thomas 
was  promoted  from  a  captain  to  the  position  of  major.  The 
fact  that  this  second  regiment  was  officered  by  Jefferson 
Davis  from  the  Southern  States  impressed  General  Thomas 
that  the  Secretary  of  War  anticipated  at  that  time  the  armed 
conflict  over  the  Union  that  afterwards  broke  out,  Thomas 
was  in  error  about  this.  While  Jefferson  Davis  saw  at  an 
early  day  that  secession  was  inevitable,  he  saw  no  war,  nor 
conld  he  be  made  to  believe  that  such  a  dread  calamity  would 
ever  occur.  In  common  with  all  prominent  men  of  the 
South,  he  thought  the  business  instincts  and  peaceful  habits 
of  the  North,  together  with  the  sympathy  so  freely  bestowed 
in  behalf  of  the  slave-owners,  would  force  the  free  states  to 
submit  to  a  peaceful  separation.  It  was  the  misfortune  of 
each  side  to  be  profoundly  ignorant  of  the  other.  While 
President-elect  Lincoln  laughed  and  jeered  at  the  belief  that 
the  South  meant  war,  Davis,  Toombs,  Yancey,  and  Stephens 
sneered  at  the  Northern  people,  the  millions  of  merchants, 
mechanics,  and  farmers  offering  to  fight  if  the  South  once 
moved  out  of  the  Union. 

It  is  well  for  us,  however,  that  such  was  the  condition. 
Had  the  gift  of  prophesy  fallen  either  upon  Lincoln  or  Davis 
after  the  presidential  election  that  gave  the  administration 
to  the  Republicans,  the  one  would  not  have  sat  calmly  at  the 
new  capitol  of  the  South  waiting  for  Virginia  to  pass  her  act 
of  secession,  nor  would  the  other  have  given  his  time  to  a 
consideration  of  a  million  claims  to  office.  Jefferson  Davis 
could  and  would  have  seized  Washington,  and  President 
Lincoln,  at  Philadelphia,  would  probably  have  been  negotiat- 
ing for  a  peaceful  settlement  of  a  broken  Union.  No,  for- 
tunately for  us  and  for  all,  the  clouds  of  war  were  hid  behind 
a  dim  horizon  and  the  Southern  leaders  were  listening  en- 
tranced to  the  cry  that  gathered  strength  from  the  conserva- 
tives and  abolitionists  of  "  let  the  erring  sisters  depart  in 
peace,"  when  the  gun  at  Sumter  caught  its  echo  in  the 
roar  of  a  people's  wrath  and  the  leaders  on  both  sides  were 
stunned.  Jefferson  Davis  wakened  to  the  fact  that  he  had 
lost  his  golden  opportunity  when  with  a  regiment  of  raw 


West  Pointers  go  South.  73 

militia  he  could  have  taken  the  national  capitol,  while  Presi- 
dent Lincoln  turned  from  his  horde  of  hungry  office  seekers 
to  accept  the  regiments  that  poured  into  Washington  to  fight 
for  the  Union. 

As  for  West  Point,  Jefferson  Davis  believed  that  there 
was  no  necessity  to  fill  offices  of  regiments  from  Southern 
States  for  secession  purposes.  He  claimed  to  have  all  West 
Point.  He  openly  boasted  that  he  could  "  have  his  pick  in 
case  of  civil  war  of  West  Point,"  and  it  was  no  idle  boast. 
A  majority  of  West  Pointers  went  South,  and,  as  the  world 
believes  to-day,  the  ablest  lot.  It  is  not  difficult  to  under- 
stand that  this  was  from  honest  sense  of  duty.  In  our 
anxiety  to  create  an  aristocracy  from  which  to  select  our 
pfficers,  in  imitation  of  the.  English  army,  we  have  secured  a 
sort  of  aristocracy  without  getting  the  officers.  The 
Almighty  haa  not  seen  fit  to  endow  the  graduates  with  niili- 
ta,ry  qualities,  to  say  nothing  of  his  refusal  to  give  that  little 
school  a  monopoly  of  military  talent.  The  consequence  is, 
that  it  had  come  to  be  in  President  Lincoln's  time,  and  is 
for  that  matter  yet,  a  social  affair.  Now,  previous  to  the 
late  war,  all  our  aristocracy  pertained  to  the  South,  and 
with  that  class  West  Point  sympathized.  An  abolitionist  in 
the  eyes  of  both  was  a  low,  scurvy  fellow,  not  to  be  tolerated 
for  an  instant.  President  Lincoln  in  their  eyes  was  a  vulgar, 
plow-born  rail- splitter,  and  his  mass  of  followers  no  better 
than  socialists,  to  use  the  mildest  terms. 

TRUE  REFORM  Is  NEVER  RESPECTABLE. 

"These  men  are  not  gentlemen,"  said  a  disgusted  dame 
from  the  Fabourg  St.  Germain,  after  being  introduced  to  the 
conspirators  who  overthrew  the  republic  of  France  to  make 
way  for  the  empire. 

"  My  dear,"  was  the  significant  response  of  the  brilliant 
woman  who  took  part  in  that  infamy,  "we  do  not  make  rev- 
olutions out  of  gentlemen." 

Wrong  ever  sits  crowned  with  jewels  under  its  silken 
canopy,  and  smiles  with  dignified  contempt  upon  the  hungry 
and  naked  wretches  who  would  demolish  the  throne  to  get 
at  the  treasure  of  which  they  have  been  robbed.  And  they 


74  Life  of  Thomas. 

who  are  not  yet  deprived  of  all  and  able  to  destroy  the  im- 
pudent usurpation  are  cowed  by  epithets.  When  our  Savior 
left  his  divine  mission  on  earth  to  win  its  way  alone,  to  be 
rulK'd  a  Christian  was  to  become  lost  under  a  loathsome  ava- 
laiu-he  of  tilth  that  buried  civil  rights  and  character  together. 
It  seems  strange  even  now  that  to  be  an  abolitionist  previous 
to  the  late  war  was  to  not  only  lose  cast  socially,  but  subject 
the  poor  philanthropist  to  a  suspicion  of  dishonesty.  He  was 
regarded  as  a  negro  thief,  although  his  larceny  gave  no  other 
return  than  to  be  egged  in  Boston  and  hanged  in  South 
Carolina. 

To  become  a  soldier  of  West  Point  one  ceases,  so  far  as 
political  rights  are  concerned,  to  be  a  citizen.  The  blind 
obedience  to  the  powers  that  be  taught  at  the  academy  leaves 
nothing  to  the  graduate  but  his  social  privileges,  and  of 
course  these  become  precious.  It  has  since  the  war,  under 
the  domination  of  trade  instincts  of  greed,  been  discovered 
that  cadetships  were  sold  for  money.  The  interesting  part 
of  the  result  was  the  market  value  of  a  cadetship.  This 
amounted  to  five  thousand  dollars.  Now,  when  one  remem- 
bers that  in  time  of  peace  the  graduates  can  never  hope  in  a 
long  line  of  service  to  be  more  than  a  captain,  the  value  de- 
pends on  some  other  privilege  than  rank  and  pay.  It  is  the 
social  standing  that  is  paid  for.  Seats  in  the  Senate  are  on 
m.irket  for  the  same  purpose.  There  is  money,  however,  in 
both.  A  cadet  can  marry  a  rich  girl  and  generally  does  so, 
and  the  Wall  street  operator  who  buys  his  chair  in  the  Senate 
as  he  buys  his  seat  at  the  Stock  Exchange  gains  confidence 
from  his  senatorial  robes  that  are  thus  made  to  cover  transac- 
tions dangerously  near  theft. 

To  be  fair  and  just  to  the  little  military  school,  we  must 
remember,  as  we  have  said,  that  patriotism  is  as  little  taught 
as  the  art  of  war.  That  blind  obedience  which  is  considered 
essential  to  a  soldier  precludes  political  instruction,  and 
without  that  patriotism  is  a  blind  impulse,  and  it  -is  small 
wonder  that  the  poor  officers  were  puzzled  between  the 
claims  of  state  and  their  allegiance  to  the  government. 
They  solved  the  to  them  troublesome  problem  by  clinging  to 
old  associations  and  following  the  familiar  and  pleasant  social 


Slaveholding  Experience.  75 

lights.  The  case  of  General  Robert  E.  Lee  is  one  in  point. 
This  leader  of  the  Confederate  armies  hung  doubtful  be- 
tween a  sense  of  duty  to  his  government  and  the  loving  asso- 
ciation of  family  and  friends  that  the  claim  of  his  native 
state  held  on  his  heart.  He  could  not  continue  in  the  service 
and  so  make  war  on  his  own  people.  He  shrunk  from  offer- 
ing his  services  to  a  cause  that  he  knew  and  confessed  in 
writing  to  be  so  uncalled  for  as  to  be  treasonable.  He  could 
not  resign  and  retire  to  private  life  while  ringing  in  his  ears 
were  the  cries  of  his  own  kin  and  people  for  aid  in  a  death- 
struggle.  He  ended  by  laying  down  the  sword  of  a  subordi- 
nate and  taking  up  that  of  a  leader  in  behalf  of  a  state 
against  a  nation.  How  differently  a  clear  brain  and  a 
stronger  character  solved  this  same  question  we  will  consider 
directly. 

An  event  occurred  about  this  time  that  throws  a  strong 
side  light  upon  the  character  and  convictions  of  George  H.. 
Thomas.  While  in  Texas,  finding  that  he  could  not  have  a 
servant  for  his  family,  he  bought  a  colored  woman.  When 
recalled  from  Texas  economy  dictated  that  he  should  sell 
again  the  human  chattel  he  had  purchased.  This  he  could 
not  bring  himself  to  do.  He  might  buy,  "  but  he  could  not 
sell  a  human  being,"  to  use  his  own  words.  Opposed  to 
slavery  he  was  not  an  abolitionist,  for  he  recognized  as  sacred 
the  guarantees  of  the  constitution  that  he  was  so  soon  to 
assist  in  tearing  from  the  national  charter  with  bayonets. 
While  true  to  himself  he  was  conservative  to  all  others,  and 
in  the  consideration  of  all  moral  questions  gave  to  his  fellow 
the  same  freedom  he  reserved  to  himself.  As  it  was  a  mat- 
ter belonging  exclusively  to  himself  and  his  God,  he  recog- 
nized in  his  fellow-men  the  same  responsibility  and,  the 
same  security  from  human  interference.  While  always  for 
reform  he  had  in  him  nothing  of  the  reformer.  He  had  lit- 
tle patience  with  the  man  who,  not  content  with  walking 
himself  in  the  direction  of  the  sunlight,  sought,  as  a  special 
agent  of  God,  to  drag  others  into  the  same  path.  He  would  not 
sell  the  woman,  and  there  was  nothing  left  but  to  take  her  with 
him  at  an  expense  he  could  illy  endure  to  his  home  in  Virginia. 
Her  subsequent  history  illustrates  the  difficulty  attending  the 


Lift  of  Thomas. 

Mtt-mpt  to  lift  a  race  of  slaves,  made  such  through  genera- 
tions of  servitude,  to  au  equality  of  freedom  with  the  master 
in  one  gem-ration.  Major  Thomas  had  really  liberated  the 
slave  he  purchased.  To  make  her  free,  however,  was  diffi- 
cult. When  the  war  sent  the  poor  creatures  out  to  struggle 
for  a  subsistence  they  had  not  been  trained  to  meet  or  make 
possible,  this  poor  woman  persistently  clung  to  the  man  who 
had  bought  her  but  would  not  sell  again.  She  came,  not 
only  herself,  but  with  husband  and  children.  Major  Thomas 
made  kindly  and  with  patience  many  efforts  to  throw  the 
poor  family  on  their  own  resources  and  train  them  to  live 
independently  in  their  new  condition.  It  could  not  be  done, 
and  the  family  remained  dependent  upon  him  so  long  as  he 
was  alive  to  meet  their  pitiful  demands. 

The  Second  Cavalry,  of  which  Thomas  was  major,  went 
to  Texas  under  orders,  and  he  joined  his  command  in  that 
stiiu-  May  the  1st,  1856.  In  1859,  the  Texas  reserve  Indians 
being  assigned  to  the  Indian  Territory,  Major  Thomas  com- 
manded the  escort.  Under  orders  he  explored  the  region 
lying  about  the  head-waters  of  the  Canadian  and  Red  rivers. 
His  turn  for  study,  and  the  long  habit  of  close  observation, 
made  the  service  of  great  benefit  to  the  government.  In- 
deed, the  records  of  the  War  Department  give  a  singular 
history  of  explorations  and  study  on  the  part  of  this  accom- 
plished officer  in  whatever  new  country  his  services  found 
him.  They  prove  him  to  have  been  well  versed  in  botany 
and  geology.  The  boy  who  could  make  his  own  saddle  and 
shoes  had  developed  into  the  man  who  not  only  could  but 
would  utilize  evepy  occasion  for  investigation  and  thought. 
The  department  found  this  habit  so  available  in  its  excep- 
tional major  of  cavalry  that  in  1860  he  was  sent  to  ex- 
plore the  sources  of  the  Concho  and  Colorado  rivers. 
The  work  of  this  single  officer  contrasts  strikingly  with 
the  expedition  sent  subsequently  to  triangulate  unknown 
regions,  made  up  mainly  of  Congressional  dependents,  such 
as  sons  and  friends  of  members  who  voted  heavy  appro- 
priations to  pay  the  expenses  of  these  scientific  picnics.  We 
have  at  this  writing  a  huge  bureau  at  Washington  held 


77 

together  and  perpetuated  by  a  system  of  lobby  triangulation 
far  more  effective  than  that  in  mythical  canons. 

In  this  expedition  Major  Thomas  received  his  only 
wound  in  life.  In  a  skirmish  with  the  Indians  an  arrow 
passed  through  his  chin,  pinning  it  down  in  a  most  pain- 
ful manner  to  his*  breast  that  it  had  entered.  He  quietly 
drew  the  arrow  from  the  wound  and  continued  the  pursuit. 
As  this  gives  us  the  only  instance  of  a  wound  received  by 
our  hero,  although  ever  at  the  front  and  in  peril  when  pres- 
ent in  an  engagement,  we  reproduce  from  his  report  an  ac- 
count of  the  affair.  It  is  an  extract  from  his  report  of  Au- 
gust 31,  1860 : 

"I  have  the  honor  to  submit  for  the  information  of  the 
department  commander,  the  following  report  of  the  opera- 
tions of  the  expedition  under  my  command,  to  the  head- 
waters of  the  Concho  and  Colorado  rivers,  during  the 
months  of  July  and  August.  .  .  .  On  the  morning  of  the 
25th  inst.,  about  fourteen  miles  east  of  the  mountain  pass, 
one  of  the  Indian  guides  discovered  a  fresh  horse  trail  cross- 
ing the  road.  As  soon  as  the  packs  could  be  arranged  and 
our  wagons  dispatched  with  the  remains  of  our  baggage  to 
the  post,  with  the  teams  (two  sick — the  hospital  steward  and 
a  private  of  the  band — too  sick  to  ride)  I  followed  the  trail 
with  all  the  remainder  of  the  detachment  and  three  guides,  in 
a  west-north-west  direction  for  about  forty  miles  that  day, 
traveling  as  long  as  we  could  see  the  trail  after  nightfall. 

"  On  the  26th,  about  7  A.  M.,  the  Delaware  guide  dis- 
covered the  Indians,  eleven  in  number,  at  camp.  He  and 
their  spy  discovered  each  other  about  the  same  time,  and 
giving  mo  the  signal  agreed  upon,  the  party  moved  at  once 
in  a  gallop  for  a  mile  and  a  half  before  coming  in  sight  of 
their  camp,  which  was  located  on  the  opposite  side  of  a  deep 
ravine  (running  north,  and,  I  presume,  into  the  Clear  Fork), 
impassable  except  at  a  few  points.  Here  we  lost  consider- 
able time  searching  for  a  crossing,  and  only  succeeded,  finally, 
in  getting  over  by  dismounting  and  leading  our  animals.  In 
the  meantime,  the  Indians,  being  already  mounted  and  hav- 
ing their  animals  collected  together,  had  increased  their 
distance  from  us  by  at  least  half  a  mile.  As  soon  a&  the 


78  Life  of  Thomas. 

crossing  was  effected  and  the  men  remounted,  we  pursued 
them  at  full  speed  for  about  three  miles  and  a  half  further, 
pushing  them  so  closely  that  they  abandoned  their  loose  ani- 
mals and  continued  their  flight,  effecting  their  escape  solely 
from  the  fact  that  our  animals  had  been  completely  ex- 
hausted by  the  fatiguing  pace  at  which  th'e  pursuit  had  been 
kept  up.  As  we  were  gradually  overhauling  them,  one  fel- 
low, more  persevering  than  the  rest,  and  who  still  kept  his 
position  in  the  rear  of  the  loose  animals,  suddenly  dismounted 
and  prepared  to  fight,  and  our  men,  in  their  eagerness  to  dis- 
patch him,  hurried  upon  him  so  quickly  that  several  of  his 
arrows  took  effect,  wounding  myself  in  the  chin  and  chest, 
also  private  William  Murphy,  of  Company  "  D,"  in  the  left 
shoulder,  and  privates  John  Tile  and  Caspar  Siddle,  of  the 
band,  each  in  the  leg,  before  he  fell,  by  twenty  or  more 
shots.  ...  By  this  time  the  main  body  of  the  Indians, 
who  were  mounted  on  their  best  animals,  were  at  least  two 
miles  from  us,  retiring  at  a  rapid  pace,  and  it  being  impos- 
sible to  overtake  them,  on  account  of  the  exhausted  condi- 
tion of  our  animals,  the  pursuit  was  discontinued." 

In  October,  1860,  Major  Thomas  solicited  a  leave  of  ab- 
sence. It  was  his  only  request  for  such  indulgence  in 
twenty  years  active  service.  This  devotion  to  duty  con- 
tinued throughout  life.  There  was  no  political  significance 
in  this  asked  for  leave  of  absence,  but  Major  Thomas  came 
North  possessed  of  the  knowledge  that  General  Twiggs  and 
the  main  body  of  officers  under  him  were  unfriendly,  to  use 
the  mildest  terms,  to  the  government  that  had  so  unex- 
pectedly passed  to  the  control  of  what  was  considered  at  the 
South  the  abolition  party. 

Now,  although  the  Southern  leaders  meant  mischief  and 
were  loud  in  their  threats,  we  have  to  bear  in  mind  that  the 
main  body  of  Southern  people  were  loyal  to  the  old  Repub- 
lic. It  was  with  extreme  difficulty  that  the  ordinance  of  se- 
cession was  passed  through  any  legislature,  and  in  some  this 
was  done  fraudulently.  There  is  no  question  that  had  the 
proposed  secession  been  put  to  a  vote  before  the  bombard- 
ment of  Fort  Sumter,  it  would  have  been  defeated.  What 
changed  this  condition  we  will  refer  to  hereafter.  But  the 


A  Notable  Accident.  7f< 

impression  made  upon  Major  Thomas's  mind  by  General 
Twiggs's  utterances  and  the  vaporing  talk  of  officers  about 
head-quarters  is  scarcely  worth  remembering. 

It  was  during  this  leave  of  absence  while  journeying 
from  Richmond  to  Washington  by  rail  that  Major  Thomas 
met  with  an  accident  that  gave  color  to  and  was  felt  through 
all  his  subsequent  career.  In  stepping  from  a  railroad  train 
in  the  dark,  he  was  thrown  into  a  ditch  with  such  violence 
that  his  spine  was  so  effected  that  for  months  after  it  ap- 
peared as  if  he  was  shut  out  from  active  life.  This  must  be 
borne  in  mind,  for  it  becomes  strongly  significant  in  consid- 
ering George  H.  Thomas's  attitude  toward  the  government 
when  secession  was  rapidly  developing  into  war. 


80  Life  of  Thomas. 


CHAPTER  III. 

Thomas  Announces  His  Allegiance  tp  the  Government— Loyal  from  the 
First— Difference  in  Temperament  that  Made  His  Course  the  Reverse 
of  that  of  Lee — Question  of  the  Right  to  Secede. 

The  wrath  aroused  iu  the  Southern  mind  at  so  distin- 
guished an  officer  as  this  one  of  Virginia  birth  remaining 
steadfast  in  his  loyalty  to  the  Federal  Government,  found 
expression  in  an  impugnment  of  his  motives.  The  Southern 
impulse  ran  largely  on  sentiment.  That  one  should  coldly 
reason  out  his  duty  and  calmly  abide  by  the  result,  in  the  face 
of  affection  on  one  side  and  an  abstract  political  doctrine  on 
the  other,  was  quite  beyond  the  comprehension  of  the  hot- 
headed rnen  w)io  plunged  us  into  the  cruelest  war  that  ever 
afflicted  humanity. 

It  is  generally  safe,  in  considering  the  conduct  of  a  man, 
to  consult  his  character  as  well  as  career.  However  conflict- 
ing, even  to  positive  inconsistency,  may  be  his  conduct,  a 
study  of  his  temperament  and  intellectual  qualities  will 
throw  light  upon  his  motives  and  solve  what  at  first  sight 
seems  a  profound  mystery.  We  know  what  Thomas  inher- 
ited in  his  Huguenot  blood  on  one  side  and  Welsh-English 
on  the  other.  Slow  to  determine,  he  was  steadfast  in  his  re- 
solve. Whatever  may  have  been  his  intellectual  lights,  he 
was  guided  by  them  and  not  by  his  feelings. 

To  appreciate  this,  let  us  take  Robert  E.  Lee.  The  dis- 
ruption of  the  Union  was  to  this  eminent  leader  very  pain- 
ful to  think  of.  Every  drop  of  his  blood  came  from  heroes 
of  the  Revolution.  He  had  been  reared  to  the  high  patriotic 
regard,  born  of  Virginia  soil,  for  the  great  Republic  that  a 
host  of  immortal  dead  had  given  all  their  days  and  many 
their  lives  to  build  above  him.  A.  soldier  by  profession,  a 
patriot  by  his  birth,  he  had  followed  the  flag  of  his  fathers 
through  all  his  youth,  ready  to  die  fighting  for  its  honor. 
We  know  this ;  no  man  questions  it.  He  has  left  proofs  strong 


Lee.  fijtit  'J'/>om"s. 

as  those  of  Holy  Writ  of  his  inner  consciousness  when  the 
time  came  to  test  his  patriotism.  It  was  a  crucial  test.  He 
saw  on  one  side  the  great  Republic  that  as  a  soldier  he  had 
sworn  to  defend  against  all  comers  in  the  true  spirit  of  the 
knights  of  old,  sanctioned  by  the  noblest  appreciation  of  the 
best  men  and  sanctified  by  the  fame  of  Washington,  Jefferson, 
Madison,  Patrick  Henry,  and  a  host  of  heroes  Virginia  born  ; 
and  on  the  other,  the  dark  horde  of  armed  men  gathering  to 
strike  down  all  that  he  held  dear.  But  they  were  his  people. 
He  knew  that  they  were  wrong — indeed  criminal,  but  they 
were  his  people.  He  could  no  more  resist  this  appeal  to  his 
heart  than  he  could  cease  to  be  Robert  E.  Lee.  This  feeling 
dominated  his  intellect,  and  from  the  kindliest  motives  he, 
in  common  with  all  of  such  temperaments,  moved  down  the 
road  to  sin,  for  such  he  regarded  a  war  against  the  Union,  as 
his  letters  written  at  that  time  clearly  prove. 

Now  let  us  consider  the  case  of  George  H.  Thomas  from 
the  same  point  of  view.  To  him  came  home  precisely  the 
same  call  upon  his  conscience,  the  same  appeal  to  his  feel- 
ings. But  in  his  case  the  mind  reigned  supreme  and  held 
these  feelings  under  strong  control.  All  the  sweet  associa- 
tions of  youth  and  manhood,  all  the  sacred  ties  of  home  and 
kin,  were  tugging  at  his  heart,  but  these  emotions  were  held 
under  the  clear. brain  and  indomitable  will  of  one  who  could 
never  consent  to  wrong  tainted  by  dishonor  and  cloaked  un- 
der a  bastard  patriotism  that  ran  its  limits  along  state  lines 
and  left  out  all  the  fathers  had  fought  for.  He  knew  that 
the  cry  that  came  up  to  him  was  not  that  of  his  people.  It 
was  known  to  him,  as  it  was  patent  to  the  world,  that  the 
scheme  of  secession,  from  its  first  inception  to  its  final  de- 
velopment, came  not  from  the  people,  but  from  the  hot- 
headed, ambitious  men  chance  and  slavery  had  made  leaders. 
The  Virginia  ordinance  of  secession  was  a  fraud.  It  won  its 
way  with  difficulty  through  a  faithless  legislature,  that  knew 
that  a  fair  submission  to  the  people  would  have  voted  it 
down  by  an  immense  majority. 

Geo.  H.  Thomas  could  no  more  have  clasped  hands  with 
these  conspirators  than  Robert  E.  Lee  could  resist  their  ap- 
6 


82  Life  of  Thomas. 

peals.  The  one  followed  his  heart  into  an  unholy  cause,  the 
other  obeyed  the  dictates  of  reason  and  the  high  call  of  pa- 
triotic duty  in  remaining  firm  to  the  flag  of  the  fathers,  a 
soldier  of  the  cross  and  a  soldier  of  the  great  Eepublic. 

There  is  yet  another  state  of  fact  bearing  on  the  trial  of 
Thomas  in  this  respect  that  settles  the  question  beyond  doubt. 
Two  letters  are  published,  in  which  it  is  claimed  that  at  one 
time  the  then  Major  Thomas  hesitated  and  hung  doubtful 
between  the  cause  of  our  government  and  that  of  .the  Con- 
federates. We  reprint  both.  The  first  reads  as  follows  : 

"Colonel  Francis  H.  Smith,  Supt.  Virginia  Military  Institute, 

Lexington,  Va. 

DEAR  SIR:  In  looking  over  the  files  of  the  National  In- 
telligencer this  morning,  I  met  with  your  advertisement  for  a 
commandant  of  cadets  and  instructor  at  the  institute.  If  not 
already  filled,  I  will  be  under  obligations  if  you  will  inform 
me  what  salary  and  allowances  pertain  to  the  situation,  as 
from  present  appearances  I  fear  it  will  soon  be  necessary  for 
me  to  be  looking  up  some  means  of  support. 

Very  respectfully,  your  obedient' servant, 

GEO.  H.  THOMAS,  Major  U.  S.  Army." 

The  second  letter,  found  not  long  since,  among  the 
etored-away  archives  at  the  state  capitol,  is  here  given  : 

"NEW TORE  HOTEL,  March  12,  1861. 
To  His  Excellency,  Gov.  John  Letcher,  Richmond,  Va. 

DEAR  SIR:  I  received  yesterday  a  letter  from  Major  Gil- 
ham,  of  the  Virginia  Military  Institute,  dated  the  9th  inst., 
in  reference  to  the  position  of  Chief  of  Ordnance  of  the 
State,  in  which  he  informs  me  that  you  had  requested  him  to 
ask  me  if  I  would  resign  from  the  service,  and  if  so,  whether 
that  post  would  be  acceptable  to  me.  As  he  requested  me  to 
make  my  reply  to  you  direct,  I  have  the  honor  to  state,  after 
expressing  my  most  sincere  thanks  for  your  very  kind  offer, 
that  it  is  not  my  wish  to  leave  the  service  of  the  United 
States  as  long  as  it  is  honorable  for  me  to  remain  in  it,  and, 
therefore,  as  long  as  my  native  state  (Virginia)  remains  in 


For  the  Union  from  the  Firtt.  83 

the  Union,  it  is  my  purpose  to  remain  in  the  army,  unless  re- 
quested to  perform  duties  alike  repulsive  to  honor  and  hu- 
manity. I  am  very  respectfully  your  obedient  servant, 

GEORGE  H.  THOMAS, 

Major  United  States  Army."- 

This  last  letter  is  a  complete  vindication,  if  such  were 
needed,  to  the  claimed  treachery  of  the  first.  On  January 
18,  1861,  Thomas  applied  for  a  situation  at  the  Virginia  Mil- 
itary Institute,  a  private  school,  differing  from  others  only  in 
the  fact  that  the  pupils  were  called  cadets  instead  of  students, 
and  were  subject  to  the  drill  and  discipline  of  private  sol- 
diers. How  he  could  join  the  confederacy  through  that, 
confounds  the  understanding.  But  let  that  pass;  the  officer 
contemplating  a  division  of  the  government  to  take  service 
in  the  confederacy,  and  actually,  it  is  said,  seeking  such 
service,  on  the  12th  of  March  of  that  same  year  is  offered 
precisely  what  it  is  claimed  he  sought,  and  he  promptly  de- 
clines. 

The  later  letter  settles  the  reading  given  the  first.  If 
any  other  evidence  were  necessary,  it  is  near  at  hand.  It 
will  be  remembered  that  Major  Thomas  was  gravely  hurt  in 
alighting  from  a  railroad  train  at  night,  and  believed  for 
many  months  that  he  was  shut  out  from  further  active  service 
in  the  army.  Being  a  poor  man  with  a  dear  wife  dependent 
upon  him,  he  sought  employment  outside  the  army,  and  in 
the  direction  his  studies  and  experience  had  made  available. 

As  for  that  part  of  his  letter  which  refers  to  his  remain- 
ing in  the  army  so  long  as  Virginia  remains  in  the  Union,  we 
must  remember  that  the  time  had  not  come  for  Thomas  to 
make  his  decision.  As  well  hold  Chase,  Greeley,  and  other 
prominent  republicans,  to  the  cry  of  "  Let  the  erring  sisters 
depart  in  peace,"  as  to  place  any  grave  meaning  upon 
Thomas's  reference  to  secession.  At  the  time  this  letter  was 
written,  not  a  man  could  be  found  in  the  United  States  who 
seriously  believed  any  war  would  grow  out  of  the  political 
agitation  following  the  election  of  Abraham  Lincoln.  At 
the  North  it  was  believed  to  be  a  game  of  bluff  indulged  ic 
by  the  democracy ;  at  the  South  the  leaders  seriously  thought 


84  Life  of  Thomas. 

that  when  actual  war  was  tendered  us,  the  business  habits 
and  timid  nature  of  the  northern  people  would  come  in  aid 
of  the  then  democracy,  and  secure  a  peaceful  separation. 

The  gun  at  Sumter,  fired  12th  of  April,  1861,  caught  in 
its  echo  a  roar  that  startled  the  world,  and  changed  the  face 
of  all  things.  Up  to  that  hour,  all  had  been  speculations 
and  dreamings.  Ninety  days  after,  the  land  was  white  with 
tents,  the  roll  of  the  drum  penetrated  the  most  sequestered 
glens,  and  men  were  arming  and  falling  into  line  to  battle  to 
the  death.  The  movement  at  the  North  stimulated  the 
masses  at  the  South,  and  a  people  that  but  a  short  time  be- 
fore would  have  voted  down  the  secession  ordinance,  now 
sprang  to  arms  to  resist  invasion.  The  unexpected  war  was 
on,  and  George  H.  Thomas  was  called  abruptly  to  make  his 
decision. 

The  prompt  decision  came  from  him  at  Harrisbnrg, 
Pennsylvania,  where  the  news  from  Sumter  reached  him.  He 
immediately  telegraphed  his  wife  at  New  York,  and  his  sis- 
ters in  Virginia,  his  resolve  to  be  found  true  to  his  flag,  and 
then  quietly  obeyed  the  orders  from  the  War  Department, 
at  Washington,  that  led  so  soon  after  to  the  invasion  of  Vir- 
ginia. 

This  question  of  loyalty  and  purpose,  if  any  remain,  is 
settled  b}r  the  great  man  himself.  Colonel  A.  L.  Hough, 
after  the  death  of  General  Thomas,  gave  to  the  press  a  state- 
ment brought  out  by  a  printed  assertion  over  the  name  of 
Fitzhugh  Lee,  to  the  effect  that  Thomas  had  sought  a  posi- 
tion in  the  Southern  army.  We  quote  from  Colonel  Hough's 
letter : 

"As  a  confidential  staff  officer,  one  of  his  aides-de-camp, 
I  had  the  privilege  of  having  many  conversations  with  Gen- 
eral Thomas  upon  matters  relating  to  the  war.  The  most 
important  of  these  conversations  I  made  notes  of  at  the  time, 
with  his  knowledge  and  consent.  Among  them  is  one  on 
the  subject  of  Fitzhugh  Lee's  letter,  which  I  copy  from  my 
note-book.  A  slander  upon  the  general  was  often  repeated 
in  the  Southern  papers  during  and  immediately  subsequent 
to  the  rebellion.  It  was  given  .upon  the  authority  of  prom- 
inent rebel  officers,  and  not  denied  by  them-  It  was  to  the 


For  the  Union  from  the  Fir.^t.  85 

effect  that  he  was  disappointed  in  not  getting  a  high  com- 
mand in  the  rebel  army  he  had  sought  for,  hence  his  refusal 
to  join  the  rebellion.  In  a  conversation  with  him  on  the  sub- 
ject, the  general  said  :  '  This  is  an  entire  fabrication,  not  hav- 
ing an  atom  of  foundation ;  not  a  line  ever  passed  between 
him  and  the  rebel  authorities;  they  had  no  genuine  letter  of 
his,  nor  was  a  word  spoken  by  him  to  any  one  that  could 
even  lead  to  such  an  inference.  He  defied  any  one  to  pro- 
duce any  testimony,  written  or  oral,  to  sustain  such  an  alle- 
gation ;  he  never  entertained  such  an  idea,  for  his  duty  was 
clear  from  the  beginning.  These  slanders  were  caused  by 
men  who  knew  they  had  done  wrong,  but  were  endeavoring 
to  justify  themselves  by  claiming  their  action  to  be  a  virtue 
which  all  men  should  have  followed,  and  by  blackening  the 
character  of  those  who  had  done  right.  It  was  evident  they 
were  determined  that  no  southern-born  man,  who  had  re- 
mained true  to  his  country,  should  bear  a  reputable  char- 
acter, if  continued  and  repeated  abuse  could  effect  a  stain 
upon  it.'  " 

The  error  into  which  the  friends  of  this  silent,  unob- 
trusive man  had  fallen  is  in  the  hasty  conclusion  that  his  re- 
solve to  sustain  the  government  under  which  he  had  grown 
to  mature  manhood  was  arrived  at  without  much  hesitation, 
anxiety  or  pain.  That  there  was  no  question  from  the  start 
as  to  his  duty  we  well  know,  but  when  it  came  to  performing 
that  duty  there  is  no  loss  of  true  manhood  to  find  between  his 
reason  and  feeling  a  painful  conflict.  When  secession  was 
mere  talk — a  talk. foreign  to  Thomas'  experience — and  ordi- 
dances  were  being  passed  with  the  pompous  style  peculiar 
to  the  political  South,  he  could  treat  the  matter  with  the 
same  indifference  that  marked  the  people  of  the  North.  As 
we  have  said,  it  was  regarded  as  bluster.  It  was  this  same 
contemptuous  indifference  that  made  President  Lincoln  turn 
from  the  voice  at  the  South  to  consider  the  hungry  demands 
for  office  at  the  North.  But  when  the  awful  fact  presented 
itself  to  the  world  in  all  its  naked  deformity,  the  decision 
of  our  great  captain  was  promptly  announced  and  from 
that  out  lived  up  to  with  all  the  stern  firmness  that  so  strik- 
ingly marked  his  character. 


gg  Life  of 

We  would  do  our  subject  a  great  injustice  were  we  to 
assert  that  when  at  last  he  made  his  resolve  as  to  his  course 
in  the  emergency  so  cruelly  presented  he  did  so  without  re- 
gret over  or  worry  at  the  shock  he  gave  his  feelings.  Mas- 
culine and  masterful  as  Thomas  was  his  fine  delicate  temper- 
ament was  permeated  and  moved  by  the  finest  sensibility 
that  ever  elevated  a  man.  In  illustration  of  this  we  have 
the  fact  recorded  in  his  subsequent  career  that,  although 
ambitious  as  such  a  man  was  forced  to  be,  believing  that  he 
had  that  in  him  which,  if  given  a  trial,  would  be  of  the 
largest  benefit  to  his  cause  and  country,  yet,  when  tendered 
the  command  he  longed  for,  we  know  that  he  put  the 
tempting  ofler  calmly  to  one  side  because  in  its  acceptance  he 
felt  that  he  would  be  doing  a  grave  wrong  to  a  brother  officer. 
To  measure  a  man  of  this  sort  by  the  common  rule  of  a 
military  tailor  is  to  shut  our  eyes  to  all  that  is  worth 
knowing. 

On  the  12th  of  March,  1861,  while  ill  at  the  New  York 
Hotel,  with  war  apparently  as  remote  as  the  farthest  fixed 
star  in  the  heaven,  he  could  well  write :  "  It  is  not  my  wish 
to  leave  the  service  of  the  United  States  as  long  as  it  is 
honorable  for  me  to  remain  in  it,  therefore  as  long  as  my 
native  state  remains  in  the  Union  it  is  my  purpose  to  remain 
in  the  army — unless  requested  to  perform  duties  alike  re- 
pulsive to  honor  and  humanity;"  and  at  Harrisburg,  on  the 
13th  of  April  following,  telegraph  his  wife  at  New  York, 
and  his  sisters  in  Virginia,  that  he  would  be  found  thereafter 
in  the  military  service  of  his  country.  In  firing  on  Fort 
Sumter  the  South  had  invaded  every  loyal  state  of  the 
Union.  Fort  Sumter,  built  to  defend  our  country,  was  as 
much  the  soil  of  Massachusetts  as  of  South  Carolina.  The 
handful  of  soldiers  who  saw  the  works  crumble  about  them 
as  they  vainly  sought  to  defend  them  against  the  impious 
shot  and  shell  directed  against  our  flag  were  as  much  at 
home  as  if  they  were  the  defenders  of  the  remotest  town 
upon  the  northern  border  of  Maine. 

There  was  no  appeal  to  the  reason  in  behalf  of  this  war 
of  secession  that  did  not  excite  the  contempt  and  indigna- 
tion of  George  H.  Thomas.  Even  the  weaker  mind  of  Lee 


For  the  Union  from  the  First.  87 

recognized  the  fallacy  and  wickedness  of  this  cause.  The 
cry  of  state  sovereignty  that  carried  in  it  the  right  to  se- 
cede, so  vehemently  urged  by  the  leaders  of  revolt,  was  the 
veriest  bosh  ever  ottered  sensible  men.  Of  it  the  Southern  peo- 
ple knew  little  and  cared  less.  They  were  aroused  to  tight  out 
a  bloody  issue  to  the  bitter  end,  because,  as  they  saw  it, 
their  homes  were  being  invaded  by  armed  men.  As  for  the 
proposition,  it  is  the  rottenest  ground-rail  of  a  Virginia 
worm-fence.  We  have  sought  to  trace  this  colonial  super- 
stition to  its  birth  in  the  origin  of  the  war.  Without  consider- 
ing events  so  remote,  however  important,  we  will  look  at 
them  from  the  stand-point  taken  by  George  H.  Thomas. 

State  sovereignty  was  born  of  a  colonial  superstition 
that  divided  one  race  into  many  different  peoples,  each  seek- 
ing to  be  a  nation  in  itself.  They  were  thrown  together 
through  the  emergencies  of  the  Revolution,  very  like  many 
people  crossing  a  stream  in  a  ferry-boat.  The  passage  ef- 
fected, the  passengers  immediately  separate,  going  each  his 
own  gait  in  his  own  way.  To  sustain  the  proposition  that, 
as  they  were  traveling  the  same  road,  they  should  therefore 
continue  the  lately  enforced  association,  is  difficult.  The 
various  colonies  on  our  continent  were  not  only  jealous  of 
each  other,  but  that  jealousy  was  deepened  by  diverse  busi- 
ness interests  and  religious  beliefs.  The  fierce  fanaticisms 
that  drove  nearly  all  from  Europe  to  the  wilds  of  this  conti- 
nent were  as  varied  among  themselves  as  the  settlements 
they  made,  and  were  as  intensely  bitter  as  the  feeling  that 
forced  perilous  emigration  across  unknown  seas.  They  who 
fled,  claiming  the  right  to  worship  God  in  accordance  with 
the  dictates  of  conscience,  scarcely  effected  a  landing  before 
they  went  to  persecuting  each  other  precisely  as  the  Church 
of  Rome  and  Church  of  England  had  persecuted  them. 
This  religious  fervor  was  strengthened  by  that  egotism 
which  is  born  of  greed. 

There  was  no  sense  in  these  differences,  but  they  had 
grown  up  into  that  second  nature  that  is  always  more  pow- 
erful than  that  which  first  comes  from  our  born  instincts  and 
impulses.  There  was,  however,  a  layer  of  common  sense  in 
the  jealousy,  and  fear  felt  by  the  weaker  for  the  stronger 


88  Life  of  Thomas. 

colonies.  That  of  Rhode  Island,  for  example,  could  preach 
toleration  to  the  Puritans  of  Massachusetts  or  the  Quakers 
of  Pennsylvania,  and  yet  shrink  from  a  political  or  trade  al- 
liance that  would  submerge  their  little  community  into  the 
larger  that  then  held  the  one  harbor  on  the  Atlantic  coast 
that  bade  fair  to  be  the  gate- way  of  commerce  for  a  conti- 
nent. 

The  framers  of  our  constitution,  the  fathers  of  the  Union 
that  under  the  carefully  prepared  contract  in  writing  knit 
the  old  thirteen  states  together,  had  the  condition  above 
stated  to  encounter.  It  is  a  singular  fact  that  the  first  con- 
vention was  made  possible  not  by  political  but  trade  necessi- 
ties. These  were  stimulated  into  active  life  by  the  claims 
held  by  creditors  against  the  old  Federation,  that  had  fallen 
apart  like  a  rope  of  sand,  leaving  all  its  just  debts  unsettled. 
The  delegates  met  to  harmonize  all  their  trade  differences, 
and  ended  in  a  political  union  that  had  consequences  of  which 
they  little  dreamed,  or  the  fabric  would  never  have  been 
completed.  No  impartial  student  of  our  constitutional  his- 
tory can  doubt  for  a  moment  that  each  state  ratified  that  union 
under  the  firm  belief  that  at  any.  time  it  could  withdraw. 

We  have  said  that  the  delegates  assembled  for  one  pur- 
pose and  ended  by  accomplishing  another.  This  was  not  the 
case  with  all.  A  small  number,  whose  patriotism  extended 
beyond  the  limits  of  their  several  states,  had  from  the  start 
the  political  purpose  they  succeeded  in  bringing  about.  Led 
by  Alexander  Hamilton,  while  loudly  recognizing  the  state 
rights,  they  adroitly  took  from  the  states  all  that  made  their 
independence  possible.  As  sovereignty  means  that  power  in 
a  state  from  which  there  is  no  appeal,  these  framers  of  our 
constitution  established  that  power,  and  carefully  took  from 
each  separate  commonwealth  not  only  the  essence,  but  all 
and  every  attribute  of  sovereignty.  All  that  was  left  was 
but  thirteen  empty  shells.  So  anxious  were  these  early 
statesmen  to  consolidate  and  strengthen  their  structure,  that 
they  gave  us,  under  the  name  of  a  republic,  a  government 
more  powerful  and  despotic  than  that  of  England,  which 
they  sought  so  closely  to  imitate. 

Had  it  been  possible  for  the  old  thirteen  states  to  have 


The  National  Sovereignty.  89 

remained  as  they  were  when  the  Union  was  formed,  there 
would  be  a  show  of  reason  in  the  exercise  of  a  right  not  yet 
imposed  or  effected  by  the  legitimate  consequences  of  the 
compact.  But  an  immediate  change  of  conditions  followed. 
The  general  government  went  to  making  states.  The  curious 
part  of  the  transaction  lies  in  the  fact  that  this  had  reference 
more  to  territory  than  to  the  people  inhabiting  the  same. 
Thus  the  North-west  was  devoted,  not  to  the  inhabitants 
that  were  or  would  be  settled  thereon,  but  to  the  general 
government.  The  true  significance  of  state  sovereignty  lies 
in  that  which  goes  to  make  a  people.  There  is  not  only  a 
community  of  interest,  but  those  interests  which  make  the 
community.  One,  to  be  a  citizen  of  the  soil,  must  not  only 
be  born  upon  it,  but  born  through  many  generations,  and 
inherit  thereby  the  feeling  that  makes  the  patriot.  When 
Virginia  ceded  the  North-west  Territory  to  the  central  gov- 
ernment, that  immediately  opened  that  region,  not  to  Vir- 
ginians only,  but  to  citizens  of  other  states  and  the  world  at 
large.  The  citizenship  was  at  once  shifted  from  the  locality 
limited  to  state  lines  to  the  country  bounded  by  the  authority 
of  the  general  government.  This  was  so  clearly  recognized 
as  to  leave  no  question  when  we  purchased  Louisiana  from 
France.  In  that,  the  government  bought  not  only  the  terri- 
tory, but  the  people  inhabiting  that  country,  and  that  with- 
out their  consent.  If  secession  were  a  right,  the  people  of 
Louisiana  thus  purchased  would  return  in  their  allegiance  to 
the  French  government. 

The  same  view  obtains  in  the  acquisition  made  in  a  con- 
quest from  Mexico.  We  not  only  purchased  sovereign  states 
and  the  people  therein,  but  we  conquered  and  controlled 
them  by  bayonets.  This  in  the  face  of  our  favorite  axiom 
that  all  governments  derive  their  only  title  to  rule  from  the 
consent  of  the  governed.  No  one  suggested  nor  dreamed  of 
saying  to  the  people  of  Louisiana  or  Mexico :  "  We  have 
bought  you  or  fought  you  from  under  the  sovereignty  of 
France  or  that  of  Mexico ;  now  we  leave  you  free  to  select 
your  own  government,  in  accordance  with  our  great  axiom." 

How   completely  and    entirely  the   doctrine   of  states' 


90  />'>"•  oi  Thomas. 

rights  and  that  of  secession  under  them  disappears  before 
these  facts  of  history. 

This,  however,  is  not  all.  It  is  not  half.  As  we  have 
said,  all  compacts  carry  with  them  their  legitimate  conse- 
quences. The  rights  that  come  into  existence  as  a  legiti- 
mate result  of  a  contract  make,  of  course,  a  binding  part  of 
the  agreement.  Thus,  for,  example,  had  the  Siamese  twins 
formed  their  union  in  the  ligament  that  held  them  together 
while  separate  and  free  to  do  so  through  the  will  of  both, 
that  ligament  could  not  be  severed  if  in  such  operation  the 
life  of  one  or  both  would  be  lost  in  the  surgical  operation, 
even  if  they  were  not  aware  when  they  united  themselves 
that  such  would  be  the  result.  The  states  formed  out  of  the 
ceded  Virginia  territory  known  as  the  North-west  had  their 
boundary  under  the  Union  on  the  sea.  After  secession, 
their  boundaries  would  fall  back  to  state  lines,  and  they 
would  be  shut  out  from  the  high  seas  and  be  dependent  on  a 
commerce  that  involved  their  staples  and,  therefore,  their 
prosperity  to  the  good  will  of  alien  governments.  The  great 
North-west,  therefore,  gave  bond  and  security  by  being  in 
existence  to  keep  open  the  Mississippi  river  to  the  gulf. 
This  theory  gives  place  to  condition,  and  what  was  once  a 
right  resolves  itself  into  a  wrong  so  palpable  that  the  weak- 
est mind  can  not  fail  to  recognize  the  evil. 

Written  constitutions  are  after  all  only  so  much  legisla- 
tion built  on  the  past  and  binding  on  the  present.  The  body 
politic  is  subject  to  the  same  changes  that  effect  all  earthly 
bodies,  and  with  those  changes  come  new  wants,  new  losses, 
and  new  obligations.  We  can  as  well  fit  the  garments  of  a 
boy  to  the  wearing  of  a  man  as  to  frame  a  constitution  from 
the  past  that  is  to  serve  all  future  generations.  The  state 
sovereignty  that  was  so  clearly  in  view  to  the  fathers  of  the 
old  Republic  has  given  way  to  home  rule,  which  means  the 
right  of  all  communities  to  control  their  local  interests  in 
harmony  with  the  sovereignty  of  the  nation,  expressed 
through  C9iistitutioual  powers  that  are  as  clearly  defined  as 
common  safety  demands. 

The  tendency  of  poor  human  nature  to  swing  from  one 
extreme  to  another  is,  we  fear,  being  illustrated  in  these 


The  National  Sovereignty.  91 


revolutionary  tim«^.  The  same  patriotism  that  incited  us  to 
rally  to  the  armed  support  of  the  Union  that  we  might  save 
the  nation  now  calls  for  a  like  movement  in  the  opposite  di- 
ivction  to  save  the  people.  While  the  oppressed  communi- 
ties of  Europe  are  struggling  for  the  recognition  of  home 
rule,  we  are  concentrating  powers  in  the  central  government 
that  must  end  sooner  or  later  in  an  intolerable  despotism. 
However,  it  is  with  the  past  and  not  the  future  that  we  are 
dealing. 


92  Life  of  Thomas. 


CHAPTER   IV. 

Promoted  Through  Colonelcy  to  a  Brigadier  Generalship— Skirmish  at 
Falling  Waters—"  Stonewall  "  and  "  Rock  "—First  Bull  Run— Vindi- 
cation of  General  Patterson. 

•. 
Major  Thomas  got  the  startling  news  from  Sumter  at 

Harrisburg  while  in  execution  of  an  order  from  the  War  De- 
partment. He  continued  without  pause  in  the  line  of  his 
duty.  The  silent,  thoughful  man  had  no  confidence  with  the 
public.  All  he  may  have  written  to  his  sisters  in  Virginia  is 
not  known.  Nor  is  such  information  necessary  to  the  fame 
of  our  great  soldier.  His  duty  was  clear  to  him  and  he  was 
the  last  man  to  swerve  from  that,  let  the  consequences  to 
himself  or  others  be  what  they  might.  His  state  had  seceded 
by  ordinance  that  would  have  been  harmless,  but  for  the 
declaration  of  war  that  came  in  the  mouthing  roar  of  Con- 
federate artillery  at  Sumter.  The  entire  cordon  of  slave 
states  was  eager  for  the  war.  Having  aroused  their  people 
to  arms,  the  leaders  were  naturally  in  fear  that  some  propo- 
sition would  be  made  by  the  government  at  Washington 
they  would  be  forced  to  consider  if  not  accept.  "  Give  us  a 
white  sheet  of  paper  to  write  our  terms  upon,"  said  one  of 
the  more  distinguished,  "  and  we  will  return  it  to  you  un- 
soiled  by  ink." 

The  resignation  of  Robert  E.  Lee  gave  Thomas  his 
place,  and  it  is  strange  that  these  two  men,  each  the  greatest 
of  his  side  in  the  war  that  followed,  should  have  held  so 
much  in  common.  They  both  were  natives  of  Virginia,  and 
represented,  one  through  family  and  the  other  from  force  of 
character,  the  better  element  of  the  state  they  adorned. 
While  writing  this,  amid  the  roar  of  cannon,  the  swell  of 
martial  music,  and  the  cheers  of  thousands,  a  noble  monu- 
ment to  the  honor  of  Robert  E.  Lee  is  being  unveiled  at 
Richmond.  To  that  monument,  a  memory  in  bronze,  will 
come  pilgrims  from  distant  lands  beyond  the  sea  to  lay  im- 


Thomas  Stands  Alone.  93 

mortelles  at  its  base  in  honor  of  one  who  lifted  a  frenzied, 
senseless  revolt  to  the  dignity  of  a  great  war,  and  through 
the  purity  of  his  own  character  made  a  people's  crime  ap- 
pear a  patriotic  cause.  There  can  be  but  one  monument  of 
our  own,  and  that  remains  as  yet  unbuilt,  that  will  check 
and  hold  for  our  side  the  admiration  of  the  world.  No  man 
knowing  our  late  conflict  can  pass  by  the  tomb  of  Thomas 
to  render  homage  to  that  of  Lee.  The  one  forsook  his 
country  for  his  state;  the  other  forsook  his  state  for  his 
country.  In  all  the  traits  that  make  great  men  dear  to  us 
they  were  blessed  alike,  and  it  is  only  in  measurement  of  in- 
tellectual qualities  that  the  soldier  of  the  Union  towers 
above  the  military  leader  of  revolt.  How  clearly  this  i.s 
coming  to  be  recognized  we  learn  when  a  distinguished 
soldier  of  England,  having  claimed  for  Lee  the  admiration 
of  the  world  as  the  greatest  of  both  sides  in  our  civil  war, 
the  man  who  was  as  much  responsible  as  any  other  for  the 
banishment  of  George  Henry  Thomas  to  an  unmarked  grave/ 
was  forced  to  invoke  the  memory  of  his  neglected  dead  in  a 
challenge  to  the  British  admirer  of  Robert  E.  Lee.  The  in- 
vocation ended  the  controversy.  There  is  no  monument 
that  can  be  built  on  this  continent  as  the  marble  or  bronze 
history  of  some  man  made  prominent  in  the  late  war  which 
will  not  be  saved  from  the  contempt  that  preceded  oblivion 
by  the  haunting  shadow  of  this  silent  hero  of  a  nation's  sal- 
vation. 

The  disintegration  of  the  West  Point  part  of  the  regu- 
lar army  was  so  extensive  that  the  promotion  of  Thomas 
came  rapidly.  "  The  Virginian "  did  not  have  to  "  wait." 
He  stood  alone.  Of  all  the  faithless  he  was  faithful  still. 
And  as  the  old  system  of  promotion  had  not  yet  been  dis- 
turbed by  petty  intrigues  and  government  demands,  Major 
Thomas  got  rapid  promotion.  It  is  well  to  bear  this  in  mind. 
If  the  government  had  sought  to  hold  him  to  his  allegiance 
through  tempting  favoritism  in  the  way  of  pay  and  rank, 
there  might  have  been  ground  for  doubt.  But  instead  of 
this,  we  well  know  that  his  adhesion  to  the  Union  was  so 
striking  as  to  be  without  a  parallel,  for  his  Southern  asso- 
ciates nearly  all  threw  up  their  commissions  and  carried 


94  Life  of  Thomas. 

their  swords  to  the  side  of  the  Confederacy.  This,  strangely 
enough,  only  made  the  government  more  suspicious,  and 
even  when  he  carved  his  way  to  confidence  a  full  reward  was 
denied  him.  The  Confederacy  did  offer  him  both  confidence 
and  a  commission,  but  all  that  he  got  from  his  own  govern- 
ment, was  gained  in  hard-won  victories  upon  the  field. 

On  the  1st  of  June,  Colonel  Thomas,  then  at  Carlisle 
Barracks,  received  orders  to  report  with  four  companies  of 
the  regiment  he  commanded,  and  the  First  City  Troop  of 
Philadelphia,  to  Major-General  Robert  Patterson,  at  Cham- 
bersburg,  Pennsylvania.  He  was  assigned  to  the  command 
of  the  First  Brigade  of  the  Army  of  Pennsylvania.  On  the 
2d  of  July  he  marched  his  brigade  over  Maryland  to 
Williamsport,  crossed  the  Potomac,  and  fought  the  Battle  of 
Falling  Waters  in  Virginia,  if  we  may  call  such  a  skirmish 
by  that  name.  It  was  significant  in  the  fact  that  George  H. 
Thomas  commanded  on  one  side,  and  Thomas  T.  Jackson  on 
the  other.  "  Stonewall "  Jackson  and  the  "  Rock  of  Chicka- 
mauga  "  met  in  that  sharp  little  affair,  and  gave  a  short  pro- 
logue to  the  mighty  drama  that  was  to  have  them  its  chief 
actors.  No  two  men  were  so  much  alike  in  two  respects, 
and  so  dissimilar  in  all  others.  Both  had  convictions  so  deep 
and  strong  that  they  controlled  their  actions,  but  Jackson's 
was  the  emotion  of  his  temperament,  while  Thomas,  as  we 
have  seen,  got  at  his  conclusions  through  an  exercise  of  the 
highest  reasoning.  Jackson  was  a  fanatic,  a  Puritan  who, 
through  the  force  of  his  own  fierce  personality,  appropriated 
God  to  himself.  It  was  a  God  of  vengeance,  one  to  worship 
in  war  and  fear  in  peace.  He  escaped  West  Point  with  his 
instincts  unimpaired.  This  narrOw,  bigoted  mind  accepted 
without  question  the  doctrine  of  blind  obedience  in  a  soldier 
to  the  powers  that  be  as  it  took  in  that  of  predestination  for 
a  religion.  The  one  no  more  shut  out  the  true  religion  of 
our  gentle,  forgiving  Savior  than  the  other  closed  to  him  all 
political  information.  He  never  questioned  the  divine  right 
of  slavery  any  more  than  he  questioned  the  divine  right  of 
God,  in  his  estimation,  created  both,  the  first  for  the 
comfort  of  the  elect  on  earth,  and  the  last  as  a  place  ot  pun- 
ishment for  sinners  foreordained  through  all  eternity  to  auf- 


Stonewall  Jai'kson  and  Thomas.  95 

fer  in  everlasting  flames.  Of  a  coarse,  tough  fiber,  he  was 
without  culture.  His  manner  was  as  brusque  as  his  sympa- 
thies were  contracted. 

To  speak  of  two  such  men  as  having  any  thing  in  com- 
mon seems  monstrous.  But  history  will  hold,  so  long  as  the 
story  of  our  late  war  is  told,  that  these  two  men  were  alike 
in  being  its  grandest  soldiers.  They  were  commissionea  by 
God  to  be  the  leaders  of  men,  and  each  won  his  way  to  rec- 
ognition through  the  control  he  had  over  the  masses  he  led. 
"  Stonewall  "  and  "Rock"  got  their  significance  from  the 
staying  power  of  their  men  in  the  hour  of  deadliest  peril. 
Jackson  had  from  instinct  what  Thomas  gained  through 
thoughtful  study.  They  led  to  the  same  end.  Stouewall's 
brigade  of  "  Foot  Cavalry,"  that  made  such  forced  marches, 
and  struck  such  telling  blows,  were  the  same  sort  that  stood 
by  Thomas  in  the  outflanked  center  at  Stone  River,  and 
again  at  Chickamauga. 

After  all,  this  art  of  war  is  a  very  simple  thing  to 
comprehend  as  an  art,  and  grows  difficult,  like  all  art,  only 
in  its  application.  The  stupidest  man  alive  can  get  for  ex- 
ample a  thorough  knowledge  of  law  or  medicine,  but  when 
the  rules  come  to  be  applied  in  practice,  mere  memory  is  of 
no  avail,  and  brain  alone  is  successful.  The  calculation  of 
chances  in  war  spoken  of  by  Napoleon  is  predicated  not  on 
courage  in  the  force,  but  upon  fear.  Courage  is  an  ex- 
ceptional virtue,  fear  is  common  to  all.  On  this  account  it  is 
the  unexpected  that  tells.  To  have  the  foe  appear  unexpect- 
edly upon  one's  flank  or  rear,  is  to  demoralize  a  far  larger 
force  than  the  one  so  mysteriously  advancing  from  an  un- 
known quarter.  This  was  the  secret  of  Stonewall's  success. 
It  made  no  difference  to  him  what  the  superiority  of  the  op- 
posing force  might  be,  provided  he  could  strike  him  unex- 
pectedly. But  he  had  men  with  whom  to  strike.  They 
might  fall  in  the  blazing  beat  of  a  summer  sun,  or  they 
might  fall  from  the  enemy's  bullets,  but  so  long  as  he  led, 
and  they  could  move,  they  were  with  him. 

Said  General  Banks  to  the  writer  of  this  narrative  in 
the  Shenandoah  Valley :  "  The  only  disposition  you  can  make 
of  Stonewall  Jackson  is  to  kill  him." 


[)t  Life  of  Thomas. 

What  a  field  of  speculation  opens  upon  the  suggestion 
that  if  it  had  pleased  God  to  open  the  eyes  of  both  Federal 
and  Confederate  governments  to  a  knowledge  of  the  men  so 
that  these  two  colonels  of  the  skirmish  at  Falling  Waters 
could  have  been  called  to  command  both  armies,  what  a  dif- 
ferent war  would  have  gone  to  record.  As  it  was,  but  for 
Lee,  Stonewall  would  have  made  European  recognition,  our 
great  fear,  a  certainty,  by  putting  Jefferson  Davis  in  the 
White  House  at  Washington.  That  was  the  one  great  ob- 
jective point  of  the  Confederate  army.  The  capture  of  our 
capitol  would  have  brought  upon  our  coast  the*  combined 
fleet  of  France,  England,  Russia  and  Spain,  and  ended  the 
war  in  thirty  days.  Lee  marched  his  victorious  forces  in 
sight  of  the  city ;  indeed,  the  thunder  of  his  triumphant 
guns  several  times  woke  echoes  along  the  fretted  ceilings 
of  the  capitol.  He  saw  the  dome,  but  he  could  not  see 
what  it  covered.  He  was  contented  to  win  great  victories, 
but  these  victories  were  curses  in  disguise.  The  prolonged 
fierce  war  exhausted  the  resources  of  the  Confederacy.  The 
brave  men  whose  uniform  was  filthy  rags,  who  marched 
without  shoes,  slept  without  tents,  fought  without  food,  and 
when  forced  at  last  to  fall  back  retreated  on  the  same  sort 
of  victories  they  ever  won  and  made  the  march  of  their  foes 
a  highway  of  human  bones.  These  brave  fellows,  numbered 
by  the  thousands  at  first,  came  to  be  numbered  by  hundreds 
at  last,  while  Robert  E.  Lee  fought  his  great  fights  and 
saw  after  each  the  thinned  ranks  close  up  and  the  doom  of  the 
lost  cause  loom  as  the  end  of  all  this  useless  slaughter.  Ah  ! 
yes,  he  was  a  mighty  captain,  and  so  was  our  Grant,  arid 
they  deserve  their  monuments,  only  the  material  should  be 
changed.  Instead  of  bronze  and  marble  they  should  be 
made  of  half  a  million  skulls  in  token  of  the  slaughter  their 
stupidity  made  immortal. 

There  was  a  grim,  iron-jawed,  spectacled  man  at  Wash- 
ington, with  short  upper  lip  continually  on  the  curl,  as  if  to 
show  his  teeth — a  man  a  head  and  shoulders  above  all  his 
associates  save  one— who  said :  "  We  have  no  general,  but 
\ve  have  men;  we  can  lose  five  to  their  one  and  win,  and  I 
will  crowd  on  until  we  stamp  out  this  cursed  treason." 


Ball  Run.  97 

He  saw  the  South  being  exhausted,  and  yet,  after  the 
victory  of  the  second  Bull  Run,  after  that  of  Chancellors- 
ville,  and  that  of  Fredericksburg,  Lee  could  have  marched 
into  Washington  and  driven  that  man  and  his  master  out, 
never  to  return. 

Stonewall  Jackson  would  have  taken  Washington,  not 
because  he  saw  more  clearly,  or  saw  at  all,  but  instinctively 
he  would  have  fought  for  what  the  foe  evidently  considered 
his  most  precious  possession.  The  Southern  leaders  saw  the 
administration  risk  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  on  the  Chick- 
ahominy  rather  than  uncover  Washington,  and  if  they  failed 
to  comprehend  the  significance  of  its  capture  they  must 
have  re-cognized  the  tenacity  with  which  our  government 
clung  to  its  capitol.  It  was  the  fate  of  both  sides  to  have  a 
war  of  instruction  thrown  away  on  generals  incapable  of 
being  instructed.  The  tierce  fighting  qualities  of  Lee's  men 
were  for  him  all  that  now  make  his  monument  appropriate, 
while  on  the  other  side  the  million  of  men  under  muskets 
saved  us  the  Union  through  disasters  and  defeats. 

Colonel  Thomas  reported  to  General  Patterson  and  was 
with  that  officer  until  the  defeat  of  the  first  Bull  Run,  when 
public  indignation  forced  the  government  to  withdraw  this 
commander  from  the  field.  General  McDowell  in  risking 
a  general  engagement  with  Bean  regard  on  Bull  Run,  west 
of  Centerville,  counted  upon  Patterson  holding  the  forces 
under  General  Joseph  E.  Johnston  in  his  front.  Instead  of 
this  being  done,  the  Confederate  army  under  Johnston  arrived 
on  the  battle  field  at  the  moment  almost  that  Beauregard  was 
penning  his  order  to  retreat. 

The  writer  of  this  made  one  of  the  armed  mob  that 
McDowell  manoeuvered,  or  thought  he  did,  upon  that  sum- 
mer Sunday,  and  well  remembers  how  stationary  the  hot  sun 
seemed  as  the  promiscuous  fights  by  regiments  at  intervals 
and  the  artillery  of  both  sides  all  the  time  went  on.  It  was 
approaching  3  P.  M.,  of  the  longest  day  the  writer  ever  ex- 
perienced, when  the  tumult  died  down,  and  the  stillness  was 
broken  by  the  song  of  birds  recovered  from  their  fright.  A 
group  of  officers  belonging  to  General  Dan  Tyler  and  Scheuck's 
7 


9*  L(ff.  of  Thomas. 

command  were  wiping  their  foreheads  and  exchanging  can- 
teens under  tho  impression  that  the  enemy  was  in  full  retreat. 
VT,'  were  mm-h  in  Dogberry's  condition  when  he  bade  the 
watch  in  the  rear  of  a  retreating  army  to  "take  no  note  of 
him,  but  let  him  go,  and  presently  call  the  rest  of  the  watch 
toother  ami  thank  God  you  are  rid  of  a  knave."  We 
were  together  for  that  identical  purpose,  when  suddenly  the 
silenced  butteries  of  the  foe  opened  again  more  furious  than 
before.  It.  seemed  as  if  the  first  round  shot  given  was  aimed 
at  our  group,  for  it  killed  four  men  directly  In  our  front, 
and  then  from  right  to  left  swept  down  the  rebel  yell,  fol- 
lowed by  the  rattling  fire  of  musketry. 

The  unexpected  had  happened.  At  no  time  of  the  day 
had  our  army  been  either  confident  or  eager.  The  cessation 
of  resistance  impressed  only  a  few. with  the  fact  of  victory, 
and  now  the  tight  was  renewed  with  all  its  old  tumult.  Our 
men  retreated  before  any  order  could  be  given  to  that  effect, 
if  anv  was  ever  issued.  The  enemy  seemed  as  willing  to  let 
us  go  and  thank  God  for  the  riddance  as  we  had  been,  for 
there  was  no  pursuit,  and  in  less  than  an  hour  the  fields  and 
woods  of  Bull  Run  again  had  their  silence  broken  only  by 
the  song  of  birds. 

In  justice  to  General  McDowell  and  his  motley  mob,  we 
must  confess  that  Bull  Run  was  lost  to  us  more  through  de- 
fective arms  than  the  accession  of  General  Joseph  E.  John- 
ston and  his  fresh  troops.  When  the  demand  for  muskets 
was  made  by  our  government  in  the  unexpected  opening  of 
the  war,  certain  well  known  knaves  high  in  the  confidence 
of  the  War  Department  bought  up  in  Belgium  a  vast  quan- 
tity of  condemned  muskets,  which  they  sold  at  an  immense 
profit  to  our  government.  They  were  light  pot-metal  things, 
far  more  dangerous  to  those  handling  them  than  to  the 
enemy  tired  at.  It  was  an  infamous  shame  that  poor  fellows 
should  be  led  into  a  death  struggle  with  such  arms.  But 
Simon  Cameron  was  Secretary  of  a  War  Department  honey- 
combed with  fraud. 

Why  General  Patterson  did  not  hold  the  enemy  to  the 
front,  or,  failing  in  that,  follow  him  to  the  field  at  Bull  Run, 
has  never  been  satisfactorily  explained  to  the  world.  He 


The  Vindication  of  Pattcr.vw.  99 

had  a  complete  defense,  but  it  was  never  made  public.  So 
soon  as  General  George  II.  Thomas  appeared  as  Patterson's 
defender,  all  inquiry  as  well  as  charges  ceased.  A  "West 
Pointer  at  that  time  WHS  an  oracle  in  the  popular  mind,  and 
when  Thomas  said  Patterson  was  in  the  right,  the  confiding 
public  considered  judgment  entered  and  the  case  closed. 
General  Thomas  was  prompt  in  appearance  when  called  on 
to  give  his  verdict.  He  gave  it  in  his  own  words,  addressed 
to  one  of  General  Patterson's  staff. 

"CAMP  NEAR  HYATTSTOWN,  MD.S  August  25,  1861. 
DEAR  COLONEL  :  Your  note  has  just  been  handed  me.  I 
had  a  conversation  with  Newton  yesterday  on  the  subject  of 
General  Patterson's  campaign.  He  was  on  the  eve  of  writing 
to  the  general,  and  asked  me  what  he  should  state  was  my 
opinion  as  to  the  general's  course.  I  told  him  that  he  could 
say  that,  if  I  was  situated  as  he  was,  I  would  make  a  state- 
ment of  all  the  facts  to  the  general-in-chief  or  the  Secretary 
of  War,  fortifying  it  with  copies  of  the  orders,  etc.,  and  de- 
mand justice  at  their  hands;  and  if  they  were  not  disposed 
to  give  it,  I  would  then  demand  a  court  of  inquiry. 

Yours  truly, 

GEO.  II.  THOMAS. 

P.  S. — I  think,  however,  that  time  will  set  the  general 
all  right,  as  I  see  the  papers  are  much  more  favorable  to  him 
than  at  first." 

Justice  was  awarded  General  Patterson  by  the  govern- 
ment, so  the  court  of  inquiry  was  not  called.  Had  it  been, 
the  responsibility  would  have  been  shifted  from  Patterson's 
camp  to  the  cabinet  at  Washington",  or  rather,  to  the  head- 
quarters of  General  Winfield  Scott.  This  elderly  officer  was 
one  of  the  most  magnificent  parade  captains  ever  uniformed. 
The  hero  of  two  wars,  he  had  learned  nothing  from  either 
but  a  deportment  that  made  his  tall,  commanding  figure  a 
most  impressive  affair.  He  saw  more  marching  of  a  light 
sort  to  less  fighting  than  any  other  man  of  his  time.  His 
popular  title  was  "  fuss  and  feathers,"  which  did  great  injus- 
tice to  his  solemn,  dignified  deportment.  But  the  infirmities 


100  Life  of  Thomas. 

of  old  age  were  upon  him  when  the  civil  war  began,  and  the 
poor  old  man,  as  pure  a  patriot  as  ever  breathed,  was  sorely 
afflicted  by  the  event.  He  was  the  author  of  the  proposition 
to  "  let  the  erring  sisters  depart  in  peace,"  that  had  scarcely 
gained  favorable  utterance  from  certain  prominent  abolition- 
ists when  it  was  drowned  by  the  popular  roar  the  guns  from 
Sumter  awakened.  Owing  to  his  infirmities,  he  was  care- 
fully watched  at  Washington  until  General  McClellau,  a 
younger  parade  captain,  crowded  him  from  power.  It  is, 
therefore,  scarcely  just  to  hold  him  responsible  for  the  blunder 
at  Bull  Run. 

It  seems  that,  when  Patterson  was  ordered  into  Virginia, 
General  Thomas,  who  had  become  his  commanding  general's 
confidential  adviser,  got  him  to  petition  Lieutenant- General 
Scott  to  order  their  forces  over  the  Potomac  at  or  near  Lees- 
burg.  This,  Scott,  from  some  unknown  reason,  refused,  and 
ordered  him  to  cross  at  Williamsport.  General  Thomas's 
ground  for  the  move  he  suggested  was  to  place  Patterson's 
army  and  the  forces  in  front  of  Washington  within  support- 
ing distance  of  each  other.  Scott's  order,  when  executed, 
left  Johnston  and  Beauregard  on  an  interior  line  to  support 
each  other,  and  McDowell  and  Patterson  so  wide  apart  that 
such  conjunction  was,  if  not  impossible,  so  difficult  as  to 
amount  to  the  same  thing.  General  Scott  had  in  mind  a 
menace  to  Johnston's  communications  and  the  evacuation  of 
Harper's  Ferry.  But  the  same  result  would  have  followed 
had  the  crossing  been  effected  at  Leesburg,  while  the  addi- 
tional advantage  would  have  been  gained  of  enabling  Pat- 
terson to  reach  McDowell  before  Johnston  could  get  to 
Beauregard. 

True  it  is  that  Joseph  E.  Johnston  and  his  army  were  at 
Patterson's  front,  and  if  resisted  in  force  would  have  demon- 
strated this  fact.  But  that  would  have  brought  on  a  general 
engagement,  and  that  phrase  was  well  known  at  Washing- 
ton before  McClellan  arrived  to  change  it  into  "  Beware  of 
a  general  engagement."  The  condition  made  it  easy  for 
General  Johnston  to  leave  a  light  line  of  pickets  behind  an 
army  that  was  led  by  the  roar  of  the  enemy's  guns  and 
hastened  to  the  fight.  Perhaps  it  was  better  as  it  happened. 


Thomas  to  Patterson.  101 

Had  General  Patterson  made  a  demonstration  in  force,  the 
probability  is  that  we  should  have  had  two  defeats  to  mourn 
instead  of  one.  The  inside  history  of  the  unhappy  affair, 
however,  is  of  interest,  as  it  shows  at  this  early  stage  the 
capacity  of  our  general  to  recognize  the  condition  with  that 
ability  which  ever  rises  to  an  emergency.  He  was  ever 
master  of  the  situation.  In  a  letter  written  long  after,  vin- 
dicating General  Patterson,  it  appears  that  even  after  the 
execution  of  Scott's  blunder,  such  mistake  could  have  been 
remedied  had  General  Thomas's  advice  been  followed.  We 
give  the  letter  entire — 

"  HEAD-QUARTERS  DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  CUMBERLAND, 
BEFORE  ATLANTA,  GA.,  August  8, 1864. 

MY  DEAR  GENERAL  :  Your  favor  of  the  16th  of  July 
was  only  received  a  few  days  since,  owing,  doubtless,  to  the 
irregularities  of  the  mails  to  the  front.  In  the  council  of  war, 
at  Martinsbuvg,  I  in  substance  advised  an  advance  toward  Win- 
chester, at  least  as  far  as  Bunker  Hill,  and  if  your  information, 
after  the  army  reached  Bunker  Hill,  led  you  to  believe  that  John- 
ston still  occupied  Winchester  in  force,  then  to  shift  our  troops 
over  to  Charleston,  as  tint  >//o/v  it-ould  place  our  communications 
with  our  depot  of  supplies  in  safety,  and  still  threaten  and  hold 
Johnston  at  Winchester,  which  I  understood  was  all  that  you 
were  expected  or  required  to  do.  I  should  have  advised  a 
direct  advance  on  Winchester  but  for  the  character  of  the 
troops  composing  your  army.  They  were  all,  with  the  ex- 
ception of  a  couple  of  squadrons  of  the  Second  U.  S.  Cavalry 
and  two  batteries  of  the  regular  artillery,  three  months  men, 
and  their  term  of  service  would  expire  in  a  few  days. 
Judging  of  them  as  of  other  volunteer  troops,  had  I  been 
their  commander,  I  should  not  have  been  willing  to  risk 
them  in  a  heavy  battle  coming  off  within  a  few  days  of  the 
expiration  of  their  service. 

I  have  always  believed,  and  have  frequently  so  expressed 
myself,  that  your  management  of, the  three  months'  cam- 
paign was  able  and  judicious,  and  was  to  the  best  interests 


Life  of  Thomas. 

of  the  service,  considering  the  means  at  your  disposal  and 
the  nature  of  the  troops  under  your  command. 
With  much  respect  and  esteem, 

I  remain.  General,  very  sincerely  and  truly  yours, 

GEO.  H.  THOMAS,  Major- General  U.  S.  V. 
MAJOR-GENERAL  ROBERT  PATTERSON,  Philadelphia,  Pa." 

The  italics  above  are  our  own.  They  call  attention  to 
the  ever  ready  mind  of  a  man  who  was  said  to  be  so  slow  as 
to  be  useless.  His  tenacity  of  purpose  in  executing  his  plans, 
taken  in  connection  with  the  fact  that  he  was  slow  to  leave 
the  field,  can  scarcely  be  considered  defects.  This  letter  lets 
light  in  on  General  Thomas's  estimate  of  the  three  months' 
men.  To  understand  this  we  must  know  that  the  fighting 
element  of  a  community  is  but  a  small  part  of  the  entire 
number.  This  element  is  not  found  among  those  who  or- 
ganize companies  in  the  hour  of  peace  for  mere  display. 
They  are  soldiers  in  peace  and  apt  to  be  citizens  in  war. 
With  the  French,  the  greatest  war  power  on  earth,  this 
fighting  element  is  sifted  out  and  put  together  after  con- 
scription that  takes  all.  In  this  way  certain  brigades  and 
regiments  are  put  forward  when  desperate  valor  is  called  for 
and  the  great  mass  left  to  ordinary  service. 

When  our  civil  war  came  on,  the  South  got  at  its  fight- 
ing element  in  the  start.  Our  government  did  not.  The 
call  for  seventy-five  thousand  men  for  three  months  brought 
out  an  army  of  roisterers  that  acted  as  if  they  were  on  a 
summer  excursion,  or;  as  they  generally  expressed  it,  on  a 
picnic.  At  the  end  of  the  ninety  days  these  forces  melted 
away — some  of  the  regiments,  as  McDowell  said,  "  moving 
to  the  rear  to  the  sound  of  the  enemy's  cannon."  They  dis- 
appeared to  give  place  to  the  war  element,  the  stalwart  men 
under  muskets  who  saved  for  us  our  Union.  It  is  not  pleas- 
ant to  know  that  the  seventy-five  thousand  are  reappearing 
in  great  force  upon  the  pension  roll.  George  H.  Thomas, 
who  loved  the  real  soldier,  saw  no  material  in  the  peace 
parade  contingent  and  so  was  ready  to  absolve  Robert  Pat- 
terson from  all  blame. 

It  is  to  General  Robert  Anderson,  of  Sumter  fame,  that 


Sannul  J.  Ha  ml  all.  Rttornrnends  Thorn -it.  103 

we  owe  the  promotion  of  Thomas  to  the  position  of  brigadier- 
general  of  volunteers.  General  Anderson,  having  accepted 
command  of  the  government  forces  in  Kentucky  on  condi- 
tion that  he  should  have  the  privilege  of  selecting  four 
brigadier-generals  to  serve  under  him,  chose  "W.  T.  Sherman, 
Don  Carlos  Buell,  and  O.  M.  Mitchell.  He  was  in  doubt  as 
to  the  fourth,  thinking  to  tender  it  to  the  man  who  it  seems 
had  done  h/is  best  to  get  Kentucky  out  of  the  Union,  Gov- 
ernor S.  B.  Buckner,  when  his  nephew,  Lieutenant  Thomas 
M.  Anderson,  of  the  Fifth  Cavalry,  who  knew  the  facts, 
called  his  uncle's  attention  to  them  and  suggested  the  name 
of  George  II.  Thomas.  "  One  of  the  very  best  officers  in  the 
army,"  exclaimed  General  Anderson,  and  the  name  went  in. 

This  promotion  was  helped  on  by  no  less  a  personage 
than  Samuel  J.  Randall,  subsequently  Speaker  of  the  House 
of  Representatives,  and  through  life  an  active  leader  of  the 
Pennsylvania  Democracy.  His  letter  of  recommendation  is 
valuable  from  the  fact  that  it  comes  from  one  who,  without 
remarkable  quality  of  brain,  and  with  a  lack  of  cul- 
ture, rose  to  eminence  from  sheer  force  of  character,  and 
clear,  keen  knowledge  of  human  nature.  Mr.  Randall  had 
three  months  in  which  to  study  the  character  of  the  man  he 
recommended.  What  he  said  that  day  of  Thomas  has  since 
been  written  in  acts  more  memorable  than  bronze,  which  is 
that  he  had  the  capacity  to  command,  and  the  confidence  of 
the  men  he  commanded.  There  is  George  Henry  Thomas  in 
one  sentence.  Samuel  J.  Randall,  possessed  of  Republican 
opinions  he  was  pleased  to  treat  as  convictions  while  posing 
as  a  Democrat,  left  little  in  his  political  career  one 
cares  to  remember.  In  this,  however,  he  has  gained  the  ma- 
terial for  a  monument.  He  saw  what  Lincoln,  Stanton,  and 
Chase  failed  to  see  in  the  Virginia  colonel,  a  man  worthy 
the  utmost  confidence  and  highest  command.  "We  give  his 
letter: 

"SANDY  HOOK,  MD.,  August  3,  1861. 
Friend  Scott  : 

I  hear  you  are  the  Assistant  Secretary  of  War.  Rest 
assured  that  no  man  delights  more  in  your  high  position 
than  I  do.  I  notice  that  the  government  is  now  considering 


104  /'"''  of  Thomas. 

the  appointment  of  proper  persons  to  be  brigadier-generals. 
In  the  name  of  God,  let  them  be  men  fully  competent  to  dis- 
charge the  duties  of  the  positions  to  which  they  may  be  as- 
signed, inefficiency  is  the  evil  of  the  hour.  This  opinion  is 
1  up-.n  observation  ..f  nearly  three  months.  Most  of 
the  time,  in  fact  nearly  all  of  the  time,  \ve  have  been  under 
tin-  command  of  Colonel  George  II.  Thomas,  now  command- 
ing one  of  the  brigades  here.  He  is  thoroughly  competent 
to  ho  a  brigadier-general,  has  the  confidence  of  every  man  in 
his  command,  for  the  reason  that  they  recognize  and  appre- 
ciate capacity— which  to  them,  in  every  hour  of  the  day,  is 
so  essential  to  their  safety.  Now,  let  me,  as  a  friend  of  this 
administration,  in  so  far  as  the  war  is  concerned,  and  the 
preservation  of  the  Union  is  involved,  urge  upon  General 
Cameron  to  select  Colonel  Thomas  as  one  of  the  number  of 
proposed  brigadiers.  This  appointment  would  give  renewed 
vigor  and  courage  to  this  section  of  the  army.  I  am,  as  per- 
haps you  know,  a  private  in  the  First  City  Cavalry,  of  Phil- 
adelphia, and  I  never  saw  Colonel  Thomas  until  I  saw 
him  on  parade,  and  our  intercourse  has  only  been  such  as  ex- 
ists between  a  colonel  and  one  of  his  soldiers;  hence,  you 
see,  my  recommendation  comes  from  pure  motives,  and  en- 
tirely free  from  social  or  political  considerations.  I  speak 
for  and  write  in  behalf  of  the  brave  men  who,  in  this  hour 
of  our  country's  peril,  are  coming  forward  and  endangering 
their  own  lives,  and,  perhaps,  leaving  those  most  dear  to 
them  without  a  support.  I  write  warmly,  because  I  think  I 
know  the  necessity  of  the  case.  You  will  do  the  country  a 
service  by  giving  my  letter  a  serious  consideration.  I  hope 
to  be  in  Washington  some  time  about  the  1st  of  September, 
when  I  shall  try  to  see  you.  Will  you  please  present  my  re- 
gards to  General  Cameron,  and  if  he  has  time  to  read  this 
letter,  hand  it  to  him?  Yours  truly, 

SAMUEL  J.  RANDALL." 

That  President  Lincoln  distrusted  George  II.  Thomas 
because  of  his  birth,  we  can  well  understand,  and  this  is 
made  more  evident  from  the  fact  that  President  Lincoln  had 
seen  little  and  knew  less  of  the  man  he  doubted.  Had  they 


T]>omas  Assigned  f»  f\'i-)>f>/i.-ky.  105 

come  in  contact,  Abraham  Lincoln,  as  good  a  judge  of  men 
as  the  Hhon.  Samuel  J.  Randall,  would  undoubtedly  have 
given  his  confidence  to  the  dignified  and  taciturn  Virginian 
from  the  start.  As  it  was,  he  acted  upon  the  advice  of  others, 
and  sent  him  his  commission  of  brigadier-general,  and  Lieu- 
tenant Anderson  carried  a  letter  from  his  uncle  to  Colonel 
Thomas,  along  with  the  following  order: 

"  HEAD-QUARTERS  OF  THE  ARMY,  t 

WASHINGTON,  August  24,  1861. 

The  following  assignment  is  made  of  the  general  officers 
of  the  volunteer  service,  whose  appointment  was  announced 
in  General  Orders  No.  62,  from  the  War  Department: 

To  the  Department  of  the  Cumberland,  Brigadier-Gen- 
eral Robert  Anderson,  commanding: 
Brigadier-General  W.  T.  Sherman. 
Brigadier-General  George  H.'Thomas. 

By  command  of  Lieutenant-General  Scott* 
E.  D.  TOWNSEND, 

Assistant  Adjutant-General" 


1 00  Life  of  Thomas. 


CHAPTER  V. 

Thomas  Proposes  to  Sever  the  Main  Artery  of  the  Confederacy  by  Taking 
Ch:ittanooga — Andrew  Johnson's  Potent  Influence — Buell  Placed  in 
Command— Battle  of  Mill  Springs. 

President  Lincoln's  administration  had  many  pnantoms 
that  went  far  to  mar  success.  One  of  these  was  the  apparition 
of  a  Napoleon  from  West  Point.  Another  manifested  itself 
in  a  conquest  of  territory  instead  of  armies.  Yet  another 
was  a  solemn  belief  that  in  some  place  unknown  in  the  border 
states  were  large  bodies  of  Union  men  looking  earnestly  to 
the  old  government  for  recognition  and  aid.  This,  compara- 
tively speaking,  was  a  harmless  delusion,  for,  with  the  excep- 
tion of  Tennessee,  no  great  effort  was  made  to  hunt  down 
the  mythical  Union  men.  It  is  singular  that  such  a  delusion 
should  have  found  place  in  the  brain  of  able  men.  We  well 
know  that  before  the  sacred  soil  of  Virginia  was  invaded,  there 
was  a  powerful  Union  feeling  pervading  the  entire  South.  But 
after  that,  the  people  of  the  slave  states  rose  in  a  great  wrath 
never  before  shown  by  the  masses.  There  were  but  few 
Union  men  after  that.  There  yet  existed  the  Union  man,  a 
conscientious,  thoughtful  citizen,  found  at  long  intervals, 
who  saw  that  the  war  had  been  plunged  into  by  the  South 
without  reason  and,  of  course,  without  moral  justification, 
and  such  a  man  turned  in  anger  from  the  leaders  of  their 
people ;  but  they  had  no  love  for  the  government  that  had 
taken  up  the  challenge  so  promptly  and  was  marching, 
armed  to  the  teeth,  upon  their  homes.  No  people  ever  pre- 
sented a  more  solid  front  or  a  deeper  devotion  to  their  cause. 
In  every  other  war  of  record  we  have  traitors.  In  that  of 
our  Revolution,  the  Tories  nearly  equaled  the  patriots  in 
number,  and  Arnold,  one  of  the  bravest  and  most  capable  of 
our  officers,  gave  a  synonym  to  infamy  more  expressive  and 
significant  than  the  original  word.  But  in  the  four  years  of 


Early  Situation  in  Kentucky.  107 

an   awful  struggle,  iiot  a  man   was  found  base  enough   to 
barter  bis  honor  for  his  cause. 

It  would  have  been  better  for  themselves,  and  their 
country,  had  these  thoughtful,  dbngcientioua  men  given  ex- 
pression to  their  convictions  and  open  action  to  their  faith. 
That  Generals  Anderson  and  Thomas  and  many  others  born 
of  the  South  did  so  with  added  luster  to -their  names  goes 
far  to  prove  that  it  is  right  to  serve  the  right  under  all  cir- 
cumstances. 

Kentucky  was  not  so  promising  a  lield  to  these  searchers 
for  Union  men  as  West  Virginia  and  Tennessee,  but  it  had  its 
claims  in  that  direction,  so  that  in  the  selection  of  Anderson 
and  Thomas,  two  men  of  Southern  birth,  it  was  thought  to 
conciliate  the  enemy  and  win  the  wavering  by  people  of 
their  own  blood.  A  greater  error  could  not  have  been  com- 
mitted. Anderson  and  Thomas  were  hated  with  an  intensity 
difficult  to  express  because  of  the  very  fact  that  gained  their 
commission.  As  for  Thomas,  traveling  alone  a?id  without 
escort,  he  narrowly  escaped  with  his  life. 

The  situation  in  Kentucky  in  September,  1861,  did  not 
differ  much  from  that  in  any  other  border  stat;e.  When  the 
war  came  on,  the  active  element  among  the  secessionists,  im- 
patient at  the  delay  involved  in  Ordinances  of  Secession  and 
eager  for  the  field,  hastened  to  enlist  in  Richmond  under  Lee. 
All  that  was  left  to  the  state  made  up  a  sentiment  that,  while 
sympathizing  with  the  Southern  cause,  was  of  a  conservative 
turn.  Although  Kentucky  had  suffered  far  more  from  the 
Abolitionists  than  South  Carolina,  her  people  were  better  ac- 
quainted with  the  vast  resources  of  the  North,  had  a  trade 
and  social  intercourse  far  in  excess  of  the  more  belligerent 
states,  and  so,  after  the  hot  heads  had  left,  the  leading  citizens 
begun  to  negotiate  for  an  armed  neutrality.  They  had  no 
stomach  for  a  war  that  would  have  its  contention  about  their 
very  homes.  The  trouble  attending  such  an  attitude  was  its 
treatment  from  both  sides.  Each  army  marching  into  Ken- 
tucky felt  at  liberty  to  live  on  the  country  as  one  belonging 
to  the  other  side. 

On  the  12th  of  September,  1861,  having  reported  to 
General  Robert  Anderson  at  Louisville,  Thomas  was  assigned 


108  Life  of  Thomas. 

to  command  at  Camp  Dick  Robinson,  in  place  of  Lieutenant 
William  Nelson,  of  Kentucky,  a  volunteer  from  our  naval 
B<  ;  vice.  He  arrived  at  his  post  on  the  15th  of  September, 
ami  found  six  thousand  troops,  much  disorganized  through 
lack  of  discipline  and  equipment.  Nothing  daunted  by  the 
depressing  appearances,  he  went,  as  was  his  wont,  actively  to 
work.  All  Kentucky,  including  the  mythical  Union  men, 
protested  with  more  profanity  than  politeness  against  this 
.uizing  a  force  in  the  very  heart  of  the  state.  It  was  the 
general  opinion  that  sooner  or  later  there  would  be  a  suspen- 
sion of  hostilities  for  the  purpose  of  negotiating  a  settle- 
ment. The  belief,  born  at  military  head-quarters  on  the 
Potomac,  that  we  were  fighting  for  a  boundary  and  not  the 
conquest  of  the  South,  permeated  all  Kentucky.  The  leaders 
of  a  state  that,  next  to  Virginia,  had  produced  more  able 
men  in  a  political  way  than  any  other  of  the  Union,  had  no 
mind  for  any  move  that  would  throw  their  dark  and  bloody 
ground  into  a  Northern  alliance. 

While  Thomas  clearly  comprehended  all  the  political  bear- 
ings of  the  situation,  he-' treated  this  talk  of  fighting  for  a 
boundary  and  an  eventual  settlement  with  contempt.  "  The 
longer  the  war  goes  on,"  he  said,  "  the  wider  the  difference, 
and  the  more  intense  the  feeling.  We  end  the  conflict  either 
at  Boston  or  New  Orleans — there  is  no  boundary  between." 
An  eminent  statesman  in  Europe  said  during  the  armed  con- 
flict between  Russia  and  the  allies,  that  "  war  is  disorganized 
diplomacy."  Certainly  in  the  appeal  to  brute  force  there  is 
no  more  diplomatic  negotiation.  The  ultimatum  of  the 
campaign  has  more  force  but  less  reason  than  those  of  the 
cabinet,  and  the  first  makes  the  last  impossible. 

Putting  all  the  political  considerations  away  from  him,  he 
devoted  himself  to  his  military  work.  The  little  army  under 
hU  command  called  for  his  immediate  attention.  His  first 
tli ought,  ever  the  same  throughout  the  war,  was  for  the 
pmpor  sustenance  and  equipment  of  his  men,  the  next  their 
drill  and  discipline.  He  made  earnest  and  incessant  appeals 
to  the  War  Department  for  clothing,  blankets,  tents,  and  all 
other  material  necessary  to  an  army  in  the  field.  The 
responses  in  promises  were  profuse,  but  the  supplies  came 


Thomas'  First  Plan  of  Campaign.  109 

slowly.  The  truth  is,  the  War  Department  had  been  de- 
moralized by  its  chief,  Simon  Cameron,  the  man  of  whom  it 
was  told  that  when  applied  to  for  funds  to  win  a  legislature 
at  the  polls,  responded  that  it  would  be  cheaper  to  purchase 
the  legislature.  Whether  this  ever  occurred  we  can  not  say, 
but  that  it  was  generally  believed  to  have  happened,  gives 
the  man's  reputation  and  through  that  his  real  character. 
This  condition  of  the  department  sent  as  many  thieves  to 
the  war  to  plunder  as  brave  men  to  the  front  to  light. 

In  and  about  the  old  brick  building,  from  which  the  w;ir 
was  conducted,  thronged  a  crowd  whose  faces,  fairly  enameled 
in  guilt,  were  saved  from  the  dead  blank  of  brutal  outlook 
by  an  expression  of  greed  enlivened  by  cunning.  They 
shouldered  and  elbowed  each  other  in  their  eager  pursuit  of 
plunder.  Enormous  fortunes  were  made  through  the  sale  of 
contracts  given  political  favorites  and  bartered  away  to  more 
adroit  rogues.  While  these  scoundrels  were  fattening  on 
their  spoils,  our  poor  fellows  were  marching  without  shoes, 
shivering  without  overcoats,  and  sleeping  under  tents  that 
were  rotted  before  they  were  sent  to  the  field.  Had  Simon 
Cameron  continued  at  the  head  of  the  War  Department, 
Jefferson  Davis  would  have  dictated  terms  of  peace  in  the 
old  Liberty  Hall  at  Philadelphia. 

While  thus  eirgaged  in  duties  to  his  command;  General 
Thomas  gave  much  of  his  mind  to  a  study  of  the  military 
condition.  He  knew  that  it  was  a  war  of  resources.  Now, 
while  at  the  North  these  seemed  inexhaustible,  and  at  the 
South  they  appeared  limited,  this  very  fact  told  against  us. 
Our  abundance  made  us  wanton  in  our  extravagance,  while 
at  the  South  every  expenditure  was  made  with  the  utmost 
caution,  and  an  enforced  economy  prevailed  to  which  men 
and  officers  submitted  with  a  cheerful  content  that  was  with- 
out parallel.  How  to  cripple  the  resources  already  meager 
of  the  enemy  was  the  problem  our  military  men  were  called 
upon  to  solve.  In  a  study  of  the  map,  General  Thomas  found 
the  solution.  The  war  had  developed  itself  in  Virginia,  and 
was  being  fought  out  to  an  end  between  Richmond  and 
Washington.  This  was  on  the  eastern  verge  of  all  the 
territory  under  control  of  the  Confederacy,  and  to  supply 


110  /.  ''•  of  Thomas. 

the-foreea  thus  dispersed,  there  were  two  lines  of  railway, 
the  one  running  along  the  Atlantic  cost,  and  the  other  con- 
necting the  northern  parts  of  Mississippi,  Alabama,  and 
Georgia,  and  all  of  Tennessee,  with  the  armies  about  Rich- 
mond. General  Thomas  elaborated  the  plan  of  a  campaign 
through  Cumberland  Gap,  that  would  enable  him  to  sieze 
and  hold  the  more  northern  line  of  railroad  while  threaten- 
ing that  upon  the  coast.  This  he  submitted  to  the  War  De- 
partment. 

The  War  Department  was  pleased  to  accept  this  bold  plan 
of  attack,  especially  as  it  was  approved  by  those  Union  men 
south,  so  dear  to  the  heart  of  the  administration.  The  de- 
partment accepted  promptly  the  move  that  had  it  been  exe- 
cuted as  Thomas  suggested,  would  have  changed  the  char- 
acter of  the  war  and  shortened  the  conflict,  and  handed  it 
over  to  another  officer  to  execute.  He  received  a  letter  from 
Brigadier-General  O.  M.  Mitchel,  commanding  the  depart- 
ment of  the  Ohio  in  which  General  Mitchel  said  he  was  in- 
formed that  the  War  Department  had  ordered  him  to  Camp 
Dick  Robinson,  to  prepare  the  troops  for  an  advance  on 
Cumberland  Gap,  and  thence  into  East  Tennessee. 

To  say  this  treatment  of  Thomas  wounded  him  deeply, 
would  but  feebly  express  the  indignation  at  such  an  uncalled- 
for  rebuke.  His  long  and  well-tried  service  in  the  army  had 
won  for  him,  at  least  the  right  to  respectful  treatment.  At 
head-quarters  he  stood  the  peer,  if  not  the  superior  of  the 
men  whom  General  Scott  recognized,  and  the  department 
intrusted  with  its  confidence.  Had  any  one  possessed  the 
courage,  or  held  the  familiar  intercourse  necessary  to  tell 
General  Thomas  that  he  was  distrusted  by  the  government 
on  account  of  his  birth,  he  would  have  been  better  prepared. 
The  blow  came  without  warning.  He  resented  it  promptly, 
and  in  answer  to  General  Mitchel's  letter,  wrote  as  follows : 

HEAD-QUARTERS,  CAMP  DICK  ROBINSON, 

GARRARD  Co.,  KY.,  October  11,  1861. 
BRIGADIER-GENERAL  O.  M.  MITCHEL, 

Commanding  Department  of  the  Ohio,  Cincinnati,  0. 
GENERAL  :     Your  communication  of  the  10th   inst.  was 


First  Protest  against  Injustice.  Ill 

received  to-day  at  the  hands  of  Governor  Johnston.  I  have 
been  doing  all  in  my  power  to  prepare  the  troops  for  a  move 
on  Cumberland  Ford  and  to  seize  the  Tennessee  and  Vir- 
ginia Railroad,  and  shall  continue  to  do  all  I  can  to  assist 
yon  until  your  arrival  here;  but  justice  to  myself  requires 
that  I  ask  to  be  relieved  from  duty  with  these  troops,  since 
the  Secretary  of  War  thought  it  necessary  to  supersede  me 
in  command  without,  as. I  conceive,  any  just  cause  for  so 
doing. 

I  am,  General,  very  respectfully, 

Your  obedient  servant, 

GEO.  H.  THOMAS, 
Brigadier-General  U.  S.  A.  Commanding. 

HEAD-QUARTERS,  CAMP  DICK  ROBINSON, 

GARRARD  Co.,  KY.,  October  11,  1861. 
BRIGADIER-GENERAL  W.  T.  SHERMAN, 

Commanding  Department  of  the  Cumberland,  Louisville,  Ky. 

GENERAL:  I  received  an  official  communication  to-day 
from  Brigadier-General  0.  M.  Mitchel,  informing  me  that 
he  had  been  ordered  by  the  Secretary  of  War  to  repair  to 
this  camp  and  prep.are  the  troops  for  a  forward  movement, 
first  to  Cumberland  Ford,  and  eventually  to  seize  upon  the 
Tennessee  and  Virginia  Railroad.  As  I  have  been  doing  all 
in  my  power  to  effect  this  very  thing,  to  have  the  execution 
of  it  taken  from  me  whqn  nearly  prepared  to  take  the  field,  is 
extremely  mortifying.  I  have,  therefore,  respectfully  to  ask 
to  be  relieved  from  duty  with  the  troops  on  the  arrival  of 
General  Mitchel. 

I  am,  General,  very  respectfully, 

Your  obedient  servant, 

GEO.  H.  THOMAS, 
Brigadier- General  U.  S.  A.  Commanding. 

October  13,  1861. 
GENERAL  GEO.  H.  THOMAS, 

Commanding  Camp  Dick  Robinson. 
You  are  authorized  to  go  on  and  prepare  your  com- 


11 -J  •  Life  of  Thomas. 

iiiiind  for  active  service.  General  Mitchel  is  subject  to  my 
orders,  and  I  will,  if  possible,  give  you  the  opportunity  to 
complete  what  you  have  begun.  Of  course  I  would  do  all  I 
can  to  carry  out  your  wishes,  but  feel  that  the  affairs  of  Ken- 
tucky call  for  the  united  action  of  all  engaged. 

W.  T.  SHERMAN, 

Brigadier- General  Commanding  Department 
of  the  Cumberland. 

The  author  of  this  treatment  of  an  able  and  patriotic 
officer  was  Governor  Andrew  Johnson.  This  man,  destined 
to  perform  so  prominent  a  part  subsequently  in  our  national 
affairs,  was  loyal  to  the  government,  not  from  any  love  of 
the  Union,  but  from  an  intense  hatred  of  the  governing 
class  at  the  South.  Born  of  the  poor  white  trash  and  bred 
a  tailor,  he  grew  to  manhood  without  being  sufficiently 
schooled  to  write  his  name.  That  from  such  a  beginning  he 
should  struggle  up  to  a  national  recognition  as  a  prominent 
leader,  would  be  to  his  credit  were  it  not  marred  and  tainted 
by  methods  that  were  as  low  as  they  were  unscrupulous. 
There  had  been  in  Tennessee  from  its  earliest  history  an 
element  made  up  of  poor  whites  that  was  in  deadly  hostility 
to  the  wealthy  slave-owners.  This  would  seem  to  be  a  nat- 
ural condition  in  any  part  of  the  South,  for  the  slave-owners 
had  no  use  for  the  poor  white  laborers,  but  Tennessee  was 
alone  in  possessing  such  a  class.  To  this  Andrew  Johnson 
appealed  and  on  it  he  rode  into  office,  reaching  the  highest 
honors  in  the  gift  of  the  state.  Through  all  his  official 
career  he  remained  Andrew  Johnson.  Possessed  of  a  re- 
markable shrewdness,  a  volubility  of  speech  and  great  force 
of  character,  he  had  no  breadth  nor  culture  of  mind,  and 
would  have  passed  back  to  the  obscurity  from  which  he  had 
arisen  but  for  the  opportunity  he  seized  on  when  secession 
from  the  Union  came.  As  he  could  not  accompany  the 
Southern  senators  in  their  exodus  from  the  Union,  he  made 
a  merit  of  necessity,  and  from  his  place  in  the  chamber  he 
uttered  a  loud  denunciation  that  was  more  vituperative  than 
logical  or  severe.  The  Northern  people  failing  to  compre- 
hend that  the  act  was  more  from  a  hatred  of  the  masters 


About  Andrew  Johnson.  113 

than  a  love  of  the  Union,  accepted  him  at  once  as  a  pure, 
high-toned  patriot,  and  his  influence  thenceforward  at 
Washington,  always  mischievous,  was  ever  potent.  We 
say  he  would  have  accompanied  Jeff.  Davis,  Robert  Tombs, 
and  the  other  Southern  leaders  had  they  permitted  such  as- 
sociation, but  they  "  scorned  to  own  him  as  a  slave."  What 
he  was  capable  of  his  subsequent  career  demonstrated.  The 
only  man  on  earth  who  could  have  saved  us  from  the  infamy 
of  Mrs.  Surratt's  execution,  he  hurried  on  the  cruel  death 
from  feeling  of  fear,  for  "  in  the  lottery  of  assassination,"  he 
had  drawn  the  highest  prize  at  the  hands  of  his  boon  com- 
panion, the  assassin.  While  mouthing  his  high  resolve  to 
make  treason  odious,  the  South  came  weak,  bleeding,  and 
humbled,  and  he  was  so  delighted  to  have  it  in  his  power  to 
aid  this  ruined  aristocracy  which  had  formerly  ridden  over 
him  rough  shod,  that  he  swung  from  the  extreme  North  to 
the  extreme  South,  to  the  astonishment  and  disgust  of  his 
Union  supporters. 

An  old  Scotch  proverb  tells  us  "  that  a  mean  sinner 
makes  a  mean  saint."  This  bit  of  condensed  wisdom  of  a 
shrewd  race  is  applicable  to  other  conditions  than  that  of  re- 
ligion. Not  only  a  man  may  do  great  acts  without  himself 
being  great,  but  his  very  defects  may  shine  like  the  phos- 
phorescent glow  of  decay. 

Andrew  Johnson  instinctively  hated  a  gentleman,  and 
from  this  feeling  alone  we , find  a  motive  for  his  subsequent 
hatred  of  Don  Carlos  Buell,  whose  military  career  he  sud- 
denly terminated,  and  his  immediate  hostility  to  General 
Thomas. 

Thomas,  after  a  close  study  of  the  military  situation ? 
saw  the  true  objective  point.  Jefferson  Davis,  in  threatening 
Washington  with  the  great  mass  and  best  organized  armies 
of  the  Confederacy,  made,  as  we  have  said,  the  two  railroad 
lines  of  vital  importance,  not  only  to  success,  but  to  subsist- 
ence. The  Southern  States  menaced  by  Thomas's  projected 
move  was  the  belly  of  the  Confederacy  and  its  tenderest 
part.  To  strike  at  this  successfully  would  end  the  war. 
Two  years  after,  the  capture  of  Chattanooga  and  the  grave 


114  Life  of  Thomas. 

consequence*    that    followed    proved    the    wisdom    of    the 
scheme. 

While  this  military  project  was  being  developed,  Andrew 
Johnson  had  a  political  scheme  based  on  this  same  military 
move.  Indeed,  it  may  be  well  understood  that  but  for 
Andrew  Johnson's  eager  desire  to  get  at  tbe  supposed  loyal 
men  of  East  Tennessee,  and  between  sucb  an  element  and 
the  army  of  the  United  States  set  up  a  loyal  government  at 
Nashville,  Thomas's  proposed  campaign  would  never  have 
been  considered  at  Washington.  It  was  a  time  when  every 
prominent  politician  at  the  North  took  a  hand  in  the  conduct 
of  the  war.  This  was  done  sometimes  with  the  sanction  of 
the  administration  and  sometimes  without.  There  was,  of 
course,  a  political  side  to  the  conflict,  and  it  was  by  no  means 
an  unimportant  one.  Our  able  administration  saw  not  only 
the  field  of  armed  conflict  in  its  front,  but  the  great  danger 
of  a  political  loss  in  the  rear,  where  a  sympathy  with  the 
South,  of  old  Democratic  cultivation,  upon  which  the  Con- 
federate leaders  had  counted,  and  which,  although  quiet,  yet 
lived.  In  a  government  of  parties  such  as  ours,  it  is  difficult 
to  teach  the  minority  that  it  is  treasonable  to  promulgate 
any  opinion  in  opposition  to  the  government,  which  means 
the  party  in  power.  That  war  involved  a  new  question  that 
had  no  reference  to  how  the  government  should  be  adminis- 
tered, but  one  of  whether  we  should  have  the  present  form 
of  government  or  not,  had  no  effect  on  such  men  as  Vallan- 
digham  and  others  more  or  less  outspoken,  who,  believing 
the  South  could  not  be  conquered,  awaited  the  hour  when 
the  people,  weary  of  the  useless  slaughter  and  heavy  taxa- 
tion, would  rise  up  in  an  opposition  at  the  polls  and  drive  the 
Abolitionists,  as  they  were  called,  from  power.  Another 
matter  of  no  less  importance  was  the  threatened  intervention 
of  European  powers.  Almost  the  first  acts  of  a  stupid  con- 
gress, when  the  South  withdrew  its  members  and  left  the  old 
Whig  element  in  control,  were  the  passage  of  acts  clogging, 
and  in  some  instances  prohibiting,  trade  under  the  name  of 
protection.  This  disturbance  in  trade,  which,  accompanied  by 
a  loss  of  the  cotton  that  had  been  mainly  supplied  from  the 
United  States,  brought  great  embarrassment  to  capitalists 


Thomas  Moces  Forward.  115 

abroad  and  positive  distress  to  the  laborers.  Angered  thus 
by  senseless  and  unpatriotic  meanness,  we  lost  all  the  sympa- 
thy we  might  have  counted  on  as  the  opponents  of  slavery. 
Louis  Napoleon  was  open  in  his  opposition,  and,  failing  to 
secure  the  co-operation  of  England,  entered  into  a  secret  al- 
liance with  Russia  that  sent  a  fleet  to  our  shores,  while  the 
French  army  invaded  Mexico,  to  be  in  striking  distance 
when  the  hour  to  strike  should  arrive. 

We  state  these  facts  because  no  history  of  the  war,  no 
biography  of  a  soldier,  is  complete  or  comprehensive  without 
them.  It  was  these,  to  the  multitudes  unseen,  sides  of  the 
conflict  that  gave  men  like  Andrew  Johnson  such  influence 
at  Washington.  The  administration,  as  we  have  said,  be- 
lieved in  the  mythical  loyal  men  of  the  South  as  seriously  as 
did  Andrew  Johnson,  so  when  he  approved  heartily  of  Gen- 
eral Thomas's  proposed  move,  it  was  easy  for  him  to  select 
the  officer  to  lead  the  command. 

It  will  be  observed  that  Sherman,  to  whom  Thomas  ap- 
pealed, refused  to  relieve  him,  and  the  hurt  officer  continued 
his  active  preparation  for  what  he  had  so  much  at  heart, 
although  the  honors  of  leadership  were  given  to  another. 
But  while  preparations  were  being  hastened,  another  obstacle 
appeared  in  the  way  far  more  potent  than  the  politicians  at 
Washington.  This  was  the  enemy.  The  authorities  at 
Richmond  were  not  blind  to  the  dangers  the  gathering  of 
troops  under  Thomas  threatened.  To  meet  this,  troops  were 
being  pushed  forward  from  Cumberland  Ford,  Barboursville, 
and  Thompkinsville.  To  resist  this  counter  movement,  Gen- 
eral Thomas  marched  his  best  troops  forward  to  Rock  Castle 
Hills,  with  such  support  as  his  unprepared  condition  would 
admit  of.  This  was  accomplished  none  too  soon.  While 
the  movements  of  other  Confederate  columns  left  our  general 
in  some  doubt  as  to  their  design,  it  was  clearly  developed 
that  the  force  facing  Colonel  Garrard's  Third  Kentucky  In- 
fantry at  Rock  Castle  Hills  under  General  Zollicoffer  was 
the  one  to  be  met,  and  General  Thomas  hurried  forward 
Brigadier-General  Schoepf  with  three  regiments  and  a  bat- 
tery. 

Whilst  thus  engaged,  our  general  had  another  taste  of  the 


116  Life  of  Thomas. 

restless  and  somewhat  inebriated  Andrew  Johnson.  Like 
Sancho  Panza,  the  latter  was  in  search  of  his,  at  the  time, 
impossible  governorship,  and  his  impatient  demands  found 
an  echo  in  certain  Tennessee  Union  soldiers  in  the  camp  at 
Crab  Orchard.  Andrew  Johnson,  in  common  with  other 
civilians,  and  many  of  our  officers,  believed  that  all  that  was 
necessary  to  a  forward  movement  was  an  order  to  make  the 
same.  Such  order  carried  in  it  all  that  was  necessary  to  suc- 
cess. Horace  Greeley's  incessant  cry  of  "On  to  Richmond," 
was  of  this  sort.  Andrew  Johnson  not  only  echoed  the  pop- 
ular demand  in  his  pursuit  of  a  governorship,  but  when  not 
promptly  responded  to,  invariably  charged  the  delay  to  the  dis- 
loyal condition  of  the  officer  in  command.  General  Thomas 
was  not  the  man  to  be  influenced  by  any  such  senseless 
clamor.  From  his  first  campaign  to  his  last,  he  looked  to 
the  means  necessary  to  make  his  march  fortunate.  No  gov- 
ernor in  the  beginning,  nor  commander-in-chief  in  the  end, 
could  affect  by  impatient  demand,  this  quiet,  self-possessed 
man  in  the  discharge  of  his  duties.  It  was  to  this  indiffer- 
ence to  ignorant  interference  that  he  got  the  reputation  of 
being  slow.  He  was  slow  to  the  unnecessary  slaughter  of 
his  own  troops,  and  left  behind  him  no  Cold  Harbor  atrocity 
or  Kenesaw  Mountain  murder  to  make  the  land  shudder  and 
the  government  ashamed.  Heroes  of  these  disasters  have 
left  the  record  that  Thomas  was  too  shiggish  for  a  subordi- 
nate, and  too  timid  for  a  separate  command.  "  Judge  riot 
lest  ye  be  judged,"  is  a  prudent  passage  of  Holy  Writ  that 
it  would  have  been  well  for  these  commentators  to  have 
heeded. 

The  trouble  given  General  Thomas  in  his  own  camp  is  in- 
dicated by  the  following  letter : 

"HEAD-QUARTERS,  CRAB  ORCHARD, 

November  7,  1861. 
GOVERNOR  ANDREW  JOHNSON, 

London,  Ky. 

DEAR  SIR  :  Your  favor  of  the  6th  instant  is  at  hand.  I 
have  done  all  in  my  power  to  get  troops  and  transportation, 
and  means  to  advance  into  East  Tennessee.  I  believe  Gen- 


Thomas  to  Andrew  Johnson.  117 

eral  Sherman  has  done  the  same.  Up  to  this  time,  we  have 
been  unsuccessful.  Have  you  heard  by  what  authority  the 
troops  from  London  were  to  fall  back  ?  Because  I  have  not, 
and  shall  not  move  any  of  them  back,  unless  ordered,  for  if  I 
am  not  interfered  with,  I  can  have  them  subsisted  there  as 
well  as  here.  I  am  inclined  to  think  the  rumor  has  grown 
out  of  the  feverish  excitement  which  seems  to  exist  in  the 
minds  of  some  of  the  regiments,  that  no  further  advance  is 
contemplated.  I  can  only  say  that  I  am  doing  the  best  I  can. 
Our  commanding  general  is  doing  the  same,  and  using  all  his 
influence  to  equip  a  force  for  the  rescue  of  East  Tennessee. 
If  the  Tennesseeans  are  not  content,  and  must  go,  then  the 
risk  of  disaster  will  remain  with  them.  Some  of  our  troops 
are  not  clothed,  and  it  seems  impossible  to  get  clothing. 

For  information  respecting  the  organization  of  regiments, 
1  send  you  General  Order  No.  90,  War  Department.  If  the 
gentlemen  you  name  can  raise  regiments  agreeably  to  the  con- 
ditions and  instructions  contained  in  said  order,  the  govern- 
ment will  accept  them,  and  I  hope  will  have  arms  to  place 
in  their  hands  in  the  course  of  two  or  three  months. 

In  conclusion  I  will  add  that  I  am  here  ready  to  obey  or- 
ders, and  earnestly  hope  that  the  troops  at  London  will  see 
the  necessity  of  doing  the  same. 

Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

GEORGE  H.  THOMAS, 

Brigadier- General  U.  S.  A." 

"HEAD-QUARTERS,  CRAB  ORCHARD, 

November  7,  1861. 
BRIGADIER- GENERAL  SCHOEPF, 

Commanding  Camp  Calvert,  London,  Ky: 
GENERAL  :  I  find  it  necessary  to  reply  to  Governor  John- 
son's letter  in  the  foregoing,  which  I  send  to  you  for  your 
information.  It  is  time  that  discontented  persons  should  be 
silent,  both  in  and  out  of  the  service.  I  sympathize  most 
deeply  with  the  East  Tennesseeans  on  account  of  their  natural 
anxiety  to  relieve  their  friends  and  families  from  the  terrible 
apprehension  which  they  are  now  suffering.  But  to  make 
the  attempt  to  rescue  them  when  not  half  prepared  is 


118  Life,  of  Thomas. 

culpable,  especially  when  our  enemies  are  perhaps  as  anxioua 
that  we  should  make  the  move  as  the  Tennesseeans  them- 
selves, for  it  is  well  known  by  our  commanding  general  that 
Buckner  has  an  overwhelming  force  within  striking  distance, 
whenever-he  can  get  us  at  a  disadvantage.  I  hope  you  will, 
therefore,  see  the  necessity  of  dealing  decidedly  with  such 
people,  and  you  have  my  authority  and  orders  for  doing  so. 
We  must  learn  to  abide  our  time,  or  we  will  never  be  success- 
ful. Respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

GEORGE  H.  THOMAS, 

Brigadier- General  U.  S.  A." 

It  was  not  long,  however,  before  Andrew  Johnson 
learned  that  the  obstacle  to  an  immediate  advance  was  not 
the  distrusted  Virginian,  but  no  less  a  personage  than  Gen- 
eral W.  T.  Sherman.  General  Sherman  was  subject  to 
panics,  and  at  a  time  when  the  Confederate  authorities  were 
straining  every  resource  to  present  a  defensive  line  to  our 
forces  in  Kentucky  without  weakening  the  army  of  Rich- 
mond, Sherman  satisfied  himself  that  there  was  a  heavy 
force  at  his  front  on  the  eve  of  a  forward  movement.  He 
knew  from  some  unknown  source  that  General  Albert  Sid- 
ney Johnston,  with  an  army  of  forty-five  thousand  men,  was 
about  to  advance  between  Crab  Orchard  and  Nolensville  on 
the  Louisville  and  Nashville  Railroad,  with  Louisville  and 
Cincinnati  their  objective  points.  Under  this  delusion  he 
ordered  Thomas  to  hold  his  force  in  readiness  to  fall  back 
of  Danville,  leaving  a  part  of  his  troops  at  Rock  Castle  Hills. 
Thomas  did  not  sympathize  with  his  commander  in  these 
grave  apprehensions.  He  had  been  at  some  labor  to  collect 
reliable  information  from  scouts  and  other  sources,  and  was 
satisfied  in  the  first  place  that  the  Confederates  had  no  such 
force  as  Sherman  counted  at  their  front,  and  in  the  second 
that  the  interest  of  the  Confederacy  was  to  be  found  in  the 
necessity  of  keeping  open  their  lines  of  supply,  and  that 
this  could  be  better  secured  by  a  defensive  instead  of  an  ag- 
gressive move,  looking  to  the  possession  of  Louisville  and 
the  capture  of  Cincinnati.  Lee  carried  the  title  of  the  Con- 
federacy at  the  bow  of  his  saddle,  as  Wendell  Phillips  ex- 


Thomas  Ordered  to  Retreat.  119 

pressed  it,  and  so  long  as  that  famous  Confederate  rode  at 
the  front,  the  war  hung  doubtful.  The  authorities  at  Rich- 
mond had  no  men  to  spare  for  offensive  movements  on  the 
Ohio. 

However,  General  Thomas  obeyed  the  order  to  retreat. 
It  seems  that  he  was  as  unprepared  for  this  as  for  an  advance. 
There  was  in  Sherman's  impatience  a  heavy  loss  of  material 
and  a  serious  loss  from  sickness.  The  newspaper  cor- 
respondents, of  course,  gave  the  facts  of  the  deplorable  con- 
dition to  the  world,  and  General  Thomas  was  held,  under  a 
storm  of  abuse,  to  the  responsibility.  This  silent,  self-com- 
posed man  of  destiny  paid  no  heed  to  this  unjust  denuncia- 
tion. It  might,  however,  have  relegated  him  to  the  rear  as 
it  had  others,  but  for  a  diversion  that  drew  public  attention 
from  the  subordinate  to  his  commander.  It  is  so  ludicrous 
that  history  might  lay  aside  her  dignity  for  a  laugh  while 
putting  it  to  record  were  it  not  that  it  is  a  historical  event 
with  grave  consequences. 

General  W.  T.  Sherman,  in  common  with  many  other 
military  men,  had  not  only  contempt  for  the  journalists  who 
sought  to  plan  campaigns  and  fight  battles,  which  contempt 
a  majority  of  his  brother  officers  were  careful  to  conceal,  but 
he  had  a  wrath  against  them  which  could  not  be  controlled. 
In  a  fit  of  anger  he  seized  upon  two  of  these  enterprising 
wielders  of  the  pen  and  thrust  them  from  his  lines.  It  would 
not  have  added  to  the  ignominy  had  he  drammed  them  out 
as  camp  followers  and  thieves  were.  The  gentlemen  had 
been  guilty  of  no  other  wrong  than  holding  Sherman  to  the 
responsibility  of  his  own  acts. 

The  mythical  bull  that  in  horning  a  locomotive  under- 
full  headway  is  held  to  be  a  happy  illustration  of  courage 
without  discretion,  was  happier  than  General  Sherman,  who 
did  not  attack  one  locomotive  but  all  the  locomotives  of  the 
land.  While  the  press  fraternity  is  given  to  a  wholesome 
abuse  of  each  other,  it  presents  an  unbroken  front  of  porcu- 
pine quills  to  an  outsider  who  tries  the  same  game  against 
any  one  of  them.  Sherman  was  open  to  assault.  Whatever 
may  be  the  question  as  to  his  ability,  it  was  so  incrusted 
with  egotism  and  marred  by  eccentricity  that  his  warmest 


120  Life  of  Thomas. 

admirer  shivers  in  doubt  half  the  time  as  to  whether  this 
great  general  was  of  sound  mind.  The  correspondents  were 
not  slow  to  seize  on  these  defects,  and  General  Sherman  was 
made  to  assert  that  a  million  of  men  would  be  needed  to 
invade  Tennessee  successfully.  He  was  thereupon  pro- 
nounced insane.  This  view  of  the  general's  condition  was 
so  generally  entertained  that  the  government  relieved  Sher- 
man and  gave  the  command  to  General  Don  Carlos  Buell. 

This  new  commander  resembled  General  Thomas  in  his 
silent  reserve,  but  he  was  like  Sherman  in  his  exaggerated 
belief  of  the  enemy's  superiority  as  to  numbers  and  resources. 
With  fifty  thousand  men  under  his  command,  he  was  held 
in  check  by  Albert  Sidney  Johnston  with  a  command  of 
only  fourteen  thousand.  True,  our  government,  using  all 
its  energies  and  resources  to  supply  and  strengthen  the 
army  of  the  Potomac,  failed — we  can  scarcely  say  neglected — 
to  afford  our  forces  in  Kentucky  the  equipment  necessary 
to  an  aggressive  movement.  As  General  Thomas  wrote,  it 
seemed  impossible  to  procure  clothing.  However,  Buell, 
when  compared  to  Sherman,  was,  as  subsequent  events 
demonstrated,  the  more  capable  commander  of  the  two. 
Don  Carlos  Buell  was  the  beau  ideal  of  a  West  Pointer. 
Small  of  stature,  he  was  so  soldierly  of  bearing  that  he 
seemed  of  full  height  while  his  handsome  face  and  well  de- 
veloped head  were  impressive,  and  gave  their  owner  prom- 
inence in  advance  of  achievement.  He  had  the  courage  of 
his  temperament,  a  manly  one  of  fine  but  tough  fiber  that 
was  in  strange  contrast  to  the  caution  of  his  convictions 
that  amounted  almost  to  cowardice.  Never  shrinking  from 
responsibility,  he  did  shrink  from  its  use  in  the  calculation 
of  chances.  And  yet  his  utter  disregard  of  Sherman's  ad- 
vice to  move  leisurely  in  his  march  to  a  junction  with  the 
Union  forces  at  Shiloh  saved  our  army  under  Grant  from 
utter  annihilation  in  that  inexcusable  surprise  and  unneces- 
sary butchery  of  our  brave  men.  General  Buell's  cold, 
austere  manner  was  extremely  unfortunate  for  him  and  for 
us,  as  his  fine  abilities  were  neutralized  by  this  hauteur  in 
his  command  of  volunteers  and  association  with  their 
officers.  It  is  not  necessary  to  success,  as  the  career  of 


Buell  Succeeds  Sherman.  121 

Thomas  demonstrates,  for  a  man  to  ever  conciliate  adverse 
feelings,  but  it  is  well  for  him  to  avoid  antagonizing  such. 
The  press,  that  great  controller  of  public  opinion  and  a 
power  at  Washington  owing  to  the  political  condition,  ac- 
cepted and  sustained  a  general  the  moment  he  demonstrated 
his  capacity  to  command.  But  Buell,  as  slow  to  move  for 
the  same  reasons  as  Thomas,  was  more  cautious  in  his  move- 
ments and  permitted  the  golden  opportunity  to  swing  by  in 
which  to  show  that  capacity  the  country  was  eagerly  in 
search  of.  He  unfortunately  not  only  increased  the  hos- 
tility of  Andrew  Johnson,  but  that  of  one  of  the  most  potent 
of  the  Northern  war  governors,  Oliver  P.  Morton,  of  In- 
diana. 

Buell's  accession  to  command  was  signalized  by  a  change 
of  plan  with  which  he  is  discredited.  The  fact  is,  the  project 
of  marching  our  fifty  thousand  men  to  Nashville  as  an  ob- 
jective point,  instead  Of  through  Cumberland  Gap  to  Chat- 
tanooga, originated  at  Washington  under  the  malign  influ- 
ence of  Andrew  Johnson.  General  Buell  was  too  clever  a 
soldier  to  select  as  an  objective  point  a  place  that  had  no 
strategic  significance  whatever.  To  seize  Nashville  and 
hold  it  was  of  no  damage  whatever  to  the  Confederacy,  and 
of  but  little  advantage  to  us.  To  halt  there  was  to  maintain 
an  enormous  army  at  a  heavy  expense  for  no  practical  pur- 
pose, and  out  of  this  it  could  be  moved,  as  it  eventually 
was,  only  by  a  serious  menace  in  force  upon  its'lines  of  sup- 
plies. Nashville  was  only  a  station  at  which  to  gather  mate- 
rial for  a  movement  on  Chattanooga,  the  key  of  that  theater 
of  operation,  as  we  have  asserted  and  will  prove  as  our  story, 
progresses. 

Before  Buell  could  get  his  campaign  under  way,  the 
enemy  concentrated  a  strong  force  under  Zollicoffer  at  Mill 
Springs.  Sidney  Johnston  had  sent  the  latter  merely  to 
watch  the  river  at  that  point,  which  Johnston  intended 
should  be  done  from  the  south  bank.  But  Zollicoffer,  very 
like  Grant  and  Sherman  at  Shiloh,  established  his  camp  on 
the  north  side  of  the  Cumberland,  "  with  the  enemy  in  front 
and  the  river  in  his  rear."  .  General  George  B.  Crittenden,  of 
Kentucky,  a  graduate  of  West  Point  who  had  seen  service  in 


1  -22  Life  of  Thomas. 

Mexico,  was  appointed  to  the  command,  with  head-quarters 
ut  Knoxville.  Early  in  January,  Crittenden  was  sent  by 
Johnston  to  secure  the  safety  of  Zollicoffer's  command  and 
get  it  back  to  the  south  side  of  the  river. 

General  Johnston,  still  anxious  for  the  safety  of  his 
blundering  general,  sent  General  Hindman  with  a  division 
of  troops  to  feel  the  Federal  position  and  to  make  a  diversion 
in  favor  of  Zollicoffer.  In  making  the  movement,  Hindman 
encountered  the  troops  under  Thomas  at  Columbia,  had  his 
advance  checked,  and  so  he  reported  that  Thomas's  command 
was  intact  and  Zollicoffer  in  no  danger. 

In  the  reorganization  of  the  army  under  Buell,  Thomas 
was  assigned  the  command  of  the  first  division  of  the 
Army  of  the  Ohio,  composed  of  some  sixteen  regiments  of 
infantry,  a  regiment  and  a  company  of  cavalry,  with  three 
batteries  of  artillery.  One  of  the  brigades  was  commanded 
by  General  Albin  Schoepf,  a  Hungarian  patriot,  who  was  on 
outpost  duty  watching  Zollicoffer.  In  the  latter  part  of  the 
year  1861,  Buell  countermanded  his  former  orders  to  Thomas, 
which  were  not  to  reinforce  Schoepf,  and  directed  Thomas  to 
concentrate  his  entire  command  and  drive  Zollicoffer  from 
the  state. 

The  condition  of  the  country  roads  in  midwinter  was 
such  that  Thomas  was  not  able  to  reach  the  point  of  concen 
tration — Logan  Cross  Roads — until  the  17th  of  January. 
Here  he  went  into  camp  and  awaited  the  arrival  of  his  en- 
tire command.  This  point  was  ten  miles  from  the  encamp- 
ment of  the  enemy. 

General  Crittenden  had  been  making  every  exertion  to 
get  Zollicoffer  across  the  river,  but  had  been  delayed  by  not 
having  boats  to  transfer  the  troops  until  the  17th,  when  he 
heard  of  the  advance  of  the  Union  forces  under  Thomas. 
Crittenden  then  determined  to  take  the  initiative  and  force 
the  battle.  At  midnight  of  January  18th,  in  the  discomfort 
of  a  heavy  winter  rain,  the  Confederate  army  moved  out. 
After  six  hours'  marching  through  mud  and  rain,  the  ad- 
vance struck  our  cavalry  pickets  at  six  o'clock  in  the  early 
gray  of  a  winter  morning  two  miles  in  front  of  the  Federal 
camp.  The  cavalry  pickets  fell  slowly  back,  reporting  the 


Battle  of  Mill  Springs.  123 

advance  of  the  enemy .  The  report  reaching  Thomas,  he  or- 
dered the  infantry  advance  to  hold  the  Confederates  in  check 
until  lie  could  place  his  command  in  line  of  battle.  This  he 
accomplished  in  ten  minutes,  and  both  sides  were  soon 
actively  engaged  in  heavy  fighting,  which  was  continued  for 
nearly  an  hour. 

General  Thomas  then  sent  a  strong  force  to  attack  the 
enemy  on  the  right  flank,  which  caused  it  to  waver.  The 
heavy  firing  was  continued  in  the  center  to  keep  that  part 
engaged.  With  these  dispositions,  General  Thomas  then  or- 
dered the  Ninth  Ohio  Infantry  to  charge  the  left  flank  with 
fixed  bayonets,  which  turned  the  flank  and  drove  that  part 
of  the  enemy's  line  from  the  field.  The  entire  command 
then  gave  way,  retreating  in  disorder  to  their  intrenchments 
at  Beach  Grove,  where  the  enemy  manned  the  works  and 
checked  the  advance  of  our  troops.  General  Thomas  in- 
vested the  encampment  on  the  land  side,  keeping  up  an  artil- 
lery fire  the  entire  night,  in  order  to  prevent  escape  of  the 
enemy  in  their  boats.  During  the  night,  preparations  were 
made  by  Thomas  for  a  general  assault  on  the  works  in  the 
morning.  The  enemy,  however,  abandoned  every  thing 
during  the  night,  and  by  daylight  his  entire  command  was 
across  the  river,  excepting  the  wounded  and  the  stores.  The 
boats  used  in  the  movement  were  burned  to  prevent  pursuit. 
Many  prisoners  were  captured  and  twelve  pieces  of  canon 
with  caisons  filled  with  ammunition.  Over  one  hundred  and 
fifty  wagons,  and  more  than  one  thousand  horses  and  mules, 
with  a  large  amount  of  camp  and  garrison  equipage,  were 
left  behind  and  fell  into  our  hands. 

General  Thomas  had  in  this  engagement  eight  regiments 
of  infantry  with  two  batteries  of  artillery,  some  six  thousand 
troops  in  all.  Opposed  to  him  was  a  command  of  over  nine 
thousand  of  all  arms.  The  enemy  made  the  attack  under 
the  delusion  the  Southern  troops  cherished  at  the  outbreak  of 
hostilities,  that  "  one  Southerner  could  whip  five  Yankees." 
With  all  the  advantages  in  their  favor,  the  little  Southern 
army  suffered  a  demoralizing  defeat,  after  it  had  made  a 
gallant  attack,  splendidly  sustained  until  the  disposition  of 


124  Life,  of  Thomas. 

the  forces  against  it  by  Thomas  drove  it  in  rout  from  the 

field. 

From  the  very  opening  of  the  engagement  to  its  close, 
for  every  movement  of  the  enemy  Thomas  was  fully  pre- 
pared. There  was  no  surprise  on  this  field  of  battle  for  our 
troops  to  be  slaughtered  in.  The  cavalry  pickets  met  the 
first  advance  and  gave  swift  warning  to  the  infantry,  and 
these  were  able  to  hold  the  advance  in  check  until  the  Fed- 
eral line  of  battle  was  properly  formed.  The  troops  under 
Thomas  were  veterans  only  in  being  thoroughly  drilled  and 
disciplined,  yet  he  held  them  in  line  under  heavy  fire  until^ 
by  the  skillful  maneuvering  of  his  command,  he  won  the 
first.  Federal  victory  in  the  West. 

While  the  battle  of  Mill  Springs,  in  the  number  engaged, 
in  the  killed  and  wounded,  and  in  its  strategic  consequences, 
was  of  small  importance,  in  '  another  point  of  view  it  was 
an  event  of  grave  results.  The  stunning  blow  given  our 
ninety  days'  militia  at  Bull  Run  had  not  only  disheartened 
the  people  at  the  North, 'but  had  gone  far  to  confirm  the 
superstition  at  the  South  that  in  the  one  great  qualification 
of  the  soldier — courage — we  were  the  inferiors.  This  not 
only  robbed  us  of  the  morale  so  necessary  to  an  army,  but 
gave  that  quality  to  our  foes.  This  feeling  was  so  strong 
upon  us  that  our  untried  young  Napoleon,  McClellan,  was 
organizing  his  huge  army  about  Washington,  in  sight  of  the 
Confederate  flag  at  Munson's  Hill  and  so  close  on  rebel  guns 
that  their  roar  disturbed  his  army  reviews,  with  but  one  or- 
der of  not  to  bring  on  a  general  engagement,  and  the  com- 
forting report  each  morning  of  "  all  quiet  on  the  Potomac." 

This  repose  was  broken  by  the  victory  of  Mill  Springs. 
In  that  engagement  the  troops  of  both  sides  were  fairily 
pitted  against  each  other.  To  the  dash  of  the  Confederates 
Thomas  opposed  not  only  the  cool  courage  and  staying 
quality  of  our  men,  but  a  capacity  for  handling  that  enabled 
him  to  pass  from  fights  by  a  regiment  or  brigade  at  a  time 
to  throwing  in  the  entire  force  on  the  weakest  point  of  the 
enemy.  General  Thomas  organized  victory  by  organizing 
his  force.  Recognizing  the  fact  that  the  larger  part  of  the 
drill  is  for  mere  display,  he  simplified  it  to  the  actual  neces- 


The   Lessons  of  Mill  Springs.  125 

sities  of  the  service,  HIM!  30  molded  the  raw  recruit  into  an 
accomplished  soldier  in  less  than  sixty  days.  He  was  greatly 
aided  in  this  by  the  singular  adaptability  of  the  American 
men.  These  men  could  not  only  fall  into  line,  touch  elbows, 
keep  step,  wheel  like  a  machine,  load  and  fire,  but  they 
could  repair  bridges,  open  roads,  fell  trees,  and  construct 
fortifications  with  a  dexterity  that  was  both  admirable  and 
amazing.' 

The  victory  of  Mill  Springs  impressed  the  South  in  a 
more  subtle  manner  than  it  did  the  North.  It  was  felt  that 
a  new  element  was  being  developed  that  might  put  a  new 
face  on  the  condition.  The  jnore  turbulent  populations  of 
the  seceding  states,  where  every  citizen  was  his  own  police- 
man and  carried  his  commission  in  his  hip  pocket,  took  to 
war  more  kindly  than  our  peaceful,  money  getting  people  at 
the  North.  Leaders  of  the  slave  states  had  improved  on 
Napoleon's  axiom  that  "  a  race  of  shop  keepers  made  a  na- 
tion of  thieves  "  by  adding  "  cowards."  This  decisive  vic- 
tory was  a  startling  revelation.  These  peaceful  mechanics, 
farmers  and  tradesmen  had  not  only  stood  unmoved  by  the 
rebel  yell,  but  returned  the  fire  from  their  center,  while  the  wing 
swung  round  upon  the  enemy's  flank  with  the  precision  of 
veterans.  This  meant  war  in  its  highest  sense,  and  bade  fair 
to  build  up  an  army  of  veterans  from  the  raw  recruits  of 
the  strained  emergency.  The  lesson  taught  by  this  sharp 
fight  and  brilliant  victory  that  went  home  to  the  Southern 
mind  seemed  lost  upon  the  great  bulk  of  our  own  officers. 
The  example  set  by  Thomas  was  followed  by  none.  McClel- 
lan  had  his  head  turned  by  the  high  place  and  extraordi- 
nary powers  conferred  upon  him,  and  his  organization  con- 
sisted in  a  continual  call  for  troops  that  were  thrown  into 
brigades  and  divisions  as  rapidly  as  they  arrived  and  enough 
capacity  of  movement  got  to  enable  the  commander-in- 
chief  to  gallop  down  the  lines  accompanied  by  his  staff  of 
princes  and  rich  men's  sous.  The  men  were  splendid  in 
the^r  new  uniforms,  white  gloves  and  burnished  arms,  but 
as  a  shrewd  observer  said  to  the  late  Colonel  Tom  Key, 
"  they  appear  well  and  march  with  a  precision  that  is  re- 
markable for  ra\v  recruits,  but  I  look  in  their  faces  arid  I  do 


Life  of  Thomas. 

not  Bee  fight."  Small  wonder  when  for  nearly  a  year  this 
army  was  trained  to  an  awe  of  the  unknown  that  lay  be- 
yond Munson's  Hill.  And  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  never 
completely  recovered  from  the  effect  of  this  training.  The 
writer  of  this  narrative,  passing  from  the  Army  of  the  Po- 
tomac to  that  of  the  Cumberland,  was  amazed  at  the  differ- 
ence. He  seemed  to  get  another  sort  of  men,  and  breathed 
a  more  tonic  atmosphere.  After  hearing  the  foe  spoken  of 
with  bated  breath  it  was  refreshing  to  note  the  contemptuous 
indifference  of  these  western  men. 

The  clarion  cry  of  joy  rang  out  north  and  north-west 
over  this  victory  and  congratulatory  orders  reached  the  lit- 
tle six  thousand.  But  none  came  from  the  government  at 
Washington.  General  Buell  issued  the  following : 

"  HEADQUARTERS  DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  OHIO, 

LOUISVILLE,  KENTUCKY,  January  23,  1862. 

General  Orders,  No.  40. 

The  general  commanding  has  the  gratification  of  an- 
nouncing the  achievement  of  an  important  victory  on  the 
19th  inst.,  at  Mill  Springs,  by  the  troops  under  General 


under  General  George  B.  Crittenden  and  General  Zollicoffer. 

The  defeat  of  the  enemy  was  thorough  and  complete  and 
his  loss  in  killed  and  wounded  was  great.  Night  alone,  un- 
der cover  of  which  his  troops  crossed  the  river  from  his  in- 
trenched camp  and  dispersed,  prevented  the  capture  of  his 
entire  force.  Fourteen  or  more  pieces  of  artillery,  some  fif- 
teen horses  and  mules,  his  entire  camp  equipage  with  wagons, 
arms,  ammunition  and  other  stores  to  a  large  amount,  fell 
into  our  hands. 

The  general  commanding  has  been  charged  by  the  gen- 
eral-in-chief  to  convey  his  thanks  to  General  Thomas  and 
his  troops  for  their  brilliant  victory.  No  task  could  be  more 
grateful  to  him,  seconded  as  it  is  by  his  own  cordial  approba- 
tion of  their  conduct. 

By  command  of  Brigadier-General  Buell, 

JAMES  B.  FRY, 
A.  A.  <?.,  Chief  of  Staff.9' 


The  Organizer  of  Victory  Ignored.  127 

The  President  of  the  United  States  also  issued  a  com- 
plimentary order : 

"  HEAD-QUARTERS  OF  THE  ARMY, 

WASHINGTON,  January  26,  1862. 

The  President,  commander-in-chief  of  the  army  and 
navy,  has  received  information  of  a  brilliant  victory  achieved 
by  the  United  States  forces  over  a  large  body  of  armed 
traitors  and  rebels  at  Mill  Springs,  in  the  State  of  Kentucky. 

He  returns  thanks  to  the  gallant  officers  and  soldiers 
who  won  that  victory,  and  when  official  reports  shall  be  re- 
ceived, the  military  skill  and  personal  valor  displayed  in 
the  battle  will  be  acknowledged  and  rewarded  in  a  fitting 
manner. 

The  courage  that  encountered  and  vanquished  the 
greatly  superior  numbers  of  the  rebel  force,  pursued  and 
attacked  them  in  their  intrenchments,  and  paused  not  until 
the  enemy  was  completely  routed,  merits  and  receives  com- 
mendation. 

The  purpose  of  this  war  is  to  attack  and  destroy  a  re- 
bellious enemy  and  to  deliver  the  country  from  the  danger 
menaced  by  traitors.  Alacrity,  daring,  courageous  spirit, 
and  patriotic  zeal  on  all  occasions  and  under  all  circum- 
stances will  be  expected  from  the  Army  of  the  United  States. 

In  the  prompt  and  spirited  movements  and  daring  battle 
of  Mill  Springs,  the  nation  will  realize  its  hopes,  and  the 
people  of  the  United  States  will  rejoice  to  honor  every  soldier 
and  officer  who  proved  his  courage  by  charging  with  the 
bayonet  and  storming  intrench rnents  or  in  the  blaze  of  the 
enemy's  fire. 

By  order  of  the  President, 

EDWIN  M.  STANTON, 

Secretary  of  War." 

While  the  legislature  of  Ohio  could  pass  a  vote  of 
thanks  to  General  Thomas  and  his  men,  the  President  passed 
the  greatest  and  most  capable  of  all  his  officers  silent  as  to 
commendation  and  only  noticed  by  his  one  sentence  of  con- 
demnation, which  said,  "let  the  Virginian  wait."  Fortun- 


128  Life  of  Thomas. 

ately  for  President  Lincoln  and  fortunately  for  the  country, 
George  H.  Thomas  could  wait.  He  could  bide  his  time,  but 
while  so  doing  the  great  river  of  blood  flowed  on  from 
shameful  blunders  of  incompetent  generals — defeat  for  us 
followed  every  great  battle,  and  our  silenced  guns  gave  way 
to  the  cry  of  mourning  in  the  desolated  households  of  the 
land  and  shame  to  us  all.  The  one  competent  man  was 
waiting,  by  order  of  Abraham  Lincoln. 


Proposed  Campaign  to  Chattanooga.  129 


CHAPTER  VI. 

The  Proposed  Campaign  to  Chattanooga,  as  Viewed  in  the  Light  now 
Given  Us — Fremont  ahd  the  Gunboats  he  Furnished — Capture  of  Fort 
Donelson. 

Before  entering  upon  the  changed  condition  of  affairs 
when  the  plan  of  campaign  elaborated  by  General  Thomas 
was  abandoned,  and  General  Buell  marched  or*  Nashville,  we 
will  consider  the  possibilities  of  that  proposed  move  through 
Cumberland  Gap.  Upon  leaving  Washington  for  the  West, 
General  Thomas  had  submitted  to  the  President  and  Sec- 
retary of  War,  his  projected  campaign.  It  was  thought 
favorably  of,  but  not  approved  until  Governor  Andrew  John- 
son demanded  that  it  be  acted  on  in  behalf  of  the  loyal  citi- 
zens of  East  Tennessee.  The  President  and  Governor  John- 
son saw  only  the  patriotic  and  political  side  of  the  proposi- 
tion, and  did  not  bother  themselves  as  to  the  military  aspect. 
President  Lincoln's  practice  at  that  time  was  to  refer  all 
military  matters  to  the  military.  It  was  no  unusual  sight  to 
see  the  President  of  the  United  States  and  his  Secretary  of 
War,  Simon  Cameron,  waiting  in  the  ante-chamber  of  Mc- 
Clellan's  head-quarters  for  the  privilege  of  an  interview. 
President  Lincoln  got  over  the  delusion  he  labored  under  in 
the  beginning,  that  his  commission  could  furnish  the  country 
with  all  that  was  needed  for  military  success,  and  bringing 
his  capable  mind  to  a  common  sense  view,  assumed  a  quasi 
command.  When,  therefore,  General  Thomas  dwelt  on  the 
fact  that  if  Chattanooga  could  be  captured  and  held,  Rich- 
mond would  be  untenable — that  instead  of  striking  at  the 
head,  where  the  enemy  invited  attack,  because  it  was  stronger 
there,  it  was  better  to  assail  the  belly,  where  the  enemy  was 
vulnerable — the  words  beat  on  heedless  ears.  McClellau  had 
all  that  under  consideration.  Looking  that  far  back  now  we 
are  amazed  and  irritated  at  the  blindness  of  the  really  able 
9 


130  .«  Life  of.  Thomas. 

men  then  in  control  of  our  government.  Had  the  proposed 
campaign  through  Cumberland  Gap  been  prosecuted  under 
Thomas,  a  far  different  history  of  thc>  war  would  have  gone 
to  record  than  the  one  we  are  called  on  to  write.  It  is  true 
that  General  McClellan,  urged  by  the  President,  suggested 
that  General  Buell  should  consider  the  project.  But  General 
Buell  had  plans  o'f  his  own,  and  incurred  the  wrath  of  Andrew 
Johnson  by  his  brusque  treatment  of  that  politician.  Gen- 
eral Thomas  was  soon  given  to  know  that  his  grave  propo- 
sition was  abandoned. 

Events  shortly  after  occurred  to  give  a  show  of  reason  to 
Buell  and  Halleck's  change  of  objective. 

Before  treating  of  that,  we  will,  with  the  lights  now  given 
us,  consider  the  practicability  of  General  Thomas's  proposed 
campaign.  The  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  then  called  the 
Army  of  Ohio,  was  being  rapidly  augmented  by  the  best  ma- 
terial ever  put  under  muskets.  "Within  a  short  time,  Gen- 
eral Buell  found  himself  at  the  head  of  fifty  thousand  men, 
and  the  number  on  the  increase.  This  large  army,  accumu- 
lated to  conquer  and  hold  Tennessee  for  Andrew  Johnson 
and  the  loyal  men  thereof,  was  receiving  better  attention 
from  the  War  Department  than  had  been  given  the  little 
force  of  poorly  armed  and  worse  clad  soldiers  General 
Thomas  at  first  commanded.  Although  knowing  that  his 
scheme  of  an  offensive  campaign  was  neglected,  and  eventu- 
ally abandoned,  he  continued  his  care  of  his  men.  drilling 
them  continuously,  and  infusing  into  his  force  that  military 
spirit  without  which  an  army  is  a  mob.  He  could  at  any 
time  appointed  have  selected  twenty  thousand  and  marched 
through  Cumberland  Gap  to  Chattanooga. 

It  is  of  interest  to  learn  what  force  the  enemy  had  at  that 
time  to  resist  so  grave  a  movement.  For  some  time  before 
the  battle  of  Mill  Springs  we  had  twice  the  number  of  men 
the  enemy  could  have  brought  into  the  field.  General  John- 
ston, we  now  know,  had  but  twenty  thousand  of  all  arms,  of 
which  eight  or  ten  regiments  were  under  Zollicoffer.  After 
the  battle  that  dispersed  Zollicoffer's  force,  the  way  was  as 
open  to  an  advance  as  was  that  of  General  Sherman  when 
he  went  through  Georgia  to  a  support  of  the  sea.  Of  course 


The  First  Chattanooga  Campaign.  1U1 

this  condition  of  the  enemy  was  unknown  to  our  side.  If 
.we  except  General  Thomas,  there  was  not  a  prominent  of- 
ficer in  our  armies  anywhere  who  did  not  exaggerate  the 
numbers  of  the  Confederate  armies  in  a  way  that  would  be 
ludicrous  were  it  not  so  lamentable.  General  Thomas  knew 
the  South  thoroughly  as  to  resources  and  men,  and  having 
no  fears  to  consult,  was  never  at  a  fault.  Where  McClellan, 
Sherman,  and  Buell  saw  millions  of  armed  men,  he  looked 
down  thinned  ranks  of  ill-clad  thousands.  We  read  a  justi- 
fication of  General  Thomas's  belief  in  the  lately  published 
life  of  General  Albert  Sidney  Johnston.  That  brave  and 
brilliant  soldier  we  find,  wrote  from  Columbus,  Ky.,  on  the  27th 
of  September,  1861,  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  at  Richmond: 
"  I  suppose  a  change  of  the  plan  of  operations  has  been 
made,  and  that  the  force  intended  for  East  Tennessee  will 
now  be  combined  with  the  force  on  this  line,  making  an  ag- 
gregate strength  of  probably  more  than  50,000  men,  to  be 
arrayed  against  my  forces  here. 

"  If  the  forces  of  the  enemy  are  maneuvered,  as  I  think 
they  may  be,  I  may  be  compelled  to  retire  from  this  place  to 
cover  Nashville  with  the  aid  of  the  volunteer  forces  now  be- 
ing organized,  which  in  that  way  could  be  brought  into  co- 
operation." 

And,  on  the  8th  of  December,  he  wrote  from  Bowling 
Green  : 

"  With  the  addition  of  Nelson's  and  Rosecrans'  columns, 
their  force  on  this  immediate  line  I  believe  ought  to  be  esti- 
mated at  over  65,000  men.  Our  returns  at  this  place  show  a 
force  of  between  18,000  and  19,000,  of  which  about  5,000  are 
sick  (about  3,600  at  Nashville),  and  our  effective  force  is  un- 
der 13,000  men." 

And,  on  December  25th,  he  wrote : 

"  The  position  of  General  Zollicoffer  on  the  Cumberland 
holds  in  check  the  meditated  invasion  and  hoped-for  revolt 
in  East  Tennessee,  but  I  can  neither  order  Zollicofter  to  join 
me  here,  nor  withdraw  any  more  force  from  Columbus, 
without  imperiling  our  communications  with  Richmond,  or 
endangering  Tennessee  and  the  Mississippi  Valley.  This  I 
have  resolved  not  to  do,  but  have  chosen,  on  the  contrary, 


132  Life  of  Thomas. 

to  post  my  inadequate  force  in  such  a  manner  as  to  hold 
the  enemy  in  check,  guard  the  frontier,  and  hold  the  Barren 
until  winter  terminates  the  campaign,  or  if  any  fault  in  his 
movements  is  committed,  or  his  line  exposed  where  his 
force  is  developed,  to  attack  him  as  opportunity  offers." 

After  his  right  was  broken,  he  wrote,  page  426,  Jan.  22d  : 

"A  successful  movement  of  the  enemy  on  my  right 
would  curry  it  with  all  the  consequences  which  could  be 
expected  by  the  enemy  here,  if  they  could  break  through  rny 
defenses.  If  I  had  the  force  to  prevent  a  flank  movement,  they 
could  be  compelled  to  attack  this  position,  which,  we  doubt 
not,  can  make  a  successful  defense.  If  force  can  not  be 
spared  from  other  army  corps,  the  country  must  now  be  aroused 
to  make  the  greatest  effort  it  will  be  called  upon  to  make 
during  the  war.  No  matter  what  the  sacrifice  may  be,  it 
must  be  made  and  without  loss  of  time.  Our  people  do 
not  comprehend  the  magnitude  of  the  danger  threatened. 
Let  it  be  impressed  upon  them." 

Our  headless  armies  moved  blunderingly  along.  Presi- 
dent Lincoln,  with  his  mind  dwelling  solely  on  the  political 
aspects  of  the  field,  recommended  in  a  message  to  Congress 
the  building  of  a  railroad  from  Kentucky  to  Knoxville  that 
could  have  been  done  by  the  Army  of  the  Ohio  in  a  few 
months.  This  was  unheeded  by  a  Congress  busy  with  the 
schemes  of  taxation  that  were  dictated  by  a  greed  of  capital 
which  lost  us,  as  we  have  shown,  the  sympathy  of  Europe 
by  making  it  known  that  the  money  power  of  the  North 
thought  more  of  filling  their  individual  pockets  than  the 
vaults  of  the  treasury.  In  this  we  mean  that  sympathy 
born  of  interest.  There  is  none  other  in  a  nation  that  can 
be  counted  on.  The  provincial  simplicity,  so  pronounced  in 
our  people,  which  speaks  of  this  race,  of  that  government 
being  friendly  or  unfriendly  to  us,  should  be  relegated  to 
the  things  that  amuse. 

There  was,  of  course,  a  strong  anti-slavery  feeling  in 
both  France  and  England.  This  was  especially  strong  in 
Great  Britain,  where  in  the  emancipation  of  slaves  in  the 
West  Indies  a  man  got  a  cheap  character  for  philanthropy 
by  freeing  another  man's  slave.  But  this  sentiment  rapidly 


Fremont  Commanding  Attention.  133 

disappeared  from  a  show  for  our  side  when  we  riot  only  pro- 
claimed a  blockade  of  the  Southern  ports,  reinforced  by 
sinking  vessels  laden  with  stone  in  their  harbors,  but  es- 
tablished a  like  blockade  of  Northern  ports  in  the  form  of  a 
high  tariff.  Such  a  Congress  had  no  time  for  the  considera- 
tion of  such  measures  as  the  one  suggested  by  President 
Lincoln,  that  would  probably  have  brought  the  one  eminently 
capable  military  man  to  the  front,  shortened  the  war  by  two 
years,  saved  us  the  lives  of  two  hundred  thousand  men  and 
a  war  debt  that  the  centuries  of  toil  will  inherit. 

All  this  is  vain  speculation,  delving  idly  in  the  dead 
past,  and  only  worth  recall  in  the  way  it  shows  how  the 
sagacious  mind  of  George  H.  Thomas  saw  the  situation  as  it 
was,  and  carried  from  Washington  to  the  West  the  key  that 
would  have  opened  easy  victory  to  our  government.  When 
McClellan's  army  under  Grant  won  through  defeat  its  cap- 
ture of  Richmond  the  war  ended;  not  because  Richmond 
h}nl  been  taken,  but  that  Thomas's  scheme  of  1862  had  at 
last  been  made  a  fact  accomplished  in  the  seizure  of  Chat- 
tanooga, and  Lee's  armies  had  no  country  to  fall  back  upon 
and  subsist. 

About  this  time  occurred  a  series  of  unexpected  events 
that  not  only  changed  the  current  of  military  affairs,  but  the 
minds  of  military  men  having  control  of  the  Army  of  the 
Cumberland,  then  called  the  Army  of  the  Ohio.  General 
John  Charles  Fremont  had  been  quite  ostentatiously  put  in 
command  of  our  forces  in  Missouri,  with  head-quarters  in  St. 
Louis.  The  public  mind  at  the  North  had  instinctively  turned 
to  this  remarkable  man  as  the  one  to  command  our  armies 
in  the  conflict  so  suddenly  thrust  upon  us.  He  had  been 
made  the  first  candidate  for  the  Presidency  by  the  Free  Soil 
organization,  subsequently  the  Union  and  then  the  Repub- 
lican party,  because  of  his  prominence  as  an  explorer.  He 
was  a  picturesque  figure,  with  a  tinge  of  romance  in  his  ca- 
reer that  won  the  popular  heart.  He  failed  in  his  race  for 
the  Presidency  because  of  the  pro-slavery  feeling  of  the 
country  North  and  South.  He  went  down,  politically,  fight- 
ing gallantly  for  a  principle,  and  was,  therefore,  rather  stronger 
for  his  defeat.  The  administration  yielded  in  form  to  the 


i;]4  Life  of  Thomas. 

popular  demand,  and  gave  General  Fremont  a  high  command 
on  paper,  but  denied  him  the  substance  that  is  found  in  a 
cordial  support.  He  was  a  major-general  in  command  of  a 
great  department,  but  without  supplies  to  feed,  arm,  to 
equip,  or  transportation  to  move  his  ragged  legions.  And 
yet  he  received  almost  daily  premonitory  orders  from  the 
War  Department  to  do  something.  If  this  something,  what- 
ever it  was,  could  have  been  accomplished  by  the  general 
and  his  stafl',  a  great  success  of/ some  sort  could  have  been 
counted  upon.  He  had  a  staff  larger  and  more  gorgeous 
than  that  of  any  other  general  of  the  army.  His  staff  was  kept 
busy  issuing  and  executing  orders.  Among  those  orders  was 
one  looking  to  the  immediate  emancipation  of  the  slaves. 

Now,  while  President  Lincoln  at  that  time  left  military 
matters  to  the  military  men,  he  very  properly  retained  all 
the  politics  under  his  own  control.  He  saw  that  the  thou- 
sands thronging  out  to  carry  arms  and  offer  their  lives  to 
their  country  did  so  to  save  the  Union  and  not  to  free  the 
slaves.  All  reformers  are  rendered  odious  by  epithets  made 
offensive  through  their  offensive  use.  The  word  abolition 
had  been  hurled  at  the  abolitionists  until  it  had  become  a 
term  of  reproach  in  the  popular  mind.  As  well  call  a  man 
a  thief  or  a  murderer.  The  poor  fellow  convicted  of  this 
philanthropic  impulse  could  be  stoned  in  Boston  and  hung 
in  South  Carolina  with  popular  approval.  President  Lin- 
coln well  knew  that  if  the  belief  among  the  people  could 
once  obtain  that  this  was  a  war  in  behalf  of  the  negroes,  re- 
cruiting would  cease  and  the  administration  itself  soon  feel 
the  effects  of  lost  confidence  on  the  part  of  the  public.  Gen- 
eral Fremont  was  publicly  censured  and  not  long  after  re- 
lieved of  his  command  in  Missouri. 

Soon  after  leaving  St.  Louis,  however,  the  Pathfinder 
did  a  piece  of  illegal  work  that  eventually  made  U.  S.  Grant 
President  of  the  United  States.  General  Fremont  was  a 
thoughtful  man  given  to  original  views  with  the  striking 
fact  to  a  thousand  vagaries.  The  fact  that  had  such  por- 
tentous result  found  embodiment  in  iron-clads  for  Western 
waters.  He  conceived  the  idea  that  if  boats  were  made 
shot  proof  by  heavy  iron  armor,  the  Confederate  country 


Secret  of  Success  on  Western  Rivers.  135 

could  be  pierced  and  conquered  by  every  navigable  river 
penetrating  the  interior.  He,  therefore,  ordered  a  fleet  of 
these  iron-clads.  The  illegality  of  the  transaction  was  in  the 
fact  that  he  had  no  authority  from  the  War  or  Navy  De- 
partments and  no  appropriation  from  congress.  A  number 
of  contractors  caught  at  the  work  and  the  boats  were  soon 
afloat.  These  were  ordered  into  the  service  by  General 
Fremont,  and  a  number  of  them,  under  Commodore  Foote, 
aided  by  a  laud  force,  shelled  and  captured  Fort  Henry. 
The  infantry  and  artillery  on  shore  had  .little  to  do  with 
their  success.  The  fort  was  so  near  the  shore  of  the  river 
that  the  gunboats  found  no  difficulty  in  reducing  the  place. 

This  victory  stimulated  the  commodore  and  his  allies  to 
make  a  like  attack  on  Fort  Donelson.  Putting  his  men  in 
light  marching  order,  General  Grant  moved  across  country, 
while  Foote's  gunboats  steamed  around  by  water.  It,  was 
the  intent  of  general  and  commodore  to  take  Donelson  by 
surprise,  but  the  garrison  was  on  guard,  and  gave  our  naval 
and  land  forces  such  a  warm  reception  that  it  struck  the 
assailants  that  they  were  in  trouble  instead  of  the  Con- 
federates. Commodore  Foote  saw  that  the  fort  was  at  such 
an  elevation  his  guns  could  be  of  no  efficacy,  and  Grant  per- 
ceived that  to  take  the  place  by  an  assault  was  out  of  the 
question.  To  invest  the  place  and  starve  the  enemy  into 
submission  was  not  to  be  considered,  for  the  army  had 
moved  in  light  marching  order,  the  weather  had  come  on  to 
be  bitterly  cold,  and  the  besiegers  were  suffering  more  from 
the  start  than  the  besieged  could  be  made  to  experience. 
Under  this  deplorable  condition  of  affairs,  General  Grant 
wrote  Commodore  Fqote  an  earnest  request  that  he  would 
make  another  demonstration  under  which  the  army  could 
retreat.  And  then  the  unexpected  happened. 

General  Floyd,  in  command  of  Fort  Donelson,  was  not 
in  a  condition  of  mind  to  appreciate  the  situation.  Instead 
of  realizing  the  fact  that  he  was  safe  from  assault,  and  had 
only  to  bide  his  time  when  the  forces  threatening  him  would 
vanish  in  ignoble  retreat,  he  took  counsel  of  his  fears. 
Firmly  believing  from  his  acquaintance  with  Northern  feel- 
ing, as  expressed  by  the  federal  press,  that  if  taken  prisoner 


136  Life  of  TJiomas. 

he  would  be  immediately  hanged  as  a  traitor  to  the  govern- 
ment while  in  President  Buchanan's  cabinet,  and  greatly  ex- 
aggerating our  forces  about  the  fort,  he  resolved  with  the 
main  body  of  his  army  to  cut  his  way  out.  Leaving  Gen- 
eral Buckner  with  a  thin  line  to  hold  the  fortifications,  on 
the  morning  of  February  15th,  the  sortie  in  force  was  made 
striking  with  irresistible  force  the  Union  troops  under  com- 
mand of  General  McClernand.  The  assault  drove  our  forces 
back,  and  would  have  made  an  easy  victory  but  for  the  in- 
trepidity of  General  McClernand  and  his  officers  in  re-form- 
ing their  lines  under  fire  and  fighting  stubbornly,  although 
forced  to  fall  back.  This  unequal  conflict  continued  from 
early  daylight  until  5  P.  M.  of  the  same  day.  The  other  two- 
thirds  of  our  arrnyatDonelson  commanded  by  Generals  Smith 
and  Wallace  at  first  took  no  part  in  this  conflict,  although 
freqpently  implored  to  furnish  reinforcements,  because  Gen- 
eral Grant  the  night  before  issued  orders  that  no  move 
should  be  made,  except  at  his  command.  It  was  a  short 
winter's  day,  and  yet  it  seemed  interminable  to  the  three 
subordinates  who  sent  again  and  again  to  head-quarters  for 
orders  to  have  their  aids  return  with  the  astounding  informa- 
tion that  the  general  commanding  was  not  at  head-quarters, 
nor  could  aide  or  orderly  there  tell  where  he  was. 

The  fact  is,  that  some  time  during  the  night  Grant  had 
gone  to  Commodore  Foote's  gunboat  and  was  discussing 
with  that  officer  the  perilous  condition  in  which  they  found 
themselves  while  the  desperate  fight  went  on.  This  council 
of  war  was  set  to  the  music  of  musketry  and  canon  that 
rang  in  unheeded  to  the  cabin  where  Grant  sat,  smoked, 
drank,  and  discussed  the  emergencies  of  the  hour. 

At  about  5  p.  M.,  when  McClernand's  little  force  was 
nearly  exhausted,  Generals  Smith  and  Lew  Wallace,  of  their 
own  motion,  moved  in  to  the  relief  of  McClernand.  The  relief 
came  none  too  soon,  but  although  General  Floyd  and  all  his 
force  not  killed  or  wounded  escaped,  General  Smith  was  met 
by  a  proposition  to  surrender,  instead  of  a  deadly  resistance. 
The  flag  of  truce  from  the  fort  carried  the  question,  "  On 
what  terms  may  we  capitulate?"  "Unconditional  surren- 


The  True  Story  of  Donelson.  137 

der,"  was  the  prompt  response,  "and  unless  immediately 
complied  with,  I  will  move  upon  your  works." 

Before  that  could  be  complied  with,  General  Grant  ar- 
rived upon  the  field,  and  General  Smith  submitted  to  him  an 
account  of  the  interview  under  the  flag  of  truce.  General 
Grant  not'  only  approved  but  accepted,  his  gallant  subordi- 
nate's bold  demand  as  his  own.  He  had  unquestionably  as 
much  right  to  the  authorship  of  "unconditional  surrender,'' 
etc.,  that  carried  him  to  the  head  of  our  armies  and  into  the 
presidency,  as  he  had  to  the  credit  for  the  fight  that  day  and 
the  capture  of  the  fort.  This  is  the  true  story  of  Fort 
Donelson. 

After  the  battle,  the  War  Department  could  obtain  no 
reports  of  Grant's  strength,  though  it  repeatedly  called  for 
them.  Ilulleck,  after  investigation,  telegraphed  that  Grant 
had  "  resumed  his  old  habits,"  and  in  reply,  was  authorized 
to  remove  him.  Halleck,  however,  relented,  and  Grant  was 
saved. 

Although  General  Geo.  H.  Thomas  had  no  part  in  the 
affair,  it  had  a  marked  effect,  not  only  upon  his  subsequent 
career,  but  npon  the  war  itself.  We  gained  Fort  Donelson 
at  a  heavy  loss  to  the  Union  side,  and  instead  of  a  blessing  it 
proved  a  grave  calamity  to  our  cause  in  the  field.  From  that 
out,  all  thought  of  Thomas's  wise  plan  to  hit  the  Confederacy 
where  the  Confederacy  was  vulnerable  disappeared.  Andrew 
Johnson  found  himself  in  possession  of  the  state  capitol  at 
Nashville,  and  the  administration  soon  learned  that  the  loyal 
sentiment  of  East  Tennessee  was  of  about  the  same  use  to  it 
as  the  supposed  sympathy  of  Russia. 

The  war  went  blundering  on  with  the  fate  of  an  empire 
resting  on  the  shoulders  of  the  men  of  the  muskets,  who  fought 
and  fell  by  thousands  that  imbecility  under  epaulettes  might 
win  monuments  and  a  renown  that  shames  us  before  the 
world.  The  administration  at  Washington  was  fighting  not 
only  a  war  of  arms,  as  we  have  said,  but  a  war  of  opinions  in 
the  political  field  upon  which  rested  its  authority.  At  any 
time  it  might  be  called  upon  to  face  an  adverse  House  of 
Representatives,  and  with  the  war  ended,  to  vacate  its  place. 
President  Lincoln  had  been  not  only  a  minority  President, 


138  Life  of  Thomas. 

but  he  was  not  popular  in  the  party  that  elected  him.  Nom- 
inated by  a  local  influence  at  Chicago,  lie  was  elected  from 
necessity.  The  old  Whig  party  that  claimed  to  be  all  the 
decency  in  the  land  had  no  confidence  in  the  vulgar  rail- 
splitter — "  the  poor  white  trash  spawned  in  Illinois,"  as 
Wendell  Phillips  called  him,  while  the  hot  gospelers  sus- 
pected him  of  sympathy  with  the  slave-holders,  so  that  he 
had  not  only  to  hold  down  the  copperhead  organization  of 
the  North,  but  to  conciliate  his  own  party.  Aided  by  the 
ablest  and  most  patriotic  men  ever  called  to  a  cabinet,  his 
administration  grows  in  renown  as  its  labors  and  achieve- 
ments become  better  known  in  the  dying  out  of  the  blaze 
and  glare  of  the  armed  conflict.  The  real  heroes  of  success 
in  holding  a  nation  to  its  empire  of  a  continent  were  Lin- 
coln, Stanton,  Chase,  and  Seward.  These  four  we  recognize 
with  but  one  other,  whose  story  we  are  striving  to  tell. 

President  Lincoln  was  far  stronger  in  the  political  arena 
than  he  was  in  the  battle-field.  But  we  can  see  at  a  glance 
how  one  was  hampered  by  the  other.  The  President,  for 
example,  accepted  West  Point  as  the  source  of  all  military 
ability,  because  the  people  in  their  blind  ignorance  had  al- 
ready indorsed  the  unhappy  little  school  upon  the  Hudson. 
And  no  man  knows  better  the  power  of  a  popular  cry. 
When, therefore,  "  unconditional  surrender"  rang  out  attrib- 
uted to  an  unknown  U.  S.  Grant,  he  was  accepted  from  that  out 
as  "  Unconditional  Surrender  Grant,"  President  Lincoln  hast- 
ened to  accept  it,  although  he  knew  in  his  grim  way  that 
Grant  was  no  more  to  be  credited  with  the  happy  combina- 
tion of  words  uttered  by  the  gallant  dead  than  was  Well- 
ington guilty  of  crying,  "  dp,  guards,  and  at  'em  !"  when 
the  fight  hung  doubtful  at  Waterloo,  or  General  Zachary 
Taylor  the  man  who  cried,  "A  little  more  grape,  Captain 
Bragg!"  when  the  poor  Mexicans  were  pressing  his  front. 
Of  all  people  on  earth,  we  are  the  most  voracious  phrase 
eaters.  The  fruit  from  the  tree  of  knowledge  has  all  been 
canned  for  us  and  duly  labeled.  Our  entire  political  wisdom 
has  resolved  itself  into  a  collection  of  axioms,  and  we  com- 
fort ourselves  in  repeating  them  very  much  as  the  unlettered 
sinner  of  Kentucky  had  the  Lord's  Prayer  written  upon  the 


Catch- Phrases  of  the  War.  139 

head-board  of  his  bed,  and  went  through  his  devotions  on 
retiring  by  a  rap  to  call  attention  and  saying  solemnly, 
"  Them 's  my  sentiments,  O  Lord." 

"Unconditional  surrender"  and  "move  on  his  works" 
were  more  to  the  administration  than  ail  the  eloquence  of 
Lincoln,  Seward,  and  "Wendell  Phillips.  The  gallant  Smith 
was  in  his  grave,  and  the  man  who  fell  heir  to  his  happy  ut- 
terance quietly  accepted  the  greatness  thrust  upon  him  as 
the  administration  seized  on  that  phrase  to  strengthen  itself 
with  the  people.  Thus  were  commanders  made  and  cam- 
paigns planned  by  able  men  brought  to  naught. 


140  -Life  of  Thomas. 


CHAPTER  VII. 

Nashville  the  Political  Objective  Point — Shameful  Surprise  and  Useless 
Slaughter  at  Shiloh — Reorganization  of  the  Forces  at  Corinth  —Thomas 
Given  Command  of  the  Right  Wing — Asks  to  be  Relieved  and  Reas- 
signed to  His  Old  Command — Difficulties  in  the  Route  from  Corinth  to 
Chattanooga — McMinnville — Army  of  Ohio  Moved  Back  to  Louis- 
ville— Thomas  Appointed  to  Succeed  Buell,  but  Declines — Second  in 
Command — Perry  ville. 

The  capture  of  Forts  Henry  and  Donelson  rendered 
Nashville  untenable  by  Confederate  troops,  and  General 
Buell  immediately  moved  on  to  its  occupation.  This  changed 
the  field  of  operation  of  the  Army  of  Ohio  from  Kentucky 
to  Tennessee.  The  occupation  of  this  state  by  Union  troops 
was  held  at  Washington  to  be  of  great  political  and  military 
significance.  Mr.  Seward,  Secretary  of  State,  hastened  to 
inform  all  the  European  powers  that  we  had  wrested  another 
state  from  the  rebels  and  added  thereto  his  usual  formula 
that  in  ninety  days  this  impious  rebellion  against  the  best 
government  under  the  sun  would  be  suppressed.  This 
brilliant,  stout-hearted  statesman  presented  a  bold  front  to 
the  greatest  danger  of  all,  a  danger  that  hung  upon  our 
national  honor  like  a  wintry  cloud  from  the  first  opening  of 
the  war  until  the  last  gun  was  fired  at  Nashville.  European 
interferences  made  a  specter  that  not  only  haunted  the  State 
Department,  but  hung  in  gloom  about  the  Executive  Man- 
sion distorting  and  disturbing  the  view  at  all  quarters.  But 
one  man  could  sleep  in  quiet  with  that  menace  closing  the 
curtains  of  his  bed  darker  than  night,  and  that  man  was 
Abraham  Lincoln.  The  indomitable  will  of  a  great  mind 
was  well  sustained  by  a  temperament  made  of  a  tough, 
coarse  fiber  that  eliminated  fear.  "  I  must  run  the  machine 
as  I  find  it,",  he  said  when,  on  the  way  to  his  first  in- 
auguration, he  was  told  that  it  was  not  probable  that  he 
could  be  sworn  in  at  the  capitol.  If  fate  had  decreed  that 
the  government  was  to  fall,  he  would  have  gone  down  with 


»  Washington  After  Bull  Run.  141 

it  in  calm,  dignified  composure.  No  man  ever  felt  more  posi- 
tively the  philosophy  of  Lady  Macbeth's  two  words  given  in 
response  to  her  husband's  query :  "  If  we  fail  ? "  "  We 
fail."  That  is  all ;  we  take  the  risks  and  can  stand  the  re- 
sult, let  it  be  what  it  may.  The  administration  knew  that 
if  the  weakest  war  power  of  Europe  took  the  initiative  and 
recognized  the  Confederacy,  in  less  than  thirty  days  France 
would  follow  and  then  Russia  and  England,  and  before 
McClellan's  huge  army  could  move  from  the  fortifications  of 
Washington,  the  fleets  of  all  Europe  would  be  upon  our 
shores  protecting  their  commerce  that  had  been  so  idiotically 
assailed  by  our  congress.  All  the  painstaking  care  and 
sleepless  labors  of  the  great  men  at  Washington  during  the 
four  years  of  deadly  peril  to  the  great  Republic  which  they 
preserved  are  lost  to  the  masses  who  are  busy  building  monu- 
ments to  epauletted  imbecility  amid  the  sneers  and  jeers  of 
the  civilized  world. 

At  the  time  General  Buell  turned  .from  Cumberland 
Gap  and  marched  upon  Nashville,  General  McClellan  was 
being  pushed  out  of  Washington  by  an  impatient  adminis- 
tration and  an  irritated  public.  For  nine  months  he  had 
been  gathering  about  the  capitol  an  immense  army.  To  the 
living  man  who  saw  George  B.  McClellan's  entrance  into 
Washington  and  subsequent  conduct,  there  is  a  memory  of 
amazement.  The  battle  of  Bull  Run  was  followed  not  by 
the  defeat  of  our  army,  but  a  total  disintegration  of  an  armed 
nn>!>.  The  streets,  hotels,  drinking  shops,  and  other  dis- 
graceful resorts  were  crowded  with  drunken  officers  and  dis- 
orderly men.  The  few  regiments  enlisted  for  the  war  were 
demoralized  by  the  bad  example  of  the  hundred  days  men 
waiting  eagerly  for  the  hour  then  nearly  approaching  in 
which  they  could  throw  down  their  muskets  and  return 
home  to  tell  of  the  great  battle  from  which  they  ran  away. 
Daylight  upon  the  dirty  corners  and  streets  was  a  shame  to 
a  civilized  community,  while  the  nights  were  simply  hideous. 
As  there  were  no  fortifications  and  few  troops  prepared  for 
battle,  there  was  not  a  day  nor  a  night  that  the  Confederate 
forces  could  not  have  marched  in  and  held  the  capitol. 
Why  it  did  not  is  answered  by  the  fact  that  West  Point  was 


142  JLiife  of  Thomas. 

in  command  more  imperatively  on  the  Southern  side  than 
at  the  North.  While  McClellan  was  organizing  his  anaconda, 
as  the  army  came  to  be  known,  the  Southern  soldiers, 
officers,  and  men,  puffed  into  a  belief  that  they  were  irre- 
sistible, treated  the  Yankee  forces  and  their  occupation  of 
Washington  with  contempt.  In  the  meantime,  the  same 
bitter  jealousies,  petty  intrigues,  and  selfish  shouldering  of 
brutal  incapacity  were  developing  at  Richmond  as  at  Wash- 
ington. 

The  War  Department  had  selected  George  B.  McClellan 
as  the  general  in  command  for  no  reason  that  one  could  dis- 
cover, and  the  people  indorsed  the  choice  because  of  a  little 
victory  achieved  by  General  William  Rosecrans  in  the  moun- 
tains of  West  Virginia,  but  attributed  to  McClellan.  The 
popular  clamor  made  over  the  young  Napoleon,  as  we  called 
him,  was  ludicrous.  There  was  nothing  the  young  man  had 
ever  done  or  said,  there  was  nothing  in  ,his  appearance,  to 
justify  such  confidence.  He  had  left  the  army  for  work  in 
civil  life  without  making  a  figure  of  any  prominence,  and 
yet  there  we  were  shouting  ourselves  hoarse  over  the  com- 
mon place  in  uniform  that  was  bound  to  do  something  start- 
ling in  the  great  hereafter.  , 

To  do  McClellan  justice, he  certainly  accomplished  much 
in  immediately  calling  order  out  of  chaos.  The  drunken  mobs 
were  driven  from  the  streets,  camps  of  instruction  established, 
and  the  material  of  a  great  army  accumulated.  His  more 
important  work  was  the  construction  of  a  circle  of  fortifica- 
tions about  the  capital  that  served  subsequently  to  secure 
the  city  from  capture.  His  more  ostentatious  work  was  the 
creation  of  a  gorgeous  staff  made  up  of  princes  and  rich  men's 
sons  that  goes  galloping  down  the  memories  of  men  while 
great  fights  about  Richmond  grow  indistinct  and  remote. 

After  accomplishing  these  results  our  young  Napoleon 
seemed  at  a  loss  what  to  do  next.  For  nine  months  the  army 
grew  and  grew  with  nothing  to  show  but  the  infamous 
slaughter  of  our  men  under  the  gallant  Baker  at  Ball's  Bluff, 
with  more  than  sufficient  troops  within  supporting  distance 
to  have  turned  a  cruel  massacre  into  victory.  The  long  de- 
lay disturbed  even  the  self-possessed  President.  The  Secre- 


Early  Days  with  McClellan.  143 

tary  of  the  Treasury  became  alarmed  at  the  million  a  day 
called  for.  Mr.  Seward  saw  his  ninety  days  promised  Europe 
become  ridiculous,  while  Edwin  M.  Stanton,  whose  appoint- 
ment General  McClellan  urged,  grew  doubtful  of  his  friend's 
loyalty. 

The  day  passed  when  President  Lincoln  and  Secretary 
of  War  Simon  Cameron  could  be  seen  awaiting  an  audience 
in  McGlellan's  ante-chamber.  The  brow  of  the  President 
darkened  and  his  manner  grew  cold  in  the  presence  of  this 
petted  warrior.  He  demanded  at  last  to  be  shown  the  plan 
of  campaign,  and  then  he  gave  positive  orders  for  the  army 
to  move  on  a  certain  day.  McClellan  had  an  ill-concealed 
contempt  for  the  eminent  men  who  were  bearing  the  heavy 
burdens  their  positions  had  placed  upon  them.  In  common 
with  the  other  military  minds  he  was  ignorant  of  the  political 
condition,  and  when  he  drove  the  ilutchinsons,  the  Abolition 
singers,  from  his  camps,  he  only  responded  to  the  West 
Point  prejudice  against  these  low  creature*  bent  on  a  dis- 
organization of  society.  And  in  this  he  reflected  the  popu- 
lar feeling.  One  reads  to-day  his  orders  to  subordinates  to 
bear  in  mind  that  the  object  of  the  war  is  the  restoration  of 
the  Union,  and  not  the  interference  with  the  domestic  in- 
stitutions of  the  revolted  states.  We  must  remember,  how- 
ever, that  he  gave  expression  to  the  current  thought  and 
popular  prejudice  of  the  day. 

The  young  general  concurred  with  the  administration 
and  the  press  in  regarding  Richmond  as  our  objective  point. 
Now,  looked  at  from  either  a  political  or  a  military  point, 
Richmond  was  of  no  importance  to  either  side.  The  rudely 
formed  Confederate  Government  was  in  the  saddle,  and  any 
one  town,  let  it  be  called  capital  or  not,  might  be  lost  or 
won  without  affecting  the  result  save  and  except  Washing- 
ton. The  capture  of  our  capital  meant  to  our  own  people, 
and  the  war  powers  of  Europe,  a  loss  to  us  of  our  cause. 
As  for  the  Confederacy,  so  long  as  Lee  was  to  the  front 
with  the  South  secured  to  him  in  the  war  the  Confederacv 

„  V 

was  safe.  The  administration  did  hot  nor  could  McClellan 
be  made  to  see  this.  The  one  frittered  away  his  great  power 


144  Life  of  Thomiis. 

in  many  small  enterprises  while  the  other  seemed  to  look 
mainly  to  a  conquest  of  territory. 

It  is  not  good  sense,  not  to  say  good  strategy,  to  accept 
the  enemy's  plan  of  cam'paign.  The  Confederates,  threaten- 
ing Washington,  covered  Richmond  as  its  base  and  invited 
attack  upon  the  best  ground  for  them  and  the  worst  for  us 
on  the  whole  continent.  This  was  the  head ;  the  belly,  upon 
which  it  lived  and  where  it  was  weakest,  as  we  have  said, 
was  in  Georgia.  Had  General  Thomas's  strategy  been  ac- 
cepted, and  his  twenty  thousand  men  marched  through 
Cumberland  Gap  and  Knoxville  to  Chattanooga,  McClellan 
having  force  enough  to  man  the  fortifications  about  Wash- 
ington could  have  moved  with  a  hundred  thousand  into  the 
heart  of  the  Confederacy,  and  whether  he  ended  the  strife 
there  as  we  did  subsequently  on  the  very  line  proposed  by 
General  Thomas,  he  would  have  shifted  the  war  from  the 
border  to  the  interior  and  rendered  it  impossible  for  the  Con- 
federates to  triumph-  in  a  capture  of  our  capital. 

All  this  seems  clear  and  simple  now  as  seen  from  the 
blunders  of  the  past,  but  it  was  plain  and  practicable  at  the 
time  to  one  man  only,  and  that  was  the  general  who  put  it 
to  record  and  who  pleaded  to  have  it  adopted  while  prepar- 
ing his  force  for  the  swift,  sudden,  and  brilliant  effort.  This 
is  the  man  patronized  while  damned  with  faint  praise  in 
memoirs  of  men  who  felt  his  superiority  and  shuddered  at 
the  thought  of  the  cold,  impartial  search  of  true  history  un- 
covering their  errors  that  made  disasters,  defeat  and  whole- 
sale death  their  only  claim  to  eminence.  If  to  build  a  mon- 
ument to  such  we  were  to  gather  up  the  bones  of  men  need- 
lessly slaughtered  that  monument  would  amaze  the  world. 
These  are  they  who  have  put  aside  their  swords  to  wield 
their  pens  and  write  of  Thomas,  the  one  author  of  a  great 
plan  of  campaign,  every  move  and  every  battle  of  which 
looked  to  an  inevitable  conclusion  of  a  deadly  contest,  that 
he  was  a  good  soldier,  but  too  slow  fora  subordinate  position 
and  too  timid  for  a  separate  command. 

In  that  pitiful  book  published  by  General  McClellan's  sur- 
viving friends  and  relatives,  of  678  pages,  the  name  of 
George  H.  Thomas  does  not  appear.  Better  this  than  the 


McCleUan's  Dim  Views.  145 

miserable  misrepresentations  of  Grant,  Sherman,  and  Sheri- 
dan. Although  the  very  name  is  ignored,  upon  page  102  of 
McClellan's  own  story,  we  find  the  following  as  part  of  a 
memorandum  written  2d  of  August,  1861,  and  submitted  to 
the  President : 

"As  soon  as  it  becomes  perfectly  clear  that  Kentucky  is 
cordially  united  with  us,  I  would  advise  a  movement  through 
that  state  into  Eastern  Tennessee  for  the  purpose  of  assist- 
ing the  Union  men  of  that  region,  and  of  seizing  the  rail- 
roads leading  from  Memphis  to  the  East.  The  possession  of 
those  roads  by  us,  in  connection  with  the  movement  on  the 
Mississippi,  would  go  far  toward  the  evacuation  of  Virginia  by 
the  rebels" 

The  italics  are  our  own.  Through  the  dense  fog  of  this 
military  mind,  a  ray  of  light  seems  to  penetrate.  But  how 
dim  it  is  we  learn  when  he  makes  such  a  move  depend  upon 
the  cordial  support  of  Kentucky.  The  condition  of  the  pub- 
lic mind  in  Kentucky  was  as  unknown  to  the  young  Napo- 
leon as  was  his  military  future.  There  was  no  state  acting 
under  or  sympathizing  with  the  Confederacy  that  was  so 
solid  in  its  course  determined  on  at  an  early  day  as  Ken- 
tucky ;  shrewd,  selfish,  and  self-possessed,  the  people  of  Ken- 
tucky almost  unanimously  resolved  to  be  non-committal. 
They  manifested  the  deepest  sympathy  for  the  South,  and 
the  liveliest  appreciation  of  their  own  welfare.  In  the  pur- 
suit of  slaves,  of  which  Kentucky  lost  more  probably  than 
South  Carolina  owned,  the  people  had  learned  of  the  re- 
sources and  temper  of  their  neighbors  across  the  Ohio,  and 
through  social  intercourse  and  intermarriage,  they  had  come 
to  feel  kindly  for  a  people  who  really  regarded  their  gener- 
ous, impulsive  friends  of  the  "  dark  and  bloody  ground  "  as 
part  of  themselves.  There  were  antagonistic  and  conflicting 
motives,  but  between  the  two  Kentucky  remained  firm.  It 
was  non-committal.  The  government  appealed  for  aid  to  the 
land  of  the  one  monument — that  of  the  purest  patriot  our 
land  ever  possessed,  Henry  Clay,  to  restore  the  Union.  Clay 
lived  to  serve  and  died  almost  broken-hearted  because  he 
saw  it  endangered,  and  our  government  pleaded  in  vain.  On 
10 


146  Life  of  Thomas. 

the  other  hand,  when  Bragg  swung  from  his  base  of  supplies 
at  Chattanooga,  and  fought  his  way  through  to  Perryville, 
expecting  to  see  the  state  rise  in  welcome,  fill  his  exhausted 
ranks,  and  feed  his  famished  soldiers,  not  a  solitary  cry  of 
welcome,  not  a  recruit  appeared,  not  a  gun  or  a  ration  was 
given.  Indeed,  the  prominent  men  who  met  to  consult,  very 
plainly  advised  him  to  get  out  of  Kentucky  on  the  double 
quick. 

To  wait  for  such  a  people  under  these  circumstances  "  to 
become  cordially  united  with  us,"  was  to  prolong  the  war  in- 
definitely, and  we  can  readily  measure  the  ability  of  a  man 
capable  of  such  a  proposition. 

*  General  McClellan  had  scarcely  left  his  railroad  office  to 
assume  command  of  the  Ohio  militia  in  the  very  beginning 
of  the  war  before  he  was  called  on,  he  tells  us  in  this  same 
book,  by  Governor  Buckner,  to  arrange  terms  of  strict 
neutrality  on  the  part  of  Kentucky.  As  General  Preston, 
one  of  Kentucky's  most  eminent  men,  said  to  the  writer  of 
this  long  after  the  war,  "Kentucky  had  much  charming 
sentiment  anent  the  lost  cause,  but  not  enough  fanaticism  to 
lift  her  above  a  just  consideration  of  fine  stock,  corn,  and 
tobacco." 

In  this  same  memorandum  our  young  Napoleon  writes  : 
"  The  rebels  have  chosen  Virginia  as  their  battle-ground,  and 
it  seems  proper  for  us  to  make  the  first  great  struggle  there. 
One  is  puzzled  to  comprehend  the  "propriety"  of  this  con- 
clusion. The  enemy  had  selected  their  better  positions — 
wherein  was  it  proper  for  us  to  accept  their  chosen  arena? 
Especially  is  this  pertinent  in  view  of  the  glimmer  given  that 
the  occupation  of  East  Tennessee  with  a  control  of  the  rail- 
roads would  go  far  toward  forcing  the  evacuation  of  Vir- 
ginia by  the  rebels.  But  then  it  was  necessary  to  wait  for 
Kentucky  to  be  cordially  united  with  us. 

While  the  young  Napoleon  was  dictating  to  a  government 
taught  humility  by  its  defeat  by  a  half-armed  mob,  and  this 
muddle  of  its  military  movement,  and  rode  at  the  head  of  a 
gorgeous  staff  along  streets  to  the  music  of  cheers  from 
senators,  members  of  the  house,  cabinet  officials,  and  the 
mob,  when  all  the  armies  of  the  United  States  were  put  un- 


Nashville  Occupied.  147 

der  his  command  ;  when  all  the  vast  resources  of  the  country 
were  given  to  him,  the  one  silent  solitary  man  who  saw  it 
all,  and  could  have  used  all  their  men  and  means  to  an  end 
that  would  have  struck  like  the  hand  of  fate  at  the  fortunes 
of  the  Confederacy,  this  man  far  out  in  Kentucky  was  slowly 
but  surely,  building  up  an  army  that  was  destined  to  swing 
its  eagles  through  the  smoke  of  continuous  victory  to  a 
triumph  for  the  great  republic. 

General  Thomas  was  in  camp  at  Somerset,  Kentucky,  after 
the  victory  at  Mill  Springs,  when  he  received  orders  from 
General  Buell  to  concentrate  his  forces  and  move  on  Bowling 
Green,  where  Albert  Sidney  Johnston  was  erecting  fortifica- 
tions. Before  any  demonstration  of  this  sort  could  be  made, 
the  Confederate  general  found  his  fortifications  untenable, 
and  so  evacuating  what  had  been  a  strong  position,  fell  back 
to  Nashville.  Nashville,  however,  was  found  to  be  as  much 
without  military  significance  or  strength  as  Bowling  Green, 
and  was  soon  in  the  possession  of  the  army  under  General 
Buell.  In  accord  with  orders,  General  Thomas  moved  his 
command  to  Louisville,  and  thence  by  boats  on  the  Ohio  and 
Cumberland  to  Nashville. 

Andrew  Johnson  was  solemnly  installed  governor  of 
Tennessee.  Governor  in  name,  his  authority  was  limited  to 
the  range  of  Buell's  guns.  What  might  have  been  the  con- 
dition of  East  Tennessee  as  to  loyalty,  Central  Tennessee 
had  none  of  that  lofty  quality.  On  the  contrary,  there 
seemed  to  be  a  more  bitter  feeling  of  hostility  to  the  govern- 
ment in  that  state  than  in  any  other  at  war  with  the  Union. 
We  call  attention  to  this,  because  it  throws  much  light  on 
the  mysterious  movements  of  our  government.  Nashville 
was  of  small  political  and  less  military  importance  to  us,  and 
yet  to  gain  that  place  and  inaugurate  Johnson  our  forces 
were  deflected  trom  the  campaign  that  military  instruction 
alone  would  have  dictated  was  of  vital  importance.  The  un- 
necessary prolongation  of  the  war  and  the  many  disasters 
that  followed  can  be  attributed  to  the  Johnson  infatuation. 

About  the  15th  of  March,  General  Buell  received  orders 
to  form  a  junction  with  the  army  of  General  Grant  on  the 
Tennessee  river  at  Pittsburg  Landing.  General  Buell 


148  Life  of  Thomas. 

promptly  responded.  Ordering  General  O.  M,  Mitchel  to 
operate  with  his  force  against  the  Confederates  guarding  the 
Memphis  and  Charleston  railroads,  he  moved  with  the  divi- 
sions under  Thomas,  McCook,  and  Crittenden  on  the  direct 
road  to  Savannah,  near  Pittsburg  Landing.  The  head  of  his 
column,  under  General  Nelson,  arrived  on  the  memorable  6th 
of  April  at  the  place  designated.  All  that  day  Buell's  forces 
marched  to  the  roar  of  artillery  that  grew  louder  as  the  men 
were  urged  forward  by  their  officers,  all  excited  and  ani- 
mated by  the  potent  indication  of  a  desperate  and  unseen 
conflict.  That  the  nature  of  it  was  unknown  added  to  the 
interest  by  deepening  the  mystery.  General  Buell  had  the 
day  before  heard  from  General  Grant  by  courier,  and  the 
message  advised  Don  Carlos  that  it  was  a  junction  of  forces 
looked  for  in  which  there  was  no  hurry,  and  therefore  it  was 
not  necessary  to  fatigue  his  men.  General  Buell  was  not  of 
a  nature  to  be  overconfident.  His  clear  brain  comprehended 
the  situation,  and  Jiis  soldierly  instincts  drove  him  to  disre- 
gard the  advice  given.  He  knew  that  Grant  and  Sherman 
were  in  great  peril,  for  he  knew  Grant  and  Sherman,  and  to 
relieve  them  from  danger  he  urged  his  columns  forward  un- 
der light  marching  order,  and,  as  we  have  said,  on  the  6th 
of  April  the  battle  itself  spoke  to  him  in  warning  approval 
of  his  forced  march.  The  sun  had  set  and  the  night  was 
gathering  in  clouds  above  the  field  when  the  head  of  Buell's 
army  under  Nelson  reached  the  bank  of  the  river,  and  the, 
tired  but  excited  men  saw  under  the  further  bank  from  them 
a  mass  of  men  crowded  together  in  a  panic,  while  the  thun- 
der of  the  conflict  that  filled  their  ears  from  early  dawn  had 
died  down,  except  in  the  roar  of  the  gunboats  that  kept  up 
a  continuous  fire,  throwing  shot' and  shell  up  on  the  bank 
into  the  unseen  and  mysteriously  silent  field  beyond. 

Grant  and  Sherman  had  been  shamefully  surprised  and 
driven  back,  with  a  horrible  slaughter  of  brave  men. 
Throwing  their  forces  in  the  face  of  a  vigilant  enemy  with  a 
river  in  their  rear,  they  had  left  to  every  division  and  almost 
to  every  brigade  to  select  its  camp  to  suit  the  whim  or  con- 
venience of  the  subordinate  commanding  officer.  Provision, 
was  made,  however,  for  space  in  the  center  front  for  Buell's 


Shameful  Surprise  of  Shiloh.  149 

forces  when  they  should  arrive.  This  vacancy  made  it  im- 
possible to  devise  a  line  of  resistance  in  the  awful  emergency 
that  followed,  even  had  the  other  divisions  not  been  left  in 
air.  No  picket  line  was  thrown  out,  and  no  cavalry  sent  to 
feel  the  front  and  give  warning  of  the  swiftly  approaching 
enemy.  These  commanders  of  ours  seemed  to  have  courted 
the  surprise.  We  learn  since  the  close  of  the  war  that  the 
army  of  Beauregard  moved  up  unmolested  and  slept  on  their 
arms  within  sound  of  the  doomed  camps  where  unsuspecting 
men  were  cooking  their  last  meal  before  their  murder  in  the 
morning.  Ere  the  dawn,  brightened  into  day,  the  sleeping 
soldiers  of  our  camps  were  awakened  by  the  rebel  yell  and 
the  deadly  rattle  of  musketry  that  killed  men  as  they  leaped 
from  their  blankets,  killed  men  cooking  their  early  breakfast, 
killed  officers  asleep  in  their  tents,  and  sent  through  all  the 
camps  the  wild  terror  of  a  fatal  surprise. 

The  wonder  is  that  any  battle  was  fought  on  that  Sun- 
day in  April.  It  was  the  best  illustration  of  the  pluck  and 
sense  of  our  men.  It  was  the  soldier's  day  at  Shiloh.  They 
fell  into  line  instinctively  and  fought  in  concert  from  indi- 
vidual impulse.  Fortunately  for  us,  on  the  extreme  right  of 
our  line,  if  the  sudden  and  impromptu  formation  be  called 
such,  the  key  to  the  situation,  as  it  proved,  was  held  by  a 
strange,  eccentric  man,  known  as  Colonel  Tom  Worthington. 
The  son  of  one  of  Ohio's  most  eminent  men  in  its  pioneer 
days,  he  had  been  sent  in  youth  to  West  Point.  The  re- 
straint of  the  school  was  rather  irksome  to  the  eccentric- 
man,  and  he  left  before  he  could  be  graduated  into  command. 
There  was  no  element  of  success  in  the  late  cadet.  He  had 
the  ability  to  spend  his  patrimony  without  purchasing  with 
it  any  thing  wqrse  than  a  chronic  dyspepsia  that,  added  to 
his  natural  eccentricity,  made  men  envy  him.  When,  how- 
ever, the  war  came  so  unexpectedly,  there  was  a  wild  de- 
mand for  West  Pointers.  Tom  had  been  one  long  enough 
to  make  him  valuable.  He  was  made  colonel  of  the  Forty- 
sixth  Ohio  Infantry.  Tom's  art  of  war  was  learned  from 
Caesar's  Commentaries — a  better  authority  than  Jomini  or 
Halleck^  by  the  by — and  consisted  of  fighting  all  day  and 
fortifying  all  night.  Tom's  regiment  carried  as  many  picks 


150  Life  of  Thomas. 

and  shovels  as  it  did  muskets,  and  if  he  did  not  fight  all  day 
it  was  because  the  prudent  generals  over  him  did  not  ap- 
prove of  Caesar's  Commentaries  as  interpreted  by  Colonel 
Tom  Worthington.  He  could  not,  however,  be  restrained 
from  fortifying,  and  every  night  on  the 'march  his  regiment 
slept  behind  some  sort  of  a  breast-work.  This  served  him 
and  our  army  a  good  purpose  at  Shiloh.  When  that  fatal 
field  was  reached,  Colonel  Tom  made  an  observation.  They 
were,  he  saw,  in  the  enemy's  country,  with  that  enemy  un- 
doubtedly at  the  front,  with  a  river  in  our  rear — a  condition 
that  Csesar's  Commentaries  expres.sly  warned  against.  As 
soon  as  Colonel  Tom's  regiment  was  in  camp,  he  rode  over 
to  head-quarters,  really  for  the  purpose  of  expressing  his 
opinion  as  to  the  peril  of  their  position,  but  ostensibly  to 
learn  something  of  the  picket  line,  which  he  was  unable  to 
find,  from  the  simple  fact  that  there  was  none.  Colonel 
Worthington  was  not  an  agreeable  man.  He  was  loud  of 
speech  and  aggressive  in  manner.  He  had  not  got  from 
West  Point  even  its  polish.  Careless  in  his  attire,  he  was  so 
common  in  his  ways  that  on  the  march  it  was  no  unusual 
event  for  him  to  mount  behind  him  some  worn  out  or  sick 
soldier  and  so  furnish  a  little  transportation  that  was  a  great 
offense  to  his  brother  officers.  He  had  a  contempt  for  these 
same  officers,  who  could  not  read  Caesar's  Commentaries  in 
the  original  that  the  colonel  carried  with  him  and  consulted 
on  all  occasions. 

For  these  and  other  reasons  Colonel  Tom  was  not  wel- 
come at  head-quarters,  and  on  this  occasion  he  found  Gen- 
erals Grant  and  Sherman  with  several  other  officers  at  sup- 
per, which  the  colonel  was  not  invited  to  join.  After  fum- 
ing and  fretting  on  the  outside  he  returned  to  his  regiment, 
reporting  that  he  found  "one  general  commanding  drunk 
and  the  other  crazy."  These  words  were  used  against  him 
when  subsequently  he  was  tried,  condemned  and  cashiered 
for  insubordination  in  saving  all  that  was  saved  of  the 
doomed  army  on  the  Sunday  of  April  6th.  Colonel  Tom 
threw  out  his  own  picket  line,  established  his  own  line  of 
battle,  and  in  the  morning  was  in  command  of  the  only 
regiment  probably  not  taken  by  surprise.  This  was  most 


Budl  Arrives  in  Time.  151 

fortunately  placed  to  form  a  rallying  point,  and  first  regi- 
ments and  then  brigades  formed  and  fought  all  day,  the  en- 
emy being  unable  to  disperse  this  third  of  an  army  that 
saved  the  other  two-thirds  from  being  captured  or  driven 
into  the  river. 

It  is  claimed  by  the  Confederates  that  the  death  of  Albert 
Sidney  Johnston  robbed  their  army  of  the  fruit  of  victory. 
It  certainly  somewhat  equalized  conditions.  Our  army  went 
into  the  fight  without  a  head,  precisely -as  the  Confederates 
went  out.  We  doubt,  however,  whether  the  death  of  Gen- 
eral Johnston  had  the  effect  attributed.  It  caused  no  cessa- 
tion of  the  fierce  conflict.  What  might  have  happened  had 
daylight  been  prolonged  a  few  hours  we  can  only  conjecture, 
but  when  the  sun  went  down  its  last  rays  fell  upon  our  men 
holding  our  extreme  right,  and  with  it  a  cover  to  the  dis- 
organized mass  crowded  in  under  the  banks  of  the  river. 

With  night  came  Xelson's  command  of  Buell's  army, 
and  in  the  early  dawn  Buell's  column  moved  in  upon  the 
field  to  resume  the  fight  of  the  day  before.  These  fresh 
troops  came  none  too  soon.  General  Buell  seeking  General 
Grant  on  the  night  of  the  5th  of  April,  that  he  might  learn 
something  of  the  situation,  found  the  general  commanding 
on  a  boat  with  his  staff,  horses  and  equipage,  prepared  for 
flight.  It  had  been  the  soldier's  day  at  Shiloh  on  the  5th, 
it  became  Buell's  day  on  the  6th,  and  Buell's  victory  when 
the  hardy  men  of  the  forced  march  redeemed  the  shameful 
disaster  that  had  poured  its  gloomy  roar  in  their  ears  all  the 
day  before. 

General  Thomas  took  no  part  in  this  affair,  as  he  and 
his  command  did  not  reach  the  field  in  time.  The  deadly 
conflict  made  a  deep  impression  on  him.  He  was  one  to 
appreciate  the  noble  qualities  of  the  men  under  muskets 
and  note  how,  without  a.  head,  they  fought  even  when 
awakened  in  their  tents  by  the  rebel  yell,  and  were  shot 
down  or  bayoneted  as  they  hurried  half  dressed  into  line. 
"  The  noblest  soldiers  in  the  world,"  he  was  wont  to  say 
with  a  warmth  unusual  to  his  undemonstrative  manner,  "all 
they  need  is  a  little  instruction  and  a  capable  commander." 
He  not  only  found  appreciation  for  the  men,  but  a  measure 


152  Lift  of  Thomas. 

for  their  generals.  This  last  he  never  expressed  in  words, 
but  left  unmistakable  evidence  in  acts.  He  had  a  high  ad- 
miration for  Buell.  The  way  in  which  that  officer  took  in 
the  situation  when  advised  to  move  leisurely  in  his  march  to 
Shiloh  and  hurried  his  command  forward  under  light  march- 
ing orders  that  he  might  rescue  imbecility  from  destruction, 
was  of  a  piece  with  Thomas's  own  conduct  subsequently  at 
Nashville,  when  confronted  by  Hood's  army ;  almost  every 
hour  brought  him  a.  telegraph  order  to  fight  at  once,  which 
he  treated  with  contempt,  while  continuing  his  preparations. 
We  will  find  directly  his  confidence  in  and  admiration  of 
Don  Carlos  Buell  expressed  by  an  act  of  self-denial  that  has 
been  a  puzzle  to  the  unappreciative  ever  since. 

The  battle  of  Shiloh  was  followed  by  a  reorganization 
of  the  forces  designed  to  move  on  Corinth.  General  Halleck 
assumed  command  in  person.  Henry  Wager  Halleck  was 
the  beau  ideal  of  a  West  Pointer.  Of  portly  presence  and 
soldierly  bearing,  he  had  a  solemn,  dignified  manner,  that 
impressed  his  associates  with  a  belief  in  a  sound  intellectual 
force,  which  gained  him  the  title  of  "  Old  Brains  "  in  the 
army.  He  honestly  believed  that  war  was  an  art  that  could 
be  taught  by  books,  and  had  produced  a  volume  entitled 
*'  Halleck's  Art  of  War."  He  was  surprised  to  find,  however, 
when  he  took  the  field,  that  his  learned  effort  was  about  as 
useful  as  would  have  been  a  treatise  on  infant  baptism.  He 
was,  fortunately  for  our  military  service,  a  better  judge  of 
men  than  of  military  operations,  and  while  of  a  slow,  cau- 
tious, conservative  turn  in  speech  and  acts,  he  was  not  only 
instrumental  in  having  General  McClellan  relegated  to  the 
sphere  nature  meant  he  should  fill,  but  he  was  enabled  to 
have  George  H.  Thomas  promoted  to  positions  where  the 
great  Virginian  could  wait  for  opportunity. 

In  accordance  with  the  "Art  of  War  "  General  Halleck 
made  a  most  elaborate  division  of  his  forces.  He  had  five 
parts  under  the  names  of  Right  Wing,  Center,  Reserves  and 
Cavalry.  The  Right  Wing,  comprising  four  divisions  of  the 
Army  of  the  Tennessee  and  the  First  Division  of  the  Army 
of  the  Ohio,  was  given  to  General  Thomas.  He  secured  the 
promotion  of  General  Thomas  to  the  rank  of  Major-GeneraL 


The  Burrowing  toward  Corinth.  153 

The  center  was  given  to  General  Buell.  The  Left  Wing,  or 
Army  of  the  Mississippi,  was  intrusted  to  General  Pope,  and 
the  Reserves  to  General  McClernand,  while  General  Gordon 
Granger  had  command  of  the  Cavalry.  The  division  com- 
manders were  Major-General  W.  T.  Sherman,  Brigadier-Gen- 
erals T.  W.  Sherman,  Davis  and  McKean. 

This  immense  force  moved  on  in  accordance  with  "  Hal- 
leek's  Art  of  War,"  and  with  a  prudent  caution  that  dis- 
counted chances.  Every  day's  advance  in  parallels  was 
marked  by  heavy  fortifications  that  precluded  any  attack 
with  the  remotest  hope  of  success  on  the  part  of  the  enemy. 
If  McClellan's  army  at  Washington  was  an  anaconda  Hal- 
leek's  was  an  alligator,  and  both  weakened  the  morale  of 
their  forces  in  proportion  to  their  security.  The  men  who 
inarched  with  full  reliance  on  their  muskets  now  found 
themselves  falling  back  on  picks  and  shovels.  The  military 
roads  constructed  over  the  soft  yielding  bottoms  of  the  Ten- 
nessee were  marvels  of  engineering,  and  enabled  the  huge 
army  to  keep  abreast,  while  the  enemy  played  like  lightning 
along  the  front  and  flanks  in  continuous  skirmishes,  but  in 
vain. 

Had  this  immense  and  compact  army  been  moving  to 
any  point  of  the  slightest  importance,  it  would  probably 
have  arrived  at  its  destination  some  years  after  the  war  had 
ceased.  As  it  was,  the  value  of  Corinth  in  a  military  view 
found  measure  in  the  fact  that  it  was  thus  menaced. 

Of  so  little  importance  was  this  supposed  advantage 
thus  painfully  gained,  that  the  General  commanding  was  at 
a  loss  to  know  what  next  to  attempt.  Every  mile  gained 
by  such  a  force  not  only  increased  the  cost  and  difficulty  of 
supply,  but  the  slow  cautious  advance  bade  fair  to  bankrupt 
the  treasury  at  Washington  before  any  thing  could  be  ac- 
complished. To  meet  this  emergency,  the  three  armies 
called  together  to  demonstrate  the  success  of  Halleck's  Art 
of  War  were  separated  and  given  severally  distinct  fields  and 
aims ;  no  one  of  them,  save  that  on  Chattanooga,  of  the 
slightest  importance  to  our  success  in  the  war,  and  that  to 
Chattanooga  was  rendered  unavailing  by  its  utter  impracti- 
cability. General  Buell  was  ordered  to  move  east  from 


154  Life  of  Thomas. 

Corinth  toward  Chattanooga.  To  this  end  an  effort  was 
made  to  repair  the  railroad  eastward  from  Eastport,  but  al- 
most immediately  abandoned  as  not  practicable.  From 
this  they  turned  to  repairing  the  two  railroads  from  Nash- 
ville to  the  Tennessee  river  and  connecting  at  Stevenson, 
Alabama. 

What  a  contrast  is  this  ill-conceived,  circuitous,  ex- 
pensive route  to  that  projected  the  year  before  by  General 
Thomas  through  Cumberland  Gap  to  East  Tennessee  and 
Chattanooga.  We  were  drifting  in  blind  ignorance  toward 
the  vital  point  of  our  enemy's  weakness.  Had  General 
Thomas's  plan  of  advance  been  accepted,  with  President 
Lincoln's  project  of  a  railroad,  the  people  at  Richmond  in 
all  human  probability  would  have  been  awakened  to  the  fact 
that  we  had  the  sudden  suppression  of  their  revolt  in  view. 
The  year's  delay  had  changed  the  aspect  of  the  field,  and 
instead  of  a  huge  army  concentrated  in  Georgia  to  drive  our 
forces  where  the  Confederacy  lived,  time  and  opportunity 
had  been  given  them  to  meet  us  in  a  fatal  encounter  at 
Shiloh,  send  another  larger  force  to  the  Mississippi,  and 
garrison  Chattanooga  with  an  army  that  threatened  all  we 
had  gained  in  Kentucky  and  Tennessee. 

On  June  the  5th,  1862,  General  Thomas  was  given  com- 
mand at  Corinth  of  all  the  forces  there,  and  in  the  same 
month  occurred  an  event  strikingly  illustrative  of  General 
Thomas's  character.  He  asked  to  be  relieved  from  the  com- 
mand of  the  right  wing  of  four  divisions  and  returned  to  his 
former  command,  in  the  Army  of  the  Ohio  under  General 
Buell,  of  two  divisions.  This  restored  General  Grant  to  his 
former  command,  and  it  is  held  even  by  the  friends  of 
Thomas  that  he  was  moved  to  this  by  a  regard  for  Grant. 
It  is  not  singular  that  such  a  misconception  should  exist. 
It  seems  to  be  the  law  of  our  being  never  to  be  content  with 
our  heroes.  We  hasten  to  conceal  them  under  attributes 
that  are  not  only  foreign  to  their  natures,  but  antagonistic 
to  what  we  admire  in  them.  Now,  had  General  Thomas 
been  such  a  weak  sentimentalist  as  to  give  up  a  high  com- 
mand in  pity  for  one  whose  habits,  to  say  the  least,  at  that 


Thomas  Returns  to  His  Own.  155 

time  made  command  for  him  a  public  danger,  the  title  of 
the  Rock  of  Chickamauga  is  misplaced. 

The  truth  is  that  General  Thomas  was  not  moved  by 
any  such  sentimental  weakness.  He  comprehended  in  all 
its  horror  the  crime  of  Shiloh.  The  thoughtful,  reserved 
man  with  all  his  impulses  under  iron  control  seldom  spoke 
save  in  his  acts.  He  asked  to  be  returned  to  his  old  com- 
mand because  in  that  command  he  was  building  an  army 
that  was  to  be  irresistible  through  its  perfect  organization 
and  its  confidence  in  its  general.  The  work  he  had  given 
himself  to  do  was  more  important  to  him  and  his  cause  than 
any  temporary  honor.  "  What  is  the  good  of  a  hundred 
thousand  men  when  you  can  handle  and  tight  only  one  thou- 
sand ?"  was  what  he  thought,  and  the  query  held  in  it  more 
than  allHalleck's  Art  of  War.  And  so  he  gladly  turned  over 
his  four  divisions  to  the  vulgar  ambition  of  any  one  pleased 
with  such  fringe  work  of  command,  and  returned  to  the  men 
who  from  his  care  of  them  called  him  u  Pap  Thomas,"  and 
whose  confidence  in.  him  won  eventually  the  higher  title 
found  in  the  "  Rock  of  Chickamauga." 

In  July,  1862,  General  Ilalleck  was  called  to  Washing- 
ton and  appointed  general-in-chief  of  all  the  armies  of  the 
United  States.  This  was  in -effect  the  position  held  up  to 
that  time  by  General  Geo.  B.  McClellan.  But  this  officer 
had  demonstrated  in  the  field  the  incapacity  that  was  sus- 
pected and  feared  at  Washington,  while  he  was  organizing 
the  army  he  so  completely  wrecked  upon  the  Chickahoininy. 
The  administration,  relying  upon  West  Point  to  conduct  the 
war,  had  no  comprehensive  plan,  no  great  objective^  points, 
but  drifted  along  in  the  most  confusing  and  inconclusive 
manner.  All  that  saved  us  from  a  hopeless  wreck  was  that 
the  Confederacy  was,  if  possible,  in  a  worse  condition.  It 
had  but  one  great  objective  point,  which  was  Washington, 
and  this  it  seemed  persistently  to  ignore.  Great  masses  of 
men  moved  to  and  fro  without  any  definite  purpose,  and, 
coming  together,  bloody  battles  were  fought  without  other 
result  than  that  found  in  the  lists  of  killed,  wounded,  and 
missing.  It  looked,  as  an  experienced  French  general  said, 
as  if  we  sought  to  end  the  war  by  a  slaughter  of  efach  other. 


150  Life  of  Thomas. 

Had  President  Lincoln  and  Secretary  Stanton  ignored  West 
Point  and  taken  immediate  command,  a  different  manage- 
ment and  a  different  result  would  undoubtedly  have  occurred. 
Any  man  of  common  sense  can  plan  a  campaign  whether  he 
can  iight  a  battle  or  not.  The  trouble  with  the  administra- 
tion was,  however,  as  we  have  said,  that  believing  West 
Point  held  a  Napoleon,  if  he  could  only  be  found,  and  while, 
of  course,  deeply  concerned  about  the  armed  conflict,  it  left 
the  field  to  professed  military  men  and  devoted  its  time  to 
foreign  and  domestic  political  affairs.  Yet  President  Lin- 
coln was  himself  an  able  general.  Edwin  M.  Stanton,  while 
lying  upon  the  sick  bed  from  which  he  never  came  alive,  re- 
peated a  conversation  had  between  President  Lincoln  and 
General  McClellan,  wherein  McClellan  was  urging  upon  the 
president  the  necessity  of  sending  every  available  man  to 
Torktown. 

"We  can  not  uncover  Washington,"  said  the  President 
firmly. 

"  The  safety  of  Washington  is  in  my  success  at  Rich- 
mond," responded  the  general. 

"  Why  go  to  find  the  rebels  at  a  heavy  cost  and  a  greater 
peril,  when  they  are  at  our  door  within  a  day's  march  ?" 

McClellan  transported  his  army  of  a  hundred  thousand 
men  of  all  arms  to  the  vicinity  of  Yorktown,  then  occupied 
by  General  Magruder  with  only  five  thousand  men.  Instead 
of  assaulting  the  place  with  his  overwhelming  numbers,  our 
general  proceeded  to  besiege  the  place,  and  from  the  5th  of 
April  to  the  4th  of  May  had  all  his  army  in  trenches,  gradu- 
ally approaching  the  enemy.  When  at  last  he  was  about  to 
open  fire,  the  Confederates  quietly  withdrew.  On  the  10th 
of  April,  Norfolk  was  occupied  by  General  Wool.  After  the 
evacuation  of  Yorktown,  the  occupation  of  Williamsburg 
was  contested,  and  although  the  Confederates  withdrew,  it 
was  after  a  hot  contest  that  proved  virtually  a  victory  to 
them,  for  it  deepened  the  caution  of  our  general  and  further 
demoralized  an  army  trained  through  a  year  to  the  warning 
found  in  a  daily  order  not  to  bring  on  a  general  engagement. 
The  distance  from  Williamsburg  to  Richmond  is  fifty  miles, 
and  over  this  the  enemy  retreated,  fighting  as  he  fell  back. 


The  Chickahominy.  157 

This  continued  until  the  Chickahominy  was  reached,  when 
an  obstacle  presented  itself  that  checked  our  advance.  This 
stream,  that  in  dry  seasons  is  a  mere  brook,  in  a  wet  time  be- 
comes a  river,  with  low,  swampy  banks.  The  rain-storms 
that  sometimes  follow  heavy  cannonading  had  not  only  sub- 
merged the  low,  murky  flats  that  made  marching  difficult, 
but  swelled  the  little  Chickahominy  to  proportions  that 
made  crossing  in  the  presence  of  the  enemy  perilous  in  the 
extreme.  This  peril  came  to  McClellan  swiftly  after  the 
25th  of  May.  The  base  of  operations  for  the  army  was  at 
White  House,  on  the  York  River  Railroad,  where  that  road 
crosses  the  Pamunky,  twenty-four  miles  east  of  Richmond. 

Fitz  John  Porter  had  advanced  to  Hanover  Court  House, 

ji 

where  he  separated  to  form  a  junction  with  the  forces  under 
McDowell.  But  McDowell  had  been  withdrawn  to  cover 
Washington,  and  so  Porter  returned  to  his  original  camp. 
It  will  be  seen  by  reference  to  the  map  that  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  was  nearly  equally  divided  on  the  two  sides  of  the 
river.  The  left  wing  had  four  divisions  moving  along  the 
York  River  Railroad  south  of  the  Chickahominy,  while  the 
right  wing,  consisting  of  five  divisions,  marched  in  the  same 
direction  on  a  parallel  line  with  the  Chickahominy,  now  a 
fierce,  turbulent,  impassable  stream,  roaring  on  between. 
There  was  no  bridge  promising  communication,  save  one 
known  as  Bottom  Bridge,  and  that  was  in  a  sorry,  uncertain 
condition.  Appreciating  this  situation,  on  the  31st  of  May, 
the  Confederates,  under  General  Joseph  E.  Johnston,  made 
an  attack  on  McClellan's  left.  On  the  31st,  Longstreet  and 
Hill  moved  in  and  fought  what  is  known  as  the  battle  of 
Fair  Oaks.  Our  forces  were  driven  back  by  superior  num- 
bers and  were  about  to  surrender,  when  General  Sumner, 
who  had  his  entire  corps  in  column  ready  to  move,  hurried 
Sedgwick's  division  across  the  shaky,  almost  floating  Bottom 
Bridge.  This  unexpected  and  impetuous  charge  upon  the 
exposed  flank  of  the  Confederates  reversed  the  situation  and 
drove  the  late  victors  back  upon  Fair  Oaks  station. 

It  was  so  evident  to  the  Confederates  that  McClellan 
had  the  back  of  his  army  broken  across  the  Chickahominy, 
that  a  desperate  effort  was  continued  to  force  the  advantage. 


158  Life  °f  Thomas. 

Their  attack  was  resumejil  on  the  2d  of  June,  but  owing  to  • 
some  confusion  in  their  own  efforts  the  attack  was  unsuc- 
cessful, and  with  a  loss  of  4,233  men  to  our  5,739,  they  aban- 
doned their  position  at  Fair  Oaks. 

While  our  army  was  repairing  damages  and  building 
bridges,  the  unexpected  happened  in  two  directions.  Stone- 
wall Jackson  suddenly  appeared  from  the  Valley  on  McClel- 

right,  while  General  J.  E.  B.  Stuart,  in  command  of  fifteen 
hundred  cavalry,  swung  round  the  right  flank  of  our  arrny 
and  destroyed  nearly  all  the  stores  collected  for  the  support 
of  our  forces.  In  the  face  of  these  disasters,  McClellan  de- 
termined to  retreat  to  the  James,  that  was  then  open  and  af- 
forded easy  water  transportation  and  a  safer  base  than  that 
at  "White  House.  This  retreat  was  far  more  hazardous  than 
any  advance  could  have  been.  He  had  to  move  by  the  flank 
on  one  road  only,  and  that  open  to  attack  at  a  dozen  points 
from  other  roads  crossing  it.  Striving  to  conceal  his  move 
by  a  false  attack  and  a  bold  raid  by  the  cavalry,  the  entire 
army  began  its  retreat.  The  enemy  were  not  much  behind, 
and  then  followed  the  seven  days  fighting  from  the  25th  of 
June  to  the  1st  of  July.  In  this  retreat,  our  men  seemed  to 
have  regained  the  lost  spirit  that  nearly  a  year's  training  had 
taken  out  of  them,  and  fought  well — so  well,  indeed,  that 
had  it  been  an  advance  instead  of  a  retreat,  the  Confederates 
would  have  fared  badly.  The  seven  days  fighting  ended  in 
the  battle  of  Malvern  Hill,  when  the  Confederates  were  so 
terribly  worsted  that,  had  McClellan  marched  on  to  Rich- 
mond, he  would  undoubtedly  have  driven  the  Confederate 
government  out  with  its  army.  Instead  of  this,  he  called  a 
council  of  war,  that  proved  true  to  the  traditional  council 
that  never  fights.  Instead  of  taking  Richmond,  McClellan 
closed  his  report  to  the  Secretary  of  War  in  the  following 
words,  which  give  the  true  measure  of  the  man.  They  read  : 

"  If  I  save  this  army  now,  I  tell  you  plainly  that  I  owe  no 
thanks  to  you  or  any  other  person  in  Washington.  You 
have  done  your  best  to  sacrifice  this  army." 

It  was  the  belief  of  this  brainless  bullet-head,  that  the 
government  at  Washington  was  not  only  willing,  but  anxious 
to  sacrifice  its  only  army  that  it  might  be  rid  of  its  general. 


The  Real  Stature  of  McClellan.  159 

This  not  only  crops  out  in  the  closing  lines  of  his  extra- 
ordinary report,  but  appears  on  every  page  of  the  book 
called  "  McClellan's  Own  Story,"  published  since  his  death. 
"When  one  remembers  the  patriotism,  the  toil,  and  anxiety  of 
the  eminent  men  then  making  our  government,  one's  indig- 
nation boils  at  the  insolence  of  this  military  imbecile  whose 
blunders  nearly  lost  us  our  army,  and  left  the  field  the  brave 
men  fought  over  stained  with  the  useless  blood  of  fifty 
thousand  men. 

We  read  those  events  to-day  under  a  glare  of  sunlight 
given  us  by  "McClellan's  Own  Story,"  and  "Long's  Life  of 
Lee."  "  If  I  save  this  army."  "  This  army  "  at  that  mo- 
ment numbered  nearly  a  hundred  thousand,  and  had  shown 
in  a  retreat  that  seemed  planned  for  its  destruction,  a  fighting 
capacity  that  almost  equals  that  of  the  Army  of  the  Cum- 
berland, and  subsequently,  when  gathered  on  Malvern  Hill, 
achieved  a  great  victory.  It  was  in  fact  a  victory  that 
opened  the  road  to  Richmond  had  our  very  little  Napoleon 
possessed  the  sense  to  seize  on  the  advantage.  In  lieu  of 
this,  he  had  the  telegraph  at  Washington  vibrating  with  con- 
tinuous cries  for  reinforcements.  We  now  read  in  the  care- 
fully prepared  "  Life  of  Lee,"  by  Long,  that  while  with 
80,000  brave  men,  our  diminutive  Napoleon  was  demanding 
help,  the  pious  Lee  was  thanking  God  every  night  for  an- 
other twenty-four  hours  in  which  to  fortify  Richmond,  and 
strengthen  his  shattered  army. 

Why  President  Lincoln  did  not  respond  to  McClellan's 
treacherous  insolence  by  arrest  and  trial  for  treason,  is  found 
in  the  unwritten  history  of  that  troubled  time.  We  have 
Edwin  M.  Stanton's  word  for  it,  and  the  strange  arid  contra- 
dictory conduct  of  both  president  and  secretary,  leave  no 
doubt  that  the  government  dared  not  arrest  him.  It  dared 
not  even  displace  him  on  the  James  by  another  general. 
McClellan  had  not  only  surrounded  himself  by  a  group  of 
favorite  officers  in  command  of  his  several  corps,  but  he  and 
they  had  assidiously  cultivated  in  the  rank  and  file  a  discon- 
tent toward  the  administration  of  President  Lincoln.  The 
men  were  taught  to  believe  that  they  were  being  sacrificed 
to  the  abolition  selfishness  at  Washington.  This  distrust  and 


160  Life  of  Thomas. 

discontent  had  become  BO  general  that  when,  on  July  7th,  Pres- 
ident Lincoln  visited  the  army,  orders  had  to  be  issued  for 
the  men  to  cheer  their  chief  executive  to  check  what  the  of- 
ficers believed  would  occur  in  the  shape  of  mob  violence  and 

insult. 

"  We  had  to  get  the  army  back  to  the  fortifications  at 
Washington  for  fear  of  a  revolt  in  getting  clear  of  the  fel- 
low," said  Edwin  M.  Stanton  after  the  war. 

This  fact  makes  clear  and  consistent  President  Lincoln's 
conduct  toward  George  B.  McClellan.' 

This  was  the  condition  of  the  military  field  when  after  the 
capture  of  Corinth  the  three  armies  were  separated  and  given 
three  different  lines  of  operation.  Generals  Grant  and  Sher- 
man were  sent  to  the  Mississippi,  while  General  Buell  was 
ordered  to  move  eastward  with  Chattanooga  as  an  objective. 
We  were  drifting  in  the  right  direction  by  a  most  circuitous 
route,  and  a'fter  a  lost  opportunity.  One  man  alone  saw  the 
situation,  but  he  was  not  in  a  position  to  make  his  knowledge 
available.  Not  in  command,  he  was  not  of  the  sort  to  press 
persistently  his  views  upon  those  in  authority.  He  was  build- 
ing his  own  army  and  biding  his  own  good  time. 

The  movements  of  Buell  were  not  lost  to  the  enemy. 
The  people  at  Richmond  had  not  been  slow  either  in  their  ap- 
preciation of  the  great  gate-way  to  the  South,  or  in  observ- 
ing that  we  seemed  profoundly  ignorant  of  its  importance. 
Now,  however,  that  a  huge  army  was  moving  in  that  direc- 
tion with  an  active  repair  of  railroads  and  an  accumulation 
of  stores,  active  measures  were  taken  to  meet  the  menaced 
danger.  The  general  movement  of  our  fources  under  Buell 
was  eastward.  Generals  Nelson  and  Wood's  forces  were  em- 
ployed in  repairing  the  Memphis  and  Charleston  Railroad. 
They  formed  a  junction  with  General  O.  M.  Mitchel's  divi- 
sion, already  engaged  in  the  same  work.  General  McCook's 
division  marched  from  Corinth,  and  General  Crittenden's 
from  Boonville,  and  took  position  at  Battle  Creek,  threaten- 
ing Chattanooga  early  in  July.  As  rapidly  as  roads  could  be 
repaired  and  supplies  gathered,  the  entire  army  moved  in  the 
same  direction.  General  Thomas  brought  up  the  rear.  He 
was  then  ordered  on  the  5th  of  August  to  Decherd,  and  on 


Bragg  Marches  for  Kentucky. 

the  19th  to  McMinnville,  in  command  of  all  the  troops  col- 
lected there  for  an  aggressive  movement. 

General  Bu ell's  military  operations  were  gravely  em- 
barrassed by  the  political  movements  inaugurated  by  Andrew 
Johnson  and  enforced  by  the  administration.  The  phantom 
of  a  loyal  population  in  Tennessee  yet  haunted  the  brain  of 
the  authorities  at  "Washington.  Fortunately  for  us  all  a  like 
will-o'-the-wisp  was  misleading  the  people  at  Richmond.  To 
offset  our  loyal  Tennesseeans  they  had  an  immense  popula- 
tion of  the  disloyal  in  Kentucky,  and  it  was  determined  that 
two  columns  should  move  into  that  state  and  hold  Frank- 
fort until  an  ordinance  of  secession  could  be  passed  and  arms 
given  the  brave  Kentuckians  with  which  to  drive  the  Fed- 
erals across  the  Ohio. 

To  this  end,  while  a  column  under  General  Kirby  Smith 
marched  through  Cumberland  Gap  into  Kentucky ;  General 
Bragg,  cutting  loose  from  his  base  of  supplies  at  Chattanooga, 
marched  an  army  of  twenty-five  thousand  men  to  form  a 
junction  with  Smith  at  or  near  Louisville.  General  Buell 
had  twice  the  number  of  men  and  better  supplied  and 
equipped  of  all  arms,  but  owing  to  his  political  duties  that 
he  dared  not  neglect,  this  force  was  so  scattered  that  it  ap- 
peared impossible  to  concentrate  them  in  time  to  drive 
Bragg  back  over  the  Tennessee,  or  from  his  line  of  operations, 
which  would  have  been  quite  as  fatal ;  for  Bragg,  depending 
on  the  country  for  supplies,  had  to  select  the  one  possessed 
of  the  most  fertility.  This  marked  his  line  of  march  from 
Chattanooga  to  Kentucky,  in  the  mind  of  General  Thomas, 
as  if  he  had  read  it  in  an  order  from  Bragg's  head-quarters. 
General  Buell  did  not  concur  in  the  view  taken  by  General 
Thomas.  Believing  that  Bragg  had  an  army  of  fifty  thou- 
sand men,  he  could  not  be  made  to  believe  that  such  a  force 
under  the  command  of  a  sane  mind  would  seek  to  support 
itself  from  the  country  through  which  it  marched.  Buell 
was  deceived  as  to  the  number  of  Bragg's  army  and  believed 
that  Nashville  was  its  destination.  Thomas  was  satisfied 
that  Bragg  aimed  at  Kentucky.  There  was  a  wide  difference 
in  their  views  and  a  wider  in  the  results.  If  Bragg's  pur- 
11 


162  Life  of  Thomas. 

pose  was  to  invade  Kentucky,  he  would  cross  over  to  the 
Sequatchie  Valley.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  he  meant  Nash- 
ville, it  would  be  necessary  to  check  the  move  at  McMinn- 
ville.  The  two  routes  were  too  far  apart  to  hold  both,  and 
it  was  then  of  vital  importance  to  know  as  soon  as  possible 
which  was  to  be  selected.  When  the  crossing  of  the  Ten- 
nessee by  the  Confederates  was  effected  the  greatest  possible 
efforts  were  made  to  learn  of  their  movements.  We  gather 
this  from  the  telegrams  that  passed  between  Generals  Thomas 
and  Buell.  We  copy  from  them  as  not  only  throwing  light 
on  the  events,  but  giving  us  a  knowledge  of  the  two  distin- 
guished officers  then  in  command. 

On  the  day  that  General  Thomas  reached  McMinnville, 
General  Buell  discussed  the  situation  in  a  lengthy  dispatch  : 
"  The  enemy  crossed  three  hundred  cavalry  and  three  thou- 
sand infantry  at  Chattanooga  yesterday.  This  may  be  for 
the  purpose  of  foraging  in  Sequatchie  Valley,  but  we  must 
be  prepared  for  more  than  that.  Hold  your  command 
in  readiness  to  march  at  the  shortest  notice.  .  .  .  You 
should,  by  means  of  spies  and  scouts,  keep  yourself  thoroughly 
informed  of  what  is  going  on  between  you  and  Chattanooga. 
.  .  .  I  shall  concentrate  your  division  and  McCook's  at 
Tracy  City,  or  near  there,  and  send  Crittenden  up  the  Se- 
quatchie Valley  to  about  the  Anderson  road.  We  must  be 
prepared  either  to  fight  in  detachments,  or  concentrate  rap- 
idly, according  to  circumstances." 

On  the  22d,  General  Thomas  telegraphed  to  General 
Buell :  "  I  have  believed  for  a  day  or  two  that  the  demonstra- 
tion in  this  direction  is  to  cover  the  advance  of  the  enemy 
toward  Kentucky.  .  .  .  The  citizens  here  think  they 
will  advance  into  Kentucky." 

General  Buell  replied  the  same  day :  "  From  General 
McCook's  information  this  morning,  it  seems  almost  certain 
that  Bragg  is  marching  on  McMinnville,  his  advance  was  on 
the  top  of  Walden's  Ridge  last  night.  McCown  is  said  to 
be  crossing  at  Kingston,  and  Withers  at  Harrison.  Of 
course  they  will  expect  to  unite.  What  sort  of  ground  can 
we  take  by  concentration  at  McMinnville  ?  How  would  it  do 


Observing  Bragg.  163 

to  fight  at  Altamont?  Is  the  ground  such  as  to  give  us  the 
advantage  of  our  artillery?" 

General  Thomas  replied  the  same  day :  "  By  all  means 
concentrate  here.  The  enemy  can  not  reach  Nashville  hy 
any  other  route  across  the  mountains  unless  by  Sparta.  At 
Altamont,  I  am  positively  informed,  that  the  enemy  would 
have  an  equal  advantage  with  ourselves.  Here  we  will  have 
a  most  decided  advantage,  and  by  being  here,  should  he 
march  by  Sparta,  we  can  meet  him  either  there,  or  at  Althus- 
ford  across  the  Caneyfork.  He  is  obliged  to  pass  this  place 
or  Sparta  to  reach  Nashville.  ...  I  can  not  think  that 
Bragg  is  coming  here,  either  by  the  Hill  or  Therman  road." 

In  answer  Buell  said  :  "  I  can  hardly  think  that  the  en- 
emy will  attempt  to  march  across  to  McMinnville,  at  least 
not  immediately.  It  appears  to  me  that  he  will  rather  en- 
deavor to  get  into  North  Alabama,  and  perhaps  strike  across 
to  Decherd.  If  we  advance  to  Altamont,  we  may  thwart  him 
in  both  and  preserve  our  communications  with  Decherd  and 
Nashville.  What  think  you?" 

General  Thomas  replied  on  the  same  day :  "  We  can  get 
neither  forage  nor  water  at  Altamont.  It  will  be  difficult 
for  us  to  march  across  the  mountains  to  Sequatchie  Valley 
as  for  the  enemy  to  come  to  Altamont  or  this  place.  I  would 
not  advise  concentrating  here  except  for  battle  or  for  an  ad- 
vance into  East  Tennessee.  I  think  our  connection  with 
Nashville  will  be  better  preserved  by  holding  Decherd 
with  a  division  to  enable  us  to  concentrate  either  there  if 
threatened  or  at  this  place.  I  also  learn  that  Tupelo,  Mis- 
sissippi, has  been  abandoned,  and  most  of  the  enemy  at  that 
place  sent  to  Chattanooga.  I  therefore  do  not  apprehend  any 
attempt  to  seize  North  Alabama." 

The  next  day  Buell  telegraphed :  "  There  is  no  possibil- 
ity of  our  concentrating  at  McMinnville.  We  must  concen- 
trate in  advance  and  assume  the  offensive,  or  fall  back  at 
last  to  Murfreesboro.  I  deem  the  former  the  surest,  and  we 
will  act  accordingly.  I  wish  you,  therefore,  to  move  by  a 
forced  march  to  Altamont,  there  to  form  a  junction  with 
McCook,  Crittenden,  and  Schoepf.  There  must  be  no  delav 
or  failure.  The  enemy's  advance  was  at  the  top  of  Walden's 


L\f>'  "/  Thomas. 

Ridge,  ten  miles  from  Chattanooga,  night  before  last,  and 
talked  of  being  at  McMinnville  to-morrow.  That  is  hardly 
possible,  but  they  must  be  met  at  the  earliest  possible  mo- 
ment." 

A  day  later  he  telegraphed  :  "  In  advancing  to  Altamont, 
take  the  Hickory  creek  road,  instead  of  the  Therman  road. 
This  will  put  you  on  a  shorter  line  of  retreat  on  Murfrees- 
boro  by  way  of  Manchester,  and  brings  us  nearer  together. 
.  .  In  the  event  of  any  reverse  which  makes  it  necessary 
for  the  whole  force  to  fall  back,  do  so  by  Manchester  and 
Beech  Grove,  making  a  stand  to  check  the  enemy  whenever 
it  can  be  done  to  advantage."  On  the  24th,  General  Thomas's 
scouts  returned  with  intelligence  that  the  enemy  would  ad- 
vance on  McMinnville  by  two  or  three  routes,  and  that 
forces  were  at  Pikeville  and  in  the  Sequatchie  valley.  He 
then  reported  to  General  Buell  that  he  would  move  that 
afternoon  in  compliance  with  orders.  It  is  evident,  how- 
ever, from  the  foregoing  quotations,  that  he  was  reluctant  to 
move  to  Altamont,  and  the  issue  of  that  movement  proved 
that  his  reluctance  was  well  founded. 

August  25th,  at  5  p.  M.,  Thomas  telegraphed  to  General 
Buell  from  Altamont :  "  The  enemy  no  nearer  than  Dunlap. 
It  is  reported  that  there  is  one  brigade  there  and  one  at  Pike- 
ville. .  .  .  Water  scarce,  only  one  spring  here,  and  not 
forage  enough  in  the  neighborhood  to  last  for  one  day.  The 
road  up  the  mountain  is  almost  impassable ;  General  Wood 
has  been  from  six  o'clock  until  now,  and  has  not  succeeded  in 
getting  his  artillery  up  the  road.  I  deem  it  next  to  impossible 
to  march  a  large  army  across  the  mountains  by  Altamont,  on 
account  of  the  scarcity  of  water  and  forage  and  the  extreme 
difficulty  of  passing  over  the  road.  I  will  therefore  return 
to  McMinnville  and  await  further  orders.  As  I  mentioned 
in  one  of  my  dispatches,  I  regard  McMiuuville  as  the  most 
important  point  for  occupation  of  any.  The  occupation  of 
McMinnville,  Sparta,  and  Murfreesboro  will,  in  my  opinion, 
secure  the  Xashville  and  Chattanooga  Railroad." 

General  Thomas's  experience  confirmed  what  he  had 
anticipated  as  to  the  condition  of  Altamont,  and  without 
further  orders  he  fell  back  to  McMinnville,  where  he  waa 


Thomas'  Views  of  Bragg's  Move.  165 

again  telegraphed  as  follows:  "Keep  your  position  at  Mc- 
Minnville,  but  make  nothing  like  a  permanent  establishment. 
Be  always  ready  to  move  at  a  moment's  notice.  That  Bragg 
is  on  that  side  of  the  river  with  a  large  force  is  beyond  all 
question.  It  is  hardly  probable  that  it  is  merely  for  the  pur- 
pose of  demonstration,  and  we  must  be  prepared  to  con- 
centrate promptly.  Of  course,  the  passage  of  so  large  a 
force  across  the  mountains  is  difficult,  but  not  as  much  so  as 
you  would  suppose  from  the  road  you  took.  The  Therman 
road  is  very  good  and  the  mountains  quite  easy  of  ascent. 
The  descent  on  this  side  is  easy  enough  by  four  roads  all  di- 
verging from  Altamont,  tlie  first  going  by  Beersheba  to  Mc- 
Minnville,  the  second  by  Hickory  creek  to  McMinnville  or 
toward  Manchester,  the  third  also  to  Manchester  and  to 
Decherd  by  Pelham,  and  the  fourth  by  Cowan.  The  Beer- 
sheba is  excellent  for  a  mountain  road.  The  question  is, 
how  to  meet  an  advance  which  may  take  either  of  these 
roads  through  Altamont?  The  best  position  we  could  take 
would  be  McMinnville,  Altamont,  and  on  the  Therman  road 
just  this  side  of  Sequatchie  valley.  We  should  not  only  be 
able  to  concentrate  against  an  advance  on  that  road,  or  the 
Sparta  road,  but  also  to  threaten  his  flanks,  if  he  should  at- 
tempt to  go  into  North  Alabama  by  Battle  creek — a  not  im- 
probable thing  on  many  accounts.  The  difficulty  of  supply- 
ing ourselves  on  the  mountains  is,  I  think,  the  only  objection 
to  the  disposition  I  mention." 

To  this,  General  Thomas  replied  on  the  28th :  "  Troops 
at  this  place  can  watch  the  direct  Chattanooga  road,  the 
Dunlap,  and  the  Harrison  and  Pikeville  roads,  and  by  the 
system  of  expresses  established  by  Smith,  I  think  I  can  give 
you  intelligence  of  the  enemy  before  he  can  cross  Sequatchie 
valley." 

"We  give  these  telegrams  more  at  length  than  a  mere 
narrative  would  warrant,  because,  as  we  have  said,  they 
throw  light  on  the  different  views  held  in  advance  as  to 
Bragg's  movement  by  Generals  Thomas  and  Buell.  Had 
General  Thomas's  earnestly  urged  advice  been  acted  on,  the 
result,  as  we  can  now  see,  would  have  saved  us  the  mortify- 
ing retreat  to  the  Ohio  river.  Bragg  was  extremely  anxious 


166  Life  of  Thomas. 

to  avoid  a  battle  in  the  mountains,  where  the  Union  forces 
had  the  advantage  of  acting  on  the  defensive,  and  could, 
therefore,  select  positions.  General  Buell  overrated  the 
force  commanded  by  Bragg,  and  he  gravely  mistook  the  ob- 
ject of  Bragg's  men.  General  Thomas  recognized  the  fact 
that  Bragg,  in  severing  his  army  from  its  base  of  supplies  at 
Chattanooga,  was  driven  to  move  in  light  marching  order, 
as  the  forage  was  scarce  in  the  country  through  which  he 
was  forced  to  pass.  If  he  could  escape  a  general  engage- 
ment and  make  his  connection  with  Kirby  Smith  on  the 
Ohio,  all  Tennessee  and  much  of  Kentucky  would  have  to 
be  abandoned  by  our  troops.  This,  however,  was  not  so 
much  the  purpose  of  this  bold  maneuver  as  the  belief  that 
Kentucky,  relieved  of  our  presence  and  encouraged  by  that 
of  a  Confederate  force,  would  at  once  pass  the  Ordinance  of 
Secession,  and  so  greatly  add  men  and  material  to  the  cause. 
With  Kentucky  no  longer  an  unarmed  neutrality,  the  men- 
ace to  the  Confederacy  at  its  weakest  point  would  be  re- 
moved, and  Lee's  army  left  to  threaten  our  Capitol  and 
force  the  fighting  on  the  ground  that  eminent  general  might 
select. 

Thomas  saw  all  this,  and  while  Buell  was  in  a  maze  as 
to  Bragg's  intent,  our  general  never  for  an  instant  had  the 
slightest  doubt.  He  had  to  obey  orders,  and  in  so  doing 
opened  the  way  for  Bragg  through  the  Sequatchie  valley, 
the  shorter  and  better  route  to  Kentucky.  The  next  move 
upon  the  board  was  an  order  issued  30th  August  concen- 
trating the  army  at  Murfreesboro.  General  Thomas  was 
directed  to  march  in  the  rear  of  Wood's  and  Ammen's  di- 
visions, to  keep  a  day's  march  between  his  force  and  that  of 
the  enemy,  and  so  to  avoid  a  general  engagement.  On  the 
first  of  September,  he  advised  with  General  Thomas  by 
telegram  by  asking,  "  Do  any  circumstances  present  them- 
selves which  would  make  a  change  in  our  movements  ad- 
visable ?  " 

,          Thomas  replied,  "I  think  as  the  movement  has  com- 
menced that  it  had  better  be  executed." 

This  maneuver  had  scarcely  been  executed  before  it  was 
abandoned.  Neither  the  movement  nor  the  abandonment 


The  Race  for  the  Ohio.  lt>7 

of  it  was  in  accord  with  the  views  of  General  Thomas.  He 
did  not  believe  in  the  beginning  that  Murfreesboro  was  the 
best  point  at  which  to  concentrate,  nor  after  the  concen- 
tration that  it  was  well  to  abandon  that  line  of  operation. 

At  Murfreesboro,  General  Thomas  was  surprised  by  an 
order  from  his  general  commanding  to  proceed  at  once  by 
rail  to  Nashville.  The  immediate  cause  of  this  change  of 
purpose  came  in  General  Buell's  mistaken  impression  as  to 
Bragg's  force.  Had  he  known  that  Bragg  had  really  severed 
his  force  from  his  base  of  supply,  and  had  one  of  so  small  a 
number  that  he  could  subsist  on  a  by  no  means  rich  line  of 
country  with  no  hope  of  reinforcement  until  he  reached 
Kentucky,  he  would  have  seen  that  with  the  fifty  thousand 
men  concentrated  at  Murfreesboro  he  could  have  driven 
Bragg  back  on  the  Tennessee.  It  is  very  clear  that  had 
General  Thomas  been  in  command,  a  great  battle  would 
have  been  fought  and  the  extraordinary  race  of  two  armies 
from  the  Tennessee  to  the  Ohio  would  never  have  startled 
the  American  people. 

The  movements  of  these  two  armies  were  the  most  ex- 
traordinary of  the  war.  Marching  on  parallel  lines,  both 
generals  aimed  to  keep  their  forces  apart.  Buell,  believing 
that  Bragg  outnumbered  him,  sought  his  reinforcements  at 
Louisville,  while  Bragg,  knowing  that  Buell  had  two  men  to 
his  one,  found  a  junction  with  Kirby  Smith  a  necessity.  And 
so  for  days  the  two  armies  nearly  abreast  moved  on  different 
roads  at  times  almost  in  sight  of  each  other.  General 
Thomas  was  sent  to  the  front  when  a  fight  was  imminent, 
and  then  to  the  rear  when  the  safety  of  the  army  called  for 
his  care.  This  recognition  of  his  ability  accompanied  him 
through  the  war.  It  made  no  difference  what  rank  he  held, 
lie  was  ever  in  command  so  far  as  the  commanding  officer 
was  concerned. 

At  Prewitt's  Knob,  General  Thomas,  intercepting  Bragg, 
prepared  for  a  battle  that  Bragg,  of  course,  declined,  by 
changing  his  course  east  from  the  road  to  Louisville  and 
marching  northward.  Our  army  continued  its  march  to 
Louisville,  where  heavy  reinforcements  awaited  its  arrival. 

The  government  at  Washington  was  dissatisfied  with 


Life  of 

(icncral  Buell  from  the  beginning  of  his  command.  The 
march  from  Murfreesboro  to  Louisville  deepened  the  dis- 
trust. The  malign  political  influence  of  which  wo  have 
spoken,  beginning  with  Thomas,  was  continued  to  Buell. 
The  silent  reserve  of  the  Virginia  general  that  so  irritated 
Johnson 'was  a  dignified  contempt  in  Don  Carlos  that  mad- 
dened to  blind  wrath  the  ambitious  politician.  When  it  be- 
came evident  that  Bragg  had  crossed  the  Tennessee  in  force, 
Governor  Johnson  sent  humbly  to  General  Buell  for  infor- 
mation as  to  what  he,  the  general  commanding,  proposed 
doing.  Of  course  an  officer  of  Buell's  military  turn  was  not 
the  man  to  regard  Andrew  Johnson's  demand  with  much 
favor  or  even  polite  conversation.  As  governor  of  the  state 
honor,  he  responded  in  person  and  clanked  with  two  aids 
into  the  governor's  office  and  asked  stiffly  what  his  excel- 
lency desired. 

"Bragg  is  moving  on  Nashville,"  said  Johnson  fiercely, 
"  and  I  want  to  know  what  is  being  done  to  protect  the 
oapitol." 

"  I  do  not  know,"  said  the  general  calmly  and  slowly, 
"  that  General  Bragg  threatens  Nashville.  When  the  pur- 
pose of  his  crossing  the  Tennessee  is  developed,  I  will  be 
prepared  to  meet  and  fight  him." 

"  There  is  no  question  but  that  your  General  Bragg 
means  Nashville."  The  governor  uttered  the  word  general 
impressively  and  with  a  sneer. 

"I  hardly  think  you  are  certain  of  your  conclusion. 
General  Bragg  is  an  old  experienced  soldier  and  must  know 
that  Nashville  is  not  a  place  of  any  military  significance." 

"And,  therefore,  you  will  abandon  it." 

"I  don't  say  that.  The  defense  of  Nashville  is  at  Mur- 
freesboro. If  General  Bragg  is  defeated  there,  then  Nash- 
ville is  safe.  If  he  is  not,  Nashville  can  not  be  held.  Is 
there  any  thing  else  you  wish  of  me,  governor?  " 

••  Xo,  sir;  no,  sir;  my  business  is  with  the  government 
at  Washington."  And  General  Buell,  with  his  two  aids, 
clanked  out  from  the  office. 

There  was  a  fighting  parson  in  the  army  called  Colonel 
Granville  Moody.  This  evangelist  wore  epauletts,  was  a  man 


Prayer  with  And  re  n-  Johnson.  169 

six  feet  in  height,  well  proportioned,  and  possessed  of  a  vocal 
organ  of  such  penetrating  power  that  he  could  address  an 
audience  of  ten  thousand  with  more  ease  than  the  ordinary 
speaker  could  entertain  a  hundred.  He  preached  war  from 
the  pulpit  dedicated  to  the  unresisting  Savior,  and  to  stimu- 
late enlistment  volunteered  himself.  As  a  colonel  of  a  pious 
regiment,  he  prayed  much  and  fought  more.  He  was  fond  of 
Andrew  Johnson,  probably,  because  the  governor,  finding  the 
religious  element  of  much  service  to  himself,  patronized  the 
fighting  parson.  This  hot  gospeler  of  the  sword  was  pres- 
ent at  the  interview,  and  as  soon  as  General  Buell  was  out 
of  hearing,  Governor  Johnson  said  to  him  :  "  That  man's  a 
traitor;  his  heart  is  not  in  the  cause.  The  government 
should  be  warned.  But  I  weary  of  the  work.  I  am  met  at 
every  turn  by  treachery.  It  is  most  disheartening." 

"Governor  Johnson,"   said    Colonel    Moody   solemnly, 
•"  let  us  pray." 

Without  a  word  more  these  men  dropped  upon  their 
knees,  and  Colonel  Moody  addressed  God  in  a  long,  fervent 
appeal  for  strength  to  meet  and  foil  the  disloyal  in  their 
treachery  to  the  faithful  government.  It  is  safe  to  say  that 
Andrew  Johnson  cared  little  for  the  petition  offered  the 
Almighty,  but  he  did  care  for  the  one  he  was  brooding  over 
to  President  Lincoln  asking  the  removal  of  Buell.  He  knew 
that  the  Rev.  Colonel  Moody's  name  would  strengthen  his 
demand,  and  as  he  joined  the  fighting  parson  in  an  appeal 
to  the  Lord,  it  was  but  right  the  armed  evangelist  should 
join  the  governor  in  one  to  the  president. 

It  seems  preposterous,  looked  at  now,  that  great  events 
should  turn  on  causes  such  as  the  one  here  narrated  that  the 
Kev.  Granville  Moody  was  given  to  repeating  at  camp-meet- 
ings and  revivals  in  after  life.  But  it  is  true  that  a  general 
of  high  soldierly  qualities  was  dismissed  the  service,  under  at 
cloud,  because  a  demagogue  and  an  armed  parson  saw  fit  to 
demand  his  sacrifice.  All  this  will  be  made  apparent  here- 
after. 

When  General  Buell  reached  Louisville,  he  was  met  by 
an  order  retiring  him  from  the  command  of  the  army,  and  ap- 
pointing General  Thomas  his  successor.  Thomas  promptly 


170  Lift  of  Thomas. 

requested  a  suspension  of  this  order  until  he  could  be  heard. 
That  Buell  had  been  outmaneuvered  and  outmarched  by 
Bragg,  Thomas  well  knew,  as  he  subsequently  testified  be- 
fore the  court  of  inquiry  organized  to  question  the  conduct 
of  the  general  commanding.  But  it  was  an  error  in  judg- 
ment in  a  general  whose  prompt  arrival  not  only  without 
orders,  but  contrary  to  orders,  on  the  fatal  field  of  Shiloh, 
saved  the  army,  and  whose  capacity  to  command  was  un- 
questioned, for  as  we  shall  see  directly,  he  was  not  removed 
because  the  government  had  any  doubt  whatever  as  to  his 
military  ability.  General  Thomas  had,  through  the  force  of 
circumstances,  been  taken  into  the  confidence  of  Buell,  and 
although,  as  we  have  shown,  he  did  not  approve  of  his  com- 
mander's management  of  the  late  campaign,  he  saw  that  the 
error  of  judgment  did  not  sanction  the  cruel  injustice. 
Thomas  knew,  also,  that  the  charges  made  against  his  friend 
and  general,  were  without  the  slightest  foundation,  in  fact. 
He  made  no  reference,  however,  to  this  last,  for  the  very 
good  reason  that  he  had  just  cause  for  declining  to  super- 
sede Buell,  as  stated  in  a  telegram  to  head-quarters,  which 
read  : 

"  General  BuelFs  preparations  have  been  completed  to 
move  against  the  enemy,  and  I  respectfully  ask  that  he  may 
be  retained  in  command.  My  position  is  very  embarrass- 
ing. Not  being  as  well  informed  as  I  should  be  as  the  com- 
mander of  this  army,  and  on  assumption  of  such  responsi- 
bility." 

The  government  acted  promptly  on  the  receipt  of  this 
dispatch.  The  order  was  revoked,  and  Buell  retained  in 
command. 

This  act  of  General  Thomas  was  not  understood  at  Wash- 
ington, nor  until  lately  has  it  been  better  comprehended  by 
fhe  public.  Among  the  military  it  was  of  course  miscon- 
strued. Such  a  sense  of  justice,  such  self-denial,  were  un- 
known to  men,  saturated  with  selfishness,  and  rendered 
dizzy  by  the  despotic  power  of  military  position  who 
climbed  to  place  regardless  of  their  self-respect  or  sense  of 
honor.  General  Thomas  was  made  of  different  material. 
His  ambition  came  solely  from  his  consciousness  of  capacity, 


Why  Thomas  Protested.  171 

and  while  he  loved  his  country  with  all  his  heart,  he  loved 
his  honor  more.  Even  General  Buell  misunderstood  the  di- 
vine promptings  of  Thomas's  mind  in  this  matter.  He  at- 
tributed his  subordinate's  act  to  a  personal  friendship  and  ad- 
miration of  himself,  and  was,  therefore,  quite  amazed  when 
at  the  Buell  court  of  inquiry,  General  Thomas,  summoned 
as  a  witness,  coldly,  and  with  striking  impurturbability,  gave 
the  errors  of  his  general  when  he  permitted  Bragg  to  march 
abreast  of  him  from  Murfreesboro  to  the  Ohio.  Of  course 
the  feeble  egotism  expressed  through  the  burlesque  imitations 
of  Csesar's  "  Commentaries,"  and  published  as  "  Memoirs," 
dispose  of  George  H.  Thomas  in  a  sentence  which  may  be 
made  to  say :  u  He  was  a  good  enough  officer,  but,  unfortun- 
ately, too  slow  for  a  subordinate,  and  too  timid  fora  separate 
command."  We  have  given  strength  to  the  sentence  by  con- 
densing into  a  few  words  the  atrocious  dullness  of  many 
pages  by  men  who  proved  themselves  as  ignorant  of  our 
great  captain  as  they  were  of  the  war  in  which  they  peopled 
national  cemeteries  with  uncalled-for  dead  for  coming  gen- 
erations to  weep  over  and  honor. 

It  will  be  observed  that  our  general  did  not  decline  the 
command.  He  only  asked  that  it  might  be  suspended  and 
Buell  retained,  and  why?  Because,  as  he  said  subsequently, 
"I  am  not  as  modest  as  I  have  been  represented  to  be.  I 
did  not  request  the  retention  of  General  Buell  through 
modesty,  but  because  his  removal  and  my  assignment  were 
alike  unjust  to  him  and  to  me.  It  was  unjust  to  relieve  him 
on  the  eve  of  a  battle,  and  unjust  to  myself  to  impose  upon 
me  the  command  of  an  army  at  such  a  time."  Had  the  gov- 
ernment pressed  its  order,  Thomas  would  have  accepted,  for 
such  an  act  upon  the  part  of  the  authorities  at  "Washington, 
relieved  him  of  all  responsibility.  Had  the  War  Depart- 
ment, on  the  other  hand,  attempted  to  give  the  command  to 
other  than  Buell  or  Thomas,  the  order  would  have  been 
greeted  by  an  indignant  protest  as  in  September,  1861,  and 
after  when  he  was  called  upon  to  serve  under  General  Rose- 
crans.  It  is  to  be  remembered  that  at  all  times  in  the  mind 
of  General  Thomas  he  regarded  a  separate  command  for  him- 
self as  one  which  enlarged  the  force  under  him,  and  widened 


172  Life  of  Thomas. 

his  field  of  service.  He  never  lost  sight  of  the  men  he  had 
trained  to  know  him  and  the  enemy,  and  whom  he  had 
drilled  and  disciplined  under  his  own  eye  into  veterans  long 
before  their  baptism  of  fire. 

In  the  reorganized  army  at  Louisville,  numbering  over  a 
hundred  thousand  men,  General  Thomas  was  made  second  in 
command.  This  was  a  high  title  attached  to  very  little 
power,  and  less  responsibility.  The  army  was  composed  of 
three  army  corps.  Major-General  Alexander  McDowell  Mc- 
Oook  being  given  command  of  the  first ;  Major-General 
Crittenden  of  the  second,  and  Brigadier-General  C.  C.  Gil- 
bert of  the  third.  This  arrangement  was  extremely  de- 
fective. "While  Thomas  was  designated  second  in  command, 
he  had  no  actual  authority  as  such.  His  old  division  was  in 
General  Gilbert's  corps,  but  any  attempt  at  actual  control 
put  two  major-generals  in  one  corps.  Had  the  second  gen- 
eral in  command  been  given  power  to  act  on  his  own  responsi- 
bility in  the  absence  of  the  general  commanding,  or  in  any 
other  emergency,  the  position  would  have  possessed  some 
significance.  As  it  was,  the  general  carried  a  decoration 
only.  He  did  not  even  have  the  confidence  of  his  command- 
ing officers.  A  knowledge  of  the  movements  of  the  army 
came  to  him  through  orders  to  be  transmitted  to  the  corps 
commander,  so  that  General  Thomas  was  a  clerk  carrying 
the  high  title  of  second  in  command. 

General  Buell  was  a  self-reliant  man  of  not  only  a  re- 
served habit,  but  possessed  of  such  a  high  regard  for  military 
discipline  that  to  advise  with  a  subordinate  was  to  abdicate 
command.  In  all  the  exchange  of  telegrams  when  Thomas 
was  at  the  front  and  Buell  in  doubt  as  to  Bragg's  move- 
ments, the  object  kept  in  view  was  intelligence,  not  advice. 
It  was  this  condition  that  forced  General  Thomas  to  ask  for 
a  suspension  of  the  order  relieving  Buell  in  his  behalf,  and 
it  was  a  continuation  of  this  condition  that  brought  about  a 
shameful  disaster  and  eventual  retirement  of  an  eminent  and 
promising  commander. 

On  the  1st  of  October,  the  army  moved  in  the  three 
corps  upon  their  different  roads  from  Louisville  to  concen- 
trate at  Bardstown.  The  marching  was  well  timed,  and, 


Approaching  Perryville.  173 

had  the  enemy  been  found  at  Bardstowri,  would  have  been 
in  position  to  overwhelm  the  lesser  force  held  under  Bragg 
and  Kirby  Smith.  But  the  same  full  knowledge  of  the  situ- 
ation that  had  displayed  itself  in  the  march  from  Chatta- 
nooga to  Kentucky  forced  Bragg  to  avoid  an  engagement 
when  disaster  only  could  be  expected.  Bragg's  army  was 
not  at  or  near  Bardstown",  and  the  march  was  resumed  in 
the  direction  of  Perryville,  where  it  was  believed  Bragg 
would  make  a  stand.  The  order  of  march  that  had  been  so 
admirably  maintained  from  Louisville  to  Bardstown  was  not 
pressed  in  this  later  advance.  The  three  corps  were  not 
abreast,  and  this  fact  coming  to  the  knowledge  of  Bragg  on 
the  7th  of  October,  impelled  him  to  make  an  attack,  believ- 
ing he  could  repulse  the  corps  in  the  lead  before  the  others 
could  be  brought  up  to  its  relief.  He  was  mistaken  as  to 
the  condition,  but  strangely  successful  in  his  daring  attack. 
To  appreciate  the  audacity  of  this  fight  on  the  part  of  the 
Confederates,  we  have  to  remember  that  it  was  made  by 
three  divisions  under  General  Polk  against  eight  divisions 
of  the  Union  army.  It  was  sudden,  unexpected,  deadly,  and 
successful.  Polk  had  command  of  the  rear  guard  of  Bragg'a 
army  lie  was  at  Perryville  when  General  Gilbert,  in  com- 
mand of  the  center,  was  preparing  to  encamp  within  three 
miles  of  that  place.  In  the  rear  at  some  distance  was  McCook 
on  our  left,  and  behind  this  was  Critteuden.  The  entire 
force  had  been  distressed  in  its  march  that  day  from  a  lack 
of  water.  Crittenden's  command  had  to  be  moved  far  to 
the  right  for  the  purpose  of  relieving  the  deadly  thirst  of  the 
men,  and  along  the  entire  front  there  was  the  confusion  that 
followed  the  sight  of  water  to  thirsty  soldiers,  thirty  thou- 
sand of  whom  were  raw  recruits. 

It  was  well  known  that  our  army  was  in  the  presence  of 
the  enemy.  It  was  not  known,  however,  although  the  fact 
could  have  been  demonstrated  by  a  reconnoisance,  that  they 
were  almost  within  gunshot.  General  Buell  determined  to 
fight  a  great  battle  that  morning,  on  the  8th,  and  had  or- 
dered his  several  generals,  after  getting  into  line,  to  report 
to  him  in  person.  This  General  McCook  did,  leaving  his 
men  a  mere  mob  searching  for  water.  In  his  absence  the 


174  Life  of  Ttiomas. 

blow  was  struck,  and  while  reporting  that  all  was  quiet  upon 
his  front  the  roar  of  artillery  and  rattle  of  musketry  broke 
upon  their  ears.  General  Buell  was  confined  to  his  tent  by 
a  hurt  received  the  day  before  by  his  horse  falling  upon  him. 
Nevertheless,  he  sprang  from  his  cot  and  hurried  out — 

"What  is  the  meaning  of  that?"  he  cried. 

"Oh,  nothing,"  responded  McCook  carelessly,  "but  a 
skirmish." 

"A  skirmish  with  such  a  waste  of  ammunition — that  is 
the  way  my  orders  are  obeyed?  Go  back,  sir,  and  put  a 
stop  to  that  folly." 

General  McCook's  return  to  his  command,  unlike  Gen- 
eral Sheridan's  at  Winchester,  had  no  poet  and  actor  to  im- 
mortalize disaster,  or  perhaps  the  genial,  full-stomached  Mc- 
Cook would  now  be  sung  as  a  great  captain  "  twenty  miles 
away."  It  is  true  he  had  but  five  miles  to  ride  before  he 
struck  the  headless  confusion  and  horrible  slaughter  that 
came  not  of  his  absence  but  of  his  inability.  Poor  McCook ! 
this  was  the  beginning  of  a  series  of  defeats  that  we  shall  be 
called  on  to  chronicle  ere  we  end  our  story  of  the  war.  The 
old  Grecian  and  Roman  warriors  were  wont  to  consult  the 
bowels  of  birds  to  get  auguries  of  success  or  warnings  of  de- 
feat from  the  gods.  McCook's  full  stomach  proved  such 
deadly  omen  wherever  presented.  He  owed  his  elevation  to 
favoritism,  the  McCook  and  Stanton  families  having  been  at 
an  early  day  almost  one  in  their  daily  intercourse  and  affilia- 
tions. He  was  of  West  Point,  and  had,  therefore,  gradu- 
ated acceptably  into  any  position  the  government  might  give 
him. 

General  McCook  galloped  upon  the  field  through  the 
dense  smoke  of  which  the  almost  level  rays  of  the  setting  sun 
were  shining,  to  find  General  Jackson's  two  brigades  of  raw 
troops  being  pressed  back  by  heavy  odds  of  veterans.  There 
was  no  question  as  to  General  McCook's  courage.  After 
sending  an  earnest  request  to  General  Sheridan,  then  under 
General  Gilbert's  command,  for  protection  to  his  right, 
which  entreaty  received  no  response,  McCook  turned  his  at- 
tention to  his  left,  and  had  the  satisfaction  of  seeing  a  re- 
pulse of  the  enemy.  It  was  a  bloody  affair,  however,  result- 


Blunders  of  Perryville.  175 

ing  in  the  deaths  of  Generals  Jackson  and  Terrill  and  a 
fearful  mortality  of  men  and  subordinate  officers.  McCook 
then  turned  to  his  right,  and  none  too  soon.  This  fierce  ap- 
peal for  help  upon  his  right  was  unheard.  Between  his 
right  and  Rosecrans'  left,  where  Gilbert's  force  should  have 
been,  and  into  the  gap,  the  enemy  came,  striking  McCook's 
line  at  right  angles. 

There  was  no  time  during  that  bloody  engagement  in 
which  we  could  not  have  swung  our  left  into  the  rear  of  the 
enemy  and  captured  or  killed  the  entire  force.  As  if  to 
compel  this,  the  enemy  hurried  their  columns  in  between 
McCook  and  Rousseau,  wheeled  on  their  left  and  actually  at- 
tacked McCook  with  their  backs  to  and  within  sight  of  five 
divisions  that  seemed  paralyzed  by  the  audacity  of  the  move. 
Our  brave  men  engaged  in  the  actual  conflict,  the  bulk  of 
them  fresh  from  their  peaceful  homes  and  all  unused  to  war, 
proved  their  manhood  by  grimly  fighting  while  thus  en- 
gaged for  two  hours.  In  all  that  time  not  an  order  was  is- 
sued from  a  general  commanding.  General  Thomas,  the 
imaginary  second  of  command,  was  five  miles  distant  on 
the  extreme  right  and  General  Buell  the  same  distance  at 
the  rear  incapacitated  by  a  hurt.  Captain  Fisher  of  General 
McCook's  staft'  carried  a  second  petition  for  help  to  Gilbert, 
but  failing  to  get  any  hurried  of  his  own  accord  to  General 
Buell.  It  was  then  too  late.  JTight  was  enveloping  a  field 
from  which  General  Buckner  was  slowly  withdrawing,  leav- 
ing behind  his  dead  and  wounded  and  a  stain  upon  our 
military  record  that  can  never  be  removed.  General  Thomas 
was  upon  our  extreme  right  and  of  course  in  command  of 
Crittenden's  corps.  Hearing  the  battle  he  could  not  see, 
taught  him  that  it  was  more  serious  than  a  skirmish  and  noth- 
ing but  the  late  hour  would  save  them  from  being  involved  in 
a  general  engagement.  He,  waiting  for  orders  that  he  ex- 
pected every  instant  which  never  came,  of  course  he  denied 
General  Crittenden's  earnest  request  to  lead  his  troops  into 
a  fight  that  was  evidently  a  desperate  one.  "  No,"  he  said, 
"  I  know  nothing  of  General  Buell's  plan,  and  I  must  wait 
here  where  he  knows  I  am  for  orders." 

Knowing  General  Thomas  as  we  do,  it  is  impossible  to 


176  Life  of  Themas. 

conceive  his  acting  other  than  he  did.  Had  he  known  the 
situation  he  would  of  course  have  moved  into  the  tight 
without  orders.  But  he  could  not  realize  that  two  divisions 
of  Bragg' s  army  had  been  not  only  recklessly  thrown  against 
eight  divisions,  but  actually  wedged  in  between  forces  that 
had  they  been  moved  to  battle  would  have  annihilated 
them.  In  criticising  the  conduct  of  General  Buell  we  have 
to  bear  these  facts  in  mind.  Had  the  general  orders  been 
obeyed  the  gap  between  McCook  and  Rousseau  would  not 
have  presented  the  opportunity  so  readily  seized  on  by  the 
enemy.  Then,  again,  General  McCook  had  reported  his 
front  clear  of  the  enemy  at  the  very  instant  almost  of  their 
attack  when  the  roar  of  their  guns  gave  the  lie  to  his  report. 

The  Confederates  continued  their  retreat  from  Kentucky 
unmolested.  For  three  days  General  Buell  was  busy 
maneuvering  his  force  so  as  to  bring  the  entire  front  forward 
for  a  general  engagement.  Of  course  this  was  soldierly  and 
prudent  had  the  enemy  accepted  the  challenge  and  gone 
into  the  fight.  But  Bragg's  and  Kirby  Smith's  campaign 
into  Kentucky  was  a  ludicrous  failure.  Instead  of  meeting 
an  enthusiastic  welcome  of  which  they  had  been  assured, 
they  encountered  scowls  from  the  many  and  open  abuse 
from  the  few.  The  thoughtful  Kentuckians  were  of  no  mind 
to  have  the  armed  conflict  shifted  from  the  Virginia  soil  to 
their  OAvn,  and  let  us  hope  that  the  memory  of  Henry  Clay 
yet  lived  among  the  fair  fields  and  pleasant  homes  of  a  brave 
people.  The  danger  of  dissension  had  shortened  the  life  of 
the  great  leader,  and  the  memory  of  his  dying  anguish  must 
have  had  weight  with  the  people  that  adored  him  through- 
out his  illustrious  career. 

General  Buell  learned  too  late  that  while  he  was  pre- 
paring to  hurt  the  enemy  in  a  great  battle  that  enemy  was 
moving  swiftly  from  a  state  that  gave  it  no  welcome,  and 
not  even  transportation  to  carry  back  the  arms  that  had  been 
brought  in  to  equip  the  expected  patriots. 


Buell  Court  of  Inquiry.  17,7 


CHAPTER   VIII. 

The  Buell  Court  of  Inquiry — Thomas  Shows  that  had  his  Suggestion  of 
Concentrating  the  Army  at  Sparta  been  acted  on  Bragg's  Advance 
would  havt>  been  Checked. 

The  disastrous  battle  of  Perryville  came  to  the  aid  of 
Governors  Johnson,  of  Tennessee,  and  Morton,  of  Indiana, 
and  General  Buell  was  not  only  deprived  of  command,  but 
ordered  before  a  court  of  inquiry.  This  was  a  new  sort  of 
tribunal  unknown  to  the  usages  of  war  or  the  law,  constitu- 
tional or  statutory,  and  originated  in  the  fertile  mind  of  the 
Hon.  Secretary  of  War,  Edwin  M.  Stanton.  The  court,  con- 
sisting of  Generals  Lewis  Wallace,  Daniel  Tyler,  N.  J.  T. 
Dana,  Edward  0.  C.  Ord,  Albin  Shoepf,  and  Major  Donn 
Piatt,  judge-advocate,  was  convened  to  assist  the  pres- 
ident in  an  inquiry  as  to  the  military  conduct  of  Don 
Carlos  Buell,  Major  General,  lately  in  command  of  the  Army 
of  the  Ohio.  When  Major  Piatt  received  his  orders,  he  re- 
paired to  the  War  Department  to  learn,  if  possible,  the  line 
of  inquiry  from  the  charges  prepared.  He  found  no  charges 
on  file,  and,  on  making  application  to  the  Secretary  of  War, 
found  that  none  had  been  prepared.  On  stating  that  he 
was  at  a  loss  to  know  how  to  conduct  so  blind  an  in- 
vestigation, he  was  told  to  apply  to  Andrew  Johnson  and 
Oliver  P.  Morton,  who  could  furnish  him  with  all  the  charges 
necessary  to  the  investigation. 

The  court  convened  at  Cincinnati  in  midwinter,  and  the 
night  before  its  organization  the  judge- advocate  went  to  In- 
dianapolis to  consult  Governor  Morton,  as  Governor  John- 
son was  at  Nashville.  Arriving  at  Indianapolis  at  8  p.  M., 
the  officer  went  in  search  of  the  governor.  This  proved 
more  of  a  task  than  he  anticipated.  The  governor  could 
not  be  found.  He  was  not  at  his  office  nor  at  his  house. 
They  who  ought  to  have  known  of  the  eminent  man's  where- 
12 


178  Life  of  Thomas. 

abouts  denied  such  knowledge  with  an  amused  expression, 
the  meaning  of  which  never  was  explained.  The  search 
was  at  last  abandoned,  and  the  judge-advocate  had  retired 
to  his  room  to  snatch  an  hour's  sleep  before  returning  on 
the  early  train  to  Cincinnati  when  the  governor  walked  in. 
lie  offered  no  explanation  of  his  mysterious  absence,  but, 
learning  the  object  of  the  visit,  plunged  into  business.  He 
and  Andrew  Johnson  had  demanded  this  court  to  try  Gen- 
eral Buell  not  for  incapacity  or  misconduct  as  an  officer,  but 
for  being  a  traitor,  and  the  governor  was  quite  indignant 
when  he  learned  that  "the  double-dyed  villain,"  as  he 
phrased  it,  was  not  under  arrest.  The  suggestion,  however, 
that  a  man  could  not  well  be  arrested  when  no  charges 
had  been  made  against  him,  somewhat  quieted  the  governor's 
indignation,  for  Oliver  P.  Morton  was  not  only  an  able  man, 
but  a  profound  lawyer. 

The  judge-advocate  informed  the  governor  of  his  in- 
structions from  the  Secretary  of  War,  and  Governor  Mor- 
ton entered  upon  a  recital  of  acts  clearly  indicating  that  Gen- 
eral Buell  was  in  treasonable  correspondence  and  even  per- 
sonal communication  with  General  Bragg;  that  the  entire 
movement  from  Murfreesboro  to  the  Ohio  was  planned  and 
conducted  for  the  purpose  of  giving  both  Tennessee  and 
Kentucky  to  the  rebels.  When  the  judge-advocate,  how- 
ever, proposed  to  formulate  these  charges  and  place  them 
before  the  court,  the  governor  demurred-  "By  no  manner 
of  means,"  he  said  earnestly,  "  I  give  you  these  only  for 
your  own  guidance.  Johnson  and  I  will  furnish  the  wit- 
nesses, and  we  will  appear  ourselves  at  the  proper  time." 

The  judge-advocate  returned  to  his  court,  which  he 
Bwore  to  secresy,  an  oath  General  Buell  declined  taking,  and 
on  a  demand  from  that  officer  for  charges,  he  was  informed 
that  the  court  was  one  of  inquiry  only  to  assist  the  presi- 
dent in  a  better  knowledge  of  the  late  campaign  that  had 
ended  so  disastrously  to  the  government.  General  Buell 
protested  to  this  course  and  claimed  that  the  tribunal  had 
no  legal  sanction,  and,  having  said  so,  proceeded  quietly  with 
the  so-called  investigation. 

The  court  sat  for  six  months.     When  the  witnesses  prom- 


Thomas  Before  the  Buell  Court.  179 

ised  by  the  war  governor  appeared,  the  better  class  of  them 
absolutely  knew  nothing  of  the  treasonable  practices  charged, 
while  those  who  were  voluble  in  their  information  the  law 
officer  of  the  court  was  ashamed  to  put  on  the  stand.  They 
nearly  all  belonged  to  that  class  of  mercenary  spies  known 
as  detectives  that  one,  General  Baker,  of  the  War  Depart- 
ment, made  so  numerous  and  utterly  unreliable.  While 
waiting  for  these  witnesses,  who  never  got  before  the  court, 
the  judge-advocate  devoted  himself  of  course  to  an  investi- 
gation of  the  campaign.  Among  the  witnesses  summoned 
by  both  sides  appeared  George  H.  Thomas. 

General  Buell  conducted  his  side  of  the  inquiry  with 
marked  ability.  Confined  as  this  was  to  the  military  opera- 
tions in  Tennessee  and  Kentucky,  he  had  the  advantage  not 
only  of  better  information,  but,  as  the  witnesses  were  sub- 
ordinates, his  very  presence  embarrassed  and  at  times  con- 
fused them.  General  Buell  is  under  the  medium  height,  but 
he  walks  erect  with  a  singularly  military  bearing  while  his 
austere  manners  and  the  striking  seriousness  of  his  hand- 
some face  made  up  a  personality  that  told  on  the  witnesses 
disposed  to  criticise  his  military  management.  He  came 
into  court  in  full  uniform  with  sword  on  side  to  show  that 
he  was  not  under  arrest  and  accompanied  by  two  aids  so  well 
drilled  and  disciplined  that  they  seemed  a  chorus  ready  at 
any  moment  to  break  into  song.  This  told  on  the  witnesses 
and  had  its  effect  on  the  court.  The  law  officer,  whose 
duty  kept  him  impartial,  but  who  really  sympathized  with 
a  man  one  out  of  a  thousand  in  culture  and  ability  who  was 
being  imposed  on  by  two  scurvy  politicians  and  a  stress  of 
untoward  circumstances,  soon  recognized  the  fact  that  the 
defendant  had  won  over  half  the  court  before  the  investiga- 
tion had  half  ended.  Generals  Dana  and  Ord  could  not  con- 
ceal their  partiality  for  Buell,  while  Generals  Tyler  and 
Shoepf  were  moved  to  hostility  more  by  Generals  Dana's 
and  Ord's  support  than  aught  else.  General  Lew  Wallace 
presided  with  a"  dignified  impartiality  that  was  admirable. 
He  was  helped  to  this  in  a  good  manner  by  the  fact  that  he 
had  been  put  under  a  cloud  by  charges  openly  made  by  Gen- 
eral Grant  of  misconduct  at  Shiloh,  and  as  General  Halleck 


180  Life  of  Thomas. 

had  assigned  him  to  this  court  instead  of  a  command  in  the 
field,  he  was  quite  willing  to  find  defects,  but  defects  that 
could  be  traced  to  Washington.  There  is  no  reflection  in 
this  upon  ;i  man  of  genius  who  has  since  won  through  his 
pen  the  immortality  denied  his  sword.  In  conducting  the 
inquiry  and  in  his  finding,  he  proved  himself  eminently  able 
and  just. 

This  was  the  situation  when  General  George  II.  Thomas 
appeared.  His  entrance  seemed  to  fetch  a  new  condition, 
and  what  had  been  General  Buell's  advantage,  swung  imper- 
ceptibly to  the  other  side.  The  calm,  dignified,  yet  easy 
bearing  of  a  man  who  made  one  feel  his  presence  before  he 
uttered  a  word,  prepared  the  court  for  evidence  of  moment. 
The  commission  was  not  disappointed.  Although  he  con- 
fined his  testimony  strictly  to  the  questions  asked,  and  gave 
it  without  the  slightest  show  of  partiality,  it  soon  became 
clear  to  the  military  tribunal  that  Bragg,  with  an  inferior 
force,  had  outmaneuvered,  outmarched,  and  outfought  Gen- 
eral Buell.  Beginning  with  the  crossing  of  the  Tennessee 
river,  he  told  of  the  confused  and  uncertain  information  as 
to  Bragg's  movements;  how  the  route  through  the  Se- 
quatchie  Valley  was  left  open  to  the  confederates  for  their 
march  to  Kentucky ;  then  came  that  extraordinary  race  of 
two  armies  nearly  abreast  to  the  Ohio,  the  reorganization 
and  the  short  campaign  that  ended  in  the  disastrous  fight  at 
Perryville. 

No  man  was  ever  more  amazed  than  General  Buell.  He 
had  welcomed  the  coming  of  General  Thomas  as  that  of  a 
friend,  the  friend  who  had  declined  the  command  on  the  ground 
that  he,  Buell,  better  knew  the  situation  t.hau  he,  Thomas, 
could,  and  who  had  never  given  other  reason  than  the  one 
found  in  his  response  to  the  War  Department.  General 
Buell  had  naturally  attributed  this  course  on  the  part  of  his 
great  subordinate  to  not  only  a  friendly  feeling,  but  to  a  be- 
lief in  the  generalship  that  was  being  questioned.  The 
revelation  was  stunning,  so  much  so  that  his  cold,  calm  man- 
ner that  had  so  far  sustained  him,  vanished,  and  it  was  with 
difficulty  that  he  could  restrain  himself  until  a  cross-examin- 
ation became  proper.  When  the  witness  was  turned  over, 


Thomas1  Adverse  Testimony.  181 

General  Buell  attacked  the  main  point.  General  Thomas 
had  been  asked, the  question  that  had  been  put  to  every  wit- 
ness for  the  government,  as  to  whether  there  was  not  a  point 
at  which  our  troops  could  have  been  concentrated  after  Bragg 
crossed  the  Tennessee  where' he  could  have  been  atracked 
with  fair  prospect  of  driving  him  back,  or  forcing  him  from 
the  line  of  advance  upon  which  he  hoped  to  get  supplies  for 
his  army.  General  Thomas  had  answered  in  the  affirmative, 
and  pointed  upon  the  map  to  the  place. 

"  You  have  said,  General  Thomas,"  said  Buell,  "  that  at 
Sparta  we  could  have  concentrated  our  forces  with  a  fair 
prospect  of  defeating  Bragg  ? " 

"  Yes,  sir." 

"  Please  tell  the  court,  General,"  and  a  slight  sneer  tinged 
the  question,  "whether  that  opinion  has  come  from  a  study 
of  the  situation  since,  or  whether  it  suggested  itself  to  your 
mind  at  the  time?" 

"If  you  will  give  me  your  book  of  telegrams,"  was  the 
quiet  response,  "  I  believe  it  will  answer  better  than  I  can." 

The  book  asked  for  was  handed  General  Thomas,  and  he 
slowly  turned  the  leaves  until  he  came  to  what  he  was  in 
search  of,  and  then  returned  it  open  to  General  Buell.  The 
color  deepened  upon  the  face  of  Buell  as  he  read  that  which 
terminated  all  cross-examination  on  that  point. 

The  finding  of  this  extraordinary  tribunal  was  of  no 
consequence.  It  was  virtually  an  acquittal  of  General  Buell, 
and  a  mild  censure  of  General  Halleck.  The  eventual  his- 
tory of  the  records  was  as  curious  as  the  conduct  of  the 
court.  Taken  down  by  that  accomplished  stenographer,  Mr. 
Benn  Pitman,  they  were  forwarded  to  the  War  Department 
in  a  box.  Some  years  after  a  delver  in  the  dust  of  worthless 
things  called  for  these  records.  They  could  not  be  found. 
Box  and  all  had  disappeared.  This  very  disappearance  made 
them  valuable.  Congress  resolved,  and  the  press  was  about 
taking  up  the  mystery,  when  Mr.  Benn  Pitman  informed  the 
department  that  he  could  replace  the  records  from  his  orig- 
inal copy  in  shorthand.  This  was  done,  and  immediately  all 
interest  in  them  subsided. 


182  Life,  of  Thomas. 


CHAPTER   IX. 

Treason  in  the  Head-quarters  at  Alexandria— Preparations  for  the  Removal 
of  McClellan — Pope  Put  in  Command  of  the  Forces  Defending  Wash- 
ington— The  Shameful  Story  of  the  Second  Bull  Run — The  Fitz  John 
Porter  Case — Lee's  Invasion  of  Maryland — McClellan  Relieved  of 
Command. 

Between  the  llth  of  March,  1862,  and  the  8th  of  Octo- 
ber of  the  same  year,  while  General  Buell  was  trying  con- 
clusions with  General  Bragg  that  ended  in  the  disastrous 
battle  of  Perryville,  the  war  continued  to  drift  without  any 
progress  toward  a  conclusion  on  either  side.  It  looked  as  if 
the  government  had  agreed  with  the  insurgents  to  make  it  a 
question  of  endurance.  These  armies  marched  without  any 
plan  of  campaign,  and  battles  were  fought  with  apparently 
no  other  object  than  to  kill  and  wound  more  on  one  side 
than  on  the  other.  These  bloody  encounters  were,  with  but 
few  exceptions,  favorable  to  the  South.  Had  it  not  been  for 
the  navy,  that  enabled  Commodore  Dupont  to  capture  Jack- 
sonville, Florida,  Commodore  Farragut  to  take  New  Orleans 
and  force  the  surrender  of  Forts  Jackson  and  St.  Phillips, 
with  the  subsequent  capture  of  Natchez,  the  people  at  the 
North  might  well  have  despaired  of  eventual  success.  There 
was  one  uniform  story  attached  to  every  military  event  on 
land,  which  told  of  a  brave  soldiery  badly  handled.  Our 
men  under  muskets,  blindly  obeying  incompetent  men  under 
epaulettes,  left  their  dead  and  dying  on  fields  of  defeat  that 
would  have  been  of  no  avail  had  they  been  fields  of  victory. 

We  have  somewhat  anticipated  in  giving  General  Mc- 
Clellan's  disasters  before  Richmond.  On  the  10th  of  August, 
1862,  our  forces  were  withdrawn  from  the  James  before 
Richmond  to  the  fortifications  of  "Washington  that  they 
might  be  given  a  new  commander.  "We  have  already  cited 
the  reasons  for  this  extraordinary  move.  We  had  won  a 
great  victory,  no  thanks  to  McClellan,  at  Malvern  Hill,  and 


Trying  to  Drop  McClettan.  183 

if  there  was  any  purpose  known  to  man  for  the  capture  of 
Richmond,  we  were  in  a  position,  under  a  capable  com- 
mander, to  accomplish  that  event.  It  was  easy  to  send  sup- 
plies and  reinforcements  by  the  open  water  ways,  and  there 
was  no  apparent  reason  for  us  to  abandon  that  which  we  had 
gained  at  such  heavy  cost  of  men  and  money.  The  govern- 
ment at  Washington,  however,  had  no  choice.  The  fear  of 
the  Confederate  army  had  come  to  be  less,  as  we  have  said, 
than  a  fear  of  our  own  forces  honeycombed  with  treason- 
able discontent  by  the  shallow  McClellan  and  his  stupid  sub- 
ordinates. 

The  government  anxiously  sought  for  some  one  to  put 
in  command  when  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  should  be  un- 
der the  guns  of  the  fortifications  at  Washington,  and  to  re- 
lieve McClellan,  when  an  arrest  could  be  made  should  a 
revolt  be  manifested.  The  most  promising  of  the  West 
Pointers — of  course  no  other  could  be  selected — in  the  eyes 
of  the  War  Department  was  a  young  man  answering  to  the 
name  of  General  John  Pope,  who,  on  the  8th  of  April,  1862, 
had  captured  Island  No.  10  in  the  Mississippi.  The  selection 
was  not  faulty.  General  Pope  had  not  only  high  soldierly 
qualities,  proud  self-confidence,  and  great  force  of  character, 
but  he  possessed  a  thoughtful  mind,  enriched  by  stores  of  in- 
formation. He  was  given  command  at  first  of  all  the  forces 
that  had  been  retained  to  cover  Washington  in  the  absence 
of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  These  several  divisions  were 
in  a  bad  condition.  General  McClellan  made  not  only  a  con- 
tinuous demand  for  troops,  but  one  for  supplies,  that  impov- 
erished every  other  army  in  the  field.  Thus,  while  General 
Thomas  was  organizing  the  nucleus  of  the  force  that  was 
destined  in  the  end  to  win  the  conflict  for  the  Union,  he 
found  it  almost  impossible  to  secure  blankets  for  his  men, 
the  hundred  and  fifty  thousand  men  under  McClellan  were 
having  daily  parades  in  white  gloves  and  polished  shoes. 
There  was  enough  wasted  on  this  favored  force  to  have  sup- 
plied all  the  others  in  the  field  with  comforts  at  least.  The 
extravagance  cultivated  in  the  nine  months  of  inaction  be- 
fore Washington  told  fearfully  against  the  government  when 
these  troops  were  subject  to  the  privations  common  to  every 


184  Lift,  of  Thomas. 

campaign.  It  seemed  to  the  men  that  they  were  intention- 
ally neglected,  and  this  gave  weight  to  the  openly  uttered 
charge  from  head-quarters  that  the  Abolitionists  at  Washing- 
ton had  purposely  sacrificed  the  army  because  of  this  hatred 
of  its. general.  All  this  appears  of  record  in  McClellan's 
o\vn  story  to  his  wife,  as  presented  and  published  by  his 
widow. 

General  Pope  proceeded  at  once  to  organize  and  equip 
the  thirty-five  thousand  given  him  to  defend  Washington 
until  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  had  been  safely  lodged  be- 
hind the  fortifications  of  the  capital.  Thanks  to  our  young 
Napoleon,  it  was  a  question  whether  a  huge  army  that  ought 
to  have  been  marched  from  Malvern  Hill  to  Richmond  could 
be  safely  got  from  the  James  river  to  the  shelter  of  the  guns 
at  Washington. 

There  was  no  time  to  be  lost  by  the  newly  appointed  com- 
mander. Lee's  victorious  army  had  a  short  inarch  before 
them,  and  any  day  might  appear  in  full  force  to  battle  for  its 
one  objective  point,  the  capture  of  our  capital.  The  trans- 
portation of  our  army  in  its  defeat  from  before  Richmond  to 
Washington  under  the  command  of  a  sullen,  disloyal,  and 
brainless  commander  was  not  hurried.  From  the  general- 
in-chief  down  to  the  humblest  private,  it  was  felt  to  be  a 
shameful  failure.  After  nine  months'  costly  preparation, 
after  a  fearful  loss  of  life,  an  army  of  a  hundred  thousand 
men  had  been  marched  to  the  sight  of  the  Confederate  capi- 
tal, only  to  be  driven  back  by  an  inferior  force  to  the  place 
of  beginning.  General  Pope,  with  an  intelligence  and  en- 
ergy that  were  admirable,  gathered  up  the  scattered  troops 
and  hastily  equipped  them  for  service.  He  had  thirty-live 
thousand  all  told,  and  about  thirty  thousand  capable  of  im- 
mediate service.  He  was  aid^ed  in  this  by  capable  subordi- 
nates of  the  highest  courage  apd  purest  patriotism.  The 
administration  at  Washington  seconded  to  its  utmost  these 
heroic  efforts.  We  take  no  account  in  our  so-called  histories 
of  the  war,  that  have  eyes  for  naught  but  aimless  campaigns 
and  battles  without  results,  of  the  task  imposed  on  the  im- 
mortal statesmen  God  seemed  to  have  called  to  command  in 
our  hour  of  peril.  The  disastrous  retreat  from  the  James 


Lee's  Mom  Against  Pope..  185 

had  not  only  strengthened  the  disloyal  element  at  the  North, 
but  justified  the  governments  of  Europe  in  an  immediate 
recognition  of  the  Confederacy.  We  did  not,  could  not, 
know  then  that  we  were  safer  from  such  European  interfer- 
ence while  the  South  was  most  successful  than  when  the 
Confederate  armies  were  losing  in  the  field.  To  our  openly 
avowed  enemies  abroad,  the  Confederates,  in  their  hour  of 
triumph,  seemed  to  be  winning  without  that  recognition  and 
aid  which  might  have  troublesome  consequences  to  the  war 
powers  of  Europe. 

It  was  to  deceive  the  enemy  as  to  our  real  weakness  that 
the  boastful  orders  written  at  the  War  Department  by  Secre- 
tary Stanton  were  issued  over  the  name  of  General  Pope. 
They  were  unfortunate,  for  while  they  deceived  no  one  they 
placed  the  new  commander  in  a  false  position.  In  common 
with  all  capable  men  General  Pope  was  without  noisy  self- 
assertion  and  went  quietly  about  the  work  assigned  him. 

On  the  20th  of  August,  1862,  Lee  with  his  entire  army 
appeared  before  Pope  upon  the  Rapidau,  and  here  occurred 
on  the  part  of  the  Confederate  general  a  maneuver  that  is 
without  a  parallel  in  the  annals  of  intelligent  war. 

To  understand  this  we  must  know  that  when  it  became 
evident  that  the  ninety  thousand  men  under  McClellan  were 
being  withdrawn,  a  great  effort  was  made  to  reach  Pope  and 
defeat  his  army  before  that  of  McClellan  could  come  to  hia 
assistance.  General  Lee  made  his  point,  and  with  the  entire 
army  from  about  Richmond  confronted  Pope  with  only  thirty- 
five  thousand.  But  Pope  had  withdrawn  from  the  line  of  the 
Rapidan  and  was  strongly  posted  beyond  the  Rappahannock. 
The  bold  Lochinvar  from  out  the  west  was  aided  in  this  by 
a  rise  in  the  river.  To  attempt  a  crossing  on  the  part  of  the 
Confederates  was  hazardous,  but  with  the  larger  force  under 
Lee  such  an  attempt  demonstrated  at  one  point  and  accom- 
plished at  another  was  possible.  He  declined  the  attempt. 
His  strategem  was  to  cut  his  army  in  half  and  send  one  part 
over  the  almost  forgotten  ford  of  the  Rappahannock,  far  off 
to  the  north  through  Thoroughfare  Gap  in  Bull  Run  Moun- 
tains, into  the  rear  of  the  Union  forces.  Of  course  this  was 
accomplished  without  opposition.  Indeed,  had  Pope  been 


186  Life  of  Thomas. 

taken  into  advisement  he  would  have  strongly  advocated  the 
move.  It  threw  forty  thousand  Confederates  in  between 
Pope's  and  McClellan's  armies  and  entirely  beyond  aid  from 
the  forty  thousand  left  idle  under  Lee  on  the  Rappahan- 
nock. 

The  army  thus  entrapped  marched  under  Stonewall 
Jackson.  We  do  not  know  that  Jackson  approved  of  this 
extraordinary  move.  We  doubt  it.  He  probably  obeyed 
orders.  There  was  another  officer  under  Lee  second  only  in 
military  ability  to  Jackson,  and  that  was  General  Longstreet. 
He  had  not  been  consulted,  for  it  had  become  a  common  event 
to  have  his  views  in  opposition  to  his  general.  This  was  not 
agreeable,  and  on  this  account  probably  he  had  not  even  been 
informed  of  Lee's  intent  and  Jackson's  movement.  Wonder- 
ing at  an  inaction  so  unaccountable,  a  delay  that  lost  the 
Confederate  army  three  days  when  every  hour  was  fraught 
with  the  gravest  consequences,  he  was  suddenly  summoned  to 
head-quarters  where  he  found  his  general  in  an  unusual  state 
of  anxiety.  Longstreet  learned  to  his  amazement  and  con- 
sternation what  had  happened. 

-'  My  God.  General  Lee,"  he  cried,  "  you  hav'e  reversed 
positions ;  we  hurried  here  to  attack  Pope  and  McClellan  in 
their  divided  condition,  and  now  you  have  not  only  cut  our 
army  in  two,  but  sent  half  of  it  in  between  Pope  and 
McClellan." 

."What  do  you  advise,"  asked  Lee. 

"  To  permit  me  to  take  the  army  here  and  follow  Jack- 
son as  rapidly  as  possible." 

This  was  done  and  none  too  soon.  Had  a  force  been 
left  by  Pope,  however  small,  to  defeat  the  passage  at  Thor- 
oughfare Gap,  Lee  and  Longstreet  would  have  been  too  late 
for  the  Second  Bull  Run  battle  that  followed.  Pope,  fully 
aware  of  the  extraordinary  condition,  was  so  sure  of  closing 
in  on  Jackson  and  annihilating  his  inferior  army  that  he  con- 
centrated his  forces  for  a  swift,  deadly  blow.  In  this  he 
counted  largely  upon  the  co-operation  of  McClellan's  Army 
of  the  Potomac,  then  being  slowly  forwarded  to  the  field.  It 
is  now  history  that  he  relied  upon  a  support  that  was  honey- 
combed with  treachery.  McClellan  had  not  yet  been  relieved 


Pope,  McCleUav,  Porter.  187 

of  his  command,  and  through  him  orders  had  to  pass  send- 
ing his  troops  to  the  aid  of  Pope.  Quartered  with  his  huge 
staff  of  princes  and  rich  men  at  Alexandria,  the  wire  con- 
necting hin>  with  the  War  Department  trembled  with  con- 
tinuous demands  to  hurry  forward  his  troops.  One  reads 
with  amazed  indignation  the  insolent  responses  to  the  fran- 
tic appeals,  and  yet  more  indignantly  the  story  of  dis- 
obedience. In  all  the  shameful  record  of  imbecility  with  its 
continuous  account  of  defeats  and  disasters,  when  brave  men 
went  down  in  thousands  to  bloody  graves  without  cause, 
the  most  shameful  is  this  story  of  the  second  Bull  Run. 

General  Pope  was  quick  to  learn  of  Stonewall  Jackson's 
unmilitary  move;  prompt  to  act  upon  the  information. 
Jackson  was  well  in  the  trap  Lee  had  so  strangely  planned 
for  him.  To  take  advantage  of  this,  it  was  necessary  that 
the  forces  from  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  should  act  promptly. 
The  first  evidence  that  such  earnest  and  honest  support,  so 
necessary  under  the  emergency,  could  not  be  relied  on  came 
in  the  conduct  of  General  Fitz  John  Porter.  He,  with  his 
command  of  regulars,  was  at  Warrenton  Junction  on  the 
night  of  the  27th  of  August.  That  evening  he  received  the 
order  from  Pope  which  read  :  "  The  major-general  command- 
ing directs  that  you  start  at  one  o'clock  to-night,  so  as  to  be  here 
by  daylight  to-morrow  morning."  It  is  said  Hooker  had  been 
in  severe  engagement.  It  indicated  an  advantage,  but  not  a 
rout.  It  repeated:  "  It  is  necessary  on  all  accounts  that  you 
should  be  here  by  daylight." 

This  positive  order  was  deliberately  disobeyed.  He  did 
not  inarch  at  one  o'clock.  He  did  not  move  at  daylight.  It 
was  seven  A.  M.  before  he  got  under  way.  The  excuse  given 
for  this  failure  to  comply  with  a  positive  order  is  that  his 
troops  were  weary  and  needed  rest — that  the  night  was  dark 
and  the  road  to  Bristow  was  much  incumbered  by  wagon 
trains. 

The  night  was  dark.  The  writer  of  this  well  remem- 
bers riding  through  it  in  a  vain  search  of  his  command  after 
a  leave  of  absence.  But  every  troop,  division,  and  brigade 
of  both  armies  were  on  the  move  that  fatal  night  except  that 
of  Fitz  .lohn  Porter.  Nor  is  it  true  that  his  troops  were 


188  Life  of  Thomas 

unfit  to  move  on  account  of  excessive  marching  the  day  be- 
fore. His  forces  had  done  as  little  of  that  as  any  other  bri- 
gade in  the  Federal  army. 

Instead  of  moving  even  at  daylight,  we  find  him  writing 
a  long  letter  at  six  A.  M.  to  General  Burnside,  and  his  motive 
shown  by  the  missive  is  so  disloyal  that  he  could  have  been 
condemned  on  its  reading  to  immediate  death ;  that  would 
have  been  awarded  by  the  court-martial  that  tore  the  epau- 
lets from  his  shoulders  but  for  the  unfounded  fear  that 
Lincoln,  then  regarded  as  a  weak  man,  would  not  approve 
the  sentence. 

When,  after  a  second  order  directing  him  to  march  at 
early  dawn,  obeyed  by  reluctantly  moving  at  seven  A.  M.,  he 
did  follow  instructions,  the  march  placed  him  and  his  forces 
upon  the  flank  of  Jackson's  army.  Had  he  followed  the  ad- 
vantage thus  given,  Jackson's  force  would  have  been  over- 
whelmed, for  we  all  know  the  effect  of  an  attack  upon  the 
rear  such  as  Porter  could  have  made.  Instead  of  this,  he 
remained  idle  all  that  day,  and  when  late  in  tbte  afternoon  he 
did  move,  it  was  in  retreat.  All  that  day  he  heard  the  roar 
of  a  conflict  going  on,  and  this  he  leaves  of  record  in  his  own 
dispatches,  although  he  and  his  friends  have  since  denied 
that  any  battle  was  in  progress. 

In  the  trial  of  this  man,  much  time  was  lost  in  proving 
or  disproving  the  time  when  he  got  orders  to  attack.  It  was 
time  thrown  away.  General  Porter  knew  why  he  was  there 
and  what  his  duties  were.  To  appreciate  this,  let  the  reader 
suppose  for  an  instant  that  McClellan  had  been  in  command 
instead  of  Pope.  Would  there  have  been  then  any  hesitation 
in  the  mind  of  this  subordinate  or  any  delay  in  his  move- 
ments? Porter  well  knew  why  he  had  been  hurried  into 
position  and  what  was  expected  of  him. 

The  defense  is  simply  pitiable.  It  is  that  he  was  satisfied 
a  heavy  force  was  at  his  front,  and  to  attack  was  to  insure 
defeat,  and  he  actually  claims  commendation  for  his  conduct. 
To  accept  his  own  dispatch  to  McDowell,  in  which  he  asks. 
u  How  goes  the  battle?  it  seems  to  go  to  our  rear,"  he  heard 
the  roar  of  the  conflict  in  which  his  brother  soldiers  were 
being  driven  from  the  field,  and  he  left  them  to  their  cruel 


JFitz  John  Porter's  Failure.  189 

fate.  If  there  was  actually  no  battle,  aa  now  claimed,  he 
thought  there  was,  or  he  would  not  have  so  written.  He  did 
not  move  into  the  fight  then  going  on,  and  all  that  day  made 
no  effort  to  communicate  with  head-quarters  or  any  other 
part  of  our  army. 

The  fact  is,  that  no  force  whatever  was  at  his  front. 
Longstreet's  command  did  not  reach  Jackson's  right  wing 
until  noon,  nor  did  his  hungry  and  exhausted  troops  get  into 
position  at  all  that  day.  When  it  was  reporte'd  that  Porter 
had  withdrawn,  the  men  who  had  been  hurried  up  were  per- 
mitted to  break  ranks  and  seek  the  rest  and  food  they  so 
much  needed.  The  proof  of  this  rests  on  testimony  which 
can  not  he  disputed.  We  have  only  to  turn  to  the  report 
made  by  General  Robert  C.  Schenck  to  settle  this.  On  the 
morning  of  the  29th,  this  gallant  and  able  officer  moved  from 
the  hills  below  Bull  Run  to  Young's  creek,  and  occupied 
what  is  known  as  Gibbon's  woods,  where  a  skirmish  had 
occurred  the  day  before,  and  where  General  Schenck  found 
the  killed  and  wounded,  which  he  cared  for.  Here  he  re- 
mained until  late  in  the  afternoon.  Now  it  was  impossible 
for  Longstreet's  forces  to  be  at  Porter's  front  with  General 
Schenck's  divisions  at  Gibbon's  woods.  This  is  corroborated 
by  General  T.  L.  Rosser,  of  the  Confederate  service,  who  tes- 
tifies that  at  ten  A.  M.  he  was  ordered  to  gallop  his  cavalry 
with  bushes  fastened  to  the  horses'  tails,  so  that  rising  clouds 
of  dust  might  impress  our  forces  under  Porter  with  the  be- 
lief that  the  Confederates  were  being  heavily  reinforced. 
This  he  continued  to  do  for  four  or  five  hours,  which  would 
have  ended  the  effort  at  two  or  three  p.  M.  It  certainly  was 
not  continued  after  the  arrival  of  Longstreet's  troops. 

There  is  one  important  fact  that  seems  to  have  escaped 
the  attention  of  both  courts  and  which  impresses  us  that 
Longstreet's  half  of  Lee's  army  numbered  at  least  forty 
thousand  men.  It  had  but  one  road  along  which  to  march 
from  Thoroughfare  Gap  to  the  battle-field.  N"ow,  supposing 
that  the  head  of  the  column  arrived  upon  the  field  at  2  p.  M., 
how  long  did  it  take  to  fetch  up  the  entire  force  so  as  to 
put  it  in  position  for  immediate  service.  It  certainly  was 
not  there  when  General  Schenck  fell  back  from  Gibbon's 


190  Life  of  Thomas. 

woods  between  three  and  four  of  the  afternoon  when  Rosser 
was  brushing  the  same  road  over  which  Longstreet  was  to 
march.  The  direct  and  positive  testimony  is  against  any 
such  claims  as  that  offered  by  Porter,  while  all  the  circum- 
stantial evidence  is  in  deadly  antagonism  to  such  assumption. 
Against  this  we  have  the  guessing  of  Confederate  witnesses 
whose  very  uncertainty  as  to  time  is  fatal  to  their  conclu- 
sion. We  know  what  guessing  is  in  a  time  of  such  intense 
anxiety.  And  when  we  add  to  this  the  bond  of  sympathy 
toward  Porter  and  his  general,  McClellan,  we  can  readily  see 
how  noon  may  stretch  to  three  or  four  o'clock. 

There  is  yet  another  fact  strangely  overlooked.  It  was 
a  physical  impossibility  for  Longstreet's  command  to  march 
from  Thoroughfare  Gap  to  the  battle-field  in  time  to  form  a 
line  on  Jackson's  right.  The  distance  as  a  crow  flies  is 
twelve  miles,  but  the  only  road  along  which  it  could  have 
moved  lengthened  the  distance  into  a  day's  march  for  the 
best  equipped  army.  Lee's  army  was  badly  provided  with 
transportation  and  exhausted  by  the  forced  march  from  Gor- 
donsville  to  Thoroughfare  Gap.  This  he  was  obliged  to  ap- 
proach cautiously,  but  not  in  a  way  to  give  his  men  their 
necessary  rest  and  food.  On  the  night  of  the  28th,  the 
little  Union  force  left  at  the  gap  was  brushed  aside,  and  on 
the  morning  of  the  29th,  the  march  was  resumed  to  the  roar  of 
Jackson's  artillery  attacking  Poe's  brigade  under  Heintzelman, 
that  made  an  attempt  to  flank  the  enemy's  right.  This  was 
after  10  A.  M.  There  can  be  no  mistake  as  to  the  hour,  for  it 
was  entered  in  Heintzelman's  diary.  This  is  confirmed  by 
a  memorandum  attached  to  the  .report  of  General  J.  E.  B. 
Stuart.  After  the  fight  was  over  and  Poe  repulsed,  General 
Stuart  reports  that  he  went  in  search  of  Longstreet,  riding 
in  the  rear  of  Jackson's  army  along  Centerville  road.  He 
met  Lougstreet  at  the  head  of  his  column  between  Gains- 
ville  and  Haymarket.  Now,  counting  the  time  necessary  to 
repulse  Poe,  for  Stuart  did  not  leave  the  field  till  that  was 
ended — add  to  this  the  ride  on  exhausted  horses,  for  Stuart 
was  in  from  one  of  the  most  desperate  raids  ever  accom- 
plished by  Confederate  cavalry  in  which  he  had  ridden  as 
Cook,  General  Lee's  biographer  informs  us,  "  through  storm 


Fitz  John  Porter's  Failure.  191 

and  shine,  through  night  and  day" — we  say  add  such  a  ride 
to  the  time  given  to  the  fight,  and  it  must  have  been  1  p.  M. 
or  later  when  he  met  the  head  of  Longstreet's  force.  We 
learn  from  General  Lee  that  it  took  two  hours  and  a  half  to 
get  the  force  in  line  of  battle,  and  that  line  was  the  prolonga- 
tion of  Jackson's  right  nowhere  near  Porter's  front. 

Had  this  creature  of  McClellan's  moved  in  to  the  sup- 
port of  our  left  any  time  during  the  29th,  one  of  two  things 
would  have  happened.  Either  he  would  have  demonstrated 
the  presence  of  Longstreet  and  so  enabled  Pope  to  fall  back 
as  was  his  intent  behind  Centerville  and  then  wait  for  the 
slow  moving  reinforcements  from  McClellan's  army,  or  the 
movement  on  Jackson's  right  in  the  absence  of  Longstreet 
would  have  annihilated  Jackson's  army.  As  it  was,  the 
frightful  disaster  of  the  30th  occurred,  and  this  man,  lately 
restored  not  only  to  position  and  a  claim  on  the  treasury, 
but  to  public  estimation  as  a  loyal  officer,  has  upon  his  hands 
the  blood  of  many  thousand  brave  men  killed  and  wounded 
through  his  treachery. 

We  have  dwelt  at  length  upon  this  affair  because  of  the 
treason  developed  that  so  nearly  proved  fatal  to  the  cause  of 
the  government.  That  the  administration  was  forced  to 
fetch  back  the  army  to  the  fortifications  of  Washington  be- 
fore it  dared  displace  its  general,  can  be  accepted  as  the  truth 
of  history.  That  this  same  man  willfully  refused  co-opera- 
tion with  General  Pope,  all  his  acts  after  his  return  to  Alex- 
andria bear  witness.  The  motives  that  made  him  retain 
Franklin's  and  Sumner's  corps  after  positive  orders  from  the 
War  Department  to  hurry  them  to  the  field,  are  reflected  in 
the  insolent  telegrams  in  which  he  advises  to  "  leave  Pope  to 
get  out  of  his  scrape"  and  in  the  refusal  of  Franklin  to  report 
to  Pope  and  of  Porter  to  fight.  The  shame  of  it  all  is  that 
the  man  is  now  known,  since  "  his  own  story  "  is  published, 
to  have  been  such  an  imbecile.  Had  he  been  what  his  silly 
followers  claimed  for  him,  a  Napoleon,  the  whole  affair  would 
have  gained  in  the  dignity  of  crime  from  what  we  now 
shrink  from  as  a  sickening  folly.  We  have  a  strange  weak- 
ness as  a  people  in  our  burning  desire  to  have  heroes  to  wor- 
ship, and,  rather  than  do  without,  we  imitate  barbarous 


19:2  Life  of  Thomas. 

races  in  creating  them.  Not  content  with  the  onions  and 
monkeys  kindly  furnished  us  by  nature, that  we  might  adore 
as  did  the  Egyptians,  we  hasten  to  stuff  effigies  of  men  with 
imaginary  qualities,  and  not  only  bump  our  empty  skulls 
upon  the  floor  in  their  presence,  but  proceed  in  wrath  to 
brain  any  one  who  attempts  to  puncture  the  idols  and  expose 
the  stuffing. 

The  defeat  of  Pope's  army  drove  the  administration  at 
Washington  to  a  deeper  degradation  than  it  had  already  suf- 
fered. Instead  of  deposing  the  incompetent  at  the  head  of 
the  army,  whose  insolence  and  treachery  would  have  justi- 
fied arrest  and  trial,  the  president  was  forced  to  continue  him 
that  the  men  thoroughly  permeated  with  distrust  might  be 
reorganized  and  again  put  in  the  field.  This  was  the  work 
of  President  Lincoln.  The  man  who  selected  his  Secretary 
of  War  because  of  that  secretary's  ability,  in  the  face  of  an 
openly  expressed  contempt,  and  the  gravest  insult  one  man 
could  offer  another,  was  not  one  to  consult  his  fears  in  an 
awful  emergency,  such  as  the  one  which  fell  upon  the  gov- 
ernment. Using  his  own  quaint  fable  that  came  to  be  com- 
mon political  property  on  the  stump,  he  said,  "  It  is  no  time 
to  swap  horses  while  swimming  the  stream.  We  must  bear 
with  this  fellow  a  little  longer.  He  was  useful  in  organizing 
an  army  in  the  first  instance,  and  can  be  of  use  in  reorganiz- 
ing this." 

And  so,  George  B.  McClellan  continued  in  command. 
Lee's  foolish  invasion  of  Maryland  followed.  To  one  who 
saw  the  rout  at  the  Second  Bull  Run,  that  was  the  wildest  of 
the  war,  and  knew  of  the  treason  that  brooded  in  the  head- 
quarters at  Alexandria,  and  knew  that  on  the  night  of  the 
fatal  30th,  the  entire  army  under  Lee  could  have  entered 
Washington  with  our  panic-stricken  mob  of  unarmed  men, 
for  in  such  a  flight  no  man  could  be  expected  to  carry  his 
musket,  the  neglect  of  the  opportunity  sounded  the  death 
knell  of  the  Confederacy.  The  invasion  of  Maryland  was 
not  only  as  hopeless  as  had  been  that  of  Bragg  of  Kentucky, 
but  it  was  an  acknowledgment  of  weakness.  The  broad 
river  and  the  heavy  fortifications  were  confessed  by  Lee  to  be 
beyond  his  best  effort.  He  had  wrested  a  great  victory  from. 


Lee-  Invades  Maryland.  103 

under  the  feet  of  a  mighty  foe.  He  saw  his  enemies  flying 
in  wild  disorder,  and  he  knew  that  their  head-quarters  were 
rendered  useless  to  their  government  by  a  treason  that  fairly 
honey-combed  the  camp.  He  turned  aside  and  marched  into 
Maryland,  leaving  on  his  flank  all  there  was  of  the  Union 
forces.  He  gave  them  time  to  make  up  their  mean  little  dif- 
ferences, to  reorganize,  refit,  and  reinforce  the  huge  army. 
He  marched  into  Maryland  with  a  proclamation  and  a  hope. 
The  proclamation  invited  Maryland  to  join  the  Confederate 
cause,  and  the  hope  was  that  out  of  the  abundance  of  that 
prosperous  state,  supplies  might  be  given  to  his  empty  com- 
missary, and  fresh  recruits  to  the  thinned  ranks  of  his  army. 
Unfortunately,  he  showed  to  the  Marylanders  the  army  they 
were  to  equip  and  recruit.  The  ragged,  gaunt  host  of  grim 
veterans  were  not  inviting.  Shoeless,  and  in  tatters,  their 
ouly  uniform  dirt,  they  swung  by,  the  ghost  of  an  army, 
and  "  My  Maryland  "  saw  what  proved  to  be  the  truth,  that 
victory  to  such  a  force  was  as  fatal  as  defeat.  It  was  mani- 
fest that  the  South  had  no  solid,  stalwart  sons  of  toil  on 
which  to  build,  and,  of  course,  no  resources  to  sustain  such 
under  arms.  Slavery  had  wasted  men  as  it  had  impoverished 
the  soil,  and  it  was  only  a  question  of  time  when  the  crash 
would  come,  and  the  cause  of  state  rights  be  a  lost  cause  to 
the  continent.  Had  Lee  captured  Washington,  he  would 
have  had  no  need  of  a  call  upon  the  border  states.  He 
would  have  won  recognition  from  the  European  governments, 
and  their  interference  would  have  soon  followed,  which  had 
in  it  a  negotiation  for  peace,  and  a  boundary  line  that  would 
have  put  the  capitol  of  our  fathers  in  the  keeping  of  men 
who  made  human  servitude  the  corner  stone  of  their  social 
and  political  fabric. 

The  danger  of  the  Union  was  not  in  that  fierce  host  of 
terrible  fighters^  but  in  the  council  chambers  and  kingly  cab- 
inets of  Europe.  The  very  victories  that  so  wasted  the 
strength  of  the  South,  were  against  them.  They  lulled  our 
foreign  enemies  into  the  belief  that  the  Confederates  were 
quite  able  to  win  without  embarrassing  interference  from 
them.  Although  relieved  by  Lee's  move  into  a  grave  trap  of 
13 


194  Life  of  Thomas. 

his  own  creating,  what  days  of  killing  anxiety,  what  night- 
sweats  came  to  the  men  at  Washington  in  that  dark  hour  of 
our  peril.  The  senseless  mass  that  go  shouting  over  the 
brainless  bullet-heads,  gold  braid  and  feathers  in  the  blaze 
and  glare  of  war  made  great,  had  better  turn  their  eyes  to 
our  real  heroes,  who,  under  Lincoln,  saved  the  grand  Repub- 
lic. But  we  prefer. 

The  duet  o'er  gilded,  to  the  gold  o'er  dusted. 

And  BO  build  cloud-capped  monuments  to  the  heroes  of 
disaster,  while  slow  decay  effaces  the  names  of  those  who 
have  real  claims  upon  a  nation's  gratitude. 

While  McClellan  slowly  moved  in  at  the  head  of  the 
two  armies,  upon  Lee's  flank  and  rear,  that  aggressive  gen- 
eral of  -the  South  suddenly  fell  upon  Harper's  Ferry  and 
captured  fifteen  thousand  men  and  enough  supplies  to  relieve 
his  army.  It  is  true  that  Harper's  Ferry,  as  a  military  posi- 
tion, meant  Loudon  and  Maryland  Heights,  and  the  coward- 
ice of  Ford  and  the  treachery  of  Miles  gave  these  trophies 
without  resistance  to  the  Confederates ;  yet,  had  McClellan 
marched  a  mile  a  day  more  rapidly  than  he  did,  such  invest- 
ment of  the  place  as  made  the  seizure  of  the  heights  possible 
would  not  have  been  within  the  power  of  the  Confederates. 

While  Harper's  Ferry  was  being  captured — why  an  at- 
tempt was  made  to  hold  the  place  is  a  military  mystery — 
McClellan  engaged  Lee  at  South  Mountain,  and  the  passes 
were  gained  after  a  fierce  resistance  by  Hill  and  Longstreet's 
forces.  Had  McClellan  taken  advantage  of  this  success,  we 
now  see  clearly  it  would  have  resulted  in  an  utter  destruction 
of  the  Confederate  army.  In  his  eagerness  to  capture  Har- 
per's Ferry,  the  Confederate  general  had  put  the  Potomac 
between  almost  two  halves  of  his  army,  and  ,it  remained  for 
McClellan  to  defeat  these  forces  in  detail.  Our  great  captain 
did  nothing  of  the  sort.  Marching  upon  his  right  instead 
of  upon  his  left,  he  fought  for  Turner's  Gap  long  enough  to 
allow  Lee  to  concentrate  again.  After  came  the  battle  of 
Antietam,  when  it  was  demonstrated  that  "the  great  organ- 
izer," as  he  is  called,  could  not  handle  hie  organization. 


McCldla-n,"  Failure  and  Removal. 

The  battle  was  fought  by  divisions,  brigades,  and  even  regi- 
ments, and  in  no  instance  was  the  weight  of  our  eighty- 
seven  thousand  men  felt  by  the  forty  thousand  which  Lee 
had  under  him,  until  Hill's  and  McLaw's  divisions  came 
upon  the  field  late  in  the  day.  However,  taking  Lee's  object 
in  view,  and  that  was  to  get  his  army  over  the  Potomac, 
the  result  of  the  battle  was  a  victory  to  our  arms,  and  had 
McClellan  followed  it  up  by  a  tierce  attac'k  in  the  morning, 
the  remnant  of  the  Confederate  force  that  would  have  made 
the  crossing  might  have  been  counted  as  missing  and  scat- 
tered for  all  the  evil  they  could  do  the  Union  thereafter. 
Although  reinforced  by  fourteen  thousand  fresh  troops  the 
night  of  the  battle,  our  general  permitted  the  ConfederateH 
to  recross  the  Potomac,  whence  they  fell  back  unmolested 
to  the  security  of  Bunker  Hill  and  Winchester.  No  orders 
from  Washington,  however  curtly  worded,  could  induce 
McClellan  to  renew  active  hostilities. 

"This  fellow,"  said  Secretary  Stanton  to  the  President, 
"  is  settled  with  his  family  at  Washington,  and  is  there  for 
the  winter.'' 

"Has  he  sent  for  his  wife?" 

"  His  wife  is  with  him." 

"And  that  black  and  tan  terrier?" 

"  Is  one  of  the  family." 

"  Then  he  has  gone  into  winter  quarters  and  must  be 
removed."  And  he  was  removed. 


196  Ltfe  of  Thomas. 


CHAPTER  X. 

Rosocrans  given  Command  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland — Thomas  pro- 
tests against  his  Junior  being  placed  over  Him — Takes  Command  of 
the  Center — Advance  upon  Chattanooga — Battle  of  Stone  River — 
Thomas  opposes  Retreat. 

William  S.  Rosecrans  prided  himself  in  deeds  that  will 
live  in  history  to  be  a  man  of  eminent  military  genius.  We 
use  the  word  genius  advisedly,  well  remembering  its  proper 
as  well  as  popular  meaning.  Genius  is  to  the  human  mind 
what  the  pearl  is  to  the  oyster — disease — but  a  pearl  all  the 
same.  It  is  not  only  a  disease,  but  it  is  a  surprise.  General 
Rosecrans  could  plan  a  campaign  and  tight  a  battle  in  a 
way  to  amaze  the  military  world,  and  yet  he  promised  so 
little  that  his  promotion  was  accidental  and  carried  with  it 
no  prospect  of  aught  but  disaster.  He  was  so  ignorant  of  char- 
acter that  he  could  not  distinguish  between  Alexander 
McDowell  McCook  and  George  H.  Thomas.  His  business 
capacity  was  so  limited  that  a  department  under  him  was 
in  confusion,  and  yet  from  the  beginning  of  his  career 
in  the  army  until  its  close  his  record  is  a  brilliant  suc- 
cession of  triumphs  that  are  as  strange  as  they  are  start- 
ling. This  record  begins  with  the  battle  of  Rich  Moun- 
tain in  July,  '61,  when  McClellan  found  himself  in  command 
of  thirty  thousand  men  opposed  to  Generals  Pegram  and 
Garnett  with  only  ten  thousand  all  told.  But  the  Confeder- 
ates were  strongly  fortified,  the  one  on  Laurel  Hill  and  the 
other  and  larger  force  upon  Rich  Mountain,  West  Virginia. 
While  McClellan  was  hesitating  as  to  what  to  do  General 
Rosecrans  asked  permission  to  lead  a  brigade  by  a  bridle 
path  to  the  rear  of  Pegram.  This  was  granted  upon  an 
understanding  to  the  effect  that  when  Rosecrans  got  in 
position  he  was  to  inform  his  general  commanding,  who 
would  immediately  second  the  effort  in  the  rear  by  an  attack 
on  the  front.  This  was  based  upon  the  belief  that  Rosecrans 


Rosecrans   First  Victory.  197 

would  surprise  the  enemy.  The  force  led  along  the  moun- 
tain path  to  the  rear  created  much  consternation,  but  failed 
as  a  surprise,  and  Rosecrans  was  scarcely  in  position  before 
he  was  called  on  to  tight  and  fought  so  bravely  with  muskets 
alone  that  unaided  he  drove  Pegram  and  his  men  into  the 
mountains.  This  led  to  the  defeat  of  Garnett  and  a  capture 
of  the  entire  forco. 

McClellan  received  his  notice  of  Rosecrans'  condition 
in  the  roar  of  the  conflict  that  echoed  and  re-echoed  ajnong 
the  mountains  as  if  a  million  of  men  were  engaged  in  a 
death  struggle.  McClellan  having  got  no  word  from  his 
gallant  subordinate,  naturally  believed,  for  McClellan,  that 
he  was  being  defeated,  and  rested  idly  in  his  tent  until  late 
in  the  day  when  a  portion  of  Rosecrans'  command  came  into 
cam})  through  Pegram's  works  with  a  goodly  number  of  Con- 
federate prisoners. 

This  brilliant  little  achievement  had  two  results.  With 
the  press  and  people  unacquainted  with  the  details,  McClel- 
lan received  all  the  praise.  At  Washington  among  the  mil- 
itary Rosecrans  rose  as  a  marked  man.  Lincoln  and  Chase, 
especially,  were  struck  with  the  audacity  and  dash  of  the 
venture,  and  after  McClellan,  Rosecrans  was  selected  for  high 
promotion.  It  was  soon  discovered,  however,  that  their  favor- 
ite had  defects,  not  so  fatal  to  the  cause  as  those  of  McClellan, 
but  eminently  fatal  to  himself.  As  we  have  said,  he  lacked 
in  business  capacity  and  was  character  blind.  Could  he 
have  handled  men  as  he  handled  masses  he  never  would 
have  made  a  deadly  enemy  of  Edwin  M.  Stanton.  A  blind 
believer  in  military  training,  he  regarded  civilians  in  camp 
or  cabinet  as  obstacles  in  the  way  of  success  and  could  not 
therefore  see  in  the  great  War  Secretary  any  thing  beyond 
the  President's  clerk,  whose  impertinent  interference  was  to 
be  rebuked,  if  not  snubbed,  by  the  military  generals  he  an- 
noyed with  his  orders.  In  illustration  of  this  we  have  to 
record  the  fact  that  when  a  vacancy  in  the  regular  army  of 
a  major-generalship  occurred,  Mr.  Stanton  addressed  a  cir- 
cular to  all  the  generals  in  the  field  announcing  the  fact  that 
this  position  was  to  be  awarded  to  the  commander  who 
achieved  the  first  great  victory.  All  save  Rosecrans  re- 


198  Life  of  Thoma*. 

ceived  this  with  thanks.  Our  impulsive  general  seized  his 
pen  and  administered  a  scathing  rebuke  in  return.  ^  He  ad- 
vised the  indignant  War  Secretary  that  he,  Rosecrans,  was  in 
arms,  not  for  the  sake  of  personal  reward,  but  from  patriotic 
impulse,  and  that  such  an  offer  was  ill-advised  and  ill-timed. 
We  have  no  access  to  the  response  that  Mr.  Stanton  did  not 
make  of  record  other  than  in  a  nature  that  was  strangely 
bitter,  vindictive  and  tenacious  in  its  memory  of  insults. 

It  is  a  striking  fact  that  of  the  three  members  of  Presi- 
dent Lincoln's  cabinet  most  necessary  to  the  successful  issue 
of  the  conflict,  that  is  of  State,  War  and  Finance,  each  one 
was  greater  in  his  chosen  vocation  than  his  President.  But 
no  one  of  them  held  as  much  of  all  as  the  man  God  in  his 
mercy  called  to  power  in  that  dark  hour  of  peril  to  the 
desperate  government.  Abraham  Lincoln  was  the  great 
balance-wheel  to  the  machine  and  held  it  steadily  to  its  work. 
Stanton  had  his  faults,  and  grave  faults  they  were,  but  he 
had  no  weaknesses.  The  President  interfered  only  when 
the  faults  were  likely  to  work  wrong  to  the  cause.  Had  he 
not  exercised  his  wise  control,  Stanton,  with  Pope's  army 
drifting  a  wreck  into  Washington  and  the  Army  of  the  Po- 
tomac under  disloyal  generals  worked  into  a  condition  of  in- 
subordination, would  have  put  McClellau  under  arrest  and 
summoned  a  drum-head  court-martial  to  try  the  weak  gen- 
eral for  insubordination  in  the  face  of  the  enemy.  And  now, 
when  it  becomes  necessary  to  select  a  general  to  serve  in 
place  of  Buell,  removed,  President  Lincoln  intervened  be- 
tween Mr.  Stanton's  vindictive  dislike  and  the  public  good. 

The  great  War  Secretary  selected  George  H.  Thomas, 
not  only  because  of  his  confidence  in  the  eminent  Virginian, 
but  because  he  was  advised  that  Secretary  Chase  was  about 
to  approach  the  President  in  behalf  of  Rosecrans.  The 
President  did  listen  patiently  to  both  Secretaries,  and  then 
said: 

"  Let  the  Virginian  wait ;  we  will  try  Rosecrans." 

The  writer  of  this  happened  to  be  in  the  office  of  the 
Wa  Secretary  when  Mr.  Stanton  returned  from  the  execu- 
tive mansion,  bilious  with  wrath  at  Secretary  Chase's  inter- 
ference and  Rosecrana'  success.  His  first  words  were: 


Thomas  Overslaughed.  199 

''Well,  you  have  your  choice  of  idiots;  now  look  out 
for  frightful  disaster." 

We  will  see  how  these  ominous  words  followed  and 
shadowed  a  pure  patriot  and  a  brilliant  soldier  to  the  end. 

The  General  Order  No.  168,  assigning  General  William 
S.  Rosecrans  to  command  of  the  army  in  place  of  General 
Buell,  was  isued  the  24th  of  October,  1862.  It  was  a  painful 
surprise  to  General  Thomas.  It  will  be  rememberd  that, 
when  the  position  was  tendered  him  at  Louisville,  he  asked, 
without  declining,  that  it  might  be  suspended.  He  had 
every  reason  to  believe  that  such  had  been  the  course  taken. 
Considered  worthy  the  command  on  the  29th  of  September, 
what  had  occurred  since  to  throw  him  out  of  the  line  of 
promotion?  To  those  who  have  been  busy  in  egotistical 
memoirs,  letters,  and  addresses,  damning  General  Thomas 
in  faint  praise  by  saying  that  he  was  a  good  officer,  but  too 
slow  for  a  subordinate  and  too  cautious  for  an  independent 
command,  and  that  he  shrunk  from  all  responsibility,  had 
better  read  the  letter  he  addressed  General  Halleck  upon  that 
occasion.  It  is  as  follows : 

"  Soon  after  coming  to  Kentucky,  I  urged  upon  the 
government  to  send  me  twenty  thousand  men  properly 
equipped  to  take  the  field,  that  I  might  at  least  make  the 
attempt  to  take  Knoxville  and  secure  East  Tennessee.  My 
suggestions  were  not  listened  to,  but  were  even  passed  by  in 
silence.  But,  without  boasting,  I  believe  I  have  exhibited  at 
least  sufficient  energy  to  show  that,  if  I  had  been  intrusted  with 
that  expedition  at  that  time  (fall  of  1861),  I  might  have  con- 
ducted it  successfully.  Before  Corinth,  I  was  intrusted  with 
the  command  of  the  right  wing,  or  Army  of  the  Tennessee. 
I  feel  confident  that  I  did  my  duty  patriotically,  and  with  a 
reasonable  amount  of  credit  to  myself.  As  soon  as  the 
emergency  was  over,  I  was  relieved  and  returned  to  the 
command  of  my  old  division.  I  went  to  my  duties  with- 
out a  murmur*,  as  I  am  neither  ambitious  nor  have  any  polit- 
ical aspirations.  On  the  30th  of  September,  I  received  an 
order  through  your  aide,  Colonel  McKibben,  placing  me  in 
command  of  the  Department  of  the  Ohio,  and  directing 
General  Buell  to  turn  over  the  command  of  his  troops  to 


200  Life  of  Thomas. 

me.  This  order  came  just  as  General  Buell  had  by  extraor- 
dinary efforts  prepared  his  army  to  pursue  and  drive  the 
rebels  from  Kentucky.  Feeling  that  a  great  injustice  would 
be  done  him  if  not  permitted  to  carry  out  his  plans,  and  that 
I  would  be  placed  in  a  situation  to  be  disgraced,  I  requested 
that  he  might  be  retained  in  command.  The  order  relieving 
him  was  suspended,  but  to-day  I  find  him  relieved  by  Gen- 
eral Rosecrans,  my  junior,  although  I  do  not  feel  conscious 
that  any  just  cause  exists  for  overslaughing  me  by  placing 
me  under  my  junior,  and  I  therefore  am  deeply  mortified 
and  grieved  at  the  course  taken  in  this  matter." 

To  this  warm  yet  dignified  protest,  General  Halleck 
responded  as  follows: 

"  HEAD-QUARTERS  OF  THE  ARMY, 

WASHINGTON,  November  15,  1862. 

GENERAL — Your  letter  of  October  30th  is  just  at  hand. 
I  can  not  better  state  my  appreciation  of  you  than  by  refer- 
ring you  to  the  fact  that  at  Pittsburg  Landing  I  urged  upon 
the  Secretary  of  War  to  secure  your  appointment  as  major- 
general,  in  order  that  I  might  place  you  in  command  of  the 
right  wing  of  the  army  over  your  superiors.  It  was  through 
my  urgent  solicitation  that  you  were  commissioned. 

When  it  'was  determined  to  remove  General  Buell, 
another  person  was  spoken  of  as  his  successor ;  and  it  was 
through  my  solicitation  that  you  were  appointed.  You  hav- 
ing virtually  declined  the  command  at  that  time,  it  was  nec- 
essary to  appoint  another,  and  General  Rosecrans  was  selected. 

You  are  mistaken  about  General  Rosecrans  being  your 
junior.  But  this  is  of  little  importance,  for  the  law  gives 
the  President  power  to  assign  without  regard  to  dates,  and 
he  has  seen  tit  to  exercise  it  in  this  case  and  many  others. 

Rest  assured,  General,  that  I  fully  appreciate  your  mili- 
tary capacity,  and  will  do  every  thing  in  my  power  to  give 
you  an  independent  command  when  opportunity  offers.  It 
was  not  possible  to  give  command  after  you  had  declined  it. 

Yours  truly, 

H.  W.  HALLECK, 

Comman  der-in-chief." 


Antedating  a  Commission.  201 

In  considering  this  shameful  treatment  of  General 
Thomas,  it  is  well  to  remember  what  we  have  been  at  some 
pains  to  state,  the  political  influences  that  were  brought  to 
bear  upon  the  mind  of  Abraham  Lincoln.  We  have  seen 
that  General  Buell  was  regarded  by  all  the  hot  gospelers  of 
abolitionism — and  especially  by  Andrew  Johnson  and  his  im- 
mediate followers — as  disloyal  to  the  cause,  and  not  therefore 
to  be  trusted  with  any  command.  General  ThomaS,  being 
by  birth  a  Virginian,  was  of  course  suspected,  but,  when  he 
wisely  asked  that  the  order  placing  him  in  Buell's  position 
might  be  suspended,  the  suspicion  in  the  minds  of  the  fanatics 
became  confirmed  distrust.  This  was  brought  to  bear  upon 
the  President.  Now,  it  is  extremely  doubtful  whether  Presi- 
dent Lincoln  shared  in  their  distrust.  It  is  more  than  proba- 
ble that  he  was  moved  to  a  selection  of  Rosecrans  because  he 
had  not  only  confidence  in  him,  but  knew  that,  while  Rose- 
crans was  not  offensive  to  the  abolitionists,  he,  being  a  Cath- 
olic, had  a  wide  popularity  with  the  true  believers  of  that 
faith.  It  was  well  known  that  the  Catholic  clergy  at  home 
and  abroad  had  little  sympathy  with  our  government  in  its 
armed  attempt  to  sustain  the  Union.  The  strife  from  that 
point  of  view  was  regarded  as  a  Yankee  war,  originating 
with  Puritans,  who  began  with  hanging  Quakers,  and  con- 
tinued such  bigoted  persecution  by  denying  the  Catholics 
the  civil  rights  and  social  privileges  accorded  other  sects.  It 
was  not  a  body  of  people  to  be  neglected  or  slighted.  At 
that  time  the  Irish  contingent  of  volunteers  made  a  force  of 
brave  men,  and,  to  increase  that  force  in  the  field  and  win 
favor  in  the  eyes  of  the  Catholics  at  home,  it  was  well  to  ad- 
vance General  Rosecrans,  who,  after  assisting  at  mass  in  the 
morning,  felt  free  to  swear  his  orders  through  till  late  at 
night. 

This  promotion  was  not  without  friction.  Not  only  did 
Thomas's  commission  antedate  that  of  General  Rosecrans, 
but  also  those  of  Generals  McCook  and  Crittenden.  Presi- 
dent Lincoln  solved  the  difficulty  by  quietly  moving  his  pen 
through  the  date  of  Rosecrans'  commission,  and  writing 
over  August  16,  1892,  March  21  of  the  same  year.  With 


202  Life  of  Thomas. 

this  fact  known  to   us,  we   read   General  Thomas's  reply  to 
General  Halleek : 

"  GALLATIN,  TENN.,  November  21,  1862. 
MAJOR-GENERAL  HALLECK, 

Commanding  U.  S.  Army,  Washington,  D.  C. 

GENERAL — I  have  the  honor  to  acknowledge  the  receipt 
of  your  letter  of  the  15th  instant,  and  to  thank  you  sincerely 
for  the  kindness  of  its  tone.  I  should  not  have  addressed 
you  in  the  first  place,  if  I  had  known  that  General  Rose- 
crans'  commission  was  dated  prior  to  mine.  The  letter  was 
written,  not  because  I  desired  the  command,  but  for  being 
superseded  by  a  junior  in  rank,  when  I  felt  that  there  was 
no  good  cause  for  so  treating  me. 

I  have  no  objection  to  serving  under  General  Rosecrans, 
now  that  I  know  that  his  commission  dates  prior  to  mine, 
but  I  must  confess  that  I  should  feel  deeply  mortified  should 
the  President  place  a  junior  over  me  without  a  just  cause,  al- 
though the  law  authorizes  him  to  do  so  should  he  see  fit. 

I  am,  General,  very  truly  yours, 

GEORGE  H.  THOMAS, 

Major- General  U.  S.  A" 

When,  some  time  subsequent  to  this,  General  Thomas 
learned  the  facts  of  the  forgery,  he  was  extremely  indignant, 
and  wrote  to  General  Halleek  : 

"  I  have  made  my  last  protest  while  the  war  lasts.  You 
may  hereafter  put  a  stick  over  me,  if  you  choose  to  do  so.  I 
will  take  care,  however,  to  so  manage  my  command,  what- 
ever it  may  be,  as  not  to  be  involved  in  the  mistakes  of  the 
stick." 

General  Rosecrans  hastened  to  tender  General  Thomas 
a  continuation  of  his  position  as  second  in  command,  but  our 
hero  was  weary  of  a  place  that  had  in  it  honor  alone,  and 
asked  for  a  command  with  well  defined  duties  and  individual 
responsibility.  In  response  to  this,  he  was  given  the  center, 
with  Generals  Rousseau,  Dumont,  Negley,  and  Fry  as  his 
subordinates. 

Ever  mindful  of  the  grand  objective  point  of  the  war  on 
our  side,  General  Thomaa  again  brought  forward  his  old  plan 


Chattanooga  Thomas'  Objective.  203 

of  invasion  through  Cumberland  Gap  and  East  Tennessee  to 
Chattanooga.  He  claimed  that  a  column  of  twenty  thousand 
men  was  more  available  in  that  direction  than  a  hundred 
thousand  on  the  line  through  Nashville.  Kentucky  had 
proven  herself  entirely  neutral,  while  East  Tennessee  swarmed 
with  citizens  who,  if  not  loyal  to  the  Union  at  heart,  were  in 
deadly  enmity  to  the  Confederate  cause,  and  had  suffered 
terribly  from  their  open  avowal  of  hostility  to  the  govern- 
ment at  Richmond.  The  line  of  supply  could  be  more  easily 
maintained,  and  the  army,  instead  of  moving  among  foes, 
would  receive  aid  and  comfort  from  friends. 

General  Rosecrans  thought  favorably  of  the  plan  of 
campaign.  His  acute  military  mind  followed  Thomas  with 
a  clear  comprehension  of  the  situation.  He  saw  at  a  glance 
that  it  was  a  great  flank  movement  on  the  forces  under  Lee 
in  Virginia,  and  if  successful,  as  it  promised  to  be,  would 
force  the  lighting  out  of  Virginia  to  the  cotton  states.  Our 
gallant  navy  was  winning  its  way  along  the  coast,  so  that  a 
struggle  confined  to  the  cotton  states  must  of  necessity  be 
brief.  It  was  a  fascinating  proposition  to  General  Rose- 
crans, but  there  was  a  lion  in  the  path.  The  Catholic  gen- 
eral had  been  out  of  the  military  service  many  years,  and  in 
that  time  mixing  with  the  people  had  picked  up  some  polit- 
ical information.  He  comprehended  clearly  the  lofty  ambi- 
tion of  Andrew  Johnson  in  his  desire  to  be  a  military  gov- 
ernor with  an  army  of  a  hundred  thousand  men  to  hold 
down  the  population  he  was  supposed  to  benefit  by  govern- 
ing. General  Rosecrans  knew  that  this  executive  inebriate 
was  sustained  by  a  political  power  that  forced  obedience, 
whenever  it  failed  to  command  respect.  The  general  com- 
manding remembered  that  Thomas,  the  author  of  the  pro- 
posed campaign,  had  been  thrust  aside  by  this  maliffn  influ- 
ence, General  Mitchell  discouraged  and  threatened,  and  Gen- 
eral Buell  driven  from  his  command  in  disgrace,  and  so  had 
no  care  to  try  conclusions  with  any  such  political  element. 

The  newly  made  commander  put  the  grand  plan  of  a 
campaign  behind  him  and  proceeded  with  his  political  work, 
which  meant  to  defeat  and  drive  Bragg  from  Tennessee,  and 
once  more  return  to  Governor  Johnson  his  conquered  terri- 


204  Life  of  Thomas. 

tory.  To  this  end  he  began  the  concentration  of  forces  at 
Nashville.  To  make  this  concentration  available,  it  was 
necessary  to  open  again  the  line  of  railroad  from  Louisville 
to  Nashville  arid  at  the  last  named  place  accumulate  vast 
supplies.  This  essential  work  was  given  to  General  Thomas 
and  his  command. 

To  keep  open  a  single  line  of  railroad  through  a  hostile 
territory  for  two  hundred  miles  taxed  the  resources  of 
Thomas's  entire  command.  A  guerrilla  chief  of  high  cour- 
age and  audacity  known  as  John  Morgan  with  a  mere  hand- 
ful of  men  put  the  entire  Army  of  the  Cumberland  at  de- 
fiance. Seizing  the  best  horses  at  command  in  a  region  of 
country  long  famous  for  its  fast  speed  and  blood  in  horses, 
this  famous  raider  could  burn  a  bridge  or  blow  up  a  tunnel 
in  sight  of  infantry  set  to  guard  one  or  the  other,  and  be  off 
before  even  a  bullet  could  be  sent  after  him.  Here  to-day 
and  gone  to-morrow,  he  puzzled  officers  and  bid  defiance  to 
troops,  and  kept  a  huge,  force  of  men  under  engineers  busily 
repairing  what  was  so  easily  destroyed.  General  Thomas 
met  this  exasperating  evil  by  organizing  a  cavalry  that  was 
something  more  than  men  on  horseback.  When  the  war 
first  began,  it  was  a  West  Point  idea  that  it  was  to  be  fought 
out  without  cavalry.  When  we  recovered  from  this  idiotic 
condition  and  begun  organization,  it  was  based  on  the  worst 
possible  system  in  accepting  men  who  wanted  to  ride  instead 
of  searching  for  those  who  knew  how  to  ride.  Volunteers 
from  towns  and  cities  who  never  had  been  astride  of  a  horse 
were  fascinated  with  the  idea  of  owning  one,  while  the  coun- 
try bred,  well  knowing  that  not  only  was  riding  a  labor  but 
the  care  of  the  horse  a  heavy  task,  fought  shy  of  that  arm 
of  the  service.  The  consequence  was  that  the  cavalrymen 
were  helpless  in  the  saddle,  while  their  horses  were  starved 
and  ridden  to  death  in  thirty  days.  It  was  said  for  nearly 
two  years  of  our  cavalry  that  onte  never  was  killed  save  by  a 
fall  from  his  horse. 

General  Thomas  organized  a  corps  of  mounted  riflemen 
selected  from  farmers'  sons,  and  directed  them  not  to  guard 
the  railroad,  but  hunt  down  John  Morgan  and  his  men. 
The  result  was  that  the  famous  raider,  finding  himself 


Rosecrans  Moves  on  Nashville.  205 

closely  pursued  in  Kentucky,  had  the  audacity  to  attempt  a 
raid  on  Ohio.  It  began  brilliantly  enough,  but  ended  in  the 
penitentiary. 

The  necessary  preparations  for  an  advance  of  our  army 
were  punctured  continuously  by  impatient  thrusts  from  the 
War  Department.  That  Edwin  M.  Stanton  sought  to  drive 
Rosecrans  from  the  command,  can  not  now  be  doubted,  and  had 
he  not  been  restrained  by  President  Lincoln  and  Secretary 
Chase,  he  would  undoubtedly  have  succeeded.  The  reason  of 
this  unreasoning  enmity  could  not  fail  to  feel  his  insecurity, 
and  to  placate  the  irate  Secretary,  he  did  that  which  proved  a 
source  of  continuous  disaster  and  his  ruin  in  the  end.  Sec- 
retary Stanton,  as  strong  in  his  friendships  as  he  was  in  his 
enmity,  had  the  McCook  family  as  his  wards,  and  his  especial 
pet  was  Alexander  McDowell  McCook.  General  Rosecrans 
tendered  the  War  Secretary  the  olive  branch  by  giving  this 
genial  gentleman,  but  utterly  incompetent  officer,  command 
of  the  right  wing  of  the  army.  This  was  -  a  fatal  step  and 
second  to  that  was  the  weakening  of  the  center  by  with- 
drawing a  huge  force  to  guard  the  communication  between 
Louisville  and  Nashville.  This  left  Thomas  only  Rous- 
seau's and  Negley's  divisions  with  two  detached  brigades 
from  the  rear. 

Moving  by  different  roads  from  Nashville,  the  army  un- 
der Rosecrans  came  abreast  at  Stone  river  near  Murfreesboro 
with  that  of  Bragg.  It  was  a  cold,  cloudy  evening  of  the 
29th  of  December,  with  the  twilight  darkening  down  in  ad- 
vance of  sunset,  when  General  Thomas,  riding  slowly  along 
the  lines  then  going  into  camp  for  the  night,  heard  heavy 
firing  to  the  front  and  left.  There  had  been  more  or  less  of 
disturbance  of  this  sort  in  the  active  march  from  Nashville, 
but  the  annoyance  made  by  the  enemy  was  easily  brushed 
aside.  On  this  occasion,  however,  the  roar  was  more  pro- 
nounced. 

"  What  is  the  meaning  of  that,  General  ?"  asked  an  aide 
of  General  Thomas. 

"  It  means  a  fight  to-morrow  on  Stone  river,"  was  the 
brief  response  as  the  general  continued  calmly  his  preparations 
for  the  night. 


i>0(j  Life  of  Thomas. 

True  enough,  General  Rosecrans,  believing  the  enemy  to 
be  in  full  retreat,  had  ordered  General  Crittenden  late  in  the 
evening  to  cross  Stone  river  and  occupy  Murfreesboro.  In 
obeying  this  command  Crittenden  found  such  a  decided  re- 
sistance that  he  reported  the  enemy  to  be  in  force  upon  the 
further  side  of  the  river  and  received  in  return  an  order  to  fall 
back.  Crittenden's  report  was  confirmed  by  the  right  in  a 
fierce  engagement  which  McCook's  force  met  from  the  en- 
emy when  our  right  sought  to  go  into  camp  for  the  night. 
Bragg's  entire  army  tff  veterans  was  posted  on  Stone  river 
to  dispute  the  further  march  of  the  forces  of  the  Union. 

A  night  before  a  great  battle  in  our  army  of  volunteers 
differed  strongly  from  that  of  probably  any  other  armed 
force,  especially  in  Europe.  The  volunteers,  however  well 
drilled  and  disciplined  into  a  fighting  machine,  had  yet  an 
interest  more  or  less  intelligent  that  they  were  free  to  exer- 
cise. The  bayonets  not  only  thought  but  felt,  and  around 
each  camp-fire  was  an  improvised  council  of  war,  in  which 
not  only  the  situation  was  considered,  but  the  character  and 
capacity  of  officers  discussed.  This  condition  strengthens 
an  army,  provided  the  men  wearing  epaulets  possess  the  en- 
tire confidence  of  those  bearing  muskets.  That  the  dis- 
crimination is  apt  to  be  mainly  correct  and  just,  a  knowledge 
.of  public  opinion  confirms.  Men  may  be  misled  as  to  facts 
and  through  distorted  evidence  of  such  can  well  be  deceived 
as  to  leaders  they  seldom  or  never  encounter  personally.  But 
when  opportunities  are  given  the  eventual  verdict  can  be  re- 
lied on.  On  the  cold,  murky  night  of  the  30th,  could  one 
have  passed  from  camp  to  camp  and  gathered  up  the  opin- 
ions expressed  he  would  have  been  able  to  almost  outline  the 
successes  and  failures  of  the  day  to  come.  We  must  also  re- 
member that  whether  the  convictions  that  prevailed  were 
just  or  unjust  they  influenced  action  on  the  part  of  those  who 
made  for  us  victory  or  defeat.  It  is  a  tradition  of  the  Army 
of  the  Cumberland  that  confidence  in  success  was  based  on 
the  fact  that  "  Pap  Thomas "  held  the  center,  as  the  fact 
proved  when  the  trial  came. 

All  men  are  brave  through  association.  "We  mean  that 
the  great  Republic,  having  called  into  the  field  the  fighting 


Stone.  River.  207 

element  of  its  loyal  population,  had  a  right  to  count  on  a 
certain  amount  of  courage  to  make  battles  and  campaigns. 
But  this  successful  courage  depends  on  .reasonable  conditions. 
The  men  must  touch  elbows  in  spirit  as  well  as  in  person, 
and,  above  all,  must  have  confidence  in  their  officers.  The 
bravest  body  of  men  ever  put  under  arms  and  drilled  into 
veterans  are  subject  to  panics  in  the  presence  of  the  unex- 
pected. As  we  have  said  before,  this  is  the  fatal  effect  which 
follows  successful  flank  movement  or  an  attack  in  the  rear. 
To  overcome  this,  there  is  nothing  so  potent  as  the  cool,  self- 
possessed  conduct  of  the  general  in  command  who  possesses 
the  confidence  of  his  men. 

No  battle  came  off  upon  the  30th  of  December.  General 
Rosecrans,  finding  the  enemy  at  his  front  prepared  to  resist 
before  Murfreesboro  his  further  approach,  passed  the  day  in 
getting  his  forces  in  position  preparatory  to  an  assault.  To  this 
end  he  massed  his  troops  heavily  under  Crittenden  upon  his 
left  for  the  purpose  of  flanking  an  enemy  he  found  strongly 
posted  upon  heights  well  fortified.  General  Bragg,  without 
regard  to  Stone  river  that  cut  his  right  at  almost  right  angles, 
had  seized  on  a  line  of  heights  running  for  over  a  mile  from 
north  to  south.  To  flank  this  position  on  Bragg's  left  called 
for  a  march  of  two  miles  and  a  crossing  of  Stone  river  in 
the  face  of  the  enemy. 

As  General  Rosecrans  did  not  attack  on  the  30th,  Gen- 
eral Bragg  determined  to  take  the  initiative  and  open  fight 
on  the  31st.  While  strongly  posted,  there  were  conditions 
that  might  arise  and  make  his  position  extremely  precarious. 
He  had  his  army  cut,  as  we  have  stated,  by  Stone  river.  It 
was  midwinter  and  a  stormy  one.  This  same  river  might  in 
any  twelve  hours  rise  to  a  stage  of  water  that  would  be  fatal 
to  his  army.  He  believed  that  the  Union  army  greatly  out- 
numbered his  and  so  could  not  afford  to  take  chances  that 
might  augment  the  difference.  Hence,  he  resolved  to  end 
the  delay  by  taking  the  initiative  at  daylight  on  the  31st. 
Strange  to  say  he  determined  upon  the  same  maneuver,  only 
reversed,  that  General  Rosecrans  had  resolved  on.  He  pre- 
pared to  strike  our  left.  In  the  evening  General  Bragg 
extended  his  left,  made  up  of  McGowa's  and  Cleburne'a 


208  Life  of  Thomas. 

divisions,  sustained  by  Wharton's  cavalry,  quite  a  mile  be- 
yond our  right.  At  daylight  this  line  made  up  of  two-fifths 
of  Bragg' s  infantry  swung  around  upon  our  right  in  assault 
that  for  momentum  and  dash  had  probably  no  parallel  in  the 
war.  The  immediate  result  was  disastrous  to  the  Union 
army.  Our  flank  made  up  of  three  brigades  was  badly  ar- 
ranged to  meet  an  assault  of  eight  full  brigades.  General 
McCook's  head-quartars  were  too  far  from  the  scene  of  the 
conflict  while  General  Willich  next  in  command  on  the 
field  was  not  at  his  post.  While  General  McCook  was  shav- 
ing and  General  Willich  was  off'  in  search  of  information  as 
to  the  enemy  that  he  could  have  had  by  remaining  at  the 
head  of  his  command,  our  men  were  left  to  fight  as  best  they 
could  against  overwhelming  numbers.  General  Bragg  in 
his  report  of  the  battle  claimed  he  had  surprised  our  forces. 
This  was  not  true.  Skirmish  lines  had  been  well  thrown  out 
and  we  had  full  and  fair  warning  of  the  approaching  storm. 
The  men  and  their  immediate  officers  were  in  line  and  pre- 
pared as  well  as  they  could  be.  But  their  superior  officers 
'  who  should  have  been  at  the  front  or  in  sight  of  it  to  remedy 
our  exposed  position  by  an  immediate  rally  of  supports,  were 
surprised.  Indeed,  the  information  General  Willich  went  in 
search  of  was  given  him  in  the  shape  of  a  capture,  not  only 
of  seven  hundred  of  his  men,  but  the  curious  general  him- 
self. 

Our  brave  fellows  fought  as  well  as  they  could,  and  bet- 
ter than  was  to  be  expected.  Kirk's  and  Willich's  commands 
were  swept  aside.  Captain  Edgarton,  located  near  the  salient 
angle  of  the  line,  was  captured  with  his  battery,  and  the  gal- 
lant Goodspeed  lost  three  guns  posted  to  the  right  of  Wil- 
lich's brigade.  This  exposed  General  Davis's  right  flank  to 
the  enveloping  lines  of  the  enemy,  and  Colonel  Post  was 
forced  to  change  ground  perpendicular  to  the  rear,  and  so 
repel  a  flank  attack.  The  59th  Illinois,  supporting  Pinney's 
battery,  was  moved  one-fourth  of  a  mile  to  the  right.  The 
74th  and  75th  Illinois  infantry  came  up  in  support,  and  as 
the  enemy  overlapped  the  22d  Indiana,  moved  in  beyond  the 
battery.  In  a  few  seconds  the  enemy  came  in  upon  them, 
attacking  Baldwin  and  Post  upon  the  flank,  and  Carlin, 


Thomas  Stays  Defeat.  209 

Woodruff,  and  Sill  in  the  front.  The  resistance  made  by 
troops  thus  hurriedly  called  to  new  and  trying  positions  was 
so  persistent  that  General  Polk,  of  the  Confederate  service, 
was  forced  to  fetch  up  all  his  reserves.  This  was  not  the 
only  repulse  made  by  our  unsupported  forces.  But  the 
weight  and  force  of  the  victorious  enemy  were  irresistible,, 
and  our  right  fell  back  fighting,  while  the  front  of  Bragg's 
army  swung  in  as  our  flank  receded.  The  Confederates  were 
sweeping  on  to  victory,  but  not  without  being  made  to  pay 
dearly  for  their  gain.  The  losses  were  so  heavy  that  General 
Hardee  was  forced  to  call  earnestly  for  reinforcements,  nor 
could  he  arrest  the  retreat  of  a  single  regiment,  or  pre- 
vent the  reformation  of  lines  on  new  conditions  as  the  old 
gave  way. 

General  Rosecrans,  who  had  ordered  Crittenden  to  ad- 
vance, as  we  have  stated,  upon  the  enemy's  right  flank,  find- 
ing himself  anticipated,  countermanded  his  order  and  hur- 
ried Crittenden  to  the  support  of  his  own  shattered  right. 
It  is  not  to  be  supposed  that  this  gallant  officer  so  brilliant 
upon  a  field  lost  either  head  or  heart.  He  not  only  pushed 
forward  his  forces  to  remedy  the  loss,  but  rode  at  their  head 
for  hours  under  the  deadliest  fire  ever  experienced  in  battle. 
Captain  Byron  Kirby,  a  brave,  capable  aide,  was  shot  out  of 
his  saddle,  and  Col.  Garesche,  General  Rosecrans'  chief  of 
staff  was  killed,  a  round  shot  taking  off  his  head,  and  so 
close  to  his  general  that  the  blood  and  brains  of  one  of  the 
most  promising  officer  in  the  service  fell  in  a  shower  upon 
Rosecrans,  who  was  so  absorbed  in  his  efforts  to  get  up  his 
troops  in  time  that  he  did  not  notice  even  these  casualties. 
As  Major  Frank  S.  Bond  says  when  his  attention  was  called 
to  the  fact  that  Garesche  was  killed,  he  only  glanced  at  the 
headless  trunk  that  for  a  second  swayed  to  and  fro  upon  the 
flying  charger  ere  it  fell,  and  the  general  made  no  response. 
His  heart  was  wrung  with  anxiety  no  words  can  express, 
and  his  eager  eyes  were  on  the  columns  that  at  the  double 
quick  were  hurrying  to  the  rescue.  He  might  have  been  re- 
lieved had  he  known  that  at  the  pivotal  point,  ready  at  the 
moment  upon  which  trembled  uncertain  the  fate  of  a 
14 


210     .  Life  of  Thomas. 

death  struggle,  was  one  who,  although  prompt  and  efficient, 
was  cool  and  calm  in  the  deadly  hour  of  peril,  and  held  in 
the  hollow  of  his  hand  a  victory  snatched  from  the  jaws  of 
defeat. 

General  Thomas,  holding  the  center,  saw  the  right 
•doubled  up,  and  a  victorious  foe  sweeping  on  to  his  rear.  It 
was  necessary  to  change  front,  and  this  in  the  midst  of  the 
conflict,  and  in  the  face  of  the  foe.  This  he  did  with  all  the 
precision  of  a  parade.  It  was  done  none  too  soon.  The  en- 
tire army  under  Bragg,  save  Breckenridge's  division  left 
across  the  river,  was  moving  victoriously  from  a  defeat  of  the 
right  wing  upon  the  flank  of  the  center.  To  designate  at  a 
glance  the  new  line,  post  upon  it  the  troops  unengaged,  ex- 
tricate the  brigades  that,  fighting,  fell  back  almost  sur- 
rounded by  the  foe,  was  the  task  given  General  George  H. 
Thomas,  and  it  was  accomplished  in  time  to  check  and  drive 
back  the  enemy  at  the  very  moment  when  victory  was  in  its 
clasp. 

The  center,  reinforced  from  the  left,  held  its  own  against 
repeated  assaults  until  the  short,  cold  day  ended  in  a  cloudy 
night  that  enveloped  the  fatal  field  in  a  darkness  that  seemed 
impenetrable.  When  the  fighting  ceased,  the  Union  army 
found  itself  driven  back  over  a  mile  from  its  extreme  right. 
The  entire  army  under  Bragg  except  Breckenridge's  division 
was  pressing  in  upon  our  forces  at  a  point  that  had  been  our 
center  when  the  fight  began.  In  a  word,  they  were  in  pos- 
session of  the  field,  and  so  admirably  posted  that  a  renewal 
of  the  battle  next  morning  would  be  under  more  promising 
conditions  than  those  of  the  tight  already  ended. 

General  Thomas  mingled,  as  was  his  wont,  among  his 
troops  listening  to  reports  and  suggestions  of  his  subordinate 
officers,  and  above  all,  looking  to  the  care  of  the  wounded. 
A  fact  was  impressed  by  the  unfortunate  events  of  the  day 
upon  his  thoughtful  mind  that  had  been  a  belief  before,  and 
was  conviction  now.  This  truth  was  that  the  men  making 
up  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  were  not  subject  to  the  wild, 
unreasoning  panics  that  so  afflicted  the  Army  of  the  Po- 
tomac. He  saw  the  unexpected  happen  when  the  long, 
heavy  column  of  the  enemy  swung  around  the  right  and  ap- 


Thomas  Opposes  Retreat.  211 

peared  almost  in  the  rear  of  the  badly  posted  brigades,  and 
he  saw  these  brigades  give  way  not  in  wild  disorder,  but 
fighting  desperately  as  they  fell  back  under  command  of  their 
gallant  officers.  This  fact,  pressed  upon  his  mind,  gave  birth 
to  the  oracular  saying  that,  uttered  that  night  saved  the  Army 
of  the  Cumberland  from  retreat. 

General  Rosecrans,  who  had  overtaxed  his  strength  in 
his  heroic  efforts  of  the  day,  called  a  council  of  war  that 
night  to  consider  the  possibilities  of  a  retreat  that  would 
save  what  was  left  of  his  army.  He  was  in  no  condition  of 
mind  or  body  to  give  the  crisis  cool  consideration.  The 
council  was  held  in  a  rough  log-cabin,  but  dimly  lit  and  un- 
warmed,  a  weird  assembly  on  that  New  Year  eve.  All  the 
brave  gentlemen  assembled,  from  Rosecrans,  in  his  old  faded 
uniform  yet  stiff  with  the  blood  and  brain  of  Garesche, 
down  to  the  colonel  the  day's  casualties  had  made  com- 
mander of  a  brigade,  bore  marks  of  the  hard  fight,  not  only 
in  the  pale,  anxious,  yet  firm  faces  and  disordered  dress,  but 
in  several  instances  bloody  wounds.  General  Thomas,  mov- 
ing in  his  slow,  deliberate  way  through  the  throng  to  a  cor- 
ner, found  a  board,  and,  improvising  a  seat,  leaned  back  and 
fell  asleep.  As  the  discussion  opened  and  continued  with 
much  heat,  Rosecrans  often  cast  his  eyes  upon  the  man  who 
had  saved  his  center  that  day,  as  if  longing  fot  an  opinion 
he  had,  like  other  commanders,  learned  to  lean  upon.  But 
Thomas  slept  on. 

We  are  told  that  a  majority  of  the  officers  favored  not  a 
retreat,  but  falling  back  to  a  better  position.  Rosecrans  was 
considering  a  retreat  to  Nashville.  He  was  possessed  of 
some  facts  not  known  to  the  officers  present.  Some  ugly 
demonstrations  had  been  made  by  the  enemy  on  our  line  of 
supplies,  and  Nashville  itself  was  in  a  feverish  state  of 
alarm  over  an  expected  assault  that  would  carry  the  city. 
The  discussion  waxed  warm.  The  gallant  General  Critten- 
den  led  the  opposition,  and  was  warm  in  his  antagonism  to 
any  withdrawal  of  the  army.  He  maintained  that  Bragg's 
army  was  more  crippled  and  in  a  worse  condition  than  ours, 
and  to  give  way  would  break  the  spirit  and  destroy  the 
morale  of  our  army.  Near  midnight,  General  Rosecrans 


212  Life  of  Thomas. 

called  on  Surgeon  Eben  Swift,  the  medical  director  of  the 
department,  to  know  if  he  had  sufficient  transportation  to 
remove  our  wounded.  The  doctor  replied  that  he  helieved 
he  had ;  that  there  were  between  five  and  six  thousand 
wounded,  but  many  of  these  could  walk.  General  Rose- 
crans  then  awakened  Thomas  and  asked  him :  "  Will  you 
protect  the  rear  or  retreat  to  Overall  creek?" 

General  Thomas  promptly  and  emphatically  responded 
in  the  memorable  words,  "  This  army  can 't  retreat,"  and  fell 
asleep  again.  And  "this  army"  never  did  retreat. 

It  was  after  midnight  when  General  McCook,  at  the  re- 
quest of  Rosecrans,  rode  with  him  to  the  rear,  for  the  pur- 
pose of  selecting  a  new  position.  The  clouds  that  darkened 
the  fore  part  of  the  night  cleared  away,  and  the  two  officers 
were  not  only  able  to  see  that  the  proposed  position,  owing 
to  the  low  condition  of  the  ground,  was  untenable,  but  they 
saw  something  else.  General  D.  S.  Stanley,  under  orders,  had 
forbid  any  fires  to  be  built  in  the  rear,  but  lawless  wagoners 
and  some  insubordinate  cavalry  had  disobeyed  these  orders, 
and  far  down  on  the  west  of  the  road  the  two  generals  saw 
a  long  line  of  light,  mostly  torches,  moving  actively  to  and 
fro.  Rosecrans  exclaimed :  "  The  enemy  is  in  our  rear."  He 
not  only  remembered  the  reports  from  his  disturbed  lines 
and  of  the  condition  of  Nashville,  but  he  gave  a  significance 
to  General  Thomas's  sententious  utterance  that  was  entirely 
foreign  to  its  utterance.  The  man  who  had  brought  five 
brigades  from  out  Bragg's  army  in  the  midst  of  a  deadly 
conflict  that  had  for  our  apparently  doomed  forces  a  fire  in 
front,  flank,  and  rear,  and  had  swung  his  own  line  round 
under  a  cross-fire  of  artillery  and  infantry,  felt  the  fiber  of 
a  force  that  might  be  killed  bilt  could  not  be  driven. 

General  Rosecrans  and  his  amiable  but  evil  genius  gal- 
loped back  to  the  tent,  where  most  of  the  council  remained, 
and  said :  "  We  must  fight  or  surrender." 

The  dawn  of  the  New  Year's  day  brought  on  no  fight- 
ing, nor  yet  that  of  the  second.  Had  Rosecrans  known  how 
terribly  Bragg's  forces  had  suffered  in  killed  and  wounded, 
he  would  have  renewed  the  conflict  at  daylight  on  the  first. 
We  know  now,  being  able  to  look  impartially  on  both  sides, 


About  General  Negley.  213 

that  such  an  attack  must  have  resulted  in  an  overwhelming 
defeat  of  the  Confederates.  The  dash  of  the  Southern 
troops  that  made  such  brave  fighting  in  the  beginning  ex- 
hausted a  race  that  lacked  staying  power  at  all  times.  Over- 
whelming as  the  victories  of  the  South  have  been,  in  no  one 
instance  was  the  fruit  clearly  and  fairly  gathered.  Lee's 
army,  after  every  triumph  on  the  field,  seemed  stunned  by  its 
own  success.  Bragg's  army  formed  no  exception,  and  would 
not  probably  have  resumed  the  offensive  even  had  it  escaped 
its  terrible  punishment.  Even  on  the  afternoon  of  the 
second,  we  opened  the  conflict  by  General  Crittenden  send- 
ing across  Stone  river,  on  the  right  of  Bragg,  Van  Cleve's 
division  and  Grose's  brigade  of  Palmer's  command.  Gen- 
eral Bragg,  seeing  the  danger  this  meant  to  his  right,  ordered 
Breckenridge  to  repel  our  forces.  This  was  promptly  exe- . 
cuted.  Van  Cleve  fell  back  to  the  bank  of  the  river,  under 
protection  of  some  fifty  guns  of  Major  John  Mendenhall, 
General  Crittenden's  chief  of  artillery.  At  this  juncture 
occurred  a  dashing  event  that  was  unexpected  on  both  sides. 
Colonel  John  J.  Miller,  irritated  and  disgusted,  in  common 
with  both  men  and  officers  of  Negley 's  command,  at  the  cow- 
ardly conduct  of  their  general,  took  command  without  orders 
from  Negley  and  in  opposition  to  those  from  another  general 
of  division,  and  crossing  the  river  with  seven  regiments,  at- 
tacked Breckenridge's  forces  with  such  fury  that  they  were 
forced  back  in  great  confusion  toward  Murfreesboro.  Gen- 
eral Jeff.  C.  Davis,  with  his  division,  advanced  promptly  to, 
the  support  of  Miller,  and  the  two  seized  on,  held,  and  forti- 
fied a  height  that  proved  the  key  to  ther  situation.  For  this 
gallant  deed  done  without  orders,  General  Negley,  who  took 
no  part  in  the  affair,  was  promoted  to  major-general. 

As  the  position  taken  and  fortified  in  this  impulsive 
manner  exposed  Bragg's  forces  to  an  enfilading  fire  of  artil- 
lery, there  was  nothing  left  but  immediate  retreat.  This 
occurred  on  the  night  of  the  third.  f  The  rear  guard  made 
itself  so  annoying  to  Thomas's  front  that  permission  was 
given  for  a  night  attack.  The  thin  line  of  Confederates  was 
easily  pierced,  but  the  result  came  too  late;  General  Bragg 
was  in  full  retreat.  He  saved  his  material,  but  left  his 
wounded  at  Murfreesboro. 


214  Life  of  Thomas. 


CHAPTER  XI. 

Immediate  Effect  of  the  Stone  River  Victory — Review  of  the  Operation* 
During  the  Six  Months  Following  the  Army  of  the  Potomac — Burnside 
takes  up  McClellan's  Cry  of  "On  to  Richmond" — Disaster  of  Fred- 
ericksburg — Hooker  succeeds  Burnside — Meade  put  in  Command — In- 
vasion of  Pennsylvania  and  Battle  of  Gettysburg. 

The  unexpected  victory  on  Stone  river  sent  a  wave  of 
feeling  through  the  North  that  lifted  Rosecrans  into  high 
popular  favor,  and  bade  fair  to  make  him  our  foremost  mili- 
tary leader.  It  broke  down  for  a  time  the  personal  hostility 
of  the  "War  Department,  and,  let  the  Secretary  think  what 
he  might,  he  was  for  a  time  reduced  to  silence.  This  was  the 
more  irritating  from  the  fact  that  Secretary  Chase,  who  was 
so  earnestly  involved  in  a  military  success  that  would  insure 
the  financial  system  of  the  administration  that  was  ever 
trembling  on  the  verge  of  collapse,  could  not  refrain  boast- 
ing of  his  sagacity  in  selecting  Rosecrans  as  the  successor  of 
Buell.  Stanton  could  ill-brook  this  interference  on  the  part 
of  Chase,  and  in  this  instance  it  was  doubly  offensive  from 
his  personal  dislike  of  the  general. 

"  You  see,"  said  Chase  to  Stanton,  at  a  cabinet  meeting, 
"  my  friend  has  justified  all  I  urged  on  you  in  his  behalf." 

"If  you  knew  as  much  about  Stone  river  as  I  do," 
growled  the  War  Secretary,  "you  would  not  feel  so  cock- 
sure of  your  friend.  But  for  George  H.  Thomas,  the  man  I 
wanted  to  head  that  army,  Stone  river,  instead  of  being  a 
victory,  would  have  been  a  defeat." 

"Come  now,  Stanton,"  retorted  Chase,  "be  just.  We 
selected  Rosecrans,  and  Rosecrans  £ad  the  sagacity  to  select 
Thomas.  Then,  you  know,  there  is  nothing  so  successful  as 
success." 

Could  General  Rosecrans  have  followed  this  victory  by 
active  operations  and  continuous  fighting,  he  would  unques- 
tionably have  won  his  way  to  a  command  of  all  our  armies. 


Preparations  for  Advance.  215 

But  this  he  thought  to  be  impossible.  The  line  of  advance 
for  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  in  its  march  on  Chatta- 
nooga had  by  chance  been  made  so  difficult  that  an  imme- 
diate forward  movement  was  out  of  the  question.  With 
nothing  but  a  single  line  of  railroad  reaching  from  Louisville 
to  Murfreesboro  to  depend  on  for  "supplies,  it  required  time 
for  transportation,  even  when  the  road  was  open ;  but  this 
same  road  had  not  only  to  be  guarded,  but  reconstructed, 
continually.  The  line  of  advance  by  the  way  of  Nashville 
was  run  through  the  most  disloyal,  active,  and  intelligent 
people  of  the  Confederate  states.  Every  step  forward  deep- 
ened the  hostility.  The  men  kept  at  home  by  extreme 
youth  or  old  age,  or  other  incapacity,  armed  with  squirrel  rifles, 
infested  every  road,  and  made  every  laurel  bush  an  ambus- 
cade for  stragglers  from  our  army.  The  very  women  hurled 
epithets  at  our  troops  as  they  marched  by  their  dwellings. 
It  was  not  only  necessary  to  rebuild  the  railroad  without 
ceasing,  but  that  same  road  had  to  be  guarded  and  heavy 
fortifications  constructed  about  the  depots  where  arms,  mu- 
nitions of  war,  food,  and  clothing  were  collected. 

Six  months  were  given  to  this  work.  It  met  with  no 
approval  at  Washington.  The  War  Department  seemed  to 
shut  its  eyes  willfully  to  the  necessities  of  the  situation.  We 
must  in  justice,  however,  say  that  Secretary  Stanton,  while 
grumbling  at  the  delay,  lost  no  time  in  forwarding  the  sup- 
plies demanded.  He  was  less  energetic  in  the  forwarding  of 
men,  for  he  honestly  believed  they  could  be  more  efficiently 
used  elsewhere. 

In  the  meantime,  as  winter  passed  to  spring  and  from 
spring  to  summer,  and  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  was 
being  reorganized,  well  equipped,  and  stores  upon  which  it 
could  depend  accumulated,  the  war  in  other  fields  continued 
to  drift  with  an  almost  uniform  loss  to  the  Union  armies. 

While  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  is  at  Murfreesboro 
thus  reorganizing  for  an  advance,  we  will  turn  to  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac,  and  learn  what,  during  the  six  months  fol- 
lowing the  battle  of  Stone  river,  was  being  done  by  that  army 
of  defeats. 

When,  on  the  8th  of  November,  1862,  General  Ambrose 


216  Life  of  Thomas. 

E.  Burnside  superseded  by  order  General  McClellan,  there 
was  consternation,  not  to  say  disgust,  throughout  the  Army 
.of  the  Potomac.  It  was  generally  known  that  the  man  thus 
selected  to  the  command  of  the  one  army  of  the  Union  des- 
ignated to  do  the  hardest  fighting  was  strikingly  incompe- 
tent. It  is  but  justice  to  General  Burnside  to  say  that  he 
shared  himself  in  this  conclusion,  and  deepened  the  djsmay 
by  its  open  avowal.  The  secret  of  this  strange  selection  is 
to  be  found  in  the  condition  of  the  army  as  McClellan  held 
and  left  it.  The  discontent  of  the  men  and  the  open  disloy- 
alty of  the  corps  commanders  were  so  marked  that  the  ad- 
ministration dared  not  put  over  them  a  soldier,  however  dis- 
tinguished, not  of  the  McClellan  clique  or  circle.  General 
Bu>rnside,an  amiable  and  loyal  gentleman,  had  the  confidence 
of  the  government,  not  because  of  any  ability,  but  for  that 
he  privately  criticised  McClellan's  motives  and  movements  to 
the  President,  and  he  had  the  favor  of  the  McClellan  group 
for  the  sympathy  he  expressed  in  their  behalf.  And  yet  it 
was  well  known  that  at  the  first  Bull  Run  he  refused  to  lead 
a  regiment,  the  only  one  left  intact,  into  the  fight,  upon  the 
ground  that  said  regiment  was  made  up  of  the  best  families 
of  Rhode  Island,  and,  if  he  got  it  cut  up  as  the  others  were, 
he  would  not  dare  to  return  to  that  state.  At  Antietam, 
when  ordered  to  carry  a  bridge,  the  possession  of  which 
would  have  pierced  the  enemy's  center,  he  delayed  for 
hours,  until,  indeed,  the  golden  opportunity  was  past.  He 
had  neither  physical  nor  moral  courage,  and  his  protest,  when 
called  to  the  responsibility  of  the  high  command,  was  simply 
pitiable. 

The  truth  is  that  nearly  two  years'  observation  and  ex- 
perience of  the  eminent  men  at  Washington  had  given  them 
a  contempt  of  merely  military  men.  It  seemed  to  them 
that  the  "  bullet  heads,"  as  the  immortal  Hawthorne  had 
designated  the  military  leaders,  an  expression  Secretary 
Stanton  and  President  Lincoln  had  adopted,  were  nearly  all 
the  same  ;  that  they  all  blundered  into  errors  the  men  were 
expected  to  rectify  by  hard  fighting.  Their  capacity,  they 
believed,  was  exercised  not  in  planning  campaigns  that  had 
any  sense  in  objective  points,  but  in  the  production  of  that 


Burnside  Succeeds  McClellan.  217 

sort  of  military  literature  that  followed  blunders,  called  bat- 
tles, and  claimed  premeditated  reason  for  what  in  fact  were 
merely  casualties.  The  President  and  his  irritable  Sec- 
retary of  "War  really  wished  to  put  fighting  Joe  Hooker,  as 
he  was  called,  in  command,  but  firmly  believed  that  such  se- 
lection would  demoralize  the  entire  army. 

Of  course  Burnside  took  up  what  McClellan  had  left 
and  the  senseless  "  on  to  Richmond  "  continued  the  cry  of 
press,  people,  and  administration,  although  the  ground  to  be 
marched  over  gave  Lee  the  strength  of  a  hundred  thousand 
men  to  his  well  tried  veterans.  Every  mountain  range  and 
river  became  a  fortification,  behind  which  the  army  on  the 
defense  doubled  its  forces  while  waiting  in  grim  silence  for 
devoted  men  to  be  led  to  the  slaughter.  And  if  successful, 
with  Richmond  captured,  we  would  be'no  nearer  the  end  of 
the  war  than  before. 

As  Richmond  was  to  be  our  military  terminal,  the  sim- 
ple-minded Burnside  took  the  more  direct  route.  He  would 
go  by  the  way  of  Fredericksburg.  To  this  end  he  moved 
down  the  north  bank  of  the  Rappahannock  to  a  position  op- 
posite that  insignificant  town.  He  labored  under  the  strange 
delusion  that  this  movement  was  unknown  to  the  enemy. 
He  seemed  to  forget  ttfat  he  was  marching  through  a  coun- 
try where  all  were  hostile  spies,  and  men  and  women  active 
and  intelligent  informers.  To  confirm  all  that  came  to  Lee's 
ears  in  this  way,  General  J.  E.  B.  Stuart,  raiding  across 
Warrenton  Springs,  entered  Warrenton  just  as  our  rear 
guard  were  marching  out,  and  found  all  the  information 
necessary  in  reports  and  papers  the  red  tape  of  our  army 
carefully  collected  and  as  regularly  left  for  the  enemy's 
perusal.  Thus  officially  informed,  Lee  gathered  his  army 
and  hastily  took  position  south  of  Fredericksburg.  Nature 
gave  him  in  this  a  strange  advantage.  The  Rappahannock, 
running  a  southerly  direction  under  bluffs  in  the  east  bank, 
has  on  its  west  bank  a  level  space  of  a  mile  in  width  and 
about  five  miles  in  length,  extending  from  Massaponnax 
creek  to  where  the  bluffs  abut  on  the  Rappahannock  op- 
posite Beck's  Island.  Lee  offered  no  opposition  to  Burn- 
side's  passage  of  the  river  other  than  an  irregular  fire  of  ar- 


218  Life  of  Thomas. 

tillery  at  the  pontoons  bearing  them  across  the  stream. 
This  was  intentionally  feeble.  Lee  easily  favored  that  cross- 
ing. With  eighty  thousand  veterans  in  position  on  the 
bluff,  and  three  hundred  pieces  of  artillery  to  sweep  the  plain, 
he  laid  in  wait  behind  a  dead-fall  with  victory  as  well  se- 
cured as  if  Burnside  had  surrendered  in  advance.  On  that 
calm,  mild  Indian  summer  morning,  a  hundred  thousand  of 
our  brave  fellows  fell  into  line  prepared  for  slaughter  to  the 
music  of  six  hundred  guns  that  on  the  Confederate  side 
poured  round  shot  and  shell  in  our  ranks,  while  the  Union 
artillery  on  the  bluffs  east  of  the  river  fell  short  and  had 
to  cease  firing,  for  they  were  doing  more  injury  to  our  own 
troops  than  to  the  enemy. 

And  was  the  fearful  might  of  these  hundred  thousand 
thrown  at  once  upon  the  enemy?  Not  at  all,  for  the  battle 
was  fought  as  all  the  battles  of  the  Potomac  army,  by  brig- 
ades and  divisions,  at  times  by  a  regiment  only.  Franklin, 
for  example,  having  under  his  command  fifty-five  thousand 
men  on  our  left,  remained  idle  while  the  battle  raged  upon 
his  right.  Franklin  claimed  that  his  order  received  at  7  A. 
M.  that  day  was  so  vaguely  worded  that  he  waited  for  more 
decisive  and  clearer  instructions.  Why  his  army  had  been 
crossed  over  the  river  and  heavy  reinforcements  sent  to  him 
and  all  brought  face  to  face  with  the  enemy,  he  did  not 
seem  to  consider.  However,  had  the  entire  hundred  thou- 
sand been  marched  up  those  musket  fringed,  slippery  heights, 
their  hopeless  slaughter  would  have  been  only  the  greater. 
What  a  frightful  massacre  it  was.  The  Wilderness,  Cold 
Harbor,  Chickasaw  Bluff,  and  Kenesaw  Mountain  have  since 
come  in  to  parallel  that  wholesale  wanton  assassination  of 
brave  men  at  Fredericksburg,  but  no  such  sickening  idiocy 
in  a  commander  has  overtaken  us  since  that  dreadful  event. 
All  day  long  the  awful  work  went  on.  Our  gallant  men 
went  in  by  brigades  and  came  out  in  remnants,  leaving  their 
dead  and  wounded  piled  up  in  front  of  intrench  ments  that, 
rising  tier  above  tier,  poured  an  incessant  storm  of  shot, 
shell,  and  musketry  upon  the  storming  parties  that  could 
only  cheer  on  and  fall.  When  we  build,  as  we  are  building, 
lofty  monuments  to  defeat,  we  should  gather  the  bones  of 


The  Butchery  of  Fredericksburg .  219 

such  dead,  and  if  they  fail  to  out-top  in  each  instance  the 
Obelisk  at  the  national  capitol  to  the  memory  of  George 
Washington,  they  will,  at  least,  be  significant  in  their  ghastly 
grim  silence  of  all  the  monuments  left  to  tell  of  incompe- 
tence bathed  in  blood. 

Our  gallant  subordinate  officers  had  not  learned  then,  as 
they  eventually  did  in  subsequent  campaigns,  to  send  in 
their  men  instead  of  leading  them,  and  the  loss  of  such  waa 
fearful . 

Night  ended  the  unequal  conflict.  At  least  fifteen  thou- 
sand had  been  sacrificed  in  vain.  The  next  day  the  commis- 
sioned idiocy  proposed  renewing  the  attack,  but  there  was  a 
revolt  along  the  whole  line,  and  for  two  days  following  the 
Confederate  commander  contented  himself  with  strengthen- 
ing his  lines,  and  at  last  permitted  our  demoralized  forces  to 
recross  the  river.  Had  he  followed  up  his  victory  and 
poured  his  veterans  on  our  disorganized  masses  with  a  river 
in  their  rear,  he  would  have  annihilated  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac,  and  the  road  to  Washington  could  have  been 
marched  along  as  much  unmolested  as  would  have  been  the 
triumphant  tramp  of  his  thousands  along  Pennsylvania  ave- 
nue to  a  possession  of  our  capitol.  Robert  E.  Lee  failed  to 
close  the  trap  Burnside  had  hurried  into,  and  so  the  war 
went  on. 

It  went  on,  however,  without  Ambrose  E.  Burnside. 
He  was  promptly  relieved  and  "Fighting  Joe  Hooker" 
called  to  lead  a  forlorn  hope  of  a  hundred  thousand  men. 
General  Joseph  Hooker  was  a  soldierly  looking  man,  six 
feet  in  height,  well  proportioned,  with  a  face  that  had  upon 
it  more  the  sparkle  of  high  animal  spirits  than  the  repose 
of  thought.  The  fact  that  he  possessed  entire  belief  in  him- 
self, with  a  force  of  character  peculiar  to  such  leaders,  se- 
cured confidence  in  him  from  others,  conspicuous  among 
whom  were  the  President  and  Secretary  of  War.  It  is 
told  of  Hooker,  that  when  he  first  appeared  at  Washington 
to  solicit  service,  to  which  he  was  entitled,  of  course,  being 
a  West  Point  graduate,  certain  reports  from  the  Pacific 
slope  of  wild  dissipation  and  a  demoralized  condition  pre- 
ceded and  accompanied  him.  The  President  and  Secretary 


220  Life  of  Thomas. 

Stanton  had  been  warned  by  the  McClellan  crowd  to  beware 
of  Hooker.  Failing  to  get  recognition  from  the  general  in 
command  or  notice  from  Stanton,  Hooker  appealed  to  Lin- 
coln. In  two  interviews  granted  him  by  the  President,  the 
applicant  found  that  the  amiable,  easy  mannered  chief  magis- 
trate could  say  no  with  a  ready  facility  that  was  only  equaled 
by  the  quiet  firmness  with  which  he  stood  by  the  negative. 
In  the  third  interview,  however,  General  Hooker,  impatient 
at  the  opposition  that  he  had  discovered,  broke  into  angry 
denunciation  of  the  McClellan  crowd. 

"You  have  put  the  armies  of  the  Union,  Mr.  Presi- 
dent," he  cried,  "in  the  hands  of  men  who  have  neither 
ability,  courage,  nor  patriotism.  They  have  no  heart  for  the 
fight  and  they  crowd  out  those  who  have.  Good  morning, 
Mr.  President ;  when  you  need  me,  let  me  know.  I  can 
wait." 

"  Hold  on,  Hooker,"  responded  President  Lincoln,  who 
said  afterward  that  he  saw  tears  in  the  gallant  officer's  eyes — 
a  fact  the  fighter  repudiated,  saying  that  it  was  whisky,  not 
water,  that  the  chief  magistrate  saw — "  hold  on ;  I  will  con- 
sult Stanton  and  McClellan  and  see  what  can  be  done." 

"Advise  them  to  give  me  command  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac,"  replied  the  audacious  applicant.  "  It  is  bound  to 
come  sooner  or  later,  and  might  as  well  come  now." 

"  Not  so  fast,  Joseph,"  replied  the  President.  "  We  will 
give  you  a  chance  to  fight  your  way  up,  and  that  is  about  all 
you  can  ask  now." 

When  McClellan's  removal  was  finally  determined,  the 
War  Secretary  had  warmly  pressed  Hooker  for  the  place. 
Had  he  been  free  to  choose,  he  would  have  preferred  George 
H.  Thomas  to  any  other.  President  Lincoln  had  his  own 
views,  however,  and,  for  reasons  before  stated  by  us,  he  se- 
lected Burnside. 

Hooker  found  the  army  in  a  demoralized  and  disorgan- 
ized condition.  The  ninety-day  men,  called  foolishly  into 
the  service,  were  leaving  the  posts  in  the  rear  they  were 
called  out  to  man,  their  time  being  at  an  end,  and  no  amount 
of  persuasion  could  induce  them  to  remain.  Raw  recruits, 
it  is  true,  were  pouring  in,  but  desertions  of  old  soldiers  and 


Hooker  Replaces  Bumside.  221 

new  soldiers  numbered  some  two  hundred  a  day.  While  the 
front  was  filled  with  discontent,  the  rear  was  crowded  with 
thieving  officials  and  contractors.  It  was  the  beginning  of  a 
condition  that  not  only  continued  but  grew  worse  until  the 
end  of  the  war.  When  the  newly  commissioned  general  came 
to  consult  the  rolls,  he  was  startled  to  find  that  no  less  than 
2,922  officers  and  80,964  non-commissioned  officers  and  men 
were  absent  from  their  regiments,  many  of  them  in  hospi- 
tals, more  on  leave  or  detached  duty,  and  a  terrible  list  of 
them  unaccounted  for— in  other  words,  deserters. 

This  was  a  deplorable  showing,  but  must  be  recognized 
as  the  legitimate  result  of  blundering  disasters  and  bloody 
defeats  that,  beginning  with  the  war,  had  accompanied  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  for  over  two  years.  The  volunteers 
were  men  of  more  than  ordinary  intelligence,  and  had 
been  strengthened  in  their  habits  of  assumed  responsibility 
by  the  absurd  system  of  election  of  all  officers  under  the' 
grade  of  brigadiers,  that  made  the  rank  and  file  more  con- 
stituents than  soldiers.  These  men  of  the  Potomac  Army 
had  been  won  to  confidence  in  McClellan  by  the  silent  and 
most  insidious  means.  The  lamentable  failure  of  Burnside 
strengthened  this  prejudice,  and  when  Hooker  was  commis- 
sioned, the  McClellan  clique  of  higher  officers  became  more 
active  and  open  in  their  opposition.  Nothing  daunted  by 
these  malign  influences  and  unhappy  results,  Hooker  applied 
himself  vigorously  to  a  reorganization  of  the  army,  devoting 
two  months  to  a  better  discipline  and  an  attempt  to  put 
more  heart  into  the  demoralized  lines. 

On  the  27th  of  April,  1863,  Hooker  accomplished  what 
Burnside  could  have  more  readily  done,  and  that  was  flank- 
ing Lee  out  of  his  strong  position  on  the  high  ground  in  the 
rear  of  Fredericksburg.  Leaving  General  Sedgwick  with  a 
column  of  twenty  thousand  men  to  make  a  demonstration 
on  Lee's  front  he  crossed  the  bulk  of  his  army  over  the  Rap- 
pahannock  and  occupied  Chancellorsville.  It  was  not  so  strong 
a  position  as  that  of  Lee's  at  Fredericksburg.  Having  ac- 
complished this  strategic  move  our  general  fell  into  a 
stupendous  error.  He  jumped  to  the  conclusion  that,  hav- 
ing flanked  the  Confederates  out  of  their  stronghold,  Lee 


222  Life  of  Thomas. 

would  fall  back  in  retreat  toward  Richmond.  To  insure 
this,  as  he  thought,  he  had  dispatched  General  George  D. 
Stoneman  with  nearly  all  his  cavalry  in  a  raid  upon  Lee's 
communications.  This  had  an  unexpected  result.  The  Con- 
federates had  a  deserved  contempt  for  the  tailors,  hatters 
and  shoemakers  we  had  mounted  as  cavalry,  and  as  Lee  had 
no  accumulated  stores  in  his  rear  to  be  destroyed  he  left  the 
feeble  attempt  of  Stoneman  and  his  men  to  exhaust  itself. 
The  absence  of  the  cavalry,  such  as  it  was,  proved  fatal  to 
our  self-confident  commander.  Lee  of  course  evacuated 
Fredericksburg,  but  instead  of  falling  back  on  Richmond  he 
moved  silently  and  swiftly  upon  Chancellors ville.  Suddenly 
and  without  warning  Stonewall  Jackson's  column  of  twenty- 
five  thousand  struck  Hooker's  extreme  right.  Emerging 
in  lines  three  deep  from  a  dense  wood  the  veterans  of  Jack- 
son fell  with  crushing  weight  and  force  upon  the  Eleventh 
Corps,  entirely  unprepared.  Nearly  all  with  arms  stacked 
were  preparing  their  supper,  shared  in,  it  is  said,  by  what 
ought  to  have  been  a  picket  line.  It  was  a  force  made  up 
in  large  degree  from  a  foreign  element  stranded  upon  our 
sea-ports,  too  worthless  to  seek  employment  in  the  interior. 
It  was  a  cruel  slaughter  and  a  fearful  panic  that  spread 
swifter  than  legs  could  carry  fear. 

This  disaster  to  our  army  had  one  good  result  to  our 
arms.  Stonewall  Jackson  fell  mortally  wounded  from  the 
fire  of  his  own  men.  The  great  war  genius  of  the  South 
went  down  and  with  him  the  fortunes  of  the  Confederacy. 
The  fatal  volley  that  sent  the  cruel  bullets  crushing  through 
his  rugged  form  was  a  volley  fired  over  the  grave  of  the 
lost  cause.  From  that  out  good  fortune  deserted  the  Southern 
side.  It  went  down  fighting  to  the  last,  but  it  went  down. 
The  grand,  simple  mannered  man  of  war,  who  infused  his 
indomitable  spirit  into  his  men  and  was  a  tower  of  strength 
to  the  cause  he  fought  for,  died  none  too  soon  nor  a  day  too 
late.  The  Confederacy  had  reached  its  zenith.  Up  to  that 
time  his  prayers  to  God  seemed  to  have  been  answered.  The 
rebel  yell  of  triumph  rung  in  his  dying  ears,  and  his  last 
glance  on  life  took  in  our  National  Capital  as  yet  open  to 
capture.  There  were  elements  at  work  sapping  the  founda- 


Disaster  at  Chancellor sville.  223 

tion  of  his  cause  that  dying  he  did  not  see  ard  living  he 
could  not  avert. 

While  the  army  of  Richmond  was  wasting  itself  in 
fruitless  victories,  Thomas  and  Rosecrans  with  their  veterans 
were  preparing  a  death  blow  to  the  Southern  cause  in  the 
capture  of  their  citadel,  Chattanooga,  and  Grant  with  his 
legions  sustained  by  iron-clads  were  moving  along  the  Mis- 
sissippi, destined  to  make  that  inland  sea  of  flowing  waters 
an  impassable  line  cutting  the  Confederacy  nearly  in  halves. 

The  Army  of  the  Potomac  differed  from  that  of  the 
Cumberland,  as,  indeed,  any  army  made  up  of  North-western 
men,  in  that  it  was  subject  to  paralyzing  panics  that  were 
unknown  elsewhere.  The  disaster  that  befell  Hooker's 
right  was  no  greater  than  that  of  our  right  at  Stone  river, 
but  the  panic  made  all  the  difference.  As  Blenker's 
frightened  fugitives  fell  back  they  stampeded  Deven's  com- 
mand, that,  rolling  on  with  the  mass,  started  Schurz's  force 
in  advance,  and  the  tide  striking  Steinwehr's  division, 
bore  it  along  until  a  mass  of  forty  thousand  men  were 
poured  into  Chancellorsville  with  the  tidings  to  the  startled 
commander  that  Lee  and  his  entire  army,  instead  of  being 
on  a  retreat,  were  annihilating  the  Army  of  the  Potomac. 

This  was  not  accomplished,  however,  until  after  some 
of  the  hardest  fighting  of  the  war.  Sickles'  corps,  that  had 
been  moved  out  in  the  direction  of  Predericksburg,  not  only 
encountered  the  enemy,  but  from  eight  in  the  morning  un- 
til six  P.  M.  did  such  execution  that  the  report  of  killed 
and  wounded  of  Lee's  army  was  never  made  public.  This 
was  followed  by  the  engagement  on  the  next  day,  Sunday, 
3d  of  May,  when  with  our  lines  more  contracted  to  cover  the 
loss  on  our  right  the  army  of  Lee  was  held  in  a  check  that 
bid  fair  at  one  time  to  be  a  great  victory  to  our  side.  The 
confusion  brought  on  by  the  disaster  to  our  right  was  deep- 
ened by  an  accident  that  befell  General  Hooker.  A  round 
shot  that  went  crashing  through  the  head-quarters,  pros- 
trated the  side  of  the  room  against  which  the  general  was 
leaning  and  the  concussion  knocked  him  senseless.  He  was 
thought  to  be  killed  and  the  rumor  of  such  a  grave  casualty 
reaching  the  lines  of  course  did  much  to  discourage  the 


224  Life  of  Thomas. 

troops.  It  was  a  long  period  of  doubt  before  he  could  be 
restored,  and  then  but  partially,  to  himself.  Sick  and  dazed 
he  could  not  understand  that  the  fight  hung  doubtful  and 
that  Sickles  and  Birney  were  calling  in  desperation  for  rein- 
forcements and  ammunition.  It  was  a  fatal  hour.  Thirty 
thousand  men  stood  idle  when  ten  thousand  ordered  in  at 
the  right  moment  would  have  insured  a  victory.  Lee  learned 
to  his  cost  that  fighting  from  an  intrenched  position  made 
almost  impregnable  by  nature  was  quite  another  business 
from  that  of  moving  his  men  in  when  the  chances  were 
equal.  He  was  well  prepared  and  quite  willing  to  permit 
Hooker  to  cross  his  army  to  the  north  side  of  the  Rappa- 
hannock  unmolested.  This  was  done.  The  Army  of  the 
Potomac,  less  eighteen  thousand,  again  occupied  its  old  po- 
sition at  Falmouth.  In  addition  to  the  killed,  wounded  and 
missing  of  the  Chancellorsville  battle,  some  twenty  thousand 
nine  months'  and  two  years'  men  were  mustered  out  of  the 
service.  Of  course  these  were  more  than  replaced  by  raw  re- 
cruits, but  such  new  material  required  time  to  mold  into 
shape  and  make  serviceable  as  soldiers.  General  Hooker 
addressed  himself  heartily  to  this  service,  and  was  getting 
the  army  into  form  again  when  an  event  occurred  that  called 
for  immediate  action  in  a  distant  field.  General  Lee  leaving 
A.  P.  Hill's  corps  to  mask  his  movement  invaded  Pennnsyl- 
vania.  This  was  so  advisedly  executed  that  but  for  General 
Milroy,  who  in  command  of  ten  thousand  men  at  Winches- 
ter, got  the  information  he  conveyed  to  the  startled  admin- 
istration at  Washington  from  Lee  himself,  it  would  have  been 
a  complete  surprise. 

A  braver  man  or  more  gallant  officer  than  General  Mil- 
roy never  wore  sword.  Had  his  judgment  equaled  his  in- 
trepidity, he  would  have  been  invaluable,  and  it  is  a  specimen 
of  how  the  war  was  conducted  from  the  Union  side  that  he 
was  permitted  to  so  fortify  Winchester  as  to  call  for  forty 
thousand  men  to  man  the  works.  Winchester  was  of  no  im- 
portance as  a  strategic  point.  It  covered  nothing  and  could 
be  marched  around  on  all  sides,  and  the  country  surrounding 
it  could  be  invaded  without  trouble.  In  the  doubts  that  beset 
not  only  the  head-quarters  of  the  Potomac  Army,  but  the 
War  Department,  as  to  Lee's  purpose,  in  the  mysterious 


Pennsylvania  Invaded.  225 

movements  he  was  making  General  Ilalleck  issued  an  ad- 
visory order  to  General  Schenck,  at  Baltimore,  in  reference 
to  Milroy.  General  Schenck  sent  the  writer  of  this  to  Win- 
chester with  discretionary  powers  as  to  Milroy.  A  day's 
investigation  at  Winchester  satisfied  the  chief  of  staff  that 
Milroy,  in  any  event,  had  better  be  in  Harper's  Ferry,  and 
so  ordered  him  with  all  his  material  back  to  that  strong- 
hold. General  Schenck,  at  the  urgent  entreaty  of  Milroy, 
countermanded  the  order,  and  three  days  thereafter  Milroy 
found  himself  surrounded  by  Lee's  army.  The  gallant 
soldier  cut  his  way  out  with  a  loss  of  half  his  force  and  all 
his  artillery  and  stores.  He  carried  to  Washington  positive 
information  as  to  Lee's  designs,  and  was  ordered  under  ar- 
rest, but  never  tried,  for  obeying  his  general's  order  to  re- 
main at  Winchester. 

Hooker  lost  no  time  in  covering  Washington  that  Lee's 
movement  threatened  and  at  the  same  time  put  his  forces  in 
position  to  try  conclusions  with  the  enemy,  should  they 
move  on  our  capital  or  invade  Pennsylvania.  As  we  have 
said,  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  much  reduced,  and  Gen- 
eral Hooker  called  earnestly  on  the  government  for  all  the 
available  men  within  reach.  The  War  Department,  how- 
ever, was  weary  of  "  Fighting  Joe  ;  "  and  General  Halleck, 
whose  success  in  life  came  more  from  a  good  digestion  and  a 
cold  heart  than  through  intellectual  processes,  undertook  to 
freeze  the  gallant  fellow  out  in  the  face  of  the  enemy.  To 
this  end  he  was  refused  the  11,000  men  uselessly  quartered 
at  Harper's  Ferry.  This  was  such  an  idiotic  act  that  Gen- 
eral Hooker  caught  at  its  intent  and  asked  to  be  relieved. 
This  request  was  promptly  complied  with,  and  General 
George  G.  Meade  given  command. 

The  invasion  of  Pennsylvania  was  a  blunder  based  on 
the  erroneous  belief  that  the  many  famous  victories  of  Lee's 
army  had  made  it  invincible,  and  that  another  such  in  the 
home  of  the  Union  would  so  strengthen  the  anti- war  feeling 
at  the  North  and  sicken  the  Union  feeling  that  it  would  go 
far  toward  ending  the  war  if  it  did  not  terminate  the  armed 
conflict  at  once.  The  truth  is  that  these  vaunted  victories 
15 


226  Life  of  Thomas. 

were  almost  as  fatal  to  the  Confederacy  as  defeats  would 
have  been.  The  lighting  clement  at  the  South  was  being 
rapidly  exhausted.  Slave  labor  had  well  nigh  eliminated  the 
sturdy  bone  and  sinew  that  go  to  make  a  state,  and  now  in 
the  hour  of  their  utmost  need,  the  leaders  looked  in  vain 
over  their  vast  territory  sparsely  settled  for  armed  men  to  fill 
up  the  ranks  thinned  by  victories. 

There  was  another  consideration  as  well  as  this  that 
made  President  Davis  oppose  the  projected  invasion.  A 
sagacious  statesman  of  wide  experience  and  observation,  he 
saw  the  difference  in  morals  between  fighting  for  home  at 
home  and  a  struggle  in  an  invasion  of  an  alien  land.  This 
feeling  in  the  ignorant  poor  whites  and  the  bigoted  masters 
had  in  two  years  reached  a  fanaticism  so  great  that  martyr- 
dom was  acceptable.  We  had  learned  in  that  time  that  the 
only  disposition  we  could  make  of  a  Southern  soldier  was  to 
kill  him,  and  in  such  the  life  was  purchased  at  a  fearful  cost, 
not  only  of  blood,  but  treasure.  Every  man  killed  cost  us 
two  lives  and  a  hundred  thousand  dollars,  counting  loss  from 
disease  as  well  as  loss  in  battles.  Fierce  as  the  feeling  was, 
the  wiser  people  at  Richmond  feared  it  would  weaken  among 
men  transferred  from  their  own  soil  to  the  land  of  the  enemy. 
There  was  another  fact  no  less  potent  to  be  feared  that 
came  in  on  the  knowledge,  the  ragged  rank  and  file  of  the 
Confederate  army  would  learn  of  the  dense  population  and 
great  wealth  of  the  North.  Let  the  reasons  be  what  they 
may,  Lee  took  the  responsibility  of  marching  his  army  from 
victories  in  Virginia  to  defeat  in  Pennsylvania. 

They  who  worship  at  the  shrine  of  the  dead  Virginian 
may  well  shun  a  closer  investigation  of  his  military  career, 
and  in  that  respect  imitating  the  more  cunning  example  of 
admirers  of  Grant  at  the  North.  And  yet  a  military  part 
that  can  not  bear  the  light  of  truth  had  better  be  broken  up 
and  cast  into  the  limbo  of  forgotten  things,  for  the  day  must 
corne  when,  under  the  eye  of  calm,  cold  history,  the  sham 
will  be  exposed  to  the  shame  of  its  idolaters.  Had  General 
Lee  been  what  his  blind  admirers  claim,  he  would  have  seen 
that  the  Mississippi  dividing  the  South  in  halves  was  in  dan- 
ger .of  being  lost  to  the  Confederacy  from  a  dash  of  troops, 


(jfttyaburg.  227 

and  that  Chattanooga,  the  key  to  the  whole  situation,  was 
menaced,  and,  instead  of  an  invasion  of  Pennsylvania,  he 
would  have  been  moving  to  the  rescue  of  both  river  and 
stronghold.  President  Davis  knew,  as  did  President  Lin- 
coln, that  the  war  of  the  Confederacy  was  being  fought  in 
the  cabinets  of  Europe,  and  the  only  hope  of  eventual  suc- 
cess to  the  South  was  a  recognition  that  would  be  followed 
by  interference.  After  Lee's  brilliant  victories,  it  was  the 
better  policy  of  the  Confederacy  to  hold  the  condition  as 'it 
was.  Sooner  or  later  the  longed  for  recognition  must  come. 
Davis,  therefore,  opposed  Lee's  bold  move,  but  his  general 
had  fought  his  way  to  an  elevation  quite  above  such  control 
and  he  marched  to  his  doom. 

After  General  Meade  took  command,  the  two  armies 
went  blindly  groping  about  Pennsylvania  in  search  of  each 
other.  The  Battle  of  Gettysburg  was  an  accident.  General 
Meade,  after  getting  a  rather  uncertain  knowledge  of  the 
enemy's  whereabouts,  but  entirely  ignorant  of  the  intent, 
designated  a  position  of  considerable  natural  strength  on 
Pipe  creek,  some  fifteen  miles  south-east  from  Gettysburg. 
All  the  army  corps  were  moving  in  that  direction.  On  the 
29th  of  June,  General  Kilpatrick,  marching  his  cavalry  at  a 
leisurely  pace  in  a  north-westerly  direction  through  Liberty 
and  Tarrytown,  to  Hanover,  was  much  astonished  at  an  at- 
tack from  Stuart's  horse,  and  would  have  been  captured  but 
for  the  timely  arrival  of  General  Custer's  command.  On 
the  30th,  General  Buford,  moving  upon  Gettysburg,  en- 
countered the  van  of  Lee's  army.  Buford  was,  of  course, 
driven  back  by  the  superior  force.  But  General  Reynolds' 
1st  corps,  under  command  of  General  J.  S.  Wadsworth,  heard 
in  the  still  hot  day  of  June  the  roar  of  artillery,  hurried  for- 
ward, entered  Gettysburg,  and  driving  the  Confederates  out, 
seized  upon  and  held  the  heights  overlooking  the  town  from 
the  north-west.  General  John'F.  Reynolds  came  up  rapidly 
with  the  two  corps,  the  1st  and  llth,  marching  about  22,000 
in  all,  and  while  making  a  personal  reconnoisance,  was  killed. 
General  Abuer  Doubleday,  coming  forward  at  the  time  with 
the  whole  of  the  llth  corps,  assumed  command.  He  was 
forced  back  to  Seminary  Ridge,  immediately  west  of  Gettys- 


-2-2 S  Life  of  Thomas. 

burg.  General  O.  O.  Howard  at  this  time  joined  the  force  on 
Cemetery  Hill,  and  reaching  Doubleday,  assumed  command, 
giving  the  llth  corps  to  General  Schurz.  The  two  corps,  al- 
though admirably  posted,  were  set  upon  by  nearly  all  Lee's 
army  in  front  and  flank,  were  driven  back  through  Gettys- 
burg, and  rallied  with  difficulty  on  Cemetery  Hill,  south  of 
the  town. 

Ewell,  Rhodes,  and  Early,  the  Confederate  commanders, 
dfd  not  press  their  advantage.  They  felt  the  disadvantage  of 
being  the  invaders.  Although  Gettysburg  is  in  an  old,  well- 
settled  region,  with  an  excess  of  excellent  roads,  it  is  sur- 
rounded by  a  rough  country  with  but  a  small  part  under  cul- 
tivation. The  greater  part  is  given  up  to  a  natural  growth 
of  forest  trees.  The  Confederates,  swift  to  avail  themselves 
of  such  cover  in  Virginia,  and  so  to  conceal  their  movements, 
found  affairs  reversed.  The  same  ignorance  that  dazed 
Northern  commanders,  when  shut  out  from  view  by  dense 
woods,  confused  the  Southern  generals  in  Pennsylvania,  es- 
pecially in  the  neighborhood  of  Gettysburg.  It  was  early  in 
the  summer  afternoon  when  tlie  fighting  ceased,  but  it  ceased 
because  there  was  something  in  the  air  that  portended  the 
unexpected.  They  were  right,  the  unexpected  appeared  in 
the  person  of  General  Dan  Sickles,  with  the  corps  which  had 
reached  the  field  in  answer  to  a  summons  from  General  How- 
ard, and  in  violation  of  orders  fr_om  General  Meade.  These 
forces,  without  orders  from  their  commander-in-chief,  pos- 
sessed themselves  of  positions  that  proved  impregnable  in 
the  three  days'  desperate  fighting  that  followed.  This  term- 
inated in  Pickett's  famous  assault  and  defeat,  because  of  the 
fact  that  the  supports  called  on  to  charge  for  half  a  mile  over 
open  ground,  were  swept  by  a  murderous  artillery  fire, 
fringed  with  still  more  deadly  musketry.  For  the  second 
time  the  Confederates  were  called  upon  to  do  what  had  been 
given  the  brave  men  of  the  Union  again  and  again  to  do  on 
fields  wantonly  watered  with  their  blood  by  the  brainless 
bullet-heads  we  had  in  command. 

Lee's  army  was  gently  escorted  back  to  and  over  the  Po- 
tomac. Wearied,  half  starved,  and  out  of  ammunition,  the 
ragged  veterans  waded  in  the  mud  unmolested  by  the  vie- 


Gettysburg.  229 

torious  armies  of  the  Federal  government.  Indeed,  the  old 
order  of  McClellan  was  renewed,  and  General  Sedgwick, 
with  his  fresh  troops,  was  warned  to  so  press  the  rear  as  not 
to  fetch  on  a  general  engagement.  A  General  Kelly,  with  a 
force  of  some  thousand  men,  used  in  keeping  open  the  Balti- 
more and  Ohio,  was  on  the  further  side  of  the  Potomac,  and 
could  have  successfully  disputed  its  passage  with  Lee,  was 
complimented  by  General  Halleck  for  his  celerity  and  suc- 
cess in  keeping  out  of  the  way. 

The  loss  to  the  two  armies  in  this  Pennsylvania  cam- 
paign could  not  have  been  less  than  forty  thousand  men. 
Why  they  were  killed  and  wounded  on  either  side  puzzles 
the  understanding.  General  Lee  disavowed  any  intent  other 
than  having  a  battle  at  Gettysburg,  when  all  the  odds  were 
against  him,  and  why  the  same  fight  might  not  have  secured 
the  same  purpose  on  the  Rappahannock,  can  not  be  answered. 
The  same  may  be  said  of  the  Union  forces.  The  tenderness 
shown  the  Confederates  after  their  defeat  is  equally  without 
reason. 

"  These  Americans,"  said  the  Paris  Figaro,  "  are  fighting 
on  a  military  system  inaugurated  by  the  Kilkenny  cats. 
The  two  armies  meet  and  fight  and  slaughter  each  other  with 
the  utmost  fury.  Then  they  fell  back  and  reorganize  for  an- 
other general  massacre.  Positively,  the  war  will  end  when 
the  last  man  is  killed.'* 


230  Life  of  Thomas. 


CHAPTER  XII. 

The  Campaign  at  the  West — Grant  and  Sherman  Prepare  for  the  Descent 
Upon  Vicksburg — Three  Months  Lost  in  Getting  Rid  of  a  "  Political 
General  " — Washburne's  Support  of  Grant — Sherman's  Forces  Landed 
at  the  Mouth  of  the  Yazoo — Defenses  of  Chickasaw  Bluff. 

While  upon  the  one  side  of  the  central  Army  of  the 
Cumberland  that  of  the  Potomac  was  being  steadily  defeated 
until  the  battle  of  Gettysburg,  upon  the  other  a  huge  army 
under  Grant  was  'operating  upon  the  Mississippi.  Having 
given  in  brief  narrative  the  history  of  the  first,  we  now  turn 
to  the  forces  on  the  right. 

It  will  be  remembered,  when  the  old  soldier,  Winfield 
Scott,  was  called  upon  for  an  opinion  as  to  how  better  to  con- 
duct the  war  upon  the  Union  side,  he  condemned  the  "  On  to 
Richmond  "  project  as  ill  advised.  This  not  only  because  of 
the  well  known  axiom  that  it  is  not  wise  to  let  your  adver- 
sary select  your  ground  of  campaign,  but  for  that  he  knew 
every  inch  of  ground  between  Washington  and  Richmond, 
and  from  its  nature  every  march  along  it  presented  difficul- 
ties almost  impossible  to  overcome.  In  lieu  of  this,  he  pro- 
posed a  column  of  fifty  thousand  men  to  descend  and  open 
the  Mississippi.  Of  course,  the  possession  and  control  of  .the 
Mississippi  was  of  importance  second  only  to  the  capture  of 
Chattanooga.  Such  success  cut  the  Confederacy  in  a  way 
that  paralyzed  one-half  the  territory  the  government  at 
Richmond  looked  to  for  men  and  supplies.  Could  this  have 
been  accomplished  early  in  the  war,  it  would  have  gone  far 
toward  terminating  the  armed  conflict.  But,  at  the  time 
when  General  Scott  offered  this  as  an  objective  point,  it  was 
as  far  beyond  our  reach  as  military  talent  seemed  to  be. 
Our  hastily  constructed  navy,  inland  and  at  sea,  had  not  yet 
been  developed,  and  the  possibility  of  running  past  forts,  and 
so  rendering  them  unavailable,  had  not  been  tried. 

In  suggesting  the  descent  of  a  column  of  fifty  thousand 


Natural  Features  of  the  Mississippi.  231 

men  down  the  Mississippi  at  the  time,  General  Scott  showed 
an  ignorance  of  that  mighty  river,  and  the  country  through 
which  it  flows,  hard  to  recognize  in  a  man  of  average  infor- 
mation and  intelligence.  In  ordinary  stages  of  water,  the 
Mississippi  flows  through  swamps  on  one  side  and  bluffs 
upon  the  other,  and  when  flooded,  an  event  that  happens 
every  year,  the  mighty  river  sweeping  away  all  barriers,  be- 
comes a  great  inland  sea.  To  attack  from  the  interior,  and 
descend  with  an  army,  presented  obstacles  far  more  fatal 
than  any  between  Washington  and  Richmond.  To  attempt 
this  with  transports,  was  to  have  sunk  such  by  batteries  at 
Columbus,  Fort  Pillow,  Memphis,  Helena,  Vicksburg,  Grand 
Gulf,  and  Port  Hudson,  on  one  side  or  the  other,  and  to 
march  by  land  was  equally  fatal,  because  of  the  utter 
impossibility  of  finding  lines  bearing  upon  the  river  that 
could  be'  relied  on  in  a  campaign.  We  have  a  clearer  state- 
ment of  the  condition  in  the  memoirs  of  General  J.  H.  Wil- 
son, of  the  engineers,  who  writes : 

"All  the  way  from  Cairo  to  New  Orleans  the  Mississippi 
meanders  through  a  vast  alluvial  region,  the  whole  of  which 
is  annually  overflowed,  except  where  levees  have  afforded  a 
partial  barrier.  This  great  basin  is  nearly  fifty  miles  in 
width,  and  extends  on  the  east  to  the  upland  plains  of  Ten- 
nessee and  Mississippi,  while  on  the  west  it  is  bounded  by 
the  lesser  elevation  of  drift  alone.  The  bluffs  that  form  the 
escarpment  of  the  eastern  plains  are  usually  quite  steep  and 
thickly  overgrown  with  timber,  underbrush,  and  vines.  At 
various  points  in  its  course,  the  river  touches  one  extremity 
or  the  other  of  the  bottom  land,  washing  the  base  of  the 
bluffs  and  often  cutting  deep  into  the  soft  strata.  Columbus, 
Fort  Pillow,  Memphis,  Helena,  Vicksburg,  Grand  Gulf,  and 
Port  Hudson  are  points  of  this  kind,  and  rise  from  eighty  to 
two  hundred  feet  above  the  freshets. 

u  The  alluvial  region  throughout  its  entire  extent  is 
higher  near  the  banks  of  the  river,  and  falls  off  gradually 
till  it  reaches  the  line  of  the  bluff;  the  drainage  is  therefore 
toward  the  hills,  and  is  the  source  of  the  intricate  net- work 
of  bayous  for  which  the  basin  is  remarkable.  The  Cold- 
water,  the  Tallahatchie,  the  Yazoo,  the  Washita,  the  Red 


232  Life  of  Thomas. 

• 

and  Atchafalaya  rivers,  besides  numerous  other  creeks  and 
smaller  streams,  are  accordingly  nothing  more  than  huge 
side  drains.  During  freshets  the  water  that  breaks  over  the 
Mississippi  banks  or  through  the  crevasses  flows  through  cy- 
press swamps  and  a  labyrinth  of  bayous  till  it  reaches  the 
bluffs,  and  is  again  forced  back  into  the  parent  stream. 

"  Besides  the  bayous,  crescent-shaped  lakes,  the  sole  re- 
mains of  the  ancient  meanderings  of  the  river,  abound  on 
both  sides,  often  at  considerable  distance  from  the  present 
channel.  The  forests  of  the  alluvial  region  are  extremely 
luxuriant  and  dense;  cottonwood,  tulip,  sweet  gum,  magno- 
lia, sycamore,  and  ash  are  found,  with  an  almost  impenetra- 
ble jungle  of  cane  and  vine.  '  The  cypress  swamps  that  oc- 
cupy the  lower  portions  of  the  bottom  are  nearly  always  un- 
der water,  and  this,  with  the  slimy  character  of  the  soil  and 
the  treacherous  beds  and  slippery  steep  banks  of  the  bayous, 
renders  the  country  almost  impassable  in  summer,  and  en- 
tirely so,  except  by  boats,  in  winter." 

"When  to  these  topographical  obstacles  we  add  that 
of  climate,  so  injurious  to  the  native  born  and  fatal  to 
Northern  men,  we  can  well  believe  that  the  Confederates 
were  quite  willing  to  have  the  government  at  Washington 
try  conclusions  upon  the  Mississippi.  The  capture  of  New 
Orleans  and  the  fall  of  Memphis  shortened  the  line  of  river 
to  be  seized  and  held,  but  did  not  lessen  the  difficulties  of 
such  a  conquest.  It  fell  to  the  lot  of  General  U.  S.  Grant  to 
make  this  wild  and  desperate  endeavor.  Admitting  that  in 
the  end  he  did  achieve  a  questionable  triumph  in  this  direc- 
tion, one,  after  a  careful  study  of  the  facts,  is  forced  to  the 
uncomplimentary  conclusion  that,  had  he  possessed  more 
sense,  he  would  have  been  less  successful.  Of  all  the  gen- 
erals who  achieved  notoriety  during  the  civil  war,  he  is  the 
one  whose  career  as  a  soldier  will  bear  the  least  scrutiny. , 
Of  a  coarse  fiber,  no  culture,  and  of  limited  intelligence, 
his  memory  serves  to  illustrate  either  that  his  fame  rests 
on  newspaper  fiction,  fostered  by  political  partisanship,  or 
that,  to  be  a  successful  military  man,  a  marked  lack  of  intel- 
lectual qualities  is  a  necessity.  We  have  seen  how  at  Shiloh 
he  suffered  a  surprise  and  merciless  slaughter  in  the  enemy's 


Chara>-t( ri<tics  of  Grant.  233 

country;  how  at  Fort  Henry  lie  failed  to  have  his  forces  on 
hand  to  reap  the  fruits  of  Commodore  Foote's  victory ;  how 
at  Fort  Donelson  he  absented  himself  mysteriously  from  the 
field  at  the  critical  moment  when  the  Confederates,  cutting 
their  way  out,  could  have  been  captured  to  a  man.  History 
now  tells  us  that  in  the  combined  operation  against  Price 
and  Van  Dorn,  he  failed  to  co-operate  and  enabled  Price  to 
march  oft'  three  miles  and  fall  with  his  full  weight  of  over- 
whelming numbers  upon  Rosecrans,  who  subsequently  de- 
feated Van  Dorn  at  Corinth  without  Grant's  aid,  although 
the  Confederates  had  double  the  force  that  our  general  of 
real  military  genius  had  under  him.  It  is  strange  that  so 
unsuccessful  a  general  should  be  able  to  retain  the  confidence 
of  the  War  Department  at  Washington,  that  must  have 
known  of  his  blunders  and  habits. 

There  is  a  solution  to  this  mystery  found  in  the  name 
and  career  of  Elihu  Benjamin  Washburne,  a  remarkable 
man  of  Maine  birth  and  parentage  and  New  England  train- 
ing and  culture,  if  that  word  can  be  applied  to  a  coarse, 
strong  man,  who  made  up  in  cunning  all  that  he  lost  in 
brain.  From  early  life  to  the  close  of  his  public  career,  he 
was  a  most  successful  politician.  To  great  strength  of  char- 
acter he  added  a  purity  of  motive  as  rare  as  it  was  admira- 
ble in  the  time  when  frauds  in  public  office  began  to  organ- 
ize for  plunder  upon  a  helpless  people,  exhausted  and  dazed 
by  one  of  the  bloodiest  wars  that  ever  poor  humanity  suf- 
fered. A  lawyer  by  profession,  Washburne  soon  passed  to 
the  more  congenial  pursuit  of  politics,  and  in  Illinois,  where 
he  opened  a  law  office,  soon  grew  to  be  a  noted  and  influen- 
tial leader.  He  was  returned  to  Congress  so  frequently  that 
he  came  to  be  the  father  of  the  House,  and  was  widely  noted 
for  his  jealous  guardianship  of  the  public  treasury. 

The  Hon.  Elihu  B.  Washburne  had  little  interest  in  and 
less  knowledge  of  war.  But,  in  common  with  many,  he  was 
well  aware  that  out  of  that  war,  if  successful,  would  come  a 
military  leader  to  claim  the  recognition  of  the  people  he  had 
served,  and  Elihu  resolved  to  be  the  patron  and  friend  of 
that  man.  He  selected  Grant,  and  his  choice  was  as  strange 
as  his  faithful  support  was  without  parallel.  Here  was  a 


284  Life  of  Thomas. 

man  forced  from  the  old  army  because  of  his  habits,  who 
had  risen  only  to  the  rank  of  captain  in  the  service, 
and  an  utter  failure  in  all  that  he  attempted  as  a  means 
of  subsistence  in  civil  life.  Through  all  his  early  mili- 
tary career,  as  a  small  farmer  near  St.  Louis,  as  a  clerk 
at  Galena,  he  not  only  gave  no  evidence  of  ability  of  any 
sort,  but  no  one  of  his  associates  or  family  ever  suspected 
him  of  aught  beyond  the  dullest  common  place;  and  yet, 
through  good  and  evil  report,  the  Hon.  Elihu  stood  by  his 
protege.  It  was  a  powerful  support.  Not  only  the  Presi- 
dent, but  the  Secretary  of  War,  regarded  Washburne  as  a 
man  of  sterling  integrity,  as  well  as  a  politician  whose  fol- 
lowing among  the  people  was  so  earnest  that  he  was  a  power 
at  Washington  not  to  be  neglected  or  slighted.  Every  pro- 
motion gained  by  Grant  was  really  given  by  Washburne. 
Once  only  he  faltered,  and  that  was  when  he  learned  that, 
after  a  frightful  assault  on  Vicksburg,  Grant  left  his  dead  to 
rot  and  his  wounded  to  writhe  in  agony  on  the  outer  slopes 
of  the  enemy's  works  for  three  days,  under  the  hot  summer 
sun  of  that  horrible  climate.  Washburne  sought  Lincoln 
with  the  pitiable  tale.  He  would  carry  the  responsibility  no 
longer. 

"  Elihu,"  said  the  President,  much  moved,  as  he  put  his 
hand  on  the  politician's  shoulder,  "  it  is  a  bad  business,  but 
we  must  try  the  man  a  little  longer.  He  seems  a  pushing 
fellow,  with  all  his  faults." 

It  takes  one  woman  and  several  men  to  make  a  celeb- 
rity, and  Grant  had  in  Washington  a  host.  We  will  find,  as 
we  progress  with  the  story  of  Vicksburg,  that  it  was  lucky 
for  General  Grant  that  telegraphic  facilities  were  so  incom- 
plete between  the  War  Department  and  the  fields  in  the 
Mississippi,  that  the  people  at  Washington  knew  as  little 
of  operations  about  Vicksburg  as  the  public  knows  to-day. 
Had  the  frightful  blunders,  the  fearful  mortality,  reached 
the  administration,  Grant  would  have  been  superseded  in 
the  first  month  of  his  campaign.  But  of  this  hereafter. 

The  fall  of  Forts  Henry  and  Donelsoji  with  the  subse- 
quent evacuation  of  Nashville,  the  credit  for  all  of  which  was 
given  Grant,  restored  the  rough  soldier  to  confidence  and 


First  Move  on    Vicksburg.  235 

made  Washburne's  efforts  in  his  behalf  more  easy.  We 
must  also  bear  in  mind  that  Halleck,  the  military  ad- 
viser of  the  President,  co-operated  with  Washburne  in  the 
promotion  of  Grant,  not  from  any  confidence  he  had  in  the 
man  or  love  for  him  personally,  but  merely  because  he  found 
the  President  and  Secretary  of  War  so  inclined.  It  was  the 
force  of  discipline  that  made  the  superior  officer  infallible  and 
all-powerful.  Therefore,  in  July,  when  Halleck  was  ordered 
to  Washington,  he  restored  Grant  to  command  of  his  former 
troops  with  head-quarters  at  Corinth.  From  this  place  Grant 
wrote  Halleck,  proposing  an  advance  along  the  Mississippi 
Central  Railroad  with  Vicksburg  as  an  objective  point. 
That  meant  an  attack  upon  an  army  of  thirty  thousand  men, 
the  defeat  of  which  made  Vicksburg  untenable.  On  2d  No- 
vember, 1862,  Grant  informed  Halleck  that  he  had  com- 
menced a  movement  on  Grand  Junction  with  three  divisions 
from  Corinth  and  two  from  Bolivar,  and  that  he  would  leave 
the  next  day  and  take  command  in  person.  If  found  practica- 
ble he  would  go  to  Holly  Springs  and  perhaps  to  Grenada, 
completing  railroads  as  he  marched. 

To  this  Halleck  replied :  "  I  approve  your  plan  of  ad- 
vancing on  the  enemy  as  soon  as  you  are  strong  enough  for 
that  purpose."  On  4th  November,  Grant,  having  marched 
to  Grand  Junction,  ordered  Sherman  to  co-operate  by  mov- 
ing two  divisions  from  Memphis,  but  on  the  8th  he  informed 
Sherman  that  he  estimated  Pemberton'3  force  at  thirty  thou- 
sand, and  that  he  felt  "  strong  enough  to  handle  that  num- 
ber without  gloves."  Therefore,  he  countermanded  the 
march  from  Memphis. 

Although  his  plan  of  advance  along  the  Mississippi  Cen- 
tral Railroad  had  been  approved  at  Washington,  and  he  had 
taken  the  initiative  in  that  direction,  there  came  a  sudden 
halt.  An  obstacle  appeared  so  potent  that  it  at  once  arrested 
all  movements.  General  Adam  Badeau  in  his  military  his- 
tory of  General  Grant,  with  a  naivete  that  is  charming, 
plausibly  tells  us  that  this  potent  obstacle  to  the  movement 
of  a  hundred  thousand  men  came  in  the  form  of  what  Gen- 
eral Badeau  is  pleased  to  call  a  "  political  general."  John 
A.  McClernand  had  entered  the  service  from -civil  life.  This 


236  Life  of  Thomas. 

was  objectionable,  but  when  he  exhibited  a  natural  turn  for 
soldiering,  governed  by  an  abundance  of  common  sense, 
the  objection  became  fatal,  and  Grant,  Sherman  and  Halleck 
united  in  not  only  condemnation,  but  in  a  most  astonishing 
manner  they  all  sought  to  baffle  and  cold-shoulder  the  am- 
bitious civilian  from  the  service*  While  moving  his  army 
as  he  had  outlined  to  Halleck  he  learned  through  the  pub- 
lic journals  that  General  John  A.  McClernand  had  been  au- 
thorized to  organize  a  column  to  open  the  Mississippi  river. 
This  was  precisely  what  Grant  and  Sherman  had  on  hand. 
The  two  West  Pointers  learned  to  their  dismay  that  this  was 
President  Lincoln's  project,  and  although  Halleck  disap- 
proved, the  obstinate  commander-in-chief  of  ,  all  our  naval 
and  military  forces  persisted.  He  would  have  the  Mississippi 
opened  by  his  friend  from  Illinois,  and  nobody  else,  and  in 
his  friend's  own  time  and  way. 

Grant  saw  with  consternation  that  if  he  continued  and 
defeated  Pemberton,  and  thus  made  Vicksburg  unten- 
able, this  political  general  would  sweep  down  the  Missis- 
sippi unmolested,  and  not  only  occupy  Vickeburg,  but  grasp 
the  glory  reserved  for  himself.  It  is  a  monstrous  proposition, 
and  one  could  well  doubt  it,  were  it  not  told  in  the  very  vol- 
ume prepared  by  Badeau  and  approved  by  Grant,  and  from 
this  unquestionable  source  we  learn  that  the  objective  point 
shifted  from  Pemberton  and  his  Confederate  army  to  Mc- 
Clernand, and  the  President's  column  organized  to  open  the 
Mississippi.  Immediately  all  movements  looking  to  the 
proposed  march  along  the  Mississippi  Central  Railroad  came 
to  a  halt. 

The  descent  of  the  Mississippi  and  an  attack  from  ^the 
river  upon  Vicksburg  was  an  idiotic  project,  lifted  into  a 
horror  by  the  loss  of  ninety  thousand  brave  men  needlessly 
sacrificed.  The  plan  of  campaign  made  by  Grant  was  not 
only  admirable,  but  in  fact  the  only  one  that  had  a  show  of 
reason.  The  Confederate  War  Department,  believing  that 
Vicksburg  could  be  attacked  only  from  the  river,  had  failed 
to  furnish  either  a  general  or  an  army  for  successful  opera- 
tion in  the  field.  Thirty  thousand  men  under  Pemberton 
might  possibly  have  been  augmented  to  forty  thousand,  and 


Grant  Move*  on  McClernand.  237 

with  Pemberton  superseded  by  Joseph  E.  Johnston  a  gen- 
eral would  be  had  capable  of  resistance. . 

As  the  political  general  loomed  more  clearly  into  sight 
the  movement  along  the  Mississippi  Central -Rail road  not  only 
came  to  a  halt,  but  Grant's  objective  point  shifted  from  Pem- 
berton  to  McClernand.  In  this  he  was  encouraged  by  Hal- 
leek.  Indeed,  all  West  Point  officers  put  aside  their  personal 
differences  and  united  heartily  in  opposing  and  if  possible 
sacrificing  any  one  from  civil  life  who  presumed  to  an  in- 
dependent command.  It  was  to  give  Grant  a  hint  that,  on 
the  5th  of  November,  Halleck  telegraphed :  "  Had  not 
troops  sent  to  reinforce  you  better  go  to  Memphis  hereafter  ? 
I  hope  to  give  twenty  thousand  additional  men  in  a  few- 
days."  To  this  Grant  responded  in  a  tentative  manner : 
"  Reinforcements  are  arriving  very  slowly.  If  they  don't 
come  in  more  rapidly  I  will  attack  as  I  am." 

This  sounds  strange  in  the  presence  of  the  fact  that  only 
the  day  before  he  had  sent  Sherman  back  to  Memphis  with 
two  divisions,  informing  his  lieutenant  that  he  could  handle 
Pemberton  with  the  troops  he  had.  The  next  day,  growing 
unhappy  over  McCleruand,  and  more  uneasy  about  him 
than  Pemberton,  he  telegraphed  Halleck  :  "Am  I  to  under- 
stand that  I  lie  here  while  an  expedition  is  fitted  out  for 
Memphis,  or  do  you  want  me  to  push  as  far  south  as  pos- 
sible ?  Am  I  to  leave  Sherman  subject  to  my  orders,  or  is 
he  and  his  force  reserved  for  some  especial  service?" 

It  will  be  remembered  that  Grant  had  volunteered  to 
move  south  along  the  railroad  and  handle  Pemberton.  To 
this  project  the  War  Department  assented  and  expected,  of 
course,  the  handling  to  begin.  Halleck  promptly  responded : 
"  You  have  command  of  all  the  troops  sent  to  your  depart- 
ment, and  have  permission  to  fight  the  enemy  when  you 
please."  At  this  Grant  concluded  he  had  disposed  of  the 
"  political  general,"  and  on  the  14th  informed  Sherman  :  "1 
have  now  complete  control  of  my  department."  His  de- 
partment was  precisely  the  same  as  before,  less  McClernand. 
He  continues,  "  Move  with  two  divisions  of  twelve  full  regi- 
ments each,  and,  if  possible,  with  three  divisions,  to  Oxford 
and  Tallahatchie  as  soon  as  possible.  I  am  ready  to  move 


238  Lift  of  Thomas. 

from  here  (La  Grange)  any  day,  and  only  wait  your  move- 
ments." 

Thus,  with  the  pestiferous  "  political  general "  out- 
maneuvered,  Grant  turned  his  attention  to  the  enemy.  The 
strange  delay  caused  by  thus  moving  on  Washington,  instead 
of  Vicksburg,  had  awakened  the  Confederates  to  their  dan- 
ger. An  army  of  a  hundred  thousand  men  moving  along 
the  Central  Railroad  could  not  well  be  met  by  a  force  under 
Pemberton  of  only  eight  thousand  men.  Had  Grant  clung 
to  this  plan  of  a  campaign,  it  would  have  been  as  bloodless 
as  was  Sherman's  subsequent  march  through  Georgia  to  the 
sea  with  the  army  of  ninety  thousand  men  saved  from  the 
doom  of  graves  in  swamps  and  bayous  about  Vicksburg. 

The  movement  began.  The  forces  at  Helena  were  or- 
dered by  Halleck  to  co-operate  by  crossing  the  Mississippi  at 
Helena  and  cutting  the  Central  Railroad  in  Pemberton's 
rear.  The  campaign  from  the  interior  was  well  under  way 
when  the  ghost  of  the  "  political  general  "  appeared  to  startle 
Grant.  "On  the  25th,  Halleck  again,"  says  Badeau  ap- 
proved by  Grant,  "broached  that  dismal  river  expedition, 
doubtless  urged  on  by  President  Lincoln.  He  inquired  how 
many  men  Grant  had  in  his  department,  and  what  force 
could  be  sent  down  the  river  to  Vicksburg."  Grant  replied 
that  he  had  "  in  all  72,000  men,  of  whom  18,000  were  at 
Memphis,  and  16,000  of  these  could  be  spared  for  the  river 
expedition."  Halleck  followed  this  information  by  tele- 
graphing to  Grant  that  he  had  given  orders  for  the  advance 
of  all  the  forces  under  his  command,  that  he  had  written 
Steele  in  Arkansas  to  threaten  Grenada,  and  had  asked  Ad- 
miral Porter  to  send  boats  to  co-operate  at  the  mouth  of  the 
Yazoo.  He  concluded  by  asking,  "  Shall  I  countermand 
the  order  for  this  move?"  Of  course  Halleck  responded, 
"  No."  This  expedition  of  McClernand,  except  that  Grant 
had  been  called  on  for  men  to  make  it  practicable,  had  noth- 
ing to  do  with  Grant's  proposed  campaign  in  the  mind  of 
the  administration  at  Washington.  The  army  did  move.  It 
accomplished  a  march  of  twenty-five  miles  in  twenty-three 
days,  but  its  commander  had  lost  all  interest  in  the  move- 
ment. While  the  Confederate  government,  alarmed  at  the 


Grant  Plotting  Against  McClernand.  231) 

menacing  danger,  was  straining  every  resource  to  put  in  the 
field  another  army  equal  to  the  emergency,  the  admirably 
planned  campaign  was  abandoned,  and  the  high  resolve  died 
out.  On  the  5th  December,  we  find  him  telegraphing  to 
Ilalleck :  "  How  far  south  would  you  like  me  to  go  ?  " 
About  the  same  time,  to  indicate  his  entire  abandonment  of 
his  original  plan,  he  suggested  to  Halleck  that  "  if  the  Helena 
troops  were  at  my  command,  I  think  it  would  be  practicable 
to  send  Sherman  to  take  them  and  the  Memphis  forces  south 
of  the  Yazoo  river,  and  thus  to  secure  Vicksburg  and  the 
state  of  Mississippi."  This  meant  to  turn  his  back  on  Pem- 
berton.  Halleck,  good  easy  Halleck,  sharing  in  Grant's 
horror  of  a  political  general,  acquiesced,  and  so  Grant 
marched  Sherman  back  to  Memphis  to  command  an  expedi- 
tion that  would  reduce  Vicksburg  from  the  river.  Grant 
promised  co-operation.  How,  one  is  at  a  loss  to  compre- 
hend, and  as  it  was  not  given,  we  can  well  believe  Grant 
did  not  comprehend  himself.  He  said  to  Sherman  :  "  Pro- 
ceed to  reduce  Vicksburg,  assisted  by  the  gun-boats,  and  I 
will  hold  the  forces  here  in  readiness  to  co-operate  with  you 
in  such  manner  as  the  movements  of  the  enemy  make  neces- 
sary." 

It  seems  so  monstrous  now,  looking  back  upon  the 
events,  to  attribute  such  a  motive  to  General  Grant  as  that 
found  in  the  presence  and  purpose  of  General  McClernand, 
that  we  would  hesitate  even  an  intimation  of  it  were  it  not 
that  Badeau,  General  Grant's  accepted  historian,  in  a  work 
that  was  submitted  by  the  author  to  the  general  himself  and 
by  him  indorsed,  tells  us : 

"Grant  was  still  anxious  lest  McClernaud  should  obtain 
the  command  of  the  river  expedition,  and,  therefore,  had 
hxirried  Sherman  to  Memphis  on  the  very  day  that  he  secured 
the  authority,  so  that,  if  possible,  the  latter  might  start  be- 
fore McClernand  could  arrive.  Halleck,  too,  sent  the  per- 
mission without  that  deliberation  which  he  sometimes  dis- 
played." 

Thus  it  is  put  to  historical  record,  and  sanction  by  Gen- 
eral Grant,  that  all  the  halts,  hesitation,  and  eventual  aban- 
donment of  a  wise  campaign  for  one  that  proved  the  most 


240  Life  of  Thomas. 

disastrous  of  the  war,  had  their  origin  in  the  jealousy  of  a 
brother  officer  and  the  desperate  resolve  to  defeat  his  am- 
bitious designs,  let  the  cost  be  what  it  might.  Grant  was 
correct  in  his  surmise.  Had  he  persisted  in  his  campaign 
through  the  interior  of  Mississippi,  his  success  would  have 
been  the  evacuation  of  Vicksburg  and  the  triumphant  occu- 
pation of  it  by  his  rival. 

To  appreciate  the  pitiful  meanness  of  this  conspiracy, 
to  use  the  mildest  term,  where  a  hundred  thousand  lives 
were  involved  and  a  loss  of  at  least  ten  millions  to  the  gov- 
ernment threatened,  one  has  only  to  suppose  George  II. 
Thomas  in  the  place  of  Grant.  What  a  remonstrance  would 
have  gone  to  "Washington  against  any  river  expedition  until 
after  the  occupation  of  the  field  in  Mississippi  had  at  least 
divided  the  Confederate  armies,  and  if  this  were  persisted  in, 
what  haste  would  have  been  given  in  hearty  co-operation  to 
make  the  desperate  river  expedition  a  success.  The  man 
whose  high  sense  of  honor  held  his  ambition  under  calm 
control,  whose  lofty  patriotism  annihilated  self,  and,  above 
all,  whose  tender  love  of  the  men  whose  lives  were  in  his 
keeping  made  him  strike  only  when  he  knew  his  blow  would 
be  fatal,  towers  Mke  the  eagle  in  his  pride  of  place  above 
the  mousing  owls  our  poor  country's  misfortune  had  given 
command. 

On  the  20th  of  December,  a  most  disgraceful  disaster 
was  seized  on  by  Grant  as  a  justification  of  his  change  of 
plans.  On  that  day,  Van  Dorn's  cavalry  made  an  expected 
descent  on  Holly  Springs,  and  destroyed  all  the  supplies  for 
the  army  collected  at  that  place.  The  value  in  money 
amounted  to  over  two  millions;  in  the  loss  to  the  army,  it 
was  incalculable.  We  say  the  attack  was  expected,  for 
Grant's  defense,  in  Badeau's  Confessions,  is  based  on  the 
warning  he  sent  to  the  miserable  Colonel  Murphy,  who  sur- 
rendered his  little  force  without  a  blow  to  overwhelming 
numbers. 

One  readily  learns  the  strength  of  the  Washburne  influ- 
ence at  Washington  from  this  event.  Had'any  other  general 
in  the  army  bejan  guilty  of  such  a  shameful  disaster,  he  would 
have  found  himself  at  least  relegated  to  the  rear,  if  he  es- 


Grant  Loses  His  Depot.  241 

caped  a  court  of  inquiry.  While  the  War  Department  was 
growling  and  grumbling  over  Rosecrans  because  of  his  delay 
in  repairing  railroads  and  fortifying  Nashville  and  Murfrees- 
boro  for  the  better  security  for  his  stores,  General  Grant  is 
permitted  to  waste  a  like  time  in  meaningless  marches,  and 
end  by  having  his  depot  of  supplies  swept  away,  and  his 
campaign,  approved  of  by  the  government,  rendered  of  no 
avail  for  at  least  two  months  to  come.  He  was  not  even  rep- 
rimanded, the  War  Department  finding  relief  in  cashiering 
the  cowardly  Murphy  for  not  dying  in  defense  of  supplies 
his  general  had  left  unprotected. 

After  this,  Grant  abandoned  his  proposed  campaign 
along  the  line  of  the  Central  Mississippi  Railroad,  contem- 
plated at  the  best  season  of  the  year,  for  the  roads  were  good, 
and  took  up  the  river  expedition,  that  he  might  wrest  it  from 
the  hands  of  the  political  general.  To  appreciate  this,  we 
must  remember  that  the  plan  of  campaign  did  not  at  first 
include  the  river  expedition.  Sherman,  with  two  divisions, 
was  put  in  the  field  to  co-operate  with  his  general.  These 
movements,  we  have  seen,  were  closed  up  when  McClernand 
appeared.  Sherman,  with  these  divisions,  had  joined  Grant 
south  of  the  Tallahatchie,  and  then  he  was  suddenly  marched 
back,  as  Badeau  informs  us,  to  take  the  river  expedition 
from  McClernand.  This  was  defeated  by  special  orders  from 
President  Lincoln  putting  McCleruaud  in  command.  Noth- 
ing would  defeat  this  but  a  return  to  Memphis  by  Grant. 
"  Since  Sherman  was  not  to  command  it,  he  was  anxious  to 
do  it  himself."  To  this  end  the  entire  army,  with  all  the 
supplies  left  to  it,  marched  back  to  Memphis.  He  got  there 
in  time  to  send  Sherman  dow.n  the  Mississippi  before  the 
hated  and  dreaded  McClernand  could  put  in  an  appearance. 
This  expedition  was  composed  of  42,000  men  in  58  steam- 
boats, and  Commodore  Porter's  fleet  of  gunboats  carrying 
280  guns  and  800  men. 

We  learn  from  Sherman's  Memoirs  that  the  preparations 
were  hasty.     Of  course  they  were.     The  dreadful  McCler- 
naud  was  expected  daily  with  the  order  of  the  President  in 
his  pocket.     General  Sherman  says  : 
16 


242  Life  of  Thomas. 

"The  preparations  were  necessarily  hasty  in  the  ex- 
treme, but  this  was  the  essence  of  the  whole  plan,  viz.,  to 
reach  Vicksburg,  as  it  were,  by  surprise,  while  General  Grant 
held  in  check  Pemberton's  army  at  Grenada,  leaving  me  to 
contend  with  the  smaller  garrison  at  Vicksburg  and  its  well 
known  strong  batteries  and  defenses." 

The  phrase  of  "  as  it  were  "  is  good,  but  not  so  suggest- 
ive as  "  its  well  known  strong  batteries  and  defenses."  The 
Confederates  at  Richmond,  as  well  as  at  Vicksburg,  were 
surprised  that  any  such  insane  and  murderous  attempt  would 
be  made.  The  grand  Sherman  combination  descended  the 
river  unmolested.  In  his  memoirs,  the  hero  of  defeat  says 
that  the  sight  was  grand.  The  continuous  roar  of  the  high- 
pressure  steamboats,  fifth-eight  in  number,  sounded  like  so 
many  monsters  breathing  defiance  to  the  foe.  Crowded  with 
brave  men  being  led  to  the  slaughter,  the  many  bands  on 
each  boat  made  the  air  vibrate  under  the  bass  of  the  steam- 
boats' bellow  and  the  dash  of  wheels,  and  composed  a  sym- 
phony of  death  long  to  be  remembered  by  those  who  sur- 
vived. 

The  Shermans  that  are  more  full  of  go  without  the  nec- 
essary ballast  of  brain,  who  mistake  the  confidence  of  con^ 
ceit  for  the  confidences  of  genius,  are  common  to  all  armies. 
The  governments,  however,  are  not  many  that  are  willing  to 
trust  such  with  the  lives  of  brave  men  and  the  destinies  of 
empires.  It  remains  for  us  to  be  remarkable  as  the  only 
people  found  willing  to  elevate  such  into  heroes,  and  build 
monuments  to  their  memories  above  the  graves  of  the  wan- 
tonly slaughtered  thousands  on  thousands. 

Sherman's  army  was  landed  on  an  island  at  the  mouth 
of  the  Yazoo.  We  may  well  suppose  the  martial  strains  of 
military  music  died  out  in  the  awful  presence  of  the  work 
before  them.  The  island  that  received  the  doomed  men  is 
formed  by  the  Yazoo,  the  Mississippi,  and  bayous,  and  lies 
opposite  to  the  place  known  as  Chickasaw  Bluffs.  The 
Chickasaw  range,  further  up,  changes  its  name  to  Haine's 
Bluff,  close  under  which  the  Yazoo  in  two  places  runs  in 
twelve  and  twenty  miles  above  Vicksburg,  so  that  Haine's 
Bluff  closed  the  Yazoo  from  our  gun-boats.  The  winding 


Chickasaw  Bluffs.  243 

Yazoo  forms  the  boundary  of  the  island  on  the  north.  A 
deep  bayou,  the  Chickasaw,  serves  the  same  purpose  on  the 
north-east,  a  deep,  sluggish  stream  running  from  the  Yazoo 
toward  Chickasaw  Bluffs  to  what  is  known  as  Old  river, 
which  runs  between  the  island  and  the  bluffs  to  the  Mis- 
sissippi at  Vicksburg.  The  island  is  scarred  with  bayous 
and  dotted  with  lagoons  and  swamps.  Nearly  all  of  it  is  ten 
feet  under  water  during  floods.  The  only  part  of  this  dis- 
mal swamp  of  death  that  presented  a  possible  approach  to 
the  enemy's  works,  was  below  Chickasaw  bayou,  fronting 
Chickasaw  Bluffs,  and  that  by  narrow  causeways  over  Old 
river,  each  swept  by  concentrated  tire.  On  the  side  next  the 
bluffs  was  a  levee  to  keep  Old  river  from  a  strip  of  land  be- 
tween it  and  the  hills.  This  was  an  imposing  parapet,  well 
lined  with  infantry.  This  levee  was  not  only  a  fortification, 
but  it  served  to  cover  the  road  that  ran  parallel  to  and  under  it 
so  that  troops  could  be  marched  without  exposure  from  end 
to  end.  On  the  face  of  the  bluff  rising  tier  upon  tier  were 
rifle  trenches  until  the  crest  was  reached,  and  there  artillery 
was  planted  so  as  to  sweep  with  round  shot  and  shell  all  the 
spaces  in  front.  The  best  artillery  from  Krupp's  works  in 
Germany  crowned  their  heights.  For  nearly  a  year  the 
slaves  of  Vicksburg  had  been  worked  under  intelligent  su- 
pervision, it  being  well  known  that  these  defenses  held  the 
Mississippi.  It  is  not  to  be  wondered  at,  therefore,  that  the 
War  Department  at  Richmond  felt  relieved  when  it  learned 
that  instead  of  a  sensible  campaign  in  the  rear  that  would 
have  turned  Vicksburg,  the  front  had  been  selected,  where, 
owing  to  the  natural  and  artificial  defenses,  ten  thousand 
men  were  as  effective  as  ten  hundred  thousand;  in  a  word, 
that  the  place  was  as  impregnable  as  Gibralter,  as  in  the  end, 
under  Grant,  it  was  found  to  be. 

To  save  ourselves  from  the  charge  of  exaggeration,  we 
quote  from  Sherman's  Report.  He  says  : 

"  Immediately  in  our  front  was  a  bayou,  passable  only  at 
two  points,  on  a  narrow  levee  or  sandbar,  which  was  per- 
fectly commanded  by  the  enemy's  sharpshooters  that  lined 
the  levee  or  parapet  on  its  opposite  bank.  Behind  this  was 
an  irregular  strip  of  bench  or  table  land,  on  which  were  con- 


244  Life  of  Thomas. 

structed  a  series  of  rifle  pits  and  batteries,  and  behind  that  a 
high,  abrupt  range  of  hills,  whose  scarred  sides  were  marked 
all  the  way  up  with  rifle  trenches,  and  the  crowns  of  the 
principal  hills  presented  heavy  batteries. 

"  The  country  road  leading  from  Vicksburg  to  Yazoo 
City  runs  along  the  foot  of  these  hills,  and  answered  an  ad- 
mirable purpose  to  the  enemy  as  a  covered  way,  along  which 
he  moved  his  artillery  and  infantry,  promptly  to  meet  us  at 
any  point  at  which  we  attempted  to  pass  this  difficult  bayou. 
Nevertheless,  that  bayou,  with  its  levee  parapets,  backed  by 
the  line  of  rifle  pits,  batteries,  and  frowning  hills,  had  to  be 
passed  before  we  could  reach  terra  jirma,  and  meet  our  en- 
emy on  any  thing  like  fair  terms." 

To  demonstrate  after  the  bloody  event  that  to  carry 
these  blufts  by  assault  was  an  impossibility  Sherman  gives  us 
a  condition  that  he  must  have  known  in  advance.  Unfor- 
tunately for  the  army  the  brave  men  under  his  command 
were  not  veterans,  or  they  would  have  thrown  down  their 
muskets,  as  they  subsequently  did  at  Cold  Harbor,  and  told 
their  officers  that  if  they  wished  to  assault,  to  do  so  them- 
selves. The  noble  fellows  of  the  rank  and  file  were  new  to 
war,  and  never  for  an  instant  believed  their  general  com- 
manding would  send  them  in  to  death  without  hope  of  suc- 
cess, as  he  did  since,  to  shield  himself  from  censure — in  cold 
words,  he  tells  the  world  that  the  place  could  not  be  taken 
by  assault. 

We  are  not  called  on  to  give  the  sickening  details  of  the 
horrible  slaughter.  Sherman  would  not  be  Sherman  did  he 
not  seek  to  shield  his  own  stupidity  under  cover  of  blame  to 
others.  Although  in  his  own  report  he  shows  the  place  to 
have  been  impregnable,  this  censure  he  launches  at  the  heads 
of  Generals  George  "W.  Morgan  and  J)eCourcy  for  not  hav- 
ing accomplished  the  impossible.  After  indulging  in  his 
gratuitous  fling  at  two  brave  and  efficient  officers,  our  gen- 
eral says  generously  : 

"  I  assume  all  the  responsibility,  and  attach  fault  to  no 
one,  and  am  generally  satisfied  with  the  high  spirit  mani- 
fested by  all.  ...  I  attribute  our  failure  to  the  strength 


A   Useless  Slaughter.  245 

of  the  enemy's  position,  both  natural  and  artificial,  and  not 
to  his  superior  fighting." 

This  general  satisfaction  must  have  been  extremely  com- 
forting to  the  desolate  households  of  the  land  where  the 
precious  dead  were  mourned  and  the  cripples  tenderly  cared 
for.  It  is  difficult  to  say  which  is  the  more  exasperating,  the 
imbecility  that  ordered  the  assault,  or  the  sublime  conceit 
that  seeks  to  make  his  approbation  a  salve  for  death  and 
dishonor. 

This  great  man,  whose  smile  was  salvation,  re-embarked 
all  but  the  two  thousand  slaughtered  at  the  foot  of  the 
Chickasaw  Bluffs,  and,  comforted  by  his  satisfaction,  steamed 
up  the  river  to  Milliken's  Bend,  where  he  learned  some- 
thing. 

Before  taking  up  the  thread  of  events,  let  us  turn  to 
Badeau's  work — ever  bearing  in  mind  that  it  is  the  work 
approved  of  by  Grant  as  his  military  history — and  learn  why 
Grant  did  not  co-operate  with  Sherman,  for  the  belief  was 
prevalent  throughout  the  land  that  the  assault  on  Chickasaw 
Bluff  was  a  failure  because  of  that  absence  of  co-operation. 
Turning  to  that  valuable  autobiography,  for  such  it  is,  we 
find  the  following  points  made  and  italicized  so  that  the  most 
simple  may  not  escape  their  meaning.  It  says : 

1.  Grant  "  meant,  if  he  could,  to   hold   Pemberton  at 
Grenada,  and  thus  allow  Sherman  to  enter  Vicksburg  with- 
out any  material  opposition." 

2.  But  if  he  had  so  held  Pemberton,  it  would  have  made 
no  difference  to  Sherman;  for  "the  strength  of  the  works  at 
Vicksburg  was  not  fully  appreciated  when  this  arrangement 
was  made ;  they  were  so  strong  that  had  Grant  been  able  to 
keep  Pemberton' s  entire  force  in  his  own  front,  there  would 
have  been  no  different  result  to  Sherman's  endeavor." 

3.  Sherman  "  never  could  have  anticipated  a  tactical  co- 
operation from  Grant ;  for  Grant  had  neither  promised  nor 
suggested  it;"   therefore,  when  at  Oxford  he  laid  out  the 
plan  of  concerted  movements  and  his  part  in  the  interior,  he 
said  in  his  letter  of  instructions  to  Sherman — "  I  will  hold 
the  forces  here  in  readiness  to  co-operate  with  you  in  such 


246  Life  of  Thomas. 

manner  as  the  movements  of  the  enemy  make  necessary" — 
he  meant  not  tactical,  but  moral  co-operation. 

4.  Sherman,  in  his  report  of  the  assault,  shows  that  he 
was  not  looking  for  Grant's  tactical  co-operation  in  it,  for  he 
says :  "  Not  one  word  could  I  hear  from  General  Grant,  who 
was  supposed  to  be  pushing  south."    "  I  proposed     ...     to 
attack  the  enemy's  right,  which,  if  successful,  would  give  us 
substantial  possession  of  the  Yazoo  river,  and  place  us  in 
communication  with  General  Grant."     The  italics  and  gaps  are 
Badeau's. 

5.  Sherman  could  not  have  expected  "tactical  co-opera- 
tion" from   Grant,  nor  even  moral  co-operation,  in  his  as- 
sault; for  this  remark  in   Sherman's  report  of  the  assault 
shows  that  he  had  before  heard  that  Grant  was  falling  back : 
"  The  rumor  of  General  Grant  having  fallen  back  behind  the 
Tallahatchie  became  confirmed  by  my  receiving  no  intelli- 
gence from  him." 

6.  Sherman  himself  declared  that  his  failure  was  owing 
to  "the  strength  of  the  enemy's  position,  both  natural  and 
artificial."     As   one   sufficient   cause   is   in   logic   sufficient, 
therefore  his  failure  was  not  owing  to  Grant. 

7.  Sherman's  own  report  shows  that  the  enemy's  forces 
at  Vicksburg  were  so  large  that,  without  regard  to  Grant, 
success  was  impossible,  for  he  says :  "  I  suppose  their  (the 
rebel)  organized  forces  to  amount  to  about  15,000,  which 
could  be  reinforced  at  the  rate  of  about  5,000  a  day,  provided 
General  Grant  did  not  occupy  all  the  attention  of  Pemberton's 
forces  at  Grenada."     The  italics  in  all  these  citations  are 
Badeau's. 

8.  Sherman's  general  letter  of  information  of  the  cam- 
paign to  the  division  commanders,  which  Badeau  cites  as 
"  before  the  attack  " — in  fact,  December  23d,  while  coming 
down  the  river — told  the  plan  of  co-operation  as  "  to  act  in 
concert  with  General   Grant  against  Pemberton's  forces,  sup- 
posed to  have  Jackson,  Miss.,  as  a  point  of  concentration." 
Also:  "It  maybe  necessary  (looking  to  Grant's  approach), 
before  attacking  Vicksburg,  to  reduce  the  battery  at  Haiue's 
Bluff,  so  as  to  enable  the  gunboats  and  lighter  transports  to 
ascend   the   Yazoo   and   communicate   with   General    Grant." 


Grant  Fails  Sherman.  247 

Also  :  Grant's  left  and  center  were  at  last  accounts  approaching 
the  Yallabusha  near  Grenada,  and  the  railroad  to  his  rear  by 
which  he  drew  supplies  was  reported  to  be  seriously  dam- 
aged. This  may  disconcert  him  somewhat,  but  only  makes 
more  important  our  line  of  operations."  Again :  "At  the 
Yallabusha,  General  Grant  may  encounter  the  army  of  General 
Pemberton,  the  same  which  refused  him  battle  on  the  line  of 
the  Tallahatchie,  which  was  strongly  fortified,  but  he  (Pcm- 
berton)  will  hardly  have  time  to  fortify  the  Yallabusha,  and 
in  that  event  General  Grunt  will  immediately  advance  down 
the  high  ridge  lying  between  the  Big  Black  and  the  Yazoo, 
and  will  expect  to  meet  us  on  the  Yazoo." 

These  appear  as  Sherman's  expectations. 

9.  This  same  romantic  letter  of  general  intelligence  by 
Sherman  to  the  general  officers,  issued  while  the  grand  flotilla 
was   descending  the   Mississippi,  showed   that   he   contem- 
plated, among  other  things,  landing   above  Vicksburg  and 
murchmg  into  the  interior  to  attack  Vicksburg  from  the  east 
on  the  line  of  the  railroad  from  that  place  to  Jackson,  Miss. 
"  I  propose  to  land  our  whole  force  on  the  Mississippi  side, 
and  then  reach  the  point  where  the  Vicksburg  and  Jackson 
Railroad  crosses  the  Big  Black,  after  which  to  attack  Vicks- 
burg by  laud  whilst  the  gunboats  assail  it  by  water." 

10.  Sherman    himself  absolves   Grant  from  blame  for 
lack  of  "tactical  co-operation"  in  this  assault  in  his  general 
absolution  in  his  report,  when  he  says :   "  The  effort  was 
necessary  to  a  successful  accomplishment  of  my  orders,  and 
the  combinations  were  the  best  possible  under  the  circum- 
stances.    I   assume   all  the   responsibility,   and   attach   the 
blame  to  no  one." 

Grant,  through  Badeau,  in  this  cold  showing,  so  satis- 
factory to  himself,  that  Sherman  could  not  have  expected 
him  to  co-operate  either  tactically  or  otherwise,  is  not  un- 
mindful of  the  fact  that  his  and  Sherman's  glory  are  held 
together  by  the  same  ligament,  and  that  it  is  necessary  to  let 
his  lieutenant  down  gently,  hence  he  says:  "  Sherman  de- 
serves all  praise  for  his  determination  to  attempt  the  assault 
when  he  knew  not  only  that  Grant  never  intended  to  sup- 
port him  in  its  tactical  execution,  but  that  he  was  probably 


248  Life  of  Thomas. 

unable  to  render  even  the  strategical  support  to  the  move- 
ment which  had  been  originally  planned."  And  then  he 
adds  as  a  solace  :  "  Indeed,  when  Grant  threw  both  his  armies 
on  the  Mississippi,  success  still  fled  before  him  coyly  as  in 
the  interior." 

We  are  inclined  to  attribute  the  last  half  of  the  above 
sentence,  so  poetically  referring  to  the  subsequent  slaughter  of 
men,  to  Adam  Badeau,  whose  playful  fancy  is  as  sparkling  as 
his  imagination  is  acute  when  dealing  with  history.  But  our 
Chickasaw  hero  does  not  rest  easy  under  this  showing.  In 
his  memoirs,  that  quiver  and  palpitate  with  valued  informa- 
tion, he  gives  us  Grant's  letter  calling  him  to  confer  at  Ox- 
ford on  the  new  plan,  in  which  Grant  says :  "  My  notion  is 
to  send  two  divisions  back  to  Memphis  and  fix  upon  a  day 
when  they  should  effect  a  landing  and  press  from  here  with 
this  command  at  the  proper  time  to  co-operate."  He  also 
asserts  that  Grant's  letter  meant  practical  co-operation.  "  In- 
form me  of  the  earliest  practical  day  when  you  will  embark 
and  such  plans  as  may  then  be  matured.  I  will  hold  the 
forces  here  in  readiness  to  co-operate  with  you  in  such  man- 
ner as  the  movements  of  the  enemy  may  make  necessary." 

He  also  quotes  a  letter  dated  December  14th  gotten  by 
him,  Sherman,  at  Memphis,  which  he  says :  "  Completes 
all  instructions  received  by  me  governing  the  first  movement 
against  Vicksburg."  And  this  as  to  co-operation.  "The 
enemy  are  as  yet  on  the  Yallabusha.  I  am  pushing  them 
down  slowly,  but  so  as  to  keep  up  the  impression  of  a  con- 
tinuous move.  .  .  .  My  head-quarters  will  probably  be  at 
Coffeeville  one  week  hence.  .  .  .  It  would  he  well  if  you 
could  have  two  or  three  small  boats  suitable  for  navigating  the 
Yazoo.  It  may  be  necessary  for  us  to  look  to  that  base  of 
supplies  before  we  get  through."  General  Sherman  follows 
this  up  with  the  assurance  that  it  was  clearly  understood 
that  he  was  to  have  co-operation  of  some  sort,  and  that  it 
called  on  him  to  make  the  immediate  assault  on  Vicksburg, 
"  as  necessary  to  the  successful  accomplishment  of  my  orders." 
He  adds :  "  Up  to  that  moment  I  had  not  heard  a  word  from 
General  Grant  since  leaving  Memphis,  and  most  assuredly  I 


Grant  Fails  Sherman.  249 

had  listened  for  days  for  the  sound  of  his  guns  in  the  direc- 
tion of  Yazoo  City." 

The  picture  of  the  general  listening  for  guns  that  never 
spoke,  but  were  in  fact  at  Memphis,  is  extremely  pathetic, 
and  reminds  one  of  Lady  Percy's  heartfelt  appeal  to  her 

father: 

"  O  yet,  for  God's  sake,  go  not  to  those  wars, 
The  time  was,  father,  when  you  broke  your  word, 
When  you  were  more  endeared  to  it  than  now ; 
When  your  own  Percy,  when  my  heart's  dear  Harry 
Threw  many  a  northward  look  to  see  his  father 
Lead  his  forces  up ;  but  he  did  long  in  vain." 

The  pathos  is  somewhat  marred  by  the  fact  that  such 
was  Sherman's  conceit  that  it  was  quite  impossible  for  him 
to  feel  any  anxiety.  Had  he  known  the  vital  importance  of 
Grant's  co-operation,  he  would  have  delayed  the  wanton  and 
cruel  assault  until  he  heard  the  roar  of  Grant's  guns,  which 
he  tells  us  he  was  wishing  for.  He  had  no  anxiety  in  ad- 
vance, no  remorse  for  the  two  thousand  gallant  men  killed 
and  crippled  as  he  steamed  back.  "  It  was  all  right,"  he 
said,  complacently,  "  a  most  spirited  affair." 

The  controversy  between  these  rivals  in  disaster  ap- 
pears very  mild.  They  could  not  afford  to  quarrel.  Facts 
developed  in  such  a  contention  would  have  relegated  both 
to  the  rear,  saved  us  ninety  thousand  men  and  the  patriotic 
North  the  shame  of  such  a  slaughter.  It  was  gentle  and 
forgiving,  for  the  two  soon  found  that  the  government  at 
Washington,  immersed  in  grave  troubles  nearer  home,  had 
less  thought  of  miseries  on  the  Mississippi,  while  Elihu  B. 
Washburne  and  his  immediate  followers  continued  their  ap- 
plause in  behalf  of  the  tanner  of  Galena,  who  developed 
through  retreats  the  high  capacity  of  a  commander. 


250  Life  of  Thomas. 


CHAPTER   XIII. 

Assault  of  Vicksburg  from  the  River  given  up  as  Hopeless — "  Employment 
for  Superfluous  Troops  "  in  a  Campaign  against  the  vexatious  Waters 
of  the  Mississippi — Details  of  Four  Thousand  kept  constantly  at  work 
in  an  attempt  to  change  the  River's  Current — The  Laborers  exposed  to 
Fevers,  Dysentery,  Malaria,  and  a  deadly  Artillery  Fire  from  the 
Enemy — Deaths  by  Thousands  in  the  Ditches — The  Project  a  Fail- 
ure— Lake  Providence  Canal  Scheme  Tried  and  Abandoned — Co-ope- 
ration with  Banks. 

General  Sherman  went  away  from  the  point  of  Chicka- 
eaw  Bluff  with  two  thousand  men  less,  that  number  having 
been  killed  or  crippled  in  the  bloody  assault  on  an  impreg- 
nable position.  This  was  on  the  1st  of  January,  1863.  On 
the  2d,  he  learned  that  the  dreadful  political  general  was  at 
the  mouth  of  the  Yazoo.  "  He  was  there  with  orders  from 
the  War  Department  to  command  the  expeditionary  force 
on  the  Mississippi."  This  was  simply  atrocious.  Two  thou- 
sand brave  men  had  been  sacrificed  to  prevent  this  result, 
and  yet  the  ghost  of  a  political  general  would  not  down. 
General  Sherman,  however,  informed  the  detested  com- 
mander of  his  attempt  on  Vicksburg,  and  gave  as  a  reason 
for  not  continuing  the  wanton  slaughter  of  his  men  that 
Pemberton's  army  was  pouring  into  the  place,  which  fact 
convinced  him,  Sherman,  that  Grant  must  be  near.  Mc- 
Clernand  quite  assured  the  hero  of  defeats  that  Grant  was 
having  a  good  time  at  Memphis  and  entertained  no  thought 
of  moving ;  that  his  depot  of  supplies  had  been  dislodged  by 
Van  Horn,  and  that  Grant  had  withdrawn  his  forces  from 
Coffeeville  and  Oxford  to  Holly  Springs  and  La  Grange;  and 
further  that  Quimby's  division  of  Grant's  army  was  actually 
at  Memphis  for  stores  when  he,  McClernand,  passed  down. 

As  this  condition  made  any  attempt  on  Vicksburg  from 
the  river  utterly  hopeless,  all  came  out  of  the  Yazoo  and  or- 
ganized at  Milliken's  Bend. 

What  next  to  do  puzzled  these  warriors.     As  a  steamer 


The  Speeter  of  Me  demand.  251 

having  two  barges  in  tow  laden  with  ammunition  for  Sher- 
man's army  had  been  captuned  and  carried  up  the  Arkansas 
river  forty  miles  to  a  place  called  Fort  Hindman,  Sherman 
proposed  that  he  should  proceed  up  the  Arkansas,  reduce 
the  fort,  and  retake  the  vessels.  The  result  was  that  Mc- 
Clernami,  having  senior  commission,  went  in  command,  and 
after  a  bloody  fight  took  the  place.  Badeau,  the  historian, 
tells  us  that  Grant,  before  he  learned  the  result,  was  quite 
indignant  at  the  side  issue  thus  gotten  up — his  indignation 
passed  to  disgust  when  he  found  that  success  had  crowned 
McClernand's  effort.  However,  it  would  not  do  for  the 
political  general  to  win  victories — something  then  unknown 
to  Grant's  army.  To  avoid  this  Grant  hurried  to  the  army 
that  he  found  afloat  at  Napoleon.  From  Sherman's  memoirs 
we  learn  that  Grant,  on  the  18th  day  of  January,  ordered 
McClernand  with  his  own  and  my  own  corps  to  return  to 
Vicksburg,  to  disembark  on  the  west  bank,  and  to  resume 
work  on  a  canal  across  a  peninsula,' which  had  been  begun 
by  General  Thomas  Williams  the  summer  before,  the  object 
being  to  turn  the  Mississippi  at  that  point  so  as  to  circum- 
vent the  Confederates  at  Vicksburg. 

From  facts  developed  since  the  close  of  the  war,  .we 
learn  that  President  Lincoln  had  more  confidence  in  General 
McClernand  as  a  military  possibility  than  he  had  in  Grant, 
and  as  Edwin  M.  Stanton  shared  in  this,  it  is  evident  that  the 
political  general  would  have  superseded  the  West  Point  in- 
competent had  it  not  been  for  Washburne,  who  saw  in  Mc- 
Clernaud  other  possibilities  in  the  political  arena.  Thus 
were  affairs  complicated  at  Washington  by  considerations 
foreign  to  a  mere  military  review  of  the  situation.  As  Presi- 
dent Lincoln  could  not  well  offend  the  Washburne  combina- 
tion, he  sought  to  compromise  by  leaving  Grant  in  command 
of  the  department  and  especially  designating  a  subordinate 
to  command  the  expedition  down  the  Mississippi.  Halleck, 
Grant,  and  Sherman  saw  no  objection  to  this,  for  they  well 
knew  that  it  was  possible  to  make  the  subordinate's  position 
so  uncomfortable  as  to  force  a  resignation.  Had  the  three 
melancholy  warriors  possessed  the  wisdom  now  attributed  to 
them,  they  would  have  had  McClernand  follow  the  fate  of 


252  Life  of  Thomas. 

Sherman,  and  waste  his  forces  in  front  of  impregnable  bluffs 
that  stand  guard  about  Vicksburg.  Instead  of  this  Grant 
took  command  and  proceeded  to  make  himself  more  offensive 
to  McClernand  than  to  the  Confederates.  In  a  fierce  order 
to  his  subordinate,  he  said,  "  this  expedition  must  not  fail," 
and  he  might  have  added,  as  it  failed  under  Sherman.  And 
so  he  set  the  particularly  selected  general  to  digging  an  im- 
possible canal  to  divert  the  channel  of  the  Mississippi  and 
leave  Vicksburg  and  its  bluffs  six  miles  from  this  inland  sea, 
which  it  vexed  according  to  President  Lincoln. 

The  Father  of  Waters  is  strangely  sinuous  in  its  course  ; 
why  it  should  be  so,  has  never  been  and  probably  never  will 
be  accounted  for.  Of  course,  it  is  subject  to  certain  forces 
that  make  it  so  snake-like  in  its  course,  but  what  they  are 
we  can  not  blame  Grant  for  not  knowing.  One  of  these  ec- 
centric bends  is  at  Vicksburg.  Looking  at  the  map,  one  can 
see  that  the  river  makes  a  short  bend  to  the  north-east  and 
runs  five  miles  to  the  Vicksburg  bluffs,  and  then  turns  yet 
shorter  and  runs  back  south-west,  creating  a  peninsula  that 
for  five  miles  is  nowhere  more  than  two  miles  wide.  It 
struck  Grant  that  if  the  fact  were  demonstrated  to  the  Mis- 
sissippi that  a  short  cut  of  two  miles  would  save  over  ten 
miles,  the  river  would  at  once  ac<5ept  the  shorter  route,  and 
so  leave  Vicksburg  with  all  its  natural  defenses  useless  to  the 
Confederates.  The  project  was  not  original  with  Grant.  As 
we  have  seen,  the  canal  that  was  to  have  been  the  opening 
suggestion  to  the  mighty  river  was  commenced  the  year  be-' 
fore.  Grant,  however,  adopted  it  heartily,  and,  being  his 
own  engineer,  assumed  all  the  responsibility.  The  attempted 
change  of  the  Mississippi  was  popular  with  the  people  who 
knew  nothing  of  the  obstacles  that  proved  in  the  end  impos- 
sibilities. Details  of  four  thousand  men  were  relieving  each 
other  in  a  toil  that  continued  from  daylight  until  dark. 
They  uprooted  huge  trees,  dug,  plowed,  scraped,  and  shov- 
eled with  dams  and  levees  to  protect  them  from  the  waters 
of  a  river  that  was  supposed  to  be  only  too  willing  to  avail 
itself  of  the  new  channel.  In  this  hopeless  task,  the  north- 
ern men  brought  in  contact  with  the  wet  lowlands  of  this 
malarial  region  were  seized  with  fevers,  and  soo*n  the  trans- 


Death  Stalking  Before  Vicksburg.  253 

ports,  converted  into  hospitals,  were  crowded  with  the  sick 
and  dying.  This  was  had  enough,  but  a  worse  condition  was 
soon  demonstrated  in  the  fact  that  the  enemy's  guns  swept 
the  space  devoted  to  the  canal,  and  the  men  of  the  detailed 
four  thousand  who  escaped  the  malaria  were  exposed  to  the 
shot  and  shell  from  batteries  that  could  not  be  silenced  or 
even  troubled  by  a  reply.  The  Confederates  practiced  this 
artillery  fire  on  the  poor  men  who  had  volunteered  to  fight, 
and  were  condemned  to  die  under  fire  and  malaria  as  fatal 
as  the  round  shot  or  shell  of  the  enemy.  And  the  task  was 
hopeless.  In  indication  of  his  sagacity,  Grant  says,  through 
Badeau,  that,  "on  the  4th  of  February,  he  reported  to 
Halleck  that  he  had  lost  all  faith  in  the  practicability 
of  the  scheme.  The  canal,  he  said,  is  at  right  angles 
with  the  thread  of  the  current  at  both  ends,  and  both  ends 
are  in  an  eddy — the  lower  coming  out  under  bluffs  com- 
pletely commanding  it.  Warrenton,  a  few  miles  below,  is 
capable  of  as  strong  defenses  as  Vicksburg,  and  the  en- 
emy, seeing  us  at  work,  have  turned  their  attention  to  that 
point." 

That  discovery  of  these  plain  facts  deferred  to  so  late  a 
day  as  the  4th  of  February  is  brought  forward  as  an  indica- 
tion of  his  sagacity,  is  somewhat  amusing.  And,  having 
made  this  discovery,  why  did  he  continue  the  dreadful  work  ? 
The  answer  is  simple  and  plain  enough.  He  did  not  know 
what  else  to  do.  He  could  not  imitate  the  disastrous  exam- 
ple of  Sherman,  and  hurl  his  army  against  the  impregnable 
bluffs.  One  wonders  he  did  not.  This  heartless  butcher  of 
his  own  men  was  much  given  to  that  sort  of  warfare.  But 
this  was  too  hopeless,  and  what  to  do  next  he  did  not  know. 
To  re-embark  his  army  and  steam  up  the  Mississippi  as  Sher- 
man had  done,  would  be  in  effect  to  force  the  War  Depart- 
ment to  find  another  commander.  He  could  not  get  by 
Vicksburg,  and  so  the  four  thousand  went  on  digging  and 
dying  by  the  hundreds,  while  the  Confederate  gunners  stead- 
ily practiced  throwing  in  round  shot  and  shell  upon  them. 
This  attempt  at  changing  the  channel  of  the  Mississippi 
amused  the  Confederates.  They  were  perfectly  willing  that 
one-third  of  our  forces  in  the  field  of  war  should  remain  idle 


254  Life  of  Thomas. 

where  they  especially  wanted  them,  and,  if  our  general  era- 
ployed  his  time  fighting  malaria  and  the  Mississippi  under 
fire  from  their  guns,  he  was  quite  welcome.  The  War  De- 
partment at  Richmond,  under  the  circumstances,  counted 
Pemberton's  eighteen  thousand  men  equal  to  Grant's  hun- 
dred thousand,  and  greatly  strengthened  Bragg  and  Lee  with 
volunteers  from  west  of  the  Mississippi. 

Now  that  we  have  access  to  the  real  facts  developed  by  the 
government  records  of  both  sides,  we  have  some  strange  reve- 
lations. One  of  them  is  found  in  the  treatment  given  General 
Rosecrans  while  making  preparation  for  the  grandest  cam- 
paign of  the* war,  and  that  awarded  Grant.  The  complaint 
was  made  by  not  only  Halleck  but  Grant  that  Rosecrans'  de- 
lay was  giving  the  Confederates  the  opportunity  to  withdraw 
men  from  behind  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  to  threaten 
Grant.  We  now  learn  from  the  records  that  it  was  Grant 
who  was  so  completely  in  a  hole  that  he  could  neither  fight 
nor  fly,  and  his  "  bottled  condition,"  to  use  the  words  he  sub- 
sequently applied  to  General  Ben.  Butler,  enabled  the  Con- 
federates to  leave  the  bluffs,  malaria,  and  Mississippi  to  fight 
Grant,  and  actually  to  send  their  forces  to  strengthen  Bragg. 
Instead  of  there  being  any  just  complaint  against  Rosecrans, 
it  was  Grant  who  could  not  march,  and  so  threatened  the 
general  move  of  the  two  other  armies. 

There  is  another  strange  revelation  to  be  found  in  the 
fact  that  while  Rosecrans  was  snubbed  in  nearly  all  his  ap- 
peals for  arms  and  men,  Grant,  although  hopelessly  swamped 
before  Vicksburg,  was  favored  in  a  way  that  indicated  soft- 
ening of  the  brain  at  Washington.  The  transports  that  car- 
ried the  army  down  the  Mississippi  were  needed  by  the  War 
Department.  But  Grant  informed  the  President  that  the 
marks  on  the  trees  about  there  indicated  floods  that  would 
cover  the  peninsula  to  the  depth  of  ten  feet,  so  the  transports 
were  left  to  save  the  army  from  drowning.  Grant,  and 
nearly  all  the  officers  from  generals  down  to  colonels,  made 
these  transports  their  head-quarters,  and  to  deprive  them  of 
such  luxuries  would  have  been  extremely  unpleasant. 

Meanwhile  the  digging  and  the  dying  went  on.  The 
detail  of  four  thousand  continued  while  the  hospitals  on 


The  Death-dealing  Canal.  255 

transports  became  crowded  and  graves  multiplied.  It  has 
been  said  that  each  railroad  tie  of  the  Panama  railroad  rep- 
resented and  was  a  grave-mark  of  fifty  men.  In  like  man- 
ner, if  the  dead  from  fever  could  have  been  gathered  that 
Grant's  canal  struck  down,  enough  bodies  would  have  been 
obtained  to  build  a  levee  against  the  rising  waters  of  a  river 
that  had  its  surface  above  their  heads,  while  a  hundred  and 
twenty  feet  below  the  great  world  of  water  swept  down  at 
the  rate  of  six  miles  an  hour.  Grant,  through  Badeau,  in- 
forms us  that  this  "plan  of  turning  a  mighty  river  from  its 
course  attracted  the  attention  of  the  civilized  world ;  that 
the  rebels  loudly  predicted  failure,  and  the  jibes  of  those 
who  opposed  the  war  at  the  North  were  incessant." 

Still  Grant  toiled  on.  Four  thousand  soldiers  were  con- 
stantly employed  on  the  work,  besides  negroes,  who- were  of 
comparatively  little  use.  But  this  work  became  more  diffi- 
cult and  dangerous.  Badeau  informs  us:  "  The  troops  who 
were  engaged  for  two  months  on  the  canal  were  encamped 
immediately  on  its  west  bank,  and  protected  from  possible 
inundation  by  a  levee,  but  the  continuing  rise  in  the  river 
made  a  large  expenditure  of  labor  necessary  to  keep  the  water 
out  of  the  camps  and  canal." 

The  innocence  of  confession  in  Grant  as  given  by  Badeau 
is  amazing.  While  four  thousand  men  kept  at  work  in  an 
effort  to  change  the  channel  of  the  river,  another  four 
thousand  were  busy  building  a  dam  to  keep  the  other  detail 
from  drowning.  He  continues :  .  .  .  "  The  work  was 
tedious  and  difficult,  and  seemed  interminable*  and  toward 
the  last  it  became  dangerous,  for  the  enemy  threw  shells  all 
over  the  peninsula,  .and,  as  Grant  had  predicted,  erected  bat- 
teries which  commanded  the  lower  end  of  the  canal." 

And  yet  this  hopeless  work  with  its  terrible  cost  in  life 
and  treasure  was  persisted  in  simply  because  the  general 
commanding  did  not  know  what  else  to  do.  The  bristling 
heights  from. which  the  Confederates,  unmolested,  practiced 
their  artillery,  were  before  him  as  they  were  before  Sherman 
on  that  fatal  day  when  he  sent  "his  thousands  up  to  die,  but 
he  dared  not  attack,  and  so  he  went  on  in  a  work  in  which 
he  acknowledges  in  Badeau  he  had  almost  from  the  begin- 


256  Life  of  Thomas. 

uing  no  confidence.  We  are  told,  however,  that  he  was, 
nevertheless,  on  the  edge  of  success  when  the  unexpected 
happened.  Here  it  is  in  the  general's  own  words,  or  rather 
the  general's  account  run  through  Badeau,  is  told  as 
follows : 

"  But  at  last  there  seemed  some  prospect  of  success,  the 
dredge-boats  worked  to  a  charm,  the  laborers  reached  a  suffi- 
cient depth  in  the  soil,  the  wing  was  ready  to  connect  with 
the  main  artery,  and  the  undertaking  was  apparently  all  but 
completed  when,  on  the  8th  of  March,  an  additional  and 
rapid  rise  in  the  river,  and  the  consequent  increase  of 
pressure  caused  the  dam  near  the  upper  end  of  the  canal  to 
give  way,  and  every  attempt  to  keep  the  rush  of  water  out 
proved  abortive. 

"  The  torrent  thus  admitted  struggled  for  a  while  with 
the  obstacles  that  sought  to  stay  its  course,  but  finally,  in- 
stead of  coming  out  below,  broke  the  levee  of  the  canal  it- 
self, and  spread  rapidly  across  the  peninsula,  overwhelming 
every  barrier,  and  separating  the  northern  and  southern 
shores  as  effectually  as  if  the  Mississippi  itself  flowed  be- 
tween them.  It  swept  far  and  wide  into  the  interior,  sub- 
merging the  camps  and  spreading  itself  into  the  bayous  even 
to  the  Tensas  and  Lower  Red.  The  troops  were  obliged  to 
flee  for  their  lives,  horses  were  drowned,  implements  were 
broken  and  borne  away  by  the  current,  and  all  the  labor  of 
many  weeks  was  lost." 

While  prosecuting  this  hopeless  task  of  turning  the  bed 
of  the  Mississippi,  the  general  commanding  had  in  mind  a 
project  equally  hopeless  of  getting  away  from  Vicksburg. 
He  could,  of  course,  re-embark  his  army  and  return  to  Mem- 
phis, as  we  have  said,  but  this  would  be  an  acknowledgment 
of  defeat,  and  an  immediate  return  to  tanning  hides  at 
Galena.  To  avoid  this  he  sought  to  free  himself  of  Vicks- 
burg. To  this  end  he  conceived  the  plan  of  cutting  a  canal 
from  the  river  to  lake  Providence,  a  crescent-shaped  body  of 
water  supposed  to  be  a  former  bed  of  the  Mississippi.  It  is 
six  miles  in  length,  and  measured  by  an  air  line  is  forty  miles 
above  Vicksburg.  From  this  lake  it  was  supposed  that, 
through  a  partly  defined  channel,  called  Bayou  Baxter, 


Employing  Superfluous  Troops.  257 

Bayou  Macon  could  be  reached.  This  would  take  the  army 
to  a  point  opposite  Vicksburg,  about  forty  miles  from  the 
river.  Then  following  the  Teusas  river,  the  army  could  be 
got,  after  a  tortuous  course  of  six  hundred  miles  into  the 
Mississippi,  some  two  hundred  miles  below  Vicksburg.  The 
object  of  all  this  Grant,  through  Badeau,  informs  us : 
"  Through  these  various  channels,  is  was  thought  possible  to 
open  a  route  by  which  transports  of  light  draught  might 
reach  the  Mississippi  again  below,  and  thus  enable  Grant  to 
re-enforce  Banks  (then  either  on  the  Red  river  or  the  Atcha- 
falaya),  and  to  co-operate  with  him  against  Port  Hudson." 

We  do  not  find  in  any  of  the  chronicles  that  this  re- 
markable engineer  foretold  the  utter  impossiblity  of  opening 
and  using  this  succession  of  narrow  waterways  through  the 
enemy's  country.  These  bayous  were  almost  impassable  in 
their  natural  state,  and  could  readily  be  obstructed  by  felling 
trees.  Badeau,  speaking  for  Grant,  tells  us  all  about  it.  He 
says: 

"  The  levee  was  cut  and  a  canal  opened  between  the 
river  and  the  lake,  through  which  the  water  passed  rapidly ; 
but  peculiar  difficulties  were  encountered  in  clearing  Bayou 
Baxter  of  the  overhanging  forests  and  fallen  timber  with 
which  it  was  obstructed.  The  land  from  Lake  Providence, 
and  also  from  Bayou  Baxter,  receded  until  the  lowest  inter- 
val between  the  two  widens  out  into  a  cypress  swamp,  where 
the  Bayou  Baxter  is  lost.  This  flat  was  filled  with  water  to 
the  depth  of  several  feet,  and  the  work  of  removing  the 
timber  that  choked  the  bayou  for  a  distance  of  twelve  or 
fifteen  miles  was,  in  consequence,  exceedingly  difficult  and 
slow.  But  if  this  could  have  been  accomplished,  the  chan- 
nel in  high  water  would  have  been  continuous,  though  intri- 
cate and  circuitous  to  a  remarkable  degree. 

"  So  McPherson's  corps  was  engaged  in  the  undertaking 
for  many  weeks.  The  impossibility  of  obtaining  the  requi- 
site number  of  light  draught  steamers,  however,  would  have 
rendered  this  route  useless,  even  had  it  been  thoroughly 
opened.  But  no  steamer  ever  passed  through  the  tortuous 
channel,  which  served  only  to  employ  the  superfluous  troops 
17 


258  Life  of  Thomas. 

and  to  demonstrate  the  fertility  arid  variety  of  devices  de- 
veloped during  this  anomalous  campaign." 

The  last  sentence  in  this  extraordinary  statement  awak- 
ens an  indignation  that  no  words  can  express.  "But  no 
steamer  ever  passed  through  the  tortuous  channel,  which  served 
only  to  employ  the  superfluous  troops"  This  amazing  confes- 
sion of  heartless  imbecility  is  reinforced  by  another  passage 
on  the  same  subject.  It  says:  "The  project  exacted  atten- 
tion and  speculation."  "Well  it  might.  He  continues  to  say 
that  many  thought  it  would  divert  the  Mississippi  to  this 
route  from  Vicksburg  and  all  the  lower  towns.  But  he, 
Grant,  did  not  entertain  this  wild  belief.  "  He  believed  that 
Vicksburg  was  only  to  be  won  by  hard  fighting,"  and  mean- 
while he  was  "simply  affording  occupation  for  his  men" 

No  fighting  was  being  done.  None  could  be  done,  and 
while  the  general  commanding  through  the  weary  months 
was  vainly  striving  to  relieve  himself  and  forces  from  the 
condition  into  which  he  had  led  them,  his  wonderful  brain 
found  occupation  for  the  men  in  working  out  projects  that 
his  sagacious  mind  saw  in  the  beginning  of  each  was  im- 
practicable. He  had  no  confidence  in  the  attempted  change 
in  the  channel  by  a  canal  cutting  the  peninsula,  and  yet  for 
weeks  he  continued  the  work — continued  until  at  last  the 
Mississippi  drowned  out  his  men  and  in  one  flood  swept  away 
the  work  that  was  the  work  of  death.  He  attempted  a 
passage  through  Lake  Providence  that  would  carry  his  army 
four  hundred  miles  from  Vicksburg,  and  is  careful  to  put  it 
to  record  that  he  had  no  faith  in  the  project.  And  the  as- 
tounding plea  in  justification  is,  that  it  not  only  illustrated 
the  intellectual  superiority  of  the  commander,  but  gave  oc- 
cupation to  his  superfluous  troops,  While  the  commander 
of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  crying  aloud  for  more 
men,  while  General  Rosecrans  was  pleading  in  vain  for  rein- 
forcements and  supplies,  while  at  every  point  of  the  conflict 
the  cry  went  up  that  the  Confederates  outnumbered  us, 
Grant  had  "  his  superfluous  troops  "  to  dig  and  die  of  dysen- 
tery and  fevers  in  swamps,  when  all  the  work,  according  to 
Grant's  confession,  was  utterly  useless. 

What  this  occupation  was  we  have  told.     The  brave, 


The  Plague  Before  Vickvburg.  259 

patriotic  men  of  the  North,  who  left  their  homes  and  bread- 
winning  for  wives  and  children  to  tight  for  their  country, 
were  found  occupation  as  laborers  in  the  swamps  and  bayous 
of  the  Mississippi.  The  detail  of  four  thousand  at  a  time 
upon  a  work  that  was  prosecuted  day  and  night  under  fire 
of  an  enemy,  could  not  have  been  designed  as  an  occupation 
to  preserve  health,  for  they  fell  by  hundreds,  stricken  down 
by  a  malarial  fever  as  fatal  as  any  plague  that  ever  afflicted 
humanity.  The  few  escaping  death  were  sent  north  living 
skeletons,  to  languish  a  few  years  in  their  desolate  homes. 
One  walking  through  the  beautiful  national  cemetery  at 
Vicksburg  sees  it  crowded  with  the  graves  of  our  gallant 
dead,  and  takes  no  heed  of  the  host  sent  home  to  die,  whose 
numbers  would  make  another  cemetery  of  like  size.  The 
number  of  the  lost  from  our  forces  about  Vicksburg  have 
been  reduced  to  90,000.  And  why  was  this  vast  army,  that 
could  have  marched  victorious  from  Memphis  to  New  Or- 
leans, rendering  Vicksburg  and  Port  Hudson  untenable — 
-why  was  it  sacrificed?  Grant  answers  through  Badeau, 
"to  give  the  men  occupation,"  while  the  commander,  at  his 
gorgeous  head-quarters  upon  one  of  the  transports,  feasted, 
and  made  merry,  while  he  racked  his  dull  brains  to  find 
some  way  out  of  the  awful  dilemma  in  which  he  found 
himself. 

For  fear  our  readers  may  think  we  exaggerate  in  chron- 
icling the  sad  condition  of  our  men  under  muskets,  we  turn  to 
Grant  himself,  when  in  the  accepted  biography,  by  Badeau,  he 
says :  "  These  various  attempts  and  expeditions  on  both  sides 
of  the  Mississippi,  although  unsuccessful  in  their  main  objects, 
were  yet  productive  of  beneficial  results.  The  national 
forces  so  constantly  employed  became  hardened  by  exposure, 
and,  of  course,  improved  in  spirits  and  health.  They  ob- 
tained, also,  a  thorough  knowledge  of  the  peculiar  difficulties 
of  the  country  in  which  they  were  operating,  and  were  thus 
better  able  to  encounter  those  difficulties." 

The  story  of  suffering  and  death  is  better  told  by  Gen- 
eral Wm.  E.  Strong,  one  of  the  army,  in  his  eloquent  ad- 
dress at  the  dedication  of  a  monument  to  General  McPher- 
son  at  Clyde,  Ohio,  22d  July,  1881.  He  said  : 


260  Life  of  Thomas. 

"  It  was  composed  of  men  whose  bodies  were  so  inured 
to  hardships  that  disease  could  make  no  impression  on  them. 
Each  man  represented  five  others  who  had  started  with  him ; 
the  five  had  succumbed  to  disease  or  to  the  bullets  of  the 
enemy;  four  out  of  the  five  were  put  under  the  sod  that  was 
to  be  made  free  soil  by  their  exertions  and  the  exertions  of 
their  comrades;  the  fifth  was  at  home,  discharged  from  the 
service  by  reason  of  disability,  broken  in  health  for  life  or 
with  a  leg  or  arm  gone.  The  sixth  man,  to  whom  no  swamp 
could  give  a  fever,  to  whom  wet  clothes  for  a  week  could  not 
give  the  rheumatism,  to  whom  no  march,  however  long  was 
a  hardship — this  culled  and  selected  sixth  man  was  there, 
robust,  healthful,  the  ruddy  glow  of  health  coursing  through 
every  thousandth  part  of  a  square  inch  of  his  body  and 
visible  through  every  pore  of  the  skin,  the  patent  seal  and 
superscription  of  the  Almighty  that  he  was  the  genuine  coin 
of  the  realm." 

We  learn  from  the  approved  life  of  Grant  by  Badeau 
that  the  country  taught  by  the  families  of  the  afflicted  men  the 
real  condition  of  affairs  became  clamorous.  The  press  took 
up  the  cry.  It  was  at  this  time  the  famous  letter  from  M. 
Halstead  was  written  to  Secretary  Chase,  in  which  he  so  se- 
verely denounced  the  general  commanding  before  Yicks- 
burg  as  a  drunken  imbecile,  and  had  it  been  published  be- 
fore Grant  became  a  political  quantity  it  would  have  been  ac- 
cepted as  the  truth,  for  Grant  through  Badeau  says: 

"  The  country,  meanwhile,  and  the  government,  had  be- 
come very  impatient.  Clamors  were  raised  every-where  against 
Grant's  slowness;  the  old  rumors  about  his  personal  character 
were  revived  (for  character  read  habits) ;  his  soldiers  were  said 
to  be  dying  of  swamp  fevers  and  dysentery  in  the  morasses 
around  Vicksburg ;  he  was  pronounced  utterly  destitute  of 
genius  or  energy ;  his  repeatedly  baffled  schemes  were  de- 
clared to  emanate  from  a  brain  unfitted  for  such  trials ;  his 
persistency  was  dogged  obstinacy;  his  patience  sluggish 
dullness." 

The  project  of  getting  away  from  Vicksburg  by  the  way 
of  hake  Providence  was  tried  and  abandoned  as  impractica- 
ble. And  yet  no  fact  was  developed  in  the  trial,  but  must 


Seeking  to  Let  Go  Vicksburg.  261 

have  been  known  at  head-quarters  in  the  beginning  But 
the  surplus  forces  had  to  be  employed,  if  only  in  sick  serv- 
ice at  the  hospitals  and  in  funeral  processions.  This  bayou 
pass  business  seemed  to  have  a  fascination  for  the  general. 
Before  he  abandoned  one  we  find  him  seizing  on  another. 
The  temptation  came  in  the  way  of  the  Yazoo  Pass.  This 
eccentric  waterway  is  some  six  miles  below  Helena,  Arkan- 
sas, on  the  east  side  of  the  Mississippi ;  one  hundred  and 
sixty  miles  above  Vicksburg  by  an  air-line,  and  three  times 
that  by  the  waterway  that  wound  in  and  out  like  a  serpent. 
This  narrow  bayou  led  to  Moon  lake,  from  that  the  water- 
way turned  eastward  to  Goldwater  river  or  bayou;  thence  to 
the  Tallahatchie;  thence  in  a  crooked  course  of  over  a  hun- 
dred miles  united  with  the  Yallabusha  to  form  the  Yazoo. 

A  madder  project  to  destroy  an  enemy  was  never  de- 
vised than  the  one  that  had  placed  that  army  in  the  swamps 
and  bayous  before  Vicksburg  from  the  river  from  which  the 
general  was  vainly  devising  means  of  extraction.  For- 
tunately a  tentative  effort  of  a  force  under  Sherman,  sus- 
tained by  Admiral  Porter,  not  only  failed  but  with  reason  to 
thank  God  that  it  escaped  destruction,  demonstrated  that  a 
campaign  in  that  direction  was  not  to  be  attempted. 

Grant,  through  Badeau,  sums  up  the  campaign  by  com- 
paring it  to  that  of  Napoleon  about  Ulm,  in  which  the  great 
Napoleon  suffers  from  the  comparison.  The  text  says  com- 
placently of  the  advantages  that  the  famous  French  general 
had  over  our  eminent  strategist  that  Grant  "  instead  of  mov- 
ing fresh  from  a  camp  like  that  of  Boulogne,  the  Army  of 
the  Tennessee  had  spent  months  amid  the  swamps  and 
fevers  of  the  Mississippi."  Had  Napoleon  at  Boulogne 
quartered  his  army  for  months  in  a  fever  stricken  swamp  for 
no  other  purpose  than  to  cudgel  his  brain  in  a  vain  hope 
to  find  some  way  out  other  than  the  one  opened  by  com- 
mon sense,  to  say  nothing  of  common  humanity,  the  com- 
parison might  not  have  helped  Grant,  but  it  would  have  low- 
ered Europe's  greatest  general  to  the  level  of  reasonable  com- 
parison. 

The  general  commanding  with  his  army  in  front  of  Vicks- 
burg, which  he  dared  not  assault,  was  prolific  of  plans 


262  Life  of  Thomas. 

by  which  he  could  extricate  himself  without  a  public  con- 
fession of  defeat.  This  bayou  business  under  Sherman  that 
proved  such  a  ludicrous  failure  had  scarcely  ended  ere  Grant 
bethought  of  another  project.  This  consisted  of  cutting  a 
canal  from  the  Mississippi  at  Duckport  to  a  narrow  bayou 
known  as  Walnut  bayou,  thence  through  the  tortuous  wind- 
ings of  the  most  eccentric  waters  returned  to  the  Mississippi 
some  eighty  miles  to  New  Carthage.  Of  this  bayou  move 
Grant  again  advises  Halleck.  He  says : 

"  The  dredges  are  now  engaged  in  cutting  a  canal  from 
here  into  these  bayous.  I  am  getting  all  the  empty  coal- 
boats  and  other  barges  prepared  for  carrying  troops  and  ar- 
tillery, and  have  written  to  Colonel  Allen  for  some  more 
and  also  for  six  tugs  to  tow  them.  With  them  it  would  be 
easy  to  carry  supplies  to  New  Carthage  and  any  points  south 
of  that," 

Through  Badeau  he  informs  the  curious  world  that  "  he 
proposed  to  send  an  army  corps  to  co-operate  with  Banks. 
With  this  increased  force  Port  Hudson  could  certainly  be 
taken,  and  then  Banks'  entire  army  might  be  combined 
with  Grant's,  and  moving  up  from  below  a  co-operative  at- 
tack be  made  on  Vicksburg." 

Grant  had  no  men  to  spare  for  any  such  wild  goose 
affair  as  this,  and  his  real  object  was  to  get  his  entire  army 
by  this  route  away  from  not  only  the  front  of  Vicksburg, 
but  the  pestiferous  place  itself.  He  must  have  known  that 
such  was  the  heavy  draft  for  men  made  by  the  then  great  ag- 
gressive armies  in  the  field  under  Hooker,  Rosecrans,  and 
himself,  that  Banks  was  allowed  only  enough  to  act  on  the 
defensive  in  holding  Louisiana.  It  is  true,  that  Halleck,  to 
quiet  President  Lincoln's  growing  impatience,  and  well 
believing  that  Grant  was  swamped  before  Vicksburg,  kept 
a  continuous  demand  on  the  unhappy  general  to  co-operate 
with  Banks  in  an  attack  on  Port  Hudson.  Grant  denies, 
however,  that  he  had  any  intent  to  move  his  entire  army. 
We  are  told  that  he  meant  to  send  or  lead  20,000  by  the 
narrow  way  of  winding  bayous  to  Port  Hudson,  some  four 
hundred  miles  below,  in  a  wild  hope  of  finding  Banks'  army 
there,  and  that  a  siege  of  Port  Hudson  would  withdraw  the 


Abandoning  the  Vicksburg  Front.  263 

irritated  public  mind  from  the  failure  at  Vicksburg.  In  the 
meantime,  the  main  body  was  to  remain  in  the  stagnant 
waters  of  Grand  Gulf  where  the  sick  list  was  increasing  as 
the  season  advanced. 

Had  Grant  consulted  the  War  Department  at  Richmond, 
hq  could  not  have  devised  a  plan  more  favorable  to  the  Con- 
federacy than  this.  In  the  first  place,  he  so  divided  his 
forces  as  to  enable  the  enemy  to  attack  in  detail  and  defeat 
with  ease.  The  small  force,  for  example,  left  at  Milliken's 
Bend,  would  be  open  to  attack  from  Vicksburg.  The  Vicks- 
burg forces,  relieved  from  any  menace  of  a  great  army  with 
the  interior  abandoned,  could  at  any  time  assume  the  ag- 
gressive with  fatal  effect.  This,  while  the  moving  column 
destined  for  Port  Hudson  would  depend  for  its  supplies  on 
Milliken's  Bend  where  every  transport  would  have  to  be  ac- 
companied by  a  small  army  to  save  it  from  destruction.  The 
fact  is  that  Grant,  whatever  may  have  been  his  statements  at 
the  time  or  his  literary  efforts  after,  meant  to  get  his  entire 
army  from  before  Vicksburg,  let  the  cost  be  what  it  might. 
This  was  so  evidently  the  fact  that  it  produced  general  dis- 
may among  the  subordinate  generals  of  the  army.  With 
the  charming  simplicity  of  obtuseness  that  characterizes  all 
of  Grant's  literary  efforts,  he  confesses  to  the  truth  of  the 
condition,  and,  through  Badeau,  says: 

"  When  the  idea  became  known  to  those  in  his  in- 
timacy to  his  staff  and  to  his  corps  commanders,  it  seemed 
to  them  full  of  danger.  To  move  his  army  below  Vicks- 
burg was  to  separate  it  from  the  North  and  from  all  its  sup- 
plies ;  to  throw  what  seemed  an  insurmountable  obstacle  be- 
tween himself  and  his  own  base  ;  to  cut  his  communications 
and  to  place  iris  army  exactly  where  it  is  the  whole  object 
and  aim  of  war  to  get  the  enemy." 

All  the  generals  were  alarmed;  Sherman,  especially, 
was  excited.  "All  strove,"  says  the  guileless  Badeau, 
"  within  the  limits  of  soldierly  subordination  to  divert  their 
chief  from  what  they  considered  a  fatal  error."  He  con- 
tinues : 

"  Even  after  the  orders  for  the  movement  had  been  is- 
sued, Sherman  rode  up  to  Grant's  head-quarters  and  pro- 


264  Life  of  Thomas. 

posed  his  plan.  He  asserted,  emphatically,  that  the  only 
way  to  take  Vicksburg  was  from  the  north,  selecting  some 
high  ground  on  the  Mississippi  for  a  base.  Grant  replied 
that  such  a  plan  would  require  him  to  go  back  to  Memphis. 
*  Exactly  so,'  said  Sherman,  '  that  is  what  I  mean.' ' 

Sherman  followed  his  verbal  protest  with  a  letter  to  the 
same  end  addressed  to  Grant's  chief  of  staff.  Grant  read  the 
letter  in  silence.  The  man  who  had  moved  his  army  down 
the  Mississippi  because  of  his  jealousy  of  a  political  general 
after  Sherman  had  demonstrated  that  Vicksburg  could  not 
be  taken  at  the  front  from  the  river,  well  knew  that  if,  at  the 
end  of  the  terrible  loss  of  men  and  means,  he  returned  to 
Memphis,  he  would  be  relegated  to  the  obscurity  from  which 
he  had  so  recently  emerged. 

Some  move  had  to  be  made.  Grant,  in  his  military 
biography  edited  by  Badeau,  states  the  situation  fairly  in 
a  paragraph  written  to  show  that  he  was  in  no  worse  con- 
dition than  the  other  generals  in  command.  There  is  a 
slight  historical  inaccuracy  in  his  claiming  Corinth  and 
luka  as  his  temples  and  designating  Banks'  forces  as  a 
mammoth  expedition,  when  the  fact  was  that  Banks  had  but 
thirty  thousand  men  holding  the  lower  Mississippi  against  a 
capable  active  Confederate  commander,  supplied  with  troops 
liberated  from  Vicksburg  by  Grant's  bottled  condition.  But 
these  inaccuracies  are  so  trivial  in  comparison  with  others 
that  we  can  well  let  them  pass.  He  says : 

"  Indeed,  it  is  not  surprising  that  the  government  should 
have  urged  him  on.  No  substantial  victory  had  cheered  the 
flagging  spirits  of  the  North  since  Grant's  own  successes  at 
Corinth  and  luka  of  the  preceding  autumn.  Banka  had 
achieved  no  military  results  with  his  mammoth  expedition ; 
Burnside,  in  December,  had  suffered  the  repulse  of  Freder- 
icksburg ;  Rosecraus  had  not  got  further  than  Murfreesboro, 
and  the  great  force  of  60,000  or  70,000  men  at  Grant's  dis- 
posal had  accomplished  absolutely  nothing  during  six  long, 
weary  months  of  effort  and  delay." 

We  have  to  remember,  however,  that  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac,  that  of  the  Cumberland,  and  of  Banks  at  New  Or- 
leans, were  all  organized  for  practical  movements  forward, 


Rosccrdns  Endangered  by  Grant.  265 

while  the  seventy  thousand  men  under  Grant  were  digging 
their  own  graves  in  a  hopeless  position  his  incompetence 
provided.  So  hopeless  was  this,  that  when  his  Port  Hudson 
plan  was  developed,  there  came  a  revolt  against  it  from  all 
his  subordinate  generals. 

We  have  referred  to  the  fact  that  it  was  Grant,  and  not, 
as  generally  believed,  Rosecrans,  whose  helpless  inactivity 
relieved  the  Confederates  of  one  great  army.  This  hero  of 
disaster  admits  that  the  army,  in  the  beginning  of  the  canal 
digging,  bayou  clearing,  and  general  swamp  life,  numbered  a 
hundred  and  thirty  thousand  men,  and  at  the  time  the  above 
paragraph  referred  to  was  reduced,  without  fighting,  to  sixty 
or  seventy  thousand.  As  to  liberating  Confederates  from 
his  front,  he  writes  Halleck,  27th  March,  that  the  forces 
were  not  to  exceed  ten  thousand  in  the  city  (Vicksburg)  to- 
day. Thus,  in  a  masterly  movement,  that  is  compared  to 
that  of  Napoleon  at  Ulm,  he  had  so  arranged  as  to  be  with 
sixty  or  seventy  thousand  men  fastened  to  a  front  manned 
only  by  ten  thousand,  but  equal  under  the  circumstances  to 
a  hundred  thousand.  Now,  not  only  were  the  Confederates 
relieved,  but  our  armies  were  drained  to  continue  the  supply 
of  fever-stricken  and  swamp-suffering  men  under  this  man 
so  superior  to  Napoleon  at  Ulm. 

At  intervals  few  and  far  between,  we  strike  a  truth  in 
this  singularly  erroneous  military  life  prepared  by  Badeau 
from  material  supplied  by  Grant,  such,  for  instance,  as  the 
following,  written  to  Halleck  as  late  as  the  4th  of  April : 

"  From  information  from  the  South  by  way  Corinth,  I 
learn  that  the  enemy  in  front  of  Rosecrans  have  been  rein- 
forced from  Richmond,  Charleston,  Savannah,  Mobile,  and  a 
few  from  Vicksburg.  They  have  also  collected  a  large  cav- 
alry force  of  20,000  men.  All  the  bridges  eastward  from 
Savannah  (Tenn.)  and  north  from  Florence  are  being  rapidly 
repaired.  Chalmers  is  put  in  command  of  North  Mississippi, 
and  is  collecting  all  the  partisan  rangers  and  loose  inde- 
pendent companies  of  cavalry  that  have  been  operating  in 
this  department.  He  is  now  occupying  the  line  of  the  Tal- 
lahatchie.  This  portends  preparations  to  attack  Rosecrans, 


266  Life  of  Thomas. 

and  to  be  able  to  follow  up  any  success  with  rapidity.  Also, 
to  make  a  simultaneous  raid  into  West  Tennessee,  both  from 
Mississippi  and  by  crossing  the  Tennessee  river." 

The  "few  taken  from  Vicksburg"  amounted  in  number 
to  an  army  of  thirty  thousand  men. 


Plan  of  Escape  from  before  Vicksburg.  2H7 


CHAPTER  XIY. 

The  Port  Hudson  Plan  of  Escape  from  before  Vicksburg — Running  Steam- 
ers Past  the  Batteries — McClernand  Forces  the  Evacuation  of  Grand 
Gulf  and  Port  Gibson — Grant  Fails  to  Follow  Up  the  Advantage,  and 
Moves  Off  in  a  Raid  on  Jackson — Pembertou  Moves  Out  of  Vicksbunr^ 
Intending  to  Form  a  Junction  with  Johnston  and  Attack  Grant's  Rear- 
Bloody  Battle  of  Champion's  Hill — Pemberton  Retreats  into  Vicks- 
burg— The  Assaults  and  Horrible  Loss— The  Wounded  Left  to  Die  and 
and  the  Dead  to  Rot — Pemberton  Surrenders — Fearful  Cost  of  the 
Questionable  Advantage. 

The  newspaper  historians  aud  the  egotistical  memoirs 
of  the  brainless  bullet-heads,  as  the  great  Hawthorne  desig- 
nated a  majority  of  our  generals,  are  so  occupied  with  mili- 
tary operations  that  they  take  no  note  of  the  men  at  the  head 
of  the  government  upon  whom  fell  the  great  responsibility 
of  conducting  the  conflict  to  a  successful  issue.  The  time 
the  stolid  and  ignorant  soldier  was  advising  Halleck  of  the 
perilous  condition  of  the  Union  armies,  April  4,  1863,  was 
the  darkest  period  of  the  war.  That  ablest  of  our  diplo- 
matic statesmen,  William  H.  Seward,  of  the  State  Depart- 
ment, had  days  of  anxiety  and  nights  bereft  of  sleep  over  the 
threatening  attitude  of  Europe  toward  us.  Our  war  was 
being  carried  on  in  the  cabinets  abroad.  Recognition  of  the 
Richmond  government  was  threatened  hourly.  Its  fatal  re- 
sult would  have  been  swift  and  conclusive.  It  looked  to  the 
French  and  Russian  powers,  the  most  forward  and  potent 
against  us,  that  the  revolted  states  would  win  without  their 
hazardous  interference.  No  less  heavy  was  the  task  assigned 
Salmon  P.  Chase,  Secretary  of  the  Treasury.  The  fearful 
outlay  of  a  million  a  day  to  keep  our  armies  in  the  field  upon 
loans  from  the  people,  for  capital  that  is'  ever  selfish,  timid, 
and  unpatriotic,  held  aloof,  and  these  loans  in  the  shape  of 
currency,  being  the  credit  of  an  imperiled  government,  con- 
tinued to  depreciate  until,  at  the  time  of  which  we  write,  the 
premium  on  gold  reached  seventy-two,  and  bade  fair  ere  long 
to  leave  the  paper  money  without  value.  The  government, 


268  Life  of  Thomas. 

of  course,  was  bidding  against  itself  in  purchases  that  an 
almost  worthless  currency  steadily  augmented.  Edwin  M. 
Stanton,  a  strange  compound  of  ill-temper,  vindictive  preju- 
dices, lofty  patriotism,  and  eminent  ability,  a  man  of  errors 
but  no  weaknesses,  had  the  task  of  conducting  a  war  in 
which  he  had,  as  he  claimed,  no  generals,  but  a  vast  army  of 
men  under  muskets,  the  bravest  and  best  God  ever  gave  to  a 
people.  Back  of,  and  more  fatal,  because  insiduously  sapping 
the  very  foundation  of  popular  faith,  was  a  disJoyal  senti- 
ment at  the  North  that  fed  and  fattened  on  disaster,  and  day 
by  day,  slowly  but  surely,  honey-combed  the  faith  that  held 
Lincoln's  administration  at  Washington  and  our  armies  in 
the  field.  These  eminent  men,  with  the  most  eminent  at  their 
head,  bore  the  strain  of  this  terrible  burden  to  the  end.  "The 
coarse,  tough  fiber  of  the  greatest  man  with  which  our 
country  was  ever  blessed  not  only  enabled  him  to  live  through 
the  heavy  responsibility  of  his  task,  but  lifted  him  above  de- 
pression and  the  fatal  effects  of  panics.  It  was  this  condi- 
tion at  Washington  that  enabled  Washburne  to  keep  the 
most  incapable  of  our  commanders  at  the  head  of  an  army 
being  wasted  in  swamps  and  bayous.  He  was  from  Illinois, 
Lincoln's  own  state,  and  he  knew  the  popular  power  this 
sagacious  leader  held.  Then,  again,  Grant  did  not  seem 
more  unfortunate  than  the  other  commanders.  Lincoln  said, 
with  his  usual  quaintness,  that  selecting  a  general  "  was  like 
putting  one's  hand  in  a  sack  to  get  one  eel  from  a  dozen 
snakes." 

But  popular  patience  was  drawing  to  a  close.  Army 
correspondents  for  public  journals  writing  from  the  horrible 
fever-stricken  camps  of  Grant's  army,  although  petted  and 
wined,  could  not  be  controlled.  Members  of  Congress  be- 
gan working  their  way  to  the  front.  The  same  law-makers, 
discontented,  thronged  the  executive  mansion  at  Washington, 
while  the  mails  came  laden  with  letters  from  people  having 
sons  and  brothers  dead  or  dying  of  malaria. 

Some  sort  of  a  movement  became  a  necessity.  This  was 
resolved  on  in  the  Port  Hudson  plan,  that  meant,  if  success- 
ful, to  get  the  entire  army  from  before  Vicksburg  down  to 
Banks,  at  New  Orleans.  The  man  who  resembled  Napoleon 


Swamps  and  a  Cuvious  Canal.  269 

at  Ulm  persisted.  Orders  were  issued  "  in  the  last  week  of 
March "  for  concentration  of  all  the  forces  at  Milliken's 
Bend.  Hurl  but,  at  Memphis,  was  stripped  of  every  man 
that  could  be  spared  from  the  rear ;  yawls  and  flatboatg  were 
collected  from  St.  Louis  and  Chicago,  and,  on  the  28th  of 
March,  McClernand  was  sent,  by  the  circuitous  roads  that 
lead  from  Milliken's  Bend  by  way  of  Richmond  and  west  of 
Roundaway  Bayou,  to  New  Carthage,  twenty-seven  miles 
below.  McPherson  and  Sherman  were  to  follow  as  rapidly 
as  ammunition  and  rations  could  be  forwarded. 

The  canal  called  the  Duckport,  through  the  looping  Wal- 
nut Bayou  to  Bayou  Vidal,  had  not  been  completed ;  supplies 
were  to  follow  as  soon  as  the  canal  was  opened.  The  troops 
moved  in  light  marching  order,  with  only  ten  days  rations 
in  their  haversacks.  The  road,  if  it  could  be  called  such, 
along  which  the  troops  were  to  march,  had  to  be  built  of 
rough  logs  to  keep  the  horses  and  wagons  from  sinking  hub 
deep  in  the  soft  mud.  In  addition  to  the  road  bed  of  logs, 
over  two  thousand  feet  of  bridging  had  to  be  built,  and  to 
get  seventy  thousand  men  of  all  arms,  with  the  necessary 
transportation  of  ammunition  and  food,  along  such  a  cause- 
way was  so  hopeless  that  Grant  relied  altogether  on  the  canal 
he  was  digging  to  open  water  transportation.  The  canal 
was  at  last  completed,  but  not  opened,  for  suddenly  a  situa- 
tion presented  itself  that  was  more  ludicrous  than  any  ever 
devised  for  opera-boufle.  McClernand,  with  twenty  thou- 
sand men  wading  through  swamps  and  swimming  bayous, 
was  busy  constructing  the  sixty  miles  of  road.  Now,  this 
rough  causeway  was  but  a  few  inches  above  the  level  of  the 
water,  and  to  open  the  canal  was  to  pour  in  on  this  pioneer 
corps  a  flood  that  would  sweep  it  off'  in  four  feet  of  water. 
The  great  engineer  had  not  perceived  this  until  he  was  about 
to  open  the  line.  He  was  forced  to  wait  until  the  high  water 
of  the  Mississippi  subsided,  and  then  he  had  another  ludi- 
crous surprise.  There  was  not  enough  water  in  the  canal 
to  float  a  shingle.  And  so  the  waterway  for  easy  transporta- 
tion dropped  out,  and  with  it  disappeared  the  Port  Hudson 
project. 

Again  our  commander  met  face  to  face  the  fact  that  his 


270  Life  of  Thomas. 

only  course  out  of  his  half-year's  vain  struggle  with  the  im- 
possible was  to  confess  his  failures  and  return  his  army  to 
Memphis  and  himself  to  Galena.  A  man  of  any  thing  like 
a  sensitive  temperament  would  have  long  since  acknowledged 
his  failure  and  asked  to  be  relieved.  Grant  was  not  of  that 
sort.  So  long  as  the  political  influence  at  Washington 
availed  him  so  long  would  he  hold  the  unfortunate  army  to 
death  by  fevers  in  front  of  Vicksburg.  The  country,  how- 
ever, had  to  be  kept  interested  in  fresh  events,  and  now  one 
presented  itself  that  might  with  a  better  hope  of  success  have 
been  tried  in  the  beginning.  This  project  was  to  run  past 
the  batteries  at  night  with  gunboats  and  steamers  laden  with 
men  and  supplies.  Such  perilous  attempts  had  been  made 
successful  by  iron-clads,  but  now  it  was  proposed  to  use  the 
light  built  unguarded  steamboats  of  the  Mississippi.  Three 
of  these  were  selected  and  partly  protected  by  bales  of  cotton 
and  wet  hay.  These  were  escorted  by  one  wooden  and  six 
iron-clad  gunboats.  These  were  to  "  run  past  twenty-eight 
heavy  guns  that  commanded  the  river  for  eighteen  miles." 
Illustrating  the  sort  of  men  in  our  volunteer  ranks  the  brave 
fellows  turned  over  to  Grant,  not  as  food  for  powder,  but  food 
for  fevers,  small-pox  and  measles,  we  quote  from  Badeau's 
Grant,  the  following  : 

"  Only  two  of  the  steamboat  masters  were  willing  to  en- 
counter the  danger ;  the  crew  of  one  transport  (barge)  also 
remained  aboard,  but  all  others  shrank.  When,  however,  it 
became  known  in  the  army  that  volunteers  were  wanted  for 
the  dangerous  task,  men  enough  to  man  a  hundred  steamers 
pressed  themselves  upon  the  commanders;  pilots,  masters, 
engineers  and  men  all  were  found  in  the  ranks  and  among 
the  officers  on  shore,  and  from  these  crews  were  speedily  im- 
provised for  the  transport  fleet." 

The  Confederates,  soon  discerning  our  attempt,  lit  the 
river  with  huge  fires,  in  some  instances  houses,  and  poured 
in  upon  the  passing  fleet  an  incessant  fire.  The  damage  in- 
flicted is  left  in  great  obscurity.  We  know  that  of  the  three 
steamboats  but  one  escaped,  and  as  the  barges  or  transports, 
as  they  were  called,  were  cut  loose  from  the  steamers  and 
gunboats  the  moment  they  came  under  fire  they  were  left  to 


The  Destruction  of  a  Fleet.  271 

a  current  of  from  five  to  six  miles  an  hour  to  float  slowly  by 
the  death  dealing  shells  of  the  enemy.  Badeau  reluctantly 
admits  a  little  light  upon  the  affair  by  telling  of  an  old  rebel 
in  whose  house  McClernand  made  his  head-quarters  at  New 
Carthage.  This  aged  son  of  the  South  was  openly  rejoicing 
at  the  entire  destruction  of  our  venturesome  fleet.  "  By 
daylight,  however,"  'writes  Badeau,  "  the  wrecks  had  all 
passed  by  and  after  awhile  a  gunboat  appeared  below  the 
line  and  then  a  transport;  then  one  after  another  the  whole 
fleet  of  iron-clads  and  army  steamers  hove  in  sight  from  their 
perilous  passage." 

As  but  three  steamers  had  started,  and  two  were  de- 
stroyed, the  use  of  the  plural  is  as  obscure  as  the  sentence  which 
says  "  the  wrecks  had  all  passed  by."  In  Grant's  memoirs 
which  supplement  Badeau's  military  life  and  are  evidently  by 
the  same  hand,  we  learn  that  the  hideous  resolve  to  remain 
with  his  army  upon  the  river  front  of  Vicksburg  for  nearly 
half  a  year  without  a  practical  move  or  a  blow  in  battle  came 
of  a  patriotic  desire  to  sustain  the  administration  and 
strengthen  the  hearts  of  the  people  by  pretended  moves  for- 
ward "  to  a  great  victory."  This  is  queer  reading  to  all  who 
remember  that  the  most  desponding  event  that  chilled  the 
North,  arrested  volunteering  and  gave  political  victory  to  the 
war  opponents  was  Grant's  encamped  condition  before 
Yicksburg.  This  throughout  the  press  was  attributed  to  the 
commander's  incapacity  and  unfortunate  alcoholic  habits. 
Perhaps  it  was  this  same  motive  not  to  discourage  the  war 
sentiment  that  made  him  conceal  his  losses  on  all  occasions. 
That  a  greater  part  of  the  barges  or  transports  were  sunk 
and  the  brave  men  who  had  volunteered  to  man  them  found 
their  graves  in  the  mud  of  the  Mississippi  can  not  be  ques- 
tioned. The  loss  being  carefully  concealed  Grant  reports  to 
Halleck :  "  Our  experiment  of  running  the  batteries  at 
Yicksburg,  has  demonstrated  the  entire  practicability  of 
doing  so  with  but  little  risk." 

As  we  have  said,  what  was  accomplished  with  a  great 
loss  in  the  end,  could  have  been  done  almost  without  loss  in 
the  beginning.  If  one,  or  at  the  farthest,  two  months,  of 
the  time  spent  in  hopeless  canal  digging  and  bayou  explor- 


272  Lift  of  Thomas. 

ing  hud  been  given  to  preparing  iron-clads,  the  batteries  at 
Vicksburg  could  have  been  run  with  the  same  success  that 
attended  like  attempts  elsewhere. 

As  we  have  a  large  number  of  sensible  people,  quite  in- 
telligent and  reasonable  when  apart  from  political  prejudices, 
who  insist  upon  it  that  this  hero  of  fevers,  small-pox,  and 
measles,  was  a  clear-brained,  thoughtful  man,  who  projected 
his  mind  from  the  complications  of  the  present  into  the  fu- 
ture of  success,  it  is  well  to  turn  to  his  own  record,  made  up 
in  communications  to  Halleck,  at  Washington.  We  have 
seen  that  while  digging  the  canal  across  the  peninsula,  he 
claims  to  have  predicted  its  failure.  And  yet  he  continued 
to  dig  to  the  end.  Of  the  attempt  by  the  Duckport  canal  to 
cut  a  waterway  to  New  Carthage,  we  learn  from  Grant,  as 
seen  through  Badeau,  that  at  a  very  early  day  he  saw  and 
prophesied  its  failure.  This  is  contradicted  by  a  letter  from 
Grant  as  late  as  the  12th  of  April,  when  he  says  that  he  then 
believed  fully  in  the  waterway,  and  he  gives  two  reasons  for 
not  availing  himself  of  its  immediate  use.  The  first  is  that 
he  has  not  suitable  vessels  for  the  purpose,  and  second,  given 
after  a  return  from  Smith's  plantation,  to  Halleck,  dated 
April  19,  is  embodied  in  his  statement  that  "  by  clearing  out 
the  bayous  from  timber,  there  will  be  good  navigation  from 
here  to  New  Carthage  for  tugs  and  barges,  also  small 
stern-wheel  steamers.  The  navigation  can  be  kept  good,  I 
think,  by  using  our  dredges  constantly  until  there  is  twenty 
feet  fall."  He  throws  an  anchor  to  the  windward  by  adding: 
"  On  this  subject,  however,  I  have  not  taken  the  opinion  of 
an  engineer  officer,  nor  have  I  formed  it  upon  sufficient  in- 
vestigation to  warrant  me  in  speaking  positively." 

This  was  a  singular  confession  from  a  commander  who, 
at  the  time,  based  the  entire  campaign  and  the  saving  of  his 
army  upon  the  very  project  he  had  failed  to  consult  compe- 
tent officers  upon,  or  to  investigate  himself. 

Three  days  after,  however,  he  seems  to  have  investigated, 
for  he  writes  Sherman,  24th  of  April,  before  he  gave  the 
water  route  a  trial,  "  The  water  in  the  bayous  is  falling  very 
rapidly,  out  of  all  proportion  to  the  fall  in  the  river,  so  that 


Moving  to  Grand  Gulf.  273 

it  is  exceedingly  doubtful  whether  they  can  be,  made  use  of 
for  the  purpose  of  navigation." 

There  does  not  seem  to  have  been  much  anxiety  to  keep 
the  government  at  Washington  advised  of  the  real  condition 
of  our  army  at  Vicksburg.  Perhaps  it  was  the  same  patriotic 
desire  to  avoid  depression  that  kept  the  army  swamped  and 
dying  there  rather  than  by  a  movement  back  to  Memphis, 
take  up  again  a  sensible  campaign  abandoned  six  months  be- 
fore for  the  sole  purpose  of  heading  off  a  "  political  general." 
"While  Grant  kept  the  War  Department  at  Washington  in 
ignorance  of  his  situation,  he  seems  to  have  treated  himself  to 
a  like  condition  in  regard  to  his  front.  While  McClernand's 
forces  were  toiling  in  the  mud,  strung  along  for  twenty  miles, 
and  not  yet  provided  with  means  to  cross  intervening  bayous 
that  were  overflowed  to  transport  an  army  and  supplies  for 
the  purpose  of  taking  Grand  Gulf,  Grant  was  pleased  to 
treat  himself  to  the  belief  that  Grand  Gulf  had  fallen,  or  if 
not,  that  such  success  was  only  a  question  of  short  time. 
Thus,  on  the  13th,  Grant  cautioned  McClernand  :  "  It  is  not 
desirable  that  you  should  move  in  any  direction  from  Grand 
Gulf,  but  remain  under  protection  of  the  gun-boats." 

It  seems  to  have  been  Job's  greatest  affliction  that 
brought  Grant  to  a  knowledge  of  his  front.  Porter 
wrote  him  that  he  could  not  harmonize  with  the  "po- 
litical general,"  and  Badeau  informs  us  that  his  general,  al- 
though afflicted  with  boils,  rode  forty  miles  to  Porter's  land- 
ing, and  then  gave  McClernand  further  instruction.  The 
fact  is  that  he  rode  but  twenty  miles.  This,  however,  was 
sufficient  for  the  ride  and  boils  to  stimulate  his  military 
mind  to  the  necessity  he  was  under  to  command  his  army  at 
the  front.  He  found  that  instead  of  McClernand  taking 
Grand  Gulf,  his  entire  force  was  strung  along  between  Rich- 
mond and  New  Carthage.  Grant  also  learned  that  the 
greater  number  of  the  barges  he  had  sent  to  run  the  block- 
ade had  either  been  knocked  to  pieces  and  sunk,  or  had 
floated  down  to  a  possession  of  the  enemy,  and  that  even  if 
he  had  his  army  on  the  river  he  lacked  boats  to  carry  it 
across  to  au  attack  on  Grand  Gulf. 
18 


274  Life  of  Thomas. 

Again  the  murderous  process  of  sending  unprotected 
boats  to  run  the  batteries  was  tried.  Grant  dispatched  to 
Halleck  the  23d  of  April : 

"  Six  boats  and  a  number  of  barges  ran  the  Vicksburg 
batteries  last  night.  All  the  boats  got  by  more  or  less  dam- 
aged. The  Tigress  sank  at  3  A.  M.,  and  is  a  total  loss — crew 
all  saved.  The  Moderator  was  much  damaged.  I  think  all 
the  barges  went  through  safely.  .  .  .  Casualties,  so  far 
as  reported,  two  men  mortally  wounded  and  several  (number 
not  known)  more  or  less  severely  wounded.  About  500 
shots  were  fired.  I  look  upon  this  as  a  great  success." 

Badeau  narrates  the  affair  more  succinctly,  save  that  in 
this  place  he  calls  the  steamboats  transports : 

"  On  the  28th  of  April,  six  other  transports  (steamboats) 
attempted  to  run  by  the  Vicksburg  batteries ;  five  of  them 
succeeded,  although  in  a  damaged  condition ;  one  was  sunk 
by  being  struck  in  the  hull  by  a  solid  shot.  The  crews  of  all 
the  transports  (steamboats),  like  those  of  their  predecessors, 
were  composed  of  volunteers  for  the  purpose  from  the  army. 
Twelve  barges,  laden  with  forage  and  rations,  were  sent  in 
tow  of  the  last  six  steamers,  and  half  of  them  got  safely  by." 

Six  of  the  twelve  barges,  laden  with  supplies,  went  down 
to  form  the  Mississippi  delta,  likewise  one  steamboat,  which 
carried  the  hospital  stores,  preparatory  to  the  Grand  Gulf 
action.  This  was  a  dear  way  of  supplying  a  great  army,  and 
this  was  to  be  the  way  until  the  Port  Hudson  expedition 
was  over.  But  Uncle  Sam  was  rich  and  Grant  said  it  was  a 
great  success.  And  none  of  these  steamers  or  barges  could 
return  for  another  load. 

A  ship-yard  was  set  up  for  repairs.  In  this,  again,  we 
have  a  hint  at  the  quality  of  these  volunteers: 

"  Mechanics  were  found  in  the  army  to  do  the  work ; 
for  it  was  a  striking  feature  of  the  volunteer  service  through- 
out the  war  that  no  mechanical  or  professional  need  arose 
when  accomplished  adepts  could  not  be  found  in  almost  any 
regiment  to  perform  the  duty  required." 

The  following  shows  that  there  is  no  mistake  as  to  the 
amount  of  destruction,  and  also  the  next  move : 

"  The  army  craft  was  soon  in  a  condition  to  be  of  use 


Me  demand  Finds  a  Road  to  Vicksburg.  275 

in  moving  troops ;  but  the  destruction  of  two  transports  and 
six  barges  reduced  the  number  so  that  it  was  found  neces- 
sary to  march  them  from  Perkins'  Plantation  to  Hard  Times, 
twenty-two  miles  further  and  a  distance  of  seventy  miles 
from  Milliken's  Bend." 

After  running  the  batteries  of  Vicksburg  at  a  fearful 
loss  of  men  and  material,  as  we  have  seen,  it  was  determined, 
as  a  part  of  the  latest  plan  to  get  away  from  Vicksburg,  to 
take  the  Grand  Gulf  fortification  by  storm.  Fortunately 
the  initiative  in  this  desperate  project  was  taken  by  the  gun- 
boats under  Porter.  A  few  minutes'  work  demonstrated 
that  Grand  Gulf  was  more  impregnable  from  the  river  front 
than  Vicksburg  itself.  Porter's  boats  were  badly  battered 
and  had  to  be  hauled  oft',  thankful  that  they  were  not  sunk. 
Had  this  been  accompanied  by  an  assault  by  infantry,  two 
thousand  would  probably  have  been  killed  and  crippled  as 
at  Chickasaw  Blufts  when  Sherman  tried  conclusions  with 
the  impossible. 

This  failure  made  the  latest  project  of  how  to  get  away 
impracticable,  and  a  new  campaign  had  to  be  thought  of. 
The  future  was  as  desperate  as  the  past  was  gloomy.  The 
water  route  being  abandoned,  the  only  means  of  supply  to 
fifty  thousand  men  was  by  the  road  from  Milliken's  Bend 
built  by  McClernand's  twenty  thousand,  seventy  miles  in 
length,  so  nearly  impassable  that  the  air  was  heavy  with  the 
odor  of  decaying  mules  killed  in  the  labor  imposed  upon 
them.  At  this  critical  moment  a  bit  of  information  came, 
Grant  claims,  to  him  from  an  intelligent  contraband.  Me- 
Clernand  asserts  that  it  was  his  through  right  of  discovery. 
It  was  to  the  effect  that  at  an  obscure  village  on  the  east 
bank  of  the  Mississippi,  called  Bruninsburg,  there  was  not 
only  a  landing,  but  a  road  on  high  ground  that  led  to  the 
rear  of  Vicksburg.  McClernand,  in  his  report,  tells  how, 
when  road  making,  he  kept  on  foot  a  series  of  explorations 
that  included  every  part  of  the  river  and  was  accompanied 
by  skirmishes  with  bodies  of  Confederates  that  sought  to 
impede  his  slow  and  heavy  engineering  and  explorations. 
But  McClernand  was  a  "  political  general "  of  vaulting  am- 


276  Life  of  Thomas. 

bition  and  exasperating  conceit,  so  that  it  was  better  to  rely 
on  the  intelligent  but  mysterious  contraband. 

Bruinsburg  was  seized  and  the  road  referred  to  found 
to  be  singularly  favorable.  The  Port  Hudson  scheme  of  re- 
treat was  abandoned  in  mind  as  it  had  been  abandoned  in 
matter.  The  half  year's  dismal  problem  had  been  solved. 
Grant  was  on  the  east  side  of  the  river  at  last,  and  the 
formidable  batteries  turned.  That  which  might  have  been 
done  by  a  campaign  along  the  Mississippi  Central  nearly 
half  a  year  before  was  accomplished,  and  Grant  found  him- 
self with  at  least  fifty  thousand  men  against  Pembertou's 
twenty  thousand,  for  such  was  the  force  of  the  enemy  hastily 
called  together  when  it  was  discerned  that  the  Union  forces 
had  run  the  batteries  with  enough  boats  to  ferry  our  army 
across  the  river.  The  Confederates  were  caught  unprepared. 
The  strange  fact  that  the  second  grand  army  of  the  Union 
had  been  kept  in  the  swamps  and  bayous,  where  ten  thou- 
sand Confederates  were  equal  to  a  hundred  thousand,  mis- 
led the  authorities  at  Richmond.  They  thought  the  stupidity 
that  inaugurated  that  strange  monstrosity  would  continue 
available  to  the  end.  They  did  not  fully  appreciate  tenacity 
of  fool  purpose,  and  the  very  stupidity  on  which  the  Con- 
federates built  proved  their  defeat  in  the  end. 

Grant  lost  no  time  in  seizing  on  the  chance  that  had 
so  strangely  been  thrown  to  him  when,  utterly  bewildered 
and  desperate,  McClernand's  forces  were  pushed  forward  to 
the  interior.  About  seven  miles  from  Bruinsburg,  they  en- 
countered a  thin  line  of  about  a  thousand  men.  In  brush- 
ing this  aside,  they  met  some  five  thousand  under  General 
Bo  wen.  A  brisk  engagement  followed  that  ended  in  a  vic- 
tory to  the  heavier  force  under  McClernand.  This  success 
forced  the  evacuation  of  Grand  Gulf  and  Port  Gibson,  the 
troops  in  the  two  fortifications  being  called  to  the  support 
of  Pemberton.  The  unexpected  had  again  happened.  That 
Grant,  instead  of  dying  with  his  thousands  on  the  river 
front  of  Vicksburg  or  retreating  up  the  Mississippi  with  the 
forlorn  remnant  of  his  army  to  Memphis,  should  construct 
i\  wretched  road  from  Milliken's  Bend  nearly  seventy  miles 
for  his  army  and  supply  wagons  to  march  over  and  then  run 


Turning  Away  from  Vicksburg.  277 

enough  steam  and  gunboats  by  the  batteries  of  Vicksburg  to 
ferry  his  army  across  the  river,  seemed  as  wildly  impossible 
as  his  past  six  months'  operation.  And  now  that  the  way 
was  open  to  Vicksburg  through  a  defeat  of  Pemberton,  he 
was  attacked  with  a  blindness  more  amazing  than  his 
previous  helplessness.  The  golden  moment  of  a  quick,  de- 
cisive seizure  of  the  chances  given  him  was  strangely  lost. 
As  we  have  seen,  the  Confederate  government,  relying  on 
the  natural  and  artificial  strength  of  Vicksburg  from  the 
river,  and  satisfied  that  Grant  could  release  himself  only  by 
falling  back  to  Memphis,  and  that  such  a  move  would  give 
them  full  time  to  gather  an  army  at  his  front,  left  at  Vicks- 
burg only  enough  men  to  man  the  works,  some  ten  thousand 
in  number.  Now  a  new  phase  was  put  upon  the  condition, 
and  Pemberton  was  calling  frantically  for  troops  and  pray- 
ing for  delay  on  our  part  to  concentrate  his  forces  for  the 
Held. 

The  prayer  offered  God  was  complied  with  by  Grant. 
Instead  of  moving  on  Pemberton,  Grant  marched  from  the 
Confederates  in  a  raid  upon  Jackson. 

We  can  not  better  state  that  cause  of  delay  than  by 
quoting  from  Mr.  Samuel  Rockwell  Reed's  book  entitled 
"  The  Vicksburg  Campaign."  On  page  58  we  find  this : 

"A  distinct  idea  of  the  field  of  operation  is  essential  to 
the  understanding  of  the  strategic  movements  now  to  be 
made.  Attention  to  a  few  points  of  outline  will  enable  the 
reader  to  carry  it  in  mind  as  well  as  if  he  had  the  map  before 
him.  Hankinson's  Ferry,  now  a  bridge  on  the  Big  Black 
river,  was  Grant's  point  of  departure,  and  had  been  the 
place  from  which  he  dated  his  head-quarters  since  the  3d. 

"  From  Hankinson's  Ferry  due  north  over  the  upland 
to  Vicksburg  is  fifteen  miles.  From  Vicksburg  due  east  to 
Jackson,  to  which  was  a  railroad,  is  forty  miles.  From 
Hankinson's  Ferry  east-north-east  to  Jackson  is  forty-five 
miles.  This  boundary  incloses  the  whole  field  of  Grant's  and 
Pemberton's  operations.  The  outline  is  that  of  a  long  right- 
angle  triangle,  the  perpendicular  side  being  from  Hankin- 
eon's  to  Vickburg,  the  base  side  from  Vicksburg  to  Jackson, 
the  hypothenuse  from  Jackson  to  the  ferry ;  or  say  like  a 


278  Life  of  Thomas. 

wedge,  supposing  the  slant  to  be  all  on  one  side,  the  butt 
being  at  the  ferry  and  Vicksburg,  arid  the  straight  side 
from  Vicksburg  to  Jackson.  The  following  diagram  gives 
the  shape  and  proportions  of  the  field  of  operations : 


Vicksburg.  o —  ~~^°  Jackson. 


Hankinson's.  o 

"  This  is  the  theater  of  the  war.  The  main  natural 
feature  crossing  it  is  Big  Black  river,  which,  coming  down 
south-west,  crosses  the  railroad  ten  miles  east  of  Vicksburg, 
and  on  down  to  Hankinson's  Ferry,  and  to  the  Mississippi 
at  Grand  Gulf.  Five  miles  east  of  Big  Black,  on  the 
Vicksburg  and  Jackson  Railroad  is  Edwards'  Station,  soon 
to  be  historical.  About  seven  and  a  half  miles  east  of  this 
is  Champion's  Hill,  soon  to  be  called  by  the  soldiers  "the  hill 
of  death ;"  a  little  way  east  of  this,  Bolton  Station ;  then, 
nearly  nine  miles  east,  Clinton ;  from  there  to  Jackson  is 
about  nine  miles.  On  diverging  and  converging  roads  from 
Hankinson's  to  Jackson,  along  the  hypothenuse,  are  Rocky 
Springs,  Utica,  Cayuga,  Auburn,  New  Auburn,  Raymond 
and  Mississippi  Springs.  The  diagram  is  on  the  direct  lines. 
The  actual  distance  from  Vicksburg  to  Jackson  by  the  rail- 
road is  forty-four  miles  ;  from  Hankinson's  Ferry  to  Jackson 
by  the  common  roads  nearly  fifty  miles.  From  Hankinson's 
to  Vicksburg,  or  to  the  railroad  in  the  rear  of  Vicksburg, 
there  need  not  be  more  than  a  mile  or  two  variation  from 
the  direct  line  of  fifteen  miles. 

"  Grant's  immediate  base  is  at  Hankinson's  Ferry.  His 
objective  is  Pemberton's  army,  covering  Vicksburg,  its  line 
of  communication  being  the  railroad  to  Jackson.  A  march 
of  fifteen  miles  from  Hankinson's  Ferry  would  bring  Grant's 
army  upon  this  ralroad  and  compel  Pemberton  to  come  out 
to  fight  a  battle  for  his  communications  or  be  shut  up  in 
Vicksburg  without  an  effort.  Badeau  says  Grant  estimated 


Costly  Strategy.  279 

Pemberton's  forces  at  thirty  thousand.  Grant  was  not  sub- 
ject to  the  military  fault  of  underrating  the  number  opposed 
to  him.  At  Pittsburg  Landing  he  sent  word  to  Buell  that 
he  was  attacked  by  one  hundred  thousand  men. 

"  Of  this  estimated  thirty  thousand  Grant  reported  that 
he  had  engaged  eleven  thousand  at  Port  Gibson,  and  had 
1  entirely  routed '  and  '  thoroughly  demoralized  '  them.  The 
route  direct  to  Vicksburg  from  Hankinson's  Ferry  had  the 
line  of  bluff  on  the  one  hand,  which,  with  the  wet  bottoms 
beyond,  formed  a  rampart  for  the  left  flank  and  rear,  all  the 
way  to  Vicksburg.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Big  Black 
river  offered  a  natural  intrenchment  for  the  right  flank  and 
rear  all  the  way.  The  route  would  be  over  a  rolling  country 
of  plantations  and  roads,  and  with  no  serious  natural  ob- 
stacles. 

"  The  route  taking  VNTarrentou  by  the  rear,  the  Confed- 
erates would  have  to  depart  therefrom  as  soon  as  the  march 
began.  At  "Warrenton,  Grant  would  strike  the  river  a  little 
way  below  the  lower  end  of  this  canal  across  the  tongue  of 
land  opposite  Vicksburg,  whereby  the  wagoning  of  his  sup- 
plies from  Millikeu's  Bend  and  Young's  Point  would  be  re- 
duced to  three  miles,  by  a  r6ad  now  practicable.  Thus  a 
march  of  ten  miles  to  Warrenton  would  fetch  him  back  to 
his  base  of  supplies  and  re-inforcements.  This  would  relieve 
all  the  troops  that  were  guarding  the  land  route  of  sixty 
miles,  round  by  way  of  Richmond  to  Hard  Times,  and  would 
add  these  to  his  fighting  force. 

"  The  defeat  of  Pemberton  in  a  pitched  battle,  while 
covering  Vicksburg,  might  be  expected  to  carry  with  it  the 
immediate  fall  of  the  place,  without  the  dreadful  labor  and 
consuming  of  the  army  by  a  siege.  Then  Grant  could  turn 
his  army  east,  scatter  the  ineffectual  force  at  Jackson,  and 
make  that  his  base  of  operations.  General  J.  E.  Johnston's 
narrative  shows  that  he  expected  Grant  to  do  this,  and  he 
said  that  Grant's  occupation  of  Jackson  was  the  loss  of  the 
State  of  Mississippi.  It  appears  that  at  first  Grant  con- 
templated the  direct  line,  for  he  wrote  Sherman,  then  at 
Grand  Gulf,  May  7th :  « If  Blair  was  now  up  I  believe  we 


280  Life  of  Thomas. 

could  be  in  Vicksburg  in  seven  days.'  Blair  had  only  two 
brigades,  and  was  on  the  way  from  Milliken's  Bend. 

"  To  march,  however,  from  Hankinson's  Ferry,  fifteen 
miles,  upon  the  communications  of  Pemberton's  army,  cov- 
ering Vicksburg,  and  deciding  the  fate  of  the  Confederate 
army  and  of  Vicksburg  in  one  battle,  would  be  so  direct  and 
obvious  that  it  could  hardly  be  called  'any  thing  higher  than 
a  grand  tactical  movement.  It  is  what  any  general  would  do 
if  he  thought  he  could  beat  the  opposing  army.  And  in  gen- 
eral, when  a  commander  enters  on  an  invading  campaign,  he 
thinks  he  can  beat  the  enemy's  army. 

"  It  is  such  a  direct  and  obvious  movement  as  Bonaparte 
would  have  made,  or  Frederick  the  Great,  but  it  would  not 
be  strategic  in  the  highest  degree.  But  to  depart  from  a 
direct  line  of  fifteen  miles,  and  to  march  fifty  miles  to  Jack- 
son, lengthening  it  by  zigzag  marches  to  seventy,  and  then 
back,  leaving  the  enemy  covering  Vicksburg — this  is  high 
strategy. 

"  This  is  that  which  raised  General  Grant's  military 
fame  to  its  zenith.  In  explaining  this  strategy,  Badeau  takes 
the  common  mind  into  the  uppermost  realms  of  the  military 
art.  The  general  and  overruling  reason  was  in  Grant's  na- 
ture, as  he  has  before  stated  :  '  It  was  his  nature  in  war  al- 
ways to  prefer  the  immediate  aggressive.'  Therefore,  he 
went  to  Jackson  and  back,  when  the  enemy  was  in  his  im- 
mediate front.  But  Badeau  has  also  an  abundance  of  par- 
ticular reasons. 

"  Badeau  concedes  the  apparent  advantages  of  the  direct 
or  tactical  line,  but  he  mentions  a  serious  obstacle.  'Appar- 
ently, Grant's  most  natural  course  was  to  march  direct  upon 
Vicksburg,  and  at  once  begin  the  seige,  or  at  least  at- 
tack its  garrison,  should  that  come  out  to  meet  him.  He 
was  not  more  than  twelve  (ten)  miles  from  Warrenton,  and 
had  only  one  formidable  obstacle  to  encounter,  the  Big  Black 
river,  the  line  of  which  would  probably  be  taken  by  any  en- 
emy opposing  him.' 

"  The  adage  celebrates  the  short  memories  of  truthful 
historians.  After  Adam  Badeau  has  had  Grant  for  several 
days  in  possession  of  the  crossing  of  the  Big  Black  river,  and 


The  Long  Way  to  Vicksburg.  281 

after  McFherson,  on  the  4th,  had  made  reconnaissance  north 
along  the  west  side  of  the  Big  Black  to  within  six  miles  of 
Vicksburg,  and  had  found  no  enemy,  he  restores  the  Confed- 
erate army  to  the  Big  Black  river,  in  front  of  Grant,  as  a 
*  formidable  natural  obstacle '  which  Grant  would  have  to 
encounter,  with  the  Confederate  army  holding  it,  if  he  went 
by  the  direct  road. 

"  The  statement  of  this  reason  by  Adam  Badeau,  ap- 
proved by  Grant,  is  an  indication  of  the  abundance  of  reasons 
Grant  had  for  leaving  a  direct  way  of  fifteen  miles,  and  going 
around  one  hundred  and  fifty  miles  to  avoid  the  enemy  at 
Vicksburg.  The  other  reason  is  that  General  Gregg  was 
'collecting  another  force  toward  the  east  and  north,  of  whose 
strength  Grant  was  not  well  informed.'  Therefore,  he  re- 
solved to  go  east,  'to  drive  eastward  the  weaker  one'  before 
the  two  could  unite.  Then  he  would  seize  Jackson,  destroy 
the  railroads  there,  and  thus  would  have  'Vicksburg  and  its 
garrison  isolated  from  the  would-be  Confederacy.' 

"  That  no  force  arrived  at  Jackson  or  on  the  east  till  the 
10th,  only  distinguishes  Grant's  foresight  in  making  the  im- 
mediate objective  of  his  plan  a  reinforcement  which  might 
come  on  the  east  if  he  waited  for  it.  That  the  Confederate 
forces  at  Vicksburg  and  Jackson,  having  the  inner  line, 
could  unite  by  moving  half  the  distance  which  Grant  marched 
to  prevent  them,  might  be  a  consideration  in  war  as  prac- 
ticed in  the  old  world ;  but  Adam  Badeau  says  that  Grant's 
military  methods  were  original ;  that  '  his  mind,  indeed,  was 
never  much  inclined  to  follow  precedents,  or  to  set  store  by 
rules;  he  was  not  apt  to  study  the  means  by  which  other 
men  had  succeeded ;  he  seldom  discussed  the  campaigns  of 
great  commanders  of  European  wars,  and  was  utterly  indif- 
ferent to  precept  or  example  whenever  these  seemed  to  him 
inapplicable.'  And  he  was  '  not  apt  to  study '  these  ;  they 
were  always  inapplicable." 

A  more  admirable  statement  of  the  situation  could  not 
be  made.  There  is  no  profit  to  be  found  in  following  the 
senseless  marches  and  impotent  raids  that  put  the  anxious 
Pemberton  on  the  flank,  leaving  him  the  inner  line  and  all 
the  time  he  could  ask  to  concentrate  his  forces  and  take  the 


282  Life  of  Thomas. 

field.  Grant  marched  away  from  Pemberton,  and  found  so 
few  Confederates  at  Jackson,  that  his  capture  of  the  place 
could  scarcely  be  called  an  engagement.  Grant's  blind  move- 
ments seemed  to  puzzle  both  Pemberton  and  Johnston.  The 
one  in  command  of  some  six  thousand  men,  the  other  with 
only  eighteen  thousand,  moved  on  a  false  scent,  striving  to 
determine  what  the  Yankee  general  was  aiming  to  accom- 
plish. -It  resembled  a  skilled  fencer  fighting  with  a  left- 
handed  opponent,  or,  rather,  one  who  knew  nothing  of  fence. 
Grant  destroyed  the  stores  at  Jackson,  and  immediately 
sought  by  a  return  to  secure  what  he  had  so  strangely  aban- 
doned, some  point  on  the  Mississippi  that  he  could  make  a 
base  of  supply.  While  seeking  to  accomplish  this,  he  con- 
sidered it  necessary  to  brush  aside  an  enemy  that  was  not  in 
his  way.  There  was  no  Confederate  force  in  Mississippi  then 
or  at  any  time  thereafter  sufficient  to  cope  with  the  seventy 
thousand  men  under  Grant.  It  was  the  only  hope  of  Pem- 
berton to  gather  all  the  troops  available,  and  make  a  desper- 
ate and  hopeless  resistance  to  the  enemy.  It  was  thus,  while 
the  two  opposing  armies  were  blindly  feeling  their  way,  one 
full  of  needless  apprehension,  the  other  in  despair,  that  they 
encountered  by  chance,  and  the  bloody  battle  of  Champion's 
Hill  went  into  history  as  the  hill  of  death. 

When  Pemberton  discovered  that  Grant  had  abandoned 
his  base  upon  the  Mississippi,  and  moved  on  Jackson,  thereby 
no  longer  threatening  Vicksburg,  he  came,  in  common  with 
Johnston,  to  the  conclusion  that,  instead  of  a  new  raid,  our 
general  sought  to  make  Jackson  his  head-quarters,  and  from 
there  open  communication  with  Memphis.  This  presented 
itself  to  the  military  mind  as  a  sensible  maneuver,  only  sec- 
ond in  importance  to  Grant's  original  plan  of  campaign  from 
Memphis  to  the  interior  of  Mississippi  that  was  deflected,  as 
we  have  seen,  by  the  loss  of  stores  at  Holly  Springs  and  the 
presence  of  McClernand,  commissioned  by  the  President  to 
open  the  Mississippi.  Taking  this  view  of  the  situation, 
Pemberton  concentrated  his  forces,  eighteen  thousand  in  all, 
and  moved  out  from  Vicksburg  and  the  Big  Black  to  form 
a  junction  with  Johnston  arid  make  an  attack  on  Grant's 
rear.  He  failed  in  both.  Embarrassed  by  floods  that  carried 


Champion's  Hilt.  283 

<• 

away  bridges,  instead  of  a  direct  march  to  where  he  ex- 
pected to  meet  Johnston,  he  lost  valuable  time  in  a  retrograde 
movement  in  search  of  bridges.  While  resting  his  troops, 
three  and  a  half  miles  from  Edwardt's  Station,  he  received 
the  following  from  Johnston  : 

"Banton  Road,  Ten  Miles  from  Jackson,  May  18,  1863, 
8:30  o'clock  A.  M. — Our  being  compelled  to  leave  Jackson 
makes  your  plan  impracticable.  The  only  mode  by  which 
we  can  unite  is  by  your  moving  directly  to  Clinton,  and  in- 
forming me  that  we  may  move  to  that  point  with  about 
6,000.  I  have  no  means  of  estimating  the  enemy's  force  at 
Jackson.  The  principal  officers  here  difier  very  widely,  and 
I  fear  he  will  fortify  if  time  is  left  him.  Let  me  hear  from 
you  immediately.  .  .  ." 

Seeking  to  comply  with  this  and  marching  on  to  Clin- 
ton, he  came,  much  to  his  astonishment,  not  on  Grant's  rear, 
but  on  the  head  of  his  column  moving  west.  Pemberton's 
amazement  was  only  equaled  by  Grant's,  when  he  heard  the 
roar  of  an  artillery  duel  at  his  front.  He  claims,  through 
Badeau,  to  have  been  aware  of  Pemberton's  movement  from 
the  Big  Black,  but  as  the  disposition  of  his  entire  force 
looked  to  an  attack  on  his  left  flank  and  rear  from  Johnston, 
we  can  well  believe  that  his  first  notice  of  Pemberton's  pres- 
ence came  from  his  guns.  This  apprehension  of  danger  from 
Johnston,  as  we  shall  see,  saved  Pemberton's  entire  force 
from  being  captured.  Pemberton,  in  his  dispatch  to  John- 
ston, puts  the  number  of  his  force  at  seventeen  thousand 
men.  With  this  little  army  he  had  to  encounter  a  force, 
well  in  hand,  that  Grant,  through  Badeau,  puts  at  forty-five 
thousand  men.  As  Pemberton's  dispatch  was  to  Johnston, 
we  can  believe  that  he  states  the  truth.  But,  as  General 
Thomas  was  wont  to  say,  "  what  is  the  good  of  a  hundred 
thousand  men  when  you  can  fight  only  a  thousand?"  Grant 
had  force  enough  to  flank,  envelope,  and  capture  Pember- 
ton's little  army  without  firing  a  gun  or  losing  a  man. 
Pemberton,  finding  the  scrape  into  which  fate  had  forced  him, 
with  an  eye  of  a  soldier — and  he  was  every  inch  of  him 
that — seized  on  a  position  which  Grant  described  as  follows : 

"  The  enemy  was  strongly  posted  with  his  left  on  a  high 


284  Life  of  Thomas. 

9 

wooded  ridge  called  Champion  Hills,  over  which  the  road  to 
Edward's  Station  runs,  making  a  sharp  turn  to  the  south  as 
it  strikes  the  hills.  This  ridge  rises  sixty  or  seventy  feet 
above  the  surrounding  country,  and  is  the  highest  land  for 
many  miles  around.  The  topmost  point  is  bald  and  gave  the 
rebels  "a  commanding  position  for  their  artillery,  but  the  re- 
mainder of  the  crest,  as  well  as  a  precipitous  hillside  to  the 
east  of  the  road,  is  'covered  by  a  dense  forest  and  under- 
growth and  scarred  with  deep  ravines,  through  whose  en- 
tanglements troops  could  pass  only  with  extreme  difficulty." 

This  describes  a  natural  fortress.  Further  along  he 
narrates  that  the  deep-cut  road  running  along  the  crest  of 
the  ridge,  then  turning  and  running  across  and  down  to  the 
west,  made  an  intrenchment  for  the  Confederates  when 
driven  to  and  along  the  top. 

"  To  the  north,  the  timber  extends  a  short  distance  down 
the  hill,  and  then  opens  into  cultivated  fields  in  a  gentle 
slope  toward  Baker's  creek,  almost  a  mile  away.  The  rebel 
lines  ran  southward  along  the  crest,  its  center  covering  the 
middle  road  from  Raymond,  while  the  extreme  right  was  on 
the  direct  or  southern  road.  The  whole  line  was  about  four 
miles  long." 

We  have  said  that  Pemberton  seized  on  this  natural 
projection  rising  above  and  commanding  the  level  country 
of  roads  and  ravines  on  all  sides,  with  the  eye  of  a  soldier. 
He  must  have  known  that  Champion's  Hill  covered  nothing, 
and  with  such  a  superior  force  gathering  at  his  front,  right, 
and  left,  he  was  in  imminent  danger  of  being  surrounded 
and  captured.  This  movement,  therefore,  was  only  to  give 
the  enemy  so  serious  a  check  that  he  could  retreat  without 
serious  loss.  To  his  amazement  and  much  to  his  comfort, 
Grant  accepted  the  challenge  given  him,  instead  of  engaging 
the  Confederate's  attention  by  an  artillery  duel,  and  moving 
to  his  rear  by  a  road  upon  which  Logan  eventually  stumbled 
and  from  which  he  was  recalled  just  in  time  to  permit  Pem- 
berton's  defeated  army  to  retreat  without  loss.  There  was 
no  earthly  occasion  for  an  assault  on  Pemberton's  front  by 
infantry.  But  as  Grant  informs  us,  through  Badeau,  he  dis- 
covered that  "  Champion's  Hill,  on  the  rebel  left,  was  evi- 


Champion's  Hill.  285 

dently  the^  key  to  the  whole  situation,"  and,  as  it  was  the 
strongest,  the  place  to  attack.  Here  is  the  story  as  told  by 
Grant : 

"A  vigorous  effort  on  the  part  of  McClernand  would 
have  accomplished  the  defeat  by  noon.  .  .  .  Or,  later  in 
the  fight,  Logan  could  have  kept  in  their  rear,  if  McCler- 
nand had  come  up  in  time,  and,  with  all  their  retreat  cut  off, 
the  enemy  might  have  been  forced  to  surrender  in  mass.'' 

This  is  all  very  well  for  an  afterthought,  but  the  records 
are  against  the  statement.  Grant  was  not  so  much  con- 
cerned about  the  attack  on  Pemberton  as  he  was  apprehen- 
sive of  one  on  his  flank  and  rear  from  the  southern  road  by  an 
imaginary  army  under  Johnston.  Hovey's  division,  less  in 
number  than  Pemberton's  so  strongly  posted,  was  in  position 
to  move  up  and  be  slaughtered,  as  it  eventually  was,  when 
Grant  heard  from  McClernaud.  He  now  tells  us,  through 
Badeau  and  in  his  memoirs,  that  "staff  officers  were  sent  to 
him  (McClernand)  at  once  to  push  forward  with  all  rapidity ; 
but  by  the  nearest  practicable  route  of  communication  he 
was  at  least  two  and  a  half  miles  away."  The  cold,  brutal 
record  tells  us  the  sort  of  "push  forward"  that  was  expected 
of  the  "political  general."  At  fifteen  minutes  past  10  A.  M., 
Grant  sent  him  written  orders:  "From  all  information  gath- 
ered from  citizens  and  prisoners,  the  mass  of  the  army  are 
south  of  Hovey's  division.  McPherson  is  now  up  with 
Hovey  and  can  support  him  at  any  point.  Close  up  your 
forces  as  expeditiously  as  possible,  but  cautiously.  The  enemy 
must  not  be  permitted  to  get  to  our  rear.  If  you  can  com- 
municate with  Blair  and  Ransom,  do  so,  and  direct  them  to 
come  up  to  your  support  by  the  most  expeditious  route." 

This  written  order  is  conclusive  as  to  Grant's  condition 
of  mind  at  the  time,  and  that  while  fighting  on  the  de- 
fensive, left  to  the  enemy  abundance  of  time  to  slaughter  his 
weight  in  Union  soldiers,  and  thus  get  away  from  a  defeat 
that  in  consequences  that  followed,  was  equal  to  a  victory. 
There  is  other  evidence  equally  conclusive,  such  for  example 
as  that  shown  in  Grant's  orders  to  Ransom's  brigade  of  Ar- 
thur's division  of  McPherson's  corps,  then  coming  up  from 
Grand  Gulf.  Says  Grant,  through  Badeau :  "  Grant  there- 


286  Life  of  Thomas. 

fore  directed  Ransom  to  move  hie  command  so  as  to  join 
the  forces  north  of  him  by  the  first  road  leading  northward. 
Enemy  are  reported  as  having  sent  a  column  to  our  left  and 
rear.  Avoid  being  cut  oft'." 

Grant  was  on  the  defensive.  In  command  of  forty-five 
thousand  men,  with  only  seventeen  thousand  at  his  front,  he 
disposed  his  forces  to  repel  an  imaginary  enemy  of  vasi  pro- 
portions in  his  rear.  The  "  political  general "  who,  obeying 
orders  to  watch  his  flank  and  rear,  approached  as  directed, 
cautiously,  and  was,  therefore,  held  responsible  for  the  safety 
of  Pemberton's  army,  did  not  seem  to  share  in  the  troubled 
dream  of  an  impossible  enemy.  McClernand  says  in  his 
report,  that  he  rode  to  Grant's  head-quarters  early  that 
morning  to  ask  that  McPherson  support  Hovey,  "urging 
among  other  things,  that  if  his  corps  should  not  be  needed 
as  a  support,  it  might  in  the  event  that"  I  should  beat  the 
enemy,  fall  upon  his  flank  and  rear  and  cut  him  off.  Assur- 
ances altogether  satisfactory  were  given  by  the  general,  and 
I  felt  confident  of  our  superiority  on  the  right.  I  went  for- 
ward with  the  center  formed  by  Osterhaus  and  Carr." 

We  can  not  do  better  in  giving  a  history  of  this  extra- 
ordinary battle  than  to  accept  the  account  and  keen  analysis 
of  the  late  Samuel  R.  Reed,  whose  disposal  of  Grant  as  a 
capable  general  on  this  occasion  has  been  ignored,  no  man 
venturing  to  controvert  the  facts  or  question  the  criticisms. 
Reed  says : 

"  Thus  did  Grant  order  the  battle  defensively  under  the 
belief  that  he  was  in  danger  of  being  taken  in  the  rear  and 
cut  off  from  a  return  to  Grand  Gulf,  and  thus  his  attack  on 
the  Confederates  left  at  Champion's  Hill  was  to  make  a  di- 
version from  that  danger.  Badeau  now  begins  the  battle 
against  the  fortress  of  Champion's  Hill. 

" '  Continuous  fighting  had  been  kept  up  all  the  morn- 
ing between  Hovey's  skirmishers  and  the  rebel  advance,  and 
by  eleven  o'clock  this  grew  into  a  battle.  At  this  time 
Hovey's  division  was  deployed  to  move  westward  against  the 
hill,  the  two  brigades  of  Logan  supporting  him.  Logan  was 
formed  in  the  open  field,  facing  the  northern  side  of  the 
ridge,  and  only  about  four  hundred  yards  from  the  enemy, 


Champion's  Hill.  287 

Logan's  front,  and  the  main  front  of  Hovey's  division  being 
nearly  at  right  angles  with  each  other. 

"  'As  Hovey  advanced  his  line  conformed  to  the  shape  of 
the  hill,  and  became  crescent  like,  the  concave  toward  the 
hill.  McPherson  (Logan)  now  posted  two  batteries  on  his 
extreme  right,  and  well  advanced.  These  poured  a  de- 
structive enfilading  fire  upon  the  enemy,  under  cover  of 
which  the  national  line  began  to  mount  the  hill.  (No  enfilad- 
ing fire  could  cover  the  movement  of  Hovey's  crescent  line  up 
the  end  of  the  ridge).  The  enemy  at  once  replied  with  a 
murderous  discharge  of  musketry,  and  the  battle  soon  raged 
hotly  all  along  the  line  from  Hovey's  extreme  left  to  the 
right  of  Logan ;  but  Hovey  pushed  steadily  on  and  drove 
the  rebels  back  six  hundred  yards  till  eleven  guns  and  three 
hundred  prisoners  were  captured,  and  the  brow  of  the  height 
was  gained.' 

"  When  a  division  has  stormed  such  a  natural  fortress, 
and  has  taken  '  the  key  to  the  whole  position,'  by  that  which 
was  equivalent  to  carrying  strong  entrenchments  by  assault, 
it  might  naturally  be  expected  that  the  commanding  general, 
who  was  observing  this,  would  have  support  at  hand  to  carry 
this  forward  and  make  this  *  key '  turn  the  whole  position. 
But  it  was  otherwise  : 

" *  The  road  here  formed  a  natural  fortification  which 
the  rebels  made  haste  to  use.  It  was  cut  through  the  crest 
of  the  ridge  at  the  steepest  part,  the  bank  on  the  upper  side 
commanding  all  below  so  that  even  when  the  national  troops 
had  apparently  gained  the  road  the  rebels  stood  behind  this 
novel  breastwork,  covered  from  every  fire,  and  masters  of 
the  whole  declivity.  Finding  himself,  however,  in  spite  of 
this  advantage,  losing  ground  on  a  point  so  vitally  import- 
ant, the  enemy  now  pushed  re-enforcements  rapidly,  and 
when  these  arrived,  rallied  under  cover  of  the  woods,  and 
poured  down  the  road  in  great  numbers  on  the  position  oc- 
cupied by  Hovey. 

" l  For  awhile  Hovey  bore  the  whole  brunt  of  the  battle, 
and  after  a  desperate  resistance  was  compelled  to  fall  back, 
though  slowly  and  stubbornly,  losing  several  of  the  guns  he 
had  taken  an  hour  before.  But  Grant  was  watching  the 


288  Life  of  Thomas. 

fight  on  the  first  spur  of  the  hill  under  fire,  and  seeing  that 
the  enemy  was  getting  too  strong  for  Hovey,  he  sent  in  a 
brigade  of  Crocker's  division,  which  had  just  arrived.' 

"  Hovey's  report  relates  the  same  incident  thus  : 

« <  Brigadier-General  Quimby's  division,  commanded  by 
General  Crocker,  was  near  at  hand,  and  had  not  yet  been 
under  fire.  I  sent  to  them  for  support,  but,  being  unknown 
to  the  officers  of  that  command,  considerable  delay  ensued, 
and  I  was  compelled  to  resort  to  General  Grant  to  procure 
the  order  for  their  aid.  Colonel  Boomer,  commanding  Third 
Brigade  of  Quimby's  division,  on  receiving  the  command 
from  General  Grant,  came  gallantly  up  the  hill;  Colonel 
Holmes,  with  two  small  regiments — Tenth  Missouri  and 
Seventeenth  Iowa — soon  followed.  The  entire  force  sent 
amounted  to  about  two  thousand  men.' 

"  Badeau  continues  :  '  These  fresh  troops  gave  Hovey 
confidence,  and  the  height  that  had  been  gained  with  fear- 
ful loss  was  still  retained.  The  preponderance,  however,  was 
even  yet  in  favor  of  the  enemy.'  But  Hovey's  lack  was 
more  of  battalions  than  confidence,  and  he  says : 

" '  My  division,  in  the  meantime,  had  been  compelled  to 
yield  ground  before  overwhelming  numbers.  Slowly  and 
stubbornly  they  fell  back,  contesting  with  death  every  inch 
of  the  field  they  had  won.  Colonel  Boomer  and  Colonel 
Holmes  gallantly  and  heroically  rushed  with  their  commands 
into  the  conflict,  but  the  enemy  had  massed  his  forces  and 
slowly  pressed  our  whole  line  with  reinforcements  backward 
to  a  point  near  the  brow  of  the  hill.  Here  a  stubborn  stand 
was  made.' 

"  To  resume  now  Badeau's  narrative  at  the  point  where 
Grant  sent  the  reinforcement : 

"  '  Meanwhile  the  rebels  had  made  a  desperate  attempt 
on  their  left  to  capture  the  battery  in  McPherson's  corps 
which  was  doing  them  so  much  damage ;  they  were,  how- 
ever, promptly  repelled  by  Smith's  brigade  of  Logan's  di- 
vision, which  drove  them  back  with  great  slaughter,  captur- 
ing many  prisoners.  Discovering  now  that  his  own  left  was 
nearly  turned,  the  enemy  made  a  determined  effort  to  turn 
the  left  of  Hovey,  precipitating  on  that  commander  all  his 


Champion's  Hill.  289 

available  force;  and  while  Logan  was  carrying  every  thing 
before  him,  the  closely  pressed  and  nearly  exhausted  troops 
of  Ilovey  were  again  compelled  to  retire.  They  had  been 
lighting  nearly  three  hours,  and  were  fatigued  and  out  of 
ammunition  ;  but  fell  back  doggedly,  and  not  far.' 

"Outnumbered,  fatigued,  and  out  of  ammunition,  too, 
is  reason  enough.  Continues  Badeau: 

"  k  The  tide  of  battle  at  this  point  seemed  turning  against 
the  National  forces,  and  Hovey  sent  back  repeatedly  to  Grant 
for  support.  Grant,  however,  was  momentarily  expecting 
the  advance  of  McClernand's  four  divisions,  and  never 
doubted  the  result.' 

"  Still,  more  battalions  to  Hovey,  outnumbered  and  out 
of  ammunition  might  be  as  useful  at  the  moment  as  Grant's 
never  doubting  the  result. 

"  But  was  Grant  momentarily  expecting  this?  Badeau 
continues  :  'At  thirty  minutes  past  twelve  he  had  again 
dispatched  to  McClernand :  "As  soon  as  your  command  is  all 
at  hand,  throw  forward  skirmishers  and  feel  the  enemy, 
and  attack  him  in  force  if  an  opportunity  occurs.  I  am  with 
Hovey  and  McPherson,  and  will  see  that  they  co-operate." ' 

"  So  he  was  promising  McClernand  that  he  would  see 
that  Hovey  co-operated ;  likewise  McPherson.  And  McCler- 
nand, after  he  had  got  his  men  well  in  hand — which  they  had 
been  since  daylight — was  to  throw  forward  skirmishers  and 
feel  the  enemy,  and  'if  an  opportunity  occurred'  to  attack 
him  in  force.  He  was  left  to  wait  for  his  opportunity. 

"  Considering  what  was  going  on  where  Grant  was  '  un- 
der fire,'  his  orders  to  McClernand  seem  almost  too  energetic 
and  peremptory,  indicating  an  undue  excitement  or  the  glow 
of  battle.  Badeau  says :  '  That  commander,  however,  did 
not  arrive.'  But  as  Grant,  in  answer  to  McClernand's  in- 
quiry whether  McPherson  would  support  Hovey  and  whether 
he  should  bring  on  the  battle,  had  sent  the  above  order,  fol- 
lowing another,  telling  him  that  the  mass  of  the  enemy  was 
in  his  (McClernand's)  front,  aiming  to  turn  his  left,  Grant 
could  hardly  expect  him  '  to  arrive.'  And  now  Badeau  con- 
tinues: 
19 


290  Life  of  Thomas. 

"  *  Grant,  seeing  the  critical  condition  of  affairs,  now 
directed  McPherson  to  move  what  troops  he  could  by  a  left 
flank  around  to  the  enemy's  right  front  on  the  crest  of  the 
ridfire.  The  prolongation  of  Logan  to  the  right  had  left  a 
gap  between  him  and  Hovey,  and  into  this  the  two  remain- 
ing brigades  of  Crocker  were  thrown.  The  movement  was 
promptly  executed ;  Boomer's  brigade  went  at  and  into  the 
fight,  and  checked  the  rebel  advance  till  Holmes'  brigade 
came  up,  when  a  dashing  charge  was  made,  and  Hovey  and 
Crocker  were  engaged  for  forty  minutes,  Hovey  recaptur- 
ing five  of  the  guns  he  had  already  taken  and  lost.' 

"  Badeau  by  this  has  made  two  affairs  of  the  sending  of 
Boomer  and  Holmes  to  Hovey's  aid,  of  which  Hovey  makes 
but  one.  The  muddle  is  explained  by  Crocker's  report, 
which  says  that  two  regiments  of  Colonel  Sanborn's  brigade 
were  taken  from  the  right  to  support  Colonel  Boomer,  and 
that  Colonel  Holmes  came  after.  Crocker  continues:  'At 
this  critical  moment,  Colonel  Holmes  arrived  in  the  field 
with  two  regiments  .  .  .  and  proceeded  ...  to  the 
front,  relieving  Colonel  Boomer,  who  by  this  time  was  out 
of  ammunition.'  This  situation  on  the  left  of  Hovey,  and 
nearest  to  Grant,  was  that  which  impressed  him  that  '  the 
position  was  in  danger;'  that  is  to  say,  that  his  right  wing 
was  in  danger  of  being  turned  by  its  left  and  cut  off. 

"  Badeau  continues:  'But  the  enemy  had  massed  his 
forces  on  this  point,  and  the  irregularity  of  the  ground  pre- 
vented the  use  of  artillery  in  enfilading  him.  Though 
baffled  and  enraged,  he  still  fought  with  courage  and  ob- 
stinacy, and  it  was  apparent  that  the  national  line  was  in 
dire  need  of  assistance..  In  fact,  the  position  was  in  danger/ 

"  This  seems  a  remarkable  achievement  of  generalship, 
with  45,000  men  at  hand  against  17,000,  desiring  only  to 
retreat.  And  now  comes  another  stroke  of  generalship. 
Badeau  goes  on : 

"  '  At  this  crisis,  Stevenson's  brigade  of  Logan's  division 
was  moved  forward  at  a  double  quick  into  a  piece  of  wood 
on  the  extreme  right  of  the  command ;  the  brigade  moved 
parallel  with  Logan's  general  line  of  battle,  charged  across 
the  ravines,  up  the  hill,  and  through  an  open  field,  driving 


Champion's  Hill.  291 

the  enemy  from  an  important  position,  where  he  was  about 
to  establish  his  batteries,  capturing  seven  guns  and  several 
hundred  prisoners.  The  main  Vicksburg  road,  after  follow- 
ing the  ridge  in  a  southerly  direction  for  about  a  mile  to  the 
point  of  intersection  with  the  middle  or  Raymond  road, 
turns  almost  to  the  west  again,  running  down  hill  and  across 
the  valley  where  Logan  was  now  operating  in  the  rear  of  the 
enemy.' 

"At  length  the  battle,  after  slaughtering  men  for  hours 
in  assaulting  a  steep  and  broken  hill,  naturally  so  strong  a 
position  that  practically  it  tripled  the  enemy's  force,  had 
stumbled  upon  a  clear  way  around  the  head  of  the  ridge  by 
which  Pemberton  could  be  turned  and  captured.  Continues 
Badeau : 

" '  Unconscious  of  the  immense  advantage,  Logan  swept 
directly  across  the  road,  and  absolutely  cut  oft'  the  rebel  line 
of  retreat  to  Edward's  Station  without  being  aware  of  it.' 

"  But  at  this  juncture,  the  essential  part  played  by  the 
commanding  general  in  this  battle  is  again  to  be  exempli- 
fied. 

'"At  this  very  juncture,  Grant,  finding  that  there  was 
no  prospect  of  McClernand  reaching  the  field  (McClernand 
was  following  Grant's  instructions),  and  that  the  scales  were 
still  balanced  at  the  critical  point,  thought  himself  obliged, 
in  order  to  still  further  re-inforce  Hovey  and  Crocker  in  front» 
to  recall  Logan  from  the  right,  where  he  was  overlapping 
and  outflanking  the  rebel  left. 

" '  Had  the  national  commander  been  acquainted  with 
the  country,  he  would,  of  course,  have  ordered  Logan  to 
push  on  in  the  rear  of  the  enemy,  and  thus  secure  the  cap- 
ture or  annihilation  of  the  whole  rebel  army.  But  the  en- 
tire region  was  new  to  the  national  troops  (to  Grant),  and 
this  great  opportunity  was  unknown.' 

"And  now  comes  a  singular  incident,  reversing  the  usual 
effect.  When  Logan  withdrew  from  this  road,  to  march  by 
a  long  circuit  to  Hovey's  left,  then  the  Confederates  became 
alarmed  for  the  road,  and  gave  up  the  fight.  Says  Badeau  : 
'As  it  was,  however,  the  moment  Logan  left  the  road,  the 
enemy,  alarmed  for  his  line  of  retreat,  finding  it,  indeed. 


292  Life  of  Thomas. 

not  only  threatened,  but  almost  gone,  at  once  abandoned  his 
position  in  front.' 

"  But  there  was  a  coincidence  at  the  front : 

"'At  this  crisis  a  national  battery  (Badeau  is  too  delicate 
to  say  Hovey's  division — in  fact  three  batteries)  opened  from 
the  right  a  well  directed  fire,  and  the  victorious  troops  of 
Hovey  and  Crocker  pressing  on,  the  enemy  once  more  gave 
way  ;  the  rebel  line  was  driven  back  for  the  third  time  and 
the  battle  decided.' 

"  But  before  this  consummation,  an  episode  had  come 
off  which  had  an  important  effect : 

" '  Before  the  effect  of  the  final  charge  was  known,  Logan 
rode  eagerly  up  to  Grant  declaring  that  if  one  more  dash 
could  be  made  in  front,  he  would  advance  in  the  rear  and 
complete  the  capture*  of  the  rebel  army.  Grant  at  once 
rode  forward  in  person,  and  found  the  troops  that  had  been 
so  gallantly  engaged  for  hours  withdrawn  from  their  most 
advanced  positions  and  refilling  their  cartridge  boxes.  Ex- 
plaining to  them  the  position  of  Logan's  forces,  he  directed 
them  to  use  all  dispatch  and  push  forward  as  rapidly  as  pos- 
sible.' 

"By  this  it  appears  that  Grant  was  going  to  send  Logan 
back  to  the  road  from  which  he  had  withdrawn  him  to  re- 
inforce Hovey's  left,  and  that  he  passed  by  commanding 
officers  and  mingled  with  the  soldiers  and  explained  the 
situation  to  them  and  directed  them  to  use  all  dispatch  and 
make  another  dash  at  the  enemy.  Badeau  relates  that 
then — 

"'He  proceeded  himself  in  haste  to  what  had  been 
Pemberton's  line,  expecting  every  moment  to  come  up  with 
the  enemy,  but  found  the  rebels  had  entirely  broken  and  fled 
from  the  field.  Logan's  attack  had  precipitated  the  rout, 
and  the  battle  of  Champion's  Hill  was  won.  This  was  be- 
tween three  and  four  in  the  afternoon.' " 

The  attentive  reader  of  this  battle  narrative  must  won- 
der what  made  the  Confederates  "  break  and  fly  from  the 
field."  Badeau's  narrative  makes  out  that  General  Grant 
had  withdrawn  Logan  from  his  attack  on  their  flank  and 
rear,  and  that  Hovey's  troops  had  drawn  from  their  most  ad- 


Champion's  Hill.  293 

vanced  position,  and,  as  it  appears,  were  not  engaged  at  the 
time,  as  they  were  "refilling  their  cartridge  boxes,"  and  that 
Grant  went  among  them  and  explained  Logan's  position  and 
directed  them  to  make  one  more  assault,  and  then  himself 
rode  in  haste  toward  Pemberton's  line. 

Such  a  suppression  of  the  attack  and  such  retiring 
movement  does  not  usually  cause  the  strongly  placed  adver- 
sary to  break  and  run.  The  only  explanation  suggested  of 
the  cause  of  the  sudden  turn  of  the  battle  to  victory  at  this 
juncture  is  Grant  and  staff,  including  the  redoubtable  Ba- 
deau,  riding  in  haste  to  Pemberton's  line.  This  would  make 
at  least  one  instance  in  which  the  victory  was  won,  according 
to  the  battle  pictures,  by  a  cunning  commanding  general 
riding  furiously  at  the  enemy's  ranks.  Perhaps,  however,  by 
going  back  to  the  next  preceding  citation,  and  adding  thereto 
Hovey's  and  Crocker's  reports  and  the  fact  that  Logan  con- 
tinued to  attack,  an  idea  may  be  had  of  the  cause  of  Pem- 
berton's giving  up  the  battle. 

By  referring  back  to  Hovey's  account  of  what  followed 
when  he  had  been  reinforced  from  Crocker's  divisions,  it 
will  be  seen  that,  before  reinforcements  arrived,  his  division 
had  been  forced  to  give  ground,  and  that  this  continued 
thereafter  till  all  had  been  driven  back  to  the  brow  of  the 
hill,  when  a  stubborn  stand  was  made.  At  this  point  Hovey 
relates  that  which  was  the  turning  point  in  this  "key  to  the 
position :" 

"  The  irregularity  of  our  line  had  previously  prevented 
me  from  using  artillery  in  enfilading  the  enemy's  line,  but  as 
our  forces  were  compelled  to  fall  back  slowly,  the  lines  be- 
came marked  and  distinct  and  about  2:30  P.  M.  I  could  easily 
perceive  by  the  sound  of  firearms  through  the  woods  the  po- 
sition of  the  respective  armies. 

"I  at  once  ordered  the  First  Missouri  Battery,  com- 
manded by  Captain  Schofield,  and  the  Sixteenth  Ohio  Bat- 
tery, under  First  Lieutenant  Murdock,  to  take  position  in  an 
open  field  beyond  a  slight  mound  on  my  right  in  advance  of 
and  with  parallel  ranges  of  their  guns  with  our  lines.  About 
the  same  time,  Captain  Dillon's  Wisconsin  Battery  was  put 
in  position ;  two  sections  of  the  Sixteenth  Ohio  Battery  on 


294  Life  of  Thomas. 

the  left,  the  Wisconsin  battery  in  the  center,  and  Captain 
Schofield's  on  the  right.  Through  the  rebel  ranks  these  bat- 
teries hailed  an  incessant  shower  of  shot  and  shell,  entirely 
enfilading  the  rebel  columns. 

"The  fire  was  terrific  for  several  minutes,  and  the  cheers 
from  our  men  on  the  brow  of  the  hill  told  of  our  success. 
The  enemy  gave  back,  and  our  forces,  under  General  McGiu- 
nis,  Colonel  Stark,  Colonel  Boomer,  and  Colonel  Holmes, 
drove  them  again  over  the  ground  which  had  been  hotly 
contested  for  a  third  time  during  the  day,  five  more  of  the 
eleven  guns  not  taken  down  the  hill  falling  a  second  time  into 
our  possession.  .  .  .  Thus  ended  the  battle  of  Champion's 
Hill  at  about  3  p.  M." 

While  this  gives  a  reason  for  the  retreat  of  the  enemy 
which  the  common  mind  can  understand,  Adam  Badeau's 
account  of  Grant's  action  at  this  crisis  can  be  reconciled 
with  it  by  taking  in  Crocker's  report,  which  states  that 
Colonel  Holmes'  arrival  at  the  point  "relieved  Colonel 
Boomer,  who  by  this  time  was  out  of  ammunition."  It  is 
probable,  therefore,  that  it  was  to  Boomer's  men,  while  re- 
filling their  cartridge  boxes,  that  General  Grant  was  explain- 
ing Logan's  situation  while  the  rest  of  the  line  was  dealing 
the  finishing  stroke  to  the  enemy. 

At  the  time  Mr.  Reed  wrote  his  history  of  and  masterly 
comment  upon  the  battle  of  Champion's  Hill,  the  Confeder- 
ate account  was  not  known  to  him.  We  now  learn  that  it 
was  not  the  fierce  fighting  under  Hovey,  nor  his  artillery 
fire,  that  drove  the  Confederates  from  their  strong  position. 
Pemberton,  who  was  fighting  on  the  defensive  for  the  pur- 
pose of  retreat  under  cover  of  the  night,  saw  in  alarm  his 
only  road  in  the  rear  occupied  by  Logan's  troops.  He  was 
completely  hemmed  in,  and  while  galloping  along  his  line  in 
utter  desperation,  he  saw  the  enemy  strangely  disappear,  and 
he  was  quick  to  seize  the  opening  offered  him.  He  could 
not  wait  for  night,  and  in  consequence  suffered  from  a  rout 
his  hasty  retreat  engendered. 

According  to  Grant's  account,  given  through  Badeau, 
the  entire  fight  on  our  side  was  made  by  Hovey  and  a  part 
of  Logan's  division,  about  five  thousand  men,  sent  in  at  the 


Champion's  Hill.  295 

almost  impregnable  part  of  the  natural  fortification.  What 
the  other  forty  thousand  were  doing  i8  lost  in  mystery. 
"  What  is  the  good  of  a  hundred  thousand  men  when  you 
can  fight  only  a  thousand  ?"  What  is  the  good  of  forty-five 
thousand  when  you  can  not  fight  even  the  one?  When 
Grant  says,  through  Badeau,  "  that  had  he  known  of  that 
road  to  the  rear  of  Pemberton's  army,  he  would  have  availed 
himself  of  it,  he  acknowledges  to  a  dazed  condition  of  mind 
that  can  be  defended  only  by  sheltering  its  owner  behind 
that  fatal  habit  that  always  asserted  itself  at  the  most  critical 
moment.  While  that  artillery  duel  was  in  progress  at  11 
A.  M.,  had  he  swung  his  right  under.Logan  to  the*  unguarded 
rear  of  the  Confederates,  he  would  have  captured  the  entire 
seventeen  thousand  without  the  necessary  loss  of  a  man. 
His  loss  in  the  assault  upon  the  ridge  above  aggregated  two 
thousand,  six  hundred  and  sixty-two.  Considering  the 
number  engaged,  it  was  on  our  side  the  bloodiest  of  the  war, 
and,  as  we  now  see,  a  wanton  destruction  of  life. 

General  Grant,  as  we  learn  from  Hay  and  Nicolay's  Life 
of  Lincoln,  was  learning  the  art  of  war.  This  was  the  first 
battle  in  which  he  commanded  in  person  since  the  miserable 
fiasco  at  Belrnont.  It  will  be  observed  that  his  instructions 
were  written  in  blood.  Of  it  Mr.  Reed  says: 

"  The  circumstances,  conditions,  and  ideas  of  this  battle 
are  so  well  revealed  by  Adam  Badeau's  narrative  that  a  sim- 
ple summing  up  of  these  constitutes  a  complete  judgment  on 
the  generalship.  By  taking  this,  the  reviewer  can  avoid  all 
disputing  criticism,  and  can  let  the  whole  question  rest  on 
the  authority  of  the  commanding  general  and  his  authorized 
biographer.  Their  history  sets  forth  tl^e  following  facts  and 
conclusions: 

"  1.  General  Grant,  up  to  the  morning  of  the  16th,  was 
ignorant  that  Pemberton's  army  had  crossed  the  Big  Black 
river,  while  in  fact  it  had  advanced  to  Edward's  Station  on 
the  13th;  therefore,  all  his  railroad  destroying  and  other 
diffusive  operations  were  in  the  belief  that  Pemberton  was 
wrst  of  Big  Black  river,  keeping  guard  over  Yicksburg. 

"  2.  General  Grant,  at  five  o'clock  in  the  morning  of  the 
16th,  was  surprised  by  the  intelligence  from  two  railroad  la- 


296  Life  of  Thomas. 

borers  that  Pemberton,  with  a  force  which  these  wonderfully- 
informed  persons  estimated  at  25,000,  was  at  Edward's  Sta- 
tion, and  advancing  with  the  'design  to  attack  his  rear7 
around  his  left. 

"  3.  General  Grant  was  greatly  alarmed  by  this  intelli- 
gence, as  was  shown  by  the  alarming  orders  he  issued  to 
Sherman,  McPherson,  McClernand,  Blair,  and  Ransom. 

"  4.  General  Grant's  orders  and  conduct  of  the  battle,  after 
he  had  come  to  the  front,  was  upon  his  idea  that  Pember- 
ton's  main  force  was  moving  south-east  into  the  rear,  while 
in  fact  Pemberton  was  trying  to  retreat  to  the  north.  In 
this  persistent  delusion,  Grant  ordered  the  battle  to  be  de- 
fensive, with  extreme  caution,  on  the  center  and  left,  em- 
bracing, Badeau  says,  15,000  men,  and  he  ordered  the  assault 
on  the  head  of  Champion's  Hill  as  a  co-operation  in  the  de- 
fense of  his  extreme  left  and  rear. 

"  5.  Through  open  fields  around  the  head  of  Champion's 
Hill,  was  a  clear  way  or  road  in  the  rear  of  the  ridge,  which 
was  the  road  of  retreat  from  the  hill,  which,  had  Grant 
known,  he  need  not  have  assaulted  the  hill,  but  could  have 
'thus  secured  the  capture  or  annihilation  of  the  whole  rebel 
army.' 

"  6.  General  Grant,  having  reached  the  front  about  ten 
A.  M.,  still  holding  to  his  delusion  that  Pemberton's  main 
force  was  on  the  offensive  to  his  (Grant's)  left  and  rear,  sent 
orders  to  McClernand  to  make  his  dispositions  accordingly, 
and  then  he,  without  reconnoitering  the  open  country  around 
the  north  end  of  the  ridge,  in  ignorance  that  it  could  easily 
be  turned,  without  waiting  for  Sherman's  corps,  without 
waiting  even  till  all  of  McPherson's  had  come  up,  ordered 
Hovey's  division,  supported  by  Logan's,  to  assault  the  most 
difficult  point  on  the  ridge." 

What  puzzles  the  ordinary  understanding  is  that,  while 
taking  Grant's  belief  that  the  enemy  threatened  his  flank 
and  rear,  his  mistake  of  a  murderous  assault  on  the  ridge 
not  only  fails  to  prevent  such  an  attempt,  but  actually  would 
have  played  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy.  Had  Grant  been 
correct  in  his  surmise,  he  could  not  have  favored  Pember- 
ton's design  more  effectually  than  he  did  while  holding  the 


The  Road  Open  to  Vicksburg.  297 

great  mass  of  his  array  inactive,  instead  of  swinging  around 
to  the  Confederates'  rear,  and  pouring  in,  we  will  say,  five 
thousand  to  be  uselessly  slaughtered.  He  assisted,  as  far  as 
he  possibly  could,  to  co-operate  with  Pemberton  in  precisely 
what  he  feared. 

Pemberton  reported  a  loss  of  1,429  killed  and  2,196 
missing.  These  last  came  of  disasters  during  and  immedi- 
ately after  the  conflict.  He  had  accomplished  all  that  could 
have  been  expected  of  him.  He  had  given  a  force  vastly  su- 
perior in  numbers  such  a  stunning  reception  that,  in  its  con- 
sequences, it  was  a  victory.  The  force  of  his  blow  is  shown 
in  the  fact  that  the  pursuit  was  so  feeble  that  it  could  scarcely 
be  called  a  pursuit.  However,  Pemberton  had  to  be  thank- 
ful for  the  composed  condition  of  our  commander's  mind 
that  was  yet  haunted  by  a  supposed  army  under  Johnston. 
The  Confederacy  had  no  men  for  Mississippi.  Rosecrans 
and  Thomas,  at  this  time,  were  moving  on  an  objective  point 
of  more  vital  importance  than  Vicksburg;  while  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac,  as  we  have  seen,  was  menacing  the  forces 
under  Lee  in  a  way  that  taught  the  Confederates  that  no  vic- 
tory, to  their  side,  however  decisive  in  itself,  served  to  effect 
the  great  result  of  the  war.  Bowen  made  a  stand  at  Baker's 
creek,  when  Loring,  with  5,778,  moved  off  on  his  own  mo- 
tion, leaving  eleven  guns  to  fall  into  our  hands.  Bowen  and 
Stevenson  fell  back  at  night,  and  covered  the  Big  Black  at 
the  railroad  bridge,  without  loss,  and  here  turned  to  face 
their  pursuers.  It  was  a  strong  position,  and,  had  they  pos- 
sessed sufficient  force,  would  have  been  an  ugly  obstacle  to 
our  army.  Again,  the  stand  was  taken  in  behalf  of  the  miss- 
ing Loring,  who  was  on  his  way  to  Jackson.  In  a  short  and 
sharp  engagement,  the  force  of  the  Confederates  was  brushed 
aside.  The  road  was  open  for  us  to  Vicksburg,  for  this  was 
the  last  effort  made  to  stay  the  pursuit,  and  Pemberton's  de- 
moralized and  disorganized  force  entered  unmolested  a  place 
so  fortified  by  nature,  and  improved  on  by  two  years  work  of 
slave  labor,  that  ten  thousand  men  immediately  grew  in  ef- 
fective resistance  to  fifty  thousand.  In  "A  Rebel  Narrative 
of  the  Seige  by  H.  S.  Adams,"  we  learn  of  the  actual  con- 
dition of  the  defeated.  He  writes: 


298  Life  of  Thomas. 

"  Late  on  a  Sunday  night  the  main  body  of  the  vanquished 
forces  began  pouring  into  the  town.  Neither  order  nor  disci- 
pline had  been  maintained  on  the  march ;  the  men  were 
scattered  for  miles  along  the  road,  declaring  their  readiness 
to  desert  rather  than  serve  again  under  Pemberton.  The 
planters  and  population  of  the  country,  fleeing  from  the 
presence  of  the  victorious  enemy,  added  to  the  crowd  and 
confusion,  and  the  inhabitants  of  the  city  awoke  in  terror  to 
find  their  streets  thronged  with  fugitives — one  vast  uproari- 
ous mass,  in  which,  with  shrinking  citizens  and  timid  wo- 
men and  children,  were  mingled  the  remnants  of  Pember- 
ton's  dismayed  and  disorganized  army.  And  these  were  the 
troops  that  were  now  the  reliance  of  Vicksburg." 

This  was  on  the  night  of  the  17th.  Had  the  head  of 
Grant's  columns  pushed  in  the  rear  of  this  disorganized 
crowd  of  fugitives,  it  would  have  been  impossible  for  Pem- 
berton to  have  reorganized  in  time  to  man  the  defenses,  and 
the  campaign  against  Vicksburg  would  have  terminated 
there  and  then  in  a  possession  of  Vicksburg  and  a  capture 
of  the  enemy's  entire  army.  That  such  energetic  pursuit 
was  not  made,  we  learn  from  the  history  given  us  by  Grant, 
and  while  reading  it  we  remember  this  commander's  little 
complaint  of  Rosecrans,  for  after  that  hard  fought  victory  over 
Van  Dorn  at  Corinth,  Rosecrans  did  not  follow  and  an- 
nihilate the  enemy.  And  again,  how  he  earnestly  urged 
Halleck  and  Stanton  not  to  promote  George  H.  Thomas 
after  his  great  battle  at  Nashville,  until  he,  Grant,  saw 
whether  Thomas  was  energetic  in  the  pursuit.  Here  was  an 
instance  of  criminal  delay  in  pursuit  that  held  the  lives  of 
thousands  and  vast  expenditure  of  treasure  in  its  result. 
But  then  our  hero  of  disaster  was  learning  the  art  of  war— 
(see  Hay  and  Nicolay's  Life  of  Lincoln) — and  had  not  yet  ar- 
rived at  a  knowledge  of  how  to  annihilate  a  defeated  and 
disorganized  enemy. 

On  the  18th  the  head  of  Sherman's  corps,  that  had  seen 
no  fighting,  struck  the  Benton  road  three  and  a  half  miles 
from  Vicksburg,  and  by  night  of  that  day  nearly  all  of 
Grant's  army  was  in  position.  An  interesting  event  is  told 
us  by  the  historian,  Adam  Badeau,  indorsed  by  U.  S.  Grant, 


A  Result  at  Last.  209 

that  gives  us  the  condition  of  the  military  mind  at  that  try- 
ing period.     We  are  told  : 

"Grant  was  with  Sherman  when  his  column  struck  the 
Walnut  Hills.  As  they  rode  together  up  the  furtherest 
height,  where  it  looks  down  on  the  Yazoo  river,  and  stood 
upon  the  very  bluffs  from  which  Sherman  had  been  repulsed 
six  months  before,  the  two  soldiers  gazed  for  a  moment  on 
the  long-wished  for  goal  of  the  campaign — the  high,  dry 
ground  on  the  north  of  Vicksburg,  and  the  base  of  their  sup- 
plies. Sherman  at  last  turned  abruptly  around  and  ex- 
claimed to  Grant :  '  Until  this  moment  I  never  thought  your 
expedition  a  success.  I  never  could  see  the  end  clearly  until 
now.  But  this  is  a  campaign ;  this  is  a  success  if  we  never 
take  tke  town.'" 

,  This  speech  of  Sherman's,  ending  in  the  exclamation 
"  this  is  a  campaign  ;  this  is  a  success  if  we  do  not  take  the 
town,"  is  so  ludicrous  that  it  would  be  laughable  were  it  not 
for  the  smear  of  blood  over  all  that  makes  a  horror  too  deep 
for  ridicule.  Poor  man,  for  half  a  year  he  had  followed  his 
leader,  vainly  endeavoring  to  discover  what  they  were  driv- 
ing at.  He  had  seen  an  immense  army  wasted  away  in  canal 
digging  and  bayou  clearing,  that  his  chief  condemned  in 
each  instance  to  be  in  vain,  and  when  at  last  the  army  was 
brought  in  striking  distance  of  the  foe  so  long  sought  for — 
within  fifteen  miles  of  Pemberton's  small  force,  startled  and 
demoralized  by  our  army  appearing  in  the  interior  with  a 
fair  base  of  supplies,  the  puzzled  Sherman  saw  nearly  fifty 
thousand  men  led  off  on  a  raid.  Cutting  loose  from  the 
base,  he  saw  this  same  army  marched  a  hundred  and  seventy 
miles,  when  one  of  fifteen  would  have  carried  them  over  the 
Big  Black,  then  undefended,  and  forced  Pemberfon  into 
Vicksburg,  or  to  battle  when  Grant's  great  superiority  of 
numbers  would  have  insured  him  an  easy  victory.  The  un- 
happy general  was  so  relieved  to  find  himself  and  corps  be- 
fore Yicksburg,  that  he  said  it  was  a  success,  even  if  they 
did  not  take  the  town.  Considering  that  all  the  loss  of  life, 
time,  and  treasure  had  been  sacrificed  for  this  one  objective 
point,  his  exclamation  was  as  grotesque  as  any  point  in 
opera  bouffe. 


300  Life,  of  Thomas. 

But  the  town  w*as  to  be  taken,  and  to  this  end  a  general 
assault  was  ordered.  That  our  readers  may  comprehend 
what  this  order  meant,  we  quote  from  the  report  of  the  en- 
gineers : 

"  The  ground  upon  which  Vicksburg  stands,  is  supposed 
by  some  to  have  been  originally  a  plateau,  four  or  five  miles 
long,  and  about  two  miles  wide,  and  200  or  300  feet  above 
the  Mississippi  river.  This  plateau  has  been  gradually  washed 
away  by  rains  and  streams,  until  it  is  transformed  into  a 
labyrinth  of  sharp  ridges  and  deep,  irregular  ravines.  The 
soil  is  fine,  and  when  cut  vertically  by  the  action  of  the 
water,  remains  in  a  perpendicular  position  for  years,  and 
smaller  and  newer  ravines  are  often  so  deep  that  their  as- 
cent is  difficult  to  a  footman.  The  sides  of  the  declivities 
are  thickly  wooded,  the  bottoms  of  the  ravines  never  level, 
except  when  the  streams  that  formed  them  have  been  un- 
usually large. 

"At  Vicksburg  the  Mississippi  runs  a  little  west  of 
south,  and  all  the  streams  that  enter  it  from  the  east  run 
south-west.  One  of  these  empties  into  the  river  five  miles 
below  the  city,  and  the  dividing  ridge  that  separates  two  of 
its  branches,  was  that  in  which  the  rebel  line,  east  of  Vicks- 
burg, was  built.  On  the  northern  side  of  the  town,  the  line 
also  ran  along  a  dividing  ridge  between  two  small  streams 
that  enter  the  Mississippi  just  above  Vicksburg.  These 
ridges  are  generally  higher  than  any  ground  in  their  imme- 
diate vicinity. 

"Leaving  the  Mississippi  on  the  northern  side  of  Vicks- 
burg, where  the  bluffs  strike  the  river,  the  line  stretched 
back  two  miles  into  the  interior,  crossed  the  valley  of  two 
small  streams,  and  reached  the  river  again  below  at  a  point 
where  the  bluff'  falls  back  from  the  Mississippi  nearly  a  mile. 
Here  the  works  followed  the  bluff  up  the  river  for  a  mile 
or  more,  so  as  to  give  fire  toward  the  south  on  any  troops 
that  might  attempt  an  attack  from  that  direction  by  mov- 
ing along  the  bottom  land  between  the  bluff  and  the  Mis- 
sissippi. 

"  The  whole  line  was  between  seven  and  eight  miles 
long.  ...  It  consisted  of  a  series  of  detached  works  on 


The  Works  of  Vicksburg — First  Assault.  301 

prominent  and  commanding  points,  connected  by  a  continu- 
ous line  of  trench  or  rifle-pit.  .  .  .  They  were  placed 
at  distances  of  from  seventy -five  to  five  hundred  yards  from 
each  other.  .  .  .  The  ravines  were  the  only  ditches,  but 
no  others  were  needed,  trees  being  felled  in  front  of  the 
whole  line  and  forming  in  many  places  entanglements  which 
under  fire  were  absolutely  impassible.  .  .  .  The  difficult 
nature  of  the  ground  rendered  rapidity  of  movement  and 
unity  of  effort  in  an  assault  absolutely  impossible. 

"  North  of  the  railroad  the  hills  are  higher,  the  wood 
denser,  and  the  line  naturally  stronger,  but  south  of  that 
road,  although  the  ridges  were  lower  and  the  country  cleared, 
the  ground  was  still  rough  and  entirely  unfitted  for  any  united 
tactical  movement,  and  the  artificial  works  were  stronger. 

"  The  whole  aspect  of  the  rugged  fastness,  bristling  with 
bayonets,  and  crowned  with  artillery  that  swept  the  narrow 
defiles  in  every  direction,  was  calculated  to  inspire  new  cour- 
age in  those  who  came  .  .  .  from  their  succession  of 
disasters  in  the  open  field.  Here,  too,  were  at  least  eight 
thousand  fresh  troops  who  as  yet  had  suffered  none  of  the 
demoralization  of  defeat." 

The  general  commanding  was  not  left  long  in  doubt  as 
to  the  result  of  a  general  assault  made  by  one  of  the  three 
corps — the  other  two  not  yet  reaching  within  striking  distance. 
It  was  most  disastrous.  No  report  was  ever  made  of  the 
killed  and  wounded  on  our  side.  General  T.  Kilby  Smith, 
who  gallantly  led  his  brigade,  in  a  private  letter  written  not 
long  after  the  event  says : 

"  We  are  just  now  out  of  hell.  Why  we  were  sent  there 
no  man  can  tell.  For  two  years  the  rebels  have  been  fortifying 
their  position  here  that  is  naturally  so  strong  that  little  art 
is  called  for.  Against  these  we  were  hurled.  Down  ravines 
so  steep  that  if  unobstructed  no  man  could  make  way,  but 
with  trees  felled  into  thick  chevaux  de  frise  the  attempt  was 
utterly  hopeless.  At  every  turn  we  found  a  concentrated 
fire  that  wiped  off  the  head  of  columns  as  if  it  had  been 
mowed  down.  We  went  in  with  a  rush,  and  came  out  some 
of  us  in  a  hurry.  We  could  not  have  lost  less  than  a  thou- 
sand men,  while  I  doubt  whether  a  rebel  was  even  wounded." 


302  Life  of  Thomas. 

Such  an  experience  one  would  think  quite  sufficient. 
But  our  general  commanding  was  not  satisfied  it  seems,  for 
another  murderous  attempt  on  a  larger  scale  was  made  but 
four  days  after. 

It  is  claimed  by  and  in  behalf  of  General  Grant  by 
Badeau  that  a  sufficient  compensation  for  the  awful  loss 
sustained  in  the  first  assault  was  found  in  the  knowledge 
gained  of  "  the  nature  of  the  enemy's  works,  and  their  ap- 
proaches, the  character  of  the  ground  and  the  unusual  ob- 
stacles by  which  it  was  incumbered,  together  with  the  policy 
of  the  defense."  The  value  of  all  this  information  obtained 
at  the  cost  acknowledged  is  shown  in  the  fact  that  the  sec- 
ond assault  made  on  the  22d  May  was  precisely  the  same  as 
the  first,  except  that  McPherson's  and  McClernand's  corps 
were  in  position  before  the  assault  was  made.  One  studies 
the  movement  in  vain  to  find  wherein  is  the  boasted  knowl- 
edge bought  in  blood  by  the  first  assault.  What  had  we 
gained  in  learning  the  nature  of  the  enemy's  works  and 
their  approaches?  Was  a  way  found  open  that  our  army 
could  take  advantage  of?  Did  such  awful  experience  give 
us  knowledge  "  of  the  ground "  blazoned  with  blood  that 
would  enable  our  men  to  do  better  in  a  second  attempt  ? 
What  had  we  gained  in  being  made  acquainted  with  the  "  un- 
usual obstacles  "  together  with  "  the  policy  of  defense  ?"  In 
what  respect  did  the  general  commanding  avail  himself  of 
his  newly  made  information  to  save  life  or  insure  success? 
The  answer  is  a  silent  one,  more  eloquent  than  words. 

Our  army  naturally  adapted  itself  to  the  situation.  War- 
renton  was  made  a  base  of  supplies.  This  is  the  Warrenton 
that  could  have  been  reached  by  Grant  in  a  day's  march  from 
Hankinson's  ferry.  Two  days  were  given  to  fetching  up 
supplies  and  distributing  tents  to  troops  that  so  far  had  been 
marching  without  shelter. 

From  Badeau  and  Grant's  Memoirs,  but  not  from  his 
reports,  we  learn  that  at  the  time  of  the  second  assault, 
Vicksburg  was  not  invested.  The  length  of  our  works  was 
only  eight  miles.  When  completely  invested  this  measured 
twelve  miles.  Our  three  corps  had  a  front  of  about  four 
miles  on  the  22d.  Between  McClernand's  left  and  the  river 


Preparing  for  a  Second  Assault.  803 

below  Vicksburg  there  was  an  opening  of  four  miles,  a  like 
gap  between  McPherson's  and  McClernand's  forces.  There 
were  no  advanced  works,  nor  had  we  any  force  in  reserve  to 
sustain  the  thin  line  thrown  around  an  enemy,  that,  holding 
the  inner  line,  could  easily  concentrate  on  any  point.  It  was 
this  disposition  of  his  forces  that  tempted  Floyd  at  Donelson 
to  cut  his  way  out  and  enabled  Pemberton,  as  we  shall  see 
directly,  to  regain  the  only  point  lost  by  the  Confederates. 
The  simultaneous  attack  ordered  at  10  A.  M.  on  the  22d  could 
be  had  only  on  these  terms.  What  the  general  commanding 
expected  to  accomplish  he  has  not  volunteered  to  inform 
either  the  War  Department  or  the  world.  The  valuable  in- 
formation boasted  of  furnished  no  change  in  the  order  of 
attack.  The  thin  line  broken  into  fragments  by  the  nature 
of  the  ground  and  the  artificial  obstacles,  presented  groups 
in  spaces  where  front  and  flank  batteries  made  killing  easy 
to  the  sheltered  Confederates.  A  diversion  had  been  at- 
tempted by  Admiral  Porter,  who  brought  his  mortar  and 
gunboats  down  on  the  20th,  and  for  forty-eight  hours  kept 
up  an  incessant  bombardment  that  was  innocent  of  any  harm 
done  the  enemy.  The  citizens  of  Vicksburg  were  driven 
from  their  homes  into  holes,  it  is  true,  but  they  accepted  the 
hardship  and  danger  with  cheerful  alacrity,  and  Admiral 
Porter  could  as  well  have  dropped  his  ammunition  in  the 
Mississippi  river  for  all  the  harm  he  did  the  enemy.  At  an 
early  hour  on  the  22d  the  artillery  fire  accompanied  by  skir- 
mishes began  and  continued  until  the  assault  was  made. 
Neither  the  skirmish  line  nor  the  artillery  effected  any  dam- 
age to  the  enemy.  All  our  guns  were  field  pieces  save  six 
thirty-two  pound  Parrotts  in  McClernand's  corps.  The  fire 
on  our  part  was  delivered  with  alacrity,  and  Vicksburg  was 
girt  with  a  heavy  roar,  but  with  the  exception  of  the  Parrott 
guns  our  batteries  were  beyond  range  and  as  helpless  as  Ad- 
miral Porter,  swinging  his  shells  up  from  the  river  to  drop 
in  the  streets  of  the  town. 

We  quote  from  Badeau,  who  gets  his  information  from 
Sherman  and  gives  that  narrative  as  a  sample  of  all  the  work 
done  on  that  fatal  day.  Sherman  approached  the  grave- 
yard road  which  ran  along  an  inferior  ridge  across  great 


304  Life  of  Thomas. 

ravines  toward  the  enemy's  works,  but  as  it  approached  the 
intrenchments,  it  turned  to  the  left  running  parallel  with 
them  for  some  distance  closely  swept  by  musketry  from  the 
parapet.  Says  Badeau : 

"  Its  general  direction  was  perpendicular  to  the  rebel 
line,  but  as  it  approached  the  works,  it  bent  to  the  left,  pass- 
ing along  the  edge  of  the  ditch  of  the  enemy's  bastion  and 
entering  at  a  shoulder  of  the  bastion.  The  timber  on  the 
sides  of  the  ridge  and  in  the  ravine  had  been  felled  so  that 
an  assault  at  any  other  point  in  front  of  the  Fifteenth  Corp.s 
was  almost  impossible.  The  rebel  line,  rifle  trench  as  well 
as  small  works  for  artillery,  was  higher  than  the  ground  oc- 
cupied by  the  national  troops,  and  nowhere  between  the 
Jackson  road  and  the  Mississippi  on  the  north  could  it  be 
reached  without  crossing  a  ravine  a  hundred  and  twenty 
feet  below  the  level  of  the  hills,  and  then  scaling  an  acclivity 
whose  natural  slope  was  every-where  made  more  difficult  by 
fallen  trees  and  entanglements  of  brush  and  vines. 

It  would  be  difficult  to  conceive  of  a  more  impassable 
front  than  this.  Given  a  ravine  120  feet  deep  with  sides  so 
steep  that  in  themselves  they  presented  an  impregnable  de- 
fense, these  sides  further  protected  by  artificial  works  made 
up  of  chevaux  de  frise  of  fallen  trees,  tangled  vines,  and 
stakes,  a  single  road  on  an  inferior  cross-ridge,  this  road 
enfiladed  by  the  guns  of  a  bastion,  and  as  it  approached 
the  works  turning'  so  as  to  be  swept  broadside  by  mus- 
ketry at  short  range,  and  we  have  a  defense  to  assault 
which  is  to  send  men  to  certain  failure  and  cruel  death.  We 
have  learned  all  this — the  valuable  knowledge  boasted  of  by 
General  Grant — and  of  what  avail  ?  The  assault  was  or- 
dered and  attempted.  A  forlorn  hope  of  150  men — men  who 
volunteered  to  enter  these  jaws  of  hell — headed  the  column 
of  doomed  volunteers.  They  carried  boards  and  poles  with 
which  to  cross  the  ditch.  After  came  Ewing's  brigade,  then 
Charles  Smith's,  then  that  of  Kilby  Smith's,  making  Blair's 
division.  The  forlorn  hope  dashed  forward  on  the  road,  fol- 
lowed by  the  Thirtieth  Ohio,  the  artillery  playing  upon  the 
bastion  which  commanded  the  road.  This  fire  made  no  im- 
pression on  the  bastion,  and  suddenly,  when  the  road  was 


Persisting  in  Murderous  Assaults.  305 

crowded  with  our  brave  fellows,  a  double  line  of  gray-backs 
rose  cooly  above  the  parapet  and  poured  a  concentric  fire  on 
the  head  of  the  column  that  seemed  to  eliminate  it  from  ex- 
istence. 

We  quote  from  General  Sherman's  report.  He  says : 
"It  halted,  swerved,  and  sought  cover.  The  rear  pressed 
on,  but  the  fire  was  so  terrific  that  very  soon  all  sought  cover. 
The  head  of  the  column  crossed  the  ditch  of  the  left  face  of 
the  bastion,  and  climbed  upon  the  exterior  slope  where  the 
colors  were  planted,  and  the  men  burrowed  in  the  earth  to  shield 
themselves  from  the  flank  fire.  The  leading  brigade  of  Ewing 
being  unable  to  carry  that  point,  the  next  brigade  of  Giles 
Smith  was  turned  down  a  ravine,  and  by  a  circuit  to  the  left 
found  cover,  formed  line,  and  threatened  the  parapet  some 
three  hundred  yards  to  the  left  of  the  bastion  and  the  brig- 
ade of  Kilby  Smith  deployed  on  the  off  slope  of  one  of  the 
spurs,  where,  with  Ewing's  brigade,  they  kept  up  a  constant  fire 
against  any  object  that  presented  itself  above  the  parapet." 

The  italics  in  this  abstract  are  our  own.  We  call  at- 
tention to  the  accuracy  of  statement  generally  indulged  in  by 
General  Sherman.  How  the  men  burrowed  is  left  to  our 
imagination.  As  the  brave  fellows  had  boards  and  poles 
with  which  to  cross  the  ditch,  we  wonder  with  what  instru- 
ments they  dug  holes  in  the  earth.  However,  as  General 
Sherman  did  not  witness  the  terrible  assault,  we  may  con- 
clude that  he  was  misinformed  by  some  subordinate  whose 
frightened  imagination  ran  away  with  the  facts. 

However,  the  assault  was  a  disastrous  failure,  and  one 
would  suppose  that  enough  had  been  done  to  demonstrate 
the  utter  impossibility  of  carrying  such  a  work  in  this  way. 
But  the  murderous  sacrifice  of  life  was  not  to  cease  here. 
General  Sherman  continues : 

"About  2  P.  M.  General  Blair  reported  to  me  that  none  of 
his  brigades  could  pass  the  point  of  the  road  swept  by  the 
terrific  fire  encountered  by  Ewing's,  but  that  Giles  Smith 
had  got  a  position  to  the  left,  in  connection  with  General 
Ransom,  of  McPherson's  corps,  and  was  ready  to  assault.  I 
ordered  a  constant  fire  of  artillery  to  be  kept  up  to  occupy 
20 


306  Life  of  Thomas. 

the  attention  of  the  enemy  in  our  front.  Under  these  cir- 
cumstances, Ransom's  and  Giles  Smith's  brigades  charged 
up  against  the  parapet,  but  also  met  a  staggering  fire,  before 
which  they  recoiled  under  cover  of  the  hillside." 

Badeau  says  of  this  second  attack  :  "  The  ground  over 
which  they  passed  is  the  most  difficult  about  Vicksburg. 
Three  ravines  cover  the  entire  distance  between  the  grave- 
yard and  Jackson  roads,  and  opening  into  one  still  larger, 
rendered  this  portion  of  the  line  unapproachable,  except  for 
individuals.  Nowhere  between  these  points  could  a  com- 
pany march  by  a  flank  in  any  thing  like  order,  so  broken  is 
the  ground,  and  so  much  is  it  obstructed  by  the  slashing 
which  had  been  made  by  felling  forest  timber  and  the 
luxurious  vines  along  the  sides  of  the  ravines.  .  .  .  The 
troops  pushed  on  and  in  the  blazing  sun  sought  to  reach 
the  enemy's  stronghold;  but,  like  the  column  of  Ewing,  they 
became  hopelessly  broken  up  into  small  parties,  and  only  a 
"few,  more  daring  than  the  rest,  succeeded  in  getting  close 
enough  to  give  the  rebels  any  serious  cause  for  alarm.  But 
these  were  met  by  a  staggering  fire,  and  recoiled  under  cover 
of  the  hillside.  Many  a  brave  man  fell  after  he  had  passed 
through  the  difficulties  of  the  approach  and  reached  the  rebel 
line.  The  foremost  were  soon  compelled  to  crawl  behind 
logs  and  under  the  brows  of  the  hill,  where  they  waited  for 
single  opportunities  to  bring  down  the  enemy  as  he  showed 
himself  along  the  parapet  or  in  the  rifle  trench." 

General  Steele's  brigade,  which  was  Sherman's  right, 
had  a  less  difficult  country  to  cross,  but  a  cleared  valley  in- 
stead of  precipitous  ravines  exposed  his  troops  "  for  three- 
quarters  of  a  mile  to  a  plunging  fire  from  every  point  of  the 
adjacent  rebel  line.  The  distance  to  pass  under  fire  was  not  less 
than  four  hundred  yards,  and,  though  the  obstacles  to  overcome 
were  less,  the  exposure  to  fire  being  greater,  made  the  result 
here  the  same  as  the  assault  on  Sherman's  left.  By  2  o'clock 
it  was  evident  that  the  national  forces  could  not  reach  the 
rebel  fortifications  at  any  point  in  Sherman's  front  in  numbers 
or  order  sufficient  to  carry  the  line,  and  all  further  operations 
were  suspended." 

The  line  of  works  in  front  of  McPherson's   corps  fol- 


An  Impossible  Assault.  307 

lowed  the  line  of  the  high  ridge  nearly  north  and  south ; 
"  they  were  strongly  constructed  and  well  arranged  to  sweep 
the  approaches  in  each  direction."  The  only  road  to  them 
"  was  completely  swept  at  many  points  by  direct  and  cross 
fires."  In  Logan's  division,  Leggett's  brigade  was  on  the 
road,  supported  by  John  E.  Smith's  brigade;  Stevenson's 
brigade  in  the  ravines  and  on  the  slopes  to  the  south.  At 
the  appointed  time  all  moved  forward.  Sherman  tells  the 
result : 

"  Their  order  of  battle,  however,  was  weak,  from  the 
nature  of  the  ground ;  columns  of  regiments  not  greater 
than  a  platoon  front,  battalions  by  the  flank,  in  columns  of 
fours,  or  regiments  in  a  single  line  of  battle,  supported  by 
troops  in  position,  and  covered  by  skirmishers. 

"Notwithstanding  the  bravery  of  the  troops,  they  be- 
came broken  and  disorganized  by  the  difficult  nature  of  the 
ground  and  the  fire  of  the  enemy  from  trench  and  parapet ; 
and  they,  too,  were  compelled  to  seek  cover  under  the  brows 
of  the  hills  along  which  they  had  advanced.  John  E.  Smith 
was  thus  checked  by  the  cross-fire  of  artillery  commanding 
the  road.  .  .  .  Stevenson  was  somewhat  protected  by  the 
uneven  nature  of  the  ground.  .  .  .  His  advance'  was 
bold,  and  had  nearly  reached  the  top  of  the  slope  in  his 
front,  but  being  only  in  line,  and,  therefore,  without  any 
great  weight,  unsupported  by  columns  or  heavy  bodies  to 
give  it  confidence  or  momentum,  it  also  failed." 

Quimby's  division  was  McPherson's  left.  Badeau  says  : 
"Quimby's  troops  moved  out,  but  the  enemy's  line  in  their 
front  being  a  strong  re-entrant  (turning  by  an  angle  inward), 
no  great  effort  was  made  by  them.  At  this  time  they  were 
simply  useful  from  the  menacing  attitude  they  held." 
Neither  McPherson  nor  any  of  his  generals  made  any  report 
of  this  assault;  at  least  none  was  forwarded  to  the  War  De- 
partment. The  reason  will  appear  further  along. 

McClernand's  corps  held  the  left  of  the  line — first  A.  J. 
Smith's  division,  then  Carr's,  then  Hovey's.  Badeau's  de- 
scription makes  the  ground  of  the  same  difficult  character, 
deeply  cut  up  by  ravines,  but  less  incumbered  with  timber, 
save  in  Hovey's  front.  McCleruand's  report  says : 


308  Life  of  Thomas. 

"  Five  minutes  before  10  o'clock  the  bugle  sounded  the 
charge,  and  at  10  o'clock  my  columns  of  attack  moved  for- 
ward, and  within  fifteen  minutes  Lawler's  and  Landrum's 
brigades  had  carried  the  ditch  slope  and  bastion  of  a  fort. 
Some  of  their  men  rushed  into  the  fort,  finding  a  piece  of 
artillery,  and  in  time  to  see  the  men  who  had  been  working 
and  supporting  it  escape  behind  another  defense  command- 
ing the  interior  of  the  former.  All  of  this  daring  and  heroic 
party  were  shot  down  except  one,  who,  recovering  from  the 
stunning  effect  of  a  shot,  seized  his  musket  and  captured  and 
brought  away  thirteen  rebels  who  had  returned  and  fired 
their  gun." 

The  actor  in  this  extraordinary  affair  was  Sergeant 
Joseph  Griffith,  Twenty-second  Iowa,  and  for  his  amazing 
achievement  he  was  promoted  to  be  first  lieutenant.  This 
capture  of  thirteen  men  by  one  soldier  has  a  Munchausen 
look,  until  we  learn  that  these  Confederates  were  in  between 
two  fires,  and  that  a  quick  surrender  was  all  that  saved  their 
lives.  As  it  was,  four  were  killed  while  in  the  act  of  surren- 
dering, and  probably  by  a  fire  from  their  own  side. 

McClernand  continues:  "The  colors  of  the  One  Hun- 
dred and  Thirtieth  Illinois  were  planted  upon  the  counter- 
scarp of  the  ditch,  while  those  of  the  Forty-eighth  Ohio 
and  Seventy-seventh  Illinois  waved  over  the  bastion.  Within 
fifteen  minutes  after  Lawler's  and  Landrum's  success,  Ben- 
ton's  and  Burbridge's  brigades  carried  the  ditch  and  slope  of 
another  earth-work  and  planted  their  colors  upon  the  latter. 
Captain  White,  of  the  Chicago  Mercantile  Battery,  carried 
one  of  his  pieces  by  hand  quite  to  the  ditch,  and,  double- 
shotting  it,  fired  into  an  embrasure,  disabling  a  gun  in  it 
ready  to  be  discharged  and  scattering  death  among  the  rebel 
cannoneers.  A  curtain  connected  the  works  forming  these 
two  points  of  attack."  "There,"  he  says,  "for  more  than 
eight  long  hours,  they  (our  troops)  maintained  their  ground 
with  deathlike  tenacity."  Osterhaus'  and  Hovey's  forces, 
forming  the  column  of  assault  on  the  left,  had  a  longer 
march  over  the  most  difficult  ground  to  pass  over.  "  They 
pushed  forward  under  a  withering  fire  upon  a  more  extended 
line  until  an  enfilading  fire  from  a  strong  redoubt  on  their 


The  Murderous  Assaults.  309 

left  front  and  physical  exhaustion  compelled  them  to  take 
shelter  behind  a  ridge.  Their  skirmishers,  however,  kept  up 
the  conflict."  Pembertori,  alarmed  at  the  success  of  our 
troops  under  McClernand,  now  massed  troops  to  drive  the 
four  brigades  from  the  points  they  had  gained  in  the  works. 
McClernand,  well  knowing  that  sooner  or  later  this  would 
be  done,  sent  to  General  McArthur,  then  on  the  march  from 
Warrenton,  urging  him  to  hurry  up,  and  he  also  advised 
General  Grant  of  the  situation  and  begged  for  troops. 

The  conduct  of  the  general  commanding  at  the  time  of 
the  assault,  and  the  subsequent  controversy  between  Grant 
and  McClernand,  throw  such  light  on  the  murderous  mode 
of  warfare  indulged  in  that  both  become  important.  We 
have  seen  that  a  second  assault  was  ordered  because  the  first 
had  given  us  a  knowledge  of  the  enemy's  mode  of  defense, 
the  nature  of  the  ground  fortifications,  and  other  unknown 
circumstances  that  after  became  plain  to  the  military  mind 
and  of  great  advantage  to  the  assaulting  party.  When  the 
bloody  encounter  occurred  again,  these  supposed  advantages 
seemed  in  some  way  to  have  disappeared.  The  reports  made 
by  the  general  commanding,  and  especially  by  the  subordi- 
date  generals,  tell  us  of  an  advance  over  and  among  obstacles 
•that  seem  all  of  them  to  be  as  surprising  in  their  newness  as 
in  the  first  attempt.  At  ten  o'clock  A.  M.,  an  advance  along 
the  entire  line  was  made.  At  twenty  minutes  past  ten,  it 
was  at  an  end,  with  two  thousand  of  our  gallant  fellows  dead 
or  wounded  outside  the  enemy's  works.  Save  at  one  point, 
the  attack  was  a  complete  failure,  a  most  disastrous  failure. 
At  noon,  along  the  entire  line,  save  that  part  under  McCler- 
nand, the  fighting  ceased.  Sherman  and  McPherson  confessed 
their  signal  defeat,  and  asserted  that  to  take  Vicksburg  by 
assault  was  impossible.  In  face  of  these  facts,  fully  com- 
municated to  General  Grant  at  three  P.  M.,  he  ordered  a  re- 
newed assault,  and  in  less  than  an  hour,  according  to  General 
Grant's  report,  the  dead  and  wounded  were  increased  to  four 
thousand,  and  the  result,  so  far  as  the  capture  of  Vicksburg 
was  concerned,  was  the  same. 

These  four  thousand  we  now  know  were  wantonly  butch- 
ered; but,  at  the  time,  there  was  no  question  as  to  the  last 


310  Life  of  Thomas. 

two  thousand.  The  commanding  general  might  have  be- 
lieved in  the  first  assault  of  that  fatal  day  there  was  hope — 
a  forlorn  one,  perhaps,  but  yet  a  hope — of  success.  But,  for 
the  second,  acknowledged  by  him  to  have  doubled  his  loss, 
there  was  demand  for  explanation.  That  subtle  yet  ever 
present  guardian  of  the  people  and  voice  of  power,  the  press, 
took  up  the  matter,  and,  after  detailing  the  mad  attempt, 
said,  in  explanation,  that  the  general  commanding  was  so 
under  the  influence  of  liquor  that  he  had  no  head,  and,  of 
consequence,  no  mercy  on  his  troops.  Of  course,  the  polit- 
ical general,  McClernand,  is  made  the  scape-goat.  McCler- 
nand  claimed  to  have  captured  two  forts  and  so  broken  the 
enemy's  line.  He  asked  for  a  vigorous  blow  by  McPherson 
to  make  a  diversion  in  his,  McClernand's,  behalf.  Grant,  in 
response,  ordered  a  general  assault,  and  then  came  the 
slaughter.  McClernand  had  deceived  him.  The  political 
general  had  made  no  such  success. 

Let  us  see.  When  did  the  excuse  suggest  itself  to  Gen- 
eral Grant?  Certainly  not  on  the  day  the  assault  occurred. 
On  that  night  Grant  wrote  Halleck :  "  We  have  possession 
of  two  of  the  enemy's  forts."  This  letter  is  in  strange  vari- 
ance with  Grant's  conduct  during  the  day.  At  eleven  A.  M., 
he  received  from  McClernand  this  note : 

"  I  am  hotly  engaged  with  the  enemy.  He  is  massing 
on  me  from  right  and  left.  A  vigorous  blow  from  McPherson 
would  make  a  diversion  in  my  favor." 

Grant  says  that  he  received  this  note  at  twelve  noon ; 
his  answer,  however,  bears  date  11:50,  and  reads:  "If  your 
advance  is  weak,  strengthen  it  from  your  reserves  or  other 
parts  of  the  line."  We  quote  this  to  show  the  condition  of 
mind  in  which  this  terrible  affair  was  conducted.  The  note 
sent  back  to  McClernand  is  not  in  response  to  the  one  re- 
ceived. McClernand  had  not  asked  for  reinforcements.  He 
knew  that  the  entire  army,  stretched  along  a  line  four  miles 
in  extent,  had  no  reserves.  But  the  fighting  of  all  that  army 
save  his  own  had  ceased,  and,  fearing  a  concentration  on  his 
forces  fiercely  engaged  and  gaining  important  advantage,  he 
asked  that  the  fight  might  be  renewed.  General  Grant  af- 
fected not  to  believe  this.  In  his  report  to  Halleck,  he  says  i 


The  Murderous  Assaults.  311 

"  The  position  occupied  by  me  during  most  of  the  time  of 
the  assault  gave  me  a  better  opportunity  of  seeing  what  was 
going  on  in  front  of  the  Thirteenth  Army  Corps  (McCler- 
nand's)  than  I  believe  it  possible  for  the  commander  to 
have." 

And  yet,  strange  to  say,  he  left  this  commanding  position 
to  go  around  on  foot  to  Sherman,  and  then  order  the  assault 
that  he  was  satisfied  was  uncalled  for. 

General  Sherman,  in  his  Memoirs,  says  of  this  event : 
"After  our  men  had  been  fairly  beaten  back  from  off  the  par- 
apet, and  had  got  cover  behind  the  spur  of  ground  close  up 
to  the  rebel  works,  General  Grant  came  to  where  I  was,  on 
foot,  having  left  his  horse  some  distance  to  the  rear.  I 
pointed  out  to  him  the  rebel  works,  admitted  that  my  assault 
had  failed,  and  he  said  the  result  with  McPherson  and  Mc- 
Clernand  was  about  the  same." 

In  relation  to  McClernand's  claim  of  having  gained  a  de- 
cided advantage,  Sherman,  in  his  Memoirs,  continues  :  "  Gen- 
eral Grant  said,  < I  don't  believe  a  word  of  it,'  but  I  reasoned 
with  him  that  this  note  was  official  and  must  be  credited, 
and  I  offered  to  renew  the  assault  at  once  with  new  troops. 
He  said  he  would  instantly  ride  down  to  McClernand's  front, 
and,  if  I  did  not  receive  orders  to  the^contrary  by  three 
o'clock  P.  M.,  I  might  try  it  again.  Mower's  fresh  brigade 
was  brought  up  under  cover,  and  some  changes  were  made 
in  Giles  Smith's  brigade,  and  punctually  at  three  o'clock  p. 
M.,  hearing  heavy  firing  down  along  the  line  to  my  left,  I 
ordered  the  second  assault.  It  was  a  repetition  of  the  first — 
equally  unsuccessful  and  bloody.  The  same  thing  occurred 
with  McPherson,  who  lost  in  this  second  assault  some  valua- 
ble officers  and  men,  without  adequate  result." 

And  the  general  commanding  disappeared  from  Sher- 
man's front.  It  appears  that  he  did  not  return  to  his  com- 
manding position  in  the  rear  of  McClernand's,  but  went  on 
foot,  we  presume,  to  McPhersou's  center  and  showed  McCler- 
nand's dispatch.  Now,  McClernand  never  claimed  what 
Grant  asserts.  The  celebrated  note  reads  as  follows : 

"  We  have  gained  the  enemy's  intrenchments  at  several 
points,  but  are  brought  to  a  stand.  I  have  sent  word  to 


312  Life  of  Thomas. 

McArthur  to  reinforce  me  if  he  can.  Would  it  not  be  best 
to  concentrate  the  whole  or  a  part  of  his  command  at  this 
point?  P.  S. — I  have  received  your  dispatch.  My  troops 
are  all  engaged  and  I  can  not  withdraw  any  to  reinforce 
others." 

Again,  this  follows : 

"  We  are  hotly  engaged  with  the  enemy.  We  have  part 
possession  of  two  forts  and  the  stars  and  stripes  are  floating 
over  them.  A  vigorous  push  ought  to  be  made  all  along  the 
line." 

That  General  Grant  had  intervals  of  confidence  in  Mc- 
Clernand's  success  is  shown  by  the  following  dispatches : 

"  FROM  FIELD  SIGNAL  STATION. 
"  To  GENERAL  MCCLERNAND  : 

"  McArthur  advanced  from  Warrenton  last  night.  He 
is  on  our  left.  Concentrate  with  him  and  use  his  forces  to 
the  best  advantage." 

"  FROM  FIELD  SIGNAL  STATION. 
"  To  GENERAL  MCCLERNAND  : 

"  Sherman  and  McPherson  are  pressing  the  enemy.  If 
one  portion  of  your  troops  are  pressed  reinforce  them  from 
another.  Sherman  has  gained  some  successes." 

The  next  dispatch  reads  : 

"  General,  I  have  sent  a  dispatch  to  you  saying  that 
McArthur  left  Warrenton  last  night;  was  about  half  way 
1  about  1  A.  M.  this  morning.  Communicate  with  him  and  use 
his  forces  to  the  best  advantage.  McPherson  is  directed  to 
send  Quimby's  division  to  you  if  he  can  not  effect  a  lodgment 
where  he  is.  Quimby  is  next  to  your  right,  and  you  will  be 
aided  as  much  by  his  penetrating  into  the  enemy's  lines  as 
by  having  him  to  support  the  column  you  have  already  got. 
Sherman  is  getting  on  well." 

The  vacillating  conduct  of  the  commander  in  going  from 
where  he  could  see  the  McClernand  assault  to  Sherman  and 
refusing  to  resume  the  attack,  then  seeking  McPherson  and 
giving  the  fatal  order  referring  Quimby  to  McClernand  and 
then  ordering  Quimby  to  his  support ;  saying  to  Sherman  that 


Making  Me  demand  a  Scape-goat.  313 

he  did  not  believe  a  word  of  McClernand's  gain  while  penning 
the  above  dispatches  that  show  he  did  believe,  all  go  to  prove 
that  General  Grant  was  not  himself  on  this  trying  occasion. 

The  end  of  the  struggle  that  had  been  going  on  for  ten 
hours  is  given  in  McClernand's  report.  It  says :  "  Colonel 
Boomer's  and  Sanborn's  brigade  of  General  Quimby's  divis- 
ion, much  exhausted,  came  up,  but  before  either  of  them 
could  be  fully  applied — indeed,  before  one  of  them  was  en- 
tirely formed — night  set  in  and  terminated  the  struggle. 
Colonel  Boomer  early  fell  while  leading  his  men  forward, 
lamented  by  all.  Meanwhile  the  enemy,  seeing  Quimby's  divis- 
ion moving  in  the  direction  of  my  position,  hastened  to  concen- 
trate additional  forces  in  front  of  it  and  made  a  sortie,  which 
was  repelled.  About  8  p.  M.,  after  ten  hour's  continuous 
fighting  my  men  withdrew  to  the  nearest  shelter  and  rested 
for  the  night,  holding  by  a  strong  picket  most  of  the  ground 
they  had  gained." 

The  grave  question  which  Grant  is  permitted  to  settle 
against  the  political  general,  who  was  guilty  of  having  at 
one  time  won  the  confidence  of  President  Lincoln,  has 
a  reverse  finding  in  history.  Grant  admits  that  if  Mc- 
Clernaud  effected  a  lodgment  in  the  enemy's  works  so  as  to 
break  the  line  and  open  the  road  to  reserves,  supposing  he 
had  such,  through  to  Vicksburg,  it  was  the  duty  of  the  general 
commanding  to  renew  the  general  assault  whatever  the  con- 
sequences as  to  mortality  might  be  and  to  afford  McClernand 
as  many  troops  as  he  possibly  could  use  in  the  way  of  rein- 
forcements. Grant's  letter  of  that  night  in  which  he  reports 
two  forts  had  been  taken  can  be  credited  to  his  condition, 
for  at  the  very  time  he  penned  these  words  night  was  on 
them  and  the  advantages  were  lost.  We  may  question  the 
testimony  of  McClernand's  subordinates,  although  the  bodies 
of  their  comrades  were  lying  cold  in  death  within  the  works 
they  had  carried,  for  the  judgment  of  such  witnesses  is  apt 
to  be  dazed  by  their  imaginations.  They  might  have  taken 
works  of  really  no  avail,  as  Grant  claimed  to  see  from  his 
coign  of  vantage,  so  far  as  seeing  was  concerned.  But  we  have 
since  the  Confederate  records  have  come  into  our  possession 
witnesses  whose  testimony  is  evidence  beyond  impeachment. 


314  Life  of  Thomas. 

We  have  General  Pemberton's  report,  which  says:  "It  was 
of  vital  importance  to  drive  them  out."  From  General 
Stevenson's  report  we  learn  :  "  The  work  was  constructed  in. 
such  a  manner  that  the  ditch  was  commanded  by  no  part  of 
the  line,  and  the  only  means  by  which  they  could  be  dis- 
lodged was  to  retake  the  angle  by  a  desperate  charge.  .  . 
.  A  more  gallant  feat  than  this  charge  has  not  illustrated 
our  arms  during  the  war." 

Brigadier-General  Lee  was  in  the  immediate  command 
of  that  part  of  the  line,  but  died  without  making  a  report. 
Colonel  Dockery,  commanding  a  brigade  of  the  reserve,  says : 
"  While  on  the  way  to  General  Moore's  lines,  a  courier  from 
Brigadier-General  Lee  to  General  Green  reported  that  Gen- 
eral Lee's  line  had  been  broken  by  the  enemy." 

Colonel  Waul,  of  the  Texas  Legion,  who  organized  the 
force  which  retook  the  works,  says:  "Alive  to  the  impor- 
tance of  the  position,  General  Lee  issued  and  reiterated  or- 
ders to  Colonel  Shelly,  commanding  the  Twenty-third  Ala- 
bama, and  Lieutenant-Colonel  Pettus,  commanding  the 
Forty-sixth  Alabama,  who  occupied  the  fort,  to  retake  it  at  all 
hazards,  offering  the  flags  to  the  commands  capturing  them. 
After  several  vain  attempts,  they  refused  to  volunteer,  nor 
could  the  most  strenuous  efforts  of  their  chivalric  commander 
urge  or  incite  them  to  the  assault. 

"  General  Lee  then  directed  the  colonel  of  the  Legion  to 
have  the  fort  taken.  He  immediately  went  there,  taking 
with  him  one  battalion  of  the  Legion  to  aid  or  support  the 
assailants,  if  necessary,  informing  Captain  Bradley  and  Lieu- 
tenant Hagan,  who  respectively  commanded  the  companies 
that  had  previously  been  sent  as  a  support  to  the  garrison. 
These  gallant  officers  not  only  willingly  agreed,  but  solicited, 
the  honor  of  leading  those  companies  to  the  assault.  .  .  . 
Three  of  Colonel  Shelly's  regiment  also  volunteered.  .  .  . 
This  feat,  considered  with  the  accompanying  circumstances, 
the  occupation  of  the  enemy,  the  narrow  pass  through  which 
the  party  had  to  enter,  the  enfilading  fire  of  musketry  and 
artillery  they  had  to  encounter  in  the  approach,  the  unwill- 
ingness of  the  garrison,  consisting  of  two  regiments,  to  vol- 
unteer, and  permitting  the  flags  to  float  for  three  hours  over 


Me demand 's  Success.  315 

the  parapet,  the  coolness,  courage,  and  intrepidity  mani- 
fested, deserve  highest  praise  for  every  officer  and  man  en- 
gaged in  the  hazardous  enterprise." 

The  truth  is,  however,  that  whether  McClernand  effected 
a  lodgment  of  grave  importance  or  not,  the  condition  was 
such  that  gallant  service  was  of  no  avail.  Had  McArthur's 
forces  been  on  the  field,  as  a  reserve  to  McClernand,  so  as  to 
have  troops  on  hand  to  take  advantage  of  the  break,  an  as- 
sault then,  while  a  general  attack  was  going  on,  might  have 
ended  in  the  capture  of  Vicksburg.  But  this  was  not  the 
situation.  Vicksburg  depended  on  its  fortifications.  These 
swelled  the  strength  of  eighteen  thousand  men  to  at  least 
sixty  thousand  for  holding  the  river  line.  Pemberton,  giv- 
ing ten  thousand  to  man  the  works,  could  throw  a  heavy  re- 
serve upon  any  point  sorely  pressed  or  fight  an  engagement 
in  any  breach  their  enemy  could  make.  Grant,  in  employ- 
ing his  entire  army  as  an  assaulting  force,  without  a  reserve, 
was  in  no  condition  to  avail  himself  of  such  a  break  in  the 
Confederate  lines  as  McClernand  gave  him.  He  simply 
drove  his  devoted  troops  like  sheep  to  the  slaughter  against 
works  he  had  demonstrated  before  were  impregnable. 

We  have,  however,  the  grim  satisfaction  of  knowing 
that,  while  our  general  commanding  was  not  himself,  the 
gentleman  commanding  the  Confederates  was  himself,  and 
was  cursed  for  that  by  the  authories  at  Richmond.  He  was 
denounced  for  fighting  the  battle  of  Champion's  Hill  before 
securing  a  conjunction  with  Johnston's  six  thousand.  And 
after  being  driven  to  Vicksburg,  he  did  not  take  advantage 
of  the  latest  assault,  with  its  fearful  slaughter  of  our  troops, 
by  making  a  sortie  from  the  part  of  Vicksburg  not  then  in- 
vested, and  driving  Grant's  army  into  the  Mississippi  by  an 
attack  in  its  rear. 

While  poor  Pemberton,  however,  is  consigned  to  an  un- 
marked grave,  true  history  will  come  in  time  to  rot  the  gar- 
lands and  deepen  the  dust  upon  the  monuments  erected  to 
the  memory  of  Grant.  We  will  seek  in  shame  to  forget  a 
man  whose  bloody  blunders  at  Vicksburg  were  crowned  by 
an  act  that  makes  us  shudder  to  know  and  sicken  to  remem- 
ber. This  is  strong  language,  but  justified  by  facts.  A 


316  Life  of  Thomas. 

I 

frightful  Ios8  of  over  four  thousand  men  had  occurred.  The 
mass  of  these  lay  where  they  fell.  Badeau,  in  his  Grant- 
indorsed  version  of  his  master's  life,  says:  "The  hill-sides 
were  covered  with  the  slain  and  with  unfortunates  who  lay 
panting  in  the  heat,  crying  for  water  which  none  could 
bring  them,  and  writhing  in  pain  that  might  not  be  re- 
lieved." 

For  three  days  the  four  thousand  were  left,  the  dead  to 
rot,  and  the  wounded  to  writhe  in  agony  under  that  hot 
Southern  sun,  a  hideous  neglect  which  was  terminated  only 
by  the  following  note  sent  under  flag  of  truce  from  Pem- 
berton : 

"  Two  days  having  elapsed  since  your  dead  and  wounded 
have  been  lying  in  our  front,  and  as  yet  no  disposition  on 
your  part  of  a  desire  to  remove  them  being  exhibited,  in  the 
name  of  humanity,  I  have  the  honor  to  propose  a  cessation 
of  hostilities  for  two  and  a  half  hours  that  you  may  be  en- 
abled to  remove  your  dead  and  dying  men.  If  you  can  not 
do  this,  on  notification  from  you  that  hostilities  will  be  sus- 
pended on  your  part  for  the  time  specified,  I  will  endeavor 
to  have  the  dead  buried  and  the  wounded  cared  for." 

To  this  Grant  replied  at  3:30  p.  M.,  and  it  was  agreed 
that  hostilities  should  cease  at  6  P.  M.,  that  our  dead,  for  all 
were  dead  by  this  time,  might  be  buried.  A  flag  of  truce, 
asking  a  suspension  of  hostilities  until  the  dead  were  in- 
terred and  the  wounded  cared  for,  might  have  been  at  once 
resorted  to  from  the  first,  but  Grant,  who  had  reported  to 
Halleck  and  published  to  the  people  that  the  assault  was 
enough  of  a  success  to  put  us  in  possession  of  the  battle- 
field, could  not  thus  confess  his  falsehood  by  asking  a  flag  of 
truce.  And  so  the  slow  torture  of  wounds  under  that  hot 
June  sun  of  the  fiery  south  with  agonizing  thirst,  went  on, 
our  poor  fellows  dying  slowly  by  torture  that  a  lie  might  be 
palmed  off"  upon  the  people  who  had  sent  their  sons  and 
brothers  down  to  die  for  their  country. 

Badeau  in  a  foot  note  makes  a  feeble  eflbrt  at  a  defense 
against  Pemberton's  imputations  of  inhumanity,  that  the 
impossibility  of  relieving  those  wounded,  "  was  occasioned 
by  Pemberton's  troops."  He  adds,  philosophically :  "  The 


Savage  Cruelty  to  the  Wounded.  317 

wounded  suffer  frightfully  after  every  battle,  and  the  party 
which  is  repelled  is  always  unable  to  bestow  attention  on 
those  whom  it  leaves  on  the  field." 

But  it  will  be  observed  that  Grant,  in  his  report  to  Hal- 
leek,  and  in  his  publications  in  the  press,  denies  that  our 
forces  were  repelled.  According  to  that  report,  we  held  the 
field  up  to  the  very  trenches  of  the  enemy. 

Badeau,  the  Grant-indorsed  biographer,  allows  no  sense 
of  humanity  to  General  Pemberton  in  his  offer  of  permission 
to  Grant  to  bury  his  dead.  He  asserts  that  Pemberton 
sought  to  escape  a  pestilence  bred  by  the  stench  of  these 
dead  Union  volunteers.  He  says :  "  For  two  days  the  un- 
buried  corpses  were  left  festering  between  the  two  armies, 
when  the  stench  became  so  intolerable  to  the  garrison  that 
Pemberton  was  afraid  it  might  breed  a  pestilence.  He  there- 
fore proposed  an  armistice." 

General  Pemberton  had  another  stratagem  in  this,  and 
this  reveals  a  fine  stratagem  on  Grant's  part.  Continues 
Badeau : 

"  The  offer  was  promptly  accepted,  and  the  rebels  also 
availed  themselves  of  the  opportunity  to  carry  off  the  dead 
horses  and  mules  that  lay  in  their  front,  and  were  becoming 
very  offensive  to  the  besieged.  These  were  the  animals  that 
Pemberton  had  turned  loose  from  the  city  and  driven  over 
the  lines  from  want  of  forage.  They  were  shot  wherever 
they  were  seen  by  the  sharpshooters  from  the  besieging 
army,  that  the  stench  arising  from  their  putrefaction  might 
annoy  the  enemy." 

War  at  best  is  cruel  and  barbarous.  But  in  the  hands 
of  heartless  men  it  becomes  a  hell,  far  beyond  the  dreams  of 
the  fanatic.  In  its  better  aspects,  under  the  guidance  of  hu- 
mane men,  the  atrocities  are  excused  because  of  their  neces- 
sity. This  is  terrible,  we  say,  but  it  is  war.  But  in  all  the 
annals  of  killing,  no  such  infamy  as  this  at  Vicksburg  ap- 
pears of  record,  and  it  lies  outside  of  plea  found  in  neces- 
sity. Then  the  cool  indifference  in  which  we  are  told  that 
the  starving  brutes  that  came  staggering  from  behind  the 
Confederate  works  were  shot  down  that  their  stench  might 
breed  a  pestilence.  The  proposition  was  as  idiotic  as  it  was. 


318  Life  of  Thomas. 

cruel.  Our  northern  troops  poured  in  to  reinforce  the  lines 
thinned  by  sickness,  were  in  a  condition  to  be  the  first  suf- 
ferers from  this  premeditated  pestilence.  Crowded  into  forti- 
fied camps,  digging  like  moles  in  the  earth,  or  crowded  in 
open  ditches,  they  sickened  and  died  as  they  had  been  dying 
for  half  a  year.  Not  satisfied  with  this,  we  are  told  that  our 
able  general  organized  a  pestilence  by  leaving  the  dead  upon 
the  outer  slope  of  the  enemy's  fortification,  and  killing  the 
starved  animals '  driven  from  the  beleaguered  town.  This 
surpasses  even  the  uncalled-for  order  to  lay  waste  a  wide 
stretch  of  fertile  country,  and  so  make  war  on  helpless  age, 
or  defenseless  women  and  children  by  fetching  such  a  popu- 
lation face  to  face  with  death  from  starvation.  Nor  will  we 
walk  backward  and  cover  with  the  blanket  of  ignorance 
these  awful  crimes  against  God  and  Christian  civilization. 

There  is  official  evidence  of  General  Grant's  personal 
habits  and  condition  in  these  dreadful  days.  How  terrible 
and  sickening  the  situation  must  have  been,  will  appear  with 
horrible  distinctness  from  the  following  letter  written  a  few 
days  after  the  assaults  to  Grant  by  General  John  Rawlins, 
his  chief-of-staif,  and  delivered  by  Rawlins  in  person.  No 
lapses  of  ordinary  degree  would  have  induced  a  staff  officer 
to  venture  upon  thus  sharply  arraigning  the  commander-in- 
chief : 

"  BEFORE  VICKSBURG,  Miss.,  June  6,  1863,  \ 

1  o'clock  A.  M.     j 

DEAR  GENERAL:  The  great  solicitude  I  feel  for  the 
safety  of  this  army  leads  me  to  mention  what  I  had  hoped 
never  again  to  do — the  subject  of  your  drinking.  This  may 
surprise  you,  for  I  may  be  (and  I  trust  I  am)  doing  you  an 
injustice  by  unfounded  suspicions,  but  if  an  error  it  better  be 
on  the  side  of  his  country's  safety  than  in  fear  of  offending 
a  friend.  I  have  heard  that  Dr.  McMillan,  at  General  Sher- 
man's a  few  days  ago,  induced  you,  notwithstanding  your 
pledge  to  me,  to  take  a  glass  of  wine,  and  to-day,  when  I 
found  a  box  of  wine  in  front  of  your  tent  and  proposed  to 
move  it,  which  I  did,  I  was  told  you  had  forbid  its  being 
taken  away,  for  you  intended  to  keep  it  until  you  entered 
Vicksburg,  that  you  might  have  it  for  your  friends ;  and  to- 


General  Rawiins  on  Grant's  Drinking.  319 

night,  when  you  should,  because  of  the  condition  of  your 
health  if  nothing  else,  have  been  in  bed,  I  find  you  where  the 
wine  bottle  has  just  been  emptied,  in  company  with  those 
who  drink  and  urge  you  to  do  likewise,  and  the  lack 
of  your  usual  promptness  of  decision  and  clearness  in 
expressing  yourself  in  writing  tended  to  confirm  my  sus- 
picions. 

You  have  the  full  control  of  your  appetite  and  can  let 
drinking  alone.  Had  you  not  pledged  me  the  sincerity  of 
your  honor  early  last  March  that  you  would  drink  no  more 
during  the  war,  and  kept  that  pledge  during  your  recent 
campaign,  you  would  not  to-day  have  stood  first  in  the 
world's  history  as  a  successful  military  leader.  Your  only 
salvation  depends  upon  your  strict  adherence  to  that  pledge. 
You  can  not  succeed  in  aiiy  other  way.  As  I  have  before 
stated,  I  may  be  wrong  in  my  suspicions,  but  if  one  sees  that 
which  leads  him  to  suppose  a  sentinel  is  falling  asleep  on  his 
post,  it  is  his  duty  to  arouse  him;  and  if  one  sees  that  which 
leads  him  to  fear  the  general  commanding  a  great  army  is 
being  seduced  to  that  step  which  he  knows  will  bring  dis- 
grace upon  that  general  and  defeat  to  his  command,  if  he 
fails  to  sound  the  proper  note  of  warning,  the  friends,  wives, 
and  children  of  those  brave  men  whose  lives  he  permits  to 
remain  thus  imperiled  will  accuse  him  while  he  lives  and 
stand  swift  witnesses  of  wrath  against  him  in  the  day  when 
all  shall  be  tried.  If  my  suspicions  are  unfounded,  let  my 
friendship  for  you  and  my  zeal  for  my  country  be  my  excuse 
for  this  letter;  and  if  they  are  correctly  founded,  and  you 
determine  not  to  heed  the  admonitions  and  the  prayers  of 
this  hasty  note  by  immediately  ceasing  to  touch  a  single  drop 
of  any  kind  of  liquor,  no  matter  by  whom  asked  or  under 
what  circumstances,  let  my  immediate  relief  from  duty  in 
this  department  be  the  result.  I  am,  General,  your  friend, 

JOHN  A.  RAWLINS. 

The  biography  of  the  lackey  and  the  memoirs  of  overfed 
egotism  give  as  a  reason  for  these  vain  assaults,  the  con- 
tinued menace  of  General  Joseph  E.  Johnston  in  Grant's 
rear,  and  the  fear  that  Bragg  would  abandon  Rosecrans' 


320  Life  of  Thomas. 

front  and  come  to  the  relief  of  Pemberton..  We  now  know 
that  General  Johnston,  after  the  most  strenuous,  efforts  had 
collected  twenty-eight  thousand  men  of  all  arms,  but  these 
were  so  deficient  in  transportation,  in  supplies  of  all  sorts,  in 
muskets  and  artillery,  that  his  available  forces  numbered  but 
eight  thousand  men.  As  for  Bragg,  the  authorities  at  Rich- 
mond so  recognized  the  importance  of  his  objective  point, 
Chattanooga,  that  had  they  thought  it  in  immediate  danger, 
they  would  have  transferred  Lee's  army  from  the  Potomac 
to  the  Tennessee. 

A  little  of  the  sagacity  given  in  imagination  to  General 
Grant  would  have  relieved  his  military  mind  of  all  fears  of 
interference  on  the  part  of  either  Johnston  or  Bragg. 
While  Pemberton  was  almost  shrieking  to  Johnston  for  aid 
to  raise  the  siege,  Johnston  was  sending  his  subordinate 
officer  orders  to  cut  his  way  out  and  so  join  their  forces 
for  operations  in  the  interior.  Johnston  held  that  Vicks- 
burg  was  not  worth  the  struggle  being  made  to  hold  it.  As 
the  enemy  had,  with  the  exception  of  Port  Hudson,  entire 
control  of  the  Mississippi  river,  the  Confederacy  was  as 
much  cut  in  two  as  it  would  be  had  our  forces  possessed 
Vicksburg  and  Port  Hudson. 

Grant  began  the  siege  of  Vicksburg  with  forty  thou- 
sand men.  Through  frantic  appeals  for  reinforcements  from 
Grant,  this  number  was  doubled  from  troops  that  should 
have  gone  to  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland.  The  general 
who  organized  slaughter  for  his  own  troops  and  made  such 
frantic  demand  for  more  men  ought  to  have  known  that  with 
forty  thousand  men  he  outnumbered  the  two  armies  of  the 
Confederacy,  and  when  this  force  was  augmented  to  eighty 
thousand,  he  could  have  left  enough  men  to  man  the  works 
about  Vicksburg  and  marching  to  the  interior  have  driven 
Johnston  from  the  field.  To  have  defeated  Johnston  thus  was 
to  have  made  Vicksburg  and  Port  Hudson  untenable  to  the ' 
enemy.  Had  he  six  months  before  marched  his  huge  army, 
as  he  at  that  time  contemplated,  through  the  interior  of 
Mississippi  along  the  line  of  the  Mississippi  Central  Railroad, 
he  had  a  chance  of  brushing  General  Pemberton  aside,  and 
a  campaign  of  six  weeks  would,  in  all  human  probability, 


Making  Occasion  against  Me  demand.  321 

have  brought  the  evacuation  of  Vicksburg  and  Port  Hud- 
son, instead  of  six  months'  campaign,  if  it  can  he  called  such, 
and  its  awful  mortality  from  disease  as  well  as  bullets.  We 
have  seen  how  the  general  commanding  came  to  change  his 
objective  point  from  Pemberton's  army  to  the  person  of  Mc- 
Clernand,  and  so  drifted  into  the  bayous,  swamps,  and  bluffs 
of  the  Mississippi. 

This  history  of  bloody  blunders  would  be  incomplete 
were  we  to  fail  recounting  how,  on  the  18th  June,  General 
Grant  succeeded  in  finally  capturing  his  objective  found  in 
the  political  general — the  real  author  of  all  our  woes.  It 
will  be  observed  that,  as  early  as  the  6th  of  May,  Grant  got 
from  the  War  Department  full  authority  to  dispense  with 
the  services  of  the  man  who  had  originated  this  mad  attack 
on  Vicksburg  from  the  river.  It  was  difficult,  however,  for 
the  general  commanding  to  avail  himself  of  this  authority. 
The  camps  about  Vicksburg  fairly  swarmed  with  newspaper 
correspondents,  and  while  Grant  reported  to  the  War  De- 
partment, these  gentlemen  of  gifted  pens  reported  to  the 
sovereign  people,  whose  sons  were  in  the  trenches  and  rap- 
idly filling  cemeteries  about  the  city.  General  McClernand 
was  guilty  of  being  General  McClernand — no  more  nor  less. 
Now,  while  this  was  sufficient  in  the  mind  of  the  general 
commanding,  it  was  no  offense  whatever  in  the  eyes  of  the 
gifted  press  men.  On  the  contrary,  so  far  McClernand's 
military  career  contrasted  favorably  with  that  of  either 
Grant  or  Sherman.  Indeed,  looking  at  the  political  general 
from  that  point  of  view,  his  character  and  military  career 
appear  brilliant.  We  have  seen  that  he  carried  a  fortifica- 
tion by  storm  long  before  Vicksburg  was  assailed — an 
achievement  neither  Grant  nor  Sherman  ever  accomplished. 
It  was  McClernand's  corps  that  made  the  arduous  march 
from  Milliken's  Bend  to  Hard  Times,  in  which,  while  fight- 
ing the  enemy  he  invariably  defeated,  he  built  that  road  for 
Grant  and  his  army  from  the  Slough  of  Despond  to  the 
blood-stained  victory  of  Disaster.  It  was  McClernand's 
corps  that  completed  the  highway  by  which  Grant  hoped  to 
get  away  from  Vicksburg,  then  by  a  forced  march  reached 
21 


322  Life  of  Thomas. 

Port  Gibson,  and  beat  the  enemy  there  after  a  surprise  almost 
as  great  as  that  which  came  to  Grant  when  he  discovered 
that  he  was  on  the  rear  of  the  enemy,  and  could  change  his 
proposed  retreat  from  Vicksburg  to  an  advance  upon  that 
citadel.  It  was  McClernand  who  shifted  from  the  right  to 
the  left  so  that  he  might  not  lead  in  the  raid  upon  Jackson, 
came  unexpectedly  upon  Pemberton  at  Champion's  Hill, 
and,  although  sent  to  slaughter,  won  a  victory.  Then  it 
was  McClernand's  corps  that  came  upon  the  enemy's  strong 
position  at  Big  Black  river  and  carried  the  same  by  assault, 
the  most  brilliant  action  of  the  campaign.  Then,  again,  it 
was  McClernand's  troops  that  gained  a  grave  advantage  in 
the  second  storming  of  Vicksburg,  that,  had  it  been  followed 
up  and  sustained,  would  have  given  us  Vicksburg. 

For  none  of  these  marked  successes  had  the  general 
commanding  a  word  of  commendation  or  even  mention. 
General  McClernand  was  evidently  not  a  sensitive  gentle- 
man, but  the  melancholy  fact  stared  him  in  the  face  that  so 
long  as  he  remained  in  command  the  troops  under  him  could 
get  no  recognition  for  their  gallant  efforts.  While  achieving 
unnamed  victories,  they  were  rapidly  filling  unnamed  graves. 
Under  this  stress,  McClernand  saw  that  he  would  have  to  be 
relieved  from  command,  but  before  this  could  overtake  him, 
resolved  that  all  Grant  neglected  in  the  way  of  praise  he 
would  do  in  behalf  of  his  brave  but  badly  abused  soldiers. 
One  hot  June  morning,  Grant's  head-quarters  were  suddenly 
invaded  by  Sherman,  shaking  with  wrath  over  a  newspaper 
he  held  in  his  hand.  It  was  some  seconds  ere  he  could  gain 
breath  to  express  his  indignation.  It  had  been  aroused  by 
"  that  fellow  McClernand,"  who  had  dared  make  a  con- 
gratulatory report  to  his  corps,  not  through  head-quarters, 
where  it  would  have  been  properly  suppressed,  but  through 
the  newspapers.  Of  course,  the  fellow,  who  had  ever  been 
a  nuisance,  must  be  cashiered  for  this  gross  breach  of  dis- 
cipline. 

Grant'  had  been  authorized  by  a  cipher  dispatch  sent 
him  by  Charles  A.  Dana  at  an  early  day  to  discharge  any 
subordinate  whom  he  found  in  his  way,  but  until  now  no 
opportunity  had  occurred.  The  cunning  political  nuisance 


Cause  Found  against  Me  demand.  323 

under  epaulettes  had  perversely  continued  to  win  successes, 
and  although  these  were  ignored  by  the  general  commanding 
and  pooh-poohed  by  all  right-minded  West  Pointers,  the  no 
less  troublesome  public  believed  the  armed  politician  could 
not  well  be  defied.  Now,  however,  the  epauletted  nuisance 
was  clearly  in  the  wrong,  and  vengeance  was  swift  and  final. 
General  McClernand  was  brusquely  notified  that  his  services 
were  no  longer  required,  and  retiring  to  the  shades  of  private 
life,  could  study  at  his  leisure  Halleck's  Art  of  War  as  illus- 
trated by  Grant  before  Vicksburg. 

We  have  no  tears  to  shed  over  the  fall  of  McClernand. 
He  was  really  the  author  of  all  the  woe  that  befell  us  at 
Vicksburg.  He  first  conceived  of  the  fatal  expedition  down 
the  Mississippi  to  the  bayous  and  swamps  of  that  dreadful 
locality.  After  winning  Lincoln  over  to  the  idiotic  design, 
he  forced,  as  we  have  seen,  Grant  to  abandon  his  campaign 
through  the  center  of  the  State  of  Mississippi  and  move 
eighty  thousand  men  to  a  locality  where  for  six  months  they 
remained  utterly  helpless,  dying  of  malarial  fevers  and 
measles,  small-pox,  and  kindred  diseases.  Without  firing  a 
gun,  the  ten  thousand  men  left  under  Pemberton  to  man  the 
fortifications,  while  thirty  thousand  were  transferred  to 
Bragg's  army — without,  we  say,  doing  aught  but  idly  look- 
ing on  as  they  watched  the  hopeless  canal  digging  and  bayou 
clearing  and  listened  to  the  wail  of  dead  marches,  the  Con- 
federates achieved  a  victory  every  hour  over  these  blind 
leaders  of  the  blind,  who  sent  their  brave  men  down  to  in- 
glorious death.  We  are  content,  therefore,  to  consign  our 
political  general  to  the  obscurity  of  unrecorded  eulogy.  It 
is  not  well,  however,  for  the  man  who  was  neither  an  able 
soldier  nor  a  successful  politician  to  look  down  with  much 
contempt  upon  the  man  who  made  for  him  all  the  gain  to  be 
gathered  from  that  murderous  performance. 

What  the  net-purport  and  upshot  of  half  a  year's  opera- 
tions about  Vicksburg  were  to  the  government  at  Washing- 
ton by  an  army  of  never  less  than  sixty  thousand  men,  can 
be  gathered  from  accounts  made  on  the  4th  of  July,  1863, 
when  the  Confederates  surrendered. 


324  Life  of  Thomas. 

We  took  prisoners  something  over  eighteen  thousand 
men  under  arms.  This  would  give  Pemberton  as  strong  a 
force  when  he  submitted  as  when  he  retreated  into  Vicks- 
burg.  As  his  ranks  were  thinned  by  disease,  and  to  a  small 
extent  by  casualties  in  the  defense,  it  is  not  to  be  supposed 
that  his  force  increased  or  even  remained  stationary.  The 
general  commanding  consulted  his  interest  by  counting  the 
rations  issued  to  the  surrendered.  As  the  city  of  Yicksburg 
was  in  the  most  sore  distress  as  to  food,  the  starving  inhab- 
itants were  included  in  the  number  provided  for,  so  General 
Grant,  never  nice  when  it  came  to  a  question  involving  credit 
to  himself,  was  enabled  to  swell  the  number  of  his  pension- 
ers to  any  figure  he  cared  to  make. 

He  gained,  let  us  admit,  eighteen  thousand  men. 

For  these,  we  lost,  from  the  time  the  army  under  Sher- 
man left  Memphis  on  this  fatal  Chickasaw  slaughter  until  the 
surrender  on  the  4th  of  July,  in  casualties  of  killed  and 
wounded,  from  men  missing  and  taken  prisoners,  exclusive 
of  the  many  thousands  who  died  from  disease,  11,28.9  men. 

And  when  at  last,  with  this  fearful  showing  of  loss  in 
money  and  in  life,  we  took  the  place,  it  was  of  no  advantage — 
no  use  whatever  to  our  government.  All  the  months  that 
Grant  was  studying  how  to  get  away  from  Vicksburg  save 
by  a  return  to  Memphis,  and  had  his  army  dying  like  dis- 
eased sheep  in  digging  canals  and  struggling  through  im- 
passable bayous,  the  war  went  on.  It  all  swept  by  him.  The 
importance  of  the  Mississippi  was  lost  in  the  advance  of 
Rosecrans  upon  Chattanooga,  our  great  objective  point  of 
the  war. 

Looking  back  now  to  these  strangely  unrecorded  facts, 
we  feel  ashamed  to  know  that  victories  were  so  rare  with  us, 
that  we  were  willing  to  accept  this  capture  of  eighteen 
thousand  men  by  eighty  thousand,  with  all  the  bloody  disas- 
ters that  accompanied  the  campaign,  as  a  great  triumph,  and 
out  of  its  incompetent  leader  construct  a  grotesque  great- 
ness that  would  be  laughable,  were  it  not  such  a  melancholy 
disgrace.  It  is  hard  for  us  as  a  people  that  the  history  of  the 
Vicksburg  hero  can  not  be  left  to  the  political  organization 


Eighty  Thousand  Capture  Eighteen  Thousand.          825 

that  made  of  him  a  political  quantity.  In  that  case,  we  need 
never  fear  that  the  truth  might  rear  its  ghastly  head  and  put 
to  record  the  facts  that  make  one  shudder  to  read.  But,  un- 
fortunately, this  faction  that  sought  to  make  Grant's  life  a 
private,  sacred,  confidential  subject,  is  but  a  part  of  the 
American  people,  and  at  least  one-half  of  our  population  is 
uot  prepared  to  cover  his  nakedness  as  a  politician  with  an 
imaginary  mantle  of  military  glory.  The  cold,  impartial 
hand  of  history,  inscribing  facts  for  the  English  speaking 
world  and  all  the  civilized  peoples  of  the  earth,  will  not  be 
influenced  in  reading  the  record  by  the  little  faction  that  has 
an  impure  motive  for  its  extravagant  fictions. 


326  Life  of  Thomas. 


CHAPTER  XV. 

Preparations  for  the  Advance  on  Chattanooga— Concentration  and  Forti- 
fication of  Supplies— Impatience -of  the  War  Department  at  the  Delay — 
Re-inforcements  and  Supplies  forwarded  Reluctantly — Treachery  to 
Rosecrans  in  his  Chief  of  Staff— Testing  the  Front  of  the  Enemy — 
Training  Raw  Recruits  into  Veterans. 

It  is  a  great  relief  to  turn  from  the  dreary  record  of  dis- 
aster found  in  the  half  year's  burials  about  Vicksburg  to  the 
history  of  a  campaign  where  the  fortunes  of  the  Republic 
were  carried  to  the  front  in  a  succession  of  victories  that  had 
a  great  objective  for  a  purpose.  We  pass  from  petty  jeal- 
ousies, mean  ambitions  and  selfish  indulgence  to  the  more 
elevated  plane  and  purer  atmosphere  ever  found  about  George 
H.  Thomas  and  William  S.  Rosecrans.  We  left  the  great 
leaders  after  the  victory  at  Stone  river  making  active  prepa- 
rations for  a  move  of  a  mighty  army  upon  Chattanooga,  the 
rugged  gate-way  of  the  South,  the  possession  of  which 
would  be  the  fall  of  the  Confederacy.  The  most  important 
part  of  this  preparation  was  to  gather  at  Murfreesboro  sup- 
plies sufficient  to  support  an  army  for  at  least  a  year.  We 
have  seen  how  Grant,  making  the  same  preparations,  left  his 
supplies  at  Holly  Springs  under  gua-rd  of  a  man  who  had  been 
proven1  a  miserable  coward  and  won  death  by  hanging  in  his 
loss  of  four  millions  of  supplies  provided  the  general  plac- 
ing him  in  command  was  promptly  cashiered.  General 
Rosecrans  took  no  chances.  Strongly  posting  his  army  so 
as  to  cover  all  approaches  from  "the  enemy,  he  called  a  halt 
first  for  the  purpose  of  repairing  the  railroad  from  Nashville 
to  Murfreesboro,  and  then  to  get  over  such  the  supplies 
necessary  to  justify  an  advance.  While  the  railway  remained 
unavailable  these  supplies,  barely  sufficient  to  support  the 
army  day  by  day,  were  wagoned  over  the  wornout  turnpikes 
and  country  roads.  During  the  delay  incident  to  this  con- 
dition the  depots  at  Murfreesboro,  indeed,  the  town  itself, 


Ignorance  and  Impatience  at  Washington.  327 

was  so  fortified  that  comparatively  speaking  a  small  force 
could  hold  the  place  in  the  absence  of  the  army. 

All  these  preparations  called  for  time,  and  as  time  wore 
on  the  victory  at  Stone  river  seemed  to  lose  its  significance 
at  Washington,  and  anon  inquiries  and  complaints  from  the 
War  Department  were  impatiently  ticked  out  to  head- 
quarters. Rosecrans  after  consultation  with  Thomas  re- 
sponded as  best  he  might.  The  care  of  the  sick  and  wounded 
that  he  reported  for  awhile  seemed  to  allay  irritation,  then 
the  difficulties  attending  the  transportation,  all  given  in  de- 
tail, served  a  like  purpose.  Much  of  this  irritation  came  of 
Secretary  Stanton's  personal  feeling  toward  Rosecrans.  He 
had  no  confidence  in  the  general  and  this  excited  and  deep- 
ened his  hostility.  Rosecrans  would  soon  have  been  re- 
lieved but  for  the  calm  judgment  of  President  Lincoln  and 
the  influence  of  Salmon  P.  Chase.  Again,  to  every  propo- 
sition made  by  the  impatient  Secretary  of  War  looking  to 
the  removal  of  Rosecrans  came  the  question  from  the  Pres- 
ident, "  Well,  who  will  we  put  in  command?"  There  was 
but  one  response  to  this,  that  came  in  the  name  of  Thomas. 
The  President's  one  answer  invariably  was,  "  Let  the  Vir- 
ginian wait."  Lincoln  did  not  know  that  the  Virginian  was 
the  only  officer  in  his  armies  who  could  afford  to  wait. 

After  a  time  the  lack  of  confidence  at  Washington,  felt 
especially  in  the  War  Department,  began  to  cripple  the  Army 
of  the  Cumberland.  While  necessary  supplies  were  forwarded 
grudgingly,  the  necessary  reinforcements,  not  to  fill  out  the 
thinned  ranks  of  old  regiments  which  during  the  entire  war 
was  never  done,  but  to  keep  the  force  at  the  number  consid- 
ered necessary  for  the  campaign,  were  actually  denied  the 
general  commanding.  It  seems  strange,  looking  back  now 
at  the  military  events  of  that  day,  to  see  how  infatuated 
the  authorities  were  at  Washington.  To  the  armies  on  the 
right  and  left  of  our  center  the  department  actually  antici- 
pated demands.  Men  and  supplies  were  hurried  forward 
without  question  or  complaint.  And  yet  all  the  efforts  of 
the  Potomac  were  purposeless,  ending  in  blood  and  with  one 
exception  disaster,  while  the  army  at  Vicksburg  was,  to  use 
Grant's  words  in  reference  to  General  Butler,  "  completely 


328  Life  of  Thomas. 

bottled  up."  The  false  assertion  in  the  shape  of  a  complaint 
was  made,  and  it  has  its  echo  to-day,  that  Rosecrans  by  his 
inactivity  enabled  the  Confederates  to  send  troops  from  his 
front  to  reinforce  Pemberton  and  Lee.  We  now  know  that 
the  reverse  was  the  truth.  We  have  seen  that  the  moment 
the  authorities  at  Richmond  learned  that  Grant's  army  was 
in  the  swamps  before  Vicksburg,  they  withdrew  thirty  thou- 
sand troops  from  Pemberton's  command  to  strengthen  Bragg. 
They  saw  that  with  the  Mississippi  in  possession  of  our  gov- 
ernment above  Vicksburg  and  below  Port  Hudson  these  two 
points  had  lost  much  if  not  all  their  significance.  The  fate 
of  empire,  so  far  as  the  South  was  concerned,  rested  on 
the  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  that  if  successful  would  make 
Virginia  untenable.  To  conquer  and  hold  Chattanooga  was 
to  flank  the  army  under  Lee  and  confine  all  that  was  left  of 
the  war  to  the  cotton  states. 

The  eulogist  of  Abraham  Lincoln,  not  content  with  the 
real  greatness  all  his  own,  now  are  claiming  for  him  that 
he  was  possessed  of  the  best  military  mind  on  the  side  of  our 
government.  How  preposterous  this  claim  is  a  few  indis- 
putable facts  prove  beyond  question.  When  General 
Thomas  proposed  his  advance  into  East  Tennessee  with 
Chatanooga  as  the  objective  point,  the  military  importance 
of  the  campaign  was  lost  on  him.  He  only  saw  the  loyal 
citizens  of  that  region,  and  sanctioned  the  movement  on 
their  account.  All  the  talk  to  him  of  thereby  flanking  the 
armed  Confederacy  and  so  selecting  our  own  line  of  advance 
was  as  much  uncomprehended  as  if  it  had  been  given  in 
Greek  or  Latin.  In  his  subsequent  enterprise  with  McClel- 
lan  while  urging  an  approach  on  Richmond  from  the  interior 
he  could  not  see  that  he  was  accepting  the  road  offered  us 
by  the  enemy,  where  the  mountain  ranges  and  numerous 
rivers  made  so  many  impregnable  fortifications  to  be  carried 
by  assaults.  We  have  seen  that  he  listened  to  McClernand 
and  sanctioned  that  descent  of  the  Mississippi  which  carried 
with  it  Grant's  army  and  buried  ninety  thousand  brave  men 
in  unhonored  graves.  The  only  comment  he  could  give 
after  the  capture  of  Vicksburg  in  his  congratulatory  order 
was  that  "the  Father  of  Waters  now  rolled  its  waves  un- 


Lincoln  as  a  General.  329 

vexed  to  the  sea."  The  military  significance  of  this  political 
sentence  remains  to  this  day  a  mystery.  Why  the  Father  of 
Waters  should  be  vexed  by  one  side  or  the  other  makes  a 
proposition  quite  beyond  solution  by  the  common  mind. 
President  Lincoln  so  far  as  he  was  concerned  had  but  one 
thought  and  that  was  the  conquest  of  territory.  There  was 
a  political  significance  to  this  that  blinded  him  to  the  fact 
that  the  title  to  all  the  Confederate  territory  was  carried  as 
Wendell  Phillips  tersely  expressed  it  at  the  bow  of  Lee's 
saddle.  Common  sense  should  have  taught  him  that  when 
he  conquered  the  armies  of  the  Confederacy  he  repossessed 
himself  of  all  the  territory  lost.  It  was  this  infatuation  that 
opened  his  ears  to  Governors  Morton  and  Johnson  and  drove 
one  of  the  most  capable  of  our  generals,  Don  Carlos  Buell, 
from  the  service.  The  fact  is,  that  President  Lincoln  knew 
BO  little  about  how  to  conduct  the  war  that  he  -feebly  left  the 
entire  business  to  West  Point,  when  he  could  as  well  have 
given  it  to  an  orphan  asylum  or  a  medical  college.  While 
impregnated  as  his  entire  cabinet  was  with  a  contempt  of 
the  military  mind  he  yet  permitted  that  mind  in  its  feeblest 
form  to  dominate  the  field. 

Recognizing  these  facts,  one  is  not  surprised,  much  as  one 
may  be  disgusted,  to  read  the  correspondence  carried  on  by 
telegraph  and  mail  between  the  War  Department  and  head- 
quarters at  Murfreesboro  during  the  half  year  of  preparations 
that  preceded  the  advance  on  Chattanooga.  The  ill-concealed 
contemptuous  impatience  on  one  side,  the  pleadings  on  the 
other  for  reinforcements  and  supplies  that  ignore  the  snubs 
and  insults,  make  any  thing  but  pleasant  reading  to  a  just 
mind.  Nothing  but  the  presence  and  influence  of  General 
Thomas  prevented  the  fiery  Rosecrans  from  throwing  his 
commission  in  the  face  of  Stanton.  In  the  great  work  be- 
fore them  Thomas  would  permit  no  irritation  however  just 
to  interfere.  "  Our  government  is  struggling  under  a  heavy 
weight  that  we  in  the  field  have  no  knowledge  of,"  he  was 
wont  to  say  to  the  writer  of  this.  "  We  must  take  it  for 
granted  that  they  are  doing  all  in  their  power  meet  our 
demands." 

Again  :  "  The  War  Department  is  impatient  of  this  ap- 


330  Life  of  Thomas. 

parent  delay  on  our  part.  It  is  to  be  regretted  some  one 
the  Secretary  and  President  have  confidence  in  is  not  sent 
here  to  learn  and  report  the  actual  condition.  We  can 
not  move  from  our  base  of  supplies  until  this  place  is  ren- 
dered secure.  It  would  not  only  be  the  loss  of  millions  in 
money,  but  the  loss  of  our  army." 

Again  :  "  I  am  satisfied  and  they  are  right  at  Washing- 
ton. Bragg  has  no  larger  force  than  we  have,  but  they  do 
not  note  that  he  is  acting  on  the  defensive  and  can  select 
his  line  of  defense  so  as  to  more  than  double  the  effective- 
ness of  his  resistance.  That  stand  at  Duck  river  is  far  bet- 
ter than  his  on  Stone  river  and  we  all  know  what  that  was." 

He  believed  that  Rosecrans  was  in  error  when  he  at- 
tributed the  neglect  under  which  the  Army  of  the  Cum- 
berland suffered  to  Secretary  Stanton's  personal  prejudice. 
He  could  not  'be  made  to  accept  such  weakness  in  a  man  he 
recognized  as  not  only  a  great  man  but  a  true  and  earnest 
patriot.  General  Thomas  was  altogether  right  in  his  esti- 
mate of  the  great  War  Secretary,  but  he  forgot  that  we  have 
disturbing  spots  on  the  sun,  and  human  experience  has  taught 
us  that  errors  go  with  virtues  in  great  characters  and  have 
equal  strength. 

Had  General  Rosecrans  to  contend  only  with  the  open 
hostility  of  the  ill-tempered  Secretary  Stanton,  he  would 
have  been,  however  uncomfortable,  at  least  safe.  But  he 
suffered  from  a  treachery  unknown  to  him  at  the  time,  a 
treachery  that  brought  misfortune  to  him  in  the  end,  and  to- 
day makes  popular  belief  which  we  are  pleased  to  call  his- 
tory. In  brief,  the  history  of  this  infamous  affair  is  as  fol- 
lows :  On  the  death  of  the  gallant  Garesche,  General  Rose- 
crans' chief  of  staff,  General  Garfield,  then  out  of  employ 
and  seeking  work,  got  Secretary  Chase  to  solicit  Rosecrans 
to  ask  for  Garfield.  One  fault  with  Rosecrans  was  his 
anxiety  to  stand  well  with  the  government  at  Washington. 
Bitter  experience  had  taught  the  inconvenience,  to  use  the 
mildest  term,  of  operating  without  such  confidence.  We 
have  seen  how  he  put  General  McCook  in  command  of  his 
right  wing  to  placate  Stanton,  and  on  this  suggestion  he  at 
once  asked  for  Garfield.  He  did  this  against  his  own  judg- 


Garfield's   Unfaithfulness.  331 

merit,  not  that  he  had  aught  against  Garfield  personally,  but 
Rosecrans  had  West  Point  as  a  superstition,  and  Garfield 
was  direct  from  civil  life.  However,  it  was  a  life-long  habit 
of  Garfield  to  make  a  study  of  any  pursuit  he  contemplated 
adopting,  and  Rosecrans  was  delighted  to  find  his  new  and 
very  entertaining  chief  of  staff  well  up  in  all  that  West 
Point  taught,  or  rather  trained  for.  Rosecrans  was  remark- 
able for  the  easy  way  in  which  he  put  aside  the  cares  of  his 
occupation  and  found  relief  in  talks  about  war,  religion, 
science,  literature,  and  politics.  He  soon  learned  that  his 
chief  of  staff  was  a  most  fascinating  conversationalist. 
Without  being  either  deep  or  original,  Garfield  had  a  most 
suggestive  mind,  and  although  brought  up  on  the  tow-path 
of  a  canal,  there  was  enough  of  courtier  to  make  him  win 
the  confidence  of  a  superior  in  place  by  a  sympathizing  list- 
ening to  his  superior's  views.  The  position  of  chief  of  staff 
gave  Garfield  the  full  official  confidence  of  his  general.  In 
addition  to  this,  he  was  soon  incited  to  partake  of  the  per- 
sonal as  well.  The  consequence  of  all  this  was  an  infamy 
upon  the  part  of  James  A.  Garfield  that  one  contemplates 
with  deepest  grief  and  horror.  General  Garfield,  when  he 
asked  Secretary  Chase  to  intercede  in  his  behalf,  knew  that 
Resecraus  had  but  one  active  influential  friend  at  Washing- 
ton, and  that  friend  Garfield  sought  to  poison  against  him. 
In  the  ugliest  period  of  impatient  complaint  at  the  War  De- 
partment, when  Secretary  Chase  was  called  continually  to 
defend  his  pet  general,  Rosecrans,  our  chief  of  staff,  made 
such  by  Chase,  volunteered  a  private,  confidential  letter,  in 
which  he  expressed  without  qualification  his  lack  of  con- 
fidence in  Rosecrans  as  a  military  man.  Fortunately  for 
Rosecrans,  Chase,  possessed  of  little  knowledge  of  human 
nature,  suffered  from  that  complaint  common  to  that  class 
of  attributing  a  selfish  motive  for  every  evil  deed,  and  he 
jumped  to  the  erroneous  conclusion  that  Garfield  was  anx- 
ious to  displace  Rosecrans  so  that  he  might  occupy  his  position. 
The  eminent  Secretary  read  between  the  lines,  as  he  thought, 
and  saw  the  mean,  selfish  face  of  a  snake  striking  from  a 
cover  at  an  honest,  capable  man.  He  refused  to  accept  the 
letter  as  true,  and  not  only  became  more  active  in  his  ad- 


332  Life  of  Thornm. 

vocacy  of  his  friend,  but  he  put  the  letter  on  file  for  future 
use.  The  use  came  after  his  death  in  its  publication.  It 
crumbles  the  base  from  beneath  the  fame  of  the  "  Martyr 
President,"  and  one  reads  on  the  face  that  the  hand  of 
Ward  sought  to  idealize  the  mean,  treacherous  letter  from 
Garfield  to  Chase. 

To  render  unto  Satan  that  which  is  Satan's,  we  must 
say  that  Secretary  Chase  was  in  error  as  to  the  motive  he 
attributed  to  Garfield.  Garfield  was  ambitious  enough. 
Painfully  full  of  self-distrust,  his  inordinate  ambition  drove 
him  on  to  positions  that  when  attained  he  hastened  to  turn 
over  to  others,  as  when  elected  President  he  gave  his  ad- 
ministration into  the  hands  of  Blaine,  and  himself  to  death. 
This  was  the  extent  of  his  martyrdom.  He  died  a  victim  to 
his  self-distrust.  He  would  not  have  hesitated  accepting  the 
place  made  vacant  by  Rosecrans,  and  he  would  have  turned 
the  army  over  to  Thomas,  contenting  himself  with  being  its 
figurehead.  But  Garfield  was  no  fool.  He  knew  that  con- 
stituted as  the  administration  was  it  was  impossible  for  a 
volunteer  officer  to  vault  into  such  a  responsibility.  West 
Point  ruled  in  all  promotions  and  Garfield  could  as  well  have 
asked  for  the  trumpet  of  the  arch-angel  as  for  an  independ- 
ent command. 

General  Gartield,  in  joining  the  Army  of  the  Cumber- 
land, had  made  an  acquaintance  who  ranked  Rosecrans  in  his 
love  and  admiration  and  that  was  General  George  H.  Thomas. 
He  knew  how  Chase  and  Stanton  regarded  this  strangely 
silent  man,  and  he  was  satisfied  that  to  make  room  for  one 
he  so  admired  it  was  only  necessary  to  remove  Rosecrans. 
He  set  about  this  work  in  the  manner  common  to  his  nature. 
An  open  attack  on  his  general  would  only  have  served  to 
throw  the  chief  of  stafi"  out  of  employ.  To  some  minds 
there  is  no  warfare  worthy  of  a  subtle,  intellectual  charac- 
ter, but  one  of  strategem  based  on  treachery.  A  frank,  open 
attack  is  simply  brutal  in  its  simplicity.  Garfield  reminds 
one  of  the  Turkish  Sultan  who  being  given  enough  money 
to  liquidate  his  debts  spent  it  all  in  bribing  his  creditors 
without  reducing  the  indebtedness.  Why  he  should  prefer 
Thomas  to  Rosecrans  is  sufficiently  clear.  He  not  only 


Thomcu  Training  His  Troops.  333 

found  Thomas  a  more  congenial  man  in  his  attainments, 
depth  of  thought  and  originality  of  views,  but  he  felt  assured 
that  under  Thomas  the  army  that  carried  both  the  fate  of  the 
Republic  and  the  fortunes  of  Garfield  would  be  certain  of  a 
glorious  success.  He  sought  to  be  the  king-maker,  and  bur- 
rowing under  Rosecrans,  deposited  the  dynamite  that  only 
exploded  years  after  to  his  own  injury. 

The  six  months'  delay  at  Murfreesboro  was  utilized  by 
General  Thomas  in  training  and  disciplining  his  men.  He 
not  only  took  the  supply  departments  in  his  own  hands,  and 
satisfied  the  rank  and  file  that  their  wants  were  considered 
with  loving  care — so  much  so  that  he  came  to  be  called 
"  Pap  "  Thomas — but  the  training  was  limited  to  the  actual 
demands  of  the  service. 

"  Most  of  these  tactics  were  gotten  up  for  show,"  he 
would  say,  "  and  are  something  worse  than  useless,  for  we 
waste  time  on  what  are  as  unnecessary  in  actual  war  as  a 
dancing-school  would  be.  By  simplifying  the  movements 
to  the  actual  demand  of  the  service  we  have  full  time  to 
make  veterans." 

Again  :  "  What  splendid  material  we  have  for  soldiers  ! 
The  adaptibility  of  the  American  character  is  something 
amazing.  It  is  not  that  I  can  order  a  regiment  to  build  a 
bridge,  repair  a  locomotive  or  rebuild  a  railroad — that  comes 
of  the  mechanics  who  sought  service — but  the  rawest  re- 
cruit becomes  an  efficient  soldier  iu  thirty  days." 

Again :  "  The  solution  of  the  vexed  question  as  to  how 
we  may  have  an  army  under  a  republic,  is  solved  by  the 
French  axiom,  '  Soldiers  on  duty,  comrades  when  off*.'  This 
is  attainable  with  us  because  of  the  good  common  sense  of 
our  men.  The  trouble,  indeed,  is  not  with  the  men  so  much 
as  with  officers.  It  is  too  common  with  the  last  to  believe 
that  they  can  maintain  discipline  and  enhance  their  own  dig- 
nity by  degrading  the  men.  This  may  do  with  Europeans, 
but  is  not  possible  with  Americans.  While  stern  and  exact- 
ing in  the  line  of  service  when  on  duty  the  officer  can  be  the 
comrade  when  off  without  any  loss  to  the  service  or  the  official 
dignity.  I  am  naturally  reserved  and  have  found  it  difficult 
to  be  on  familiar,  easy  terms  with  my  men.  I  have  envied  my 


334  Life  of  Thomas. 

fellow-officers  their  tact  in  this  respect,  but  in  all  the  efforts  I 
have  made  I  have  never  suffered  loss  from  them.  We  owe 
this  to  the  intelligence  of  our  Americans.  I  said  to  a  ser- 
geant, the  only  man  left  in  command  of  two  guns  at  Stone 
river,  who,  of  course,  was  about  getting  away,  *  I  want  you 
to  save  these  pieces,  my  good  fellow.'  He  reported  to  me 
that  night  that  the  guns  were  right  where  I  saw  them,  only 
he  '  shoved  'em  round.'  The  good  fellow  did  not  seem  to 
think  he  had  accomplished  any  thing  extraordinary,  for  when 
I  made  him  a  lieutenant  he  hesitated  about  accepting  as  he 
preferred  remaining  with  the  boys,  but  took  it  on  the  ground 
that  it  would  enable  him  to  run  home  and  see  the  old 
woman." 

General  Thomas  loved  his  men,  took  great  delight  in 
studying  their  nature  and  was  full  of  anecdotes  about  their 
ways  and  character.  It  was  at  Murfreesboro  that  he  had  an 
earnest  appeal  from  a  private  for  a  furlough.  The  man 
said,  as  if  the  saying  concluded  the  argument:  "I  aint  seen 
my  old  woman,  general,  for  four  months." 

"And  I,"  replied  Thomas,  "  have  not  seen  mine  for  two 
years — if  your  general  can  submit  to  such  privation  surely  a 
private  can." 

"  Don't  know  about  that,  general,  you  see  me  and  my 
wife  ain't  made  that  way." 

There  was  nothing  more  fascinating  than  the  face  of 
General  Thomas  when  it  broke  into  a  smile.  In  this  it  was 
winning  because  of  the  frank  expression  that  told  one  that 
it  was  more  than  lip  deep  and  came  from  the  heart.  His 
laugh  was  of  the  same  sort,  not  loud  but  musical  in  its 
brief,  hearty  enjoyment.  The  rarity  of  the  expression  made 
them  in  their  surprise  all  the  pleasanter.  The  general's 
seriousness  was  ever  sweet.  His  religious  nature,  although 
earnest  and  deep,  was  not  austere.  It  affected  his  entire 
life,  however. 

"  I  can  not  see,"  he  said,  "  how  a  man  can  be  an  infidel 
and  remain  a  brave  man.  Belief  in  God  is  like  confidence  in 
one's  general,  it  holds  us  to  the  front.  We  feel  that  the 
power  above  has  a  wise  design  in  making  us  face  the  deadly 
peril.  I  doubt  whether  any  sane  mind  ever  does  positively 


Effective  Preparations  for  Advance.  335 

disbelieve.  One  may  have  painful  doubts,  for  we  are  brought 
continually  face  to  face  with  mysterious  and  apparent  contra- 
dictions, but  back  and  above  all  these,  we  feel  that  there  is 
an  overruling  power  ever  wise  and  ever  just." 

All  of  the  many  months  of  delay  at  Murfreesboro,  while 
the  general  commanding  was  laboring  night  and  day  in 
gathering  supplies  and  rendering  the  stores  safe  from  raids, 
General  Thomas  was  as  actively  and  earnestly  employed  in 
organizing  the  center,  and  not  only  drilling  so  continuously 
that  the  troops  grew  into  veterans,  but  seeing  that  their 
food,  tents,  clothes  and  arms  were  of  the  best,  so  that  when 
the  army  came  to  move  he  had  one  under  his  immediate  com- 
mand that  was  invincible.  Elsewhere  throughout  the  war  we 
search  in  vain  for  a  body  of  men  that  never  knew  defeat;  we 
search  in  vain  for  one  to  whom  a  victory  would  not  be  a 
casualty.  The  Army  of  the  Cumberland  swung,  its  eagles 
through  the  smoke  of  battle  to  assured  victory,  and  was  the 
first  body  of  men  to  teach  the  veterans  under  Longstreet 
that  the  Rock  of  Chickamauga  was  more  firm  and  immovable 
than  the  stone-walls  that  came  of  Jackson. 

General  Rosecrans  well  knew  that  the  day  he  withdrew 
his  army  from  along  the  line  of  railroad  which  the  troops 
protected — and  this  duty  called  for  an  army — the  Confed- 
erate raiders  would  seize  upon  and  destroy  this,  the  only 
line  of  supply.  In  view  of  this,  these  fortifications  were 
made  accordingly  heavy.  They  could  resist  successfully  an 
army  of  fifty  thousand  men.  No  such  force  tried  conclusions 
with  these  earthworks,  but  as  we  will  see  they  made  the  ad- 
vance possible,  and  not  only  gave  security  to  the  millions 
worth  of  stores  where  collected,  but  served  to  keep  open  the 
line  between  Murfreesboro  and  the  advancing  army.  The 
contempt  openly  expressed  at  the  War  Department  was  of 
course  discouraging,  and  kept  the  general  commanding  in 
hourly  expectation  of  an  order  relieving  him.  That  such 
would  have  greeted  him  we  now  know  but  for  the  fact  that 
Generals  McCook  and  Thomas  earnestly  approved  of  all  the 
preparations  made. 

By  order  of  the  War  Department  the  army  was  re- 
organized 9th  January,  1863,  by  a  formation  into  three  army 


336  Life  of  Thomas. 

corps,  designated  as  Fourteenth,  Twentieth  and  Twenty-first, 
and  as  this  corresponded  to  the  old  Right,  Left  and  Center, 
the  same  commanders  were  left  as  they  were.  In  the  same 
month  a  notable  event  occurred  in  transferring  General 
James  B.  Steedman  to  Rosecrans'  command.  On  the  25th  of 
January,  by  order  of  the  War  Department,  Forts  Henry  and 
Donelson  were  transferred  to  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland. 
This  put  the  river  under  immediate  control  of  General  Rose- 
crans, a  proper  disposal  of  that  stream,  as  it  was  one  of  the 
two  lines  of  supply  afforded  his  army. 

The  Confederates  learning  of  the  delay  and  the  purpose 
of  our  army  at  Murfreesboro  felt  at  liberty  to  organize  a  cav- 
alry raid  to  our  rear.  All  the  cavalry  of  Wheeler,  Forrest 
and  Wharton,  under  command  of  General  Wheeler,  suddenly 
appeared  at  Triune.  General  Wheeler  was  one  of  the  bright- 
est stars  in  the  galaxy  of  well-remembered  cavalry  officers 
of  the  South  of  a  force  that  was  so  brilliant  and  so  brief. 
But  the  South  had  no  more  a  store  of  horses  to  draw  upon 
than  it  had  a  population  of  laborers.  Both  were  soon  ex- 
hausted. This  expedition  of  Wheeler's  was  not  fortunate. 
At  Triune  in  our  rear  he  awakened  to  the  fact  that  a  superior 
body  as  to  numbers  of  cavalry  was  in  his  rear  under  Generals 
Davis  and  Steedman.  At  Rover,  Colonel  Minty,  of  Davis' 
command,  captured  a  regiment  of  three  hundred  and  fifty 
men.  Wheeler  eluded  the  infantry  and  cavalry  that  at  one 
time  seemed  to  have  him  surrounded  and  suddenly  appeared 
before  Dover,  Tennessee.  Colonel  A.  C.  Harding  held  this 
fort  with  seven  hundred  men,  and  although  amazed  at  the 
sudden  and  unexpected  appearance  of  a  large  force  made 
such  a  gallant  resistance  to  Wheeler's  repeated  attacks  that 
Wheeler  was  repulsed  with  a  loss  of  two  hundred  killed, 
six  hundred  wounded  and  one  hundred  captured.  Colonel 
Harding  lost  but  thirteen  killed,  fifty  wounded  and  twenty 
captured.  Wheeler  in  the  face  of  this  disaster  intended  con- 
tinuing the  attack,  but  that  night  several  gun- boats  convey- 
ing transports  laden  with  reinforcements  for  Rosecrans' 
army  arrived  at  Fort  Donelson  and/  Wheeler  withdrew. 
Every  effort  was  made  to  intercept  and  capture  this  bold 


The  Arrival  of  Recruits.  337 

raider,  but  in  vain.  He  succeeded  afterward  in  riding  across 
Duck  river  at  Centerville. 

The  force  that  appeared  February  2,  1863,  at  Donelson 
and  warned  off  Wheeler  called  itself  the  Array  of  Kentucky, 
under  the  general  command  of  Gordon  Granger,  then  at 
Louisville.  From  Fort  Donelson  this  force  continued  by 
boat  to  Nashville,  where  it  was  augmented  by  two  regiments 
of  infantry  and  four  of  cavalry,  and  numbered  when  thus 
increased  fourteen  thousand  men.  They  were  mostly  raw 
recruits,  however.  All  reinforcements  to  the  Union  army 
came,  as  we  have  seen,  in  this  form.  No  recruits  were  ever 
forwarded  to  fill  out  and  make  part  of  regiments  deciminated 
by  loss  in  the  service.  There  was  official  patronage  in  the 
less  efficient  means  found  in  the  formation  of  new  regiments. 
In  every  regiment  thus  newly  created  there  was  a  host  of 
office-seekers,  men  engaged  in  enlisting  others  in  the  hopes 
that  they,  the  volunteer  agents  for  recruits,  would  be  elected 
officers.  In  this  way  our  army  continued  hindered  to  the 
last  in  reaping  the  advantage  that  came  of  experience  in  the 
service. 

It  is  remembered  that  this  force  approaching  Nashville 
by  the  river  struck  a  chill  through  the  disloyal  element  of 
that  historic  town.  The  river  is  narrow,  deep  and  tortu- 
ous, so  that  to  those  looking  on  from  the  banks  the  crowded 
transports  with  the  gayly  uniformed  recruits  with  their 
bands  filling  the  air  with  martial  music  while  silken  ban- 
ners not  yet  torn  by  shot  nor  stained  with  blood  floated  in 
the  sunny  air,  made  such  a  contrast  to  the  half-starved,  rag- 
ged veterans  under  Johnston,  that  had  almost  doubled-quick 
from  a  protection  of  the  town,  that  the  Confederate  heart 
was  made  sick. 

The  lesson  taught  the  Confederacy  by  such  exhibits 
of  great  resources  on  the  part  of  the  Union  was  lost  on  us. 
The  wanton  destruction  of  life  and  material  on  our  side  by  a 
government  hopelessly  at  sea  in  a  knowledge  of  war  and  the 
inflated  eqauletted  nonentities  we  set  up  as  generals  very 
nearly  equalized  conditions  ere  the  war  came  to  a  close. 
Both  of  our  financial  and  military  systems  were  trembling 
22 


338  Life  of  Thomas. 

on  the  verge  of  utter  ruin  when  the  Confederacy  suddenly 
went  down  from  the  same  causes  only  a  few  days  in  advance. 
When  Richmond  was  lost  and  Lee's  army  surrendered  Jeffer- 
son Davis  pleaded  with  the  leaders  with  tears  in  his  eyes  to 
continue  the  struggle,  for  he  knew  even  in  their  despair  the 
cause  was  on  the  eve  of  success.  He  knew  how  the  giant 
foe  had  wasted  resources,  thrown  away  with  reckless  ex- 
travagance both  men  and  money,  until  in  these  respects 
there  was  small  difference,  but  while  the  South  was  without 
both,  back  of  the  North  was  a  growing  discontent  of  a  dis- 
loyal class,  while  in  Mexico  the  army  of  Napoleon  was  im- 
patient to  move  upon  us,  and  the  combined  fleets  of  France 
and  Russia  were  sailing  silently  to  our  coast.  The  lack  of 
body  to  the  South,  the  absence  of  a  sturdy  class  of  laborers 
which  makes  the  foundations  of  a  state,  was  so  keenly  felt 
that  the  great  Southern  President's  earnest  pleadings  fell  on 
unheeding  ears. 

Wishing  to  ascertain  the  position  and  force  of  the  enemy 
at  his  front,  General  Rosecrans,  on  March  the  4th,  ordered  a 
general  reconnoissance.  The  force  employed  of  all  arms 
numbered  about  five  thousand.  A  movement  was  made 
from  Murfreesboro  on  Rover  by  General  Sheridan  with  four 
brigades  of  infantry  and  Minty's  cavalry.  Colonel  Minty, 
being  in  advance,  attacked.four  hundred  of  the  enemy's  cav- 
alry at  Rover  and  drove  them  back  on  six  hundred  at  Union- 
ville.  He  routed  the  combined  forces,  capturing  fifty  two 
prisoners.  He  joined  Sheridan  at  Eaglesville.  In  the  mean- 
time, General  Steedman,  marching  toward  Chapel  Hill,  met 
and  drove  back  Roddy's  cavalry.  While  these  efforts  were 
being  successfully  made,  General  Gilbert  was  organizing  a 
disaster.  He  sent  Colonel  John  Coburn,  of  the  Thirty-third 
Indiana,  south  of  Franklin  with  instructions  to  form  a  junc- 
tion with  a  column  moving  from  Murfreesboro  toward 
Columbia  and  to  fill  a  train  of  eighty  wagons  with  forage. 
Colonel  Coburn  had  his  own  regiment,  the  Eighty-fifth  In- 
diana, the  Nineteenth  and  Twenty-second  of  Michigan.  To 
this  were  added  six  hundred  cavalrymen  commanded  by 
Colonel  Thomas  J.  Jordon,  making  in  all  two  thousand, 
eight  hundred  and  thirty-seven  men.  Colonel  Coburn,  in  ac- 


An  Unfortunate  Expedition.  339 

cordance  with  hie  instructions  arriving  on  the  4th  at  Spring 
Hill,  divided  his  force,  sending  one-half  to  meet  the  column 
from  Murfreesboro  at  Rally  Hill,  and  the  other  half  toward 
Columbia  with  orders  to  return  that  night  and  form  a 
junction  again  at  Spring  Hill,  unless  the  expected  column 
should  be  met  by  the  force  sent  in  the  direction  of  Rally 
Hill. 

The  cavalry,  marching  in  advance  of  the  infantry,  came 
upon  the  enemy  near  Franklin.  A  lively  skirmish  followed 
that  the  enemy  found  too  severe  because  of  the  rapid  service  of 
Aleshire's  guns,  and  they  retreated  toward  Spring  Hill.  They 
rallied,  however,  at  Thompson's  Station  in  a  strong  position 
sustained  by  other  forces  on  their  left  flank.  Dismounting 
his  men,  Colonel  Jordan  charged  the  enemy  to  find  their 
first  line  a  mere  feint  to  cover  a  yet  stronger  position  on  the 
hills  beyond ;  when  joined  by  Coburn,  the  combined  forces 
were  checked  by  well  directed  artillery  fire  from  both  right 
and  left  flanks.  It  became  evident  that  the  retreat  of  the 
first  line  of  the  enemy  was  to  draw  our  men  into  a  position 
where  they  could  be  enfiladed  from  both  sides.  Coburn  had 
received  assuring  information  the  day  before  and  that  morn- 
ing of  a  superior  force  to  his  own  at  his  front,  and  had  so 
advised  General  Gilbert.  But,  as  he  received  no  reponse  ta 
his  report,  he  determined  to  move  forward  as  he  had  been 
instructed.  That  discretion  we  were  taught  to  know  by  the 
Fitz  John  Porter  court  of  extraordinary  review,  as  lodges  in 
a  subordinate  officer  executing  an  order  on  a  field  the  gen- 
eral commanding  could  not  see,  did  not  effect  the  gallant, 
but  imprudent  Coburn.  He  had  been  ambuscaded,  and,  suf- 
fering wofully  from  cannon  on  the  right  of  him  and  cannon 
on  the  left  of  him,  ordered  a  charge  upon  the  first  named. 
Before  this  could  be  executed,  the  enemy  not  only  disap- 
peared from  the  front,  but  developed  a  large  force  in  the  rear. 
The  gallant  Indianian  did  not  lose  his  head,  although  he  did 
lose  his  little  army.  He  ordered  retreat  when  too  late,  and 
in  twenty  minutes  he  was  forced  to  surrender  thirteen  hun- 
dred men.  Our  loss  in  killed  and  wounded  numbered  forty 
killed  and  one  hundred  and  fifty  wounded.  Our  other 
forces  escaped. 


340  Life  of  Thomas. 

The  Confederates  were  commanded  by  Van  Dorn  and 
Wheeler,  and  it  was  claimed  at  the  time  that  their  combined 
forces  numbered  fifteen  thousand  men.  As  this  would  call 
for  all  the  cavalry  of  Bragg' s  army,  and  as  reconnoissance  in 
force  was  going  on  along  the  entire  front  of  the  Confederate 
army,  it  is  not  likely  that  Coburn  and  Jordan  fought  more 
than  their  own  number.  It  was  a  neat  strategem  planned 
by  Wheeler  that  drove  our  little  force  into  a  position  where 
success  on  our  part  was  simply  impossible. 

While  this  unhappy  skirmish  was  taking  place,  General 
Sheridan  occupied  the  junction  of  the  Chapel  Hill  and  Shel- 
byville  turnpikes,  and  General  Steedman  drove  the  enemy's 
cavalry  under  Roddy  across  Duck  river,  capturing  sixty  men 
and  eighty  horses.  General  Granger,  receiving  news  of 
Colonel  Coburn's  surrender,  ordered  General  Baird's  brigade 
to  occupy  Franklin.  This  force  was  transported  by  rail 
from  Nashville  and  was  followed  immediately  by  General 
Granger  in  person.  March  the  6th,  Colonels  Jones'  and 
Heg's  brigades  drove  the  enemy  from  Middletown,  after 
which  both  brigades  returned  to  Murfreesboro. 

General  Granger  on  the  same  date  brought  forward 
his  cavalry  under  General  Smith,  with  orders  from  head- 
quarters to  make  a  general  co-operative  movement  against 
Van  Dorn  and  Wheeler.  On  the  7th,  General  Sheridan's 
brigade  reached  the  front  at  Franklin,  and  immediatly  after 
.a  brigade  arrived  from  Nashville.  On  the  arrival  of  the  two 
regiments,  the  enemy's  cavalry  that  was  said  to  be  six  thou- 
sand strong  fell  back  to  College  Grove.  On  the  7th  of 
March,  Colonel  Minty  marched  to  Franklin,  and  on  the  9th, 
General  Granger  with  his  own  and  Sheridan's  and  Minty's 
forces  drove  Van  Dorn  from  Spring  Hill.  As  a  part  of  this 
movement,  General  Davis  advanced  from  Salem  to  Eagles- 
ville  to  relieve  General  Steedman's  front  while  General  R. 
S.  Granger  moved  to  his  support.  On  the  10th,  General 
Gordon  Granger  drove  Van  Dorn  across  Rutherford's  Creek 
near  Columbia.  Further  demonstration  was  rendered  im- 
practicable by  the  high  water  that  prevented  the  passage  of 
infantry  and  artillery.  The  main  object  of  this  extended 
and  heavy  reconnoissance  was  obtained.  The  general  com- 


Generals  who  Cared  for  Life.  341 

manding  was  thereby  possessed  of  the  points  at  which  the 
enemy  was  posted  in  force  at  his  front  and  the  space  it 
would  be  necessary  for  him  to  cover  for  the  purpose  of 
flanking  Bragg  out  of  a  position  from  which  he  could  not  be 
driven  by  assault  without  heavy  and  useless  loss. 

We  are  now  dealing  with  generals  whose  knowledge  of 
war  rose  above  inhuman  slaughter  of  their  troops  in  the  face 
of  impregnable  positions.  It  was  a  dangerous  art  of  war. 
We  huve  seen  how  a  most  capable  general,  Don  Carlos  Buell, 
was  relegated  to  the  rear  for  steadily  refusing  to  sacrifice  his 
men  in  hopeless  attacks.  We  have  seen  that  at  times  General 
Buell  carried  this  commendable  quality  to  an  extreme,  but 
this  humane  consideration  met  with  no  approval  at  Wash- 
ington, where  Secretary  Stanton  had  resolved  on  one  mode 
only  of  ending  the  war  in  behalf  of  the  Union,  and  that  was 
by  "attrition,"  which  meant  to  crowd  in  troops  until  the  gi- 
gantic revolt  was  stamped  out.  The  proposition  to  give 
three  men  for  the  enemy's  one  made  the  generals  of  Shiloh, 
Chickasaw  Bluft",  Champion's  Hill,  and  the  two  assaults  on 
Vicksburg  acceptable  at  Washington.  Nothing,  as  we  have 
said,  but  the  approval  of  Thomas  and  McCook  prevented 
Rosecrans  getting  an  early  dismissal.  We  must  remember 
in  this  connection  some  facts  now  clear  to  our  comprehension, 
but  once  obscured  by  the  glare  and  blaze  of  an  armed  con- 
flict, that  our  war  for  the  Union  was  really  being  fought  in 
the  courts  of  Europe,  where  the  smallest  war  power  once 
recognizing  the  Confederacy  could  have  ended  the  strife 
against  us.  Delay  was  fatal.  The  longer  the  war  was  pro- 
tracted, and  the  more  evident  it  became  that  we  could  not 
conquer  the  revolted  states,  the  more  certain  the  recognition 
grew.  The  government  then  at  Washington  wanted  quick, 
heavy  blows,  and,  under  the  circumstances,  the  brutal  butch- 
ers who  would  fight  without  knowing  how  to  fight  were  pre- 
ferred to  abler  men  who  knew  what  preparations  were  nec- 
essary to  make  fighting  available.  In  addition  to  this,  the 
authorities  at  Washington  saw  our  financial  and  military  sys- 
tems rapidly  breaking  down.  It  had  come  to  be  a  mere 
question  of  time  when  volunteering  would  cease  and  the 


342  Life  of  Thomas. 

paper  money  of  the  government  drop  to  the  same  worthless 
level  that  had  overtaken  that  of  the  Confederacy. 

"We  will  consider  the  matter  hereafter,  when  we  reach 
a  point  in  our  record  where  such  consideration  is  more  nec- 
essary to  a  clear  understanding  of  our  hero's  worth  and  serv- 
ices. But,  looking  back  now,  it  is  strange  that  Rosecrans 
was  permitted  to  remain  in  command.  There  is  a  fact  not 
generally  known  that  probably  weighed  heavy  in  his  favor,  and 
this  was  that  General  Rosecrans  was  a  devout  Catholic,  the 
brother  of  Bishop  Rosecrans  and  the  warm  friend  and  asso- 
ciate of  Archbishop  Purcell.  Secretary  Stanton  had  a  kindly 
feeling  for  the  Catholic  Church,  and  President  Lincoln  had 
the  sagacity  to  see,  as  did  Secretaries  Seward  and  Chase,  that 
through  that  element  much  might  be  accomplished  in  Eu- 
rope in  behalf  of  the  Union.  "We  well  know  that  Arch- 
bishop Hughes  was  sent  abroad  by  Mr.  Seward  as  a  diplo- 
matic agent,  while  Archbishop  Purcell  and  his  able  brother, 
Father  Edward,  remaining  loyal  to  the  Union,  were  in  con- 
tinuous and  close  relation  with  President  Lincoln  and  Messrs. 
Chase  and  Stanton,  of  the  cabinet.  Whatsoever  may  have 
been  the  influence  of  this  element,  it  did  not  save  Rosecrans 
from  continual  annoyance  or  from  serious  loss. 

It  was  a  part  of  General  Thomas's  system  of  train- 
ing to  keep  the  raw  volunteer  regiments  that  were  con- 
tinuously poured  in  under  fire  as  much  as  possible  by  skir- 
mishes at  the  front.  This  not  only  inured  them  to  actual 
war,  but  dissipated  the  vague  fear  of  war  that  paralyses  the 
newly  enlisted.  One  learns  from  actual  experience  that  the 
roar  is  out  of  all  proportion  to  the  danger,  that  for  one  man 
killed  there  is  his  weight  of  lead  wasted. 

General  Thomas  seldom  indulged  in  comment — scarcely 
ever  in  criticism — of  his  brother  officers;  but  one  night 
when  he  returned  from  head-quarters,  where  he  had  solicited 
in  vain  permission  to  make  a  demonstration  at  his  front, 
he  said,  with  some  feeling:  "It  is  a  great  error  in  the  gov- 
ernment not  to  supply  us  with  enough  horses  to  enable  us  to 
feel  daily  the  enemy  at  our  front.  It  is  the  best  training  to 
give  our  men,  while  it  gives  us  information  and  the  enemy  a 
healthy  regard  for  us.  McClellan  made  a  grave  mistake  in 


Rosecrans'  Lack  of  Cavalry.  343 

not  skirmishing  every  day  of  the  nine  months  he  was  organ- 
izing at  Washington.  It  was  like  the  poor  woman  who  con- 
sented to  have  her  daughter  learn  to  swim,  but  warned  her 
not  to  go  near  the  water.'* 

General  Rosecrans  recognized  the  weight  of  General 
Thomas's  wishes,  but  the  enemy  had  such  a  heavy  force  of 
cavalry  at  his  front  that  to  attempt  to  skirmish  was  to  invite 
such  a  disaster  as  the  gallant  Colonel  Coburn  suffered.  Gen- 
eral Rosecrans,  therefore,  asked  again  and  again  forhorseson 
which  to  mount  his  infantry  so  as  to  feel  the  enemy  in  force  at 
his  front.  With  nearly  all  of  Pembertoh's  forces  before  him, 
and  even  Lee  refused  reinforcement  that  Bragg's  army  might 
be  strengthened,  he  learned  from  Washington  that  his  ex- 
traordinary delay  was  endangering  our  army  at  Vicksburg 
and  the  Army  of  the  Potomac. 

It  would  have  been  well  for  General  Rosecrans  had  he 
accepted  the  situation,  and  provided  energetically  for  an  ad- 
vance. But  the  continued  success  of  raids  by  Confederate 
cavalry  to  the  rear  of  our  armies  provoked  imitation.  This 
was  stimulated  by  an  event  that  occurred  in  the  latter  part 
of  May.  At  a  dinner  given  to  a  member  of  Congress  by 
General  Rosecrans,  the  law-maker  repeated  a  conversation 
he  had  but  a  short  time  before  with  President  Lincoln.  In 
this  the  President  said :  "  I  can  not  understand  this  difference 
between  rebel  and  Union  soldiers.  We  are  all  of  the  same 
people,  and  our  men  ought  to  march  as  far  and  fast  and  fight 
precisely  the  same  as  the  rebels.  They  make  impudent  raids 
to  the  rear  of  our  armies,  why  can  we  not  teach  them  that 
two  can  play  at  that  game  ?  I  think  the  fault  is  in  our  gen- 
erals. As  soon  as  we  commission  one,  he  sits  down  and  yells 
for  more  men.  He  won't  move,  and  he  will  yell." 

The  President  should  have  been  informed  that  the  fault 
was  with  him,  or  rather  with  his  War  Department,  in  not 
providing  our  armies  in  the  field  with  an  efficient  cavalry. 
While  the  enemy  had  the  finest  in  the  world,  as  long  as  it 
lasted,  we  had  the  worst.  When  the  arm  was  forced  on  it,  it 
was  left  to  volunteers.  Country  lads  born  and  bred  among 
horses  preferred  the  infantry  or  artillery,  while  denizens  of 
towns  who  knew  nothing  about  riding  and  management  of 


344  Life  of  Thomas. 

horses  were  eager  to  enter  that  arm  of  the  service.  The  re- 
sult was  that  the  poor  beast  was  killed  by  ill-usage  in  ninety 
days.  There  was  but  one  gait  known  to  all  the  service  and 
that  was  a  gallop,  or  as  frequently  a  run.  As  for  efficiency, 
it  was  said  that  to  brush  against  one  of  our  mounted  men  was 
to  knock  him  off'  his  horse.  The  officers  accepted  the  situ- 
ation and  the  so-called  cavalry.  Before  the  war  ended  the 
War  Department  seemed  to  see  the  error  of  its  ways,  and  about 
the  time  the  Southern  cavalry  disappeared  our  cavalry  came 
efficiently  to  the  front. 

At  the  time  we  write  of,  while  our  mounted  men  con- 
sisted of  clerks  from  town,  tailors,  hatters  and  shoemakers, 
who  were  thrown  into  the  service  very  much  as  raw  mules 
were  broken  into  army  wagons,  without  instruction  or  train- 
ing, the  young  men  of  the  South,  fond  of  horses  from  their 
birth  and  possessed  of  a  large  body  of  blooded  steeds,  fell  into 
line  as  veterans.  The  dash  that  distinguished  the  Southern 
character  was  as  fatal  to  their  cavalry  as  ignorance  was  to 
ours  In  a  brief  time  of  hard  service  the  beautiful  and  dar- 
ing horsemen  disappeared  never  to  return.  The  South  had 
neither  a  store  of  riders  nor  horses  to  draw  from.  The  fact 
is,  the  entire  people  was  made  up  of  surface.  There  was 
nothing  but  negroes  beneath  on  which  to  build  the  state. 

There  was  another  fact  greatly  affecting  the  situation 
that  President  Lincoln  failed  to  observe.  The  swift  and  de- 
structive cavalry  raids  to  our  rear  were  through  the  enemy's 
country  where  every  man,  woman  and  child  was  a  spy  and 
an  agent  of  information  to  help  on  the  bold  efforts.  This, 
while  our  men,  making  a  feeble  imitation,  had  to  grope  their 
way  through  the  same  land  slowly  and  cautiously  where  ev- 
ery human-being  was  a  plausible  liar  and  every  bush  con- 
cealed a  guerrilla. 

Instead  of  submitting  these  truths  to  a  sensible  Presi- 
dent, General  Rosecrans  undertook  to  gratify  the  speculative 
Chief  Secretary's  hate.  To  this  end  he  organized  an  independ- 
ent force  of  seventeen  hundred  men  and  assigned  Colonel  A. 
D.  Streight  to  its  command.  The  unfortunate  colonel  was 
instructed  to  return  to  Nashville  and  march  out  from  that 
into  Alabama  and  Qeorgia  to  sever  important  lines  of  rail- 


The  Streiyht  Raid.  345 

road  supply  and  destroy  all  property  likely  to  be  of  service 
to  the  enemy.  General  Rosecrans  had  no  horses  with  which 
to  mount  his  independent  command,  so  he  gave  all  the  un- 
serviceable mules  thrown  out  from  the  artillery  and  trans- 
portation service.  The  men  were  therefore  mounted  on  the 
sick,  lame  and  blind  refuse  of  the  camp.  They  were  told, 
however,  to  seize  on  all  the  horses  in  the  enemy's  country 
that  came  in  their  way.  Colonel  Streight  was  a  brave  gen- 
tleman and  did  his  best  to  make  his  forlorn  mount  a  success. 
He  marched  to  Palmyra,  thence  to  Fort  Henry,  improving 
his  animals  by  an  exchange  of  broken-down  mules  for  poor 
horses  of  the  country.  He  embarked  from  Fort  Henry  for 
Eastport,  Mississippi.  Leaving  Eastport  on  the  21st,  he 
reached  Tuscumbia  on  the  24th,  and  moved  thence  on  the 
28th  for  Moulton  at  midnight  of  the  28th.  He  left  Moulton, 
and  passing  through  Day's  Gap  toward  Blountsville.  He 
was  attacked  in  the  rear  while  passing  the  Gap  by  Forrest's 
cavalry.  He  defeated  Forrest,  but  all  the  same  that  daring 
cavalryman  continued  to  harrass  his  rear,  capturing  the 
weary  and  now  helpless  men  by  the  dozens,  for  they  had  so 
damaged  their  ammunition  by  swimming  streams  as  to  ren- 
der it  useless.  This  sort  of  progress  was  made  through 
Blountville  and  Gadsden.  The  desperate  colonel  made  an 
effort  to  put  the  Chattahoochie  river  between  his  sorely 
reduced  force  and  the  pertinacious  Forrest  by  destroying  the 
bridge  at  Rome.  He  failed,  of  course,  and  soon  found  him- 
self and  men  so  surrounded  and  fatigued  that  nothing  was 
left  but  an  ignominious  surrender.  This  occurred  on  the 
3d  of  May.  We  now  learn  that  from  the  start  every  move 
of  the  doomed  force  was  known  to  the  enemy  and  antici- 
pated. For  years  after  the  recuperated  mules  were  shown 
by  the  natives  and  laughed  at.  Instead  of  being  cause  for 
rejoicing  at  Washington  the  unhappy  result  that  had  to  be 
acknowledged  in  the  loss  of  seventeen  hundred  men  went  far 
toward  strengthening  the  enemies  of  General  Rosecrans  in 
the  War  Department. 

The  fighting  along  the  front  continued.  On  the  9th  of 
April,  General  Stanley  was  ordered  to  the  support  of  Gen- 
eral Granger  at  Franklin.  Granger  had  reported  that  he 


346  Life  of  Thomas. 

was  menaced  by  about  nine  thousand  cavalry  and  two  regi- 
ments of  infantry  under  General  Van  Dorn.  There  was  not 
one-half  this  force  threatening  Granger,  who  had  about  five 
thousand  infantry  and  two  thousand  seven  hundred  cavalry. 
Our  infantry  was  strongly  posted  on  the  south  bank  of  Har- 
peth  river,  and  from  the  manner  the  enemy  suffered  in  its 
approach  to  Franklin  from  one  regiment,  the  Forty-first 
Ohio,  that  fought  as  it  fell  back,  it  is  very  evident  we  could 
have  assumed  the  offensive  with  every  prospect  of  success. 
General  Stanley  did  cross  the  river  and  attack  the  enemy  in 
flank,  but  failed  to  follow  up  his  advantage.  As  it  was,  the 
warm  reception  given  him  made  General  Van  Dorn  fall  back 
without  further  demonstration. 

The  continued  employment  of  new  enlisted  men  in  the 
skirmish  line  soon  began  to  tell  in  our  favor.  On  the  20th, 
General  Reynolds,  in  command  of  four  thousand  infantry, 
and  Colonel  Wilder's  mounted  infantry,  numbering  two 
thousand  six  hundred  men,  made  a  reconnoissance  north- 
east and  south-east  from  Murfreesboro.  This  force  de- 
stroyed the  railroad  between  Manchester  and  McMinnville, 
all  the  mills  at  the  last  named  place,  and  one  at  Liberty. 
He  captured  a  large  amount  of  supples,  one  hundred  and 
eighty  prisoners,  over  six  hundred  animals,  and  returned  to 
Murfreesboro  with  the  loss  of  one  man  wounded. 

On  the  27th,  Colonel  Watkins'  cavalry,  marching  from 
Franklin,  surprised  and  captured  the  Texas  Legion  between 
Columbia  and  Carter  Creek  turnpikes,  and  this  within  a  mile 
of  General  Van  Dorn's  main  forces.  One  hundred  and 
eighty  prisoners,  three  hundred  horses  and  mules,  wagons, 
and  all  the  camp  and  garrison  equipage  were  our  spoils  with- 
out the  loss  of  a  man.  Again,  Colonel  Campbell,  in  com- 
mand of  a  brigade  of  cavalry,  moved  out  from  Franklin  on 
the  30th  and  surprised  the  enemy  on  the  Columbia  and 
Jonesboro  turnpikes.  The  loss  to  the  Confederates  was 
fourteen  killed,  twenty-five  wounded,  and  thirteen  captured. 

Again,  General  Stanley  marched  from  Murfreesboro  to 
attack  a  force  encamped  near  Middleboro.  The  general  had 
one  regiment  of  mounted  infantry  with  a  portion  of  General 
Turchin's  cavalry.  Lieutenant  O'Connell,  heading  the  ad- 


Thomas'  Method  of  Teaching  War.  347 

vance,  charged  the  enemy  with  such  success  that  the  little 
conflict  was  over  before  our  main  body  came  up.  General 
Stanley  brought  in  three  hundred  horses  and  seven  hundred 
stand  of  arms. 

We  mention  these  little  affairs  to  show  that  General 
Thomas's  system  of  training  under  fire  was  bearing  fruit. 
"We  have  given  but  few  of  them  and  the  more  important, 
but  the  fighting  along  the  front  was  almost  continuous,  and 
the  entire  army  learned  before  it  was  called  on  to  move  as  an 
army  that  the  supposed  superiority  of  the  Confederates  in 
the  way  of  fighting  was  a  myth.  As  our  men  gained  con- 
fidence, the  Confederates  lost,  so  that  the  morale  so  necessary 
to  success  in  an  armed  force  shifted  from  the  Confederate  side 
to  the  Union  lines,  from  the  fact  that  allowing  largely  for  an 
equality  of  merit  as  brave  men,  our  superior  equipment  gave 
us  largely  the  odds. 

One  night  after  a  daring  exploit  of  a  few  men  had  been 
reported  to  General  Thomas,  he  said  with  a  glow  on  his 
cheeks  and  a  brighter  light  in  his  eyes  :  "  My  men  are  be- 
ing taught  the  art  of  war  in  the  only  school  of  practical  in- 
struction, and  that  is  in  the  field.  All  the  training,  however 
necessary,  is  as  nothing  to  that  training  which  is  done  in  the 
face  of  death.  Put  a  plank  six  inches  wide  and  twelve  feet 
long  five  feet  from  the  ground,  and  a  thousand  men  will 
walk  it  easily.  Lift  that  plank  five  hundred  feet  from  the 
ground,  and  one  man  in  a  thousand  will  walk  it  in  safety. 
It  is  a  question  of  nerve  we  have  to  solve  and  not  of  dex- 
terity. It  is  not  how  to  touch  elbows  and  fire  a  gun ;  it  is 
how  to  touch  elbows  and  fire  a  gun  under  fire.  We  are  all 
cowards  in  the  presence  of  immediate  death.  This  is  the 
law  of  our  being.  It  is  as  necessary  to  keep  the  earth  in- 
habited as  hunger.  We  can  overcome  that  fear  in  war 
through  familiarity.  The  South  came  into  the  field  better 
equipped  in  this  respect  than  the  North,  for  at  the  South 
men  were  more  accustomed  to  violence  and,  therefore,  more 
familiar  with  death.  What  we  have  to  do  is  to  make  vet- 
erans. The  great  error  in  McClellan's  organization  was  in 
his  avoidance  in  fighting.  He  let  that  force  on  Ball's  Bluff 
be  killed  and  captured  while  a  heavy  support  lay  idle  within 


348  Life  of  Thomas. 

the  crack  of  musketry,  for  fear  of  a  general  engagement. 
His  one  congratulatory  report  was  'All  quiet  on  the  Poto- 
mac.' The  result  was  a  loss  of  morale.  Our  troops  came 
to  have  a  mysterious  fear  of  the  enemy." 

Observing  the  attention  given  him,  General  Thomas 
seemed  called  to  himself  and  said  hastily  :  "  Well,  gentle- 
men, we  will  defer  bragging  until  we  capture  Bragg."  This 
was  more  of  a  surprise  than  his  military  comments,  for,  al- 
though the  general  had  a  keen,  yet  delicate,  sense  of  humor, 
he  seldom  indulged  in  it,  and  was  never  known  before  or  since 
to  indulge  in  a  pun.  His  staff  recognized  in  it  a  hasty  re- 
treat from  what  the  general  thought  an  improper  utterance. 

The  telegraphic  correspondence  between  Rosecrans  and 
Halleck  during  the  half  year  of  delay  affords  interesting  in- 
formation, especially  when  taken  in  connection  with  that 
between  Grant  and  Halleck  during  the  same  period.  We 
are  taught  some  of  the  evils  affecting  an  army  organization. 
In  the  process  through  which  a  mass  of  men  is  molded  into 
a  machine  under  control  of  one  mind,  the  individual,  while 
not  entirely  lost,  is  of  necessity  degraded.  When  a  man  be- 
comes a  private,  he  surrenders  for  the  time  being  and  for  the 
purposes  of  the  army  his  right  to  life,  liberty,  and  the  pur- 
suit of  happiness  to  his  superior  officer.  With  the  officer  the 
deprivation  of  these  rights  is  not  so  stringent,  but  the  neces- 
sities of  the  service  call  for  a  weak  submission  that  in  the 
common  mind  breeds  snobbery.  The  higher  officers  are  the 
fountains  of  honor,  and  as  such  become  tin  gods  on  wheels 
to  the  subordinates.  Discipline  demands  blind  obedience, 
but  this  blindness  is  not  so  complete  as  to  deprive  the  sub- 
ordinate of  a  knowledge  where  to  find  the  blind  side  of  his 
commander  and  play  on  it  for  his  promotion.  This  was 
what  troubled  General  Halleck.  He  had  been  called  to 
Washington  as  the  military  adviser  of  the  President.  He 
was,  did  he  dare  exercise  the  functions  alloted  him,  the  com- 
mander in  chief  of  all  our  armies.  But  Halleck  soon  learned 
that  President  Lincoln  and  Secretary  Stanton  were  men  who 
had  or  thought  they  had  military  views  much  affected  by 
politics,  and  back  of  both  two  of  the  strongest  characters 
ever  molded  in  human  shape.  Now,  to  question  these  views 


How  Halleck  Gave  Advice.  349 

on  the  part  of  General  Halleck  was  to  question  his  office. 
He  came  quickly  to  the  sage  conclusion  that  he  was  military 
adviser  in  name,  but  really  a  scape-goat  in  case  of  any  great 
disaster.  He  accepted  the  situation  and  immediately  set 
about  to  learn,  not  what  the  service  needed,  but  what  the 
President  and  Secretary  wanted.  He  knew  that  both  were 
at  fault  in  nearly  all  military  matters,  but  he  knew  that  they 
were  shrewd  gentlemen,  deeply  learned  in  political  affairs,  of 
which  he,  Halleck,  was  remarkably  ignorant,  and  so  he  felt 
his  way  cautiously  along  and  never  gave  one  opinion  until 
he  learned  that  of  his  superior  officers,  and  then  he  was  very 
emphatic  in  his  approval. 

The  writer  of  this  first  learned  his  lesson  in  army  or- 
ganization when  acting  as  one  of  the  board  of  officers  or- 
ganized to  investigate  the  circumstances  and  cause  of  the 
surrender  of  Harper's  Ferry.  We  had  not  been  in  session 
twenty-four  hours  before  it  was  understood  at  the  Executive 
Mansion,  and  in  the  War  Department  it  was  well  known, 
that  the  fault  was  in  McClellan.  How  this  came  to  be  the 
opinion  of  the  board  no  one  could  explain.  It  seemed  to 
pervade  the  atmosphere.  Now  we  all  know,  as  well  as  facts 
could  control  conviction,  that  Harper's  Ferry  was  lost,  not 
through  any  fault  of  McClellan,  but  from  the  treachery, 
cowardice,  and  stupidity  of  the  officers  left  there  for  the  de- 
fense. Had  not  Maryland  Heights  been  abandoned  by  Gen- 
eral Miles  and  Colonel  Ford,  the  place  could  easily  have 
been  held  until  McClellan  came  to  the  rescue.  McClellan 
was  not  only  a  Democrat,  but  he  had  forced  his  political 
opinions  into  the  army,  and  instead  of  fighting  the  country's 
battles  with  some  sense  and  a  little  success,  he  had  impu- 
dently elevated  his  shallow  mind  to  the  post  of  adviser  on 
political  subjects.  This  was  enough  to  brush  aside  Miles's 
treachery  and  Ford's  cowardice.  The  writer  of  this,  the 
younger  member,  was  called  on  to  write  the  opinion  of  the 
court.  It  was  not  his  opinion,  and  so  he  embodied  in  the 
judgment  Halleck's  testimony,  which  said,  truly  enough, 
that  had  McClellan  marched  an  hour  more  or  a  mile  further 
a  day,  he  would  have  reached  Harper's  Ferry  in  time  to 
rescue  the  garrison.  The  fact  was  that  McClellan,  after  ad- 


360  -Life  of  Thomas. 

vising  the  evacution  of  the  place,  was  feeling  his  way  along 
in  utter  ignorance  of  the  enemy's  whereabouts  or  intentions. 
The  finding  of  the  board,  so  far  as  McClellan  was  concerned, 
is  an  historical  infamy,  and  so  impressed  with  such  a  conclu- 
sion was  he  that  he  inserted  a  sentence  in  the  finding  that 
rendered  the  entire  judgment  a  ludicrous  absurdity.  It 
read :  "  By  reference  to  the  evidence,  it  will  be  seen  that,  at 
the  very  moment  Colonel  Ford  abandoned  Maryland  Heights, 
his  little  army  was  in  reality  relieved  by  Generals  Franklin's 
and  Sumner's  corps  at  Crampton's  Gap,  within  seven  miles 
of  his  position." 

Halleck  was  not  only  influenced  but  guided  by  these 
conditions  in  his  telegrams  to  Grant  and  Rosecrans.  He 
knew  that,  while  Rosecrans,  without  the  loss  of  a  man  or  a 
mule,  was  opening  his  communications  so  as  to  gather  sup- 
plies, while  at  the  same  time  he  fortified  his  base  for  the 
most  important  campaign  of  the  war,  Grant  was  wasting  an 
army  in  bayous  and  swamps  before  a  place  that  would  be 
untenable  were  it  approached  from  the  interior — and  yet, 
while  his  telegrams  were  highly  encouraging  to  the  hopeless 
canal  digger  and  bayou  cleaner,  and  men  and  supplies  were 
hurried  forward  in  advance  of  demands,  the  messages  to 
Rosecrans  were  brusque  to  insult,  and  it  was  almost  impossi- 
ble to  get  reinforcements  and  supplies.  What  makes  all  this 
the  more  striking  is  the  fact  that  Halleck  had  the  highest 
admiration  of  George  H.  Thomas,  and  knew  that  he  was 
Rosecrans'  one  adviser. 

NOTE. — Early  in  June,  a  strangely  romantic  event  occurred  at  Franklin, 
Tennessee.  Two  young  men,  in  the  uniform  of  colonel  and  major  of  the 
Union  army,  and  well  mounted,  presented  themselves  at  the  tent  of  Colonel 
Baird,  commander  of  the  post,  giving  their  names  and  ranks  as  Colonel 
Anton  and  Major  Dunlap,  and  claiming  to  be  authorized  by  an  order  from 
General  E.  D.  Townsend,  assistant  adjutant-general  at  Washington,  in- 
dorsed by  General  Rosecrans,  to  inspect  our  posts.  Colonel  Baird  was  at 
first  deceived,  and  he  permitted  the  two  to  ride  away  in  the  direction  of 
the  enemy's  lines.  A  slight  suspicion  grew  to  such  magnitude  that  he  sent 
after  the  supposed  colonel  and  major.  There  was  something  about  the 
uniforms  that  appeared  mysterious.  They  did  not  fit  the  wearers.  Again, 
the  major,  Dunlap,  was  too  young  to  hold  the  rank  claimed,  even  in  a  serv- 
ice where  promotions  were  so  rapid.  Again,  they  were  without  escort  and 
seemed  to  come  up  out  of  the  earth  to  execute  their  strange  mission. 


A  Romance  of  Spies.  351 

Colonel  Baird  sent  an  officer  with  a  corporal's  guard  to  arrest  the  men.  On 
telegraphing  General  Rosecrans,  he  learned  that  no  such  duty  as  claimed 
had  been  authorized,  nor  had  he  ever  heard  of  Messrs.  Anton  and  Dunlap. 
Faced  with  this  evidence,  the  colonel,  Anton,  confessed  that  he  was  no 
such  man,  but  Colonel  Lawrence  A.  Williams,  formerly  of  the  Union  army, 
but  asserted  that  his  companion  was  Lieutenant  Dunlap,  of  the  Confeder- 
ate army.  He  denied  that  they  were  spies  and  asked  clemency.  General 
Rosecrans  issued  a  prompt  order  calling  for  a  drum-head  court-martial. 

The  court  was  puzzled  to  know  what  these  men  hoped  to  gain  inside 
our  lines.  Every  man,  woman,  and  child  left  at  home  was  a  spy,  and  at 
Bragg's  head-quarters  our  forces  were  correctly  counted  to  a  man,  our 
works  described,  our  stores  enumerated,  while  contemplated  moves  were 
better  known  than  in  the  War  Department. 

The  order  was  duly  executed  in  the  execution  of  the  unfortunate  men. 
At  least  such  appears  of  record.  There  is  another  story,  however,  in  circu- 
lation in  the  army,  that  not  only  solves  the  mystery,  but  tells  the  wildest 
romance  that  ever  occurred  in  real  life.  It  is  to  the  effect  that  the  court 
organized  in  such  haste  discovered  that  the  boy,  Major  Duntap,  was  a 
woman,  and  from  Colonel  Williams  it  was  learned  that,  in  an  insane  love 
of  the  Southern  cause,  and  stimulated  by  the  spirit  of  adventure,  this  girl 
had  procured  this  disguise  and  ridden  into  our  lines  as  a  spy.  Colonel 
Williams,  learning  the  fact  and  knowing  the  family,  put  on  a  Union 
officer's  uniform  that  had  come  into  his  possession  from  an  officer  who  had 
died  from  wounds  in  the  colonel's  tent.  He  overtook  the  mad  girl,  and  the 
two  were  on  their  return  when  arrested. 

So  far  the  story  is  plausible,  but  what  follows  and  tells  how  the  officer 
detailed  to  execute  the  spies  substituted  dead  bodies  to  personate  the  of- 
fenders on  the  gallows  scene,  draws  rather  heavy  on  one's  credulity.  How- 
ever, we  are  reminded  that  truth  is  stranger  than  fiction,  and  is  generally 
more  disagreeable.  When  we  find  a  story,  therefore,  that  favors  our  viewg, 
we  may  be  well  satisfied  that  it  is  falae. 


352  Life  of  Thomas. 


CHAPTER  XVI. 

The  Tullahoma  Campaign — Impatient  Orders  from  Washington  for  an  Im- 
mediate Advance — Catholic  Influence  Sustains  Rosecrans — The  Natural 
Defenses  of  Chattanooga — Bragg  Flanked  Out — Battle  of  Chickamauga — 
Thomas  Holds  the  Center  and  Saves  the  Army — Retreat  to  Rossville — 
In  Possession  of  the  Granite  Gateway  to  the  South. 

In  his  retreat  from  Murfreesboro,  after  the  disastrous  en- 
gagement at  that  place,  to  Duck  river,  General  Bragg  exhib- 
ited rare  judgment  in  selecting  a  line  of  defense.  It  pre- 
sented to  General  Rosecrans'  army  an  irregular  curve  with 
a  strong  force  of  infantry  extending  from  Shelbyville  to 
Wartrace,  and  where,  from  the  formation  of  the  ground,  a 
natural  defense  was  given  almost  as  perfect  as  artificial  forti- 
fications. At  Shelbyville,  where  General  Folk's  corps  was 
stationed,  a  redan  line  covered  with  an  abatis  guarded  the 
front.  Bragg's  cavalry  was  posted  at  McMinnville,  on  his 
right,  and  was  thrown  out  as  far  as  Guy's  Gap.  Hoover's, 
Liberty,  and  Bellbuckle  gaps  were  held  by  General  Hardee's 
corps.  While  Tullahoma  was  his  great  depot  of  supplies, 
Chattanooga  made,  of  course,  his  base. 

This  was  the  condition  in  June,  1863,  when  General 
Rosecrans  determined  to  move  upon  the  enemy.  To  this 
end,  he  concentrated  the  three  corps  of  Generals  Thomas, 
McCook,  and  Crittenden  on  the  enemy's  right,  and,  to  con- 
ceal this  from  Bragg,  he  made  a  feint  upon  his  left  with  the 
main  body  of  his  cavalry  and  General  Granger's  corps.  On 
the  23d  of  June,  General  Granger  was  ordered  to  advance. 
It  was  soon  developed  that  Bragg  could  not  be  easily  dis-- 
turbed.  The  approaches  to  his  front  were  by  narrow  gaps 
in  a  rough  country  that  forced  our  armies  to  keep  the  roads 
through  these  narrow  openings.  To  advance  along  such  nar- 
row ways,  and  then  attack  the  strongly-fortified  position  at 
Shelbyville,  made  a  lin-e  so  hazardous  that  General  Rosecrans 
abandoned,  if  he  'ever  entertained  the  intent  of  such  assault. 


Opening  the  Tullahoma  Campaign.  353 

He  differed,  we  see,  from  his  associate  commander  whose 
sole  military  movement  resulted  in  finding  an  impregnable 
position  held  by  the  enemy  and  attacking  the  same.  Gen- 
eral Rosecrans  had  but  one  thought,  and  that  was  to  ma- 
neuver the  enemy  into  accepting  a  battle  field  of  his  own  se- 
lecting instead  of  one  tendered  us  by  the  enemy.  This  is 
called  the  art  of  war,  and  consists  as  much  in  saving  our  own 
men  and  material  as  in  inflicting  all  the  Damage  possible  on 
the  foe.  General  Rosecrans  felt  his  way  along  Bragg's  front, 
and  declined  accepting  the  slaughter  tendered  him  on  a  line 
that  would  be  fiercely  fought  for  and  conquered,  if  conquered 
at  all,  at  a  fearful  loss  to  us,  while  it  left  open  to  the  enemy 
a  line  of  retreat  that  would  rob  us  of  our  victory  precisely 
as  Grant  was  served  at  the  bloody  fight  of  Champion's  HilL 
Arriving  at  Shelbyville,  General  Rosecrans  proposed  turning 
General  Bragg's  right,  and,  forcing  him  out  of  his  intrench- 
ments,  give  battle  on  ground  of  his  own  selecting. 

The  first  movement  looking  to  a  blinding  of  the  enemy 
was  at  Triune — as  if  a  direct  attack  on  Shelbyville  was  con- 
templated. General  R.  B.  Mitchell  was  ordered  from  Triune 
to  skirmish  vigorously  at  Eagleville,  Rover,  and  Unionville. 
This  was  done  while  cavalry  operated  on  General  Rosecrans' 
left,  and  an  infantry  force  was  sent  toward  Woodbury.  All 
this  was  done  to  blind  the  enemy  as  to  the  real  movement. 
On  the  24th,  the  entire  army  abandoned  camp  and  took  the 
field.  General  McCook  advanced  toward  Liberty  Gap.  The 
direct  march  on  that  point  was  soon  abandoned  and  turned 
toward  Millersburg,  where  Sheridan's  and  Davis's  divisions 
bivouacked  at  night,  while  Johnson's  advanced  to  the  gap. 
After  some  severe  skirmishing  by  the  regiment  commanded 
by  Colonel  Harrison,  the  Confederates,  finding  themselves 
flanked  on  both  sides,  fell  back,  fighting,  to  the  further  end 
of  the  gap,  when  our  forces,  taking  possession  of  the  nat- 
ural gateway,  encamped  for  the  night. 

During  the  same  day,  General  Thomas's  command,  with 

Reynolds'  division  in  advance,  followed  by  Rousseau's  and 

Negley's  division,  moved  out  on  the   Manchester  turnpike. 

The  brigade  of  mounted  infantry  of  Reynolds'  division,  un- 

23 


354  Life  of  Thomas. 

der  Colonel  Wilder,  attacked  the  Confederates  at  Hoover's 
Gap,  and,  after  a  fierce  resistance,  drove  them  back  to  the 
southern  entrance  of  the  gap,  where  they  held  possession  un- 
til General  Reynolds,  with  two  brigades,  and  General  Bran- 
nan,  with  three,  came  to  the  rescue,  when  the  Confederates 
retreated,  giving  up  possession  of  another  defile  which  Bragg 
relied  on  to  make  his  position  on  Duck  river  secure. 

The  several  movements  of  troops  that  day  corresponded 
with  the  campaign  determined  on,  and  were  severally  made 
in  time.  General  Crittenden  moved  from  Murfreesboro  to 
Bradyville ;  General  Granger  marched  from  Salem  to  Chris- 
tiana. From  Murfreesboro,  at  the  same  date,  General  Stan- 
ley marched  through  Salem  to  reinforce  General  Mitchell. 
The  next  day,  General  Crittenden  held  Holly  Springs.  Gen- 
eral Thomas,  as  soon  as  General  Brannan  joined  him,  put 
that  officer  in  command  at  Hoover's  Gap.  General  Reynolds, 
having  pressed  the  enemy  all  day,  had  General  Rousseau 
close  up  on  his  rear  for  the  purpose  of  attacking  the  enemy 
next  day.  General  Stanley  concentrated  with  Generals 
Granger's  and  Mitchell's  divisions,  and  Negley's  brigade,  at 
Christiana,  intending  to  move  on  the  enemy's  right  flank. 
Laboring  under  the  delusion  that  the  main  body  of  our  army 
had  to  advance  through  Liberty  Gap,  Bragg  made  a  des- 
perate effort  to  dislodge  our  forces  under  General  Johnson. 
A  fierce  encounter  followed.  The  enemy,  having  assailed 
the  center  of  Johnson's  line,  and  failed  to  pierce  it,  next  at- 
tempted to  turn  our  flank  by  an  artillery  and  infantry  attack 
from  the  hills.  This,  too,  was  met  and  repulsed,  after  which 
the  enemy  abandoned  the  field  with  a  loss  of  one  hundred 
killed  and  seven  hundred  and  fifty  to  our  two  hundred  and 
thirty-one  killed  and  wounded.  The  cool,  courageous  con- 
duct of  our  troops  awakened  both  surprise  and  gratification 
on  the  part  of  our  officers. 

General  Thomas,  while  advancing  on  the  26th  toward 
Fairfield  encountered  Confederates  in  force  on  the  heights 
north  of  Garrison  creek.  From  this  they  were  driven  by 
Generals  Rousseau  and  Brannan  on  their  left  flank  and 
General  Reynolds  in  the  front.  With  the  flank  movements 
successfully  executed  the  heights  were  untenable.  An  at- 


Rosecrans'  Brilliant  'Strategy.  355 

tempt  was  made  by  the  enemy  to  rally  on  a  new  position, 
but  no  time  was  given  him  and  he  retired,  but  in  good 
order,  behind  a  heavy  rear-guard  supported  by  artillery 
in  the  rear  and  cavalry  on  the  flanks.  In  executing  this  re- 
treat the  Confederates  exhibited  in  officers  and  men  a  cour- 
age that  was  most  admirable.  It  is  something  for  an  officer 
in  command  to  understand  the  emergency  and  give  orders 
looking  to  relief.  It  is  another  thing  to  have  those  orders 
executed  in  a  way  to  make  them  effective. 

The  heavy  downpour  of  rain  that  visited  the  country  on 
the  first  movement  and  continued  until  long  after  the  last, 
rendered  the  roads  almost  impassable.  Bragg  relied  strongly 
on  this  condition  to  render  his  defense  on  Duck  river  im- 
pregnable. It  is  to  be  doubted  that  he  ever  thought  of  a 
flank  movement.  He  had  no  reason  to  expect  such  work  up 
to  the  6th  of  June,  1863.  No  attempt  at  such  a  maneuver 
had  been  made  by  our  armies.  It  had  been  merely  chance 
encounter  and  stupid  slaughter  in  which  we  hoped  to  win 
through  excess  of  numbers.  Bragg  wakened  to  the  startling 
fact  that  a  force  larger  than  his  entire  army  was  on  his  right 
flank.  His  once  strong  position  on  Duck  river  was  no  longer 
available  to  him.  He  could  either  march  out  and  fight  on 
ground  selected  by  General  Thomas,  or  he  could  fall  back 
upon  Chattanooga.  This  last  was  not  done,  however,  with- 
out protest  from  General  Thomas.  Without  a  moment's 
delay  after  hearing  of  General  Bragg's  defeat  he  put  his 
army  on  the  pursuit.  But  the  almost  impassable  roads,  the 
swollen  streams,  especially  the  River  Elk,  so  favored  Bragg 
that  he  crossed  the  Cumberland  Mountains  in  safety,  and 
occupying  Chattanooga  left  Middle  Tennessee  to  the  Union 
army.  This  great  result  was  achieved  by  us  with  a  loss  of 
eighty -five  men  killed,  four  hundred  and  eighty-two  wounded 
and  thirteen  missing.  Bragg's  killed  and  wounded  were  not 
reported,  but  he  left  as  prisoners  fifty-nine  officers,  and  one 
thousand  five  hundred  and  seventy-five  men  and  lost  eight 
field  pieces  and  three  rifled  siege  guns,  while  the  destruc- 
tion of  material  incident  to  a  hasty  retreat  was  enormous. 

This  masterly  campaign  was  neither  appreciated  at 
"Washington  nor  known  to  the  people.  So  accustomed  were 


356  Life  of  Thomas. 

we  to  big  battles  and  frightful  slaughter  that  a  great  victory 
like  this  obtained  without  the  useless  loss  of  a  man  seemed 
tame  and  insignificant.  It  is  true  that  Secretary  Seward 
hastened  to  make  the  most  of  the  success,  and  notified  the 
War  Powers  of  Europe  that  Tennessee  was  again  in  pos- 
session of  our  government.  This  was  not  strictly  true,  for 
Bragg  carried  into  Chattanooga  the  title  deed  to  the  state, 
and  until  he  could  be  defeated  or  dislodged  the  mere  occu- 
pancy of  the  state  amounted  to  little. 

That  Bragg  had  abandoned  the  aggressive  and  fallen 
back  upon  the  rugged  gateway  of  the  South  left  to  Rose- 
crans  and  Thomas  the  old  employment  of  repairing  railways, 
rebuilding  bridges  and  gathering  supplies  before  again  mov- 
ing forward.  This  was,  of  course,  resisted  in  the  War  De- 
partment at  Washington.  But  the  opposition  had  weak- 
ened. Grant's  disastrous  siege  of  Vicksburg,  the  forlorn' 
and  almost  hopeless  condition  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac, 
served  to  impress  President  Lincoln,  Secretary  Stanton  and 
the  obsequious  Halleck  that  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland 
was  after  all  the  only  one  under  command  of  capable  officers, 
who  seemed  to  know  what  they  had  in  hand  and  were  suc- 
cessful in  its  accomplishment.  One  fact  made  the  army  un- 
der command  of  Rosecrans  comparatively  independent  of 
the  War  Department.  In  the  wide,  fertile  region  thrown 
open  to  us  there  was  enough  within  reach  to  support  our 
army,  and  the  incessant  demand  on  the  Department  for  sup- 
plies became  less,  indeed  almost  ceased  for  a  time.  When 
our  forces  under  Buell  fell  back  to  the  Ohio  the  farmers  of 
Tennessee  and  North  Alabama  were  assured  by  the  Confed- 
erate authorities  that  they  could  rebuild  their  fences  and  re- 
plant their  fields  with  a  certainty  that  the  Yankee  forces 
would  never  again  disturb  their  crops.  The  poor  deluded 
people  were  quick  to  accept  what  they  wished  to  believe  and 
had  planted  and  cultivated  vast  stores  for  our-  forces  to 
seize  and  live  upon.  Bragg  and  his  army  behind  the  fortress 
of  Chattanooga  were  forced  to  rest  unmoved  by  the  cries 
that  arose  from  the  state  they  had  so  lately  occupied. 

In  this  helpless  condition,  the  South  was  again  feeling 
her  great  weakness.     Had  there  been  a  population  of  sturdy- 


The  Faithful  Slaves.  357 

laborers  on  which  to  draw,  it  would  not  have  been  possible 
for  an  army  to  live  upon  the  country  as  did  that  of  the 
Cumberland.  Every  wagon  train  guarded  by  cavalry  sent 
out  to  gather  in  the  harvest  would  have  been  waylaid  and 
surrounded  by  hastily  armed  but  wrathful  citizens,  and 
every  bushel  of  wheat  or  pound  of  meat  would  have  been 
dearly  paid  for  in  blood.  But  the  soil  owners  and  white 
bread  winners  had  been  already  absorbed  by  the  armies,  and 
none  left  to  guard  the  homes  but  aged  men,  boys,  and  negroes. 
The  negroes  were  in  no  wise  guardians  to  be  relied  on.  It 
can  not  be  truthfully  said  that  they  were  not  discontented 
with  their  woful  lot  of  hard,  unrequited  toil,  but  if  such 
discontent  existed,  it  was  not  sufficiently  strong  to  make 
them  take  advantage  of  the  conflict  going  on  about  them. 
They  humbly  tilled  the  soil  for  their  masters  and  cared  for 
the  households  in  their  masters'  absence  as  if  no  war  were  in 
progress.  But  this  was  the  end  of  their  service.  To  put 
arms  in  their  hands  even  to  protect  their  own  cabins  would 
have  caused  a  fear  the  North  could  not  create.  When  Ossa- 
watomie  Brown  wrote  the  emancipation  proclamation  on  the 
mountains  of  Virginia  with  a  handful  of  crazy  followers, 
gaunt-eyed  fear  sat  trembling  in  every  household  of  a  state 
that  subsequently  sent  the  bravest  of  the  brave  to  the  field 
of  battle.  There  was  no  calamity  known  to  humanity  more 
terrible  than  a  servile  insurrection.  Grim  danger,  therefore, 
sat  at  every  household,  and  uneasy  sleep  came  to  pillows  laid 
on  revolvers  throughout  the  South.  That  the  slaves  re- 
mained faithful  to  their  masters  and  cared  for  crops  that 
grew  without  overseers,  has  been  instanced  as  evidence  of 
the  kind  arid  Christian  influences  of  that  crime  of  all  crimes 
known  as  slavery.  This  is  erroneous.  Had  this  system  of 
unrequited  toil  possessed  the  slightest  trait  of  good,  it  would 
have  taught  even  the  dullest  intellect  of  the  negro  the  wrong 
being  done  him.  Had  there  been  any  good  whatever  in  the 
whip,  the  South  would  not  so  readily  have  submitted  to  a 
return  to  the  Union,  after  the  fierce  resistance  that  stained 
with  blood  the  pledge  of  undying  hatred  in  a  people.  Their 
every  act  since  the  last  fight  in  behalf  of  the  lost  cause  has 


358  Life  of  Thomas. 

been  that  of  a  people  not  only  conscious  of  having  been 
wrong,  but  of  a  wrong  they  are  glad  to  vbe  relieved  of. 

In  the  brief  but  stormy  campaign  conceived  by  Rose- 
crans  but  made  practicable  by  Thomas,  our  hero  exhibited 
those  high  qualities  as  a  soldier  that  lifted  him  head  and 
shoulders  above  the  epauletted  crowd  on  either  side.  He 
was  making  the  noble  army  that  he  subsequently  said  made 
him,  and  now,  putting  his  men  to  their  first  test  of  excel- 
lence, he  felt  assured  that  his  orders  would  be  executed  with 
promptness  and  precision,  if  such  lay  within  the  bounds  of 
human  possibility.  Riding  silent  at  the  head  of  his  column, 
he  kept  himself  in  touch  with  the  forces  under  his  command, 
and  every  part  of  the  wide  and  shifting  movement  was  under 
his  immediate  control.  The  entire  army  moved  as  a  huge 
but  perfect  machine  at  his  will,  and  his  mind  took  in  and 
held  every  part,  and  the  aides  dashing  to  and  from  him 
bringing  reports  and  carrying  orders  continued  without  in- 
terruption the  story  of  a  grand  plan  being  successfully  exe- 
cuted. The  fact  that  the  extraordinary  storm,  lasting 
through  a  week,  in  which  the  very  heavens  seemed  open  to 
the  falling  rain,  rendered,  as  we  have  said,  the  road  so  nearly 
impassable  that  men  marched  with  extreme  fatigue,  and,  for 
the  wagons  and  artillery,  teams  had  to  be  doubled  in  many 
places  to  get  on  at  all. 

"  We  have  time  to  accomplish  all  that  is  necessary  for 
my  boys  to  do,  and  the  storms  that  embarrass  us  keep  the 
enemy  from  annoying  us  or  discovering  our  intent,"  said 
General  Thomas  to  an  officer  who  feared  the  entire  force 
would  stick  in  the  mud. 

This  was  the  first  campaign  in  which  the  men  under 
Thomas  began  to  appreciate  his  real  strength.  From  the 
first,  they  were  impressed  with  the  thoughtful  kindness  that 
gained  Mm  distinction  at  an  early  day ;  but  now,  as  he  rode 
on  through  the  storm  or  camped  at  night  in  some  rude  shel- 
ter before  a  camp-fire,  never  for  an  instant  losing  command 
of  the  entire  army  intrusted  to  him  by  General  Rosecrans, 
his  presence  and  power  were  felt  through  all  the  masses 
down  to  the  most  obscure  private  in  the  ranks.  Both  officers 
and  men  took  a  pride  in  executing  his  orders,  and  their 


Thomas'  Faith  in  Religion.  359 

highest  reward  came  in  his  simple  approbation,  that  never 
got  beyond  the  phrase  of  "  Very  well." 

It  was  on  this  march  of  driving  rains,  when  the  electric 
artillery  of  the  clouds  vied  with  our  guns  in  the  reverbera- 
tions that  seemed  to  shake  the  earth,  that  General  Thomas, 
looking  from  his  tent  opening  one  night  at  the  blinding 
flashes  of  lightning,  and  listening  to  the  crash  that  followed 
with  little  or  no  space  of  time  between,  said,  as  if  speaking 
to  himself: 

"  We  are  getting  more  cold  water  thrown  on  our  cam- 
paign than  we  deserve." 

"  General,"  demanded  a  young  aide,  "  do  you  believe  in 
an  overruling  Providence?" 

*"  Most  assuredly,"  was  the  reply. 

"  I  would  like  to  know,  then,  why  he  is  not  on  our  side," 
continued  the  young  man. 

"Are  you  satisfied  such  is  not  the  case  ?  "  asked  General 
Thomas. 

"  Why,  it  looks  that  way,  General,  if  the  Almighty  is 
interfering.  We  are  getting  the  worst  of  it  all  the  time. 
Where  God  is  there  is  the  majority,  you  know." 

All  who  sat  listening  expected  to  see  this  young  man 
abruptly  snubbed,  not  that  they  knew  the  general  ever 
snubbed  any  one,  but  the  manner  was  worse  than  the  matter 
in  the  question,  and,  knowing  the  general's  deeply  religious 
nature,  they  expected  to  see  their  impertinent  comrade  sat 
upon.  Instead  of  this,  the  general  said  in  the  kindest 
manner: 

"  I  am  not  prepared,  my  young  friend,  to  throw  any 
light  upon  that  matter.  I  have  never  made  religion  a  study, 
and  I  am  not  equipped  for  its  discussion.  I  never  was 
tempted  to  question  what  came  to  me  so  sweetly,  and  so  full 
of  consolation  and  comfort,  any  more  than  I  would  doubt 
and  question  the  love  of  my  mother.  I  know  that  it  is  here, 
and  I  know  that  it  is  divine  because  it  is  good." 

"  Do  you  refer  in  that  to  natural  religion  or  revealed  re- 
ligion, General?" 

"Revealed  religion,  of  course.  I  fail  to  comprehend 
what  is  meant  by  natural  religion,  it  is  so  vague  and  uu- 


StiO  Life  of  Thomas. 

certain  ;  but  revealed  religion,  that  is  given  us  in  the  teach- 
ings and  character  of  Christ,  is  clear  in  all  things.  I  never 
met  an  infidel  who  questioned  the  goodness  of  Christ  or  the 
purity  or  divinity  of  his  teachings.  Whether  they  will  get 
us  into  heaven  or  not  after  death,  there  is  one  thing  certain, 
and  that  is,  to  obey  them  is  to  make  us  better  and  happier 
on  earth.  Accepting  that,  I  will  chance  the  rest." 

Instead  of  congratulatory  orders  over  a  great  victory 
achieved  without  loss,  the  old  irritating  and  unreasonable 
demands  for  an  immediate  advance  were  received.  General 
Halleck  saw  nothing  in  the  way  of  a  movement  on  the  en- 
emy south  of  the  Tennessee.  It  never  entered  the  military 
mind  at  Washington  that  Chattanooga  was  our  objective 
point  and  of  such  importance  that  were  it  severely  threat- 
ened, it  would  be  fought  for  if  such  defense  called  for  all 
Lee's  army.  It  was  the  key  to  the  whole  situation  as  the 
gate- way  to  the  South,  but  one  we  could  easily  hold  when 
once  possessed  with  the  loyal  population  of  East  Tennessee 
on  one  side  and  the  Tennessee  river  on  the  other.  Chat- 
tanooga opened  the  way  to  the  weak  point  of  the  Confed- 
eracy. "  It  enabled  us  to  strike  at  its  belly  where  it  lived," 
as  General  Thomas  was  wont  to  express  himself.  General 
Rosecrans  fully  appreciated  not  only  the  fact  that  to  his 
army  had  been  given  the  honor  of  striking  the  last  fatal 
blow  at  the  alien  government  in  our  midst,  but  that  to  deal 
such  a  blow  called  for  preparation  that  was  unknown  or  un- 
appreciated at  Washington.  To  Halleck  he  urged  three 
requisites  to  an  advance.  One  was  the  repair  of  the  rail- 
road to  the  Tennessee  river,  the  second  ripe  corn  in  the 
field,  and  lastly  that  he  should  have  force  enough  on  both 
sides  to  protect  his  flanks.  Repairing  the  railroad  to  the 
Tennessee  was  about  equal  to  building  a  new  road.  Bragg 
in  his  retreat  fully  appreciated  the  importance  of  this  high- 
way to  our  army,  and  he  left  no  bridges  and  few  rails  in  his 
rear.  This  important  work  could  be  hastened,  but  the  ripe 
corn  could  not  be  stimulated,  and  the  tassel  does  not  appear 
unless  the  season  is  unusually  favorable  until  about  the  15th 
of  July.  For  the  forces  on  the  flank,  the  War  Department, 
that  had  wasted  an  army  of  ninety  thousand  men  about 


Weak  Support  from  Washington.  361 

Vicksburg,  responded  by  giving  a  column  to  General  Burn- 
aide,  the  most  inefficient  general  in  the  army,  to  move  on 
Knoxville,  and  made  no  effort  whatever  to  protect  the  right 
flank  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland. 

One  reads  with  amazement  the  telegrams  and  orders 
that  illustrate  the  feeling  at  Washington  in  reference  to  this 
most  important  movement  of  the  whole  war.  "Why,  under 
the  circumstances,  as  Lincoln,  Stanton,  and  Halleck  regarded 
them,  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  was  maintained  at  all, 
puzzles  the  understanding.  There  was  but  one  reason,  and 
that  based  upon  the  conquest  of  territory.  We  had  annexed 
Tennessee  to  the  Union,  and  once  more  set  up  Andrew 
Johnson  as  military  governor  at  Nashville.  This  failed  to ' 
gratify  the  Abolitionists,  for  such  conquest  was  not  followed 
by  an  act  of  emancipation,  and  on  this  account  President 
Lincoln  was  rapidly  losing  the  confidence  and  support  of  the 
men  mainly  instrumental  in  calling  him  to  the  Presidency. 
The  only  member  of  the  government  who  made  a  reasonable 
use  of  the  otherwise  useless  conquest  was  Secretary  Seward, 
who  hastened  to  call  attention  of  the  European  govern- 
ments to  the  fact  that  two  states,  Kentucky  and  Tennessee, 
had  been  added  to  the  government,  and  the  rebellion,  there- 
fore, was  near  its  collapse. 

As  the  Cumberland  river  became  in  summer  an  uncer- 
tain source  of  supply  from  the  Ohio  river  to  Nashville,  the 
one  line  of  railway  from  Louisville  to  the  state  capital  was 
the  only  transportation  to  be  relied  on.  To  keep  this  open 
and  intact  called  for  at  least  one-fourth  of  the  army  of  in- 
vasion. And  then  we  were  not  always  successful.  Nothing 
but  the  existence  of  a  dissatisfied  minority  called  Union  men 
scattered  at  wide  intervals  served  to  preserve  this  road. 
These  men,  too  timid  to  avow  themselves,  were  none  the  less 
alive  to  the  business  of  informers,  and  if  any  of  their  neigh- 
bors indulged  in  the  luxury  of  pulling  up  a  rail,  such  wrong- 
doers were  immediately  visited  by  Union  troops  and  had 
their  houses  burned,  out-houses  and  fields  laid  waste,  as  not 
only  a  punishment  but  a  warning.  This  illustrates  the  stern 
warlike  character  of  General  Thomas.  Kind  and  just  as  he 
was,  he  yet  recognized  the  necessities  of  war,  and  was  the 


362  Life  of  Thomas. 

one  to  instruct  our  officers  along  the  line  of  the  railroad 
that  they  should  select  certain  secessionists  and  hold  them 
as  hostages.  That  is,  without  depriving  them  of  their  lib- 
erty, or,  indeed,  interfering  with  them  in  their  ordinary  pur- 
suits, they  were  to  be  told  that  they  were  to  be  held  re- 
sponsible for  any  injury  done  the  railroad.  If  such  injury 
was  done,  their  possessions  were  to  suffer  in  consequence. 
When  this  order  went  into  execution,  and  a  few  examples 
illustrated  its  working,  that  chief  of  the  raiders,  John  Mor- 
gan, found  not  only  his  main  sources  of  information  gone, 
but  prominent  secessionists  in  whose  behalf  he  appeared 
begging  him  to  desist,  for  he  was  only  doing  what  would 
prove  their  immediate  ruin.  When  such  persuasions  failed, 
the  same  men  hasten  by  night  to  our  officers  and  gave  valu- 
able information  that  they  might  save  themselves. 

On  the  25th  of  July,  the  Elk  river  bridge  had  been  re- 
built and  the  railroad  so  far  repaired  that  trains  were  run- 
ning to  Bridgeport,  Alabama.  But  General  Burnside  was 
as  slow  moving  on  Knoxville  as  the  corn  was  to  ripen  in 
July.  There  were  no  troops  and  the  promise  of  none  on  our 
right  flank,  so  General  Rosecrans,  backed  by  General 
Thomas,  refused  positively  to  move.  A  crisis  in  his  career 
seemed  to  have  reached  him.  On  the  5th  of  August,  he 
received  from  General  Halleck  a  positive  order  to  march. 
To  disobey  this  was  to  court  an  immediate  dismissal.  Bet- 
ter that,  said  both  Rosecraus  and  Thomas,  than  to  jeopardize 
the  army.  But  although  the  peremptory  order  was  disobeyed 
the  dismissal  did  not  appear.  But  it  was  no  military  con- 
sideration that  made  the  administration  hesitate.  The 
cause  was  purely  political.  We  have  seen  that  the  Catholic 
Church  was  not  in  sympathy  with  our  government.  The 
war  on  the  South  was  looked  on  at  Rome,  by  the  light  of 
events  that  had  justified  our  War  of  Independence,  as  cruel 
and  unjust.  If  the  axiom  set  up  in  1776,  that  all  govern- 
ments were  established  by  the  consent  and  for  the  benefit  of 
the  governed,  what  shadow  of  a  right  had  the  Republic  at 
Washington  to  crowd  down  the  throats  of  Southern  people 
a  form  of  government  they  did  not  recognize  or  believe  in  ? 
Secretary  Seward  and  President  Lincoln  were  not  slow  to 


Support  of  American  Catholics.  363 

recognize  the  power  of  Rome  in  Europe  and  the  danger  of 
that  influence  being  exercised  against  us. 

Now,  as  exceptions  to  the  great  body  of  the  Catholic 
clergy  in  the  United  States  appeared  Archbishop  Purcell  of 
Cincinnati,  and  his  gifted  and  pious  brother  the  Rev.  Edward 
Purcell.  They  were  patriots  of  the  purest  and  most  active  sort. 
Standing  at  the  head  and  front  of  Catholicism,  they  had  won 
the  loving  admiration  of  laymen  and  priests  at  home  while 
standing  high  in  the  confidence  of  the  Pope  at  Rome. 
They  were  not  silent  or  at  all  secretive  in  their  faith.  They 
taught  what  they  thought  and  proved  a  salutary  restraint 
to  the  more  impetuous  Catholics  in  this  country,  while  their 
influence  abroad  saved  the  Church  the  scandal  and  our  gov- 
ernment the  wrong  of  a  political  interference  from  that  quar- 
ter. When  the  Archbishop  of  Baltimore  died,  Archbishop 
Purcell  invited  General  Schenck  and  staff  to  appear  at  the 
imposing  ceremonies  of  the  funeral  in  full  uniform.  And 
when  a  successor  was  appointed  to  fill  the  Archbishopric 
of  Baltimore,  the  leading  See  of  America,  the  two  Purcells 
succeeded  in  securing  a  prelate  in  sympathy  with  our  gov- 
ernment. 

Archbishop  and  Father  Edward  Purcell  were  attached 
to  General  Rosecrans.  Through  the  general's  brother, 
Bishop  Rosecrans,  an  estimable  and  eloquent  priest,  they 
learned  to  believe  in  as  well  as  love  the  general.  The  true 
nature  and  importance  of  the  campaign  in  which  General 
Rosecrans  had  so  much  to  do  in  planning  and  executing 
came  home  to  their  gifted  minds,  and  so  this  group  of  emi- 
nent Catholic  prelates  stood  between  Stanton's  wrath  and 
the  general's  dismissal. 

On  the  15th  of  August,  General  Rosecrans  made  his 
initial  move.  While  the  fields  possessed  abundant  forage, 
the  protection  asked  for  on  his  right  and  left  flanks  had  not 
appeared,  and  to  partially  protect  his  right  he  sent  Colonel 
E.  M.  McCook  in  command  of  Brigadier-General  R.  B. 
Mitchell's  Cavalry  Division  on  the  llth  of  August  from 
Fayetteville,  Tennessee,  to  Huntsville,  Alabama,  thence 
along  the  Memphis  and  Charleston  Railroad  to  protect  that 


364  Life  of  Thomas. 

road  and  guard  the  line  of  the  Tennessee  river  from  Vicks- 
burg  to  Bridgeport. 

From  "Winchester  to  McMinnville  was  a  line  made  up 
of  the  Fourteenth,  Twentieth  and  Twenty-first  Corps  in 
readiness  to  move,  while  as  a  reserve  was  a  heavy  body  of 
troops  in  the  rear  occupying  all  the  country  north  of  Duck  river 
in  connection  with  troops  garrisoned  at  Fort  Donelson,  Clark- 
ville,  Gallatin,  Carthage,  Nashville,  Murfreesboro,  Shelby  ville 
and  Watrace.  The  army  in  advance  and  the  force  in  reserve 
were  well  in  hand,  and  as  an  advance  had  been  resolved  upon 
there  was  no  reason  for  a  longer  delay.  General  Rosecrans 
was  called  on  with  an  inadequate  force  to  flank  Lee's  army 
at  Richmond  and  force  the  abandonment  of  Virginia  for  a 
war  in  the  cotton  states.  This  great  work  was  to  be  ac- 
complished by  the  smaller  and  poorer  equipped  of  the  armies 
in  the  field.  To  make  the  situation  yet  worse  no  opera- 
tions were  being  made  on  either  Rosecrans'  right  or  left,  so 
there  was  nothing  to  prevent  a  concentration  of  troops  upon 
his  front. 

After  all,  the  neglect  and  disfavor  from  which  he  suffered 
at  Washington  were  in  his  favor.  The  authorities  at  Rich- 
mond kept  themselves  well  advised  of  military  affairs  at  our 
capital.  Washington  City,  sandwiched  between  Maryland  and 
Virginia,  was,  of  course,  a  Southern  town,  and  while  the  dis- 
loyal sentiment  was  kept  under  more  from  force  of  habit 
than  fear — for  this  little  municipal  dependence  had  so  long 
looked  up  to  and  lived  upon  the  government  that  any  thing 
like  independence  was  regarded  as  monstrous — such  restless 
discontent  found  expression  in  keeping  the  officials  at  Rich- 
mond well  advised  as  to  the  condition  of  our  White  House 
and  War  Department.  The  President  of  the  Confederacy 
and  his  Secretary  blessed  themselves  in  the  fact  that  Stanton's 
hate  and  Lincoln's  ignorance  with  Halleck's  subserviency  left 
their  stronghold  without  menace  and  their  choice  for  disas- 
trous campaigns  to  us  undisturbed.  Had  the  new  govern- 
ment measured  its  own  military  men  with  the  same  sagacity 
it  did  ours  it  would  have  been  saved  many  grave  blunders. 
While  making  no  mistake  as  to  McClellan,  Burnside,  Hooker 
and  Grant,  it  could  not  see  that  Stonewall  Jackson  was  their 


Moving  on  Chattanooga.  365 

* 

genius  of  war  beside  whom  Lee  was  a  gorgeous  drum-major. 
Resting  secure  in  the  indifference  and  contempt  of  the  War 
Department  at  Washington,  no  troops  were  gathered  at  Rose- 
crans'  front  nor  were  his  flanks  threatened.  "  Let  the  fool 
heat  his  head  against  the  granite  rocks  of  Chattanooga,"  said 
Jefferson  Davis,  "  he  will  lind  it  quite  another  thing  from 
Duck  river." 

Nature  made  Chattanooga  a  stronghold  before  which 
any  army,  however  large  and  well  equipped,  might  well  hesi- 
tate. It  lies  on  the  east  bank  of  the  Tennessee,  that  here 
makes  an  abrupt  turn  and  runs,  hemmed  in  by  the  mountains, 
from  north  to  south.  Below  Chattanooga,  this  wide,  deep, 
and  rapid  river  encounters  a  range  of  mountains  that  forces 
it  almost  due  north,  when,  again  driven  by  rocky  barriers,  it 
takes  a  north-westerly  course,  then  again  the  mountains  give 
it  a  sudden  turn  and  it  goes  winding  through  lofty  ranges  to 
the  south.  To  one  approaching  Chattanooga  on  this  deep, 
swift  river  from  the  north-east,  there  is  on  the  right,  and 
generally  on  the  left,  a  range  of  impassable  mountains.  The 
traveler  reaches  an  open  plain,  fortressed  about  by  frowning 
heights,  and  from  that  down  he  sweeps  by  towering  palisades 
that  for  sixty  miles  present  no  gap  through  which,  as  it  ap- 
pears below,  a  bridle-path  could  be  made  for  a  mule.  Long 
before  Chattanooga  could  be  reached  from  East  Tennessee, 
an  army  would  be  exhausted,  and  when  gained,  to  assault  it 
from  the  front  would  be  as  hopeless  as  Vicksburg  was  to 
Grant  as  he  approached  from  the  Mississippi.  To  get  at  it 
from  other  than  the  front  appeared  more  hopeless  still.  So, 
at  least,  thought  General  Bragg  and  his  masters  at  Rich- 
mond, and  they  had,  in  consequence,  deprived  him  of  an 
army,  leaving  only  men  enough  to  man  the  works  at  the 
front.  Bragg  was  lamenting  his  misfortune  in  being  left  idly 
to  man  an  impregnable  position,  while  grand  campaigns 
were  to  be  fought  out  by  men  who  were  his  juniors  in  rank 
and  inferiors  in  ability.  One  day,  a  courier, -white  with  fear 
and  foul  from  dust  and  perspiration,  dashed  in  on  General 
Bragg's  head-quarters  with  the  startling  intelligence  that  a 
large  force  of  all  arms  threatened  his  communications  at 
Stevenson.  His  flank  was  turned. 


366  Life  of  Thomas. 

A 

To  tell  how  this  was  accomplished,  we  return  to  the 
Army  of  the  Cumberland.  Recognizing  the  fact  that  it 
would  be  madness  to  assault  Chattanooga  from  the  front, 
General  Rosecrans  resolved  to  flank  Bragg  out.  This  could 
not  be  done  on  Bragg's  right.  In  addition  to  the  mountain 
ranges  and  the  river,  the  line  of  attack  would  be  over  a 
country  so  barren  and  dry  that  an  army  would  perish  in  the 
attempt.  So,  while  making  a  feint  in  force  upon  the 
enemy's  right,  Rosecrans  moved  the  main  body  upon  the  left. 
This  not  only  seemed  to  deceive  the  enemy,  but  gave  us  pos- 
session of  the  railroad  directly  in  our  rear,  for  supplies  and 
reinforcements. 

"When  General  Rosecrans  submitted  his  plan  of  advance 
to  General  Thomas,  our  hero  for  the  first  time  made  positive 
dissent,  and  this  upon  the  ground  of  the  peril  in  the  attempt. 
He  called  his  commanding  officer's  attention  to  the  fact  that 
our  three  corps  of  the  army  would  be  separated  and  the 
right  from  the  left  some  thirty  miles,  leaving  each  without 
support  from  the  others.  Supposing  we  were  allowed  to 
cross  the  river  unmolested,  the  Confederates  could  assault 
the  separated  columns  and  detain  and  annihilate  each  in 
turn.  General  Rosecrans  persisted.  He  was  satisfied  that 
not  enough  men  had  been  left  to  Bragg  for  such  a  campaign, 
and,  if  he  could  get  upon  his  flank  in  time,  Bragg  was  the 
one  to  suffer  annihilation.  It  was  never  safe  to  calculate 
upon  the  weakness  of  the  enemy,  and  Rosecrans  hearkened 
to  the  wisdom  of  Thomas's  warning  when  too  late.  We 
must  remember  that  Rosecrans  was  under  positive  orders  to 
move  on  the  enemy,  and  the  plan  favored  by  Thomas,  to 
flank  the  fastness  by  the  way  of  Knoxville,  called  for  more 
time  than  the  War  Department  would  allow. 

At  this  part  of  our  work,  we  avail  ourself  of  the  mas- 
terly account  and  criticism  from  the  pen  of  one  who  not 
only  took  part  in  the  campaigns  about  Chattanooga,  but  car- 
ried from  the  slopes  of  Missionary  Ridge  a  decoration  in  the 
shape  of  a  wound  that,  so  long  as  he  lives,  will  bear  evidence 
to  his  gallant  conduct  upon  the  field  of  battle-r-General  H. 
V.  Boynton.  This  soldier,  author,  and  gentleman  gives  lus- 
ter to  our  pages  in  his  clear,  incisive,  and  conclusive  story 


The  Chickamauga  Campaign.  367 

of  the  campaign  and  fight  that  won  us  Chattanooga.  The 
account  to  which  we  give  a  more  permanent  form  appeared 
originally  in  the  Cincinnati  Commercial- Gazette,  and  reads  as 
follows : 

"WASHINGTON,  August  3.  [Special.]— In  two  preliminary 
letters  about  Chickamauga,  the  attempt  was  made  to  describe 
the  field  as  it  appears  to-day,  and  to  present  some  of  the 
scenes  of  the  battle  which  came  rushing  back  over  the  plains 
of  memory  with  a  power  suggestive  of  the  departed  legions 
that  once  clothed  these  farms,  forests,  and  ridges  with  the 
terrible  magnificence  of  battle. 

"  In  a  sense,  to  write  of  Chickamauga,  is  to  try  to  excite 
interest  in  a  subject  which  far  too  many  regard  as  worn ;  but 
to  the  veterans  who  fought  there  it  will  never  be  a  thread- 
bare story.  For  that  generation  which  has  been  born  and 
has  come  to  manhood  since  Chattanooga  was  won  by  the 
Union  arms,  there  is  no  campaign  which  can  be  studied  with 
greater  profit,  or  which  will  more  richly  repay  the  reader. 
History  has  not  yet  done  justice  to  Chickamauga,  but  its  ver- 
dict is  sure.  Many  of  the  misconceptions  of  the  days  follow- 
ing the  battle  still  exist  in  the  popular  mind.  It  may  be 
years  before  they  are  cleared  away;  but  eventually  the 
Chickamauga  campaign  will  stand  in  the  history  of  our  war 
as  unequaled  in  its  strategy  by  any  other  movement  of  the 
contest,  and  as  unsurpassed,  and  probably  not  equaled,  for 
the  stubbornness  and  deadliness  which  marked  the  splendid 
fighting  of  Unionist  and  rebel  alike;  and,  furthermore,  it 
will  stand  as  a  substantial  Union  victory. 

"Just  in  proportion  as  the  credit  due  is  awarded  to  those 
who  planned  and  executed  the  campaign  will  well-merited 
condemnation  be  meted  out  to  those  at  Washington  who  in- 
sisted upon  forcing  the  movement  without  regard  to  proper 
and  vital  preparation,  who  withheld  reinforcements,  and 
who,  in  spite  of  public  and  private  warnings  which  it  was 
criminal  not  to  heed,  made  rebel  concentrations  against  Rose- 
crans  possible  from  in  front  of  Washington  itself,  and  from 
Charleston,  Mobile,  and  Mississippi. 

"  It  will  be  the  purpose  of  a  few  letters  to  go  over  some 


368  Life  of  Thomas. 

of  the  well-known  ground  of  this  campaign  with  a  view  of 
enforcing  the  ideas  expressed  in  general  terms  above,  and 
attempting  to  present  a  clear  account  of  this  most  involved 
and  still  seriously  misunderstood  battle.  The  strategy — 
matchless  in  our  war — which  compelled  Bragg  to  abandon 
Chattanooga ;  the  life  and  death  struggle  for  concentrating 
the  Union  army  when  Rosecrans,  against  the  protests  of 
Washington  authorities  that  it  could  not  be  true,  found  his 
widely-separated  corps  confronted  with  reinforcements  from 
every  part  of  the  Confederacy ;  and,  lastly,  the  great  battle 
in  the  Chickamauga  forests  for  the  possession  of  Chattanooga, 
are  each  most  fruitful  and  interesting  themes.  The  present 
letter  will  relate  to  the  first-named  subject,  the  strategy  of 
the  Chickamauga  campaign. 

"  Marching  from  Murfreesboro,  on  the  23d  of  June,  1863, 
General  Rosecrans  had  advanced  against  Bragg,  who  was 
strongly  fortified,  and  whose  lines,  besides,  occupied  gaps 
and  ranges  of  great  natural  strength.  By  brilliant  strategy, 
with  the  loss  of  only  586  killed  and  wounded,  and  thirteen 
captured  or  missing,  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  with  its 
nine  divisions  and  twenty  brigades,  operating  through  six- 
teen days  of  continuous  rain,  maneuvered  Bragg,  with  his 
seven  divisions  and  twenty-three  brigades,  out  of  his  natural 
and  artificial  strongholds,  and  forced  him  across  the  Tennes- 
see. Up  to  that  time  there  had  been  no  strategic  campaign 
to  equal  this,  and  it  was  soon  to  be  far  surpassed,  except  in 
the  one  element  of  loss,  by  the  campaign  to  follow  it.  So 
brilliant  had  been  the  conception  and  the  execution  that  all 
the  corps  commanders,  headed  by  General  Thomas,  hastened 
to  call  on  General  Rosecrans  and  offer  the  warmest  congratu- 
lations. 

"At  the  close  of  the  Tullahoma  campaign,  Bragg  occu- 
pied Chattanooga  and  the  mountain  passes  above  and  below 
it.  Rosecrans'  army  lay  along  the  western  base  of  the  Cum- 
berland Mountains,  its  right  above  "Winchester  and  its  left  at 
McMinnville.  Here  General  Rosecrans  at  once  began  the 
most  vigorous  preparations  for  another  campaign  for  the 
occupation  of  Chattanooga.  Because  the  necessities  of  the 


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CHICKAMAUGA    CAMPAIGN— THE  STRATEGY. 


The  Chickamauga  Campaign.  369 

case  compelled  secrecy  as  one  of  the  main  elements  of  success, 
there  was  soon  at  Washington  a  manifestation  of  unreasoning 
impatience  over  what  was  criticized  as  the  inaction  of  the 
Union  commander ;  but  those  who  were  on  the  ground  know 
well  the  unceasing  activity  and  energy  with  which  the  work 
progressed  of  accumulating  sufficient  supplies  of  food,  mate- 
rial, and  ammunition,  preparing  the  means  for  crossing  the 
Tennessee  and  obtaining  the  necessary  knowledge  of  the 
mountain  passes,  roads,  and  trails  by  which  the  army  must 
move.  Rosecrans'  supplies  reached  him  over  a  badly  equip- 
ped line  of  worn  railroad,  a  hundred  and  thirteen  miles  in 
length,  and,  as  can  be  readily  understood,  when  the  daily 
wants  of  a  great  army  preparing  for  extended  movement  and 
battle  are  considered,  the  matter  of  accumulating  a  surplus 
of  supplies  was  not  the  task  of  a  day  or  a  week.  With  ev- 
ery effort  the  railroad  was  not  prepared  until  July  25th,  and 
the  forward  movement  began  on  the  14th  of  August. 

"A  glance  at  the  map  will  disclose  the  great  natural  ob- 
stacles which  lay  between  General  Rosecrans  and  Chattanooga. 
As  his  army  faced  toward  the  latter  point,  the  Cumberland 
Mountains,  with  a  general  elevation  of  2,200  feet,  rose  before 
it.  The  escarpment  was  every-where  precipitous,  and  desti- 
tute of  every  means  of  approach  except  narrow  mountain 
roads  and  trails,  with  the  one  exception  that  a  short  railroad 
ran  from  Cowan  to  Tracy  City,  on  the  summit  of  the  range. 
To  the  eastward  this  range  dropped  by  like  precipitous  and 
difficult  slopes  into  the  valley  of  the  Sequatchee  River.  Be- 
yond that  stream  rose  the  equally  sharp  cliffs  of  Walden's 
Ridge,  with  a  general  elevation  of  1,300  feet.  This  fell  off 
along  the  eastern  and  southern  edge  of  the  plateau  into  the 
valley  of  the  Tennessee,  and  overlooked  it  from  the  mouth 
of  the  Sequatchee  River  to  a  point  far  above  Chattanooga. 
It  was  fifty  miles  as  the  crow  flies  from  the  lines  of  Rose- 
crans' army  across  this  continuous  mountain  region  to  the 
valley  of  the  Tennessee.  This  river  was  broad  and  deep, 
and  presented  in  itself  the  most  serious  natural  obstacle 
which  the  Union  army  had  encountered  since  it  left  the  Ohio 
river.  It  was  2,700  feet  wide  at  Bridgeport,  and  1,254  feet 
24 


370  Life  of  Thomas. 

at  Caperton,  the  points  where  the  bridges  were  subsequently 
thrown. 

"  On  the  left  bank  of  the  river,  the  stronghold  of  Chat- 
tanooga lying  behind  the  river,  and  the  great  ranges  to  the 
westward  between  Rosecrans'  position  and  his  own,  might 
well  seem  to  Bragg  impregnable,  in  fact  almost  unassailable. 
First,  toward  the  west,  came  the  Lookout  range,  rising 
abruptly  from  the  river  to  the  height  of  2,200  feet,  and 
stretching  south -westwardly  far  into  Georgia  and  Alabama. 
Its  western  precipices  looked  down  into  the  narrow  valley  of 
Lookout  Creek.  Beyond  the  latter  rose  the  equally  precipi- 
tous cliffs  *)f  the  Raccoon  Mountains,  the  latter  having  the 
same  general  elevation  as  the  Lookout  range. 

"  The  gorge  of  the  Tennessee  where  it  breaks  through 
these  mountain  ranges  is  so  narrow  and  so  thoroughly  com- 
manded from  the  heights  on  both  sides  as  to  render  it  im- 
practicable to  so  move  an  army  as  to  attack  it  from  the  front 
or  river  side. 

"  With  these  giant  obstacles  to  the  progress  of  his 
columns,  most  serious  even  if  they  had  been  within  the 
Union  lines,  but  almost  insuperable  when  found  in  an 
enemy's  territory,  and  while  he  was  bending  every  energy  to 
complete  preparations  for  carrying  out  a  brilliant  plan  of  his 
own  for  overcoming  them,  General  Rosecrans  was  astonished 
at  receiving  on  August  4th,  only  ten  days  after  his  railroad 
had  been  repaired  to  the  Tennessee  River,  a  dispatch  from 
Halleck  saying :  '  Your  forces  must  move  forward  without 
delay.  You  will  daily  report  the  movement  of  each  corps 
till  you  cross  the  Tennessee  River.' 

"  To  a  commander  who  was  building  boats,  opening 
mountain  roads,  rushing  the  accumulation  of  stores,  getting 
out  material  for  four  thousand  feet  of  bridges,  preparing  to 
leave  his  base  carrying  provisions  for  twenty-five  days,  and 
ammunition  for  two  .battles,  and  crossing  three  mountain 
ranges  and  a  deep  and  broad  river,  in  an  enemy's  country, 
and  in  the  face  of  an  army,  this  dispatch  was  not  only 
astounding,  but  discouraging  and  exasperating  to  the  last 
degree. 

"  It  had  become  a  habit  at  Washington   to  sneer  at  the 


The  Chickamauga  Campaign.  371 

slowness  of  General  Rosecrans,  as  it  was  later  to  denounce 
General  Thomas  in  similar  terms  at  Nashville.  There  was 
no  more  reason  or  justice  in  the  one  case  than  in  the  other. 
The  verdict  of  history  has  been  reached  in  the  case  of  Gen- 
eral Thomas.  It  is  sure  to  come,  and  to  be  the  same  in  this 
matter,  for  Rosecrans. 

"  To  this  dispatch,  which  can  only  be  excused  on  the 
ground  of  wholly  inexcusable  ignorance  of  the  active  prepa- 
rations in  progress  and  the  natural  difficulties  of  an  advance, 
General  Rosecrans  replied  with  his  accustomed  clearness 
and  spirit :  '  Your  dispatch  ordering  me  to  move  forward 
without  delay,  reporting  the  movements  of  each  corps  till  I 
cross  the  Tennessee,  is  received.  As  I  have  determined  to 
cross  the  river  as  soon  as  practicable,  and  have  been  making 
all  preparations  and  getting  such  information  as  may  enable 
me  to  do  so  without  being  driven  back,  like  Hooker,  I  wish 
to  know  if  your  order  is  intended  to  take  away  my  discretion 
as  to  the  time  and  manner  of  moving  my  troops.'  To  this 
Halleck  responded:  'The  orders  for  the  advance  of  your 
army,  and  that  it  be  reported  daily,  are  peremptory.'  Gen- 
eral Rosecrans  immediately  wrote  the  following  reply,  and, 
calling  his  corps  commanders  together,  read  the  dispatches 
given  above.  There  was  no  dissent  from  the  proposition 
that  at  that  stage  of  their  preparations  it  was  impossible  to 
move.  He  then  read  his  reply  as  follows,  and  all  approved 
and  agreed  that  they  would  support  him  : 

"  ;  GENERAL  HALLECK  :  My  arrangements  for  beginning 
a  continuous  movement  will  be  completed  and  the  execution 
begun  Monday  next.  We  have  information  to  show  that 
crossing  the  Tennessee  between  Bridgeport  and  Chattanooga 
is  impracticable,  but  not  enough  to  show  whether  we  had 
better  cross  above  Chattanooga  and  strike  Cleveland,  or  be- 
low Bridgeport  and  strike  in  their  rear.  The  preliminary 
movement  of  troops  for  the  two  cases  are  very  different.  It 
is  necessary  to  have  our  means  of  crossing  the  river  com- 
pleted, and  our  supplies  provided  to  cross  sixty  miles  of 
mountains  and  sustain  ourselves  during  the  operations  of 
crossing  and  fighting,  before  we  move.  To  obey  your  order 
literally  would  be  to  push  our  troops  into  the  mountains  on 


372  Life  of  Thomas. 

narrow  and  difficult  roads,  destitute  of  pasture  and  forage, 
and  short  of  water,  where  they  would  not  be  able  to  maneuver 
as  exigencies  may  demand,  and  would  certainly  cause  ulti- 
mate delay  and  probable  disaster.  If,  therefore,  the  move- 
ment which  I  propose  can  not  be  regarded  as  obedience  to 
your  order,  I  respectfully  request  a  modification  of  it  or  to  be 
relieved  from  the  command.' 

"On  the  following  day  Halleck  replied  as  follows: 

"'I  have  communicated  to  you  the  wishes  of  the  gov- 
ernment in  plain  and  unequivocal  terms.  The  objective  has 
been  stated,  and  you  have  been  directed  to  lose  no  time  in 
reaching  it.  The  means  you  are  to  employ  and  the  roads 
you  are  to  follow  are  left  to  your  own  discretion.  If  you 
wish  to  promptly  carry  out  the  wishes  of  the  government, 
you  will  not  stop  to  discuss  mere  details.  In  such  matters  I 
do  not  interfere.' 

"  This  was  answered  the  same  day  by  General  Rosecrana 
as  follows: 

" '  Your  dispatch  received.  I  can  only  repeat  the  assur- 
ance given  before  the  issuance  of  the  order.  This  army  shall 
move  with  all  dispatch  compatible  with  the  successful  execu- 
tion of  our  work.  We  are  pressing  every  thing  to  bring  up 
forage  for  our  animals.  The  present  rolling  stock  of  the 
road  will  barely  suffice  to  keep  us  day  by  day  here,  but  I 
have  bought  fifty  more  freight  cars,  which  are  arriving. 
Will  advise  you  daily.' 

"  This  was  the  last  of  interference  from  Washington, 
but,  accustomed  as  all  there  were  to  interfering  at  will,  and 
directing  affairs  according  to  the  situation  as  they  saw  it, 
they  could  not  brook  such  manifestly  proper  independence 
as  was  shown  by  Rosecraus,  and  from  that  time  forward 
there  was  needed  only  an  excuse  to  insure  his  removal. 

"  Had  there  been  a  tithe  of  the  attention  given  to  pre- 
venting the  rebels  from  concentrating  on  his  front  from 
every  part  of  the  Confederacy — in  fact,  bringing  Longstreet's 
veterans  from  the  lines  under  Halleck's  own  eyes — that  there 
was  to  the  kind  of  interference  which  has  been  noticed, 
Bragg  would  have  been  destroyed  in  front  of  Chattanooga. 
But  this  subject  properly  belongs  in  a  succeeding  letter. 


The  Chickamauga  Campaign.  373 

The  dispatches  given  above  are  well  known,  but  their  repro- 
duction will  prove  a  convenience  to  readers  who  may  not 
carry  their  exact  terms  in  mind. 

"  Ten  days  later,  namely,  on  August  14th,  the  movement 
to  secure  Chattanooga  began.  A  glance  at  the  map  will  re- 
veal its  strategy. 

"  Rosecrans  had  decided  to  cross  the  Tennessee  in  the 
vicinity  of  Bridgeport,  and  subsequently  the  Raccoon  and 
Lookout  Mountain  ranges  at  points  south  of  Chattanooga, 
and  thus  compel  Bragg  to  evacuate  the  place  or  to  come  out 
of  it  and  fight  for  his  line  of  communications.  It  is  easily 
seen  that  if,  after  crossing  the  river,  the  enemy,  warned  in 
time,  should  be  found  in  force  on  the  western  slopes  of  these 
ranges,  further  progress  in  that  direction  would  have  been 
impossible,  and  a  return  to  the  north  bank  of  the  river  ob- 
ligatory. It  was,  therefore,  necessary  to  wholly  deceive 
Bragg  as  to  the  points  of  crossing. 

"  Burnside  was  marching  from  Kentucky  into  East  Ten- 
nessee. Any  apparent  movement  of  the  Army  of  the  Cum- 
berland in  force  in  that  direction  would  naturally  lead  Bragg 
to  believe  that  a  junction  of  the  Union  forces  was  contem- 
plated on  his  right. 

"Every  thing  being  ready,  Crittenden  opened  the  cam- 
paign with  the  Twenty-first  Corps.  Leaving  his  camps  at 
Hillsboro',  Manchester,  and  McMinnville  on  the  16th  of  Au- 
gust, he  crossed  the  Cumberland  Mountains  and  pccupied  the 
Sequatchee  Valley  from  a  point  between  Jasper  and  Dunlap 
to  Pikeville.  Van  Cleve  held  the  latter  place,  Palmer  was 
established  at  Dunlap,  and  Wood  at  Anderson,  between 
Dunlap  and  Jasper.  All  built  extensive  camp-fires  and 
moved  about  in  such  ways  as  to  convey  to  observers  from  the 
heights  the  impression  that  the  whole  army  was  moving. 
Meantime  Minty's  active  cavalry  had  moved  through  Sparta 
and  driven  Dibrell's  cavalry  eastward  through  Crossville,  on 
to  the  Tennessee,  and  over  it,  and  Dibrell,  having  come  to 
reconnoiter  and  see  what  was  going  on,  naturally  got  the 
idea  that  Rosecrans'  army  was  coming.  The  crossing  of  the 
Cumberlands  was  but  the  first  step  of  the  imposing  diversion. 
Though  the  mountain  roads  were  few  and  very  difficult, 


374  Life  of  Thomas. 

Crittenden's  movements  over  them  had  been  completed  ex- 
actly on  time.  The  advance  over  Walden's  Ridge,  equally 
difficult,  though  it  was  not  quite  so  high  as  the  main  range, 
was  immediately  undertaken.  Minty,  on  the  extreme  left, 
appeared  on  the  Tennessee  more  than  thirty  miles  above 
Blythe's  Ferry,  where  he  made  most  energetic  commotion. 
Hazen  reached  the  river  in  the  vicinity  of  Dallas.  Two 
brigades  were  strung  out  along  the  edge  of  the  cliffs  on  the 
top  of  Walden's  Ridge,  where  they  overlooked  Blythe's 
Ferry,  and  could  be  seen  from  the  other  side  of  the  river. 
Minty,  with  his  troopers,  swept  down  the  valley  of  the  Ten- 
nessee to  near  Chattanooga.  Wilder  and  Wagner  also  ap- 
peared in  the  valley.  While  a  show  of  building  boats  was 
made  in  the  small  streams  about  Blythe's  Ferry,  Wilder, 
from  the  heights  of  Walden's  Ridge,  opposite  Chattanooga, 
opened  fire  on  the  town  with  artillery.  Bragg  was  thor- 
oughly deceived.  Forrest  was  ordered  far  up  the  Tennessee 
to  Kingston  to  watch  for  the  expected  crossing.  Buckner 
was  ordered  from  East  Tennessee  toward  Blythe's  Ferry. 

"As  may  be  supposed,  "Wilder's  cannonading  produced 
the  wildest  excitement  in  Chattanooga.  The  rolling-stock 
of  the  railroads  was  hastened  out  of  reach.  The  depots  of 
supplies  were  moved  out  of  the  range  of  the  unexpected 
bombardment.  D.  H.  Hill's  corps  was  hurried  off  to  guard 
the  river  above,  and  other  heavy  forces  were  moved  in  the 
same  direction.  Every  thing  done  by  Bragg  was  based  upon 
the  idea  that  Rosecrans  was  moving  in  force  to  points  on  the 
river  above  the  city. 

"  Meantime  the  real  movement  was  going  on  quietly 
sixty  to  eighty  miles  in  the  opposite  direction,  in  the 
vicinity  of  Bridgeport  and  Stevenson.  A  force  of  cavalry 
for  the  purposes  of  observation,  and  to  convey  the  idea  by 
quick  movements  that  Rosecrans  was  feigning  below,  while 
really  expecting  to  cross  above  the  city,  was  sent  as  far 
westward  as  Decatur.  Thus  Rosecrans  was  operating  along 
the  river  through  a  hundred  miles  of  mountain  region,  and 
fifty  miles  of  low  country  beyond,  and  in  spite  of  the 
natural  difficulties,  every  part  of  the  plan  was  working  with 
precision. 


The  Chickamauga  Campaign.  375 

"  Thomas  and  McCook  on  the  right  moved  at  the  same 
time  with  Crittenden.  Reynolds,  of  Thomas's  corps,  had 
marched  in  advance  and  repaired  the  roads  by  way  of  Uni- 
versity, and  down  the  eastern  slope  of  the  mountain  to  Jas- 
per. Brannan  followed  him,  and  both  were  at  first  kept 
well  out  of  sight  of  the  river.  Baird  and  Negley  came 
down  nearer  to  Bridgeport,  and  McCook  descended  back  of 
Stevenson.  With  the  exception  of  Sheridan,  at  Bridgeport, 
all  were  kept  well  concealed  from  the  enemy's  cavalry  on 
the  left  bank. 

"  Sheridan  alone  made  a  show  of  his  presence,  and 
openly  began  the  construction  of  a  trestle  through  the  shoal 
water,  in  order  to  lessen  the  length  of  the  floating  bridge. 
As  this  was  without  a  decided  show  of  strength,  it  deepened 
the  impression  that  the  movements  on  this  wing  were  the 
feint,  and  those  toward  the  upper  river  the  real  move.  In 
fact,  after  watching  Sheridan's  trestle  building  for  a  while 
from  the  other  side  of  the  river,  Anderson's  brigade  of  in- 
fantry, the  only  infantry  force  available  to  oppose  a  passage 
of  the  river,  was  withdrawn  and  sent  to  Chattanooga. 

"  The  bridge  for  Caperton's  Ferry  was  brought  down  on 
a  train,  which  was  halted  out  of  sight,  and  a  road  cut  for  its 
transportation  through  the  woods  to  a  point  near  its  destina- 
tion, where  the  troops  which  were  to  lay  it  were  drilled  in 
their  work. 

"  Early  on  the  29th,  fifty  boats,  each  carrying  fifty  men, 
were  brought  out  of  the  woods  near  Caperton's,  rushed 
across  an  open  field,  launched,  and  quickly  rowed  to  the  op- 
posite shore.  The  Confederate  cavalry  pickets  were  driven 
off,  and  twenty-five  hundred  men  held  the  south  bank. 
The  bridge  was  promptly  laid.  Davis  was  soon  over,  and 
then  McCook's  entire  corps,  with  cavalry,  started  promptly 
for  Valley  Head,  forty  miles  down  the  Lookout  range. 
Reynolds  collected  boats  at  Shellmound,  Brannan  had  built 
rafts  and  cut  out  canoes  at  the  mouth  of  Battle  Creek. 
The  long  bridge  was  successfully  laid  at  Bridgeport,  and  be- 
fore Bragg  had  recovered  from  his  surprise,  in  fact,  before 
he  had  comprehended  the  extent  of  the  movement,  Rose- 


376  Life  of  Thomas. 

crane,  with  two  corps,  was  over  the  river  and  moving  on  his 
communications. 

"As  soon  as  the  crossing  was  assured,  Crittenden 
marched  with  celerity  by  way  of  the  Sequatchee  Valley  to- 
ward the  bridges,  and  was  soon  across  with  the  main  ^>ody 
and  advancing  on  the  left  of  it  directly  toward  Chattanooga. 

"  This  crossing  of  the  Tennessee  was  a  great  feat.  The 
bridges  were  not  sufficient  for  the  army.  Reynolds  gathered 
small  boats  and  improvised  his  own  means  of  crossing. 
Brannan's  men  had  cut  out  canoes  from  immense  poplars, 
and  launched  them  in  Battle  Creek  out  of  sight.  Some  of 
them  would  hold  fifty  men.  They  also  built  rafts,  one  of 
them  large  enough  to  carry  artillery.  These,  with  an  aban- 
doned rebel  pontoon  boat,  constituted  Brannan's  flotilla. 
When  the  signal  was  given,  the  whole  swept  out  from  be- 
hind the  bushes  which  concealed  the  mouth  of  Battle  Creek, 
and  made  for  the  opposite  shore.  The  rebel  pickets  with- 
drew, and  the  crossing  was  secured.  Then  all  his  men  who 
could  swim,  piling  their  guns,  clothing,  and  accouterments 
on  a  few  fence  rails,  pushed  these  before  them,  and  thus 
gained  the  opposite  bank.  Later,  Wilder  swam  his  mounted 
brigade  across  the  river  and  joined  Crittenden  south  of  Chat- 
tanooga. Halleck  must  have  had  this  ability  for  crossing  a 
river  in  the  presence  of  an  enemy  in  mind  when  he  tele- 
graphed Rosecrans,  a  few  weeks  before,  to  move  at  once,  and 
keep  moving. 

"  But  this  crossing,  and  the  grand  diversion  which  made 
it  possible,  were  only  the  preliminary,  and  by  no  means  the 
formidable  parts  of  the  movement.  To  complete  it,  Rose- 
crans was  to  cut  loose  from  his  base,  carry  twenty-five  days' 
supplies,  and  sufficient  ammunition  for  two  battles,  cross  two 
precipitous  and  difficult  mountain  ranges,  wholly  within  the 
enemy's  territory,  and  their  passes  presumably  strengthened 
and  defended,  and,  after  crossing  the  last  range  at  widely 
separated  points,  to  descend  into  the  valley  in  the  rear  of 
that  enemy's  stronghold,  prepared  for  battle  or  any  other 
contingencies  which  might  arise  on  this  distant  and  isolated 
theater  of  action. 

"  When  Bragg  discovered  the  real  point  of  crossing  and 


The  Chickamauga  Campaign.  377 

the  lines  of  actual  movement  it  was  too  late  to  recall  the  forces 
dispatched  up  the  Tennessee  or  to  post  columns  of  sufficient 
strength  on  the  slopes  before  Rosecrans  to  impede  his  ad- 
vance in  force.  How  strong  the  positions  thus  turned  by 
the  Union  forces  were  will  appear  from  the  statement  that 
so  precipitous  and  otherwise  difficult  were  the  roads  over 
these  ranges  that  at  several  of  them  it  required  a  day  and  a 
night  for  a  division  with  its  artillery  and  reduced  trains  to 
make  the  ascent. 

"  The  Union  commander  had  delayed  his  movement  until 
the  corn  was  ripe  in  order  that  it  might  not  be  necessary  to 
carry  grain  for  his  animals,  which  would  have  largely  in- 
creased his  trains — so  careful,  thoughtful  and  wise  was  he  in 
every  detail  of  preparation. 

"  Bragg's  failure  to  resist  in  the  vicinity  of  Rosecrans' 
crossings  and  at  the  crossing  of  Raccoon  Mountains  was  due 
in  part  to  the  fact  that  even  after  he  knew  that  the  heads  of 
columns  were  over  the  river  he  was  still  inclined  to  look 
upon  their  movements  as  a  feint,  and  to  regard  the  real  point 
of  danger  to  be  above  the  city.  Rosecrans,  even  after  cross- 
ing, sought  successfully  to  strengthen  such  impressions  in 
Bragg's  mind.  He  directed  Wagner's,  Wilder's,  and  Minty's 
brigades  to  report  to  Hazen,  and  with  this  force,  some  7,000 
strong,  the  latter  was  ordered  to  make  a  conspicuous  show 
of  crossing  the  river  far  above  Chattanooga.  This  active  and 
efficient  officer  admirably  executed  his  orders.  By  extended 
fires,  by  marching  and  countermarchings,  by  moving  his 
artillery  continuously  across  openings  in  sight  from  the  oppo- 
site bank,  by  buglers  at  widely  separated  points,  and  other 
similar  devices,  he  easily  created  the  belief  that  an  army  was 
encamped  on  the  right  bank  intending  to  cross. 

"  With  the  exception  of  this  force,  all  of  .Rosecrans'  army 
was  south  of  the  river  on  September  4th,  and  on  the  move. 
The  right  was  already  well  on  its  way.  On  the  6th  his  army 
had  descended  from  Raccoon  Mountain  and  occupied  the 
valley  between  that  range  and  the  western  slope  of  Lookout 
from  a  point  seven  miles  from  Chattanooga  to  Valley  Head, 
forty-two  miles  from  the  city.  The  next  day  McCook  and 
Thomas  began  to  ascend  Lookout  at  points  respectively  forty- 


378  Life  of  Thomas. 

two  and  twenty-six  miles  from  Chattanooga.  Pn  the  8th 
McCook's  troops  were  in  motion  down  the  eastern  slope  of 
the  mountain  toward  Alpine,  and  Thomas  was  descending 
from  Steven's  and  Frick's  Gap,  both  of  which  were  near 
where  the  road  from  Trenton,  after  running  southwardly,  is 
represented  as  leading  over  Lookout.  Crittenden  had  pushed 
small  portions  of  his  command  up  mere  mountain  trails,  and 
on  the  9th  these  gained  position  where  they  could  look  down 
upon  Chattanooga.  They  saw  no  flags,  and  soon  discovered 
that  Bragg  had  evacuated.  The  day  before,  Wagner,  still 
watching  from  the  north  bank  of  the  river,  had  reported  to 
Rosecrans  that  .the  enemy  was  leaving.  The  news  came  in 
the  night,  and  Rosecrans  ordered  Crittenden  to  ascertain  the 
situation.  His  detachments  on  the  mountain  had  already 
discovered  that  the  city  was  deserted.  Crittenden  was  at 
once  ordered  to  march  around  the  north  point  of  Lookout, 
and  follow  Bragg  toward  Ringgold.  At  night  on  the  9th 
Palmer  and  Van  Cleve's  divisions  were  established  at  Ross- 
ville,  five  miles  south  of  Chattanooga. 

"  Thus,  in  three  weeks  from  the  time  his  diversion  toward 
Bragg's  right  began,  and  in  five  days  from  the  time  his  army 
was  over  the  river,  Rosecrans  had  repeated  the  Tullahoma 
campaign  on  a  far  greater  scale,  and  in  the  face  of  much  more 
formidable  obstacles,  and  absolutely  without  fighting,  except 
as  Minty's  cavalry  had  been  slightly  engaged  with  DibrelPs 
-near  Sparta  in  the  outset  of  the  movement,  had  driven  Bragg 
from  the  mountain  stronghold  of  Chattanooga,  the  objective  of 
the  campaign.  It  was  well  said  later  by  General  Meigs,  who 
came  from  Washington  to  Chattanooga  after  its  final  occupa- 
tion by  the  Union  army,  and  spent  some  days  in  studying 
the  movements  by  which  it  had  been  secured :  i  It  is  not 
only  the  greatest  operation  in  our  war,  but  a  great  thing 
when  compared  with  any  war.' 

"  But  the  occupation  of  Chattanooga,  in  a  military  sense, 
was  not  accomplished  by  sending  Crittenden's  divisions  be- 
yond it  and  one  brigade  into  it.  Bragg  had  only  with- 
drawn to  save  his  communications  and  supplies,  and  to  await 
the  reinforcements  he  knew  to  be  hastening  from  Virginia, 
from  Mobile,  and  from  Mississippi.  The  battle  for  Chatta- 


The  Chickamauga  Campaign.  379 

nooga  was  yet  to  be  fought.  Bragg  had  retired  with  delib- 
eration. He  established  his  head-quarters  at  Lafayette,  be- 
hind Pigeon  Mountains,  but  his  rear  guard  never  passed 
beyond  Lee  and  Gordon's  Mills. 

"  The  news  that  Rosecrans'  troops  were  in  Chattanooga, 
and  that  he  had  pushed  out  after  the  retreating  Bragg,  made 
a  tremendous  impression  upon  the  North.  It  was  accepted 
as  a  capture,  and  a  military  occupation  of  that  long-coveted 
stronghold.  It  is  true  it  was  occupied,  but  not  in  a  military 
sense,  since  the  Union  army  had  not  been  brought  into  it, 
or  concentrated  between  it  and  the  enemy. 

"Hence  arose  that  misconception,  which  is  widespread 
still,  that  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  had  occupied  Chatta- 
nooga, and  thence  marching  out  to  attack  Bragg,  had  been 
defeated  by  the  latter  at  Chickamauga,  and  driven  back  in 
disorder  into  Chattanooga. 

"  But,  instead,  Chickamauga  was  the  battle  for  Chatta- 
nooga, fought  by  Rosecrans  while  on  the  way  to  take  mili- 
tary possession  of  it,  and  while  he  was  concentrating  his 
army  between  Bragg  and  that  city,  the  objective  of  the 
Union  campaign.  The  battle  was  not  for  the  Chickamauga 
woods,  but  for  the  passes  behind  them  which  controlled  the 
way  to  Chattanooga.  These  were  secured  as  the  immediate 
result  of  the  battle,  and  the  successful  occupation  of  Chatta- 
nooga in  the  military  sense  followed — an  occupation  which 
lasted  till  the  close  of  the  war. 

"  In  connection  with  the  fact  of  Crittenden's  unopposed 
movement  into  Chattanooga,  another  point  of  general  mis- 
apprehension arose,  which,  through  the  years,  has  formed 
the  basis  of  unfair  and  unthinking,  if  not  ignorant,  criticism 
of  General  Rosecrans'  brilliant  strategy.  Why  did  not  Rose- 
crans  face  Thomas  and  McCook  about  in  the  valley  west  of 
Lookout,  where  their  movements  would  have  been  concealed, 
and  hurry  them  after  Crittenden  into  Chattanooga  ?  It  was 
simply  because  with  McCook's  advance  nearly  fifty  miles 
from  Chattanooga  by  the  roads  west  of  Lookout,  and 
Thomas's  head  of  column  already  down  and  over  Missionary 
Ridge,  full  thirty  miles  away,  to  withdraw  and  send  them  in 
succession  after  Crittenden  would  have  been  to  have  invited 


380  Life  of  Thomas. 

attack  in  detail  from  Bragg  upon  each  head  of  column  as  it 
followed  Critteuden,  with  all  the  chances  in  favor  of  Bragg's 
success.  Besides,  the  shortest  and  surest,  in  fact  the  only 
practicable  line  of  concentration  looking  to  the  safety  of  the 
widely-separated  corps  was  through  a  movement  to  the  left 
along  the  eastern  bases  of  Lookout  and  Missionary  Ridge. 
It  was  this  movement  of  Rosecrans  for  concentrating  on 
Crittenden's  position  south  of  Rossville  that  led  to  the  bat- 
tle of  Chickamauga.  Bragg,  having  been  heavily  re-en- 
forced, started  at  the  same  time  from  Lafayette  to  interpose 
between  Rosecrans  and  Chattanooga,  the  Union  objective  of 
the  campaign. 

"  Subsequent  letters  will  follow  this  exciting  concentra- 
tion, and  the  desperate  contests  of  each  army  for  position, 
and  the  bloody  battles  which  ensued,  and  by  which  Chatta- 
nooga was  finally  won." 

"  WASHINGTON,  August  7. — [Special."] — In  the  movements 
of  the  Union  armies,  none,  from  first  to  last,  presented  such 
brilliant  strategy  as  the  two  which  brought  General  Rose- 
crans from  Murfreesboro  to  the  rear  of  Chattanooga.  Al- 
most equally  wonderful  was  the  successful  concentration  of 
his  widely  scattered  corps.  This  was  accomplished  in  the 
face  of  an  enemy  that  had  been  heavily  re -enforced  with 
veteran  troops,  and  largely  outnumbered  General  Rosecrans. 
The  concentration,  moreover,  united  the  Army  of  the  Cum- 
berland for  battle  between  this  confident  enemy  and  the  city 
which  was  the  objective  of  the  Union  forces. 

"  The  story  is  crowded  with  brilliant  and  successful 
operations  of  detached  corps  against  greatly  superior  forces 
and  of  minor  strategy,  which  blend  harmoniously  with  the 
more  striking  features  of  the  great  campaign.  It  covers  a 
period  of  intense  anxiety  for  General  Rosecrans  and  his  sub- 
ordinate commanders,  of  most  skillful  action,  and  continued 
danger  to  destruction  in  detail.  It  culminated  in  the  deliv- 
ery of  a  battle,  which,  though  still  widely  misunderstood, 
unquestionably  ranks  for  the  stubbornness  and  effectiveness 
of  its  fighting  and  the  importance  of  its  results  with  the 
most  notable  battles  of  the  war. 


MvLKMORK'S   COVE. 


The  Chickamauga  Campaign.  381 

"A  previous  letter  left  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland 
where  its  strategy  had  thrown  it  across  three  mountain 
ranges  and  the  Tennessee  River,  and  brought  it  without  loss 
to  the  rear  of  Chattanooga,  at  the  foot  of  the  eastern  base  of 
the  Lookout  Mountains.  This  had  compelled  Bragg  to 
withdraw  toward  Lafayette.  The  left  of  the  Union  army, 
under  General  Crittenden,  had  passed  around  the  north  end 
of  Lookout  September  9th,  marched  by  Chattanooga  after 
Bragg,  and  occupied  Rossville  Gap.  General  McCook,  forty.- 
two  miles  to  the  right,  had  descended  to  Alpine,  while  the 
center,  under  General  Thomas,  was  at  Steven's  Gap,  directly 
opposite  Bragg's  center,  at  Lafayette. 

"Finding  that  the  enemy  had  withdrawn  behind  Pigeon 
Mountains,  General  Rosecrans,  having  been  assured  from 
Washington  that  no  re-enforcements  had  been  sent  from 
Lee's  army,  determined  to  push  Bragg  vigorously  at  all 
points  for  the  purpose  of  gaining  every  advantage  which  a 
retreat  presented,  and  of  inflicting  all  the  damage  possible. 
Beyond  question,  this  put  his  army  in  serious  peril,  since 
Bragg  had  only  retired  to  meet  re-enforcements  promised 
and  actually  arriving  from  all  quarters,  and  was  even  then 
concentrated  and  ready  to  strike.  McCook,  on  the  right, 
pushed  in  from  Alpine  and  Summerville  with  Stanley's  cav- 
alry to  within  seven  miles  of  Lafayette  without  finding  any 
signs  of  retreat.  He,  therefore,  wisely  kept  his  trains  and 
main  force  near  the  mountain. 

"  Negley,  of  Thomas,  marched  out  from  Steven's  Gap 
beyond  the  Chickamauga,  and  his  skirmishers  deployed  in 
front  of  Dug  Gap.  This  advanced  position  he  held  during 
the  10th,  and  early  next  morning  was  supported  in  it  by 
Baird's  division.  Here  Bragg  attempted  his  initiative,  and 
developed 'his  preparations  for  advance.  Two  corps  of  in- 
fantry, Hill's  and  Walker's,  a  division  from  Folk's  command, 
and  a  division  of  cavalry,  were  in  the  gaps  of  Pigeon  Moun- 
tains, or  the  woods  behind  them,  under  orders  to  advance  on 
Negley.  By  a  fortunate  delay  their  combinations  for  attack 
were  not  completed  until  Baird  had  arrived.  The  bold  front 
displayed  by  both  of  these  officers  still  further  held  back 
those  overwhelming  forces  of  Bragg.  When  the  latter  were 


382  Life  of  Thomas. 

ready  to  move,  the  skill,  sharp  fighting,  and  able  maneuver- 
ing under  fire  enabled  these  Onion  officers  to  bring  their 
troops  back  to  the  shelter  of  the  mountain  with  compara- 
tively little  loss.  It  was  a  thrilling  and  difficult  situation, 
and  the  day  a  most  anxious  one  for  Generals  Rosecrans  and 
Thomas. 

"  The  disappointment  was  great  to  Bragg  when  he 
learned  that  his  heavy  converging  columns  from  Catlett's 
Gap  on  his  right,  Dug  Gap  in  the  center,  and  Blue  Bird  Gap 
on  his  left,  had  met  on  the  ground  held  by  Negley  and  Baird, 
only  to  find  them  retiring  with  such  show  of  strength  and 
with  such  well  ordered  lines  as  enabled  them  to  elude  even 
serious  attack.  Both  these  officers  deserve  far  greater  credit 
than  they  have  ever  received  for  their  courage,  coolness,  and 
ability.  At  night  they  were  supported  by  the  arrival  of 
Brannan  and  Reynolds  from  the  west  side  of  the  mountain, 
and  the  position  of  Thomas  at  Steven's  Gap  was  secure. 

"  Rosecrans'  anxiety  and  Bragg's  attention  were  in- 
stantly turned  to  the  Union  left.  The  discovery  on  the  llth 
that  the  rebel  rear-guard  under  Cheatham  had  not  moved 
south  of  Lee  and  Gordon's  mill  showed  Rosecrans  that,  what- 
ever Bragg's  intention  may  have  been,  he  was  then  concen- 
trating for  battle.  As  General  Rosecrans  himself  declares  in 
his  official  report,  the  concentration  of  the  Army  of  the  Cum- 
berland became  a  matter  of  life  and  death. 

"  Crittenden,  from  the  9th  to  the  12th,  had  carried  on 
most  vigorous  operations.  Palmer  and  Van  Cleve  had  ad- 
vanced to  Ringgold.  Wood  was  close  at  hand.  Hazen, 
flinty,  and  Wilder,  fresh  from  their  part  in  the  brilliant  feint 
north  of  the  river,  had  joined  Crittenden,  and  some  lively 
minor  battles  were  the  result.  The  discovery  that  the  rebel 
rear-guard  was  still  at  Lee  and  Gordon's  suddenly  stopped 
these  operations,  and  on  the  12th,  under  an  order  to  concen- 
trate with  the  utmost  celerity  north  of  the  Chickamauga,  Crit- 
tenden established  himself  along  that  river  near  and  above 
Lee  and  Gordon's. 

"  On  the  13th,  Bragg  had  ordered  an  attack  upon  him 
by  Polk,  with  two  corps,  and  the  promise  of  the  support  of 
a  third,  hoping  to  overthrow  this  wing,  in  continuance  of  his 


The  Chiekamauga  Campaign.  383 

plan  of  defeating  the  Union  corps  in  detail,  before  the  cen- 
ter or  right  could  afford  relief.  In  the  face  of  such  threat- 
ening, with  McCook  over  fifty  miles  away,  and  Thomas  un- 
able to  move  from  the  center  till  McCook  should  be  within 
supporting  distance,  Rosecrans  undertook  the  concentration 
of  his  army. 

"At.  this  point,  that  justice  may  be  done,  it  is  well  to 
contrast  the  attitude  which  the  governments  at  Washington 
and  Richmond  had  assumed  toward  this  movement  on  the 
rebel  center. 

| 

"  For  weeks  before  General  Rosecrans  had  moved  for- 
ward, he  had  tried  to  impress  upon  the  authorities  at  Wash- 
ington the  importance  of  giving  him  strong  support.  Prom- 
ising offers  to  raise  veteran  mounted  troops  from  several 
Eastern  governors  were  laid  before  the  War  Department  and 
refused  with  insulting  warmth.  Two  weeks  later  came  the 
order  from  Halleck  to  move  at  once  and  keep  moving,  which 
is  treated  of  at  length  in  a  former  letter. 

"  This  gross  ignorance  at  Washington  of  the  gigantic 
difficulties  of  the  situation  was  equaled,  if  not  surpassed,  by 
a  telegram  on  September  llth,  the  very  day  that  Bragg's  re- 
enforced  army  was  moving  against  Rosecrans'  center  and  or- 
ganizing for  an  attack  on  his  left,  and  while  Rosecrans  and 
Thomas  and  McCook  were  straining  every  nerve  in  a  life  and 
death  effort  to  concentrate  their  army.  Said  Halleck,  by 
telegraph  of  this  date : 

"  'After  holding  the  mountain  passes  on  the  west  and 
Dalton,  or  some  point  on  the  railroad,  to  prevent  the  return 
of  Bragg's  army,  it  will.be  decided  whether  your  army  shall 
move  further  South  into  Georgia  and  Alabama.  It  is  re- 
ported here  that  a  part  of  Bragg's  army  is  re-enforcing  Lee. 
It  is  important  that  the  truth  of  this  should  be  ascertained 
as  early  as  possible.' 

"  This  showed  that  Halleck  shared  the  general  and  ig- 
norant belief  that  Rosecrans  had  occupied  Chattanooga  in  a 
military  sense. 

"At  this  time  Longstreet's  advance  had  been  gone  a 
week  from  under  Halleck's  eyes  near  Washington,  and  two 
divisions  of  Johnston's  troops  from  Mississippi,  and  Buck- 


384  Life  of  Thomas. 

ner,  from  East  Tennessee,  had  already  joined  Bragg,  and 
others  were  on  the  way. 

"The  failure  to  give  Bosecrans  effective  flanking  sup- 
ports was  inexcusable.  The  only  explanation  for  it  is  found 
in  the  irritation  and  dislike  which  his  straightforward  and 
independent  dealings  had  aroused  in  Washington,  and  a  fail- 
ure to  understand  the  natural  obstacles  of  the  position  and 
the  contemplated  advance.  Meade  was  in  a  state  of  enforced 
inactivity  before  Lee.  Grant's  army  was  doing  nothing  to 
occupy  .Johnston  in  Mississippi,  and  there  was  no  such  Union 
activity  in  front  of  Mobile  and  Charleston  as  prevented  troops 
being  spared  to  Bragg  from  those  points.  And  so,  while  the 
"Washington  authorities  were  finding  fault  with  Rosecrans 
while  he  was  pushing  some" of  the  most  brilliant  and  effectual 
moves  of  the  war,  and  were  not  even  lifting  a  finger  to  en- 
courage or  even  to  protect  him,  the  Richmond  government 
was  neglecting  no  means  to  strengthen  Bragg  to  the  extent 
of  its  powers.  As  a  result,  in  one  week  from  the  date  of 
Halleck's  telegram  inquiring  whether  Bragg  was  reinforcing 
Lee,  Longtreet  and  Johnston  and  Walker  and  Buckner  had 
reached  Bragg  from  the  extremes  of  the  Confederacy,  and  he 
had  moved  to  attack  Rosecrans  with  70,000  men. 

"In  this  criminal  neglect  of  Rosecrans  the  authorities 
were  without  excuse.  No  friends  of  Stanton's  or  Halleck's 
have  even  yet  attempted  to  explain,  much  less  defend  it. 
These  and  other  high  ofiicers,  at  one  time  or  another,  ar- 
raigned General  Rosecrans  as  solely  responsible  for  what  they 
chose  to  designate  as  the  disaster  and  defeat  of  Chickamatiga. 
It  was  the  shortest  way  for  some  of  .them  to  divert  attention 
from  the  terrible  neglect  and  responsibility  which  rested  on 
their  heads.  But  even  if  the  favorable  chances  for  the  con- 
centration of  Confederate  forces  against  Rosecrans  had  es- 
caped unwilling  observation  at  Washington,  the  authorities 
there  were  without  excuse,  since  the  case  was  very  pointedly 
placed  before  them  in  an  editorial  of  the  Cincinnati  Commer- 
cial, which  excited  so  much  attention  that  the  editor  was 
officially  notified  that  such  articles  were  highly  indiscreet. 
This  was  as  early  as  September  1st.  In  view  of  what  oc- 


The  Chickamauga  Campaign.  385 

curred  a  few  weeks  later,  and  of  the  evidence  it  gives  of 
ample  warning,  it  is  interesting  to  reproduce  this  editorial 
of  Mr.  Halstead,  printed  on  the  date  named,  under  a  title,  a 
'Point  of  Danger.'  Said  the  editor: 

"  'Jeff  Davis  and  his  generals  are  as  well  informed  as  we 
are  of  the  presence  of  a  considerable  part  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  in  New  York  City  to  enforce  the  draft,  and  that 
consequently  an  advance  on  Richmond  need  not  be  appre- 
hended for  some  weeks.  They  have  also  heard  of  the  pres- 
ence of  Admiral  Farragut  in  New  York,  and  infer  from  the 
circumstance  that  there  is  no  immediate  danger  of  an  attack 
on  Mobile.  They  know  the  situation  at  Charleston,  and  are 
not  mistaken  in  the  opinion  that  the  advance  upon  that  city 
must  be  slow,  by  process  of  engineering,  digging,  and  heavy 
cannonading.  They  do  not  need  large  bodies  of  troops  to 
make  the  defense ;  negro  laborers,  engineer  officers,  and  gun- 
ners being  all  that  are  required.  General  Grant's  army,  as 
is  well  known,  is,  for  the  most  part,  resting  from  its  labors 
in  undisputed  possession  of  an  enormous  territory.  The  real 
aggressive  movement  of  the  Federal  forces  is  upon  the  rebel 
center;  that  is  to  say,  East  Tennessee,  and  it  is  extremely 
unlikely  that  the  rebels  are  deficient  in  information  as  to  the 
strength  and  intentions  of  Generals  Rosecrans  and  Burnside. 

" '  The  important  question  is  whether  they  will  improve 
the  opportunity  by  concentrating  upon  their  center.  The 
reports  that  General  Joe  Johnston  has  joined  his  forces  to 
those  recently  under  Bragg,  and  has  thus  gathered  a  force 
almost  if  not  quite  equal  numerically  to  those  in  the  hands 
of  General  Rosecrans,  have  in  addition  the  immense  advan- 
tages of  the  occupation  of  mountain  passes,  and  that  are  to 
be  found  in  pursuing  a  defensive  system  of  warfare.  Gen- 
eral Lee  is  reported  to  have  sent  troops  to  East  Tennessee, 
nnd  it  is  probable  that  he  has  done  so,  as,  thanks  to  the  New 
York  riots,  he  has  some  divisions  temporarily  to  spare  from 
Virginia.  If  the  rebels  do  give  up  East  Tennessee  and 
Northern  Georgia  without  a  struggle,  that  is  to  say,  if  Gen- 
erals Rosecrans  and  Burnside  complete  the  operations  in 
which  they  are  engaged  without  meeting  serious  resistance, 
25 


386  Life  of  Thomas. 

it  may  be  taken  as  conclusive  evidence  of  the  exhaustion  of 
the  rebellion.' 

"  Several  subsequent  editorials  enforced  these  ideas,  and 
were  even  so  definite  as  to  point  out  Johnston,  Longstreet, 
and  Buckner  as  the  commands  which  were  likely  to  re-en- 
force Bragg. 

"  General  Rosecrans  had  had  these  general  points  of 
danger  in  mind,  and  made  them  known  to  the  Government 
nearly  a  month  before  he  crossed  the  Tennessee.  But  his 
request  for  more  men  and  flanking  supports  was  refused  at 
the  War  Department  with  much  warmth  and  most  incon- 
siderate emphasis.  This  Commercial  editorial,  therefore, 
startled  him,  and  his  records  show  that*  he  sent  Mr.  Halstead 
a  sharp  letter  intimating  that  such  an  editorial  was  little 
better  than  a  call  to  the  Jeff  Davis  government  to  fall  on 
him.  It  was,  however,  the  clear  common  sense  of  the  sit- 
uation ;  and  if  the  Washington  authorities  had  heeded  it, 
instead  as  was  their  custom,  sneering  at  *  newspaper  gen- 
erals'  and  newspaper  ways  of  carrying  on  the  war,  many 
lives  would  have  been  saved  at  Chickamauga  which  were 
lost  because  of  the  unequal  contest,  and  there  would  never 
have  been  any  questioning  of  that  costly,  but  no  less  decided 
victory. 

"  It  is  further  true  that  General  Peck,  stationed  in  North 
Carolina,  sent  word  to  General  Rosecrans,  under  date  of 
September  6,  that  Longstreet's  corps  wasNpassing  southward 
over  the  railroads.  Colonel  Jacques,  of  the  Seventy-third 
Illinois,  who  had  come  up  from  the  South,  tried  in  vain  for 
ten  days  to  gain  admittance  in  Washington,  to  communi- 
cate this  fact  of  Longstreet's  movement  to  Halleck  and 
Stanton,  and  then,  without  accomplishing  it,  started  West, 
and  reached  his  command  in  time  to  fight  with  his  regi- 
ment at  Chickamauga.  There  had  been  time  enough,  after 
General  Rosecrans'  explanations  of  his  proposed  plan,  to 
force  Burnside,  with  twenty  thousand  men,  down  from  East 
Tennessee,  and  to  have  brought  all  needed  strength  for  the 
other  flank  from  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  on  the  Missis- 
sippi. Even  when  ordered  up,  after  the  battle,  this  latter 


The  Chickamauga  Campaign.  387 

at  first  loitered  to  a  degree  that  its  commander  will  never  be 
able  to  satisfactorily  explain. 

"  To  return  from  this  digression,  Bragg,  on  the  13th,  had 
ordered  an  attack  by  three  corps  on  Crittenden.  The  latter, 
by  his  great  activity,  and  by  the  bold  operations  of  Van 
Cleve,  Wood,  Palmer,  and  the  brigades  of  Hazen,  Minty, 
and  Wilder,  had  created  the  impression  of  much  greater 
strength  than  they  really  had,  and  Polk  moved  cautiously. 
Finally,  just  as  Polk  was  ready  to  attack,  his  column  on  the 
Lafayette  road  encountered  Van  Cleve  moving  on  him  with 
a  single  brigade  of  infantry.  So  vigorously  did  this  officer 
attack,  that  he  forced  Polk's  advance  back  for  three  miles, 
and  created  the  impression  of  a  general  Union  advance. 
This  disconcerted  Polk,  and  instead  of  ordering  his  forces 
forward,  he  halted,  took  up  a  defensive  position,  and  sent  to 
Bragg  for  reinforcements.  Thus,  Negley  and  Baird,  by 
their  pluck  and  skill  in  front  of  overwhelming  forces,  and 
Palmer  and  Crittenden's  active  divisions  and  attached 
brigades  on  the  left,  by  their  unhesitating  attacks  when- 
ever they  developed  the  enemy,  and  by  this  last  one  de- 
livered in  the  face  of  an  advance  of  three  full  corps  on  one, 
had  made  the  concentration  of  the  army  possible,  and  had 
saved  it.  The  next  day,  Steedman,  that  lion  of  battle,  had 
reached  Rossville,  in  immediate  support  of  Crittenden,  with 
two  brigades  of  his  own  command,  and  two  regiments  and 
two  batteries  temporarily  attached,  having  marched  from 
Bridgeport,  a  distance  of  forty  miles,  in  twenty-eight  hours. 

"The  appearance  and  wonderful  activity  of  Hazen's, 
Wilder' s,  and  Minty's  brigades  on  the  left  of  Crittenden,  and 
Steedman's  forces  of  the  reserve  corps  at  Rossville,  with  the 
fact  that  McCopk  was  nearing  Thomas,  and  that  the  latter 
had  extended  his  left  to  within  near  supporting  distance  of 
Crittenden,  seem  to  have  restrained  Bragg  from  attack  in 
any  direction  after  the  failure  of  his  orders  to  Polk  to  at- 
tack on  the  13th  until  his  orders  of  the  night  of  the  17th  for 
an  attack  the  next  day  upon  Crittenden's  left  and  rear. 

"During  this  period  of  comparative  inaction  against  the 
Union  front,  Rosecrans  insured  the  concentration  of  his 
army  in  time  for  battle.  McCook,  not  understanding  the 


388  Life  of  Thomas. 

roads  along  the  top  of  the  mountain,  and  not  deeming  it 
prudent  to  consume  the  time  necessary  to  explore  them,  had 
crossed  Lookout  twice,  at  the  cost  of  more  than  a  full  day, 
and  appeared  with  his  head  of  column  at  General  Thomas's 
camps  during  the  16th.  On  the  17th  the  latter  closed  the 
heads  of  his  columns  toward  Crittenden. 

"  The  days  of  concentration  had  been  a  period  of  the 
most  intense  anxiety,  of  unceasing  watchfulness,  of  unbend- 
ing determination,  of  brilliant  minor  affairs,  of  unflinching 
courage,  and,  withal,  of  cool  calculation  and  precise  execu- 
tion for  every  part  of  the  army. 

"  While,  on  the  morning  of  the  18th,  the  three  corps  of 
the  Union  army  and  its  reserve  were  in  position  where  each 
could  support  the  other  if  attacked,  its  supreme  effort  for 
position  was  to  come.  Bragg's  order  for  the  battle  contem- 
plated crossing  the  Chickamauga  some  miles  below  Lee  and 
Gordon's  and  driving  the  Union  left  under  Crittenden  back 
on  the  center  and  right  under  Thomas  and  McCook,  and 
thus,  by  thrusting  his  colums  between  Roseerans  and  Chat- 
tanooga, recovering  that  place  and  forcing  the  Union  army 
back  into  the  mountains,  from  which  position  it  is  doubtful 
if  it  could  have  extricated  itself. 

"  Bragg's  order  for  attack  on  the  18th  could  not  be  ex- 
ecuted. His  army  was  concentrated  between  Lee  and  Gor- 
don's and  Lafayette.  He  moved  with  five  infantry  and  two 
cavalry  corps.  Narrow  roads,  small  bridges,  difficult  fords, 
and  dense  forests  delayed  operations,  so  that  at  nightfall  of 
the  18th  his  troops  were  not  in  position  to  attack.  In  fact, 
he  was  scarcely  ready  to  deliver  battle  under  his  plan  on  the 
morning  of  the  19th,  when  Thomas's  unexpected  attack,  far 
on  the  rebel  right  and  rear,  deranged  Bragg's  plan,  and  forced 
him  to  battle  several  miles  from  the  point  where  he  was  about 
to  open  it  on  Crittenden,  who  he  supposed  still  constituted 
the  Union  left. 

"  It  was  nothing  less  than  the  inversion  of  the  Union 
army  under  cover  of  a  night  that  had  thus  disconcerted 
Bragg  and  enabled  Rosecrans  to  array  himself  for  battle  be- 
tween Bragg  and  Chattanooga,  and  across  the  roads,  and  in 
front  of  the  passes  which  led  to  that  city.  It  was  this  night 


SATURDAY   MORNING,  SEPTEMBER  19™. 


The  Chickamauga  Campaign.  389 

march  of  two  corps  which  constituted  the  supreme  move- 
ment of  the  concentration,  and  which  at  the  same  time  de- 
feated Bragg's  purpose  to  fight  with  the  back  of  his  own 
army  to  Chattanooga  with  a  view  to  its  recovery. 

"  The  map  given  below  will  make  this  inversion  and  final 
concentration  clear,  and  show  the  position  of  the  two  armies 
at  daylight  on  the  19th,  when  the  battle  began. 

"  On  the  17th  General  Thomas's  corps  was  in  the  vicinity 
of  Pond  Spring,  Negley  on  the  left,  and  so  nearest  to  a  junc- 
tion with  Crittenden  at  Lee  and  Gordon's,  Baird  next  to  the 
right,  and  Brannan  next.  Keynolds  was  thrown  to  the  front. 
The  left  of  McCook  had  closed  on  Thomas  at  Pond  Spring. 

"During  the  day  Bragg,  strongly  threatening  Critten- 
den at  Lee  and  Gordon's  with  two  divisions,  held  him  fast, 
and  started  the  rest  of  his  army  down  the  Chickamauga  to 
cross  and  sweep  in  on  Crittenden's  left  and  rear,  expecting 
to  find  him  still  constituting  the  left  of  the  Union  army,  and 
to  double  this  left  back  on  Thomas  and  McCook. 

"  Bushrod  Johnson  had  crossed  at  Reed's  Bridge,  driven 
Wilder  nearly  to  the  state  road  at  Viniard's,  and  bivou- 
acked a  mile  and  a  half  from  Crittendeu's  left.  Walker  had 
also  crossed  at  Lambert's  Ford  with  three  divisions  and  For- 
rest's cavalry  division,  and  halted  for  the  night  about  a  mile 
in  the  rear  of  Hood.  For  the  most  part  Bragg's  army  had 
the  full  night  for  rest. 

"  On  the  other  hand,  the  Union  columns  were  alive  with 
motion.  That  night  was  to  cover  the  inversion  of  an  army. 
About  4  o'clock  Thomas  started  his  whole  corps  from  Pond 
Spring  toward  Crittenden,  McCook  following  him.  This  was 
doubtless  interpreted  by  Bragg  as  a  closing  in  on  Crittenden. 
But  it  was  far  more  than  that. 

"As  soon  as  night  shut  the  columns  in  they  were  pressed 
rapidly  to  the  left.  Negley,  as  he  drew  near  to  Crittenden, 
was  moved  to  the  Chickamauga  in  front  of  Crawfish  Springs. 
This  prevented  a  night  attempt  to  cut  the  column  by  occupy- 
ing the  roads  intersecting  at  that  point.  Meantime  Thomas, 
with  his  other  three  divisions,  pushed  on.  It  was  a  long, 
weary  night.  Heavy  trains  of  supplies  and  ammunition 
occupied  the  road.  The  troops  moved  mostly  through  the 


390  Life  of  Thomas. 

adjacent  fields,  both  for  celerity  of  marching  and  as  guards 
to  the  trains.  Heavy  flanking  forces  streamed  along  parallel 
to  the  road,  and  well  out  toward  the  river.  There  were 
constant  interruptions  to  continuous  movement,  causing  fre- 
quent halts  of  the  infantry.  The  night  was  cool,  and,  as 
the  commands  stopped,  the  men  warmed  themselves  by  start- 
ing fires  in  the  fences.  The  result  was  that  toward  midnight 
the  trains  were  every-where  driving  between  two  continuous 
lines  of  fires,  and  the  men  on  either  side,  or  in  the  road,  had 
constant  facilities  for  warming  themselves.  It  was  a  tedious 
and  most  fatiguing  night,  but  at  daylight  the  vitally  im- 
portant task  was  done.  Thomas's  head  of  column,  Baird  in 
advance,  reached  the  Kelly  farm  at  daylight,  with  Brannan 
well  closed  up  and  Reynolds  a  short  distance  in  the  rear. 
Brannan  was  on  the  State  or  Lafayette  road,  near  the  inter- 
section of  the  road  leading  into  it  from  Reed's  Bridge.  McCook 
had  reached  a  point  to  the  right  and  rear  of  Crittenden,  near 
Crawfish  Springs.  And  so  at  sunrise  the  Union  right,  in- 
stead of  resting  far  up  the  Chickamauga  from  Crittenden's 
position,  as  Bragg  expected  to  find  it,  had  become  the  left  of 
Rosecrans'  army  and  Crittenden  was  the  right.  More  than 
this,  Rosecrans  had  established  his  lines  two  miles  beyond 
Bragg's  right,  and  between  it  and  Chattanooga.  The  victory 
of  concentration  had  been  followed  by  the  equally  important 
success  of  inverting  the  army  and  thus  thrusting  its  columns 
between  the  enemy  and  the  objective  of  the  campaign.  These 
second  stages  of  the  movement  deserve  to  take  rank  with  the 
matchless  strategy  with  which  it  was  inaugurated. 

"  But  the  battle  for  the  firm  and  final  possession  of  Chat- 
tanooga was  still  to  come.  It  opened  suddenly  for  both  sides, 
and  for  Bragg  in  a  wholly  unexpected  quarter.  The  weary 
Union  troops  had  scarcely  time  to  cook  their  coffee  after  the 
night  march,  and  some  of  them  no  time  at  all,  before  the 
storm  broke  and  the  army  was  summoned  to  the  battle  which 
Thomas  had  opened." 

"  WASHINGTON,  August  14. — [Special.'] — The  last  letter  in 
this  series  left  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  on  the  morning 
of  the  19th  of  September,  concentrated  for  battle  on  the  field 
of  Chickamauga.  By  an  energetic  night  march  the  army 


The  Chickamauga  Campaign,  391 

had  been  thrown  forward  on  its  left  by  inversion  into  line, 
and  thrust  between  the  enemy  and  Chattanooga,  the  objective 
of  the  campaign.  It  was  a  difficult  and  dangerous  move- 
ment, where  two  armies,  intent  on  battle,  were  only  separated 
by  such  a  stream  as  the  Chickamauga,  which  was  every- where 
easily  fordable  above  Lee  and  Gordon's.  But  General  Thomas, 
who  led  this  column,  is  the  one  commander  of  a  great  army 
of  whom  it  can  be  said  with  accuracy  that  from  the  first  of 
the  war  to  the  close  no  movement  of  his  miscarried.  At  day- 
light of  the  19th  he  held  the  Lafayette  and  Chattanooga  road 
at  the  Kelly  farm. 

"  Bragg's  army,  though  reinforced  from  all  parts  of  the 
Confederacy,  and  though  it  had  been  well  concentrated  be- 
tween Lafayette  and  Gordon's  mills  for  several  preceding 
days,  had  been  skillfully  foiled  by  General  Rosecrans  in  the 
efforts  to  strike  his  isolated  corps.  During  the  18th  it  had 
been  pressed  by  Bragg  down  the  winding  and  thickly- 
wooded  valley  of  the  Chickamauga  in  execution  of  an  order 
for  battle.  This  order  was  based  upon  the  idea  that  Critten- 
den's  corps  at  Lee  and  Gordon's  was  the  left  of  the  Union 
army.  While  he  was  to  be  held  there  by  strong  force  threat- 
ening attack  from  the  other  side  of  the  stream,  the  bulk  of 
Bragg's  army  was  to  cross  at  the  various  fords  and  bridges 
below,  and,  turning  up  stream,  was  the.n  to  join  in  sweeping 
Crittenden  back  on  Thomas  and  McCook,  whom  Bragg  sup- 
posed still  to  constitute  the  Union  center  and  right.  In  exe- 
cution of  this  plan  Bushrod  Johnson  had  crossed  at  Reed's 
Bridge,  and  pushed  up  to  within  a  mile  and  a  half  of  Lee  and 
Gordon's,  and  westward  to  within  a  mile  of  the  Lafayette 
road,  where  night  overtook  him.  Walker's  corps  had  crossed 
below  Alexander's  Bridge,  and  bivouacked  after  a  short  ad- 
vance toward  Crittenden.  Minty  and  Wilder,  with  their 
mounted  brigades,  and  Dan  McCook,  with  his  brigade,  had 
stoutly  resisted  and  greatly  delayed  these  columns.  The  most 
of  Bragg's  army  had  rested  through  the  night.  Two  corps 
of  Rosecrans'  forces  had  marched  continuously  since  four 
o'clock  the  preceding  afternoon.  They  were  about  to  move 
into  battle  without  time  for  breakfast  or  further  rest.  Bragg, 
upon  Longstreet's  arrival,  would  have  70,000  men  available 


392  Life  of  Thomas. 

for  the  fight.  Rosecrans'  strength  for  battle  was  not  over 
56,000. 

"At  daylight  all  of  Bragg's  army,  wholly  concealed  by  the 
forests,  was  in  motion.  A  considerable  portion  of  it  was  still 
crossing  the  river  at  the  various  fords  and  bridges  from  Thed- 
ford's  to  Reed's  Bridge,  and  deploying  on  the  other  side 
toward  Crittenden,  who  was  still  supposed  to  hold  the  Union 
left. 

"  Suddenly,  about  9  o'clock,  there  came  to  Bragg's  ears 
the  sounds  of  heavy  and  unexpected  battle  far  down  the  Chick- 
amauga  and  well  toward  Rossville.  Thomas,  whose  head  of 
column  rested  at  the  Kelly  farm,  for  the  double  purpose  of 
exploring  the  forests  in  his  front  and  to  test  the  truth  of  a 
report  that  an  isolated  brigade  of  the  enemy  was  on  the  west 
side  of  the  river  near  Reed's  Bridge,  moved  Brannan  and  Baird 
directly  into  the  forest  on  the  road  toward  Reed's  Bridge.  At 
this  time  two-thirds  of  Bragg's  army,  concealed  by  the  for- 
ests, had  crossed  the  Chickamauga  and  was  directing  its  col- 
umns up  that  stream  toward  Crittenden.  Just  at  the  time 
when  Bragg  expected  that  his  right  would  have  swung 
across  the  Lafayette  road,  and  that  his  center  division  would 
have  opened  on  Crittenden's  position  at  Lee  and  Gordon's, 
these  portentious  sounds  of  battle  from  Thomas's  line  aston- 
ished and  perplexed  him.  After  vainly  waiting  for  them 
to  cease,  under  the  first  impression  that  the  affair  was  a  move- 
ment of  his  forces  in  reconnoissance,  and  that  some  Union 
cavalry  had  been  encountered,  he  found  it  so  serious  as  to  de- 
range his  whole  plan  of  battle,  and  force  him  to  meet  an 
enemy  who  had  turned  his  right.  To  do  this  he  was  obliged 
to  move  a  portion  of  his  troops  that  had  not  crossed  the  river 
down  stream  to  Reed's.  By  the  circuitous  roads  which  they 
were  obliged  to  travel,  it  required  a  march  of  six  miles  to 
reach  the  left  of  Thomas. 

"  This  destruction  of  the  rebel  plan  was  due  to  Thomas 
opening  the  battle  with  the  divisions  of  Brannan  and  Baird 
in  the  vicinity  of  Reed's  Bridge.  At  6:30  o'clock  Brannan  left 
Kelly's,  and  moving  north,  turned  in  from  the  Lafayette 
road  at  McDonald's  toward  Reed's.  A  quarter  of  a  mile  from 
McDonald's  he  deployed  his  division.  Van  Derveer  was  on 


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THE  FIRST  DAY'S  BATTLE. 


The  Chickamauga  Campaign.  393 

the  left,  and  thus  became  the  left  of  the  Union  army.  Con- 
nell's  brigade  was  in  the  center,  and  Croxton  on  the  right. 
In  like  manner  Baird  advanced  with  a  front  line  of  two  bri- 
gades. King,  with  the  regulars,  was  on  the  left  next  to 
Bran  nan,  and  Scribner  on  the  right  of  King,  while  Stark- 
weather marched  by  the  flank  behind  Scribner's  right. 

"  The  last  disposition  was  promptly  made  by  Baird  upon 
his  discovering  that  the  enemy  was  in  strong  force  to  his 
right. 

"  Thus  while  neither  army  was  aware  that  the  other  was 
in  heavy  force  in  the  woods  which  surrounded  them,  and  while 
Bragg's  forces  were  forming  to  move  up  the  Chickamauga, and 
so  away  from  Thomas's  line  of  march,  both  Brannan  and  Baird 
came  in  force  on  Bragg's  right,  in  front  of  Reed's  Bridge,  at 
a  point  near  Jay's  Mills,  and  opened  the  battle  of  Chicka- 
mauga. Croxton  struck  first  with  a  vigorous  attack  on  For- 
rest, who,  with  the  two  divisions  of  his  corps,  was  guarding 
the  Confederate  right.  The  cavalrymen  were  forced  back  to 
the  sawmill,  where  they  rallied,  dismounted,  and  began  to 
fight  as  infantry.  Croxton  held  his  own,  and  even  ad- 
vanced slightly.  Forrest  sent  for  infantry,  and  Wilson's 
brigade  of  Walker's  division  hurried  from  near  Alexander's 
and  rushed  into  the  fight. 

"  Meantime  re-enforcements  were  turning  from  all  por- 
tions of  Bragg's  line  toward  the  sound  of  furious  battle. 
Shortly  the  advance  toward  Crittenden  ceased,  so  vigorous 
had  Thomas's  battle  become.  Connell  and  Van  Derveer  at 
first  meeting  no  enemy  on  their  fronts  pressed  toward  the 
vortex  of  Croxton's  fighting.  Forrest,  relieved  by  Walker's 
infantry,  met  this  advance  of  Brannan's  left  with  his  whole 
force  and  fought  for  the  most  part  on  foot.  Croxton,  out  of 
ammunition,  was  obliged  to  retire  somewhat  before  Walker, 
when  Baird  pushed  King  in  to  support  him,  while  Van  Der- 
veer and  Connell  moved  in  first  on  Forrest  and  next  on 
Ector's  brigade  of  Walker's  reserve.  The  battle  became 
terrific.  Forrest  hurried  in  person  after  infantry  supports 
and  for  portions  of  his  own  command  left  near  Alexander's. 

"At  11  o'clock  Bragg  had  become  convinced  that  Rose- 
crans  had  forced  battle  upon  him  on  the  extreme  rebel  right. 


394  Life  of  Thomas. 

With  such  vigor  did  Thomas's  two  divisions  fight  that 
Walker  was  ordered  at  that  hour  to  go  to  Forrest  with  all 
his  force,  and  Cheatham,  of  Folk's  corps,  who  had  the 
strongest  division  of  the  army,  consisting  of  five  brigades, 
then  stationed  as  the  reserve  of  Bragg's  left.  Hardly  had 
Cheatham  started  before  Stewart,  of  Buckner's  corps,  which 
was  near  Thedford's  Ford,  ready  to  move  toward  Crittenden, 
was  also  dispatched  in  haste  to  the  Confederate  right,  and 
at  1  o'clock,  Cleburne,  of  Hill's  corps,  posted  near  the  ex- 
treme left  of  the  Confederate  line,  was  ordered  to  the  scene 
of  action  before  Brannan  and  Baird.  These  movements 
show  how  Bragg's  plan  of  battle  had  been  wholly  over- 
turned, and  how  fierce  the  fighting  of  these  two  divisions 
of  Thomas  must  have  been  to  decide  Bragg  to  send  four 
infantry  divisions  to  the  assistance  of  Forrest's  corps  of  two 
divisions. 

"Meantime  Walker  had  moved  Govan's.  brigade  ob- 
liquely on  the  right  flank  of  Scribner  and  forced  him  back. 
Simultaneously  Walthall's  brigade  struck  King  in  flank  and 
drove  him  in  disorder  over  Van  Derveer's  brigade.  Gueu- 
ther's  regular  battery,  one  of  the  best  and  most  efficient  in 
the  service,  was  captured.  We  shall  see  how  it  was  shortly 
after  re-taken  by  the  splendid  Ninth  Ohio. 

"  Thus,  while  Baird's  lines  were  shaken  by  the  over- 
whelming concentration  against  them,  and  Brannan  was 
facing  and  fighting  superior  numbers,  matters  were  hot  for 
Thomas,  who  was  slowly  moving  to  and  fro  along  his  divisions 
and  closely  watching  them.  Baird  was  restoring  his  lines 
under  fire  and  in  the  face  of  a  flank  attack.  Croxton's  men, 
with  fresh  ammunition,  were  holding  their  place.  Connell's 
brigade  was  immovable,  and  poured  its  fire  into  the  very 
faces  of  the  enemy.  Van  Derveer,  on  the  left,  was  busily 
maneuvering  to  meet  flank  attacks,  and  fighting  desperately, 
but  with  unvarying  success. 

"At  this  moment,  when  Baird  was  scarcely  able  to  main- 
tain position,  and  must  have  soon  yielded  to  numbers,  John- 
son, of  McCook's  corps,  came  on  the  field  from  Crawfish 
Springs,  and  was  led  by  Thomas  to  the  right  of  Baird. 
Here,  with  the  brigades  of  Willich  and  Baldwin  on  the  front 


The  Chickamauga  Campaign.  395 

and  Dodge  in  reserve,  Johnson,  by  heavy  fighting,  relieved 
the  pressure  on  Baird,  restored  the  line,  and  checked  Bragg's 
new  center. 

"Following  came  Palmer,  most  opportunely  ordered 
forward  by  Crittenden  from  Lee  and  Gordon's,  who  saw 
plainly  from  the  development  of  furious  battle  on  the  Union 
left  that  troops  would  surely  be  wanted  there.  Palmer  fol- 
lowed Johnson  into  line,  and  under  the  personal  direction 
of  Rosecrans,  the  brigades  of  Hazen,  Cruft,  and  Grose  were 
formed  in  echelon  and  ordered  forward,  immediately  en- 
countering Cheatham's  men  and  becoming  fiercely  engaged. 
Hazen  on  the  left  fell  with  great  vigor  on  Walker's  left  and 
relieved  Starkweather,  of  Baird,  from  precarious  position. 
At  the  same  time,  Van  Derveer  was  thrown  by  Bran  nan  on 
the  right  of  Walker  and  by  terrific  fighting  checked  Wal- 
thall's  line  and  drove  it  well  back  into  the  forests. 

"  It  was  here  that  the  Ninth  Ohio,  the  German  Turner 
regiment  of  Bob  McCook — both  regiment  and  commander 
of  glorious  memory — recaptured  the  regular  battery  and 
it  was  brought  into  the  Union  lines.  The  Ninth  had  been 
with  the  trains  during  the  night  march,  and  it  was  chafing 
far  in  the  rear  when  Van  Derveer  sent  for  it.  Sore  was  his 
need.  The  repeated  attacks  of  the  enemy  on  his  front  and 
flank  in  the  attempt  to  crush  the  Union  left  and  reach  the 
Lafayette  road  in  its  rear  were  becoming  so  frequent  and 
heavy  that,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  every  man  under  him 
was  fighting  where  he  stood  and  yielding  no  inch  of  ground, 
it  seemed  as  if  the  limit  of  human  endurance  even  for  iron 
veterans  must  soon  be  reached.  Then  from  the  near  distance 
came  the  well-known  hurrah  of  the  Ninth  advancing  from 
the  rear.  As  all  waited  to  welcome  the  head  of  its  column, 
its  charging  shout  was  heard  to  the  front  of  its  line  of  ad- 
vance, followed  at  once  by  rapid  musketry,  and  then  their 
great  "  hurrah "  of  victory.  The  story  is  brief.  Colonel 
Kammerling  at  the  head  of  his  regiment,  coming  on  at  a 
double-quick,  saw  to  his  right  and  front  the  captured  artillery 
of  the  regulars,  just  taken  by  Govan.  Without  orders  he 
halted  his  line,  fronted  it,  and  with  the  command  "Links 
Schwengket,"  swung  it  to  the  left,  faced  toward  the  hill 


396  Life  of  Thomas. 

where  the  battery  stood  in  the  hands  of  its  captors,  and,  with 
a  sweeping  charge,  drove  the  rebels  back,  bayoneting  some 
among  the  guns,  and  rushed  with  guns  and  many  prisoners 
back  to  the  Union  line.  A  few  minutes  after  he  came  in  on 
the  run  to  Van  Dervee,r,  just  in  time  to  take  part  in  the  last 
and  supreme  effort  of  the  enemy  to  crush  that  unyielding 
left.  Forrest's  men  had  passed  beyond  Van  Derveer's  left 
and  formed  for  assault  on  his  front,  and  also  directly  on  his 
flank.  But  the  vigilant  skirmishers  and  prisoners  taken  by 
them  made  known  the  movement.  The  left  was  thrown  back 
in  time,  and  the  line  presented  an  obtuse  angle  opening 
toward  the  enemy.  Into  this,  and  heavily  against  the  left  of 
it,  Forrest  hurled  his  columns,  four  deep.  On  came  these 
men  in  gray  in  magnificent  lines,  which  showed  clearly 
through  the  open  forest  bending  their  faces  before  the  sleet 
of  the  storm,  and  firing  hotly  as  they  advanced.  As  they 
came  within  the  range  of  the  oblique  fire  from  Van  Der- 
veer's right  they  halted  within  forty  yards  of  his  left,  and  for 
a  few  moments  poured  in  a  destructive  fire.  A  wheel  of 
Smith's  regular  battery,  and  of  a  section  of  Church's  guns 
which  had  reported,  brought  them  where  they  poured  a 
nearly  enfilading  fire  of  cannister  down  those  long  lines, 
standing  bravely  there  and  fighting  almost  under  the  mouths 
of  the  guns.  Thomas  and  Brannan  and  Van  Derveer  were 
looking  on  and  encouraging  the  line.  It  had  seemed  almost 
beyond  the  probabilities  to  hold  it  till  those  well  served  bat- 
teries opened.  An  instant  later  it  seemed  as  if  the  lines  of 
gray  had  sunk  into  the  earth.  When  the  smoke  lifted  from 
the  third  round  the  front  was  clear  of  every  thing  but  the 
heaps  of  dead  and  wounded,  and  the  work  of  the  day  at  that 
point  of  the  Union  left  was  done. 

"  The  fight  still  raged  bitterly,  however,  along  the  lines 
of  Johnson,  and  of  Palmer  to  the  right  of  him.  Braunan  and 
Baird  were  withdrawn  from  the  front  which  they  had  held,  the 
former  being  sent  toward  the  center  to  provide  against  contin- 
gencies there,  and  the  latter  posted  to  prevent  any  movement 
toward  the  Lafayette  road  at  McDonald's.  Forrest,  with 
cavalry,  and  Cheatham's  brigades  of  infantry  next  attacked 
Johnson  (of  McCook),  who  then  held  the  advanced  portion 


The  Chickamauga  Campaign.  397 

of  the  Union  left.  Here  the  contest  soon  became  furious 
again,  partly  on  the  ground  of  Baird'a  morning  battle. 
Maney's  splendid  brigade  rushed  to  a  hand-to-hand  fight,  but 
was  borne  back.  Wright,  Strahl,  Jackson,  and  Smith,  with 
their  brigades,  all  under  Cheatham,  each  delivered  bold  and 
most  courageous  attacks,  but  without  carrying  the  Union 
line.  Rosecrans'  army,  under  the  successive  hammering  of 
the  Confederate  onslaughts,  was  fast  being  solidly  formed 
from  left  to  right.  "Willich,  Baldwin,  and  Dodge,  of  John- 
eon,  and  Hazeu,  Cruft,  and  Grose,  of  Palmer,  were  fairly 
aligned,  having  fought  themselves  forward  into  good  po- 
sitions. 

"  The  battle  next  fell  heavily  on  the  right  of  Palmer,  as 
Bragg  at  last  had  his  whole  army  in  rapid  motion  toward  his 
right.  As  Palmer's  ammunition  began  to  fail,  Reynolds 
moved  up  to  his  right  and  rear,  and  made  most  excellent  dis- 
positions just  east  of  the  Lafayette  road.  Upon  call,  he 
pushed  Turchin  in  on  Palmer's  left,  and  the  troops  of  Edward 
King  in  on  Palmer's  right,  and  at  once  became  hotly  engaged. 
Crittenden  sent  Van  Cleve  with  Samuel  Beatty's  and  Dick's 
brigades  to  the  right  of  Reynolds',  leaving  Barnes'  brigade 
with  General  Wood  at  Lee  and  Gordon's. 

"As  fast  as  the  Union  line  could  be  extended  to  the  left, 
it  became  sorely  pressed  by  Bragg's  troops,  then  well  massed 
west  of  the  Chickamauga.  General  Davis,  from  McCook, 
pressed  rapidly  to  the  left,  and  was  sent  in  near  Viniard's. 
At  3  o'clock  Wood  was  ordered  from  Lee  and  Gordon's  to 
the  field  of  the  growing  fight.  As  Bragg  still  had  some 
forces  opposite  this  point,  General  Lytle's  brigade,  of  Sheri- 
dan's division,  was  directed  to  relieve  Wood  and  hold  the 
crossing.  Thus,  in  six  hours  from  the  time  Bragg  was  di- 
recting his  army  on  Crittenden  at  Lee  and  Gordon's,  a  single 
brigade,  posted  there  only  from  prudence,  served  for  all  de- 
mands against  Confederate  movement  from  that  direction. 
This  indicates  how  completely  Bragg  had  been  driven  from 
his  plan. 

u  Wood  and  Davis  had  not  been  dispatched  a  moment 
too  soon.  Van  Cleve,  Davis,  and  Wood,  were  confronted 
with  solid  masses  of  Bragg's  concentrated  troops,  and  the 


398  Life  of  Thomas. 

scenes  and  splendid  fighting  of  the  morning  at  the  left  were 
repeated  here  by  these  divisions.  Stewart,  Johnson,  and 
Preston,  of  Buckner's  corps,  and  Hindman,  of  Longstreet's 
advance,  were  assaulting  these  lines.  Davis  had  been 
ordered  to  wheel  in  on  the  enemy's  left  flank,  and  this  move- 
ment led  to  one  of  the  bravest  and  bloodiest  contests  of  the 
day  in  front  of  Viniard's.  Wood  advanced  his  lines  into 
the  vortex  just  when  Davis  was  hardest  pressed,  and,  when 
all  seemed  about  to  be  compelled  to  yield,  Sheridan  appeared 
on  the  flank,  and  Wilder's  mounted  brigade  came  up  in  the 
rear.  Every  division  of  the  Union  army  was  in  line  except 
the  reserve  under  Granger,  which  was  some  miles  away  to- 
ward Ringgold,  with  orders  to  hold  Red  House  Bridge. 

"  The  battle  along  Rosecrans'  center  and  right  waxed 
hotter  and  fiercer.  He  seemed  every-where  present  and  he 
was  every-where  alert.  Van  Cleve  encountered  the  left  of 
Stewart  marching  to  relieve  Cheatham,  and  a  fight  muzzle 
to  muzzle  took  place  between  Clayton  of  Stewart's  and  the 
two  brigades  of  Van  Cleve,  Sam  Beatty  and  Dick. 

"  Reynolds,  by  magnificent  generalship  and  fighting,  re- 
stored the  broken  line  in  his  front,  and  firmly  established 
himself  there.  His  brigades,  under  Turchiu  and  Edward 
King,  covered  themselves  with  laurels  as  they  swayed  back 
and  forth  on  the  tides  of  battle  which  rushed  and  swirled 
over  all  that  portion  of  the  field. 

"Davis,  with  the  brigades  of  Carlin  and  Heg,  delivered 
their  fire  at  short  range,  and  stood  their  ground  long  and 
well,  till  born  back  by  overwhelming  forces.  It  was  just  as 
this  slow  retrograde  movement  began  that  Wood  had  ap- 
peared, having  marched  rapidly  from  Lee  and  Gordon's  with 
Barker's  and  BuelPs  brigade  of  his  own  division  and  Barnes's 
of  Van  Cleve's.  They  swept  in  on  the  right,  and  by  splen- 
did fighting  checked  the  rebel  line  and  held  it  on  their  front 
in  spite  of  its  vigorous  and  splendid  fighting. 

"At  this  point  two  exactly  opposite  movements  were  in 
progress  along  the  lines  of  the  armies.  Bragg,  who  seemed 
determined  to  push  his  right  between  the  Union  left  and 
Chattanooga,  ordered  Cleburne  from  Thedford's  Ford  to  the 
extreme  right,  the  scene  of  the  morning  fighting.  At  the 


The  Chickamauga  Campaign.  399 

same  time,  General  Thomas,  convinced  that  no  perilous  at- 
tack could  be  delivered  at  that  hour  from  that  extreme  point, 
was  bringing  Bran  nan  from  the  left  to  the  support  of  Rey- 
nolds just  as  the  latter  was  fighting  to  push  the  enemy  from 
the  Lafayette  road.  Bran  nan  arrived  in  time  to  help,  and 
with  Croxton's  assistance  Reynolds  restored  the  lines  on  his 
front  and  flank,  and  regained  possession  of  the  road.  Negley 
also  arrived  opportunely  from  the  right  and  took  active  part 
at  this  point.  Wood  repulsed  Bushrod  Johnson's  division, 
though  at  great  cost.  Trigg,  of  Preston's  division,  entirely 
fresh,  moved  in  with  splendid  pluck  and  movement  to  restore 
the  line,  but  Sheridan,  from  McCook,  with  Bradley  and 
Laiboldt's  brigades,  met  and  checked  this  advance,  and  with 
its  recoil  the  heat  of  battle  on  the  Union  right  began  to 
subside. 

"About  5  o'clock  the  field  on  both  sides  was  still.  But 
Cleburne  and  Walker  were  moving  again  far  on  the  rebel 
right,  in  obedience  to  Bragg's  order  to  again  attack  the 
Union  left.  The  Confederate  march  was  over  the  field  of  the 
morning,  where  the  dead  of  Walker  were  thickly  strewed. 
It  was  a  depressing  advance.  Still  those  veterans  formed 
and  moved  on  without  a  sign  of  shrinking,  and  about  six 
o'clock  the  hour  of  silence  was  broken  by  a  terrific  attack  in 
the  gathering  dusk  upon  Johnson,  near  the  ground  occupied 
by  Baird  in  the  morning.  The  assault  fell  also  upon  Baird 
further  to  the  left.  Cleburne,  with  a  front  of  a  mile,  filled 
by  three  brigades,  had  suddenly  burst  upon  Thomas's  left. 
Cleburne  had  three  brigades — Polk,  Wood,  and  Deshler. 
Walthall  and  Govan,  of  Liddell's  division,  and  three  bri- 
gades of  Cheatham — Strahl,  Jackson,  and  Preston  Smith — 
supported  him.  The  assault  was  tremendous.  Night  was 
falling,  and  the  aim  of  each  side  was  directed  by  the  flashes 
of  the  guns. 

"  Willich,  Dodge,  and  Baldwin,  of  Johnson,  fought  their 
brigades  with  undaunted  pluck  and  endurance.  Baldwin 
fell  on  his  line.  Baird,  with  Scribner  and  Starkweather,  held 
his  ground,  though  vigorously  attacked.  Preston  Smith,  on 
the  Confederate  side,  was  killed  here.  Darkness  put  an  end 


400  Life  of  Thomas. 

to  the  movement  and  the  fighting,  and  each  army  sought 

rest. 

"For  the  commanders  of  all  grades  it  was  a  busy  night. 
While  the  Union  line  was  continuous  and  measurably  com- 
pact between  the  enemy  and  practicable  roads  to  Chatta- 
nooga, there  was  much  realignment  to  be  done  to  better  the 
position  for  the  morrow.  The  Union  troops  obtained  only 
snatches  of  rest  on  ground  white  with  frost.  No  fires  were 
lighted,  lest  the  direction  of  the  lines  might  be  revealed. 
This  made  supper  a  dry  meal.  But  the  fact  that  for  most 
there  had  been  no  time  for  breakfast  and  none  at  all  for 
dinner,  gave  excellent  relish  even  to  a  dry  supper. 

"  Rosecrans'  purpose  of  establishing  his  lines  between 
the  enemy  and  Chattanooga  had  been  accomplished.  Bragg's 
plan  of  thrusting  his  army  between  the  Union  advance  and 
that  city  had  been  defeated.  At  the  close  of  this  first  day 
victory  rested  with  Rosecrans.  He  had  found  himself  largely 
outnumbered,*and  had  thrown  every  available  man  into  the 
fight. 

"  Bragg  had  many  brigades  which  were  not  engaged, 
and  Longstreet,  with  the  greater  part  of  his  force,  was  yet 
to  arrive.  The  spirit  of  the  Union  army  had  risen  to  a  high 
pitch  under  the  splendid  and  most  effective  fighting  which 
it  had  done,  and  it  looked  forward  to  the  morrow  with  a 
confidence  born  of  the  consciousness  of  fighting  and  staying 
powers. 

"  But  hard  as  the  work  of  the  day  had  been,  and  stubborn 
and  bitter  as  was  the  fighting  in  each  army,  the  coming 
of  Sunday  was  to  witness  a  battle  eclipsing  this  and  surpassing 
all  the  war  for  its  pluck  and  deadliness.  While  the  weary 
commanders  were  preparing  for  this  day,  and  tired  sentinels 
kept  faithful  watch,  the  wounded  suffered  and  the  armies 
slept." 

"WASHINGTON,  August  17. — [Special.] — The  second  and 
final  fight  for  the  possession  of  Chattanooga  opened  on  Sun- 
day, September  20th.  We  have  seen  how  through  the  pre- 
ceding day,  in  the  white  heat  of  battle,  the  Union  lines  had 
established  themselves  on  the  field  of  Chickamauga,  and  that 


THE  SECOND  DAY'S  BATTLE. 


The  Chickamauga  Campaign.  401 

at  nightfall  they  were  still  between  Bragg  and  the  city  for 
which  they  were  fighting. 

"  It  was  a  cool  and  beautiful  morning,  though  heavy  fog 
hung  over  the  lower  parts  of  the  field,  greatly  impeding  tKe 
preparations  of  each  commander.  For  an  hour  or  two  after 
daylight  there  were  few  indications  of  the  terrific  scenes 
which  were  to  be  crowded  into  that  Sabbath-day. 

"  Both  sides  had  improved  the  night  to  rectify  and 
strengthen  the  alignment.  Bragg  had  received  important  re- 
inforcements. General  Longstreet  arrived  in  the  night  and 
was  placed  in  command  of  the  left  wing.  Polk  was  assigned 
to  the  right  wing.  With  Longstreet  came  the  bulk  of  his  two 
divisions  from  Virginia,  Hood  and  McLaws.  Three  brigades 
only  of  the  former  had  taken  part  with  Hood  in  the  first  day's 
fight.  Gist's  brigade  of  Walker's  corps  also  arrived  from 
Meridian.  The  Army  of  the  Tennessee,  with  all  the  warn- 
ings and  requests  of  Rosecrans  to  the  authorities  at  Wash- 
ington had  done  nothing  to  prevent  a  general  exodus  of* 
rebel  forces  from  Mississippi.  Even  a  portion  of  Pemberton's 
paroled  men  came,  and  two  brigades,  relieved  by  paroled 
prisoners,  were  in  time  for  the  first  day's  battle.  Bragg  re- 
adjusted his  lines  during  the  night.  The  most  important 
change  was  to  bring  Breckinridge  from  his  extreme  left,  east 
of  the  Chickamauga,  to  the  extreme  right.  Cleburne  and 
Cheatham  were  both  moved  close  to  Breckinridge.  Forrest, 
with  twd  divisions,  one  to  fight  on  foot,  was  placed  still  to 
the  right  of  Breckinridge,  to  observe  the  Lafayette  road. 
With  this  heavy  force,  strengthened  on  its  left  with  Stewart, 
he  intended  to  attack  the  Union  left  at  daylight. 

"  Rosecrans,  on  the  other  hand,  had  no  reinforcements 
with  which  to  relieve  or  help  his  lines,  and  most  of  his  army 
had  marched  a  night  and  fought  a  day  without  rest  and  with 
little  food,  and  every  available  man  had  been  engaged.  Burn- 
side  had  been  for  weeks  where  he  could  easily  have  formed  a 
junction.  In  fact,  slowly  as  he  had  moved,  his  infantry  had 
reached  Kingston  about  the  time  Rosecrans  had  finished  con- 
centrating his  army.  It  was  the  duty  and  the  business  of 
26 


402  Life  of  Thomas. 

Halleck  and  others  at  Washington  to  have  had  it  on  the  field 
for  the  first  day's  battle. 

"  It  was  grim  business  for  this  contracted  line  of  Union 
heroes  to  face  the  eleven  divisions  of  infantry  and  two  of 
cavalry,  one  of  the  latter  fighting  as  infantry,  which  Bragg 
had  before  them.  Their  only  advantage  was  in  their  shorter 
lines  and  the  fact  that  it  was  necessary  for  Bragg  to  attack, 
while  for  the  most  part  they  could  remain  on  the  defensive. 
They  were  besides  in  excellent  spirits  and  confident  of  their 
powers. 

"A  glance  at  the  map  will  show  the  rearrangement  of  the 
Union  line.  Beginning  on  the  left,  which  covered  Bragg's 
objective — namely,  the  control  of  the  Lafayette  road  to  Chat- 
tanooga— Baird,  Johnson,  Palmer,  and  Reynolds  were  with- 
drawn slightly  from  the  ground  on  which  they  had  fought 
the  day  before,  and  placed  in  strong  position  east  of  that 
road  in  the  edge  of  the  woods  which  skirted  the  Kelly  farm. 
Brannan  remained  near  the  position  to  which  he  had  been 
called  to  support  Reynolds  the  night  before.  The  divisions 
of  Negley,  Wood,  Davis,  and  Sheridan  and  the  brigade  of 
Wilder  had  all  been  drawn  back  of  the  Lafayette  road,  their 
lines  being  slightly  advanced  from  the  road,  leading  from 
Cfrawfish  Springs  to  the  Lafayette  road  at  Kelly's  farm. 

"  The  order  of  the  Confederate  line  from  its  right  to  a  point 
in  front  of  Brannan's  has  already  been  stated.  Here  Stewart, 
of  Buckner's  corps,  formed  the  right  of  Longstreet,  who  com- 
manded the  left  wing,  and,  counting  toward  the  enemy's 
left,  the  succeeding  divisions  were  Bushrod  Johnson,  with 
Law  and  Kershaw  in  reserve,  Hinman,  and  Preston.  Buck- 
ner's corps  from  East  Tennessee  was  present  with  this  wing  by 
the  courtesy  of  Burnside  and  the  Washington  authorities, 
while  the  latter  alone  were  responsible  for  the  inaction  at  the 
East  which  allowed  Longstreet's  corps  to  be  present.  By  the 
same  courtesy  Walker's  division  from  Mississippi  was  present 
with  Hill's  corps,  and  was  to  fight  again,  splendidly  but  un- 
successfully, on  Bragg's  right,  as  it  had  all  the  day  before. 

"  Under  cover  of  the  fog,  in  the  shelter  of  the  woods, 
and  in  the  painful  quiet  of  that  Sabbath  morning,  the  two 
armies  had  brought  their  lines  face  to  face.  At  9  o'clock 


The  Chickamauga  Campaign.  403 

there  was  scarcely  any  point  the  length  of  a  tiger's  spring 
between  them. 

"  Bragg  had  212  regiments,  organized  into  42  brigades, 
3,nd  these  into  7  divisions.  There  were  in  all  173  infantry  reg- 
iments and  11  of  cavalry  which  were  dismounted  and  fought 
as  infantry,  28  cavalry  regiments  and  50  batteries.  Rose- 
<?rans  had  158  regiments,  33  brigades,  14  divisions,  and  5 
corps.  There  were  141  regiments  of  infantry  and  18  of  cav- 
alry and  36  batteries. 

"  Of  Bragg's  corps  two  were  cavalry — Wheeler  and  For- 
rest. One  division  of  Forrest's  fought  as  infantry.  Rose- 
crans  had  one  cavalry  corps  of  two  divisions.  This  tre- 
mendous array  was  pushed  close  against  a  Union  front  of 
only  two  miles  and  a  half. 

"At  9  o'clock  that  Sabbath  service  of  all  the  gods  of  war 
began.  It  broke  full-toned  with  its  infernal  music  over  the 
Union  left,  and  that  morning  service  continued  there  till 
noon. 

"  Let  us  look  a  moment  at  the  Union  line.  John  Beatty's 
brigade  had  been  stretched  as  a  thin  line  from  Baird's  left 
to  the  Lafayette  road  and  across  it.  King's  regulars  formed 
the  left  of  Baird,  Scribner  his  center,  and  Starkweather  his 
right.  He  had  no  reserve.  Johnston's  division  was  'on  the 
right  of  Baird ;  Dodge  and  Baldwin,  of  his  brigades,  on  the 
front,  and  Willich  in  reserve.  Next  was  Palmer,  with  Cruft 
and  Hazen  on  the  line,  and  Grose  in  reserve.  Reynolds,  on 
Palmer's  right,  reached  the  Lafayette  or  State  road  again.  He 
had  Turchin  in  line  and  King  in  reserve.  The  Union  line  was 
protected  by  log  barricades.  It  thus  ran  around  the  Kelley 
farm  and  was  established  from  fifty  to  a  hundred  yards  within 
the  woods  which  skirted  the  great  open  space  in  their  rear. 
This  field,  which  lay  along  the  State  road  for  half  a  mile  and 
was  a  quarter  of  a  mile  wide,  became  the  scene  of  almost 
continuous  and  ever  brilliant  fighting.  Besides  the  great 
battle  along  the  main  lines  surrounding  it,  there  were  during 
the  day  five  distinct  brigade  charges  over  it,  one  of  Stanley, 
one  of  Van  Derveer,  one  of  Grose,  a  fourth  by  Willich,  and  a 
fifth  by  Turchin. 

"  Bragg's  orders  were  to  attack  successively  by  divisions, 


404  Life  of  Thomas. 

from  right  to  left.  Breckin ridge  struck  first.  He  came  on- 
in  single  Hue,  swinging  around  toward  the  State  road  to  gain 
Baird's  rear.  Adams  was  on  his  right,  Stovall  in  the  center, 
and  Helm  on  the  left.  This  latter  brigade  struck  Baird's 
breastworks,  and  was  instantly  shattered  there.  Helm  rode 
bravely  among  his  troops,  enthusiastically  urging  them  for- 
ward, and  fell  dead  while  thus  engaged.  Two  of  his  colonels 
were  killed,  and  two  were  wounded. 

"  Stovall  pushed  in  with  dauntless  pluck  against  the  reg- 
ulars on  the  left  of  Scribner,  but  King's  men  fought  splen- 
didly. The  rebels  assaulted  bravely  but  uselessly.  Adams 
had  swept  in  on  John  Beatty's  thin  line,  and  broken  it.  Still- 
it  fought  with  undaunted  courage,  yielding  doggedly,  and  by 
the  inch,  and  finally  Adams,  retarded  by  the  disaster  on  his 
left,  was  at  bay.  At  this  juncture  came  Stanley's  brigade, 
from  Negley,  near  the  center,  with  deployed  lines,  and  the 
sun  on  its  banners.  It  swept  over  the  Kelly  field,  from  near 
the  house,  and  plunged  into  the  woods  in  the  rear  of  Beatty. 
Well  might  those  who  were  witnessing  that  threatening 
move  toward  the  Union  rear  hold  their  breaths  as  Stanley 
disappeared,  and  thus  wait  for  his  volleys  and  their  effect.  In 
a  moment  they  came,  then  his  rattling  line  fire,  then  the 
cheer  of  a  charge.  The  first  attack  of  Breckinridge  had 
ended  in  a  sore  defeat. 

"  But  Cleburne  had  in  turn  advanced.  He,  like  Breck- 
inridge, came  in  single  line.  Polk,  of  Cleburne,  assaulted 
Starkweather's  front,  while  Wood  of  the  same  command  ex- 
tended the  attack  as  far  as  the  right  of  Baldwin.  The  rem- 
nants of  Helm,  under  Colonel  Lewis,  still  assisted  against 
Scribner,  but  soon  Cleburne's  division  was  repelled  at  every 
point  with  terrible  loss.  The  Confederate  officers  engaged 
describe  the  effect  of  the  Union  artillery  throughout  this 
attack  as  the  most  destructive  in  their  experience.  Thus 
Bragg's  first  attack  had  wholly  failed.  The  Union  forces 
were  exultant,  and  so  strong  were  their  skirmish  demonstra- 
tions that  Hill,  who  was  under  orders  to  organize  a  second 
and  much  stronger  attack,  paused  to  first  prepare  his  own 
lines  against  assault. 

"Walker's  reserve  corps  of  two  divisions  was  brought 


The  Chickamauga  Campaign.  405 

up,  and  its  five  brigades  distributed  along  the  shattered  points 
of  Breckinridge's  and  Cleburne's  lines.  The  organizations 
of  rebel  divisions  being  thus  destroyed,  the  attack  became 
largely  one  of  brigades  acting  independently,  each  rushing 
at  the  Union  works.  There  were  ten  rebel  brigaaes  engaged 
in  the  movement  from  the  Union  left  to  Palmer's  position, 
and  beyond  this  point  Stewart's  division  co-operated  by  as- 
saulting Reynolds'  narrow  front  and  Brannan's  lines.  Wood, 
of  Cleburne,  who  had  previously  stormed  the  angle  of  the 
Union  works  on  Johnson's  right  and  been  repulsed,  assisted 
by  Deshler,  of  the  same  division,  thinking  this  angle  the 
flank  of  the  barricades,  again  struck  obliquely  and  with  fury 
with  the  idea  of  turning  them.  Instead,  these  dashing  Con- 
federates went  to  pieces  on  Baldwin's  brigade,  of  Johnson, 
and  on  Palmer's  front.  Walthall  assaulted  the  corresponding 
angle  at  Scribner's  position,  and  though  he  carried  his  men 
within  pistol  range  of  the  crests,  he  was  beaten  back  with 
heavy  loss.  Gist,  acting  with  Helm's  (now  Lewis')  broken 
line,  attacked  with  power,  but  in  turn  was  driven  back.  Col- 
quitt,  still  further  to  the  right,  came  upon  the  regular  bri- 
gade of  King.  But  his  line  had  missed  direction,  and  was 
at  once  exposed  to  a  withering  flank  fire,  and  overwhelmed. 
Oolquitt  fell.  Several  of  his  most  prominent  officers  were 
killed.  Ector  and  Wilson,  of  Walker's  second  division  (Lid- 
dell's),  advanced  to  help,  but  without  effect.  Govan,  how- 
ever, of  this  same  division,  was  successful,  and,  by  hot  fights 
ing  and  the  weight  of  numbers,  he  bore  back  John  Beatty's 
weakened  line,  and  the  situation  on  the  Union  left  became  at 
•once  most  serious.  Every  thing  but  this  along  the  line  of 
the  second  attack  by  Bragg's  right  had  failed.  It  fyegan  to 
look  as  if  rebel  victory  was  dawning  here,  and  that  the  tri- 
umph of  Bragg's  plan  of  turning  the  Union  left  had  come. 

"  For  Breckinridge,  in  the  second  advance,  had  swung 
his  lines  much  further  to  his  right,  and  by  a  wide  left  wheel, 
had  brought  his  right  across  the  State  road,  and  so  between 
the  Union  left  and  Rossville.  His  left  reached  and  slightly 
overlapped  Beatty's  left.  Thus  formed  with  lines  perpendic- 
ular to  the  State  road,  he  began  a  march  directly  toward  the 
Kelley  house  and  the  rear  of  Reynolds,  just  beyond  it. 


400  Life  of  Thomas. 

While  the  remnants  of  the  left,  so  badly  broken,  first  under 
Helm  and  then  under  his  successor,  were  entangled  with 
Beatty  and  Stanley,  his  two  other  brigades,  Adams  on  the 
right  and  Stovall  to  the  left,  burst  out  of  the  woods  on  the 
north  side  of  the  Kelley  field,  quickly  rectified  their  lines, 
threw  out  a  heavy  skirmish  force,  and  bore  rapidly  down 
toward  Reynolds.  It  was  half  a  mile  to  his  position  over 
smooth  and  open  ground.  From  the  start  the  skirmishers 
could  throw  their  bullets  into  Reynolds'  rear.  It  was  a  move- 
ment threatening  dire  disaster.  The  moment  it  developed 
in  the  rear  of  Baird,  Walker's  corps  and  Cleburne's  brigades 
reopened  their  fire  on  the  front  of  the  barricades,  while 
Stewart  advanced  on  Reynolds  and  Bran  nan.  Thus,  taken 
on  flank,  front,  and  full  in  the  rear,  and  outnumbered  at 
every  point,  it  seemed  as  if  there  was  no  salvation  for  the 
Union  left.  But  it  came,  and  at  that  point  where  Confeder- 
ate victory  seemed  sure,  full  defeat  fell  suddenly  upon  them. 
Thomas,  watching  the  progress  of  Breckinridge's  flank  at- 
tack, had  sent  to  Rosecrans  for  Brannan.  At  that  moment 
the  battle  had  not  extended  to  the  latter.  But  just  as  Rose- 
crans' order  to  -go  to  Thomas  reached  Brannan,  signs  of 
heavy  and  immediate  attack  on  his  front  became  apparent. 
He  well  used  his  discretion,  and  remained  on  the  line  until  he 
could  report  the  situation  to  Rosecrans.  But  in  the  mean- 
time, in  partial  compliance  with  the  order,  he  sent  Fred  -Van 
Derveer's  brigade,  which  constituted  his  reserve,  to  the  help 
of  the  left.  This  brigade  deployed,  marched  rapidly  in  two 
lines  toward  the  Kelley  house,  and  came  into  the  field  less 
than  two  hundred  yards  in  advance  of  Breckinridge's  line. 
Though,  presenting  its  flank  to  the  enemy  when  he  was  first 
discovered,  it  changed  front  in  the  open  ground  under  fire, 
charged  the  rebel  line,  broke  it,  following  it  back  into  the 
woods,  and  after  an  hour's  fighting,  drove  these  two  brigades 
with  their  artillery  northward  and  entirely  clear  of  the  Union 
left.  It  then  returned  to  a  point  near  the  Kelle}'  house. 

"Govan,  of  Walker,  next  on  the  left  of  Breckinridge, 
had,  however,  gained  a  lodgment  on  the  line  which  Beatt\~ 
had  so  stubbornly  held.  Then  came  another  Union  charge 
over  the  Kelley  field.  Palmer,  under  Thomas's  orders,  sent 


The  Chickamauga  Campaign.  407 

Grose  with  his  reserve  brigade  to  clear  Baird's  immediate 
left.  Moving  from  the  edge  of  the  woods  back  into  the  open 
field,  Grose  formed  in  double  lines,  moved  at  double-quick 
across  the  rear  of  Johnson  and  Baird,  and  rushed  with  cheers 
into  the  woods  on  the  north  side  of  the  field.  In  a  few  mo- 
ments his  volleys  were  pouring  into  the  face  of  Govan.  The 
latter's  troops  fought  desperately,  .but  their  supports  on  each 
flank  had  been  previously  broken,  and  soon,  after  bitter  loss, 
gave  way.  The  Union  left  was  then  further  strengthened  by 
placing  Barnes,  of  Van  Cleve,  on  the  left  of  Baird.  It  was 
then  noon.  So  badly  shattered  was  Bragg's  right  that  it  was 
nearly  5  o'clock  before  another  attack  could  be  organized  on 
this  ground.  Thenceforth  the  Union  left  was  safe. 

"  Simultaneously  with  the  appearance  of  Breckinridge 
in  the  Kelley  field,  events  were  hastening  to  an  appalling  con- 
summation on  the  Union  center.  Stewart,  the  right  of  Long- 
street's  wing,  moved  to  the  assault  in  Reynolds'  front.  With 
three  brigades  he  rushed  upon  Turchin,  who  formed  Rey- 
nolds' advance,  and  Hazen,  of  Palmer,  next  on  the  left,  while 
his  left  also  involved  Bannan's  left.  On  his  right  he  also  had 
the  co-operation  of  Woods'  and  Deshler's  brigades,  of  Cle- 
burne.  Deshler  was  killed  as  the  movement  began,  and 
Roger  Q.  Mills,  of  Texas,  succeeded  him. 

"As  this  was  the  opening  of  the  memorable  attack 
which  led  to  the  break  in  the  Union  center,  it  is  worthy  of 
close  attention.  General  Stewart,  in  his  report,  thus  de- 
scribes it : 

"  '  For  several  hundred  yards,  both  lines*  pressed  on  un- 
der the  most  terrific  tire  it  has  ever  been  my  fortune  to  wit- 
ness. -The  enemy  retired,  and  our  men,  though  mowed  down 
at  every  step,  rushed  on  at  double-quick,  until  at  length  the 
brigade  on  the  right  of  Brown  broke  in  confusion,  exposing 
him  to  an  enfilading  fire.  He  continued  on,  however,  some 
fifty  to  seventy-five  yards  further,  when  his  two  right  regi- 
ments gave  way  in  disorder  and  retired  to  their  original  po- 
sition. His  center  and  left,  however,  followed  by  the  gallant 
Clayton  and  indomitable  Bate,  pressed  on,  passing  the  corn- 
field in  front  of  the  burnt  house,  and  to  a  distance  of  two 
hundred  to  three  hundred  yards  beyond  the  Chattanooga 


408  Life  of  Thomas. 

road,  driving  the  enemy  within  his  line  of  intrench  ments, 
and  passing  a  battery  of  four  guns,  which  were  afterward 
taken  possession  of  by  a  regiment  from  another  division. 
Here  new  batteries  being  opened  by  the  enemy  on  our  front 
and  flank,  heavily  supported  by  infantry,  it  became  necessary 
to  retire,  the  command  reforming  on  the  ground  occupied 
before  the  advance.' 

"All  this  was  going  on  in  the  front  of  Reynolds  and 
Palmer,  while  Breckin  ridge,  as  already  described,  was  enter- 
ing the  open  field  from  the  north  in  plain  sight  from  their 
rear.  Yet  not  a  single  Union  soldier  left  the  line.  Standing 
steadfast,  they  first  resisted,  as  Stewart  describes,  and  then 
were  incited  to  still  greater  action  by  the  brilliant  fighting 
of  Van  Derveer  in  their  rear,  which  so  unexpectedly  brought 
them  the  much  needed  relief. 

"  Here  the  story  reaches  the  event  of  the  break  in  the 
Union  lines,  which  is  widely  misunderstood,  and  has  been 
most  unjustly  used  to  throw  discredit  on  General  Rosecrans. 
Just  as  Longstreet's  attack  was  developing  upon  Wood's 
front,  the  latter  received  an  order  from  General  Rosecrans 
to  'close  upon  Reynolds  as  fast  as  possible  and  support 
him.'  As  Brannan  was  between  himself  and  Reynolds, 
Wood  saw  no  other  way  of  executing  the  order,  which  he 
deemed  imperative,  except  to  withdraw  from  line,  and  pass 
to  the  rear  of  Brannan.  This  he  did,  although  the  attack 
was  just  bursting  on  his  front. 

"  It  has  been  persistently  claimed,  to  General  Rose- 
crans' detriment,  that  in  the  excitement  of  the  height  of  bat- 
tle, he  had  issued  a  blundering  order.  Nothing  could  be 
more  unjust.  The  explanation  is  perfectly  simple.  General 
Thomas  had  sent  for  Brannan  to  meet  Breckinridge's  flank 
attack.  Stewart's  attack  had  struck  Reynolds  with  force 
and  was  rapidly  developing  on  Brannan's  front.  The  latter 
hastily  consulted  with  Reynolds  as  to  the  propriety  of  with- 
drawing, and  both  being  clear  that  to  obey  the  order  would 
open  the  line  to  the  enemy,  Brannan  dispatched  Van  Der- 
veer, his  reserve,  to  the  left,  in  partial  compliance  with  its 
terms,  and  then  reported  to  Rosecrans  that  he  had  deemed 
it  vitally  important  to  maintain  his  line  till  the  commanding 


The  Chickamauga  Campaign.  409 

officer  could  be  advised  of  the  situation.  He  instantly  ap- 
proved Brannan's  action.  But  just  before  his  message  ar- 
rived, upon  the  supposition  that  he  had  obeyed  the  order 
and  gone  to  Thomas,  the  noted  order  to  Wood  to  close  to 
the  left  on  Reynolds  had  been  dispatched.  When  it  reached 
Wood,  the  attack,  rolling  along  Brannan's  front,  had  reached 
his  own.  Had  he  exercised  the  same  discretion  which  Bran- 
nan  had  so  wisely  displayed,  all  would  have  been  well,  and 
that  nearly  fatal  break  in  the  Union  lines  would  not  have 
occurred.  But  instantly  on  reading  it,  Wood  rapidly  with- 
drew his  division  and  started  in  the  rear  of  Brannan  toward 
Reynolds.  Longstreet,  who  had  waited  most  impatiently 
till  11  o'clock  before  he  could  move  a  man  to  the  attack,  had 
solidified  his  lines  before  the  Union  center  and  left,  and  at  the 
moment  Wood  left  this  wide  gap  for  him,  Longstreet  thrust 
into  it  the  eight  brigades  of  his  central  column  of  attack. 
They  were  formed  in  three  lines,  and  advancing  rapidly  they 
opened  on  Brannan's  right  and  rear  and  Davis'  left,  and 
greatly  widened  the  gap.  Brannan  threw  back  his  right, 
losing  something  from  Council's  brigade  on  that  flank,  but, 
stubbornly  resisting  Longstreet's  advance  as  he  retired  that 
wing  of  his  division,  he  soon  re-established  it  on  Horseshoe 
Ridge,  near  the  Snodgrass  House,  on  a  line  nearly  perpen- 
dicular to  the  one  he  had  occupied  when  Longstreet  pushed 
through  the  gap  left  by  Wood.  The  latter  had  pushed  rap- 
idly to  the  rear  of  Brannan,  and,  though  subjected  to  heavy 
attack  after  passing  Brannan's  left,  he  was  able  to  establish 
his  line  on  a  lower  ridge  in  the  prolongation  of  Brannan's 
new  position,  and  reaching  in  the  direction  of  Reynolds.  The 
latter  officer  soon  retired  his  right  slightly,  and  the  line  was 
again  continuous,  except  a  break  between  Wood  and  Rey- 
nolds, from  Brannan's  right  to  Barnes  on  Baird's  left.  Into 
this  vacant  space  Hazen  moved  later  under  orders  from 
Palmer,  and  then  the  line  on  that  part  of  the  field  was 
firmly  established. 

"All  to  the  right  of  Brannan  had  gone.  Negley,  with 
one  brigade  of  his  division,  which  was  caught  in  the  gap, 
had  drifted  toward  Brannan.  Here,  gathering  up  much 
artillery,  which  he  was  ordered  by  Thomas  to  post  on  the 


410  Life  of  Thomas. 

crest  overlooking  the  field  in  front  of  Baird's  left,  he  took 
it  instead  to  Brannan's  right,  and  soon,  without  waiting  to 
be  attacked  in  his  strong  position,  and  although  he  had 
promised  Brannan  to  hold  this,  abandoned  it,  and  retired  in 
haste  toward  Rossville,  ordering  all  the  artillery  to  follow 
him. 

"  Davis  had  moved  rapidly  into  the  breastworks  which 
Negley  had  occupied,  and  there  placed  his  weak  force  of  two 
brigades  across  Longstreet's  advance.  But,  after  his  terrific 
fighting  of  the  day  before,  he  had  only  twelve  hundred  men 
for  action,  and  though  Carlin,  and  Heg's  men  under  Martin, 
fought  with  desperation,  they  could  do  nothing  but  yield. 
They  were  driven  in  disorder  to  the  right  and  rear. 

"At  the  same  time,  Van  Cleve,  with  his  two  remaining 
brigades  in  motion  toward  Thomas,  was  thrown  into  great 
disorder,  though  a  considerable  portion  of  them  rallied  with 
Wood. 

"As  Davis  was  borne  back,  McCook,  of  the  Twentieth 
Corps,  in  person  led  Laibolt's  brigade,  of  Sheridairs  division, 
against  Longstreet's  advancing  columns.  The  attack  was 
delivered  with  spirit  and  power,  but  it  failed  in  'the  face  of 
overwhelming  numbers,  and  the  brigade  was  utterly  routed. 
McCook  was  carried  to  the  rear  with  it. 

"  Next  came  Sheridan,  with  his  two  remaining  brigades 
under  Lytle  and  Bradley.  The  former,  with  splendid  bearing 
and  courage,  rallied  his  columns,  and  though  they  were  taken 
at  every  disadvantage,  under  the  inspiration  which  he  im- 
parted they  faced  the  resistless  advance  with  desperate  valor. 
Lytle  fell  where  death  was  thickest  for  his  comrades.  His 
brigade,  and  that  of  Bradley,  with  Wilder,  who  had  also 
fought  to  the  extremity  to  assist,  were  all  borne  to  the  rear 
and  forced  to  join  the  fugitive  columns  falling  off  from  the 
Union  right  toward  Rossville.  General  Rosecrans  had  just 
ridden  the  lines  from  the  left,  and  had  passed  in  the  rear  of 
McCook's  position,  when  the  line  was  severed.  Finding  the 
roads  in  rear  of  the  right  filled  with  retreating  columns  rep- 
resenting all  corps  of  the  army,  for  Negley  was  there  from 
Thomas,  he  deemed  it  prudent  to  ride  to  Chattanooga  'and 
decide  upon  a  new  position  in  front  of  the  place.  General 


KELLEY   FIELD— SNODGRASS  HILL— SUNDAY. 


The  Chickamauga  Campaign.  411 

Crittenden's  whole  command,  that  is,  three  divisions,  having 
been  ordered  in  succession  to  Thomas  before  the  break,  Crit- 
tenden  himself,  being  without  command,  rode  into  Chatta- 
nooga after  Rosecrans,  as  did  also  McCook.  Sheridan's  divis- 
ion was  in  good  order  by  the  time  it  reached  Rossville,  and 
most  of  the  troops  which  left  the  field  were  about  that  place 
and  McFarland's  Gap  in  fighting  condition  throughout  the 
afternoon.  Their  numbers  at  2  o'clock  were  from  seven  to 
ten  thousand.  They  could  easily  have  been  led  to  Baird's 
left  or  Brannan's  right,  as  the  way  to  either  flank  was  open. 
This  was  proved  by  the  fact  that  General  Garfield,  Colonel 
Gates  P.  Tburston,  and  Surgeons  Gross  and  Perkins,  the 
medical  directors  of  the  Fourteenth  and  Twentieth  Corps,  rode 
back  and  joined  General  Thomas.  It  is  one  of  the  myths  of 
current  Chickamauga  history  that  Sheridan  marched  with  his 
division  back  to  the  fighting  line,  but  this  is  an  error.  He 
received  a  request  at  McFarland's  Gap  from  General  Thomas 
to  return  to  the  field,  but  decided  instead  to  retire  to  Ross- 
ville.  Upon  reaching  the  latter  point  he  moved  out  on  the 
Lafayette  road  toward  General  Thomas,  but  did  not  form  a 
junction  with  him.  He  reached  the  Cloud  House  at  7  P.  M. 
and  soon  after  withdrew  to  Rossville. 

"  Six  Confederate  divisions  under  Longstreet  had  taken 
part  in  breaking  the  Union  center  and  sweeping  its  right  off 
the  field.  These  were  Stewart,  Bushrod  Johnson,  and  Pres- 
ton, of  Buckner's  corps  ;  Hood  and  McLaws,  of  Longstreet's 
Virginia  troops,  and  Hindman's  division  of  Polk's  corps. 
Eight  brigades  of  this  force  had  first  entered  the  gap  left  by 
Wood,  and  from  that  time  till  Rosecrans,  McCook,  Critten- 
den,  and  Sheridan  had  gone,  and  Brannan  had  established 
himself  on  Horseshoe  Ridge,  each  of  these  six  divisions  had 
advanced  and  fought  with  vigor.  Finally  Hindman,  finding 
no  resistance  on  his  left,  moved  to  the  right  to  assist  Long- 
street's  center  and  right,  which  had  been  checked  by  Brannan 
and  Wood.  This  brought  Longstreet's  six  divisions  together 
in  the  vicinity  of  Horseshoe  Ridge. 

"  Shortly  after  2  o'clock  Longstreet  ordered  a  general  as- 
sault by  his  wing.  It  was  delivered  with  confidence  and 
tremendous  power.  To  meet  these  six  divisions  Brannan  on 


412  Life  of  Thomas. 

the  right  had  Croxton's  brigade  and  part  of  ConnelPs;  Wood, 
on  the  left,  had  Barker's  brigade.  With  these  organized 
commands  were  a  part  of  John  Beatty's,  a  good  part  of  Stan- 
ley's and  the  Twenty-first  Ohio,  of  Sirwell's,  all  of  Negley; 
parts  of  the  Ninth  -and  the  Seventeenth  Kentucky ;  Forty- 
fourth  Indiana  and  Thirteenth  Ohio,  of  Yan  Cleave's  divis- 
ion, with  the  fifty-eighth  Indiana,  of  Buell's  brigade — in 
all  about  4,000  men. 

"Against  this  line,  hastily  formed  and  without  reserves, 
Longstreet  launched  his  solid  columns.  They  came  on  mag- 
nificently, wave  behind  wave.  They  met  sheeted  fire  from 
the  summits,  and  yet  pressed  on  to  hand  encounters,  but  from 
these  they  soon  recoiled.  The  whole  line  retired  to  the 
foot  of  the  slopes,  and  covered  by  the  forests  organized  for  a 
second  attack.  It  was  delivered  soon  after  3  o'clock.  Like 
the  first,  it  fell  on  the  fronts  of  Wood  and  Bran-nan.  But 
while  Hindman  assaulted  the  latter  in  front  he  also  sent 
a  brigade  through  the  gap  to  Brannan's  right  to  scale 
the  ridge  and  gain  his  rear.  Negley,  who  had  held  this 
point  with  abundant  artillery  and  infantry  supports,  and' 
who  had  promised  to  stay  there,  had  promptly  fled  before 
any  attack  had  reached  him  and  was  even  then  in  Rossville. 
There  was  absolutely  nothing  to  send  against  Hindman's 
left,  towering  there  with  its  fringe  of  bayonets  on  the  com- 
manding ridge,  and  forming  to  sweep  down  on  Brannan's 
right  and  rear.  Longstreet  and  all  his  general  officers  were 
exultant,  and  though  their  second  attack  had  failed  every- 
where, except  as  this  lodgment  was  obtained  on  the  ridge 
beyond  Brannan,  they  rapidly  arranged  their  lines  for  what 
they  believed  would  be  a  final  assault  leading  to  sure  victory. 

"  But  not  a  Union  soldier  moved  from  his  place.  The 
men  clutched  their  guns  tighter.  Officers  every-where  moved 
closer  to  the  lines  to  encourage  and  steady  them.  The  color- 
bearers  set  their  flags  firmer.  And  then,  as  if  to  repay  such 
courage,  help  came  as  unexpectedly  as  if  the  hand  of  the 
Lord  had  been  visibly  extended  to  save.  Suddenly  a  Union 
column  appeared,  moving  with  speed  across  the  fields  from 
the  direction  of  the  McDaniel  house.  It  was  Granger,  of 
the  reserve,  with  two  brigades  of  Steedman's  division.  Be- 


The  Chickamauga  Campaign.  413 

ing  stationed  four  miles  away  toward  Ringgold,  Granger, 
agreeing  with  Steedman  that  they  must  be  sorely  needed  on 
the  field,  had  started  without  orders,  and  though  shelled  by 
Forrest  on  his  flank  for  two  miles  of  the  way,  had  not  al- 
lowed his  columns  to  be  greatly  delayed.  And  now  Steed- 
man  was  sweeping  up  to  the  foot  of  the  hill  below  the  Suod- 
grass  House.  As  he  reported  to  Thomas,  coming  in  from 
toward  the  Kelley  farm  was  another  well-ordered  column.  It 
proved  to  be  Van  Derveer  returning  from  the  charge  upon 
Breckinridge  in  the  Kelley  field.  The  map  shows  how  he 
had  left  Brannan's  line  just  before  the  break,  and  hastened 
with  deployed  lines  toward  the  left ;  how  thus  deployed  he 
had  marched  from  the  woods  to  be  enfiladed  from  Breckin- 
ridge's  front  as  the  latter  emerged  from  the  woods  and  burst 
upon  the  Union  rear.  Here,  under  this  fire,  he  whirled  his 
brigade  to  the  left,  delivered  a  full  volley  at  pistol  range  into 
the  enemy's  faces,  charged  into  their  lines  on  a  run,  drove 
them  back  on  their  batteries,  and  pursued  both  infantry  and 
artillery  to  a  point  beyond  the  Union  left,  where  Grose,  com- 
ing from  the  rear  of  Palmer,  completed  the  work.  The 
dotted  line  shows  Van  Derveer's  return.  He,  too,  had 
moved  without  orders  to  the  sound  of  tremendous  firing 
about  the  Snodgrass  House.  Just  as  Steedman  had  hastily 
formed  and  assaulted  Hindman's  forces  beyond  the  right  of 
Brannan,  Van  Derveer  joined  his  brigade  to  Steedman's  left 
and  moved  also  to  the  assault.  Steedman  seized  a  regimental 
flag  and  rode  with  it  in  his  hands  to  the  top.  His  command 
was  the  brigades  of  those  splendid  soldiers,  John  G.  Mitchell 
and  Walter  C.  "Whitaker. 

"  One  (Whitaker' s)  plunged  into  the  gorge  through 
which  Hindman's  left  was  pouring,  the  rest  of  the  line,  with 
Van  Derveer  on  its  left,  charged  for  the  ridge.  In  twenty 
minutes  it  was  carried,  and  all  of  Hindman's  forces  were 
driven  from  it  and  out  of  the  ravine.  Whitaker  had  been 
wounded,  and  four  of  his  five  staff  officers  either  killed  or 
mortally  wounded.  One-fifth  of  Steedman's  force  had  been 
disabled  in  the  charge.  Van  Derveer's  loss  was  considerable, 
but  less  in  proportion,  as  he  was  not  fairly  in  front  of  Hind- 
man,  as  Steedman  was.  Twice  Hindmau  turned  his  recoil- 


414  Life  of  Thomas. 

ing  troops  to  recapture  the  position,  but  finally  abandoned 
the  effort  and  relinquished  the  ridge  to  Steedman.  The 
center  and  right  of  Longstreet's  third  assault  was  in  like 
manner  repelled.  In  this  movement  the  Fourth  Kentucky, 
Colonel  R.  M.  Kelley,  joined  Van  Derveer  and  fought  with 
him  till  night. 

"  The  corning  of  Steedman  was  more  than  an  inspira- 
tion. It  was  more  than  the  holding  of  the  right.  He 
brought  100,000  rounds  of  cartridges  and  artillery  ammuni- 
tion— far  more  welcome  than  diamonds.  Regiments  in  the 
line  had  been  fighting,  even  at  that  early  hour,  with  the  bay- 
onet and  clubbed  muskets.  Now,  when  Longstreet's  right 
came  on  in  aid  of  the  attempt  of  Hindman  to  hold  his  posi- 
tion on  the  crest,  they  were  received  with  terrific  and  contin- 
uing fire,  and  as  the  lines  of  gray,  with  desperate  valor, 
neared  the  summit,  Wood's  men  and  Brannan's  rushed  at 
them  with  the  bayonet  and  broke  their  ranks,  rolled  them 
down  the  slopes,  and  on  Wood's  front,  with  the  help  of  a  di- 
rect fire  from  Aleshire's  battery  on  the  left,  and  a  terrible 
enfilading  fire  from  Battery  I,  Fourth  Regular  Artillery,  on 
Brannan's  left,  under  those  splendid  young  soldiers,  Lieu- 
tenants Frank  G.  Smith  and  George  B.  Rodney,  drove  them 
in  disorder  beyond  their  artillery. 

"  At  this  time  both  Confederate  wings,  were  calling  for 
reinforcements.  Bragg's  reply  to  Longstreet  was  that  the 
right  was  so  badly  shattered  that  it  could  not  help  him. 

"  When  Steedman's  coming  with  four  thousand  men  had 
so  changed  the  whole  current  of  the  battle,  what  if  the 
seven  thousand  men  under  Sheridan  and  Negley  about  Mc- 
Farland's  and  Rossville,  much  nearer  than  Steedman  was,  had 
been  brought  up  ?  How  the  officers  who  were  there  could 
stay  themselves,  or  manage  to  keep  the  men,  is  a  mystery 
sickening  to  think  about. 

"Hindman  thus  tells  of  the  attack  by  which  he  car- 
ried the  ridge  t6  the  right  of  Brannan,  before  Steedman  ar- 
rived : 

" '  In  a  few  minutes  a  terrific  contest  ensued,  which  con- 
tinued, at  close  quarters,  without  any  intermission,  over  four 
hours.  Our  troops  attacked  again  and  again  with  a  courage 


The  Chickamauga  Campaign.  415 

worthy  of  their  past  achievements.  The  enemy  fought  with 
determined  obstinacy,  and  repeatedly  repulsed  us,  but  only 
to  be  again  assailed.  As  showing  the  fierceness  of  the  fight, 
the  fact  is  mentioned  that  on  our  extreme  left  the  bayonet 
was  used,  and  men  were  also  killed  and  wounded  with 
clubbed  muskets.' 

"  Of  the  attack  of  Steedman's  men  in  the  ravine,  where 
they  rushed  on  the  Confederate  line  with  the  bayonet, 
pushed  in  among  the  guns  and  killed  gunners  at  their  posts, 
Hindman  further  says :  '  I  have  never  known  Federal  troops 
to  fight  so  well.  It  is  just  to  say,  also,  that  I  never  saw  Con- 
federate soldiers  fight  better.'  Of  the  second  attack  upon 
Brannan's  position,  which  was  repulsed,  Kershaw,  command- 
ing in  Longstreet's  troops  from  Virginia,  said :  '  This  was 
one  of  the  heaviest  attacks  of  the  war  on  a  single  point.' 

"  Up  to  the  time  of  Steedman's  arrival,  there  had  been 
a  break  between  Reynolds  and  Wood,  but  the  flank  of  the 
former  in  advance  of  the  latter  somewhat  covered  it.  Upon 
this  point  Longstreet  now  organized  a  heavy  attack.  But 
the  lull  on  the  left,  arising  from  the  rebels  having  been,  as 
Bragg  expressed  it,  *  so  badly  beaten  back '  there  that  they 
could  be  of  no  service  on  his  left,  made  it  practicable  to 
strengthen  the  Union  center.  Hazen  was  found  to  have  am- 
munition, and  was  moved  with  celerity  into  the  gap,  and 
Grose,  Johnson's  reserve,  replaced  him.  Hazen  arrived  none 
too  soon.  His  lines  were  hardly  established  before  Long- 
street's  right  was  upon  him,  lapping  over  upon  Reynolds' 
front,  and  then,  from  Reynolds  to  Steedman,  there  was  one 
continuing  hell  of  battle.  Garfield,  who  had  come  up  with 
an  escort,  having  ridden  from  Rossville,  after  reporting  to 
Thomas,  moved  along  the  ranks  of  his  old  brigade  (Harker, 
of  Wood),  encouraging  the  men,  and  giving  evidence  against 
all  loiterers  at  the  gaps  in  the  rear  that  every  officer  and  man 
of  them  could  easily  have  reached  the  field. 

"  Longstreet's  columns  assaulted  at  every  point  as  rapidly 
as  his  lines  rolled  back  from  the  crest  could  be  reformed. 
He  had  ten  brigades  in  front  of  Brannan  and  Steedman, 
while  these  officers  had  only  four  unbroken  in  organization, 
and  fragments  of  two  others.  One  brigade  of  Preston,  which 


416  Life  of  Thomas. 

assaulted  Wood's  and  Hazen's  line,  had  over  2,000  men  iu  the 
movement.  The  successive  movements,  rather  the  tremen- 
dous dashes  of  these  lines  against  the  hill,  was  like  the  ad- 
vance of  breakers  with  which  ocean  storms  attack  the  shore. 
But,  as  surely,  each  wave  with  its  crest  of  steel,  its  spray  of 
smoke,,  and  its  glitter  of  fire  broke  and  swept  back  with  dead 
and  wounded  in  its  terrible  undertow.  It  was  treason,  but 
magnificent.  Such  was  the  scene  which  these  soldiers  of 
Thomas  saw  on  the  Snodgrass  Hill  throughout  the  afternoon 
till  dusk. 

"  To  relieve  the  left,  Polk  was  ordered  at  3  o'clock  to 
attack  in  force  with  the  whole  right  wing.  But  it  required 
much  time  to  organize  those  battered  lines  for  assault,  but 
when  done,  it  was,  indeed,  formidable.  The  second  map  will 
make  it  plain.  Cleburne,  with  four  brigades,  was  deployed 
before  Palmer  and  Johnson.  Jackson  and  Polk's  brigades 
lapped  over  Baird.  Cheatham  was  in  a  second  line.  The 
map  gives  his  position  wrongly,  though  it  is  taken  from  the 
original  official  map  in  the  War  Department.  Ranged  fur- 
ther to  the  right,  and  crossing  the  State  and  Lafayette  road 
at  McDaniel's,  and  thus  massed  against  the  Union  left,  were 
the  divisions  of  Breckinridge  and  Liddell,  Armstrong's  dis- 
mounted cavalry  division  of  Forrest,  and  Forrest's  artillery. 
While  Grade's  brigade,  of  Preston,  was  assaulting  Hazen  and 
Wood,  this  attack  on  the  Union  left  began.  But,  as  before, 
the  brigades  that  moved  up  to  the  log  breastworks  were 
speedily  shattered,  though  this  time  they  took  their  artillery 
forward  through  the  thickets  with  them,  pushing  it  by  hand. 

"  Once  more,  as  the  assault  was  made  on  Baird's  left, 
there  came  a  Union  charge  across  the  Kelley  field,  the  fourth 
for  the  day.  This  time  it  was  Willich,  the  reserve  of  John- 
son. Withdrawing  from  line  and  facing  north,  he  swept 
along  on  the  run  and  with  cheers.  His  lines  dashed  into 
the  woods  at  the  point  where  Stanley  and  Grose  had  charged 
before,  and  without  a  halt  sprang  into  the  faces  of  the  ad- 
vancing Confederates.  King's  regulars  and  Barnes  gave 
brave  help,  and  once  more  the  immediate  left  was  cleared. 
The  force  on  the  road  by  the  McDaniel  house,  though  un- 
broken, was  not  advanced.  Later,  an  assault  on  Reynolds 


The  Chickamauga  Campaign.  417 

and  Palmer  was  ordered,  but,  naturally,  it  was  feeble  after  so 
many  repulses  at  the  breastworks.  At  half-past  5  there  was 
quiet  again  along  the  Union  left.  Longstreet,  however,  in 
front  of  the  right,  was  active  for  another  hour,  though  at 
every  point  unsuccessful. 

At  half-after  5,  General  Thomas,  having  full  discretion, 
decided  to  withdraw  to  occupy  the  passes  in  his  rear  at  Me- 
Farland's  and  Rossville,  which  controlled  the  roads  to  Chatta- 
nooga. His  line  was  solid  at  every  point.  Both  wings  of 
the  Confederates  were  at  bay.  Their  right  was  too  much 
broken  to  successfully  assault  the  Union  left.  The  Union 
right,  though  its  ammunition  ran  low,  and  its  officers  were 
constantly  searching  the  boxes  of  the  killed  and  wounded 
for  cartridges,  was  becoming  practiced  in  the  use  of  the 
bayonet  against  assaulting  lines,  and,  in  spite  of  the  persist- 
ence of  Longstreet's  men,  had  begun  to  feel  comfortable  in 
its  position.  The  whole  line  could  have  been  held  until 
night.  But  daylight  was  wanted  to  set  the  army  in  orderly 
motion  toward  the  gaps  which  controlled  the  city.  After 
that  was  accomplished,  the  darkness  afforded  the  needed 
cover,  to  complete  the  movement.  It  was  because  Chatta- 
nooga, and  not  the  Chickamauga  woods,  was  the  objective 
of  the  campaign  that  the  army  withdrew  to  Rossville.  It 
was  in  no  sense  a  military  retreat.  It  was,  in  fact,  an  advance. 

"  If  Thomas  had  not  occupied  these  passes  in  the  night, 
Bragg  could  have  done  so,  and  the  object  he  had  in  view 
would  then  have  been  accomplished.  Had  Thomas  allowed 
it,  Bragg  would  have  been  only  to  glad  to  have  withdrawn 
from  the  field  and  '  retreated '  on  Rossville.  Thomas  did  not 
permit  it,  but  went  there  first,  and  Chattanooga  was  won. 

"  The  withdrawal  involved  some  fighting.  The  move- 
ment began  on  the  right  of  Reynolds.  Palmer,  Johnson, 
and  Baird  were  to  follow  in  succession,  all  leaving  their 
skirmishers  in  their  works. 

"  Reynolds  formed  his  brigades  by  the  flank  on  each  side 

of  the  Lafayette  road,  Edward  King  on  the  right  and  Turchin 

on  the  left.    Thus  he  advanced  northward  along  the  Kelley  field 

toward  Rossville.     General  Thomas  followed  at  the  head  of 

27 


418  Life  of  Thomas. 

the  column.  As  they  passed  a  short  distance  beyond  the 
south  line  of  the  field  they  encountered  the  advancing  troops 
which  had  taken  part  in  the  last  rebel  attack.  Instantly 
Thomas  ordered  Reynolds  to  cause  Turchin  to  file  to  the 
left,  and  after  thus  changing  front  to  '  charge  and  clear 
them  out.'  The  line  of  Turchin's  charge  is  shown  on  the 
map.  Filing  into  the  woods  to  the  left  at  double-quick,  he 
faced  to  the  front  while  thus  moving,  and  his  lines  darted  at 
a  run  into  the  faces  of  the  enemy.  It  was  one  of  the  bravest 
and  most  brilliant,  most  important  and  effective  charges  of 
the  day — the  fifth  over  those  Kelley  fields.  At  the  same 
moment  King,  forcing  his  way  along  the  road,  fell  on  the 
flank  of  Liddell's  division  and  broke  it.  Dan  McCook,  who 
had  been  active  during  the  day  on  the  flank  of  Forrest,  ad- 
vanced and  opened  with  his  artillery  on  the  rebel  rear,  and 
after  short  but  sharp  fighting  the  formidable  array  was 
driven  back  and  the  way  to  Rossvllle  was  open. 

"  Turchin  and  King  moved  by  the  roads  to  McFarland's 
Gap.  Baird,  Johnson,  and  Palmer  followed  over  the  same 
roads.  They  were  attacked  as  they  left  their  works  and  crossed 
the  Kelley  field,  but  order  in  their  columns  was  restored  as  soon 
as  they  gained  the  shelter  of  the  woods  on  the  west  of  the  road. 
Hazen  and  Wood  followed  at  7  P.  M.  without  molestation. 
Steedman  withdrew  at  six  o'clock  from  the  extreme  right, 
and  Brannan  was  left  alone  on  Horseshoe  Ridge.  The  sun 
was  down.  The  shadows  were  thickening  in  the  woods  be- 
fore him,  and  yet  Longstreet's  men  remained  on  the  slopes, 
and  several  times  appeared  in  detachments  close  along  his 
lines.  Suddenly  a  line  of  Preston's  men  were  found  on  the 
slope  where  Steedman  had  been.  By  some  strange  over- 
sight Brannan  had  not  been  notified  that  his  right  was  un- 
protected. A  hasty  examination  in  the  gathering  dusk 
showed  another  rebel  line  on  the  slope  directly  in  the  rear, 
which  had  come  round  through  the  gap  where  Steed- 
man's  right  had  been,  and  was  evidently  forming  for  an 
assault.  The  Thirty-fifth  Ohio,  of  Van  Derveer's  brigade, 
was  thrown  back  to  face  both  these  lines.  Fragments  of 
five  regiments  more,  which  had  opportunely  arrived,  were 
given  to  the  commander  of  the  Thirty -fifth.  His  own  regi- 


The  Chickamanga  Campaign.  413 

merit  had  one  round  and  one  in  the  guns.  This  was  placed 
in  front.  The  others,  with  fixed  bayonets,  were  formed  in 
the  rear.  Just  before  dark  a  rebel  officer  rode  in  on  the  line 
and  asked  what  troops  were  here.  He  was  shot  by  the  near 
outposts. 

"  Then  came  a  scattering  fire  from  the  flank  of  the  rebel 
line  along  the  ridge,  next  a  volley  from  the  Thirty-fifth,  and  a 
a  silent  awaiting  results  behind  its  line  of  bayonets  The  vol- 
ley had  scattered  the  enemy  on  the  ridge,  and  the  force  in  the 
rear  had  withdrawn.  These  were  the  last  shots  on  the  right. 
Following  them  there  was  absolute  quiet  every- where  on  the 
field.  The  stillness  was  painful  and  awful.  Brannan's  officers 
and  men,  peering  down  into  the  dim  and  smoking  ravine, 
saw  long  lines  of  fire  creeping  over  the  leaves,  and  in  and  out 
among  the  wounded  and  the  dead.  It  was  a  sight  far  more 
horrible  than  any  of  the  pictured  presentations  of  Dante's 
Inferno.  From  this  scene,  with  the  low  wailings  of  the  suf- 
ferers in  their  ears,  they  turned  in  triumph  and  exultant  to 
form  the  rear  guard  of  Thomas's  advance  to  Rossville.  Tur- 
chin  and  Willich  fought  last  on  the  left  and  formed  the  rear 
guard  there  ;  Van  Derveer  covered  the  right.  At  midnight 
the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  occupied  the  passes  which 
made  the  possession  of  Chattanooga  secure. 

"  There  had  been  no  such  disordered  rush  of  the  broken 
portions  of  the  army  on  Chattanooga  as  the  panic-stricken 
correspondent  of  an  Eastern  paper,  who  gave  visions  of  his  own 
early  flight  to  the  country  as  news,  depicted.  Only  a  small 
part  of  the  broken  wing  drifted  to  Chattanooga.  From  7,000 
to  10,000  stopped  at  Rossville,  and  were  fairly  organized  there. 
When  Thomas's  forces  arrived  the  whole  army  was  placed  in 
position  on  Missionary  Ridge,  and  in  front  of  it,  and  remained 
in  line  of  battle  at  Rossville  throughout  the  whole  of  the  21st. 

"At  nightfall  the  army  advanced  to  Chattanooga — ad- 
vanced is  the  word ;  the  term  l  retreated,'  so  persistently  used 
in  regard  to  this  movement  has  no  place  in  the  truthful  his- 
tory of  this  campaign.  The  Army  of  the  Cumberland  was  on 
its  way  to  Chattanooga,  the  city  it  set  out  to  capture.  It  had 
halted  at  Chickamauga,  on  its  line  of  advance,  to  fight  for  its 
objective.  On  the  night  of  the  21st  it  began  its  last  march 


420  Life  of  Thomas. 

for  the  city.  Every  foot  of  it  was  a  march  in  advance,  and 
not  retreat.  At  sunrise  of  the  22d  Brannan's  division,  which 
was  the  rear  guard,  reached  the  city,  and  the  campaign  for 
Chattanooga  was  at  an  end.  Until  that  morning  broke  the 
great  bulk  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  had  never  seen 
the  place. 

"  Thus,  crowned  with  success,  though  won  at  terrible 
cost,  closed  the  last  campaign  of  General  Rosecraus.  It  was 
matchless  in  its  strategy,  unequaled  in  the  skill  and  energy 
with  which  his  outnumbered  army  was  concentrated  for  bat- 
tle. Its  stubborn,  desperate,  and  heroic  fighting  throughout 
the  two  days'  battle  was  not  surpassed,  and  judged  by  its 
returns  of  dead  and  wounded,  not  equaled  in  any  one  of  the 
great  battles  of  the  war.  It  secured  the  city  which  it 
marched  to  capture.  The  loss  was  no  greater  than  the 
country  would  have  expected  at  any  time  in  attaining  that 
result.  If  Rosecrans  had  crossed  the  river  in  front  of  the 
city,  and  captured  it  with  even  greater  loss,  the  country 
would  have  gone  wild  with  enthusiasm.  Had  he  been  prop- 
erly supported  from  Washington,  he  would  have  entered  it 
without  a  battle,  since,  if  there  had  been  even  a  show  of 
activity  elsewhere,  Bragg's  army  would  not  have  been  so 
heavily  reinforced,  and  thus  enabled  to  march  back  on 
Chattanooga  after  its  retreat  from  the  city.  The  reverse 
on  the  field  on  Sunday  was  not  the  disaster  which  at  the  time 
it  was  declared  to  be,  and  which  it  has  ever  since  suited  sev- 
eral writers  of  military  fiction  to  persistently  represent. 
The  account  herewith  presented  shows  that  after  General 
Thomas  consolidated  his  lines  at  1  o'clock  on  Sunday,  not  a 
single  position  was  carried  and  held  by  the  enemy.  The 
withdrawal,  which  begun  soon  after  5  o'clock,  was  not  in 
any  sense  forced.  There  is  not  an  oflicer  or  soldier  who 
fought  on  those  lines  but  knows  that  they  could  have  been 
held  throughout  till  dark. 

"  The  accepted  version  of  Sunday's  break  on  Rosecrans' 
right  is  that  the  two  corps  of  Crittenden  and  McCook  were 
swept  off  the  field ;  but  only  five  brigades  of  McCook's  en- 
tire corps  left  the  field,  and  the  fragments  which  went  from 
Crittenden  would  not  exceed  two  brigades.  Palmer's  and 


The  Chickamauga  Campaign.  421 

Johnson's  divisions,  which  fought  splendidly  to  the  end 
under  Thomas  on  the  left,  were  respectively  from  Critten- 
den's  and  McCook's  corps.  Wood  belonged  to  Crittenden. 
Barnes'  brigade,  which  fought  on  the  extreme  left,  and  part 
of  Dick's  and  Samuel  Beatty's  were  all  of  Van  Cleve's  divi- 
sion of  Crittenden's  corps.  In  other  words,  the  large  part 
of  Crittenden's  force  fought  to  the  last.  Four  regiments  of 
Wilder's  brigade  of  Reynolds'  division  were  detached  and 
cut  oft'  with  the  right,  and  a  considerable  part  of  Negley's 
division  of  Thomas  went  to  the  rear,  chiefly  through  the  bad 
conduct  of  its  commander.  We  have  seen,  however,  how 
persistently  and  effectively  Stanley's  and  John  Beatty's 
brigades  of  that  division  fought,  and  Beatty  and  General 
Charles  Grosvenor  and  Sirwell  and  Stoughton,  of  these 
brigades,  were  all  found  fighting  like  private  soldiers  on  the 
hill  with  Wood  and  Brannau  to  the  last.  The  battle  of 
Sunday  was,  then,  not  the  fight  of  any  one  corps,  but  of  the 
Army  of  the  Cumberland.  There  was  no  disorderly  retreat 
of  the  army  on  Chattanooga,  and  nothing  approaching  it. 
The  greater  portion  of  the  right  wing,  which  was  cut  off  and 
certainly  thrown  -into  much  confusion,  was  reorganized  at 
Rossville,  and  occupied  its  place  in  line  at  tbat  point  through- 
out the  next  day,  and  until  the  army  moved  on  in  the  night 
to  occupy  Chattanooga.  The  battle  was  desperate  from  the 
moment  it  opened  till  its  close.  For  the  most  part  the  lines 
fought  at  close  range,  and  in  the  countless  assaults,  often 
hand  to  hand.  On  the  first  day  there  were  no  field  works  of 
any  kind.  On  the  second  Thomas  was  protected  by  such 
rude  log  works  as  could  be  hastily  thrown  together.  Bran- 
nan  and  Steedman  were  without  a  semblance  of  works.  The 
battle  in  the  main,  on  both  sides,  was  dogged,  stand-up  fight- 
ing far  within  the  limit  of  point  blank  range.  For  the  sec- 
ond day,  on  the  Confederate  side,  the  contest  was  one  con- 
tinued series  of  brave  and  magnificent  assaults. 

"  General  Rosecrans  had  crossed  the  Tennessee  with  an 
effective  force  of  all  arms  equipped  for  duty  of  a  few  hundred 
more  than  60,000.  Of  this  number  Wagner's  brigade,  with 
2,061  effectives,  held  Chattanooga,  leaving  the  Union  force 
in  front  of  Bragg  slightly  less  than  58,000.  It  was  several 


422  Life  of  Thomas. 

thousand  less  at  the  battle,  Post's  brigade  of  Davis'  division, 
and  three  regiments  of  infantry  and  one  battery,  being  en- 
gaged in  guarding  supply  trains. 

"In  a  letter  from  General  Lee  to  President  Davis,  dated 
September  14,  1863,  the  following  figures  of  Bragg's  actual 
and  prospective  strength  are  thus  stated : 

"'If  the  report  sent  to  me  by  General  Cooper  since  my 
return  from  Richmond  is  correct,  General  Bragg  had,  on  the 
20th  of  August  last,  51,101  effective  men ;  General  Buckuer, 
16,118.  He  was  to  receive  from  General  Johnson  9,000.  His 
total  force  will,  therefore,  be  76,219,  as  large  a  number  as  I 
presume  he  can  operate  with.  This  is  independent  of  the 
local  troops,  which,  you  may  recollect,  he  reported  as  exceed- 
ing his  expectations.' 

"  It  will  be  well  to  remember,  in  connection  with  these 
official  figures,  that  Bragg,  after  the  battle,  reported  Long- 
street's  force,  which  was  not  included  by  Lee,  at  5,000.  This, 
according  to  the  figures  furnished  General  Lee,  gave  Bragg 
81,219.  According  to  General  Johnson's  correspondence, 
after  he  had  sent  9,000  to  Bragg,  he  subsequently  dispatched 
him  two  small  brigades,  and  these,  later,  reached  him  the 
day  before  the  battle. 

"A  reference  to  the  losses  on  each  side  will  show  that 
there  has  been  no  exaggeration  in  the  description  of  the 
fighting.  Rosecrans'  loss  was  16,179.  This  included  4,774 
missing,  of  which  a  large  number  were  killed  or  wounded. 
Bragg's  losses,  as  compiled  and  estimated  at  the  "War  Records 
Office,  were  17,804.  Thus,  the  entire  loss  for  each  army  was 
over  twenty-five  per  cent  of  the  entire  force  of  each.  Hill's 
corps  of  the  Confederate  right  wing  lost  2,990  out  of  a  total 
8,884.  Of  the  22,885  in  Longstreet's  left  wing,  the  loss  was 
7,856,  with  one  brigade  heavily  engaged  not  reported. 
Longstreet's  loss  on  Sunday  afternoon  was  thirty-six  per  cent 
of  those  engaged. 

"  The  casualties  in  Jackson's  brigade  of  Cleburne's  divis- 
ion, which  assaulted  on  Baird's  front,  was  35  per  cent,  while 
the  Fifth  Georgia,  of  that  brigade,  lost  55  per  cent,  and  the 
First  Confederate  Regulars  43  per  cent.  Gregg's  brigade, 
of  Buckner's  corps,  lost  652  out  of  1,425.  Helm's  Ken- 


The  Chickamauga  Campaign.  423 

tucky  brigade,  on  the  Union  left,  lost  75  per  cent  of  its 
strength.  Bate's  brigade  lost  7  officers  killed  and  61  officers 
wounded,  and  the  total  casualties  were  607  out  of  1,316. 
All  his  field  officers  except  three  were  killed  or  wounded. 
The  losses  in  Govan's  brigade,  of  Walker's  corps,  exceeded 
50  per  cent.  Deas,  who  fought  in  front  of  Steedman's  as- 
sault, lost  745  out  of  1,942.  Walthall,  of  Walker,  lost  705 
out  of  1,727.  On  the  Union  side  Steedman  in  four  hours  lost 
1,787  out  of  3,700,  and  all  were  killed  and  wounded  but  one. 
Brannan's  division  had  5,998  engaged.  Its  casualties  were 
2,174,  or  38  per  cent.  The  loss  in  Van  Derveer's  brigade, 
of  this  division,  in  four  regiments  and  one  battery,  was  840 
out  of  1,788  engaged,  or  49  per  cent.  Croxton's  brigade,  of 
the  same  division,  made  up  of  five  regiments,  lost  938.  Of 
Van  Derveer's  regiments  the  Ninth  Ohio  lost  50  per  cent ; 
the  Thirty-fifth  Ohio,  a  small  fraction  less  than  50  per  cent ; 
the  Second  Minnesota  192,  or  exactly  50  per  cent,  and  the 
Eighty-seventh  Indiana  about  half  its  number.  General 
Wood  lost  1,070  in  two  brigades. 

"  These  figures  become  the  more  significant  when  com- 
pared with  the  statement  of  losses  in  the  world's  noted  bat- 
tles. General  Wheeler,  the  distinguished  Confederate  cav- 
alry commander,  thus  vividly  presented  this  question  to  the 
gathering  of  the  Society  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland 
and  Confederates,  at  Chattanooga,  in  1881 : 

"  '  Waterloo  was  one  of  the  most  desperate  and  bloody 
fields  chronicled  in  European  history  and  yet  Wellington's 
casualties  were  less  than  12  per  cent,  his  losses  being  2,432 
killed  and  9,528  wounded  out  of  90,000  men,  while  at  Shiloh, 
the  first  great  battle  in  which  General  Grant  was  engaged, 
one  side  lost  in  killed  and  wounded  9,740  out  of  34,000,  while 
their  opponents  reported  their  killed  and  wounded  at  9,616, 
making  the  casualties  about  30  per  cent.  At  the  great  battle 
of  Wagram,  Napoleon  lost  but  about  5  per  cent.  At  Wurz- 
burg  the  French  lost  but  3J  per  cent,  and  yet  the  army  gave 
up  the  field  and  retreated  to  the  Rhine.  At  Recour,  Marshal 
Saxe  lost  but  2J  per  cent.  At  Zurich,  Massena  lost  but  8 
per  cent.  At  Lagriz,  Frederick  lost  but  6J  per  cent.  At 
Malplaquet,  Marlborough  lost  but  10  per  cent,  and  at  Ra- 


424  Life  of  Thomas. 

millies  the  same  intrepid  commander  lost  but  6  per  cent.  At 
Contras,  Henry  of  Navarre  was  reported  as  cut  to  pieces,  yet 
his  loss  was  less  than  10  per  ceut.  At  Lodi,  Napoleon  lost 
1J  per  cent.  At  Valmy,  Frederick  lost  but  3  per  cent,  and 
and  at  the  great  battles  of  Marengo  and  Austerlitz,  sanguinary 
as  they  were,  Napoleon  lost  aii  average  of  less  than  14£  per 
cent.  At  Magenta  and  Solferino,  in  1859,  the  average  loss 
of  both  armies  was  less  than  9  per  cent.  At  Konigrattz,  in 
1866,  it  was  6  per  cent.  At  Werth,  Specheran,  Mars  la  Tour, 
Gravelotte,  and  Sedan,  in  1870,  the  average  loss  was  12  per 
cent.  At  Linden,  General  Moreau  lost  but  4  per  cent,  and 
the  Archduke  John  lost  but  7  per  cent  in  killed  and  wounded. 
Americans  can  scarcely  call  this  a  lively  skirmish. 

" '  At  Perry ville,  Murfreesboro,  Chickamauga,  Atlanta, 
Gettysburg,  Mission  Ridge,  the  Wilderness,  and  Spottsyl- 
vania  the  loss  frequently  reached  and  sometimes  exceeded 
forty  per  cent,  and  the  average  of  killed  and  wounded  on 
one  side  or  the  other  was  over  thirty  per  cent.' 

"  Those  who  remained  at  Chickamauga  and  fought  till 
the  night  of  Sunday  came,  when,  for  many  regiments,  every 
other  comrade  was  dead  or  wounded,  were  satisfied  with  the 
result,  and  have  always  maintained  that  Chickamauga  was 
fought  for  Chattanooga,  and  have  so  regarded  it  as  a  great 
and  notable  victory.  General  D.  H.  Hill  in  a  recent  Century 
article  thus  sums  up  the  result  for  the  Confederate  side  :  'A 
breathing  space  was  allowed  him ;  the  panic  among  his 
troops  subsided,  and  Chattanooga — the  objective  point  of  the 
campaign — was  held.  There  was  no  more  splendid  fighting 
in  1861,  when  the  flower  of  the  Southern  youth  was  in  the 
field,  than  was  displayed  in  those  bloody  days  of  September, 
1863.  But  it  seems  to  me  that  the  elan  of  the  Southern 
soldier  was  never  seen  after  Chickamauga — that  brilliant 
dash  which  had  distinguished  him  on  a  hundred  fields  was 
gone  forever.  He  was  too  intelligent  not  to  know  that  the 
cutting  in  two  of  Georgia  meant  death  to  all  his  hopes.  He 
knew  that  Longstreet's  absence  was  imperiling  Lee's  safety y 
and  that  what  had  to  be  done  must  be  done  quickly.  The 
delay  to  strike  was  exasperating  to  him ;  the  failure  to  strike 
after  the  success  was  crushing  to  all  his  longings  for  an  in- 


The  Chickamauga  Campaign.  425 

dependent  South.  He  fought  stoutly  to  the  last,  but  after 
Chickamauga,  with  the  sullenness  of  despair  and  without 
the  enthusiasm  of  hope.  That  "  barren  victory  "  sealed  the 
fate  of  the  Southern  Confederacy.' 

"  The  authorities  at  Washington,  to  cover  their  own 
shortcomings  and  inexcusable  neglect,  chose  to  deepen  the 
erroneous  impression  that  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  had 
been  routed  and  driven  back  to  Chattanooga  in  confusion. 
The  removal  of  General  Rosecrans  was  determined  upon. 
In  fact,  it  had  been  only  a  question  of  opportunity  since  the 
campaign  opened.  There  was  only  needed  the  misrepre- 
sentations about  Chickamauga  to  furnish  this. 

"  In  the  meantime,  General  Rosecrans  thoroughly  forti- 
fied Chattanooga  and  was  actually  engaged  in  preparations 
to  open  the  river  for  supplies,  exactly  as  it  was  afterward 
done,  when  he  was  removed.  In  fact,  his  plan  was  partially 
perfected  before  he  crossed  the  river,  as  is  shown  by  the 
fact  that  he  made  written  contracts  with  Northern  firms  to 
have  bridges  completed  by  October  1st  for  the  Tennessee  at 
Bridgeport,  and  the  Running  Water  at  Wauhatchie.  He 
had  ordered  the  thorough  reconnoitering  of  the  river  bank 
opposite  the  north  end  of  Missionary  Ridge — where  Sher- 
man afterward  crossed — with  a  view  to  a  flank  attack  there. 
It  was,  therefore,  altogether  fitting  and  proper  that  the  or- 
der for  his  relief  should  arrive  while  he  was  absent  making 
a  personal  examination  of  the  vicinity  of  Brown's  Ferry, 
where  he  intended  to  throw  a  bridge  to  unite  with  Hooker 
from  Bridgeport  and  open  the  river  exactly  as  was  afterward 
done.  He  had  even  notified  Hooker  of  the  plan  three  days 
before,  and  ordered  him  to  be  ready  to  execute  his  part  of  it. 
General  Thomas,  at  first,  insisted  that  he  would  resign  rather 
than  appear  to  acquiesce  in  Rosecrans'  removal  by  accepting 
the  command.  It  was  at  Rosecrans'  earnest  solicitation 
that  he  reconsidered  this  determination.  But  he  did  not 
hesitate  to  say  that  the  order  was  cruelly  unjust.  When 
General  Garfield  left  for  Washington  soon  after  the  battle, 
he  immediately  charged  him  to  do  all  he  could  to  have  Rose- 
crans righted.  These  will  be  new  statements  to  most,  but 
they  are  true. 


426  Life  of  Thomas. 

"  The  survivors  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  should 
awake  to  great  pride  in  this  notable  field  of  Chickarnatiga. 
"Why  should  it  not,  as  well  as  Eastern  fields,  be  marked  by 
monuments,  and  its  lines  accurately  preserved  for  history  ? 
There  was  no  more  magnificent  fighting  during  the  war 
than  both  armies  did  there.  Both  sides  might  well  unite  in 
preserving  the  field  where  both,  in  a  military  sense,  won  such 
renown." 

Here  ends  the  true  story  of  the  campaign  that  closed 
with  the  capture  of  Chattanooga.  No  citizen  of  the  Union 
with  a  particle  of  patriotism  and  the  smallest  sense  of  justice 
can  read  what  follows  without  a  blush  of  shame.  The  blood 
tingles  with  indignation  at  the  wanton  indignity  awarded  a 
brave  man  after  he  had  accomplished  not  only  the  most 
brilliant  achievement  of  the  war,  but  gained  an  objective 
that  went  far  toward  ending  the  conflict  in  behalf  of  the 
Union.  We  have  seen  the  several  orders  issued  from  Wash- 
ington, each  double-barreled  in  its  dictation  of  an  impossi- 
bility while  carrying  an  insult.  Ordered  to  march  when 
marching  was  impossible,  ordered  to  pursue  when  no  enemy 
was  fleeing ;  and  while  the  Confederacy  was  concentrating 
troops  upon  Rosecrans'  front,  the  authorities  at  Washington 
ignored  with  insolent  indifference  his  demands  for  troops,' 
and  begrudged  him  even  the  supplies  upon  which  his  army 
was  to  live.  While  carrion  crows  darkened  the  horizon  about 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  and  the  mocking  birds  around 
Yicksburg  took  up  and  warbled  the  dead  march  in  Saul  that 
was  being  played  continuously  over  the  unhonored  graves  of 
brave  men  who  died  as  in  a  pestilence  of  malarial  fevers,  dys- 
entery, measles,  and  small-pox,  the  Army  of  the  Cumber- 
land was  repairing  railroads,  opening  highways,  accumulat- 
ing supplies,  while  working  its  way  through  mountain 
passes,  over  rivers,  scaling  palisades,  that  it  might  carry  in 
triumph  to  the  front  the  fortunes  of  the  great  republic.  To 
win  Chattanooga  made  it  possible  to  survive  the  brutal  ig- 
norance of  the  War  Department,  Grant's  bloody  blunders, 
and  Sherman's  militia  march  to  the  sea.  And  yet  for  this 
service,  the  brave  soldier  who  alone  conceived  the  campaign, 


Thomas'  High  Sense  of  Honor.  427 

and  if  he  did  not  fight  the  battle,  had  it  fought  by  one  whose 
ability  he  was  the  first  to  discover — for  this  gain  that  will  yet 
go  to  record  as  the  crowning  glory  not  only  of  American 
arms,  but  of  American  generalship,  was  hurriedly  dismissed 
in  disgrace  from  the  service.  It  was  infamous. 

Rosecrans'  quick,  secretive  temperament  would,  as  we 
have  said,  long  before  have  driven  him  to  a  tender  of  his 
resignation,  but  for  the  influence  of  the  one  man  in  whom 
he  confided,  General  George  H.  Thomas.  General  Thomas 
not  only  had  confidence  in  the  men  in  control  at  Washing- 
ton, but  there  was  another  fact  that  influenced  him  probably 
without  his  being  clearly  aware  of  the  weight  it  had  upon 
his  conduct.  It  was  that  if  General  Rosecrans  were  relieved, 
he  would  be  called  upon  to  assume  command.  He  could  not 
consent  to  this.  In  his  eyes  it  would  not  only  be  unjust,  but 
treacherous.  He  felt  that  he  alone  was  responsible  for  the 
condition  that  the  War  Department  found  offensive.  Rose- 
crans, in  his  proud,  impetuous  way,  would  have  obeyed 
the  peremptory  orders  served  upon  him,  but  for  that.  As 
we  have  said,  the  calmer  judgment  and  superior  force  of 
character  that  existed  in  Thomas  had  control.  To  take  ad- 
vantage then  of  his  own  acts  appeared  so  dishonorable  to 
him  that  Rosecrans'  relief  meant  his  own  retirement.  The 
slightest  appeal  to  this  grand  soldier's  sense  of  honor  was 
conclusive,  and  they  who  seek  to  appreciate  the  character 
and  career  we  are  attempting  to  record,  will  do  well  to  com- 
pare the  conduct  of  these  two  gentlemen  with  the  low  in- 
trigues and  mean  ambitions  that  debased  the  service  else- 
where. And  yet  to  this  day,  we  find  well  meaning  but  ig- 
norant people  insisting  that  General  Thomas  had  no  right  to 
consider  either  himself  or  the  man  he  displaced  when  called 
to  command  by  his  government.  We  beg  leave  to  differ. 
The  man  who  is  not  true  to  himself  can  not  be  of  much 
service  to  his  government.  The  man  of  mean  ambitions 
whose  record  will  not  bear  inspection  holds  his  fame  upon 
the  same  terms.  It  is  all  a  fraud.  General  Thomas  loved 
his  country  and  her  cause  with  all  the  patriotic  devotion  of 
which  his  high  nature  was  capable,  but  he  loved  his  honor 
more.  He  shrunk  as  instinctively  from  a  compromise  of 


428  Life  of  Thomas. 

that  honor  as  much  as  he  would  have  shrunk  from  the  com- 
mission of  any  other  crime. 

In  this  connection  we  can  not  leave  the  field  of  Chicka- 
mauga  without  calling  attention  to  the  conduct  of  one  gen- 
eral a  political  organization  had  seized  upon  as  available 
property  and  insists  is  one  of  the  three  immortals  who  alone 
fought  the  successful  fight  and  saved  the  Union.  We  refer 
to  General  Phil  Sheridan.  In  the  midst  of  General  Thomas's 
desperate  resistance  against  superior  numbers,  with  his  right 
rolled  back,  so  demoralized  and  confused  and  with  such 
slaughter  that  it  was  almost  impossible  to  rally  or  reform  it, 
while  the  left  was  overlapped  and  menaced  with  defeat,  Gen- 
erals Negley,  Sheridan,  and  Davis  fell  back  with  their  forces  in 
the  direction  of  McFarland's  Gap.  General  Thomas,  learning 
that  Sheridan,  Davis,  and  Negley  were  yet  within  reach,  sent 
General  G.  P.  Thruston  with  orders  to  have  their  troops 
brought  immediately  to  the  front  upon  his  right.  The  gal- 
lant Thruston  galloped  back  to  where  he  had  left  Generals 
Sheridan  and  Davis  to  find  them  gone,  and  after  an  hour's 
search  came  up  with  them  near  McFarland's  Gap,  falling 
rapidly  back  from  the  sound  of  the  cannon  that  told  of  the 
desperate  battle  then  in  progress.  Davis  promptly  obeyed 
the  order  to  return,  but  Sheridan  refused  positively  and 
finally  to  obey. 

General  Thruston  made  a  statement,  in  which  that  loyal 
and  gallant  officer  says:  "Being  Adjutant  and  chief  of  staff 
of  the  Twentieth  Corps,  to  which  their  (Davis's  and  Sheri- 
dan's) divisions  belonged,  I  reported  to  them  General 
Thomas's  position  and  situation  and  requested  them  to  re- 
turn and  take  position  as  directed  by  him.  Davis  ordered 
his  men  to  '  right  about '  at  once  and  marched  back  under 
my  guidance,  some  of  Negley's  and  other  troops  joining  us. 
General  Sheridan  said  he  preferred  to  go  to  Rossville  and  go 
out  on  the  Lafayette  road.  I  told  him  that  it  was  getting 
late  and  he  could  scarcely  get  on  the  field  by  that  route  be- 
fore night,  but  he  insisted  upon  going  that  way,  which  was 
several  miles  around." 

Of  this  affair,  General  Sheridan  reports  as  follows : 


Sheridan  Deserts  the  Field.  429 

"After  crossing  the  road,  my  division  was  again  formed 
on  the  ridge  which  overlooked  the  ground  where  this  san- 
guinary contest  had  taken  place,  the  enemy  manifesting  no 
disposition  to  continue  the  engagement  further.  I  have 
learned  positively  what  I  had  before  partially  seen,  that  the 
division  still  further  on  the  left  had  been  driven  and  I  was  com- 
pletely cut  off. 

"  I  then  determined  to  connect  myself  with  the  troops 
of  General  Thomas  by  moving  on  the  arc  of  a  circle  until  I 
struck  the  Dry  Creek  Valley  road,  by  which  I  hoped  to  form 
the  junction. 

"  In  the  meantime,  I  was  joined  by  a  portion  of  the  division 
of  General  Davis,  under  command  of  General  Carlin,  and  a 
number  of  stragglers  from  other  divisions. 

"On  reaching  the  Dry  Cree k  Valley  road,  I  found  the 
enemy  had  moved  parallel  to  me  and  had  also  arrived  at  the 
road,  thus  preventing  me  joining  General  Thomas  by  that 
route.  I  then  determined  to  move  quickly  on  Rossville  and 
form  a  junction  with  him  on  his  left  flank  via  Lafayette 
road.  This  was  successfully  accomplished  about  5:30  o'clock 

p.  M.r 

The  italics  in  above  extracts  are  our  own,  and  they 
serve  to  penetrate  and  expose  the  fiction  the  general  indulges 
in  to  cover  his  disobedience  of  orders.  It  will  be  observed 
that  he  claims  to  have  been  cut  off  from  the  front  then  held 
by  General  Thomas.  That  is,  he  ventures  to  say  that  the 
enemy  was  in  force  between  his  division  and  General 
Thomas.  This  would  put  the  Confederates  almost  in  the 
rear  of  General  Thomas.  This  is  flatly  contradicted  by  well 
recognized  facts  and  by  the  statement  of  General  Thruston. 
This  gentleman  had  a  difficulty  in  finding  General  Sheridan, 
while  he,  Sheridan,  was  in  full  retreat  on  Rossville,  but  he 
had  no  trouble  in  riding  direct  from  General  Thomas's  cen- 
ter to  where  he  found  General  Sheridan,  and  returning 
thence  to  General  Thomas.  General  Sheridan  was  in  com- 
pany, says  General  Thruston,  with  General  Davis,  and  the 
last  named,  on  receiving  orders  from  the  general  command- 
ing, immediately  turned  about  face  and,  guided  by  Thruston, 
marched  to  the  front.  "  General  Sheridan  said  he  preferred 


430  Life  of  Thomas. 

to  go  to  Rossville  and  go  out  on  the  Lafayette  road.  I  told 
him  it  was  getting  late  and  he  could  scarcely  get  on  the  field 
by  that  route  before  night,  but  he  insisted  on  going  that 
way,  which  was  several  miles  around." 

This  is  Thruston's  testimony,  and  it  accords  with  Sheri- 
dan's at  one  point  only,  and  that  is  in  not  getting  to  the 
front  at  all.  It  is  well,  however,  to  take  the  testimony  of 
another  witness.  General  Davis  in  his  report  informs  us. 
He  says: 

"General  Negley's  division  at  this  time  passed  to  the 
rear  in  the  direction  of  Rossville,  and,  I  understood,  took 
position  at  that  place.  General  Carlin  and  Colonel  Martin 
had  also  by  this  time  succeeded  in  re-forming  their  troops 
as  far  as  was  possible,  and  Colonel  Ward,  commanding  the 
Tenth  Ohio  Infantry,  reported  to  me  with  his  regiment  for 
duty,  and  after  allowing  the  men  a  few  minutes  for  water, 
ordered  them  again  under  arms  and  moved  for  the  battle 
field  with  a  view  of  supporting  General  Thomas's  corps, 
which  was  still  maintaining  its  position.  It  is  proper  here 
to  add  that  several  detached  battalions  and  commands  re- 
ported to  me  and  accompanied  my  command  to  the  battle 
field,  making  in  all  a  force  of  twenty-five  hundred  to  three 
thousand  men. 

"  While  in  the  act  of  forming  my  lines  near  General 
Thomas's  right,  I  received  information  from  General  Garfield 
that  General  Thomas  was  falling  back,  and  orders  to  repair 
to  Rossville." 

It  will  be  seen  by  this  that  General  Davis  found  no  diffi- 
culty in  marching  direct  to  the  support  of  Thomas,  and  the 
intervention  of  Confederate  troops  to  prevent  such  move  is 
an  afterthought  of  General  Sheridan's  to  cover  and  excuse 
not  only  his  failure  to  obey  orders,  but  his  lack  of  loyalty,  as 
shown  by  his  moving,  as  we  have  said,  his  troops  to  the  rear 
at  the  sound  of  the  enemy's  cannon.  General  Thruston,  in 
making  his  statement,  omitted  from  the  writing  precisely 
what  General  Sheridan  did  say,  and  this  language  the  gallant 
young  chief  of  staff  omitted  from  a  mistaken  sense  of  pro- 
priety. The  fact  is,  the  insubordinate  subordinate,  in  a  sen- 


Sheridan  Deserts  the  Field.  431 

tence  glaring  with  profanity,  swore  he  would  obey  no  such 
orders  and  take  his  men  into  a  slaughter  organized  by  fools. 
He  would  move  on  to  Rossville,  and,  if  necessary,  out  the 
Lafayette  road.  The  day  after  the  battle,  it  was  General 
Rosecrans'  purpose  to  give  General  Negley  his  choice  to  re- 
sign or  be  tried  for  cowardice.  He  finally  asked  for  a  court 
of  inquiry,  and,  though  whitewashed,  he  never  regained 
either  military  standing  or  command.  And  yet  his  offense 
was  far  less  than  that  of  Sheridan.  Negley  took  counsel 
of  his  fears.  His  nature  proved  too  much  for  hitn.  He 
could  plead  this  weakness.  But  Sheridan  had  no  such 
excuse.  A  braver  man  never  trod  the  field  of  danger.  His 
mind  was  clear  and  his  nerves  calm,  and  he  knew  that  in 
that  roar  that  rose  behind  him  as  he  marched  away  brave 
men  were  being  done  to  death,  while  heroic  officers  were 
looking  eagerly  to  the  right  and  left  for  aid  in  this  hour  of 
death-tainted  anxiety.  We  were  outnumbered  if  not  out- 
fought, and  the  fate  of  the  great  republic  hung  trembling  in 
the  balance,  when  the  man  whom  the  nation,  for  supposed 
virtues  he  never  possessed  and  the  doing  of  deeds  a  drunken 
poet  had  dressed  in  the  rainbow  tints  of  brandy-stimulated 
imagination,  has  delighted  to  honor,  deliberately  marched 
his  men  from  the  field  of  battle. 

One  is  the  more  impressed  with  this  dastardly  conduct 
when  one  remembers  the  cruel  punishment  awarded  the  gal- 
lant Warren  by  this  same  officer,  who,  for  failing  to  accom- 
plish an  impossible  order,  was  disgraced  in  the  presence  of 
his  troops  and  sent  broken-hearted  to  a  dishonored  grave. 
The  spirit  of  the  gallant  Warren  animates  the  heart  of  every 
honest  man  in  dealing  condemnation  to  this,  the  smallest 
member  of  a  trinity  of  false  gods,  whose  only  claim  to 
memory  is  in  the  bloody  disasters  that  came  near  wrecking 
an  empire. 

Night  came  to  cover  in  the  two  armies,  equally  hurt  but 
unequally  stunned,  as  the  Confederates  suffered  in  this  re- 
spect more  than  we.  Thomas,  under  orders  from  Rosecrans, 
fell  quietly  back  to  Rossville  upon  the  line  designated  by  the 
general  commanding.  He  retired  unmolested.  One  regrets 
that  our  great  military  leader  withdrew  from  a  field  he  had 


432  Life  of  Thomas.   ' 

so  brilliantly  held.  "We  now  know  that  Bragg  was  in  no 
condition  to  renew  the  fight  and  did  not  follow  Thomas,  and 
had  our  army  assumed  the  offensive,  a  hurried  retreat  would 
have  followed  on  the  part  of  the  Confederates.  Hastily 
called  together  from  Richmond,  Mobile,  Georgia,  and  Mis- 
sissippi, they  were  badly  supplied  even  with  ammunition,  to 
say  nothing  of  food  and  shelter.  We  are  taught  from  Con- 
federate records  that  their  army  was  in  a  more  perilous  con- 
dition than  ours.  It  was  a  great  relief,  then,  when  Bragg 
learned  that  Rosecrans,  instead  of  pursuing,  had  fallen  back 
upon  Rossville,  where  a  new  and  stronger  line  of  defense 
was  being  occupied.  Bragg  changed  his  retrograde  move- 
ment and  felt  cautiously  his  ugly  enemy. 

In  making  these  reflections  on  what  seems  an  unfortu- 
nate resolve  on  the  part  of  General  Thomas,  who,  being  on 
the  ground,  knew  the  situation  as  Rosecrans  could  not  know 
it,  we  are  forced  to  remember  that  he  could  not  know  at  the 
time  how  badly  the  enemy  had  been  damaged,  and  in  this 
ignorance  it  was  wise  to  consider  the  situation  from  a  pru- 
dent point  of  view.  That  we  had  been  outnumbered,  Gen- 
eral Thomas  well  knew,  but  he  could  not  know  to  what  ex- 
tent, and  he  was  in  ignorance  as  to  what  reserves  the  enemy 
might  have  upon  the  field  or  what  reinforcements  might  be 
upon  the  railroads  hurrying  to  the  rescue  of  a  place  of  such 
vital  importance.  It  was  well  known  at  Richmond  what 
could  not  be  known  with  the  supposed  military  heads  at 
"Washington,  that  Chattanooga  was  the  key  to  the  whole  sit- 
uation, and  that  its  capture  by  our  army  made  Virginia  un- 
tenable. Almost  frantic  appeals  had  been  made  by  General 
Rosecrans  for  at  least  mounted  infantry  to  protect  his  flanks, 
and  made  in  vain,  although  the  inaction  on  the  Potomac  and 
on  the  Mississippi  of  the  Confederates  enabled  them  to  con- 
centrate from  their  inner  lines  their  best  troops  in  the  field. 
As  General  Thomas  sat  by  his  camp-fire  the  night  of  that 
awful  day  and  studied  the  maps  for  roads  upon  which  he 
could  move  against  the  enemy,  he  realized  the  fact  that  Chat- 
tanooga, which  he  had  held  in  mind  for  three  long  years  of 
hard  marching  and  bloody  fights,  was  now  within  reach,  and 
slowly  and  reluctantly  he  moved  from  the  hastily-constructed 


Bragg' s  "Barren  Victory:'  433 

defense  of  the  horse-shoe  line  of  battle  he  and  his  men  ren- 
dered immortal,  to  sleep  for  the  night  on  hills  and  valleys  to 
the  right  and  left  of  Rossville.  And  here,  after  all,  rather 
than  at  Chickamauga,  were  the  passes  which  controlled  the 
way  to  Chattanooga. 

Had  Rosecrans  gone  to  the  front  from  his  shattered 
right,  instead  of  hurrying  hack  to  repair  the  disaster  after 
ordering  Garfield  to  Thomas,  it  is  more  than  probable  he 
would,  recognizing  the  condition,  have  brought  forward  his 
reserves  the  frightened  Negley  had  led  from  the  field,  and 
with  his  impetuous  nature  assumed  the  offensive.  At  least 
he  would,  with  a  view  of  assaulting  the  enemy  that  had 
again  and  again  been  repulsed,  remained  upon  the  field  so  gal- 
lantly won.  What  the  effect  of  this  would  have  been  one 
can  surmise  by  reading  Bragg's  cautious  dispatch  made  at 
the  time  to  the  authorities  at  Richmond.  It  runs  as  follows: 

"CHICKAMAUGA  RIVER,  Sept.  20,  via  RINGGOLD,  Sept.  21. 
Major- General  Cooper,  Adjutant- General: 

After  two  days  hard  fighting,  we  have  driven  the  enemy, 
after  a  desperate  resistance,  from  several  positions,  and  now 
hold  the  field,  but  he  still  confronts  us.  The  losses  are  heavy 
on  both  sides,  especially  of  our  officers.  "We  have  taken 
over  twenty  pieces  of  artillery  and  some  2,800  prisoners. 

BRAGG." 

The  withdrawal  of  his  part  of  the  army  in  good  order, 
and  without  the  loss  of  a  man,  told  of  the  success  of  Thomas 
in  making  veterans  of  his  raw  recruits. 

The  importance  of  Chattanooga  was  recognized  at  Rich- 
mond, and,  as  soon  as  the  authorities  there  could  recover 
from  their  amazement  at  Rosecrans'  successful  flanking 
movements,  reinforcements  were  hurried  to  Bragg,  and 
enough  concentrated,  it  was  believed,  to  destroy  the  Army 
of  the  Cumberland  and  retake  their  Gibralter.  The  Confed- 
eracy failed  of  its  purpose.  They  claimed  a  victory  at 
Chickamauga,  but  it  was  barren  of  good  result  to  them.  It 
had  been  better  to  have  transported  Lee  and  his  entire  army 
28 


434  Life  of  Thomas. 

to  the  Chickamauga  than  to  permit  our  army  to  take  and 
hold  Chattanooga.  It  was  not  only  that  the  loss  to  the  Con- 
federates was  terrible,  amounting  to  thirty-six  per  cent  upon 
the  last  day,  hut,  admitting  their  claim  to  victory  on  the 
field,  they  suffered  defeat  in  our  success  in  taking  and  hold- 
ing the  great  objective  of  the  entire  war.  The  loss  inflicted 
on  us  was  fearful.  We  had  sixteen  thousand  three  hundred 
and  thirty-six,  including  one  hundred  and  thirty-two  officers, 
killed,  five  hundred  and  ninety-two  wounded,  and  two  hun- 
dred and  seventy  missing ;  fifteen  hundred  and  fifty-five  en- 
listed men  killed,  eight  thousand  eight  hundred  and  twenty 
wounded,  and  four  thousand  nine  hundred  and  eighty-five 
missing.  As  many  of  the  reported  missing  were  among  the 
slain,  the  number  of  the  killed  exceeded  two  thousand.  The 
loss  in  material  was  immense ;  thirty-six  guns,  fifteen  thou- 
sand small  arms,  wagons  and  ambulances  in  great  numbers, 
with  ammunition  and  stores  in  large  quantities.  If,  in  addi- 
tion to  this  destruction  of  men  and  material,  the  Army  of 
the  Cumberland  could  have  -been  driven  over  the  river  and 
Chattanooga  recaptured,  it  would  have  paid  the  Confederate 
government  to  have  shifted  the  seat  of  war  from  the  Poto- 
mac to  the  Tennessee. 

The  army  under  the  immediate  command  of  General 
Thomas  fell  back  without  being  molested  to  Rossville.  On 
the  morning  of  the  21st,  the  Confederates  seemed  to  awake 
from  their  stupor  and  made  a  demonstration  upon  Thomas's 
front.  It  was  a  feeble  affair,  easily  repulsed,  but  General 
Thomas,  fearing  that  the  enemy  might  flank  him  on  the 
right  and  so  get  between  us  and  Chattanooga,  advised  Gen- 
eral Rosecrans  to  fall  back  upon  that  place.  This  was  done 
with  ready  precision  and  without  loss.  Indeed  there  was  no 
molestation  upon  which  to  base  even  a  skirmish.  The  rea- 
son given  for  this  peaceful  proceeding  on  the  part  of  the  Con- 
federate commander  was  that  his  own  army  was  less  than 
half  as  strong  and  greatly  exhausted.  According  to  this 
the  claimed  victory  of  Chickamauga  was  so  barren  of  fruit 
that  it  might  as  well  be  considered  a  Confederate  defeat. 
General  Bragg,  after  the  accession  of  Longstreet's  corps, 
outnumbered  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  by  one-fourth  at 


Thomas  Reaches  his  Early  Objective.  435 

least.  The  two  days'  fighting,  according  to  General  Bragg, 
had  reduced  this  to  one-half  and  that  one-half  so  demoralized 
that  it  could  not  be  brought  to  attack  a  foe  in  retreat,  for 
this  is  what  they  designated  our  move  on  Chattanooga. 

We  were  in  possession  of  the  mountain  gate-way  to 
the  South.  We  have  seen  how  General  Thomas,  early  in 
the  spring  of  1861,  traced  upon  the  maps  of  Kentucky  and 
Tennessee  the  fine  strategical  campaign,  that  beginning  on 
the  Ohio  ended  at  Chattanooga,  and  asked  for  a  column  of 
twenty  thousand  men  that  he  might  demonstrate  its  im- 
portance. We  have  seen  how  the  force  asked  for  first  given 
was  then  taken  from  him  and  given  to  General  Mitchel. 
From  General  Mitchel  it  passed  to  Don  Carlos  Buell  and 
from  Buell  to  General  Rosecrans,  and,  near  three  years  after, 
the  campaign  ends  in  the  capture  of  Chattanooga  and  vir- 
tually the  end  of  the  war.  Our  hero,  who  alone  saw  the 
way  to  a  final  overthrow  of  a  brave  and  skillful  enemy  and 
a  preservation  of  the  Union  through  force  of  arms,  clung 
with  the  tenacity  of  an  indomitable  will  to  the  prosecution 
of  that  campaign.  No  neglect,  no  slights,  none  of  the  in- 
solence of  office  at  Washington,  where  stolid  ignorance  fed 
military  conceit,  could  swerve  him  from  his  purpose,  and  on 
the  22d  of  September,  nearly  three  years  after  his  pointing 
out  to  the  President  the  great  objective,  he  saw  his  veterans 
Mving  into  Chattoiiooga,  after  an  engagement  where  the 
fighting  fell  upon  the  men  he  had  developed  as  soldiers  un- 
der his  immediate  command,  where  through  the  force  of 
circumstances  he  passed  from  a  subordinate  to  the  general  com- 
manding. He  and  General  Rosecrans  changed  places  when 
the  fate  of  our  empire  hung  upon  that  one  day's  fighting, 
and  two  days  after  he  saw  the  column  he  had  asked  for  in 
1861  marching  under  his  command  into  the  great  stronghold 
of  the  enemy. 


436  Life  of  Thomas. 


CHAPTER  XVII. 

Edwin  M.  Stanton,  his  Character  and  Temperament — His  Intense  Dislike 
for  Rosecrans  and  its  Causes — A  Manly  Remonstrance  that  amounted 
to  Insult— Bragg  Changes  his  Intended  Assault  on  Chattanooga  into 
a  Seige — Rosecrans  Relieved  and  Thomas  put  in  Command. 

Students  in  the  true  history  of  our  late  civil  war  will  find 
one  name  more  frequently  mentioned  than  any  other  of  the 
statesmen  and  soldiers  of  that  stormy  period.  While  they 
will  find  it  difficult  to  say  whether  that  name  excites 
more  approval  than  indignation  as  they  read,  they  will  be 
certain  of  one  conviction  in  themselves  and  that  is  admira- 
tion, for  the  honest,  frank,  faithful  manner  in  which  he  exe- 
cuted his  great  trust.  Edwin  M.  Stanton  had  many  faults, 
but  more  virtues.  Possessed  of  a  strong,  broad,  thoughtful 
mind,  he  had  enriched  that  mind  by  vast  stores  of  information. 
As  an  advocate  before  the  highest  tribunals  of  the  country  he 
had  developed  and  trained  the  best  powers  of  a  combatant. 
A  state  of  nature  had  become  to  him  a  state  of  war.  This 
left  little  of  the  judicial  character  in  him.  He  could  see  but 
one  side  and  had  no  patience  with  the  advocates  of  the  other. 
Of  all  the  members  of  the  cabinet  with  the  exception  of 
Seward  he  had  the  finest  fiber  in  his  temperament.  Yet  he 
shows  to  the  worst  advantage.  Chase  for  example  was  born 
coarse  and  got  his  refinement  of  thought  and  manner  by 
early  training  and  a  life-long  association  with  the  cultured. 
Stanton,  a  man  naturally  of  refinement,  had  been  rendered 
coarse  in  manner  by  lack  of  training  and  ruffianly  surround- 
ings. The  gladiator  of  the  bar  he  came  in  time  to  be  an 
Ishmaelite  among  men  and  a  cynical  disturber  of  the  peace 
with  all.  To  these  unhappy  combinations  was  added  ill- 
health.  His  opponent  at  the  bar  learned  that  every  case  was 
a  personal  contest  and  that  each  attempt  to  get  the  better  of 
an  argument  was  treated  as  an  insult.  When  he  was  called 
much  to  his  astonishment  to  the  War  Department  by  a  Presi- 


Characteristics  of  Secretary  Stanton.  437 

dent  he  had  grossly  insulted  and  always  spoke  of  with  con- 
tempt, his  disordered  nerves  made  that  Department  a  hell  to 
the  subordinates  and.  an  insult  to  all  having  business  with 
its  chief.  Strange  to  relate  this  condition  while  resented,  of 
course,  was  never  resisted.  The  Secretary  had  such  a  clear 
head  for  not  only  the  wide  field  of  thoughtful  control,  but 
the  multitudinous  details  in  which  he  was  intrusted  that  his 
insults  of  impatience  were  overlooked  in  the  gratification  of 
having  one's  business  promptly  dispatched.  That  absurd  but 
common  excuse  used  to  save  one's  self-esteem,  found  in  "it  is 
only  his  way,"  came  in  to  save  Mr.  Stanton  from  even  reproach. 
It  is  difficult  to  make  those  who  knew  Secretary  Stan- 
ton  personally,  see  that  under  all  his  rough  exterior  there 
existed  as  kind  a  heart  as  ever  beat  in  human  breast.  Yet 
he  has  left  the  memory  of  a  brute.  This,  while  the  great 
man,  who,  recognizing  his  eminent  fitness  for  the  place  to  be 
filled,  called  him  into  his  cabinet  in  face  of  personal  differ- 
ence and  insult,  will  be  regarded  through  all  time  as  one  who 
marred  his  usefulness  through  an  excess  of  kind  feeling.  The 
belief  that  because  Abraham  Lincoln  was  amiable  in  his 
ways  he  was  kind  in  his  nature  is  a  common  error.  The 
man  who  thus  pads  his  person,  covering  with  cotton,  as  it 
were,  his  angular  points  and  nervous  sensibilities,  does  so  to 
protect  himself.  He  will  do  little  favors  to  ^conciliate  and 
encourage  kind  favors  in  return.  But  one  sooner  or  later 
learns  that  all  this  covering  is  not  for  the  better  preservation 
of  a  heart — but  only  for  the  protection  of  a  stomach.  The 
man  of  a  really  kind  nature  comes  to  be,  in  time,  ugly,  im- 
patient and  combative  in  seeking  to  relieve  others,  in  ninety- 
nine  cases  out  of  a  hundred  he  finds  an  oppressor  on  the 
ground,  and  in  fighting  that,  learns  in  time  to  be  com- 
bative. Secretary  Stanton's  personal  enmity  was,  at  times, 
malignant.  There  was  in  it,  so  far  as  the  military  subordi- 
nates were  concerned,  a  self-deception  that  went  far  to  ex- 
tenuate his  injustice.  He  professed  to  hate  McClellan  and 
Rosecrans,  for  example,  because  of  their — to  him — intense 
stupidity.  His  favorites  were  McDowell,  Hooker,  McCook, 
Pope  and  Thomas,  whom  he  claimed  to  love  because  of  their 
patriotism  and  ability.  To  tell  the  whole  truth,  Stanton 


438  Life  of  Thomas. 

shared  with  Lincoln,  and  indeed  the  entire  cabinet,  a  con- 
tempt for  the  military  leaders.  Unable  or  at  least  unwilling 
to  take  upon  themselves  the  necessary  information  to  enable 
them  to  plan  campaigns — declining  indeed  to  even  interfere, 
save  to  cover  and  protect  the  capital — they  saw  the  sort  se- 
lected by  West  Point  to  do  that  work  achieving  naught  but 
bloody  disasters.  Personal  intercourse  did  not  create  even 
ordinary  respect  not  to  say  admiration.  To  this  sweep  of 
condemnation,  Thomas  alone  made  an  exception.  He  ex- 
torted, in  his  mere  presence,  the  highest  respect.  Stanton 
once  said  to  General  Schenck;  "I  feel  before  him  as  if  I 
were  in  the  presence  of  George  Washington."  The  most 
unfortunate,  in  this  respect,  was  the  kind/ hearted,  impulsive 
"  Old  Rosey,"  as  his  men  called  him.  A  man  of  high  mili- 
tary genius  it  might  be  said  of  him  as  it  was  sung  of  Gold- 
smith: "He  wrote  like  an  angel  and  talked  like  poor  Poll." 
Regarding  the  war  as  the  property  of  West  Point,  he  looked 
upon  Edwin  M.  Stanton  as  a  mere  clerk  of  the  president, 
rather  in  the  way  of  the  army  than  a  help  to  it,  and  when 
the  obtrusive  clerk  issued  a  circular  announcing  that  a  vacant 
brigadier-general's  commission  in  the  regular  army  awaited 
the  volunteer-general,  who  would  achieve  the  first  decisive 
victory,  General  Rosecrans  was  the  only  officer  who  ventured 
to  remonstrate.  This  remonstrance  was,  in  fact,  an  insult 
and  would  have  quickened  the  resentment  of  a  less  sensitive 
man  than  Edwin  M.  Stanton.  To  say  that  Secretary  Stan- 
ton  was  blind  in  his  rage  but  feebly  expresses  the  paroxysm 
of  wrath  that  settled  into  hate  known  only  to  a  nature  ren- 
dered morbid  by  disease.  How  intense  this  was  we  may 
gather  from  the  way  it  blinded  the  great  Secretary's  better 
judgment.  Possessed  of  a  patriotism  that  permeated  his  en- 
tire being,  he  yet  actually  begrudged  the  soldiers  of  the 
Cumberland  their  supplies  and  refused  their  general  the 
necessary  reinforcements  upon  the  ground,  that  under  such 
a  general  as  Rosecrans  an  increased  army  would  only  have 
increased  slaughter  and  a  greater  national  disaster. 

We  have  dwelt  at  some  length  on  this  part  of  our  nar- 
rative from  a  desire  to  save  ourselves  from  a  supposed  unjust 
censure  of  the  great  War  Secretary.  So  far  as  the  war  was 


Simon  Cameron's  Term.  439 

concerned  he  stood  head  and  shoulders  above  his  associates  of 
the  administration.  He  was  the  successor  of  Simon  Cam- 
eron who  was  given  the  portfolio  of  the  War  Department  be- 
cause he  had  been  before  the  convention  that  nominated 
Lincoln,  a  candidate  himself,  and  by  throwing  the  vote  of 
Pennsylvania  in  behalf  of  the  successful  applicant  secured 
his  selection.  He  took  possession  of  the  War  Department, 
and  all  the  rogues  in  the  country  came  to  the  front.  A  con- 
jugation of  the  verb  to  steal  became  the  short  text  of  the 
department.  It  ran  from  "  I  steal,  thou  stealest,  he,  she  or 
it  steals,"  into  the  potential  mood  of  "  Steal  thou  and  let 
him  steal."  Shoddy  was  born,  fixed  ammunition  of  colored 
sawdust  was  contracted  for,  and  our  men  were  sent  to  the 
field  armed  with  condemned  Belgian  muskets,  more  fatal  to 
the  men  who  tried  to  use  them  than  to  the  enemy  they  sought 
to  kill.  The  Hon.  Simon  Cameron  and  his  pals  were  jing- 
ling the  stolen,  blood-stained  coin  in  their  pockets  when 
the  approaching  roar  of  Confederate  artillery  told  of  the 
stunning  defeat  of  Bull  Run  that  Cameron  and  his  compan- 
ions rascally  had  served  to  bring  about.  The  rot  of  political 
patronage  stole  into  the  army,  and  promotions  were  given 
for  services  at  the  polls  in  lieu  of  services  in  camp,  and  it  is 
amazing  that  the  Confederates  did  not  end  the  war  in  the 
beginning  by  the  seizure  of  our  Capitol.  The  condition  un- 
der the  Pennsylvania!!  got  to  be  such  at  last  that  both  Senate 
and  House,  through  delegations,  waited  on  the  President  with 
the  peremptory  demand  for  the  dismissal  of  his  War  Secre- 
tary. The  mission  to  Russia  was  given  to  Cameron  and  the 
War  Department  to  Edwin  M.  Stanton. 

In  justice  to  President  Lincoln  we  must  remember  that 
he  made  Simon  Cameron  Secretary  of  War  at  a  time  when, 
clear-headed  as  Abraham  Lincoln  was,  he  could  not  be  made 
to  believe  that  war  was  imminent.  "  No  people,"  he  was 
wont  to  say  in  his  clear,  terse  style,  "will  get  up  and  go  at 
each  other's  throats  on  an  abstract  political  proposition."  He 
was  right  enough  in  that,  for  the  war  did  not  originate  in  any 
abstract  political  proposition.  The  war  had  been  brewing 
through  two  centuries  in  the  hearts  and  minds  of  the  two 
peoples  that  eventually  went  to  killing  each  other.  No  war 


440  Life  of  Thomas. 

ever  has  a  reasonable  origin,  and  one  is  not  especially  called 
upon  to  find  any  reason  for  one.  If  one  is  curious  enough 
to  delve  in  a  dim  past  for  this  senseless  quarrel,  such  curious 
student  will  find  that  one-half  of  the  quarrel  came  over  the 
sea  and  lauded  at  Plymouth  in  the  Mayflower;  the  other  half 
came  over  the  seas  to  Virginia  in  vessels  holding  godless  ad- 
ventures. One-half  were  Puritans  and  the  other  half  pirates. 
The  lack  of  moral  sense  in  the  one  was  counter-balanced  by 
a  perverted  moral  sense  in  the  other.  The  old  habit  of  crowd- 
ing dogmas  down  broke  out  at  intervals,  while  a  sense  of  be- 
ing in  the  wrong  made  all  the  South  sensitive  and  uneasy. 
Whatsoever  may  have  been  the  origin  of  the  difference  be- 
twee,n  the  two  sections,  it  had  grown  to  such  proportions 
that  the  armed  conflict  was  as  bitter,  bloody,  and  unforgiving 
as  if  the  contestants  were  different  races. 

Edwin  M.  Stanton  illustrated  this.  Born  of  a  Quaker 
family,  he  inherited  a  hatred  of  slavery  from  his  parents,  who 
were  abolitionists,  but  early  training  under  Judge  Ely  Tap- 
pan,  of  Steubenville,  Ohio,  made  him  a  Democrat.  Such  was 
his  ardent  temperament  that  his  political  faith  took  on  all 
the  fanaticism  of  a  religious  belief.  Opposed  to  slavery,  he 
yet  detested  abolition,  and  regarded  the  Abolitionists  as 
criminal  disturbers  of  the  peace  because  they  had  no  regard 
for  the  sacred '  democratic  guarantees  of  the  Constitution. 
When  the  South,  however,  took  up  arms  against  the  Union 
he  found  himself  not  only  an  ally  of  his  old  enemies,  but 
was  from  start  to  finish  more  bitter  than  they. 

His  appearance  in  the  War  Department  was  the  signal 
for  reforms  in  every  direction.  For  a  time  he  seemed  to 
shift  the  war  from  the  South  to  a  war  on  the  rogues.  The 
panic-stricken  scoundrels  who  had  been  robbing  the  govern- 
ment within  hearing  of  the  enemy's  guns  found  themselves 
heading  toward  the  penitentiary,  and  fled  from  sight.  Order 
and  honesty  came  in  together,  and  within  thirty  days  the  very 
atmosphere  of  a  polluted  department  became  pure.  The  here- 
tofore neglected  soldiers  found  themselves  furnished  with  the 
best  arms,  comfortable  clothing,  and  shelter.  Having  swiftly 
and  promptly  arrested  fraud,  he  turned  to  the  army.  For 
months  our  young  Napoleon  by  the  grace  of  popular  bap- 


Secretary  Stanton  Meets  McClellan.  441 

tism  and  press  anthems  had  been  gathering  a  huge  array 
about  the  Capital  and  holding  grand  reviews  to  the  music  of 
Confederate  artillery  and  in  sight  of  the  rebel  flag  on  Mun- 
son's  Hill.  Among  the  first  orders  issued  was  one  informing 
General  McClellan  and  his  military  world  that  the  general's 
head-quarters  until  the  army  took  the  field  would  be  at 
the  War  Department  Building.  Two  small  rooms  were  de- 
voted to  an  establishment  that  in  itself  could  have  filled  and 
occupied  the  building.  At  a  reception  given  to  the  officers 
of  the  army  by  Secretary  Stanton,  General  McClellan,  quite 
indignant,  stalked  in,  follewed  by  his  staff  of  princes  and 
millionaires.  Having  stiffly  bowed  to  the  Secretary,  the 
young  Napoleon  was  about  to  withdraw,  when  Secretary 
Stanton,  with  his  peculiar  smile,  that  left  one  in  doubt  as  to 
whether  it  was  an  angry  gleam  of  white  teeth  from  under  his 
short  upper  lip  or  the  expression  of  a  pleasant  emotion,  said 
softly,  "  Please  wait  a  moment,  General."  Then  lifting  his 
voice  so  as  to  fill  the  room,  he  continues :  "  I  have  called  you 
together,  gentlemen,  in  a  social  way  that  we  may  become 
better  acquainted.  In  a  few  days  such  social  intercourse  will 
not  be  possible,  for  we  will,  if  you  please,  have  some  fight- 
ing. We  are  at  the  end  of  our  preparations  and  at  the  end 
of  public  patience.  It  is  my  duty  to  furnish  you  men  and 
material,  and  see  that  the  fighting  goes  on.  It  is  for  you  to 
say  how.  With  that  I  have  nothing  to  do.  I  think  it  better 
before  we  separate  that  we  should  clearly  understand  each 
other." 

This  mutual  recognition  of  each  other  did  not  avail 
much.  McClellan  had  positive  orders  to  move,  but  his  long- 
cherished  and  closely  concealed  plan  of  campaign  was  ex- 
tremely unsatisfactory.  It  was  putting  in  shape  the  popular 
cry  of  "On  to  Richmond"  by  water  ways.  McClellan  had  to 
admit  that  Richmond,  looked  at  from  a  military  point,  was 
not  of  any  strategic  importance.  President  Lincoln  truly 
told  him  that  the  place  had  no  political  significance.  "  If  we 
defeat  the  Confederate  army  of  Richmond,"  said  the  Presi- 
dent, "we  get  Richmond,  let  its  importance  be  what  it  may. 
If  this  is  the  object  in  view,  why  go  to  the  trouble  and  ex- 
pense of  sailing  an  army  around  by  water  to  Richmond  when 


442  Life  of  Thomas. 

the  army  of  Richmond  can  be  met  here  in  sight  of  Wash- 
ington ?" 

We  again  refer  to  this  bnsiness  at  Washington  for  the 
purpose  of  finding  in  it  cause  for  the  treatment  awarded  the 
general  commanding  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland.  The 
fact  is  the  nearer  an  acquaintance  with  the  military  mind 
developed  at  Washington  went,  the  profouuder  grew  the 
contempt  for  it  held  by  Lincoln  arid  cabinet.  Said  Secretary 
Chase  to  the  writer  of  this  :  "  I  have  been  studying  the  art 
of  war.  I  can  find  nothing  in  it  but  a  calculation  of  chances 
and  a  quick  eye  for  topography.  Were  I  not  so  near-sighted 
I  would  be  tempted  to  resign  my  place  as  Secretary  for  a 
command  in  the  field." 

And  yet  in  spite  of  this  derision  for  the  regular  army  offi- 
cers this  same  administration  persisted  in  not  only  leaving  the 
conduct  of  the  war  to  the  few  forced  to  the  highest  command, 
but  it  held  them  responsible.  This  was  much  complicated 
and  rendered  worse  by  unexpected  and  uncalled  for  inter- 
ference. Mr.  Seward  wished  to  call  the  attention  of  the 
war  powers  of  Europe  to  the  territory  we  were  conquering. 
Mr.  Chase  wanted  \wo  bayonets  given  every  Union  man  at 
the  South.  We  have  seen  President  Lincoln  authorizing  a 
subordinate  officer  of  Grant  to  fit  out  in  Grant's  department, 
independent  of  that  officer,  an  expedition  down  the  Missis- 
sippi to  attack  Vicksburg.  Had  these  able  men  given  a  little 
study  to  what  we  are  pleased  to  call  the  art  of  war  they 
would  have  learned  that  in  it,  as  in  all  other  pursuits  of  life, 
education  may  develop  but  that  it  never  creates,  and  that  the 
man  best  fitted  to  command  our  armies  was  the  man  com- 
missioned by  his  Maker,  and  not  of  necessity  the  graduate 
of  West  Point.  With  such  information  guiding  the  search 
it  would  not  have  been  long  ere  George  II.  Thomas  would 
have  been  called  to  command  our  armies  and,  putting  an  end 
to  the  brutal  and  senseless  objective  found  in  mere  slaughter, 
would  have  led  our  brave  men  to  where  victory  meant  an 
end  to  the  armed  conflict. 

With  all  his  faults  of  impulse  born  of  blind  prejudice 
and  bitter  personal  antagonisms  the  presence  of  Edwin  M. 
Stanton  in  the  War  Department  brought  life  and  hope,  honor 


Longstreet's  Plan  of  Campaign.  443 

and  energy  to  our  cause  in  the  field  where  that  cause  was 
being  fought.  The  huge  anaconda,  as  McClellan's  army  was 
called,  that  lay  coiled  in  stupor  about  Washington  suddenly 
uncoiled  and  moved  into  the  enemy's  country.  The  roar 
of  battles  heard  about  our  Capital  receded  in  the  distance, 
and  although  we  met  nothing  but  disasters,  and  our  armies 
that  we  sent  out  fully  equipped  came  drifting  back  in  wild 
disorder,  blame  rested  on  the  generals  commanding  while 
the  confidence  of  the  people  remained  in  the  man  whose 
strong  personality  was  felt  throughout  the  war-disturbed 
communities. 

The  Army  of  the  Cumberland  occupied  Chattanooga 
and  no  time  was  lost  in  strengthening  the  defenses  nature 
afforded  us.  General  Rosecrans  made  no  effort  to  hold 
Lookout  Mountain  or  the  railroad  and  the  river  below  the 
town.  He  felt  that  with  his  army  inferior  to  that  of  Bragg, 
while  Bragg  could  and  would  undoubtedly  be  reinforced,  he 
could  have  no  reasonable  hope  of  help  from  the  War  Depart- 
ment, and  must  therefore  husband  his  forces  so  as  to  present 
strong  lines  to  the  enemy  and  at  the  same  time  to  make  safe 
his  bridges  and  secure  the  roads  along  which  supplies  were 
to  come.  For  forty-eight  hours  Bragg  threatened  an  attack, 
but  perceiving  Rosecrans'  perilous  condition  as  to  supplies 
changed  his  intended  assault  to  a  siege.  General  Longstreet, 
the  better  soldier,  was  earnestly  opposed  to  the  siege.  This 
subordinate  held  that  long  before  want  was  felt  in  the  town 
reinforcements  would  arrive  and  raising  the  siege  reverse 
positions.  Longstreet's  plan  was  to  cross  the  river  above 
Chattanooga  and  make  themselves  felt  in  the  rear  of  Rose- 
crans to  such  extent  as  to  force  Rosecrans  to  evacuate  Chat- 
tanooga. To  cut  his  line  of  supplies  would  as  effectually 
starve  his  army  as  if  they  occupied  the  intrenchments  about 
the  town.  Their  army  would  then  be  in  a  position  to  meet 
and  defeat  in  detail  forces  sent  to  the  relief  of  Rosecrans. 
He  maintained  that  Rosecrans  would  be  forced  to  evacuate 
and  fall  back  to  Nashville,  and  that  they  could  follow  the 
railroad  to  Knoxville  and  overwhelm  Burnside,  ,and  from 
there  threaten  Rosecrans'  communications  in  the  rear  of 
Nashville.  General  Bragg  had  that  sort  of  a  mind  that  in- 


444  Life  of  Thomas. 

etinctively  rejects  all  suggestions  from  others.  "With  such, 
difficulties  are  always  impossibilities.  Of  this  sort  was  the 
lack  of  transportation  given  by  Bragg.  He  would  be  forced 
to  abandon  his  base  of  supplies  with  inadequate  means  to 
carry  with  him  the  necessary  stores.  It  will  be  seen  directly 
that  this  did  not  prevent  Longstreet  attacking  Burnside  at 
Knoxville,  and  in  a  great  emergency,  such  as  came  in  the 
loss  of  Chattanooga,  grave  chances  should  have  been  taken. 
Without  sufficient  force  to  besiege  Chattanooga  he  had 
enough  of  an  army  to  destroy  Rosecrans'  slender  line  of 
supply  over  a  land  where  the  people  were  in  deadly  hostility 
to  our  government. 

The  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  nevertheless,  was  in  great 
peril.  Bragg's  lines  extended  from  Lookout  Mountain  across 
Chattanooga  Valley  to  Missionary  Ridge,  and  along  its  base 
and  summit  to  the  Tennessee  River.  This  left  to  our  Army 
but  one  road,  some  sixty  miles  in  length,  over  the  mountains 
for  supplies.  Had  this  been  unmolested,  it  yet  would  have 
proved  inadequate.  There  was  no  part  of  our  Army  in  any 
field  so  badly  supplied  and  so  wretchedly  managed  as  that  of 
transportation  by  mules  and  horses,  and  that  of  cavalry.  In 
all  cases  wherever  we  had  an  army  in  the  field  it  was  half 
paralyzed  for  want  of  mules  and  horses.  In  a  brief  period 
the  sixty  miles  of  mountain  road  to  Bridgeport  became  a 
high  way  of  dead  animals  that  had  fallen  exhausted  and  starved 
at  their  work.  But  the  route  was  menaced  by  Bragg's  cav- 
alry commanded  by  the  intrepid  "Wheeler.  Bragg  was  well 
aware  of  the  condition,  and  knew  that  if  he  could  hold  the 
river  and  the  shorter  roads  to  Bridgeport  the  surrender  of 
our  army  was  only  a  question  of  time.  He  placed  Long- 
street  in  command  of  this  part  of  his  operations,  and  ferried 
all  of  his  cavalry  across  the  river  under  Wheeler,  subject  to 
Longstreet's  immediate  command.  Wheeler  crossed  on  the 
1st  of  October,  and  moved  in  the  direction  of  our  line  of  sup- 
ply. General  Rosecrans  Learning  of  this,  ordered  General 
Crook  to  pursue.  Heavy  skirmishing  extended  back  as  far  as 
Murfreesboro.  This  continued  from  the  1st  of  October  until 
the  12th  with  varying  successes  to  one  side  then  another. 
But  Wheeler  failed  of  his  purpose,  and  recrossed  the  river 


Rosecrans  Removed.  445 

with  a  severe  loss  of  men  and  materials,  and  the  unhappy 
consciousness  that  he  had  failed  of  his  purpose. 

It  was  not  necessary  for  Wheeler  to  have  succeeded. 
The  long  route  of  sixty  miles  killed  in  two  weeks  all  the 
available  horses  and  mtfles.  Hunger  was  upon  our  men,  and 
starvation  stared  the  commanders  in  the  face.  In  this  emer- 
gency the  suggestive  mind  of  our  brilliant  commander  con- 
ceived of  a  plan  that  was  extremely  simple,  and  promised  to 
succeed  because  it  was  unexpected.  All  there  is  of  war  that 
addresses  itself  to  the  intellectual  faculties  is  to  be  found  in 
the  study  of  the  unexpected.  To  comprehend  the  plan  pro- 
jected by  Rosecrans  one  will  see  that  the  Tennessee  River, 
sweeping  from  north  to  south  past  Chattanooga,  forms  a 
sudden  bend  at  Ross  Tow  Island,  and  then  flows  in  a  north- 
erly direction  back  opposite  Chattanooga,  forming  a  penin- 
sula with  a  narrow  neck  at  what  is  called  Brown's  Ferry. 
To  secure  this  ferry  so  as  to  throw  across  the  stream  at  that 
point  a  pontoon  bridge,  and  hold  the  same,  would  shorten 
our  line  of  supplies  by  giving  us  possession  of  the  river  from 
Lookout  Mountain  to  Bridgeport.  At  this  last  named  place 
an  old  steamboat  was  being  repaired  and  a  .new  one  built. 
To  carry  this  project  into  success  the  movements  of  three 
different  bodies  were  necessary.  The  first  was  to  have  Gen- 
eral Hooker  move  forward  from  Bridgeport ;  thence  to  Ran- 
kins'  Ferry,  and  after  to  Brown's  Ferry ;  secondly,  General 
Turchvn,  with  artillery  and  a  sufficient  force,  was  to  march 
across  the  peninsula,  and  thirdly,  a  pontoon  bridge  had  to  be 
floated  at  midnight  from  Chattanooga  nine  miles  to  the  place 
for  its  use  under  command  of  the  brave  and  brainy  Hazen. 

This  scheme  was  promptly  perfected,  but  on  the  19th 
occurred  an  event  which  gave  into  other  hands  its  execution. 
The  fate  awarded  a  great  soldier  by  the  War  Department 
under  Stanton  and  Halleck  was  approaching  their  victim  not 
without  noise,  but  without  warning.  On  the  morning  of  the 
19th  came  the  order  relieving  General  Rosecrans,  and  giving 
command  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  to  General  Thomas. 
Both  of  these  eminent  men  were  amazed  at  what  they  re- 
garded as  a  cruel  injustice  that  is  now  held  to  be  the  crown- 
ing infamy  of  the  war.  General  Thomas  at  once  indignantly 


446  Life  of  Thomas. 

refused  to  accept  a  promotion  that  came  of  such  brutal  dis- 
regard of  right;  but  General  Rosecrans  urged  General  Thomas 
to  accept.  To  decline  would  be  no  relief  to  him  (Rosecrans), 
and  it  would  subject  their  noble  Army  of  the  Cumberland  to 
the  probable  abuse  of  a  commander  who  could  have  no  just 
conception  of  its  worth.  General  Thomas,  so  earnestly 
urged  to  accept,  gave  way,  and  his  former  chief,  turning 
over  the  command,  rode  out  with  his  staff  into  the  cold  night 
that  was  not  so  chilling  and  dark  as  the  clouds  that  calumny, 
treachery,  ingratitude,  and  deep,  malignant  enmity  had  cast 
about  him.  As  he  rode  along  that  foggy,  freezing  night  he 
could  say,  with  bitter  truth,  what  the  immortal  poet  sang 
before  him  : 

"  Blow,  blow,  thou  winter  wind  , 
Thou  art  not  so  unkind 
As  man's  ingratitude." 

All  the  days  of  labor  and  nights  of  sleepless  anxiety — 
all  the  heavy  responsibility  and  grand  success  achieved  by  his 
own  masterly  abilities — all,  all  forgotten ;  and  more  bitter 
than  aught  else  was  the  fact  that  he  who  had  held  high  com- 
mand from  the  first,  ever  in  the  front,  and  in  all  the  battles 
he  had  fought  never  shamed  by  defeat,  had  really  to  give 
place  to  Grant,  a  man  incapable  of  planning  a  successful 
campaign,  who  never  knew  aught  but  defeat  and  disaster — 
the  Christopher  Sly  of  our  military  annals,  who  went  to  his 
grave  mightily  puzzled  as  to  whether  the  public  who  insisted 
upon  kissing  his  feet  understood  him  better  than  he  did  him- 
self. 

Understanding  the  character  of  Edwin  M.  Stanton,  one 
has  not  far  to  go  to  find  the  offense  by  him  committed  that 
brought  upon  his  head  the  punishment  so  savagely  awarded. 
Some  time  in  the  latter  part  of  May,  1863,  Halleck  issued, 
as  we  have  said,  an  order  to  the  effect  that  a  vacant  major- 
generalship  in  the  regular  army  awaited  the  officer  who 
should  first  achieve  a  great  victory  over  the  rebels.  This 
went  out  to  all  the  generals  in  the  field.  Only  one  replied. 
This  one,  already  in  disfavor  at  the  War  Department,  and 
involved  in  an  ugly  controversy  as  to  his  delays,  seized  his 


The  Point  of  Rosecrans'  Offending.  447 

pen — more  fatal  to  him  than  the  enemy's  sword — and,  in  hot 
indignation,  penned  the  following: 

"  HEAD-QUARTERS  DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  CUMBERLAND, 

MURPREESBORO,  TENN.,  March  6,  1863. 

Major- General  H.  W.  Halleck,  Commander-in- Chief,  Washing- 
ton, D.  C. 

GENERAL — Yours  of  the  1st  instant,  announcing  the  offer 
of  a  vacant  major-generalship  to  the  general  in  the  field  who 
first  wins  an  important  and  decisive  victory,  is  received.  As 
an  officer  and  a  citizen,  I  feel  degraded  to  see  such  auction- 
eering of  honor.  Have  we  a  general  who  would  fight  for  his 
own  personal  benefit,  when  he  would  not  for  honor  and  the 
country  ?  He  would  come  by  his  commission  basely  in  that 
case,  and  deserve  to  be  despised  my  men  of  honor.  But  are 
all  the  brave  and  honorable  generals  on  an  equality  as  to 
chances?  If  not,  it  is  unjust  to  those  who  probably  deserve 
most.  W.  S.  ROSECRANS,  Major-General." 

These  are  noble  sentiments,  and  thrill  the  patriotic  heart. 
But,  putting  away  the  sentimental  side,  this  rebuke  from  a 
subordinate  to  his  superior  officer  has  in  it  a  tinge,  to  use  the 
mildest  term,  of  insubordination  quite  foreign  to  the  rules 
and  regulations  that  go  to  make  an  army.  The  blind  obe- 
dience so  necessary  to  the  machine  called  an  army  is  in 
deadly  hostility  to  such  an  act.  General  Rosecrans  would 
have  punished  with  appropriate  severity  any  subordinate  of 
his  who  would  dare  rebuke  him  through  an  insult  such  as  he 
had  administered  to  General  Halleck — or,  rather,  Secretary 
Stanton,  who  was  in  fact  the  author  of  the  objectionable  cir- 
cular. 

Again :  it  is  not  clear  that  Rosecrans'  exceptions  were 
well  taken.  To  work  for  and  long  to  possess  a  major-gene- 
ral's commission  was  a  laudable  ambition,  and,  wjhile  one  was 
ready  to  die  for  one's  country,  to  die  under  double-starred 
epaulettes  did  not  detract  from  the  purity  of  the  patriotism 
or  the  dignity  of  the  death. 

Again :  was  not  Stanton's  judgment  of  the  men  in  the 
army,  such  as  he  and  President  Lincoln  and  his  cabinet  came 


448  Life  of  Thomas. 

to  know  personally,  of  a  clearer  sort  and  more  correct  than 
Rosecrans'  ?  We  have  seen  the  mean  jealousies,  the  low^ 
selfish  intrigues  animating  the  majority  of  their  officers,  and 
Stanton  took  their  measure  when  he  held  before  them  the 
glittering  bait  of  a  major-generalship  in  the  regular  army. 

However,  let  all  this  be  as  it  might  have  been;  when 
Rosecrans  wrote  his  name  to  that  rebuke,  he  signed  his  death 
warrant.  In  Stanton's  estimation,  he  had  added  insult  to 
incapacity,  and,  when  the  time  came  for  Rosecrans'  displace- 
ment, the  punishment  would  be  made  the  more  humiliating 
by  insult  in  return.  This  was  all  very  wrong  in  a  really 
great  man.  It  was  beneath  him,  but  the  sun  has  its  spots, 
and  we  can  only  regret  these  errors  in  one  we  love  for  the 
nobility  of  his  nature  and  admire  for  the  splendid  qualities 
of  his  intellect.  We  must  remember  that  neither  Edwin  M. 
Stanton,  nor  President  Lincoln,  nor  any  officer  outside  of 
Thomas,  Rosecrans,  and  Buell,  understood  or  appreciated 
the  importance  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland.  Lincoln 
and  Stanton,  having  no  time  to  study  the  so-called  art  of  war, 
gave  over  the  entire  military  to  West  Point,  save  when  poli- 
tics intervened  or  a  sentimental  impulse  prevailed  to  police  a 
territory  where  Union  citizens  were  supposed  to  exist.  Of 
this  sort,  in  all  eyes,  was  the  mission  given  the  Army  of  the 
Cumberland.  McClellan  had  adopted  the  popular  cry  of 
"  On  to  Richmond "  as  if  that  incorporated  idleness  where 
the  long,  dreary  past  seemed  resolved  into  a  decayed  town 
had,  any  more  than  a  thousand  others  scattered  through  the 
South,  any  political  importance  or  military  significance. 

"Why  do  you  go  to  Richmond  to  fight  when  the  enemy 
is  here?"  asked  Lincoln  of  McClellan.  He  should  have 
asked :  "  Why  go  to  Richmond  at  all  ?  " 

It  was  well  for  us  probably  that  the  government  at 
Washington,  including  Halleck  and  West  Point,  was  in  such 
profound  ignorance  of  the  situation.  Had  they  wakened  to 
the  fact  that  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  carried  the  for- 
tunes of  the  great  Republic  at  its  front,  and  that  every  mile 
marched  brought  it  nearer  to  the  unprotected  belly  of  the 
Confederacy  where  victory  would  be  death  to  the  dark  cause, 
both  Thomas  and  Rosecraus  would  have  been  displaced  to 


Rosecrans'  Plan  Opened  the  Tennessee.  44U 

give  way  to  some  noted  bullet-head,  such  as  Halleck,  and 
frightful  disasters  would  have  followed  shameful  defeat. 

Out  into  the  cold  foggy  night  rode  the  gifted  general 
whose  genius  gave  us  not  only  the  one  campaign — the  one 
from  Nashville  to  Chattanooga — of  which  we  can  justly  be 
proud,  but  won  for  this  war  the  only  military  achievement 
that  will  go  into  history  as  worthy  the  world's  admiration. 
"All  the  great  monuments  of  earth  are  built  to  the  memory 
of  solemn  asses ;"  but  the  world  moves  and  in  the  spreading 
light  of  better  intelligence  the  time  is  not  distant  when  these 
neglected  monuments  will  furnish  material  for  asylums  to 
the  care  of  the  feeble-minded  while  thoughtful  men  go  in 
search  of  the  humble  graves  of  our  truly  great. 

As  General  Rosecrans — the  dear  "  Old  Rosy  "  of  the 
Cumberland  Army — rode  in  the  dark  over  the  pontoon 
bridge  from  his  great  triumph  into  the  unmerited  obscurity 
awarded  him  by  a  mean  and  ungrateful  government,  he  passes 
from  our  pages  of  history.  Thenceforth  the  story  is  alone 
of  one  greater  than  he — greater  than  any  of  the  crowd  who 
thronged  the  camp  claiming  to  be  leaders. 

We  have  seen  that  before  he  left  he,  had  advised  the 
scheme  by  which  the  seige  of  Chattanooga  could  be  raised. 
Of  the  plan  and  its  author  General  George  H.  Thomas 
said :  "  Before  he  was  relieved  of  the  command  of  the  De- 
partment of  the  Cumberland,  General  Rosecrans  and  his 
chief  engineer,  Brigadier-General  "W.  F.  Smith,  had  con- 
sulted together  as  to  the  means  of  relieving  the  army  at 
Chattanooga  from  the  perilous  condition  it  was  in  owing 
to  the  great  difficulty  of  obtaining  supplies  and  had  par- 
tially planned  the  movement  which  was  left  to  me  to  be  com- 
pleted when  I  assumed  command,  namely,  to  open  a  short 
route  of  supplies  from  Bridgeport." 

Of  this  same  plan  General  U.  S.  Grant  says,  with  a 
sneer :  "  On  the  morning  of  the  21st  we  took  the  train 
from  the  front  reaching  Stevenson,  Alabama,  after  dark. 
Rosecrans  was  then  on  his  way  North.  He  came  into  my 
car  and  we  held  a  brief  interview  in  which  he  described  very 
clearly  the  condition  of  Chattanooga,  and  made  some  excel- 
29 


450  Life  of  Thomas. 

lent  suggestions  as  to  what  should  be  done.  My  only  wonder 
was  that  he  had  not  carried  them  out."  * 

Having  thus  introduced  the  subject  he  proceeds  to  elimi- 
nate General  Rosecrans  and  take  to  himself  the  credit  of 
devising  the  plan  that  Rosecrans  was  about  to  put  in  opera- 
sion  the  very  day  on  which  he  was  relieved.  It  is  true  he 
gives  General  "W.  F.  Smith  faint  praise  for  his  successful  co- 
operation. 

When  monuments  are  robbed  to  build  great  Cathedrals 
we  can  condone  the  crime,  but  when  the  material  is  stolen  to 
enrich  a  mean  structure  indignation  has  full  sway. 

The  War  Department  seemed  to  have  at  last  awakened 
to  the  importance  of  reinforcements  for  the  Army  of  the 
Cumberland.  To  Secretary  Stanton  probably  came  the 
sting  of  conscience  with  the  thought  that  through  his  blind 
passion  and  prejudice  a  great  army  was  in  peril.  He  hur- 
ried West  after  telegraphing  an  order  to  Grant  to  meet  him 
at  Louisville.  Grant  gives  in  his  memoirs  a  confused  ac- 
count of  this,  his  first  meeting  with  the  great  War  Secretary. 
He  says,  on  page  28,  vol.  2 : 

"  On  receipt  pf  Mr.  Dana's  dispatch  Mr.  Stanton  sent 
for  me.  Finding  I  was  out  he  became  nervous  and  ex- 
cited, inquiring  of  every  person  he  met,  including  guests  at 
the  house,  whether  they  knew  where  I  was,  and  bidding 
them  find  me  and  send  me  to  him  at  once.  About  11  o'clock 
I  returned  to  the  hotel  and  on  my  way  when  near  the  house 
every  person  met  was  a  messenger  from  the  Secretary,  ap- 
parently partaking  of  his  impatience  to  see  me.  I  hastened 
to  the  room  of  the  Secretary  and  found  him  pacing  the  floor 
rapidly  in  his  dressing-gown,  saying  that  the  retreat  must  be 
prevented." 

One  searches  in  vain  through  the  records  to  find  the  Dana 
dispatch,  or  any  dispatch,  looking  to  a  proposed  retreat  of  the 
Cumberland  Army  to  which  Grant  refers.  He  labors  not  only 
to  show  that  Rosecrans  contemplated  a  retreat,  and  goes  so  far 
in  his  memoirs  as  to  say  that  he  was  shown  the  map  with  the 
red  and  blue  lines  drawn  upon  it  indicating  the  route  of  re- 

*  Personal  Memoirs  of  U.  S.  Grant. 


Stanton  and  Grant  at  Louisville.  451 

treat.  This  is  a  falsehood  upon  the  part  of  General  Grant 
by  implication.  The  truth  is  that  both  Rosecrans  and 
Thomas,  finding  their  army  in  a  perilous  condition  as  to  sup- 
plies, considered  it  their  duty  to  study  the  means  of  extricat- 
ing themselves  in  case  of  necessity.  Hence  the  council  of 
officers  as  to  the  better  means.  The  panic  was  in  a  room  of 
the  Gait  House,  Louisville.  The  brave  men  in  command  at 
Chattanooga  looked  the  dark  future  full  in  the  face  and 
calmly  took  measures  of  relief.  When  Grant  therefore  tele- 
graphed Thomas  to  hold  Chattanooga  at  all  hazards,  Thomas 
was  surprised,  for  neither  he  nor  his  illustrious  predecessor 
contemplated  such  surrender. 

He  therefore  responded:  "We  will  hold  the  town  until 
we  starve." 

The  meeting  of  Stanton  and  Grant  at  Louisville  is  a 
private  affair  concerning  the  two  men  interested  and  no 
third.  On  this  account  we  would  pass  the  event  in  silence, 
but  General  Grant,  who  never  lost  an  opportunity  to  sneer 
at  Secretary  Stanton,  drags  this  affair  into  history.  He  was 
prompted  by  a  double  motive.  He  wished,  in  the  first  place, 
to  speak  of  Stanton's  nerveless  condition,  and,  in  the  second 
place,  to  head  off  an  account  of  the  affair  that  came  from 
Stanton  and  others  personally  acquainted  with  the  transac- 
tion. It  will  be  observed  that  Grant  begins  in  the  middle  of 
the  story  and  ends  it  without  working  back  to  the  beginning. 
It  begins,  we  remember,  "  On  receipt  of  Mr.  Dana's  dispatch 
Mr.  Stanton  sent  for  me."  Now,  one  is  left  in  the  dark  as 
to  what  dispatch  of  Dana's  he  refers  to,  also  where  he  was 
when  Stanton  sent  for  him.  The  fact  is,  as  told  by  Stanton 
and  others,  that  Stanton  and  Grant  met  in  the  morning  after 
their  arrival  at  Louisville,  and  the  morning  was  spent  in  dis- 
cussing the  condition  at  Chattanooga.  This  condition  was 
as  well  known  to  both  men  before  the  interview  as  it  was 
after.  No  dispatch  was  necessary  to  deepen  the  gloom  upon 
the  mind  of  Stanton,  or  to  rouse  the  dull  apathy  of  the 
ooarse  soldier.  Maps  were  consulted,  reports  studied,  and 
how  to  relieve  the  army  cooped  up  in  Chattanooga  through 
Stanton's  crime  was  discussed.  Both  officials  feared  that 
the  next  news  would  be  of  a  disastrous  retreat,  and  when- 


452  Life  of  Thomas. 

ever  the  door  was  opened  to  admit  any  one  Stanton  would 
start  as  if  the  evil  were  suddenly  shot  in  on  him.  Late  in 
the  afternoon  the  two  separated  for  needed  rest  and  food. 
It  was  understood  that  they  were  to  meet  in  Stanton's  room 
at  7  P.  M.  The  Secretary  was  prompt,  as  usual,  in  filling  his 
engagement,  but  the  General  did  not  appear.  Stanton  was 
at  first  impatient  at  the  delay,  then  furious  at  the  insult  or 
neglect.  Then  began  the  inquiries  and  the  creation  of  mes- 
sengers in  the  guests  of  the  hotel.  General  Grant  was  not 
in  the  hotel,  nor  was  he  at  any  place  of  amusement,  nor  at 
any  hotel.  All  were  searched  in  vain.  Hours  wore  away 
until  at  midnight  the  General  was  found  where  and  in  what 
condition  we  leave  to  the  imagination  of  our  readers. 

That  day,  October  18,  1863,  General  Grant  assumed 
command  of  the  Military  Division  of  the  Mississippi  that  in- 
cluded Tennessee  and,  of  course,  Chattanooga.  General 
JRosecrans  was  removed  and  General  George  H,  Thomas 
given  command  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland. 


Siege  of  Chattanooga.  453 


CHAPTER  XVIII. 

Siege  of  Chattanooga — Terrible  Suffering  from  Lack  of  Supplies — Thomas 
Opens  up  a  Route  Affording  Relief — A  Brave  Order  Meant  only 
for  Effect  at  Washington — Thomas  Commissioned  Brigadier-General, 
U.  S.  A. — Burnside's  Movements  at  Knoxville — Sherman  and  his 
Forces  Join  Grant  and  Thomas— The  Plan  of  Battle — Attack  Postponed 
from  Day  to  Day — Thomas's  Troops  Take  and  Hold  the  Enemy's  Works 
on  Orchard  Knob — Hooker  Captures  Lookout  Mountain — Army  of  the 
Cumberland  Takes  the  Heights  of  Missionary  Ridge — The  Gross  In- 
justice done  Thomas  in  Lying  Memoirs. 

The  Army  of  the  Cumberland  was  in  a  wretched  plight 
many  days  before  General  Rosecrans  turned  the  command 
over  to  General  Thomas.  The  attempt  to  haul  supplies  over 
a  rough  mountain  road  by  animals  already  exhausted  proved 
a  failure  from  the  beginning.  The  poor  horses  and  mules 
were  without  strength  to  carry  themselves,  aside  from  drag- 
ging heavy  wagons  heavily  laden.  There  is  one  memory  of 
tln>  \\ar  that  records  an  infamy  upon  the  hearts  of  all  true 
men  who  were  witnesses  of  the  cruelty.  We  refer  to  the 
treatment  of  the  animals.  Christians  are  cruel  to  animals  at 
best.  As  practiced  theirs  is  the  only  religion  of  all  the  earth 
that  fails  to  teach  consideration  and  kindness  to  the  dumb 
creatures  so  dependent  upon  us  for  their  comfort.  The  rural 
life  so  much  praised  by  poets  is  a  continual  torture  to  ani- 
mals, while  our  great  cities  are  fed  through  an  agonized 
abuse  that  chills  the  blood  of  right  feeling  men.  This  is  so 
terrible  that  one  clings  to  his  belief  in  a  hell  hereafter  that 
one  may  have  the  consolation  of  knowing  that  man,  who 
boasts  of  having  murdered  his  God  and  found  his  religion  in 
the  assassination,  may  find  punishment  of  the  most  exquisite 
sort  for  the  uncalled  for  and  wanton  cruelty  to  animals. 

This  is  the  condition  in  the  hour  of  peace ;  it  is  aug- 
mented to  something  fiendish  in  the  time  of  war.  Of  course 
we  could  not  expect  men  threatened  with  starvation  to  feed 
horses  and  mules.  But  these  poor  creatures  were  reduced 


454  Life  of  Thomas. 

to  a  condition  but  one  remove  from  death  before  the  siege 
began.  It  is  true  that  so  far  as  the  North  was  concerned 
the  war  turned  on  a  question  of  transportation.  The  inva- 
sion of  the  South  enforced  upon  us  long  lines  of  supplies 
that  had  to  be  kept  open,  and  vast  droves  of  horses  and 
mules  were  exhausted  in  supplying  the  cavalry,  artillery,  and 
the  thousands  and  thousands  of  wagons.  One  could  suppose 
this  would  have  enforced  the  best  care,  to  say  the  least,  of  the 
animals  upon  the  service  of  which  armies  were  so  dependent. 
But  economy  of  even  human  life  was  not  thought  of,  and  our 
Christian  training  gives  to  animals  no  share  of  the  charity 
and  love  we  retain  to  ourselves  for  our  necessary  betterment 
ere  we  assume  harps  and  robes  before  our  Father  who  is 
in  heaven,  and  not  supposed  to  know  of  the  cruelty  to  his 
creatures  for  a  time  left  to  our  control. 

The  road  to  Bridgeport  was  the  road  to  death  and,  worse 
yet,  the  road  to  torture.  One  saw  the  wretched  animals,  re- 
gardless of  blows,  fall  exhausted  to  die,  biting  at  the  very 
stones  in  their  agony  of  starvation. 

The  lack  of  transportation  told  immediately  upon  the 
army.  The  men  had  been  on  half  rations  during  the  latter 
end  of  the  forced  marches  that  had  flanked  Bragg's  forces 
out  of  Chattanooga,  and,  worn  out,  they  were  quick  to  real- 
ize the  lack  of  food.  It  seemed  to  General  Bragg  and  his 
subordinate  officers  that  it  was  but  a  question  of  time,  and 
brief  time  at  that,  when  all  this  gallant  army  that  had  out- 
maneuvered,  outmarched,  and  outfought  them  would  igno- 
miniously  surrender  to  hunger. 

The  impression  is  sought  to  be  conveyed  in  Badeau's 
Life  of  Grant,  and  Grant's  own  memoirs,  that  Grant  arrested 
a  fatal  retreat  by  telegraph,  and  that  on  his  arrival  he  imme- 
ately  succeeded  in  relieving  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland. 
Our  readers  will  observe  that  no  such  retreat  was  proposed 
at  any  time,  and  that  the  means  of  relief  had  been  perfected 
before  he  arrived  at  Chattanooga.  He  sneers  at  the  plan  that 
he  was  forced  to  approve,  and  when  through  it  the  siege  was 
raised,  he  eulogized  in  his  report  General  "W.  F.  Smith,  the 
engineer  who  executed  what  Rosecrans  projected,  without  a 


Siege  of  Chattanooga.  455 

word  for  the  author  of  the  bold  undertaking.  The  fact  is, 
Grant  was  in  no  hurry  to  assume  command.  The  order  re- 
lieving Rosecrans  and  the  order  forming  the  new  department 
were  issued  on  the  18th;  on  the  20th,  two  days  thereafter,  he 
left  Louisville  for  Nashville,  where  he  remained  all  night. 
On  the  20th  he  went  as  far  as  Stevenson.  The  next  day  at 
dark  he  reached  Bridgeport ;  from  thence  he  made  Chatta- 
nooga, getting  in  on  the  23d  about  dark.  His  excuse  was  an 
injury  got  from  a  fall  of  his  horse  at  New  Orleans.  "We  are 
willing  in  all  charity  to  concede  this  much,  although  such 
crippled  condition  does  not  figure  in  that  midnight  affair  at 
Louisville.  The  lame  back  was  aided  by  the  problem  pre- 
sented to  the  hero  of  Vicksburg  of  how  to  extricate  the 
Army  of  the  Cumberland  from  its  perilous  position.  We 
can  well  imagine,  therefore,  his  own  relief  when  General 
W.  F.  Smith  laid  before  him  Rosecrans'  plan.  He  adopted 
that  plan  with  a  mental  reservation  to  give  Smith  all  the 
credit  that  he  did  not  retain  for  himself.  The  sanctioned 
plan  was  immediately  put  in  execution.  Hooker  was  ordered 
to  move  up  from  Bridgeport,  and  on  the  morning  of  the  26th 
began  his  march.  Hazen,  in  command  of  the  men  manning 
the  pontoons,  floated  out  from  Chattanooga  at  3  A.  M.  on  the 
27th.  General  Turchin,  with  his  brigade  and  artillery,  and 
accompanied  by  General  Smith,  marched  across  to  Brown's 
Ferry. 

The  most  delicate  part  of  this  bold  maneuver  was  given 
to  General  Hazen,  who  commanded  eighteen  hundred  men. 
It  was  their  part  to  float  the  sixty  pontoons  down  the  swift 
stream  for  nine  miles,  in  sight  of  the  watch-fires  of  the  Con- 
federate picket-line  that  were  burning  at  the  edge  of  the 
water.  Their  only  exertion  was  to  steer  close  into  the 
shadow  of  the  bank  opposite  that  occupied  by  the  enemy. 
This  daring  undertaking  was  eminently  successful.  Hazen 
and  his  men  reached  Brown's  Ferry  about  5  A.  M.,  and  the 
brainy  and  gallant  young  officer  led  the  attacking  party  that 
surprised  and  captured  a  picket  holding  a  knob  immediately 
above  the  ferry.  Turchin's  force  was  immediately  ferried 
over,  and  the  two  forces  held  the  position  until  the  arrival 
of  Hooker,  who  had  come  up,  strange  to  say,  unmolested. 


456  Life  of  Thomas. 

The  ugly  problem  was  solved.  The  shorter  line  secured  in 
this  way  brought  water  transportation  within  easy  distance, 
and  from  that  out  Bragg's  army  became  one  of  observation, 
and  the  siege  was  raised. 

The  strangest  feature  of  this  exploit  was  the  indifference 
of  General  Bragg  to  what  was  being  done.  Of  course,  he 
could  not  divine  the  plan  so  admirably  made  and  successfully 
executed,  but  he  must  have  known  that  Hooker's  force  was 
the  vanguard  of  great  armies  to  the  relief  of  our  besieged 
force;  and  if  he  meant  to  secure  the  fruits  of  his  success, 
Hooker's  division  should  have  been  fought  every  inch  of  the 
way  from  Bridgeport  to  Chattanooga. 

It  will  be  observed  in  the  official  reports  that  Q-rant  does 
not  venture  to  claim  the  merit  of  solving  the  problem  of  sup- 
plies. He  does  this  by  implication  in  his  memoirs,  and  makes 
the  falsehood  the  more  shameful,  for  it  betrays  his  conscious- 
ness of  the  offense.  It  will  be  remembered  that  Grant  tells 
us  in  these  same  shambling  memoirs  that  he  met  Rosecrans 
at  Stevenson,  Alabama.  He  writes :  "  He  came  into  my  car, 
and  we  held  a  brief  interview,  in  which  he  described  very 
clearly  the  situation  at  Chattanooga,  and  made  some  excel- 
lent suggestions  as  to  what  should  be  done.  My  only  wonder 
was  that  he  had  not  carried  them  out"  The  italics  are  ours, 
and  in  them  one  may  read  the  kick  given  the  sick  lion.  One 
would  never  guess  of  one's  self  that  in  these  excellent  sug- 
gestions was  the  one  for  raising  the  siege  in  the  securing  of 
supplies  which  this  man  can  not  bring  himself  to  admitting 
that  it  originated  with  Rosecrans. 

In  his  dispatches,  made  at  the  time,  he  gives  the  credit 
to  General  Thomas.  On  October  26th,  he  telegraphed  as 
follows : 

HEAD-QUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  MISSISSIPPI, 

CHATTANOOGA,  October  26, 1863. 
Major-  General  Halleck,  Washington : 

.  .  .  General  Thomas  had  also  set  on  foot  before  my 
arrival  a  plan  for  getting  possession  of  the  river  from  a  point 
below  Lookout  Mountain  to  Bridgeport.  If  successful,  and 
I  think  it  will  be,  the  question  of  supplies  will  be  fully  set- 
tled. ...  U.  S.  GRANT,  Major- General, 


Siege  of  Chattanooga.  457 

The  motive  of  this  paragraph  is  evident  to  any  one  given 
to  a  study  of  the  military  mind  under  responsibility.  If  a 
plan  succeeded  the  general  commanding  could  take  the  credit 
of  such  achievement  as  he  eventually  did,  in  his  rambling 
and  unreliable  memoirs.  If,  on  the  contrary,  it  not  only 
failed,  but  in  its  failure  brought  on  a  disastrous  engagement 
to  our  arms  he  could  wash  his  hands  of  the  affair.  The  liter- 
ature of  military  reports  is  full  of  such  maneuvering.  If 
there  is  a  striking  success  the  general  commanding  gives  his 
subordinates  scant  praise  for  gallantry  and  obedience.  If,  on 
the  contrary,  the  result  is  disastrous  the  blame  falls  upon  the 
cowardly,  slow,  or  stupid  underlings. 

Hold  now,  good  sir,  for  I  would  even  up 

What  in  its  desperation  courts  defeat ; 

Full  well  we  know  success  will  crown  but  one, 

While  failure  hangs  her  hundreds  as  of  course  ; 

So  it  must  be  agreed  that  in  the  end 

We  share  alike  the  gallows  or  the  crown. 

One  of  the  more  alarming  features  of  the  situation  came 
in  on  the  fact  that  the  army  of  occupation  was  short  of  am- 
munition. Food  took  precedence  of  all  else  in  the  long  haul 
of  sixty  miles.  There  was  also  a  lack  of  animals.  Ten  thou- 
sand horses  and  mules  had  perished,  and  as  Grant  said  : 
"•What  was  left  could  scarcely  carry  themselves."  Had 
Hooker  been  attacked  in  his  march  to  Brown's  Ferry,  or  in- 
deed for  a  month  after,  by  the  overwhelming  force  Bragg 
could  have  brought  to  bear  the  result  might  have  been  dis- 
astrous. But  Bragg  and  his  entire  army  had  been  fought 
into  a  respect  for  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  that  in  its 
caution  approached  fear.  In  all  the  efforts  of  the  Confeder- 
ates that  followed  our  occupation  of  Chattanooga,  this  lack 
of  morale  is  the  only  solution  we  can  find  to  an  otherwise 
professed  mystery. 

Two  days  after  Grant  telegraphs  the  following  : 

CHATTANOOGA,  October  28,  1863. 
Major- General  Halleck,  Washington: 

General  Thomas's  plan  for  securing  the  river  and  south- 
side  road  hence  to  Bridgeport  has  proved  eminently  success- 


458  Life  of  Thomas. 

ful.  The  question  of  supplies  may  now  be  regarded  as  set- 
tled. If  the  rebels  give  us  one  week  more  time  I  think  all 
danger  of  losing  territory  now  held  by  us  will  have  passed  away, 
and  preparations  may  soon  commence  for  offensive  opera- 
tions. U.  S.  GRANT,  Major- General. 

On  comparing  these  dispatches  with  the  account  of  the 
same  affair  in  Badeau's  History,  approved  by  Grant  and 
Grant's  subsequent  memoirs,  we  may  learn  the  indifferent  and 
careless  way,  to  say  the  least,  in  which  these  wielders  of  the 
sword  trace  facts.  General  Thomas  puts  in  operation  the 
plan  conceived  and  elaborated  by  Rosecrans,  and  Grant  be- 
gins by  ignoring  the  author ;  then  gives  credit  to  the  execu- 
tor, and  ends  by  taking  all  that  credit  to  himself. 

"We  call  attention  to  the  above  telegram  by  italicizing 
part  of  a  sentence  that  throws  a  flood  of  light  upon  the  con- 
dition of  a  military  mind  that  died  without  discovering  the 
fact  that  on  the  28th  of  October  he  held  the  key  to  the  whole 
situation.  He  had  his  hand  on  that  which  gave  us  not  only 
the  territory  of  Tennessee,  but  every  foot  of  ground  held  by 
the  Confederacy.  In  Chattanooga  he  found,  without  know- 
ing it,  the  title  deeds  to  all  the  territory  held  by  the  authori- 
ties at  Washington^  Had  General  Thomas  been  in  command, 
and  enjoyed  the  same  confidence  given  General  Grant,  he 
would  have  advised  the  administration  at  Washington  to  re- 
lieve enough  of  the  Army  of  the. Potomac  to  man  the  fortifi- 
cations of  the  Capital,  and  send  the  bulk  of  that  army  through 
Cumberland  Gap  and  Knoxville  to  Chattanooga.  In  less 
than  thirty  days  Virginia  would  have  been  abandoned  by 
Lee  and  his  gaunt  veterans  for  Georgia  to  make  a  losing 
fight  for  a  lost  cause.  But  while  our  government  was  dream- 
ing of  conquered  territory,  strangely  ignorant  of  the  conquest 
made,  the  Hon.  Jefferson  Davis,  almost  equally  infatuated, 
directed  Bragg  to  send  Longstreet's  corps  to  Knoxville  for 
the  purpose  of  overwhelming  Burnside's  little  army  of  twenty 
thousand  men.  This  move  proved  in  the  end  the  destruc- 
tion of  an  army.  Bragg  had  reported  the  loss  of  two-fifths 
of  his  forces  that  fought  at  Chickamauga.  He  did  not,  how- 
ever, report  the  loss  of  morale  that  followed  the  fierce  fight- 


Siege  of  Chattanooga.  459 

ing  of  those  two  bloody  days.  Probably  he  did  not  recog- 
dize  this  fact  to  its  fullest  extent.  Be  that  as  it  may,  the 
natural  advantages  he  held  in  Missionary  Ridge  and  Lookout 
Mountain  were  immense,  but  no  ordinary  army  could  man 
them.  The  Union  forces  holding  the  Union  lines  could  mass 
with  ease  to  attack  any  point  that  the  general  commanding 
would  find  impossible  to  reinforce  immediately.  This  is  what 
happened,  and  President  Davis  learned  the  same  lesson  taught 
our  people  at  Washington  that  it  was  folly  to  attempt  the 
command  of  armies  at  such  a  distance. 

Life  at  Chattanooga,  in  November,  1863,  was  not  cheer- 
ful. .  Life  in  camp  is  not  of  that  sort  at  any  time,  but  shut 
in  as  we  were  by  the  enemy,  who  found  amusement  in 
throwing  round  shot  at  unexpected  intervals  from  their 
heights  among  our  tents,  added  to  the  stormy  weather  and 
general  prevalence  of  mud,  made  for  us  a  dreary  existence. 
"  The  soldier's  life  is  ever  gay,"  in  song  or  upon  the  mimic 
stage,  but  in  real  life  it  is  to  the  last  extent  dull  and  depress- 
ing. The  army  had  to  be  refitted  and  fed,  and  those  were 
matters  to  which  our  general  gave  personal  attention.  He 
had  no  time  to  spend  at  head-quarters  of  the  general  com- 
manding, had  he  been  moved  thereto  by  inclination,  which 
was  not  the  fact.  This  knowledge  of  inclination  came  to 
those  of  the  staff  more  from  what  the  general  left  unsaid  than 
from  any  expression.  He  was  on  familiar  terms  with  them 
through  the  thousand  and  one  little  things  of  manner  rather 
than  expression.  He  was  mild,  patient,  and  familiar  with  all, 
but  there  was  one  topic  on  which  he  had  a  silence  that  was 
a  command,  and  that  was  military  affairs  that  involved  com- 
ment or  criticism  on  the  acts  of  others.  Of  course,  his  opin- 
ion of  and  feeling  for  General  Grant  could  only  be  inferred. 
It  was  known,  but  known,  could  not  be  traced  to  any  rea- 
sonable source.  The  fact  is  known  that  our  Creator  has 
given  every  creature  an  instinct  through  which  it  knows  its 
enemy.  Thomas  and  Grant  felt  this.  We  should  not  won- 
der at  this.  The  one  was  a  coarse,  tough-fibered  man,  with 
more  boiler  than  machinery  in  his  make  up,  that  one  saw  at 
a  glance  in  his  dull,  weak  intellectual  outlook  from  his  eyes, 
sustained  by  a  full,  heavy  neck  and  bull-dog  jaw.  If  one 


460  Life  of  Thomas. 

doubts  this,  let  one  look  at  the  two  heads  illustrating  the  first 
and  second  volumes  of  "  Personal  Memoirs  of  U.  S.  Grant." 
The  first  is  that  of  the  soldier  when  a  young  man ;  the  sec- 
ond is  from  the  easel  of  that  most  remarkable  genius  for 
portraits,  William  S.  Marshall.  If  in  this  young  or  old 
man's  face  the  Creator  meant  to  write  greatness  of  any  sort, 
the  writing  is  illegible. 

It  is  unnecessary  for  us  to  repeat  again  what  we  have 
so  often  written  of  the  commanding  yet  winning  presence 
of  our  hero.  It  was  observed  from  the  first,  and  the  observa- 
tion was  common  talk  among  the  staff,  that  General  Grant 
was  uneasy  in  the  company  of  General  Thomas.  What 
Stanton  meant,  when  he  said  he  felt  before  Thomas  as  if  he 
were  in  the  presence  of  Washington,  Grant  also  felt  without 
probably  comprehending  it.  To  a  dull,  commonplace,  coarse 
man,  there  is  no  deeper  and  more  unforgivable  insult  than 
the  presence  of  a  quiet,  capable,  and  yet  refined  man. 

Under  this  state  of  fact,  the  intercourse  between  head- 
quarters was  limited  to  official  orders  carried  to  and  fro  by 
orderlies.  There  was  an  atmosphere  about  each  that,  while 
not  positively  chilling  to  each  other,  was  far  from  warm  and 
familiar.  One  can  well  understand  the  astonishment  of  Gen- 
eral Thomas  when  the  following  order  was  given  him : 

"HEAD-QUARTERS    MILITARY   DIVISION    OF    MISSISSIPPI, 

CHATTANOOGA,  TENN.,  November  7,  186& 

Major- General  Thomas,  Commanding  Department  of  the  Cum- 
berland. 

GENERAL — News  just  received  from  Major-General  Burn- 
side,  taken  in  connection  with  information  given  by  a  deserter 
just  in,  whose  statement  you  have,  is  of  such  a  nature  that  it 
becomes  an  imperative  duty  for  your  forces  to  draw  the  atten- 
tion of  the  enemy  from  Burnside  to  your  own  front.  Al- 
ready the  enemy  have  attacked  Burnside's  most  easterly  gar- 
rison of  two  regiments  and  a  battery,  capturing  the  battery 
and  about  half  of  the  forces.  This  corroborates  the  state- 
ment of  the  Georgia  lieutenant  as  to  the  designs  and  present 
movements  of  the  enemy. 

I  deem  the  best  movement  to  attract  the  enemy  to  be  an 


Siege  of  Chattanooga.  461 

attack  on  the  northern  end  of  Missionary  Ridge  with  all  the 
force  you  can  bring  to  bear  against  it,  and,  when  that  is  car- 
ried, to  threaten  and  even  attack,  if  possible,  the  enemy's 
line  of  communications  between  Dalton  and  Cleveland. 

Rations  should  be  ready  to  issue  a  sufficiency  to  last  four 
days,  the  moment  Missionary  Ridge  is  in  our  possession,  ra- 
tions to  be  carried  in  haversacks.  Where  there  are  not 
horses  to  move  the  artillery,  mules  must  be  taken  from  the 
teams,  or  horses  from  ambulances,  or,  if  necessary,  officers 
dismounted  and  their  horses  taken. 

In  view  of  so  many  troops  having  been  taken  from  this 
valley  and  from  Lookout,  Howard's  corps,  of  Hooker's  com- 
mand, can  be  used  in  this  movement. 

Immediate  preparations  should  be  made  to  carry  these 
directions  into  execution.  The  movement  should  not  be 
made  one  moment  later  than  to-morrow  morning. 

You  having  been  over  this  country,  and  having  a  better 
opportunity  of  studying  it  than  myself,  the  details  are  left 
to  you. 

I  am,  General,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

U.  S.  GRANT,  Major- General'' 

General  Thomas  read  without  comment  this  extraor- 
dinary paper.  Having  read  the  order,  he  sat  for  a  minute 
or  more  in  thought,  and  then  quietly  sent  for  General  "W.  F. 
Smith,  his  engineer.  The  result  of  that  conference  is  given 
in  a  letter  from  General  Smith  to  Thomas  B.  Van  Home, 
and  is  published  in  his  life  of  Thomas,  on  page  161.  It 
reads : 

"  General  Thomas  said  that,  taking  into  account  his 
numbers  and  condition,  and  the  numbers  and  situation  of  the 
enemy,  the  carrying  out  of  the  order  meant  disaster  to  us, 
and  that  I  must  endeavor  to  get  the  order  countermanded, 
and  wait  for  Sherman's  army  to  arrive. 

"After  a  somewhat  protracted  conversation,  I  suggested 
to  him  that  he  should  go  up  on  the  right  bank  of  the  river 
with  me  opposite  to  the  northern  end  of  Missionary  Ridge, 
and  make  an  examination,  to  which  he  assented,  and  we 
went  up  as  far  as  the  mouth  of  Chickamauga  creek. 


462  Life  of  Thomas. 

"  From  there  we  made  a  scrutiny  of  the  ground  and  the 
position  of  the  right  of  the  enemy  on  the  ridge,  as  marked 
by  their  works  and  smokes,  and  it  was  evident  that  General 
Thomas,  with  his  command,  could  not  turn  the  right  of 
Bragg's  army  without  uncovering  Chattanooga.  We  then 
returned,  and  I  went  to  the  head-quarters  of  General  Grant, 
and  reported  the  result  of  the  reconnoisance,  and  told  him, 
in  my  judgment,  it  was  absolutely  necessary  to  wait  for  the 
arrival  of  Sherman's  army  before  attempting  any  movement. 
"  The  order  was  at  once  countermanded." 
Of  course  the  order  was  countermanded.  We  have 
called  attention  to  some  acts  of  this  one  great  general  of  the 
war  in  popular  estimation  that  indicate  slightly  a  lack  of 
judgment  and  an  absence  of  feeling  in  regard  to  human  life 
on  the  Union  side,  but  we  have  nothing  to  reveal  so  utterly 
senseless  as  this  proposed  attack.  The  fact  is,  it  never  was 
intended  to  be  executed.  The  brave  order  was  meant  for 
home  consumption  at  Washington.  The  President,  Secretary 
of  War,  and  general-in-chief  directing  military  movements 
in  Tennessee  from  the  Capital  found  their  forces  in  an  ugly 
condition  and  themselves  in  a  panic.  Burnside,  with  an 
army  of  twenty  thousand  men  of  all  arms,  had  been  pushed 
through  Cumberland  Gap  to  Knoxville  not  so  much  for  the 
purpose  of  co-operating  with  Rosecrans,  so  as  to  protect  his 
left  flank,  but  to  protect  East  Tennessee  in  behalf  of  the  mili- 
tary governor,  Andrew  Johnson.  Burnside  seemed  to  com- 
prehend this  purpose  of  his  command,  for  he  made  no  effort 
to  aid  Rosecrans  ;  and  so  far  as  his  left  flank  was  concerned, 
the  little  army  under  the  Rhode  Island  epauletted  incapable 
might  as  well  have  been  at  Narraganset.  And  now  that  our 
forces  were  held  at  Chattanooga,  Burnside  and  the  adminis- 
tration were  calling  frantically  for  aid.  To  satisfy  this  de- 
mand the  order  was  elaborated,  issued,  and,  before  a  man 
could  be  called  out  or  a  gun  fired,  revoked.  It  had  served  a 
purpose.  The  trinity  of  meddlers  in  the  administration  was 
satisfied  that  it  had  at  Chattanooga  a  man  of  great  spirit  and 
enterprise.  In  Grant's  official  report  he  says  :  "Ascertaining 
from  scouts  and  deserters  that  Bragg  was  detaching  Long- 
street  from  the  front  and  moving  him  in  the  direction  of 


Siege  of  Chattanooga.  463 

Knoxville,  Tenn.,  evidently  to  attack  Burnside,  and  feeling 
strongly  the  necessity  of  some  move  that  would  compel  him 
to  retain  his  forces  and  recall  those  he  had  detached,  direc- 
tions were  given  for  a  movement  against  Missionary  Ridge 
with  a  view  to  carrying  it  and  threatening  the  enemy's  com- 
munications with  Longstreet,  of  which  I  informed  Bumside 
by  telegraph  on  the  7th  of  November. 

"After  a  thorough  reconnoissance  of  the  ground,  how- 
ever, it  was  deemed  utterly  impracticable  to  make  the  move 
until  Sherman  should  get  up,  because  of  the  inadequacy  of 
our  forces  and  the  condition  of  the  animals  then  at  Chatta- 
nooga, and  I  was  forced  to  leave  Burnside  for  the  present  to 
contend  against  the  superior  forces  of  the  enemy  until  the 
arrival  of  Sherman  with  his  men  and  means  of  transportation." 

On  November  21st,  General  Grant,  in  a  dispatch  to  Gen- 
eral Halleck,  spoke  of  his  order  in  the  following  terms  :  "  I 
ordered  an  attack  here  two  weeks  ago,  but  it  was  impossible 
to  move  artillery.  Now,  Thomas's  chief  of  staff  says  that  he 
has  to  borrow  teams  from  Sherman  to  move  a  part  of  his  ar- 
tillery to  where  it  is  to  be  used.  Sherman  has  used  almost 
superhuman  efforts  to  get  up  even  at  this  time,  and  his  force 
is  really  the  only  one  that  I  can  move.  Thomas  can  take 
about  one  gun  to  each  battery,  and  go  as  far  with  his  infan- 
try as  his  men  can  carry  rations  to  keep  them  and  bring  them 
back.  I  have  never  felt  such  restlessness  before  as  I  have  at 
the  fixed  and  immovable  condition  of  the  Army  of  the  Cum- 
berland. The  quartermaster  states  that  the  loss  of  animals 
here  will  exceed  ten  thousand." 

Again,  we  gather  from  Professor  Coppee,  in  his  volume 
of  Grant  and  his  campaigns,  gotten  doubtlessly  from  head- 
quarters at  the  time,  General  Grant's  intent.  The  professor 
says,  page  220  : 

"  His  (Grant's)  idea  was  to  attack  Missionary  Ridge  with- 
out delay,  and  of  this  plan  he  informed  Burnside,  telling  him 
to  hold  Knoxville  to  the  last  extremity,  but  sober  second 
thought  suggested  by  that  calm  prudence  which  is  one  of  his 
best  characteristics,  prompted  him  to  await  the  arrival  of 
Sherman  and  his  army,  and  thus  by  skill  and  carefulness  to 
leave  little  to  chance." 


464  Life  of  Thomas. 

This  is  the  view  taken  of  the  affair  at  the  time  by  the 
chief  actor  and  promoter  of  the  wild  project.  But  the  order, 
made  to  serve  a  dishonest  purpose,  is  not  permitted  to  rest  as 
stated  in  the  report.  Badeau,  in  that  unpleasant  picture 
called  the  Military  Ilistory  of  U.  S.  Grant,  approved  by  its 
hero,  finds  another  use  for  the  order,  and  that  is  in  an  attack 
on  General  Thomas.  On  pages  463  and  464,  vol.  1,  he  says: 

"  But  Thomas  announced  that  he  had  no  horses  to  move 
his  artillery,  and  declared  himself  entirely  and  absolutely  un- 
able to  move  until  Sherman  should  arrive  to  co-operate. 
.  .  Nevertheless,  Thomas's  delay  was  a  great  disappoint- 
.ment.  A  prompt  movement  on  the  part  of  that  commander 
would  undoubtedly  have  had  the  effect  to  recall  Longstreet ; 
but  now  it  was  possible  that  the  troops  sent  into  East  Ten- 
nessee might  succeed  in  overthrowing  the  occupation  which 
was  so  important." 

Not  content  with  this  fasehood,  the  dishonest  writer  of 
dull  fiction  called  history  returns  to  this  view  of  the  affair  in 
his  so-called  account  of  operations  about  Nashville.  He  then 
says,  in  the  same  work,  vol.  3,  pp.  279,  280 :  "  Grant  knew 
all  this  well.  The  same  traits  which  were  exhibited  in  the 
Nashville  campaign  he  had  seen  evinced  at  Chattanooga  a 
year  before.  The  same  provoking,  obstinate  delay  before  the 
battle,  the  same  splendid,  victorious,  irresi^sible  energy  after- 
ward. He  believed,  indeed,  in  Thomas,  more  than  Thomas 
did  in  himself.  The  subordinate  always  shrank  from  respon- 
sibility." 

Not  content  with  this  falsifying  history  and  damning  the 
illustrious  dead  with  faint  praise  he  further  quotes  from  a 
letter  written  him  by  Sherman  in  which  that  gentleman  thus 
disposes  of  the  man  who  saved  the  lofty  military  critic  from 
lasting  disgrace  as  we  will  show  hereafter.  The  quotation 
states  :  "  Thomas  always  shrunk  from  supreme  command  and 
consequent  responsibility." 

The  only  comment  we  have  to  offer  is  that  thus  speaks 
a  general  who  never  planned  a  campaign  or  wou  a  battle  of 
a  general  whose  military  genius  made  high  strategy  possible 
and  who  never  lost  one  in  the  great  battles  he  fought,  or 
sacrificed  a  man  unnecessarily.  General  Sherman  lived  to 


Siege  of  Chattanooga.  465 

be  ashamed  of  this  sentence.  When  disputing  Lord  Wolseley's 
assertion  that  General  Robert  E.  Lee  was  the  one  general  of 
the  war,  Sherman  at  first  put  forward  Grant,  but  as  if  not 
satisfied  with  his  example  of  military  ability  on  the  Union 
side,  he  soon  dropped  the  ex-President  and  fell  into  a  guarded 
eulogy  of  Thomas.  He  was  wont  to  say  years  before  his 
death  that  he  owed  all  he  possessed  of  military  reputation 
to  George  H.  Thomas;  that  had  it  not  been  for  Thomas's 
success  at  Nashville  in  annihilating  Hood's  army  the  march 
to  the  sea  would  have  been  one  of  the  most  atrocious  dis- 
asters ever  suffered  by  a  general.  We  may  not  quote  the  gen- 
eral's exact  words  accurately,  but  we  give  the  meaning  with 
pleasure,  for  it  shows  that  this  pet  of  the  press  and  theaters 
had  sane  intervals. 

The  reckless  audacity  of  Adam  Badeau's  falsehood  appears 
in  the  comment,  in  which  he  says.  "Nevertheless  Thomas's 
delay  was  a  great  disappointment.  A  prompt  movement  on 
the  part  of  that  commander  would  undoubtedly  have  had  the 
effect  of  recalling  Longstreet."  This  specimen  of  bad  gram- 
mar was  penned  in  connection  with  the  history  of  Sherman's 
assault,  November  25th,  on  the  same  part  of  the  Ridge  that 
Grant  designated  to  Thomas  on  November  7th,  and  although 
the  same  state  of  affairs  continued  to  exist  the  assault  did  not 
force  a  recall  of  Longstreet  or  even  an  order  to  that  effect. 

Adam  Badeau's  "  Military  History  of  U.  S.  Grant "  is 
so  utterly  worthless,  that  it  would  be  a  waste  of  time  to  no- 
tice it  but  for  the  fact,  that  as  we  have  said  before,  it  carries 
the  indorsement  of  Grant,  and  we  are  assured  that  every 
page  was  carefully  read  in  proof  by  the  man  whose  military 
career  and  character  the  narrative  purports  to  give.  Badeau 
wrote  and  Grant  revised.  This  order  seems  to  have  been 
reversed  in  the  "Personal  Memoirs;"  those  rambling,  in- 
accurate and  unsatisfactory  memoirs  of  a  dying  man,  in 
which  Grant  is  claimed  to  have  written  and  Badeau  revised. 
The  student  who  seeks  to  sift  fact  from  fancy  in  the  hur- 
ried and  confused  course  of  events  where  even  telegrams 

O 

from  the  front  are  almost  as  unreliable  as  if  every  telegraph 
pole  had  a  head  and  opinions  of  its  own,  must  be  guarded 
30 


466  Life  of  Thomas. 

against  accepting  the  construction  of  such  events  put  upon 
them  by  the  men  personally  interested  in  the  record.  Gen- 
eral Adam  Badeau  was  selected  to  be  the  historian  of  Grant's 
military  career.  That  he  might  pursue  this  great  work  un- 
molested by  the  care  of  business  incident  to  making  a  living, 
he  was  appointed  U.  S.  Consul  at  London.  He  had  not  only 
free  access  to  all  the  papers  of  the  "War  Department,  but  he 
was  actually  permitted  to  carry  with  him  to  London  the 
more  important  documents  of  the  public  archives.  "We  are 
of  course  left  in  doubt  as  to  the  number  and  importance  of 
those* returned.  This  painful  condition  of  doubt  is  dispersed 
by  the  character  given  the  historian  by  his  illustrious  patron 
when  such  opinion  of  character  carries  with  it  all  the 
solemnity  of  a  dying  utterance. 

There  is  nothing  to  be  gained  by  showing  what  might 
have  been  the  result  of  the  movement  proposed  in  an 
order  that  never  was  intended  to  be  executed.  The  only 
argument  one  can  use  in  favor  of  an  intended  move  is  that 
it  is  about  such  as  Grant  was  capable  of  making.  The 
force  under  Thomas  was  not  only  nearer  the  enemy  on 
Lookout  Mountain  and  Missionary  Ridge,  but  equally  dis- 
tant from  the  point  designated  for  the  assault.  Not  a  cor- 
poral's guard  could  have  been  moved  from  Chattanooga  to 
the  foot  of  the  Ridge  near  the  tunnel  without  the  cognizance 
of  the  Confederates,  and  to  mass  enough  troops  to  make 
the  assault  serious  would  have  been  to  evacuate  the  strong- 
hold we  had  gained  at  such  expenditure  of  blood  and  treas- 
ure, under  the  very  eyes  of  the  enemy.  Bragg  was  slow, 
vascillating  and  uncertain,  but  the  very  troops  in  line  would 
have  charged  down  those  slopes  without  command  as  our 
men  charged  up  the  same  declivity  without  orders,  as  they 
did  a  few  days  later.  It  is  customary  to  defend  Grant's  con- 
duct at  the  expense  of  his  head.  He  goes  acquit,  for  ex- 
ample, of  complicity  in  Grant  and  Ward's  supposed  deal- 
ing in  navy  and  army  contracts  by  the  assertion  that  al- 
though an  old  army  officer  and  for  eight  years  President  of 
the  United  States,  he  was  ignorant  of  what  army  and  navy 
contracts  were.  This  may  have  been  possible — we  hope  it 
was — but  we  draw  the  line  on  the  order  issued  at  Chatta- 


Siege  of  Chattanooga.  467 

nooga  to  General  Thomas  on  the  7th  of  November,  1863. 
No  sane  or  sober  man  could  have  issued  such  with  the  in- 
tent of  its  execution. 

The  expected  reinforcements  under  General  Sherman 
approached  slowly.  This  was  no  fault  of  the  general  com- 
manding the  coming  army.  The  rains  that  followed  our 
forces  rendered  the  roads  almost  impassable,  and  this,  to 
armies  operating  in  Tennessee,  was  an  obstacle  that  at  times 
became  the  impossible.  In  the  mean  time  General  Thomas 
pushed  forward  with  indomitable  will  the  task  of  re-equip- 
ping his  grand  Army  of  the  Cumberland.  He  was  among 
the  first  to  detect  the  "  shoddy "  and  other  frauds  that  dis- 
honest contractors,  in  collusion  with  dishonorable  officials, 
were  putting  upon  the  government  and  imposing  on  the 
men.  We  had  thousands  of  overcoats  and  blankets  that 
fell  apart  after  a  little  wear,  hats  that  melted  in  a  hard  rain, 
while  shoes  of  split  bottom  went  to  pieces  as  if  they  were 
pasted  together  instead  of  being  pegged  or  sewed.  Had  it 
not  been  for  the  presence  of  Edwin  M.  Stanton  in  the  "War 
Department  our  government  would  have  fallen  from  the 
frauds  that  honey-combed  its  very  foundations.  "We  were 
probably  in  no  worse  condition  than  any  government  en- 
gaged in  a  great  conflict  of  arms,  save  in  the  fact  that  we  were 
without  experience  in  war,  and  also,  being  a  republic,  we 
were  without  despotic  power  that  puts  aside  the  law's  delays 
in  its  dealings  with  the  dishonest.  We  have  on  this  account 
more  law  and  less  order  than  any  civilized  people  on  earth — 
so  that  when  war  came  upon  us  even  our  great  and  good 
President  had  to  shut  his  eyes  with  the  painfulest  expression 
on  his  rugged  face  at  gigantic  frauds  clearly  exposed  lest  the 
administration  lose  the  vote  of  Pennsylvania. 

Whilst  engaged  in  preparations  for  offensive  movements 
General  Thomas  received  the  commission  of  Brigadier-Gen- 
eral of  the  United  States  Army.  This  was. a  cold  recognition 
of  right  to  promotion  under  the  rules  and  regulations  of  the 
regular  army,  and  not  the  reward  of  the  War  Department 
for  gallant  and  brilliant  services  in  the  field.  Jhe  Virginian 
had  to  wait  for  that  promotion  that  recognizes  services.  He 


468  Life  of  Thomas. 

quietly  accepted  without  comment  his  commission  and  con- 
tinued his  work. 

General  Burnside  grew  in  importance  as  a  perilous  con- 
dition and  the  panic  felt  at  Washington  reached  the  head- 
quarters of  the  Army  of  the  Mississippi,  at  Chattanooga. 
The  commander-in-chief  became  yet  more  "  restless  "  as  the 
time  slowly  wore  on,  as 

"  He  gave  many  a  Northward  look 
To  see  his  Sherman  lead  his  forces  up, 
And  looked  in  vain." 

Never,  in  any  war,  did  a  more  absurd  military  maneuver 
control  grave  events.  On  the  28th  of  June,  General  Burn- 
side  marched  out  of  Camp  Nelson,  near  Richmond,  Ken- 
tucky, in  command  of  twenty  thousand  men.  He  was  ex- 
pecting his  old  corps,  as  he  was  pleased  to  call  it,  from  the 
east,  and  moved  without  that  addition.  In  light  marching 
order,  his  men  mounted  on  horses  denied  Rosecrans,  and 
with  all  his  supplies  packed  on  mules,  he  made  his  way  with- 
out serious  molestation  to  Knoxville.  The  conquest  was  so 
rapid  and  easy,  the  Confederates  so  uniformly  retreated  from 
strong  positions  in  mountain  gaps  and  on  rivers  that  General 
Burnside  jumped  to  the  conclusion  that  the  Confederacy  had 
collapsed.  He  did  not  know,  as  he  subsequently  learned  to 
his  sorrow,  that  all  the  -forces  under  Buckner  were  being 
gathered  in  to  strengthen  Bragg  in  his  death  struggle  at 
Chattanooga.  This  erroneous  idea  of  General  Burnside 
strengthened  his  belief  in  his  original  orders  that  he  was  at 
Knoxville  to  police  East  Tennessee  in  behalf  of  Andrew 
Johnson's  military  government  at  Nashville.  To  this  end, 
instead  of  connecting  with  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland, 
and  so  protecting  its  left  wing,  he  immediately  proceeded 
to  spread  his  forces  from  Kingston  to  Cumberland  Gap.  The 
great  population  of  Union  men  in  East  Tennessee  had  cer- 
tainly suffered  fearfully  for  two  years,  and  vengeance  was 
sweet  to  them.  General  Burnside,  with  his  amiable  temper- 
ament and  conservative  ways,  would  not  have  suited  them  on 
trial.  The  appearance  of  our  troops  brought  a  cry  of  joy 
and  a  Union  flag  that  had  been  long  hidden  from  nearly 


Siege  of  Chattanooga.  469 

every  house  at  Knoxville ;  and  the  next  move  in  order  was 
to  destroy  the  property  of  their  late  oppressors  and  now  fly- 
ing secessionists.  This  last  was  shocking  to  the  mild  and 
benevolent  Burnside.  He  had  no  time  to  try  conclusions  in 
this  direction,  however,  for  the  unexpected  appearance  of 
Longstreet's  forces  put  our  police  under  bayonets  on  the 
defensive.  To  get  them  together  for  that  purpose  was  the 
first  and  most  difficult  duty  of  their  general. 

Burnside  was  never  ordered  to  report  to  Rosecrans  for 
orders.  That  would  have  been  to  add  twenty  thousand  men 
to  the  Cumberland  army,  then  under  command  of  the  man 
Stanton  pronounced  incompetent.  Halleck's  latest  order  to 
Burnside  was  one  of  those  indefinite  commands  that  throws 
the  whole  responsibility  upon  the  subordinate.  This  order 
directed  Burnside  to  concentrate  his  army  on  the  Tennessee 
River  westward  from  Loudon  so  as  to  connect  with  Rose- 
crans,  who  had  just  reached  Chattanooga,  and  that  "it  was 
hoped  that  there  would  be  no  further  delay  in  effecting  a 
junction  between  the  two  armies  as  had  previously  been  or- 
dered." Halleck,  after  the  mischief  had  been  done,  claimed 
that  as  Rosecrans  ranked  Burnside  the  obedience  of  his 
order  would  have  been  what  the  situation  called  for.  Burn- 
side  evidently  did  not  BO  construe  Halleck's  directions,  but 
went  on  distributing  his  forces,  unmindful  of  the  fighting  at 
Chattanooga  and  the  peril  oY  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland, 
until  the  20th  of  October,  when  the  little  out-lying  post  of 
Philadelphia,  held  by  Colonel  F.  T.  "Wolford,  was  attacked. 
"Wolford  had  two  thousand  men  and  he  found  himself  sur- 
rounded by  Longstreet's  entire  corps.  The  gallant  colonel 
fought  fiercely  in  hopes  that  the  sound  of  his  guns  would 
fetch  him  relief  from  Loudon.  But  rumor  preceeded  the 
roar  of  artillery,  and  the  fact  of  Longstreet's  advance  was 
known  at  Loudon  in  time  to  put  the  forces  there  in  full  re- 
treat. Colonel  Wolford  cut  his  way  through,  saving  his 
command  but  losing  all  his  wagons  and  battery.  General 
Burnside  hastened  from  Knoxville  and  took  command  in 
person.  Fortunately  he  was  joined  by  his  old  9th  corps  and 
had  then  a  force  superior  in  numbers  to  that  of  Longstreet. 


470  Life  of  Thomas. 

He  fell  back  fighting  until  behind  the  intrenchments  of 
Knoxville. 

General  Burnside  was  not  the  man  to  try  conclusions 
with  Lougstreet  in  the  open  field.  The  blind  confidence 
that  had  once  marched  brave  men  to  where  they  might  be 
mowed  down  by  the  thousands  in  an  utterly  hopeless  assault 
had  swung  over  to  tha  other  extreme.  With  a  force  superior 
in  numbers  to  his  foe,  he  hid  behind  his  intrenchments,  and 
reported  to  Washington  that  he  would  hold  his  own  until 
Rosecrans  could  come  to  his  relief.  This  relief  came  in  a 
way  to  astonish  not  only  the  over  cautious  Burnside,  but  the 
whole  country  North  and  South.  One  is  puzzled  to  find  a 
reason  for  this  move  of  Longstreet  against  Burnside.  It  is 
said  to  have  originated  with  President  Jefferson  Davis.  If 
so,  it  was  a  strange  blunder, for  so  able  a  man  to  make.  He 
must  have  known  that  the  siege  had  been  broken,  and  sup- 
plies were  pouring  in  to  the  hungry  and  naked  Union  troops. 
The  fact  that  Hooker  was  on  hand  with  forces  from  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac,  and  that  Sherman  was  hurrying  for- 
ward with  the  Army  of  the  Mississippi,  should  have  admon- 
ished him  that,  whether  the  War  Department  at  Washing- 
ton appreciated  the  importance  of  Chattanooga,  or  not,  gi- 
gantic efforts  were  being  made  to  hold  it  permanently  as  our 
own.  Had  Bragg,  immediately  after  the  battle  of  Chicka- 
mauga,  followed  Longstreet's  advice,  and  marched  his  entire 
army  against  Burnside,  we  can  now  see  that  such  a  campaign, 
vigorously  prosecuted,  would  have  rendered  Chattanooga 
untenable  to  the  Union  army.  But  in  dividing  his  army  he 
sent  a  force  to  Knoxville  too  weak  for  a  quick,  grand  blow, 
while  an  insufficient  number  was  retained  to  man  the  fortifi- 
cations about  Chattanooga. 

General  Hooker,  in  command  of  the  Eleventh  and 
Twelfth  Corps  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  numbering  in 
all  twenty  thousand  men,  had  been  dispatched  by  rail  to 
Chattanooga,  which  he  reached  on  October  29th.  General 
Sherman,  with  the  Army  of  the  Mississippi,  reached  Bridge- 
port on  November  15th.  Sherman  hastened  forward  to  con- 
sult Grant  as  to  the  next  move  against  the  enemy.  Generals 
Grant,  Thomas,  Sherman,  and  Smith  made  a  reconnoissance 


Siege  of  Chattanooga.  471 

of  the  locality  Grant  had  resolved  on  as  the  one  to  be  attacked. 
Bragg  would  have  joined  in  the  recommendation  to  assail  this 
especially  strong  fortification.  It  will  he  observed  by  this  time 
that  this  pet  of  the  Illinois  politicians  had  a  peculiar  turn  for 
finding  the  enemy's  ugliest  positions  to  attack.  There  was  one 
advantage,  however,  in  the  fact  that  the  roads  north  of  the  river 
leading  to  the  crest  Grant  proposed  assaulting  were  so  con- 
cealed by  trees  that  the  enemy  might  well  be  in  doubt  as  to 
whether  the  moving  columns  were  destined  for  Knoxyille  or 
a  demonstration  against  Missionary  Ridge.  Had  the  move- 
ment been  promptly  made,  it  is  more  than  probable  that 
Bragg  would  have  been  taken  at  a  disadvantage.  This,  how- 
ever, was  not  to  be. 

After  his  careful  but  cautious  reconnoissance,  Grant  was 
yet  deplorably  ignorant,  for,  while  he  got  reliable  informa- 
tion as  to  the  roads,  he  was  deceived  as  to  Bragg's  posi- 
tion. Instead  of  the  Confederate  right  flank  resting  upon 
the  summit  General  Grant  saw  and  thought  weakly  de- 
fended, the  line  was  on  an  eminence  further  to  the  south, 
of  great  natural  strength,  as  Sherman  lived  to  demonstrate. 

As  there  has  been  a  wide  conflict  of  narrative  and  a  yet 
wider  conflict  of  opinion  as  to  the  battles  that  followed  the 
arrival  of  Sherman,  we  give  the  order  addressed  to  Generals 
Thomas  and  Sherman,  which  contains  all  there  is  of  a  plan 
of  action.  It  reads: 

"  HEAD-QUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 

CHATTANOOGA,  TENN.,  Nov.  18,  1863. 
Major- General  Geo.  H.  Thomas,  Commanding  Department  and 

Army  of  the  Cumberland. 

GENERAL — All  preparations  should  be  made  for  attack- 
ing the  enemy's  position  on  Missionary  Ridge  by  Saturday 
morning  at  daylight.  Not  being  provided  with  a  map  giving 
names  of  roads,  spurs  of  the  mountain,  and  other  places,  such 
definite  instructions  can  not  be  given  as  might  be  desirable. 
However,  the  general  plan,  you  understand,  is  for  Sherman, 
with  his  force  brought  with  him  strengthened  by  a  division 
from  your  command,  to  effect  a  crossing  of  the  Tennessee 
river  just  below  the  mouth  of  the  Chickamauga;  his  cross- 


472  Life  of  Thomas. 

ing  to  be  protected  by  artillery  from  the  heights  on  the  north 
bank  of  the  river  (to  be  located  by  your  chief  of  artillery), 
and  to  carry  the  heights  from  the  northern  extremity  to 
about  the  railroad  tunnel,  before  the  enemy  can  concentrate 
a  force  against  him. 

You  will  co-operate  with  Sherman.  The  troops  in  Chat- 
tanooga Valley  should  be  well  concentrated  on  your  left 
flank,  leaving  only  the  necessary  force  to  defend  fortifications 
on  the  right  and  the  center,  and  a  movable  column  of  one 
division  in  readiness  to  move  wherever  ordered.  This  divis- 
ion should  show  itself  as  threateningly  as  possible,  on  the  most 
practicable  line  for  making  an  attack  up  the  valley.  Your 
effort  will  then  be  to  form  a  junction  with  Sherman,  making 
your  advance  well  toward  the  north  end  of  Missionary 
Ridge,  and  moving  as  near  simultaneously  with  him  as  pos- 
sible. The  junction  once  formed  and  the  ridge  carried,  com- 
munications will  be  at  once  established  between  the  two- 
armies  by  roads  on  the  south  bank  of  the  river.  Further 
movements  will  then  depend  on  those  of  the  enemy. 

Lookout  Valley,  I  think,  will  be  easily  held  by  Geary's 
division  and  what  troops  you  may  still  have  there  belonging 
to  the  old  Army  of  the  Cumberland.  Howard's  corps  can 
then  be  held  in  readiness  to  act  either  with  you  at  Chatta- 
nooga or  with  Sherman.  It  should  be  marched  on  Friday 
night  to  a  position  on  the  north  side  of  the  river,  not  lower 
down  than  the  first  pontoon  bridge,  and  there  held  in  readi- 
ness for  such  orders  as  may  become  necessary. 

All  the  troops  will  be  provided  with  two  days'  cooked 
rations  in  their  haversacks  and  one  hundred  rounds  of  am- 
munition on  the  person  of  each  infantry  soldier. 

Special  care  should  be  taken  by  all  the  officers  to  see 
that  ammunition  is  not  wasted  or  unnecessarily  fired  away. 
You  will  call  on  the  engineering  department  for  such  prepa- 
rations aa  you  may  deem  necessary  for  crossing  your  infantry 
and  artillery  over  Citico  creek. 

I  am,  General,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

U.  S.  GRANT." 

The  at  one  time  proposed  attack  of  Hooker  upon  the 
enemy  posted  on  Lookout  Mountain,  that  if  successful  would 


Siege  of  Chattanoogo.  473 

render  the  fortifications  in  the  valley  untenable,  had,  after  a 
careful  reconnoissance  been  abandoned.  Why  this  import- 
ant change  was  made  General  Grant  explains  in  his  official 
report,  in  which  he  says :  "  Upon  further  consideration,  the 
great  object  being  to  mass  all  forces  possible  against  one 
given  point,  namely,  Missionary  Ridge,  converging  toward 
the  northern  end  of  it,  it  was  deemed  best  to  change  the 
original  plan,  so  far  as  it  contemplated  Hooker's  attack  on 
Lookout  Mountain,  which  would  give  us  Howard's  corps  of 
his  command  to  aid  in  this  purpose;  and  on  the  18th  the  fol- 
lowing instructions  were  given  to  Thomas:" 

Now  we  learn,  from  the  order  above  quoted,  and  the  ex- 
planation found  in  Grant's  official  report,  that  the  plan  of 
attack  meant  putting  in  Sherman's  forces  at  the  extremity 
of  Missionary  Ridge,  with  those  of  Thomas  so  massed  as  to 
second  and  support  Sherman's  initial  assault.  The  general 
had  but  one  idea,  and  that  centered  about  Sherman,  who  was 
to  dislodge  the  enemy  and  cut  him  off  from  his  communica- 
tions. "We  are  at  some  pains  to  make  this  clear  on  account 
of  misrepresentations  made  by  Grant  himself,  that  not  only 
disturb  real  history  but  have  been  used  to  detract  from  the 
just  merit  belonging  to  others.  It  was  the  acts  and  influence 
of  Thomas  that  subsequently  controlled  the  form  of  battle 
and  won  the  victory. 

The  strategy  found  in  the  secret  movements  of  troops 
came  to  naught  through  the  delay  incident  to  Sherman's 
marches  through  stormy  weather  and  over  muddy  roads.  To 
add  to  the  trouble  the  high  water  carried  away  the  pontoon 
bridge  at  Brown's  Ferry,  leaving  one  division  of  Sherman's 
army  in  Lookout  Valley.  The  attack  ordered  on  the  20th 
was,  therefore,  postponed  from  day  to  day.  In  the  mean- 
time Bragg  had  learned  of  the  impending  assault  arid  quietly 
massed  his  troops  to  meet  the  emergency.  The  delay  struck 
General  Thomas  as  peculiarly  unfortunate,  and  the  man 
criticised  by  Grant  and  Sherman  as  too  cautious  for  a  com- 
mander, and  too  slow  for  a  good  subordinate,  on  this  occa- 
sion was  in  advance  of  both  Grant  and  Sherman.  He  ap- 
preciated the  evil  consequences  of  Bragg  being  permitted  to 
prepare  for  an  assault  at  the  point  designated.  General 


474  Life  of  Thomas. 

Thomas  had  promptly  moved  up  his  forces  in  accordance 
with  orders.  General  Wood  was  put  in  command  of  the 
movable  column.  General  Jeff.  C.  D.avis  had  reported  his 
division  to  General  Sherman.  General  Howard's  force  was 
put  in  between  the  pontoon  bridge  at  Brown's  Ferry  and  the 
one  at  Chattanooga.  The  artillery  had  been  planted  on  the 
heights  north  of  the  river,  and  all  the  cavalry,  at  least  all 
that  could  be  mounted,  under  General  Long,  sought  to  protect 
Sherman's  left  flank,  and  was  so  posted  as  to  attack  tlie 
enemy's  connections  with  .Knoxville  should  the  emergency 
arise.  This  was  all  in  accord  with  Grant's  plan,  but  when 
the  third  postponement  occurred,  General  Thomas  sought 
the  General  commanding  to  urge  a  change  of  movement. 
Fearing  that  in  this  delay  Bragg,  enlightened  by  the  marching 
of  troops  in  the  direction  of  Knoxville,  that  did  not  continue 
in  that  direction,  would  have  time  to  collect  a  heavy  force  to 
defend  what  General  Thomas  believed  to  be  a  strong  posi- 
tion, he  urged  upon  General  Grant  that  Howard's  division 
should  report  to  General  Sherman  instead  of  his,  Thomas's 
two  divisions  in  Lookout  Valley,  and  that  these  divisions, 
with  Hooker's  corps,  should  attack  Bragg's  left  flank  at  the 
same  time  that  Sherman  moved  against  the  right  on  Mis- 
sionary Ridge. 

At  the  time  when  Thomas  was  urging  this  upon  Grant 
(22d  November),  Bragg's  extreme  right  rested  on  Missionary 
Ridge,  opposite  our  extreme  left.  The  Confederate  general 
had  disposed  his  reduced  forces  to  the  best  advantage  con- 
sidering the  natural  strength  of  defense  along  his  front.  Of 
course  he  gave  fewer  men  and  a  thinner  line  to  positions 
that  promised  the  most  from  their  natural  advantages.  But 
the  truth  was,  that  after  his  loss  at  Chickamauga,  and  the 
withdrawal  of  Longstreet's  corps,  he  was  without  a  sufficient 
number  to  hold  the  long  line  of  fortifications  that  nature  had 
been  so  liberal  in  constructing.  His  hope,  therefore,  rested 
on  his  anticipating  any  attack  from  his  enemy  and  massing 
his  forces  for  its  defense.  One  division  under  Stevenson  held 
the  summit  of  Lookout  Mountain,  while  two  divisions  under 
Cheatham  and  Walker  guarded  the  front  slope.  While  Gen- 
eral Thomas's  reticence  stood  in  the  way  of  his  volunteering 


Siege  of  Chattanooga.  475 

any  suggestions  earnestly  to  the  general  commanding,  he  dis- 
cussed freely  with  his  staff  the  situation,  and  now  that  the 
condition  of  both  sides  are  known  it  is  remarkable  to  note 
how  clear  and  accurate  his  knowledge  of  the  Confederate 
forces  was.  He  did  not  share  with  Grant  and  Sherman  that 
strange  infatuation  as  to  the  superiority  in  numbers  of  the 
Confederate  forces.  He  knew  how  heavily  the  sparse  popu- 
lation of  the  South  had  been  drawn  on,  and  no  one  was 
better  posted  as  to  the  condition  South  after  two  years  of 
such  a  destructive  war.  "  You  may  rely  upon  it,"  he  said, 
"that  Yicksburg  would  not  have  been  abandoned  and  this 
place,  the  most  important  of  all,  would  not  now  be  in  our 
hands  if  the  government  at  Richmond  could  have  furnished 
men  enough  to  save  either  or  both  places.  Longstreet's  move 
is  a  raid  upon  our  line  of  supplies.  Burnside,  at  this  mo- 
ment, has  three  men  to  Longstreet's  one.  We  greatly  out- 
number Bragg's  army,  and  if  in  our  attack  we  can  bring  the 
crushing  weight  of  our  full  force  to  bear,  we  are  sure  to  win." 
General  Thomas  made  his  suggestion  in  reference  to 
General  Hooker  and  an  attack  on  Bragg's  left,  resting  on 
Lookout  Mountain  on  the  22d,  and  General  Grant  acted  on 
it  only  in  part.  That  is,  he  allowed  only  enough  force  for  a 
demonstration,  which  he  hoped  would  deter  Bragg  from  send- 
ing reinforcements  from  his  extreme  left  to  the  threatened 
right.  We  see  from  this  condition  that  we  had  left  to  chance 
what  should  have  been  a  preconcerted  plan  to  push  the  weight 
of  our  superior  numbers  to  bear  upon  the  enemy.  It  was  by 
the  merest  casualty  that  the  movements  on  the  23d  assumed 
the  shape  and  significance  Thomas  sought  to  give  them.  It 
seems  that  in  shifting  his  forces  to  meet  the  emergency  of  an 
assault  on  Missionary  Ridge  near  the  tunnel,  Bragg  had  im- 
pressed his  own  troops  with  the  belief  that  he  was  about  to 
withdraw.  This  information  was  brought  to  our  head-quar- 
ters by  deserters,  and  went  far  to  confirming  Generals  Grant 
and  Sherman  in  the  correctness  of  their  reading  of  a  brief 
letter  Bragg  had  sent  in  the  day  before,  advising  General 
Grant  to  move  the  non-combatants  from  Chattanooga.  To 
learn  positively  whether  Bragg  was  retreating,  General 
Thomas  was  ordered  to  make  a  reconnoissance  of  the  center. 


476  Life  of  Thomas. 

As  to  General  Thomas  was  left  all  the  details  of  this  move- 
ment, he  organized  a  demonstration  that  called  for  five  divis- 
ions of  his  army,  and  so  directed  as  to  force,  if  possible,  a 
general  engagement,  should  such  become  necessary  to  save 
the  advance  from  disaster.  The  field  of  operation  was  one 
well  fitted  for  a  display,  before  both  armies,  of  the  disciplined 
drill  upon  which  General  Thomas  so  prided  himself.  The 
wide  plain  extending  from  the  Tennessee  to  Lookout  Mount- 
ain and  Missionary  Ridge  formed  an  ampitheater  that  offered 
a  fair  view  to  not  only  the  Confederates  leaning  on  their  guns 
and  looking  down  upon  our  camps  and  lines  of  fortifica- 
tions, but  to  our  own  army  occupying  various  elevations 
from  the  plain.  Directly  in  front  of  our  fortified  line  that 
extended  in  a  circular  sweep  around  Chattanooga  was  the 
enemy's  picket-line,  covering  a  like  circle  of  the  Confederate 
works,  that  was  something  more  than  half-way  between  our 
line  and  Missionary  Ridge.  The  more  conspicuous  feature 
in  this  huge  ampitheater  was  an  abrupt  elevation,  called 
Orchard  Knob,  in  possession  of  the  enemy,  and  about  half- 
way between  Chattanooga  and  Missionary  Ridge.  Along  the 
rocky  height  of  this  mound  ran  the  fortified  line  of  the  Con- 
federate works  that,  covering  a  like  elevation,  called  Indian 
Hill,  took  advantage  of  the  foot-hills  at  the  base  of  Mission- 
ary Ridge.  Along  this  base  was  yet  another  line  of  rifle- 
pits  and  log  and  stone  defenses. 

It  is  seldom  an  order  to  advance  upon  an  enemy  meets 
such  ready  acquiescence  as  this  sent  along  the  line  of  the  five 
divisions  making  the  main  body  of  the  Army  of  the  Cum- 
berland. The  gross  misrepresentations  that  had  enabled  the 
Secretary  of  War  to  send  Rosecrans  in  disgrace  to  the  rear, 
had  extended  its  malign  influence  to  the  army  he  had  com- 
manded. Chickamauga  was  regarded  as  a  bloody  disaster, 
and  Generals  Grant  and  Sherman  made  no  secret  of  their 
belief  that  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  had  been  so  de- 
moralized by  defeats  that  it  could  not  be  relied  on  in  an 
emergency,  and  on  this  account  it  was  not  called  on  to  take 
the  initiative  in  the  attack  on  Bragg,  and  held  the  center, 
where  the  general  commanding  believed  little  active  service 
would  be  required.  Head-quarters  opinions  soon  spread  in 


Siege  of  Chattanooga.  477 

an  American  army,  and  the  brave  men  under  muskets  who 
had  never  yet  met  acknowledged  defeat  as  the  Army  of  the 
Cumberland,  chafed  under  his  calumny,  and  of  their  resent- 
ment was  born  a  resolve  to  teach  their  maligners  a  lesson  on 
the  first  favorable  opportunity.  It  came  in  this  reconnois- 
sance  that  meant  so  little,  and  yet  accomplished  so  much. 

When,  therefore,  Wood's  division,  with  Sheridan's  on 
its  right,  moved  out,  it  was  with  an  elan  that  was  quite  com- 
mon to  the  Confederates,  but  rare  among  our  troops.  This 
force  swept  away  the  picket-line  and  assaulted  the  works  on 
Orchard  Knob  so  suddenly  and  with  such  force  that  they 
were  taken  almost  before  the  Confederates  could  realize  they 
had  been  attacked.  Thomas,  seeing  our  flag  on  Orchard 
Knob  and  the  adjoining  elevations,  signaled  Wood:  "You 
have  gained  too  much  to  withdraw ;  hold  your  position,  and 
I  will  support  you."  Immediately  Howard  was  ordered  for- 
ward abreast  of  Wood's  left,  and  Baird  to  advance  his  divis- 
ion to  Sheridan's  right.  At  3  p.  M.  General  Grant  telegraphed 
to  Halleck  as  follows : 

"  CHATTANOOGA,  November  23, 1863. 
"MAJOR-GENERAL  H.  W.  HALLECK,  Commander-in- Chief : 

"  General  Thomas's  troops  attacked  the  enemy's  left 
(sic)  at  2  P.  M.  to-day,  and  carried  his  first  lines  of  rifle-pits, 
running  over  the  knoll  one  thousand  two  hundred  yards  in 
front  of  Wood's  fort  and  low  ridge  to  the  right  of  it,  tak- 
ing about  two  hundred  prisoners  besides  killed  and  wounded. 
Our  loss  small.  The  troops  moved  under  fire  with  all  the 
precision  of  veterans  on  parade.  Thomas's  troops  will  en- 
trench themselves  and  hold  their  position  until  daylight, 
when  Sherman  will  join  the  attack  from  the  mouth  of  South 
Chickamauga,  and  a  decisive  battle  will  be  fought. 

"U.  S.  GRANT,  Major- General" 

That  Grant  was  astonished  at  the  cool  gallantry  of  these 
lately  despised  troops  is  not  all  that  can  be  read  in  the  above 
dispatch.  We  see  as  yet  the  old  plan  of  battle.  Thomas's 
troops  were  to  intrench  and  await  the  one  movement  that 
carried  in  it  all  that  Grant  had  projected.  It  is  necessary  to 
have  these  facts  in  mind,  for  a  new  light  seems  to  have  fallen 


478  Life  of  Thomas. 

on  the  general  commanding,  for  when  he  comes  subsequently 
to  make  his  official  report  we  find  the  following  extraordinary 
statement :  "  Thomas  having  done  on  the  23d  with  his  troops 
in  Chattanooga  Valley  what  was  intended  for  the  24th,  bet- 
tered and  strengthened  his  advanced  positions  during  the 
day  and  pushed  the  Eleventh  Corps  forward  along  the  south 
bank  of  the  Tennessese  river  across  Citico  creek,  one  brigade 
of  which,  with  Howard  in  person,  reached  Sherman  just  as 
he  completed  the  crossing  of  the  river." 

How  it  was  possible  for  Thomas  to  do  on  the  23d  what 
was  intended  for  the  24th  puzzles  the  comprehension.  We 
have  seen  that  he  was  at  once  to  make  a  reconnoissance  to 
ascertain  if  Bragg  was  in  retreat.  The  official  report  is  not 
in  accord  with  this  nor  does  it  harmonize  with  Thomas's  in- 
structions directing  him  to  mass  his  forces  well  toward  the 
northern  extremity  of  Missionary  Ridge  so  as  to  form  a 
junction  with  Sherman.  We  see  the  first  divergence  from 
the  truth  that  widened  as  it  went  until  Thomas  and  the 
Army  of  the  Cumberland  were  made  to  appear  as  mere 
puppets  in  the  hands  of  this  great  general.  The  original 
design,  that  contemplated  a  conjunction  with  Sherman,  was 
rendered  impossible  by  Thomas's  late  move  which  Grant 
says  in  his  November  23d  telegram  to  Halleck  was  accepted 
and  the  men  ordered  "to  intrench' and  hold  their  position 
until  daylight  when  Sherman,"  etc. 

Now  a  glance  at  the  map  reveals  that  it  was  impossible 
for  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  to  intrench  and  hold  their 
position  in  the  direction  they  were  and  form  a  junction 
with  Sherman.  To  lie  like  a  bulletin  is  an  old  proverb  that 
had  birth  in  the  great  Napoleon's  imaginary  flight  after  a 
battle.  But  the  little  Corsican  remembered  that  when  a 
man  begins  lying  he  has  a  choice  of  lies,  and  can  so  handle 
them  as  to  make  the  fiction  harmonious.  Our  general — and 
we  are  assured  that  he  is  the  greatest  ever  given  humanity — 
leaves  his  feeble  inventions  where  they  are  forced  to  fight 
each  other. 

Events  were  shaping  themselves  in  accord  with  General 
Thomas's  plan  of  battle.  General  Grant  must  have  known 
that  he  could  not  leave  the  center  in  its  advanced  position 


Siege  of  Chattanooga.  479 

f 

and  jet  fetch  Thomas  into  a  support  of  Sherman.  The  result 
was  that  while  Sherman's  assault  was  not  yet  resolved  on, 
the  center  was  left  where  its  gallantry  had  carried  it. 

In  the  meantime  Bragg  was  not  idle.  Awakening  to 
the  fact  that  our  left  overlapped  his  right  and  thereby  en- 
dangered his  supplies  at  Chickamauga  station  he  transferred 
Walker's  division  from  the  northern  slope  of  Lookout 
Mountain  to  his  extreme  right  on  Missionary  Ridge.  He 
thus  paved  the  way  for  General  Hooker's  subsequent  bril- 
liant achievement.  This  gallant  commander  of  the  Eleventh 
Corps  had  been,  as  we  perceive,  quite  eliminated  from  the 
plan  of  operations  conceived  on  the  18th  by  General  Grant. 
This  fact  came  home  to  him  on  reading  General  Grant's 
instructions  to  Thomas.  He  immediately  proffered  a  re- 
quest that  he  be  permitted  to  attack  with  the  troops  he 
then  had  in  hand.  This  included  the  Osterhaus  division 
that  was  designed  to  aid  Sherman  if  it  could  be  got  to 
Sherman's  command.  This  proved  not  to  be  possible,  so 
that  when  the  discretionary  power  was  given  General 
Hooker  to  attack  or  to  act  upon  the  defensive  he  immedi- 
ately proceeded  to  the  assault  of  the  enemy  holding  Look- 
out Mountain.  This  move  began  the  morning  of  the  24th. 
A  dense  fog  had  settled  upon  the  valley  and  through  it  the 
roar  of  artillery  and  the  incessant  play  of  musketry  fell  upon 
the  ears  of  both  armies.  Had  the  conflict  occurred  upon  a 
plain  one  could  have  gathered  from  the  sound,  as  it  ap- 
proached or  receded,  the  fortunes  of  the  day.  But  the 
fight  was  on  the  sides  of  a  mountain,  and  in  all  its  fury 
seemed  fixed  to  one  locality.  This  went  on  till  the  dark  fog 
deepened  into  night,  and  at  a  late  hour  the  uproar  died 
down  and  the  Union  army  in  the  valley  slept  in  dcubt.  It 
was  by  the  day's  dawning  light  that  the  proud  old  flag  of 
the  Union  was  seen  waving  from  the  uppermost  height  of 
Lookout  Mountain.  Cheers  from  sixty  thousand  throats 
went  up  in  greeting  from  the  camps  of  the  valley  while 
along  Missionary  Ridge  there  was  an  ominous  silence. 

General  Hooker's  success  came  more  from  strategy  than 
hard  fighting,  but  there  was  enough  of  both  to  justify  the  wild 
eulogies  that  rung  through  the  country,  and  again  put  the 


480  Life  of  Thomas. 

unfortunate  general  of  Chancellorsville  in  popular  favor. 
This  continued  until  the  time  when  sneers  from  a  military 
junto  discouraged  praise  and  made  Hooker's  "  fight  above 
the  clouds  "  a  play  for  questioning  sarcasm.  Had  the  trinity 
of  military  incompetents  possessed  General  Joe  Hooker's 
ability  there  would  not  have  been  any  necessity  to  build  on 
the  achievement  of  others,  nor  would  there  be  now  such  a 
sensitive  shrinking  from  historical  investigation  of  fictitious 
narratives.  General  Hooker  had  succeeded  in  crossing  his 
slender  column  over  Lookout  Creek,  without  the  knowledge 
of  the  enemy  and  by  the  dash  with  which  he  carried  works 
supposed  to  be  impregnable,  impressed  the  Confederates  that 
an  overwhelming  force  was  climbing  the  mountain  on  all 
sides  to  pour  over  under  bayonets  through  their  scantily- 
manned  fortifications. 

General  Hooker's  success  rendered  Bragg's  position  on 
Missionary  Ridge  utterly  untenable,  and  common  sense — to 
say  nothing  of  military  intelligence — directed  an  immediate 
retreat  to  a  stronger  position.  The  loss  of  Lookout  Moun- 
tain and  consequent  shortening  of  his  line  to  Missionary 
Ridge  opened  the  way  to  the  flank  and  resulted  in  the  defeat 
of  his  entire  force.  However,  Bragg  was  not  more  ignorant 
of  his  danger  than  Grant  was  of  his  gain.  The  latter  ordered 
Hooker  forward,  but  Hooker's  force  was  too  light  for  the 
grave  work  that  opened  before  them.  The  force  given  Sher- 
man to  do  slaughter  before  a  position  well  manned  and  nat- 
urally strong  should  swiftly  have  been  transferred  to  Hooker. 
As  it  was,  the  general  commanding  looked  eagerly  to  see 
Sherman  accomplish  with  great  slaughter  on  Bragg's  right 
precisely  what  Hooker  had  done  with  little  loss  on  the  ene- 
my's left.  But  Sherman  was  repulsed  with  heavy  loss,  and 
Hooker  was  arrested  by  the  lack  of  a  bridge  over  Chatta- 
nooga Creek.  Sherman  made  preparation  for  another  as- 
sault, and  Hooker  proceeded  to  rebuild  an  old  bridge.  Had 
Sherman  tried  again  he  would  have  been  left  in  defeat  to 
count  his  dead  and  wounded  ;  and  had  Hooker  succeeded  in 
crossing  Chattanooga  Creek  he  would  have  encountered  a 
heavier  force  than  his  own  as  well  posted  for  defense  as 
Bragg's  right. 


Siege  of  Chattanooga.  481 

This  was  the  condition  when  the  unexpected  happened, 
and  the  hard  proposition  presented  the  Union  army  was  sud- 
denly and  easily  solved.  The  forces  in  the  center  under 
Thomas  that  had  been  marched  over  the  enemy's  fortifica- 
tions upon  Orchard  Knob,  and  held  there  by  their  immediate 
command,  were  suddenly  called  on  by  Grant  to  make  an- 
other demonstration,  and  so  relieve  Sherman  of  the  forces 
massed  against  him.  Running  along  the  base  of  Missionary 
Ridge  were  rifle-pits  connected  by  log  and  stone  breast- 
works, and  against  these  the  four  divisions  already  noted  for 
their  dash  and  staying  power  were  ordered  to  advance. 

With  banners  waving  and  drums  beating  the  men  moved 
out  and  formed  in  lines  as  if  on  parade.  The  day  was  beauti- 
fully clear  and  cool,  while  the  field  to  be  marched  over  for 
the  assault  was  bare  and  enough  open  to  make  a  splendid 
spectacle.  Nearly  a  hundred  thousand  men  were  spectators 
of  this  imposing  military  movement.  Along  the  brow  of 
Missionary  Ride  men  crowded  to  the  front  as  officers  leaped 
upon  guns,  and  all  gazed  in  silence  upon  "  the  long  line  that 
came  gleaming  on,"  while  the  rifle-pits  and  breastworks 
waited  in  grim  silence  for  the  coming  foe.  For  twenty  min- 
utes there  was  the  stillness  of  a  cemetery,  broken  suddenly 
by  the  roar  of  artillery  from  Orchard  Knob  and  other 
heights  throwing  their  missiles  into  the  rifle-pits.  Imme- 
diately forty  guns  on  Missionary  Ridge  responded,  and  the 
usual  roar  incident  to  an  artillery  duel  was  augmented  by 
the  echoes  that  sounded  as  if  every  mountain  height  had  its 
battery.  Generals  Grant  and  Thomas,  each  with  his  numer- 
ous staff,  on  Orchard  Knob,  and  indeed  the  entire  Union 
army,  soon  lost  sight  of  the  combatants  because  of  the  smoke 
that  rolled  in  and  over  where  a  deadly  conflict  was  being 
fought.  To  the  experienced  ears  of  veterans  it  was  soon 
evident  that  the  conflict  at  the  rifle-pits  had  come  to  an  end, 
but  whether  for  or  against  our  arms  was  unknown  until,  the 
smoke  lifting,  there  could  be  seen  along  the  steep  sides  of 
Missionary  Ridge,  from  end  to  end,  the  enemy  climbing  un- 
armed, and  the  entire  line  surging  up  in  pursuit. 

"Who   gave  that   order?"   demanded    Grant,   turning 
fiercely  to  Thomas. 
31 


482  Life  of  Thomas. 

"  I  know  of  no  one  giving  such  orders,"  quietly  responded 
General  Thomas,  a  flush  of  pride  mounting  his  face  at  the 
gallant  action  of  his  men. 

"  Well,  it  will  he  investigated,"  added  the  general  com- 
manding, and  as  he  spoke,  along  the  line  of  the  ridge,  at  six 
different  points,  our  troops  were  seen  pouring  over  the  breast- 
works of  the  enemy.  Almost  immediately  it  was  learned 
from  the  irregular  report  of  artillery  along  this  same  ridge 
BO  lately  in  possession  of  the  Confederates  that  their  guns 
were  being  used  against  their  late  owners. 

There  was  a  sudden  breaking  up  of  the  generals  assem- 
bled on  Orchard  Knob.  The  battle  had  been  won.  The  in- 
solent enemy  so  long  in  possesion  of  what  they  thought  an 
impregnable  position — "  one,"  as  Bragg  wrote  in  his  official 
report,  "that  ought  to  have  been  held  by  a  skirmish-line" — 
had  been  driven  out,  and  had  General  Thomas's  suggestions 
been  acted  upon  in  their  full  significance,  the  army  under 
Bragg  would  have  been  annihilated.  General  Hooker  was 
in  the  rear,  but  with  an  insufficient  force  to  hold  the  enemy 
in  check.  Had  one-fourth  the  care  been  taken  to  strengthen 
Hooker  that  there  had  been  to  make  Sherman  formidable, 
the  two  wings  of  the  Union  army  would  have  met  to  dictate 
terms  of  surrender  to  a  helpless  army.  As  it  was,  the  retreat 
that  on  the  center  proved  disorderly,  on  the  enemy's  right 
under  Cleburne,  was  conducted  after  nightfall  slowly  and  in 
order,  the  enemy  falling  back  with  guns,  flags,  and  material. 

The  cause  of  this  result  is  to  be  found,  first  in  the  fact 
that  Grant  not  only  knew  nothing  of  strategy,  but  openly 
expressed  his  contempt  for  any  thing  savoring  of  such  use  of 
the  intellectual  process.  This  art  of  war  was  summed  up  in 
the  sentence  uttered  by  the  general  commanding  the  national 
forces  of  the  Grand  Duchess,  who  said  he  must  go  out  and 
find  the  enemy  and  fight  him.  The  second  reason  was  the 
haunting  fears  of  both  Grant  and  Sherman  that  magnified 
the  numbers  of  the  enemy.  Nothing  could  make  either  be- 
lieve that  Bragg's  army  after  the  departure  of  Longstreet 
was  one-fourth  less  than  the  forces  gathered  in  under  Grant. 

Subsequent  events  developed  another  haunting  fear  that 
disturbed  the  repose  of  our  popular,  epauletted  pets,  and  this 


Siege,  of  Chattanooga.  483 

was,  that  if  the  facts  were  once  made  known  of  the  fighting 
about  Chattanooga,  the  smoke-wreathed  halos  about  their 
heroic  heads  would  not  only  disappear,  but  gather  about  the 
brow  of  the  silent,  solitary  man  who  accomplished  all  and 
claimed  nothing.  Worried  with  this  thought  from  the  last 
echo  of  the  last  Confederate  gun  at  Chattanooga,  these  two  be- 
gan the  misrepresentations  that  were  to  rob  the  "  Rock  of 
Chickamauga"  of  all  credit  due  him  for  the  victory  he  had 
made  it  possible  for  his  men  to  win.  There  is  no  question,  now 
that  we  have  all  the  orders  and  reports  from  both  sides,  that 
to  General  Thomas's  order  to  General  Hooker  to  attack  the 
enemy's  left  on  Lookout  Mountain,  and  that  general's  amaz- 
ing success,  we  owe  the  victory  won  by  the  gallant  center. 
That  center,  having  captured  the  rifle-pits,  went  up  under 
bayonets  to  the  summit  because,  having  gained  their  first  ad- 
vantage, they  found  themselves  forced  to  decide  for  them- 
selves either  to  fall  back  or  charge  to  the  front.  They  had 
no  time  to  deliberate.  Sixty  pieces  of  artillery  were  belch- 
ing grape  down  upon  them,  while  the  rattle  of  musketry  was 
from  the  keys  of  death,  sung  of  by  Longfellow.  Twenty 
minutes  of  that  exposure  was  sufficient  to  annihilate  the  en- 
tire force.  Grant  said  subsequently,  with  that  charming  in- 
difference to  fact  so  peculiar  to  him,  that  he  expected  the 
men  to  re-form  in  the  captured  rifle-pits  and  await  further 
movement  until  ordered.  A  most  appropriate  place  that  to 
re-form  and  await  orders.  "We  know  well  that  the  forward 
dash  was  safer  than  a  retreat.  The  nearer  the  base,  the  less 
they  had  of  the  artillery  fire,  for  the  guns  could  not  be  suf- 
ficiently depressed  to  be  effective,  while  in  the  inequalities 
of  surface,  broken  as  the  face  of  the  acclivity  was,  in  gullies, 
huge  rocks,  and  trees,  there  was  some  shelter  from  musketry. 
Then,  again,  came  the  comforting  fact  that,  in  firing  down, 
the  men,  as  usual  in  such  cases,  shot  over  the  heads  of  the 
attacking  forces.  The  truth  is,  that  the  Confederate  rifle- 
pits  were  located  so  as  to  take  the  enemy  as  they  emerged 
from  the  declivity,  and  to  fire  upon  them  as  they  ascended  it 
was  necessary  to  fight  in  front  of  these  carefully  constructed 
works.  The  charge  up  that  mountain  side  was  a  splendid 


484  Life  of  Thomas. 

illustration  of  the  drill  and  discipline  General  Thomas  had 
given  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland. 

The  direct  cause  of  victory  and  defeat  was  a  shifting  of 
morale  from  the  Confederate  to  the  Union  side.  Encamped 
on  Lookout  Mountain  and  Missionary  Ridge,  the  men  who 
charged  in  overwhelming  numbers  upon  the  center  at  Chick- 
amauga  only  to  fall  back  in  the  face  of  the  deadly  fire,  saw 
beneath  them  on  the  Chickamauga  plain  a  vast  army  of  the 
same  sort  of  men,  while  across  the  several  pontoon  bridges 
they  watched  the  great  columns  marching  to  swell  the  num- 
ber. Those  men  at  the  guns  and  in  the  rifle-pits,  who  were 
expected  to  hold  that  ridge  against  all  comers,  saw  above 
Lookout  Mountain  the  old  flag  of  the  Union  floating  brightly 
in  the  sunlight,  and  but  a  few  hour  before  the  attack  the 
word  went  whispered  down  the  line  that  the  Yankees  who 
had  taken  Lookout  Mountain  were  on  their  rear. 

It  would  have  been  better  for  the  reputations  of  both 
Grant  and  Sherman  to  have  left  the  record  of  events  un- 
touched by  misrepresentations.  As  it  pleased  Divine  Provi- 
dence to  permit  these  men  to  be  on  horseback  and  in  command 
when  the  Confederacy  fell  from  sheer  exhaustion,  and  as  such 
fact  captivated,  the  common  ignorant  mind  and  made  them 
military  heroes,  they  should  have  been  content  with  their 
honors.  Grant  felt  uneasy  and  ashamed  in  the  presence  of 
Thomas,  and  both  Grant  and  Sherman  were  troubled  with 
the  thought  that  truth  and  justice  would  award  to  their 
subordinate  in .  office  the  higher  position  on  the  roll  of 
honor.  They  began  instinctively  then  to  mutilate  the  rec- 
ord to  the  injury  of  one  whose  bare  suggestions,  badly 
acted  upon,  gave  them  victory.  This  misrepresentation  be- 
gan at  once  in  their  official  reports.  We  have  seen  that  the 
general  commanding  had  but  one  purpose  in  his  offensive 
movement  against  the  enemy,  and  that  was  Sherman's  as- 
sault on  the  northern  end  of  Missionary  Ridge  near  the  tun- 
nel. The  action  of  Hooker  that  swept  Lookout  Mountain 
and  doubled  the  enemy  in  on  Missionary  Ridge,  thereby  open- 
ing a  road  to  his  rear,  came  from  Thomas.  The  successful 
movement  on  the  center  was  not  in  the  plan,  and  grew  out 
of  menace  meant  to  relieve  Sherman.  Now,  with  these  facts 


Siege  of  Chattanooga.  485 

in  mind,  let  us  read  the  official  report  of  the  general  com- 
manding, and  we  will  learn  that  as  early  as  the  25th  began 
this  distortion  of  history  and  the  wrong  to  Thomas.  It 
reads : 

"Early  in  the  morning  of  the  25th,  the  remainder  of 
Howard's  corps  reported  to  Sherman,  and  constituted  a  part 
of  his  forces  during  that  day's  battle  and  the  pursuit  and 
subsequent  advance  for  the  relief  of  Knoxville. 

"  Sherman's  position  not  only  threatened  the  right  flank 
of  the  enemy,  but,  from  his  occupying  a  line  across  the  moun- 
tain and  to  the  railroad  bridge  across  Chickamauga  Creek, 
his  rear  and  stores  at  Chickamauga  station.  This  caused 
the  enemy  to  move  heavily  against  him.  This  movement  of 
his  being  plainly  seen  from  the  position  I  occupied  on  Or- 
chard Knob,  Baird's  division  of  the  Fourteenth  Corps  was 
ordered  to  Sherman's  ^support,  but,  receiving  a  note  from 
Sherman  informing  me  that  he  had  all  the  force  necessary, 
Baird  was  put  in  position  on  Thomas's  left. 

"  The  appearance  of  Hooker's^column  was  at  this  time 
anxiously  looked  for  and  momentarily  expected,  moving 
north  on  the  ridge  with  his  left  in  Chattanooga  Valley  and 
his  right  east  of  the  ridge.  His  approach  was  intended  as 
the  signal  for  storming  the  ridge  in  the  center  with  strong 
columns,  but  the  length  of  time  necessarily  consumed  in  the 
construction  of  a  bridge  over  Chattanooga  Creek  detained 
him  to  a  later  hour  than  was  expected.  Being  satisfied  from 
the  latest  information  from  him  that  he  must  by  this  time  be 
on  his  way  from  Rossville,  though  not  yet  in  sight,  and  dis- 
covering that  the  enemy,  in  his  desperation  to  defeat  or  re- 
sist the  progress  of  Sherman,  was  weakening  his  center  on 
Missionary  Ridge,  determined  me  to  order  the  advance  at 
once.  Thomas  was  accordingly  directed  to  move  forward 
his  troops  constituting  our  center — Baird's  division  (Four- 
teenth Corps),  Wood's  and  Sheridan's  division  (Fourth 
Corps),  and  Johnson's  division  (Fourteenth  Corps),  with  a 
double  line  of  skirmishers  thrown  out,  followed  in  easy  sup- 
porting distance  by  the  whole  force,  and  carry  the  rifle-pits 
at  the  foot  of  Missionary  Ridge,  and,  when  carried,  to  re- 
form his  lines  with  a  view  of  carrying  the  top  of  the  ridge. 

"  These  troops  were  moved  forward,  drove  the  enemy 


486  Life  of  Thomas. 

from  the  rifle-pits  at  the  base  of  the  ridge  like  bees  from  a 
hive ;  stopped  but  a  moment  until  the  whole  were  in  line, 
and  commenced  the  ascent  of  the  mountain  from  right  to  left 
almost  simultaneously,  following  closely  the  retreating  enemy 
without  further  orders.  They  encountered  a  fearful  volley 
of  grape  and  canister  from  nearly  thirty  pieces  of  artillery 
and  musketry  from  still  well  filled  rifle-pits  on  the  summit 
of  the  ridge.  Not  a  waver,  however,  was  seen  in  all  that 
long  line  of  brave  men ;  their  progress  was  steadily  onward 
until  the  summit  was  in  their  possession." 

That  neither  Grant  nor  Sherman  had  these  "brave 
men  "  in  view  when  planning  the  attack  on  natural  fortifica- 
tions before  them,  is  proven  by  the  words  of  Sherman,  who 
says  of  them  in  his  Memoirs,  vol.  1,  pages  361-2,  as  follows : 
"General  Grant  pointed  out  to  me  a  house  on  Missionary 
Ridge,  where  General  Bragg's  head-quarters  were  known  to 
be.  He  also  explained  the  situation  of  affairs  generally :  that 
the  mules  and  horses  of  Thomas's  army  were  so  starved  that 
they  could  not  haul  his^uns;  that  forage,  corn,  and  provis- 
ions were  so  scarce  that  the  men,  in  hunger,  stole  the  few 
grains  of  corn  that  were  given  to  favorite  horses;  that 
the  men  of  Thomas's  army  had  been  so  demoralized  by  the 
battle  of  Chickamauga  that  he  feared  they  could  not  be  got 
out  of  their  trenches  to  assume  the  offensive ;  that  Bragg 
had  detached  Lougstreet  with  a  considerable  force  up  in 
East  Tennessee  to  defeat  and  capture  Burnside;  that  Burn- 
side  was  in  danger,  etc.;  and  that  he  (Grant)  was  extremely 
anxious  to  attack  Bragg  in  position,  to  defeat  him,  or,  at 
least,  to  force  him  to  recall  Longstreet.  The  Army  of  the 
Cumberland  had  been  so  long  in  the  trenches  that  he  wanted 
my  troops  to  hurry  up  and  take  the  offensive  first,  after 
which  he  had  no  doubt  the  Cumberland  army  would  fight 
well." 

The  knowledge  of  these  "brave  men"  came  from  their 
disobedience  of  orders  and  forcing  themselves  into  a  battle 
from  the  plan  of  which  they  had  been  eliminated  because  of 
their  believed  lack  of  morale.  And  yet  in  the  official  report 
we  are  cooly  informed  that  this  assault  upon  the  center  by 
the  supposed  demoralized  men  made  part  of  the  original 
plan  of  attack. 


Siege  of  Chattanooga.  487 

""Well,  it  will  be  investigated,"  said  Grant,  on  Orchard 
Knob,  when  the  charge  of  the  men  of  the  Cumberland  was 
being  made.  It  is  being  investigated  much  to  the  general's 
discredit. 

But,  if  the  official  report  moves  enough  from  the  truth 
to  convey  error  through  implication,  when  the  general  comes 
to  pen  his  memoirs,  or  probably  adopt  what  some  one  penned 
for  him,  he  boldly  swings  from  any  recognition  of  fact.  He 
begins  his  fiction  by  saying: 

"At  twelve  o'clock  at  night  (24th),  when  all  was  quiet, 
I  began  to  give  orders  for  the  next  day,  and  sent  a  dispatch 
to  Wilcox  to  encourage  Burnside.  Sherman  was  directed  to 
attack  at  daylight.  Hooker  was  ordered  to  move  at  the 
same  hour,  and  endeavor  to  intercept  the  enemy's  retreat,  if 
he  still  remained ;  if  he  had  gone,  then  to  move  directly  to 
Rossville  and  operate  against  the  left  and  rear  of  the  force 
on  Missionary  Ridge.  Thomas  was  not  to  move  until  Hooker 
had  reached  Missionary  Ridge.  As  I  was  with  him  on  Or- 
chard Knob,  he  would  not  move  without  further  orders 
from  me." 

Now,  one  has  only  to  test  this  narrative  by  the  orders 
actually  given  and  the  events  that  occurred  on  the  24th  and 
25th.  The  plan  of  battle,  as  we  have  seen,  referred  only  to 
Sherman's  assault  on  the  northern  extremity  of  Missionary 
Ridge.  Men  were  taken  from  Hooker  for  the  purpose  of 
strengthening  Sherman,  and  the  men  under  Thomas  were 
held  for  the  same  purpose.  Believing  from  rumors  that 
Bragg  might  be  in  full  retreat,  Hooker  was  ordered  to  inter- 
cept the  enemy  at  Rossville.  But  what  occurred  on  the  25th 
was  as  far  from  the  thought  of  the  general  commanding  as 
any  local  event  in  China.  After  giving  in  some  detail  the 
unsuccessful  attempts  of  Sherman  to  carry  the  ridge  before 
him,  he  continues  his  fanciful  narrative.  He  says,  page  78, 
volume  2d : 

"  The  enemy  had  evacuated  Lookout  Mountain  during 
the  night,  as  I  expected  he  would." 

At  what  hour  he  had  such  expectations  is  not  given.  It 
was  evidently  not  in  time  to  take  advantage  of  Hooker's 
success.  As  the  Confederates  had  left  an  opening  on  his  left 
through  which  he  could  be  flanked  without  a  fight,  it  is 


488  Life  of  Thomas, 

most  extraordinary  that  our  general  commanding  should 
neglect  such  an  opportunity  while  crowding  troops  in  on 
Bragg's  right  to  be  slaughtered  in  vain.  The  truth  is — and 
it  is  the  only  explanation  that  saves  General  Grant  from  a 
charge  of  utter  imbecility — he  did  not  expect  Hooker,  with 
his  weakened  force,  to  make  any  attack,  and  so  the  with- 
drawal of  Bragg's  forces  from  Lookout  Valley  and  Hooker's 
advance  were  as  much  a  surprise  to  Grant  as  it  was  to  all  of 
us.  And  had  Hooker  been  left  in  command  of  the  troops 
that  were  of  no  use  to  Sherman,  Bragg's  entire  army  would 
have  been  so  hemmed  in  as  to  be  forced  to  surrender.  The 
author  of  "Personal  Memoirs"  continues: 

"In  crossing  the  valley  he  (the  enemy)  burned  the 
bridge  over  Chattanooga  Creek,  and  did  all  he  could  to  ob- 
struct the  roads  behind  him.  Hooker  was  off  bright  and 
early  with  no  obstructions  in  his  front  but  distance  and  the 
destruction  above  named.  He  was  detained  four  hours 
crossing  Chattanooga  Creek,  and  thus  lost  the  immediate 
advantage  I  expected  from  his  forces.  His  reaching  Bragg's 
flank  and  extending  across  it  was  to  be  the  signal  for  Thomas's 
assault  on  the  ridge.  But  Sherman's  position  was  getting  so 
critical  that  the  assault  for  his  relief  could  not  be  delayed 
any  longer." 

Of  course  the  impression  meant  here  to  be  conveyed  is, 
that  the  unexpected  assault  on  the  ridge,  directly  in  front, 
was,  in  fact,  a  preconceived  movement.  The  trouble  about 
so  considering  it  is  that  the  only  order  given  Thomas  was  to 
so  mass  his  troops  as  to  move  in  support  of  Sherman,  and 
under  Sherman's  command.  He  would  as  soon  have  given 
orders  for  the  infantry  and  artillery  to  take  wings  and  fly 
over  the  ridge  as  to  command  a  force  so  weakened  to  h'elp 
Sherman  to  make  the  assault  that  followed.  He  continues: 

"  Sheridan's  and  Wood's  divisions  had  been  lying  under 
arms  from  early  morning,  ready  to  move  the  moment  the 
signal  was  given.  I  now  directed  Thomas  to  order  the 
charge  at  once." 

Now,  had  this  Julius  Caesar  of  pen  and  sword,  said  that 
"  I  now  directed  Thomas  to  make  demonstration  at  once," 
he  would  have  come  in  striking  distance  of  the  truth.  The 
previous  plan  looked  to  nothing  but  a  support  of  Sherman. 


Siege  of  Chattanooga.  489 

It  was  intended  that  Thomas's  left  should  touch  ou  Sherman's 
right,  and  the  attack  made  at  the  ridge  near  the  tunnel 
should  extend  south  so  as  to  envelope  all  of  the  center. 
But  when  this  demonstration  was  made  Sherman  was  idle. 
He  had  demonstrated  that  the  works  before  him  could  not 
be  taken  by  assault.  The  fact  is  that  he  and  Grant  were 
laboring  under  the  strange  delusion  that  Bragg  would  as- 
sume the  offensive  and  overwhelm  Sherman.  Hence  the 
order  for  a  demonstration  to  keep  Bragg  busy  until  Sherman 
could  be  further  reinforced.  To  make  his  version  of 'the 
affair  consistent,  he  adds  a  foot  note  to  page  78,  Second  Vol., 
which  reads: 

"  In  this  order  authority  was  given  for  the  troops  to  re- 
form after  taking  the  first  line  of  rifle-pits,  preparatory  to 
carrying  the  ridge." 

A  most  remarkable  place  this  to  be  selected  for  troops  to 
re-form.  The  place  was  open  at  the  rear  and  sixty  pieces  of 
artillery  along  the  heights  above  were  pouring  down  grape 
as  rapidly  as  their  pieces  could  be  served,  while  twenty 
thousand  veterans  under  musket  were  sending  their  more 
deadly  hail  into  the  exposed  ranks.  As  well  might  the  offi- 
cer who  blundered  in  giving  the  order  to  the  doomed  six 
hundred  immortalized  by  Tennyson,  have  modified  the  charge 
by  directing  that  when  the  cavalry  had  drawn  fire  from  the 
front,  right  and  left,  they  halt  and  re-form  before  making  the 
final  assault.  But  here  follows  the  most  amusing  statement : 

"  Sheridan's  and  Wood's  divisions  had  been  lying  under 
arms  from  early  morning,  ready  to  move  the  instant  the 
signal  was  given  (what  signal  ?)  I  now  directed  Thomas  to 
order  the  charge  at  once.  I  watched  to  see  the  effect  and 
became  impatient  at  last,  that  there  was  no  indication  of  any 
charge  being  made.  The  center  of  the  line  which  was  to 
make  the  charge  was  near  where  Thomas  and  I  stood,  but 
concealed  from  view  by  an  intervening  point.  Turning  to 
Thomas  to  inquire  what  caused  the  delay,  I  was  surprised  to 
see  Thomas  J.  Wood,  one  of  the  division  commanders,  who 
was  to  make  the  charge  standing  talking  to  him.  I  spoke 
to  General  Wood,  asking  why  he  did  not  charge  as  ordered 
an  hour  before.  He  replied  very  promptly  that  this  was  the 


490  Life  of  Thomas. 

first  he  had  heard  of  it,  but  that  he  had  been  ready  all  day 
at  a  moment's  notice ;  I  told  him  to  make  the  charge  at  once." 

This  imaginary  order  was  a  verbal  one,  and,  of  course, 
no  research  among  the  records  can  help  us.  It  is  a  little 
strange  that  one  who  formed  a  part  of  that  group  on  the  day 
in  question,  at  the  summit  of  Orchard  Knob,  heard  no  such 
order.  This  includes  General  Thomas  and  Wood,  the  last 
named  there  for  orders. 

He  writes  of  a  signal,  and  we  are  put  in  pursuit  of  that, 
for  it  was  not  an  order,  verbal  or  otherwise,  that  should  ini- 
tiate the  movement,  so  we  want  to  get  that  signal.  On 
page  78,  of  same  volume,  we  are  informed  "  His  (Hooker's) 
reaching  Bragg's  flank  and  extending  across  it,  was  to  be 
the  signal  for  Thomas's  assault  on  the  ridge."  We  were  then 
on  Orchard  Knob  waiting  for  this  signal — and  as  the  signal 
never  came,  no  order  was  given  to  charge. 

There  is,  however  a  written  order  of  record  that  Grant 
gives  us  himself  on  page  80  of  same  volume,  and  it  effectu- 
ally and  finally  puts  an  end  to  an  order  that  reflects  greatly 
upon  General  Thomas,  whose  promptness  in  executing  orders 
was  proverbial  in  the  army.  Here  is  his  vindication : 

CHATTANOOGA,  Nov.  24,  1863. 
Major- General  Thomas,  Chattanooga: 

General  Sherman  carried  Missionary  Ridge  as  far  as  the 
tunnel  with  only  slight  skirmishing.  His  right  now  rests  at 
the  tunnel  and  on  top  of  the  hill ;  his  left  at  Chickamauga 
Creek.  I  have  instructed  General  Sherman  to  advance  as 
soon  as  it  is  light  in  the  morning,  and  your  attack,  which  will 
be  simultaneous,  will  be  in  co-operation.  Your  command 
will  either  carry  the  rifle-pits  and  ridge  directly  in  front  of 
them,  or  move  to  the  left  as  the  presence  of  the  enemy  may 
require.  If  Hooker's  position  on  the  mountain  can  not  be 
maintained  with  a  small  force,  and  it  is  found  impracticable 
to  carry  the  top  from  where  he  is,  it  would  be  advisable  for 
him  to  move  up  the  valley  with  all  the  force  he  can  spare, 
and  ascend  by  the  most  practical  road. 

U.  S.  GRANT,  Major- General. 


Siege  of  Chattanooga.  491 

One  is  amazed  to  learn  that  with  this  order  of  record 
that  the  general  commanding  would  pen  such  a  narrative  as 
that  which  appears  to  the  damage  of  Thomas  in  his  memoirs. 
This  order  convicts  him  of  the  grossest  ignorance  of  the  situ- 
ation. Sherman  had  not  carried  the  ridge  to  the  tunnel. 
His  right  was  not  at  the  tunnel  and  on  the  top  of  the  hill. 
How  Thomas  was  to  co-operate  then  with  the  condition  sup- 
posed by  Grant  but  not  established  is  a  mystery.  A  deeper 
mystery  rests  upon  the  evident  lack  of  information.  Sher- 
man's head-quarters  were  within  easy  reach  at  night  and  in 
sight  from  Orchard  Knob.  Why,  then,  when  this  order  was 
given,  the  general  commanding  was  not  better  informed 
puzzles  the  student  of  history.  It  is  also  clear  that  on  the 
night  of  the  24th  General  Grant  had  no  thought  of  using 
General  Hooker's  forces  against  Missionary  Ridge,  as  claimed 
in  his  memoirs.  He  could  not,  for  he  was  as  much  in  ignor- 
ance of  what  Hooker  had  accomplished  as  the  American  peo- 
ple are  of  the  true  history  of  the  war. 

Now,  Avill  Grant's  official  report  sustain  the  assertion 
that  he  premeditated  an  assault  by  the  center  upon  Mission- 
ary Ridge?  In  this  report  he  says:  "Thus  matters  stood 
about  3  p.  m.  The  day  was  bright  and  clear,  and  the  am- 
phitheater of  Chattanooga  lay  in  beauty  at  our  feet.  I  had 
watched  for  the  attack  of  General  Thomas  early  in  the  day." 

As  General  Thomas  was  at  Grant's  elbow  all  that  morn- 
ing (25th)  (see  Grant's  Memoirs)  it  was  his  duty  to  give  the 
order  for  the  charge ;  he  claims  that  he  did  so,  but  that 
Thomas  neglected  to  obey  for  an  hour  after  its  issue.  This 
is  far  from  being  "  early  in  the  day  "  till  afternoon. 

The  fact  is  that  the  three  sentences  above  quoted  refer 
to  Thomas's  co-operation  with  Sherman,  who  was  to  carry 
the  ridge  and  turn  the  enemy's  flank  before  Thomas  came  in 
to  his  support.  He  was  not  waiting  then  for  Thomas  to  at- 
tack but  for  Sherman  to  do  that  which  the  general  never 
accomplished,  that  is,  win  a  victory.  When  it  was  found  that 
Sherman,  as  usual,  was  being  disastrously  defeated,  a  demon- 
stration was  ordered  for  the  center,  not  with  the  remotest 
hope  of  carrying  the  ridge,  but  to  divert  the  enemy  from  the 
imperiled  Sherman  to  a  slaughter  of  our  men  on  the  center. 


492  Life  of  Thomas. 

General  Grant  does  not  stand  altogether  alone  in  dis- 
torting the  truth  and  seeking  to  steal  the  honors  justly  due 
General  Thomas  and  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland.  It  is 
time  that  these  claimed  historians  make  no  reference  to  im- 
aginary orders.  They  feel  safe  in  the  fact  that  the  general 
readers  give  no  time  to  investigation,  and  when  the  historical 
student  searches  the  war  records  their  plausible  fiction  will 
be  regarded  as  settled  history.  In  this  the  historian,  Adam 
Badeau,  readily  takes  the  lead,  and  in  his  Military  History, 
approved  by  General  Grant,  we  find  on  page  525  of  Volume 
I,  the  following: 

"  Hooker  was  to  draw  attention  to  the  right,  to  seize  and 
hold  Lookout  Mountain,  while  Sherman,  attacking  Mission- 
ary Ridge  on  the  extreme  left,  was  still  further  to  distract 
the  enemy;  and  then,  when  reinforcements  and  attention 
should  be  drawn  to  both  rebel  flanks,  the  center  was  to  be 
assaulted  by  the  main  body  of  Grant's  force,  under  Thomas." 

Again,  on  page  528  of  same  volume,  we  find  this :  "  The 
rebel  center,  as  Grant  had  foreseen,  was  weakened  to  save 
the  right;  and  then  the  whole  mass  of  the  Army  of  the 
Cumberland  was  precipitated  on  the  weakened  point;  the 
center  was  pierced,  the  heights  carried,  and  the  battle  of 
Chattanooga  won." 

Now,  Grant  foresaw  nothing.  He  was  as  much  aston- 
ished at  the  events  developed  before  him  and  the  result  as  we 
all  were.  Nor  is  it  true  that  Bragg  weakened  his  center ; 
he  strengthened  his  right  by  troops  taken  from  the  shortened 
line  of  his  left. 

General  Sherman  falls  into  line  and  informs  us  on  page 
364  of  Volume  I  of  his  memoirs:  "The  object  of  General 
Hooker's  and  my  attacks  on  the  extreme  flanks  of  Bragg's 
position  was  to  disturb  him  to  such  an  extent  that  he  would 
naturally  detach  from  his  center  as  against  us  so  that 
Thomas's  army  could  break  through  his  center.  The  whole 
plan  succeeded  admirably,  but  it  was  not  until  after  dark 
that  I  learned  the  complete  success  of  the  center,  and  re- 
ceived General  Grant's  orders  to  pursue  on  the  north  side  of 
Chickamauga  Creek." 


Siege  of  Chattanooga.  493 

Anxious  to  illustrate  his  eminent  strategy  he  tells  Adam 
Badeau  (Military  History  U.  S.  Grant,  Vol.  I,  page  505): 

"  That  he  did  not  consider  the  hill  for  which  he  fought 
on  November  25th  as  very  important  in  itself,  and  therefore 
used  only  three  regiments  in  the  original  attack;  but  he 
made  as  much  noise  and  show  as  he  could  to  alarm  Bragg 
for  the  safety  of  that  flank,  and  of  the  railroad  bridge  just 
in  the  rear.  His  effort  was  to  induce  Bragg  to  detach  as 
much  as  possible  from  the  center  and  so  to  weaken  that 
which  Sherman  knew  from  Grant  would  be  the  critical  point 
of  the  battle." 

When  one  remembers  that  this  assault  was  to  be  a  sur- 
prise, and  the  anxiety  at  head-quarters  was  so  extreme  that 
reinforcements  were  hastened  to  Sherman  until  he  had  over 
twenty-five  thousand  men,  the  divine  tactics  of  gong-beating 
to  which  he  resorted,  according  to  this  story,  is  ludicrous. 
It  grows  more  so  in  light  of  the  fact  that  General  Hooker, 
who  was  to  make  a  prodigious  noise  at  the  other  end  of  Mis- 
sionary Ridge,  had  been  deprived  of  troops  to  support  our 
military  mandarin  until  but  ten  thousand  were  left. 

The  great  Napoleon  said  history  is  the  lies  agreed  upon. 
It  is  much  to  be  regretted  that  these  eminent  historians  did 
not  agree  in  their  fabrications  so  that  they  might  at  least 
harmonize  and  so  appear  more  plausible  to  the  reader.  One 
statement  alone  presents  the  unanimous  support  from  all, 
and  that  eliminates  General  Thomas  and  the  Army  of  the 
Cumberland  from  the  merit  of  a  victory  that  the  one  fought 
to  a  triumphant  close,  and  the  other  foresaw  and,  as  far  as 
he  was  permitted,  provided  for.  Had  General  Thomas's 
suggestion  in  reference  to  Hooker  and  his  attack  on  Lookout 
Mountain  been  accepted  in  full  Hooker  would  have  been  in 
the  rear  with  a  force  sufficiently  strong  to  have  destroyed 
Bragg's  army.  There  is,  however,  no  good  in  repeating 
events  that  to  the  reader  must  appear  plain  and  unquestion- 
able. 

The  Army  of  the  Cumberland  was  in  full  pursuit  when 
night  intervened  and  Bragg  was  enabled  to  retreat  un- 
molested. His  loss  of  men  and  material  was  heavy;  the 
first,  from  his  own  showing,  numbered  over  six  thousand, 


494  Life  of  Thomas. 

while  the  last  was  so  grievous  that  the  Confederate  army 
was  rendered  incapable  of  active  operations  until  the  follow- 
iug  spring,  when  a  new  commander  infused  a  new  spirit  into 
the  defeated  and  demoralized  force.  Grant,  however,  enter- 
taining, as  most  of  the  generals  did,  an  exaggerated  estimate 
of  the  enemy's  numbers,  while  our  advance  was  making  an 
assault  on  the  rear  guard,  under  General  Cleburne,  near 
Ringgold,  had  Howard's  corps  so  placed  as  to  break  the  rail- 
road from  Cleveland  to  Dalton,  and  in  that  way  prevent 
Bragg  from  sending  reinforcements  to  Longstreet.  Bragg 
was  in  no  condition  to  aid  Longstreet.  His  own  army  was 
in  peril,  and  time  was  needed  in  which  to  reorganize,  while 
urgent  demands  were  made  on  the  government  at  Richmond 
for  reinforcements. 

Further  military  operations  for  the  winter  ended  with 
the  skirmish  near  Riuggold,  and  from  that  the  Army  of  the 
Cumberland  was  put  on  police  duty  in  separate  detachments 
in  Middle  and  East  Tennessee.  These  also  were  busy  re- 
building railroads,  bridges,  fortifications,  and  storehouses, 
and,  in  view  of  a  movement  into  Georgia  in  the  spring,  vast 
stores  were  accumulated  at  Chattanooga. 

It  is  singular  to  observe  that  with  Chattanooga  in  our 
possession  but  one  man  on  our  side  seemed  to  appreciate  its 
immense  advantage.  Instead  of  an  advance  from  Chatta- 
nooga such  as  we  had  at  last  forced  upon  us,  Grant  counte- 
nanced Sherman  in  a  campaign  in  the  State  of  Mississippi 
against  General  Polk  with  Mobile  as  an  objective  point. 
When  this  was  inaugurated  the  old  fear  of  a  concentration 
took  possession  of  the  general  commanding  and  he  gave  or- 
ders to  Thomas  to  threaten  the  enemy  at  Dalton.  Bragg 
had  been  relieved  and  General  Joseph  E.  Johnston  given 
command.  General  Thomas- had  stoutly  resisted  uncovering 
Chattanooga  for  the  purpose  of  protecting  East  and  MidiJle 
Tennessee,  and  had  therefore  enough  of  his  army  in  hand  to 
hold  the  place  and  keep  intact  his  lines  of  supply.  When, 
therefore,  he  was  called  on  to  detach  one-half  his  force  from 
Chattanooga  to  reinfore  the  troops  at  Knoxville,  he  earnestly 
protested.  When  this, project  was  abandoned  and  General 
Thomas  was  ordered  subsequently  to  demonstrate  against  the 


Siege  of  Chattanooga.  495 

enemy  at  Dalton  he  hastened  to  obey.  Our  advance  found 
the  enemy  strongly  posted  at  Buzzard's  Roost.  Here  General 
Thomas,  satisfied  that  the  Confederates  held  an  impregna- 
ble position  with  superior  numbers,  advised  General  Grant 
and  proposed  falling  back  from  his  exposed  position.  This 
the  General  commanding  did  not  approve.  General  Thomas 
and  his  little  army  with  Chattanooga  itself  could  be  im- 
periled, but  General  Sherman  was  to  be  protected.  Neither 
Grant  nor  Thomas  knew  at  the  time  that  Sherman's  cam- 
paign had  proved  a  failure  and  that  he  with  his  army  had  re- 
turned to  Memphis.  As  this  move  illustrates  by  the  light 
of  subsequent  events  General  Thomas's  military  sagacity  we 
give  the  dispatches  that  passed  at  the  time  between  Grant 
and  Thomas. 

Thomas  to  Grant,  February  19,  1864 : 

"Assistant  Surgeon  Jacob  Miller,  Sixth  Missouri  Volun- 
teer Infantry,  arrived  here  yesterday  from  Dalton.  He  was 
captured  at  Lebanon,  Alabama,  when  General  Logan  sent  out 
an  expedition  toward  Rome.  He  reports  Cleburne's  division 
at  Tunnel  Hill ;  Stewart's  division  between  Tunnel  Hill  and 
Dalton;  Walker  two  miles  out  from  Dalton  toward  Spring 
Place  ;  Cheatham  at  Dalton,  and  Stevenson's  and  Bates'  di- 
visions to  the  west  of  Dalton  two  miles.  He  saw  all  of  the 
camps  and  estimates  their  forces  between  thirty  and  forty 
thousand.  He  moreover  states  that  no  troops  have  been 
sent  away  except  one  brigade  of  infantry  which  went  to 
Rome  about  the  first  of  this  month." 

Thomas  to  Grant,  from  Tunnel  Hill,  Georgia,  February 
26,  1864,  7:30  A.  M.: 

"  I  arrived  here  last  night.  Davis  and  Johnston  occupy 
the  pass  at  Buzzard's  Roost.  They  have  a  force  equal  to 
theirs  in  their  front  who  outnumber  them  in  artillery. 
It  is  not  possible  to  carry  this  place  by  assault.  General 
Palmer  made  the  attempt  to  turn  yesterday  with  Baird's  and 
Cruft's  divisions,  but  were  met  with  an  equal  force  exclusive 
of  their  cavalry  and  in  an  equally  strong  position  as  at  Buz- 
zard's Roost.  After  expending  nearly  all  his  ammunition 
he  returned  during  the  night  to  Catoosa  Platform.  Our 
transportation  is  poor  and  limited ;  we  are  not  able  to  carry 


496  Life  of  Thomas. 

more  than  sixty  pounds  per  man;  artillery  horses  so  poor 
that  Palmer  could  bring  but  sixteen  pieces.  The  country  is 
stripped  entirely  of  subsistence  and  forage.  The  enemy's 
cavalry  is  much  superior  to  ours.  Prisoners  taken  yesterday 
report  that  a  portion  of  Cleburne's  division  have  returned. 
I  will  await  the  developments  of  this  day  and  advise  you 
further." 

Grant  to  Thomas,  February  27,  1864 : 

"  It  is  of  the  utmost  importance  that  the  enemy  should 
be  held  in  full  belief  that  an  advance  into  the  heart  of  the 
South  is  intended  until  the  fate  of  Sherman  is  fully  known. 
The  difficulties  of  supplies  can  be  overcome  by  keeping 
your  trains  running  between  Chattanooga  and  your  position. 
Take  the  depot  trains  at  Chattanooga,  yours  and  Genera.1 
Howard's  wagons.  These  can  be  replaced  temporarily  by 
yours  returning.  Veterans  are  returning  daily.  This  will 
enable  you  to  draw  reinforcements  constantly  to  your  point. 
Can  General  Schofield  not  also  take  a  division  from  How- 
ard's corps  ?  It  is  intended  to  send  Granger  to  you  the  mo- 
ment that  Schofield  is  thought  to  be  safe  without  him." 

General  Grant  to  General  "Whipple  (Thomas's  chief  of 
staff),  February  27th,  6  p.  M. 

"  Information  has  reached  Washington  that  orders  have 
been  given  Johnston's  army  to  fall  back.  General  Thomas 
should  watch  any  such  movement  and  follow  it  up  closely. 
Can't  you  draw  teams  from  Bridgeport  and  Stevenson  to  send 
supplies  to  the  front  ?  They  have  teams  in  great  numbers  at 
those  places.  Every  energy  should  be  exerted  to  get  supplies 
and  reinforcements  forward.  Troops  will  leave  here  at  the 
rate  of  two  or  three  thousand  a  day  for  the  front.  Many  of 
them  go  to  Chattanooga." 

Thomas  to  Grant,  February  27,  1864,  10  p.  M.: 

"Your  two  dispatches  of  this  date  received.  I  have 
just  returned  from  the  front.  My  troops  after  ceaseless  labor 
under  the  greatest  embarrassments  for  want  of  transporta- 
tion reached  within  three  miles  of  Dalton  where  they  were 
received  by  the  enemy  strongly  posted  and  in  force  fully 
equal  to  my  own  in  infantry.  His  artillery  and  cavalry  were 
not  only  in  better  condition  (as  regards  horses),  but  at  least 


Siege  of  Chattanooga.  497 

two  to  one  in  pieces  and  men.  We  found  the  country  en- 
tirely stripped  of  every  thing  like  forage,  our  mules  being 
in  such  poor  condition  that  double  the  number  of  teams  we 
now  have  could  not  supply  the  troops,  I  thought  it  best  to 
come  back  to  Ringgold,  and,  if  workmen  could  be  found  by 
Colonel  McCallum,  to  go  to  work  deliberately  to  prepare  the 
railroad  and  advance  as  it  progresses.  The  present  condition 
of  the  road  is  not  good  and  one  day's  rain  would  render  the 
part  across  Chickamauga  Bottom  impassable  for  loaded 
wagons.  So  it  would  be  absolutely  necessary  to  repair  the 
railroad  to  supply  the  troops  at  Ringgold.  The  fact  of 
working  on  the  road  will  hold  Johnston  at  Dalton  unless  he 
intended  to  leave  under  any  circumstances.  Howard's  teams 
and  the  depot  teams  at  this  place  and  Bridgeport  are  in  no 
better  condition  than  those  belonging  to  the  divisions,  all 
being  composed  of  such  mules  as  we  have  been  able  to  keep 
after  a  fashion  during  the  winter.  Johnston  has  no  idea  of 
leaving  Dalton  until  compelled,  and  having  a  force  greater 
than  I  now  have  under  my  immediate  command,  I  can  not 
drive  him  from  that  place. 

"  If  Longstreet  has  retired,  why  can  I  not  get  Granger's 
two  divisions  and  my  First  Cavalry  Division  back  ?  The  lit- 
tle cavalry  I  had  on  the  expedition  is  completely  run  down, 
from  constant  work  and  from  want  of  forage  ?" 

Thomas  to  Grant,  Feb.  28,  1864 : 

"  General  Butterfield,  by  my  direction,  has  recently  ex- 
amined the  line  between  here  and  Nashville,  and  reports  that 
he  thinks  six  thousand  men  will  be  sufficient  to  guard  that 
line,  two  regiments  of  which  force  should  be  cavalry.  From 
what  I  know  of  the  road  between  Nashville  and  Decatur  two 
thousand  infantry  and  two  thousand  cavalry  will  be  sufficient 
to  protect  that  line.  One  thousand  infantry  will  be  sufficient 
to  protect  the  line  from  Athens  to  Stevenson.  Probably  both 
lines  of  communication  can  be  guarded  by  six  thousand  infan- 
try and  two  thousand  cavalry,  a  great  portion  .of  which  should 
be  made  up  from  the  local  militia  of  Tennessee,  or  troops 
organized  especially  for  the  preservation  of  order  in  the  state. 

"  I  believe  if  I  commence  the  campaign  with  the  Four- 
teenth and  Fourth  corps  in  front,  with  Howard's  corps  in 
32 


498  Life  of  Thomas. 

reserve,  that  I  can  move  along  the  line  of  the  railroad  and 
overcome  all  opposition  as  far  at  least  as  Atlanta.  I  should 
want  a  strong  division  of  cavalry  in  advance.  As  soon  as 
Captain  Merrill  returns  from  his  reconnoissance  along  the 
railroad  line,  I  can  give  you  a  definite  estimate  of  the  num- 
ber of  troops  required  to  guard  the  bridges  along  the  road." 

"We  also  copy  from  General  Thomas's  report  to  the  com- 
mittee on  the  conduct  of  the  war,  wherein  he  referred  to  the 
plan  of  campaign  that  he  had  submitted  to  General  Grant. 
It  reads  (page  198  of  the  committee's  record)  : 

"  The  above  proposition  was  submitted  to  General  Grant 
for  his  approval,  and  if  obtained  it  was  my  intention  (having  ac- 
quired, by  the  reconnoissance  of  February  23-25th,  a  thorough 
knowledge  of  the  approaches  direct  upon  Dalton  from  Ring- 
gold  and  Cleveland)  to  have  made  a  strong  demonstration 
against  Buzzard's  Roost,  attracting  Johnston's  whole  atten- 
tion to  that  point,  and  to  have  thrown  the  main  body  of  my 
infantry  and  cavalry  through  Snake  Creek  Gap  upon  his 
communications,  which  I  had  ascertained  from  scouts  he  had 
up  to  that  time  neglected  to  observe  or  guard.  With  this 
view  I  had  previously  asked  for  the  return  to  me  of  Granger's 
troops  and  my  cavalry  from  East  Tennessee,  and  had  already 
initiated  preparations  for  the  execution  of  the  above  move- 
ment as  soon  as  the  spring  opened  sufficiently  to  admit  of  it. 
See  the  following  telegrams  and  illustration." 

It  is  not  necessary  to  give  the  dispatches  to  which  the 
general  referred.  They  contain  the  details  of  a  proposed 
campaign  in  which  it  appears  that  all  the  troops  that  could 
be  spared  from  the  lines  of  supplies  were  to  be  forwarded 
to  Chattanooga  so  as  to  bring  his  command  near  that  of  the 
enemy.  Johnston  we  now  learn  had  then  less  than  forty  thou- 
sand men,  and  relied  upon  the  natural  strength  of  the  position 
he  had  selected  as  Bragg  once  relied  on  Chattanooga.  Thomas 
proposed  attempting  with  forty  thousand  men  what  Sherman 
subsequently  accomplished  with  a  hundred  thousand.  The 
telegrams  bet  ween  Thomas  and  Grant  and  Thomas's  statement 
to  the  committee  on  the  conduct  of  the  war  are  of  deep  in- 
terest as  showing  the  superior  generalship  of  the  Virginian, 
who  waited.  He  suggested  to  Grant,  as  he  subsequently  did 


Siege  of  Chattanooga.  499 

to  Sherman,  that  road  to  the  rear  of  Johnston  through  Snake 
Creek  Gap.  We  shall  see  how  the  one  accepted  it  in  part, 
while  the  other  rejected  it  altogether.  The  attempt  on  Dai- 
ton  was  dimissed. 

General  Thomas  was  extremely  just,  indeed  kind,  in  his 
treatment  of  the  unarmed  citizens  of  the  South.  He  had  the 
Army  of  the  Cumberland  so  well  disciplined  that  the  rules 
against  depredation  were  well  observed.  He  found  this, 
however,  more  difficult  than  to  mold  these  men  into  an 
army  that  could  change  front  under  fire  and  carry  a  deadly 
ridge  fringed  with  sixty  pieces  of  artillery,  and  that  without 
command  to  do  so.  The  country  demoralized  by  a  war  in 
which  both  sides  were  obliged  to  forage  for  a  subsistence  was 
infested  by  guerillas  armed  to  plunder  and  holding  allegiance 
to  no  Government.  It  was  observed  that  when  the  Union 
army  was  in  possession  the  citizens  sympathized  with  the 
banditti,  giving  them  information  and  many  times  food  and 
shelter.  Now,  while  the  men  were  sullen,  they  were  silent. 
The  women,  on  the  contrary,  were  outspoken,  and  to  the 
rank  and  file  extremely  exasperating.  There  was  quite  a 
vocabulary  of  epithets  that  they  shot  at  our  soldiers  wher- 
ever they  appeared.  Under  the  circumstances  it  was  diffi- 
cult to  keep  the  peace.  However,  General  Thomas,  in  his 
impartial  justice,  did  much  to  relieve  the  country  within  our 
lines  of  the  guerillas,  and  had  no  hesitation  in  holding  com- 
munities responsible  for  the  violence  done  in  their  neighbor- 
hood. General  Order  Number  Six  that  we  copy  at  length 
illustrates  his  mode  of  punishment: 

"HEAD-QUARTERS  ARMY  OP  THE  CUMBERLAND, 

CHATTANOOGA,  TENNESSEE,  Jan.  26, 1864. 
General  Orders  No.  6. — It  having  been  reported  to  these 
head-quarters  that  between  seven  and  eight  o'clock,  on  the 
evening  of  the  23d  ult.,  within  one  and  a  half  miles  of  the 
village  of  Mulberry,  Lincoln  county,  Tenn.,  a  wagon  which 
had  become  detached  from  a  foraging  train  belonging  to  the 
United  States  was  attacked  by  guerillas,  and  the  officer  in 
command  of  the  foraging  party,  First  Lieutenant  Porter, 
Co.  A,  Twenty-seventh  Indiana  Volunteers,  the  teamster, 


500  Life  of  Thomas. 

wagonmaster,  and  four  other  soldiers  who  had  been  sent  to 
load  the  train  (the  latter  four  unarmed),  were  captured. 
They  were  immediately  mounted  and  hurried  off,  the  gueril- 
las avoiding  the  road,  until  their  party  halted,  about  one 
o'clock  in  the  morning,  on  the  bank  of  the  Elk  river,  where 
the  rebels  stated  they  were  going  into  camp  for  the  night. 
The  hands  of  the  prisoners  were  then  tied  behind  them,  and 
they  were  robbed  of  every  thing  of  value  about  their  per- 
sons. They  were  next  drawn  up  in  line  about  five  paces  in 
front  of  their  captors,  and  one  of  the  latter,  who  acted  as 
leader,  commanded  ready,  and  the  whole  party  immediately 
fired  upon  them.  One  of  the  prisoners  was  shot  through  the 
head,  and  killed  instantly,  and  three  were  wounded.  Lieu- 
tenant Porter  was  not  hit.  He  immediately  ran,  was  fol- 
lowed and  fired  upon  three  times  by  one  of  the  party,  and, 
finding  that  he  was  about  to  be  overtaken,  threw  himself 
over  a  precipice  into  the  river,  and,  succeeding  in  getting  his 
hands  loose,  swam  to  the  opposite  side,  and,  although  pur- 
sued to  that  side  and  several  times  fired  upon,  he,  after 
twenty-four  hours  of  extraordinary  exertion  and  great  ex- 
posure, reached  a  house,  whence  he  was  taken  to  Tullahoma, 
where  he  now  lies  in  a  critical  situation.  The  others,  after 
being  shot,  were  immediately  thrown  into  the  river.  Thus, 
the  murder  of  three  men — Newell  E.  Orcutt,  Ninth  Inde- 
pendent Battery  Ohio  Volunteer  Artillery ;  John  "W.  Drought, 
Co.  H,  Twenty-second  "Wisconsin  Volunteers;  and  George 
W.  Jacobs,  Co.  D,  Twenty-second  Wisconsin  Volunteers — 
was  accomplished  by  shooting  and  drowning.  The  fourth, 
James  W.  Folley,  Ninth  Independent  Battery  Ohio  Volun- 
teer Artillery,  is  now  lying  in  the  hospital,  having  escaped 
by  getting  his  hands  free  while  in  the  water. 

For  these  atrocious,  cold-blooded  murders,  equaling  in 
savage  ferocity  and  every  thing  ever  committed  by  the  most 
barbarous  tribes  on  the  continent,  committed  by  rebel  citi- 
zens of  Tennessee,  it  is  ordered  that  the  property  of  all  rebel 
citizens  living  within  a  circuit  of  ten  miles  of  the  place 
where  these  men  were  captured  be  assessed  each  in  his  due 
proportion,  according  to  his  wealth,  to  make  up  the  sum  of 
thirty  thousand  dollars,  to  be  divided  among  the  families 


Siege  of  Chattanooga.  501 

who   were   dependent    upon    the   murdered    men    for   their 
support. 

Ten  thousand  dollars  to  be  paid  to  the  widow  of  John 
"W.  Drought,  of  North  Cape,  Racine  county,  Wisconsin,  for 
the  support  of  herself  and  two  children. 

Ten  thousand  dollars  to  be  paid  to  the  widow  of  George 
W.  Jacobs,  of  Delevan,  Walworth  county,  Wisconsin,  for  the 
support  of  herself  and  one  child. 

Ten  thousand  dollars  to  be  divided  between  the  aged 
mother  and  sister  of  Newell  E.  Orcutt,  of  Burton,  Geauga 
county,  Ohio. 

Should  the  persons  assessed  fail,  within  one  week  after 
notice  has  been  served  upon  them,  to  pay  in  the  amount  of 
their  tax  in  money,  sufficient  of  their  personal  property  shall 
be  siezed  and  sold  at  public  sale  to  make  up  the  amount. 

Major-General  II.  W.  Slocum,  U.  S.  Volunteers,  com- 
manding Twelfth  Army  Corps, is  charged  with  the  execution 
of  this  order. 

The  men  who  committed  these  murders,  if  caught,  will 
be  summarily  executed,  and  any  persons  executing  them 
will  be  held  guiltless,  and  will  receive  the  protection  of  this- 
army,  and  all  persons  who  are  suspected  of  having  aided 
abetted,  or  harbored  these  guerillas  will  be  immediately  ar- 
rested and  tried  by  military  commission. 

By  command  of  Major-General  Thomas, 

WILLIAM  D.  WHIPPLB,  Assistant  Adjutant- General" 

The  Army  of  the  Cumberland  left  a  kindly  feeling  in 
its  wake  among  tbe  people  of  the  South  that  had  experienced 
its  rule  and  recognized  its  justice.  We  say  kind,  in  compar- 
ison with  other  armies  of  less  discipline  and  commanded  by 
officers  such  as  Sherman  and  Sheridan,  who  openly  avowed 
their  belief  in  the  barbarous  wars  of  an  uncivilized  past.  It 
is  well  in  measuring  the  moral  greatness  of  our  hero  to  com- 
pare his  practices  with  the  armed  precepts  of  his  brother 
officers.  General  Sherman,  whose  pen  was  wont  to  run  away 
with  his  judgment,  has  left  us  a  small  volume  of  views  on 
this  subject  that  we  could  well  dismiss  as  the  impulsive  ut- 
terances of  an  uncertain  man,  were  it  not  that  he  has  be- 
queathed to  the  world  a  burning  illustration  of  his  practical 


502  Life  of  Thomas. 

use  of  his  axioms.  The  march  of  his  army  was  the  march 
of  devastation  and  death,  the  devastation  falling  on  unarmed 
citizens  and  the  death  liberally  shared  with  his  own  unfor- 
tunate soldiers. 

We  have  not  only  the  views  of  General  Thomas,  but  we 
have  his  practice  as  well  The  matter  is  deeply  impressed 
upon  the  memory  because  of  the  fact  that  General  Thomas's 
high  sense  of  justice  and  considerate  regard  for  the  unarmed 
and  helpless  were  used  against  him  by  blind  bigots  of  the 
North,  who  saw  in  his  acts  the  influence  of  his  birth  and 
early  association.  They  heartily  approved  of  President  Lin- 
coln's decision  :  "  Let  the  Virginian  wait."  General  Thomas 
made  no  secret  of  his  views  on  this  subject.  He  said  one  day, 
when  an  order  was  given  to  guard  a  man's  house  whose  loy- 
alty was  suspected,  but  who  stood  high  among  his  neighbors 
as  a  man  of  good  moral  character  : 

""We  must  remember,"  he  said,  "  that  this  is  a  civil  war, 
fought  to  preserve  the  Union  that  is  based  on  brotherly  love 
and  patriotic  belief  in  the  one  nation.  It  is  bad  enough  for 
us  to  demand  that  love  of  a  restored  Union  at  the  point  of  the 
bayonet,  but  we  can  justify  ourselves  by  claiming  that  what 
we  do  is  from  a  sense  of  duty.  The  thing  becomes  horribly 
grotesque,  however,  when  from  ugly  feeling  we  visit  on  help- 
less old  men,  women,  and  children  the  horrors  of  a  barbarous 
war.  We  must  be  as  considerate  and  kind  as  possible,  or  we 
will  find  that  in  destroying  the  rebels  we  have  destroyed  the 
Union." 

One  must  not  suppose  from  this  and  other  wise  opinions 
left  us  by  General  Thomas  that  he  was  a  politician.  He  was 
a  pure  soldier,  and  saw  all  things  through  the  opening  of  his 
tent,  and  considered  them  as  relating  to  the  war  on  hand. 
A  democrat  by  birth  and  breeding,  he  had  an  old  fashioned 
belief,  that  a  soldier,  like  a  clergyman  or  a  judge,  was  pre- 
cluded from  taking  an  active  part  in  the  partisan  contentious 
of  the  country.  He  therefore  gave  great  economic  subjects 
but  little  study,  so  little  indeed  that  he  felt  himself  disquali- 
fied for  any  office  other  than  the  one  in  his  beloved  army. 
In  this  respect  Generals  Thomas  and  Buell  stood  almost  alone, 
nearly  all  the  other  epauletted  gentlemen  of  the  war  dealt 


Siege  of  Chattanooga.  508 

largely  in  politics,  and  reflected  in  the  field  much  of  the  pas- 
sion and  prejudice  brought  out  by  partisans  at  home.  No  man 
was  more  conspicuous  for  this  than  General  Sherman.  We 
copy  from  Mr.  John  C.  Ropes'  article  on  Sherman  that  ap- 
peared in  the  Atlantic  Magazine  of  August,  1891 : 

"  It  would  not  be  right  to  close  a  review  of  General  Sher- 
man's character  and  services  without  referring  to  his  often 
announced  policy  of  devastation.  It  can  hardly  be  doubted 
that  the  desire  to  inflict  punishment  on  the  people  of  the 
South  for  their  course  in  breaking  up  the  Union  was  a  strong 
element  in  favor  of  his  project  of  marching  across  the  coun- 
try. Thus,  on  October  9,  1864,  he  telegraphs  to  General 
Grant : 

" '  Until  we  can  repopulate  Georgia  it  is  useless  for  us 
to  occupy  it ;  but  the  utter  destruction  of  its  roads,  houses, 
and  people  will  cripple  their  military  resources.  ...  I 
can  make  this  march,  and  can  make  Georgia  howl.' 

"  October  17,  to  General  Schofield :  <  I  will  .  .  . 
make  the  interior  of  Georgia  feel  the  weight  of  war.' 

"  October  19,  to  General  Beckwith  :  '  I  propose  to  aban- 
don Atlanta  and  the  railroad  back  of  Chattanooga  to  sally 
forth  to  ruin  Georgia  and  bring  up  on  the  seashore.' 

"  So  when  he  arrived  before  Savannah,  he  wrote  to  the 
Confederate  General  Hardee  as  follows :  '  Should  I  be  forced 
to  assault  or  the  slower  and  surer  process  of  starvation  I  shall 
then  feel  justified  in  resorting  to  the  harshest  measures,  and 
shall  make  little  effort  to  restrain  my  army  burning  to  avenge 
the  national  wrong  which  they  attach  to  Savannah  and  other 
large  cities  which  have  been  so  prominent  in  dragging  our 
country  into  civil  war.' 

"  To  General  Grant,  December  18  :  '  With  Savannah  in 
our  possession  at  some  future  time,  if  not  now,  we  can  pun- 
ish South  Carolina  as  she  deserves,  and  as  thousands  of  the 
people  in  Georgia  hoped  we  would  do.  I  do  sincerely  believe 
that  the  whole  United  States,  north  and  south,  would  rejoice 
to  have  this  army  turned  loose  on  South  Carolina  to  devas- 
tate that  state  in  the  manner  we  have  done  in  Georgia,  and 
it  would  have  a  direct  and  immediate  bearing  on  the  cam- 
paign in  Virginia.' 


504  Life,  of  Thomas. 

"  To  General  Halleck,  December  24 :  '  I  attach  more  im- 
portance to  these  deep  incisions  into  the  enemy's  country, 
because  this  war  differs  from  European  wars  in  this  particu- 
lar :  we  are  not  only  fighting  hostile  armies  but  a  hostile  peo- 
ple, and  must  make  old  and  young,  rich  and  poor,  feel  the 
hard  hand  of  war,  as  well  as  their  organized  armies.  I  know 
that  this  recent  movement  of  mine  through  Georgia  has  had 
a  wonderful  effect  in  this  respect.  .  .  .  The  truth  is,  the 
whole  army  is  burning  with  an  insatiable  desire  to  wreak 
vengeance  upon  South  Carolina.  I  almost  tremble  for  her, 
but  feel  that  she  deserves  all  that  seems  in  store  for  her. 
.  .  .  I  look  upon  Columbia  as  quite  as  bad  as  Charleston, 
and  I  doubt  if  we  shall  spare  the  public  buildings  there  as  we 
did  at  Milledgeville.' " 

These  might  be  taken  as  the  hasty  utterances  of  an  im- 
pulsive man,  were  it  not  that  in  his  appeals  to  the  public,  after 
the  war,  in  the  press  and  in  his  memoirs,  he  sought  to  defend 
himself  against  the  charge  of  cruel  treatment  of  an  unarmed 
people  that  actually  occurred.  The  troops  under  his  subor- 
dinates carried  into  execution,  as  far  as  they  could,  what  he 
had  threatened.  It  will  be  observed  that  he  justifies  the  in- 
famous abuse  altogether,  on  political  grounds,  and  not  the 
necessities  or  necessary  consequences  of  war,  and  the  reasons 
given  are  as  weak  as  the  intent  was  wicked — such,  for  exam- 
ple, as  the  astounding  assertion  that  because  ours  was  a  frat- 
ricidal strife,  and  therefore  embittered  beyond  an  ordinary 
war  of  alien  enemies,  we  should  countenance  the  condition 
and  carry  into  it  all  the  barbarous  usages  of  uncivilized 
races.  It  is  well  to  contrast  this  officer's  conduct  in  this  re- 
spect with  the  noble  traits  and  high  intellect  of  the  man 
whose  story  we  are  striving  to  tell,  and  the  comparison  comes 
in  here  with  peculiar  force,  because  of  the  fact  we  are  called 
upon  to  chronicle. 

Through  act  of  Elihu  B.  Washburne,  of  Illinois,  sanc- 
tioned by  President  Lincoln,  on  the  17th  of  March,  1864,  TL 
S.  Grant  assumed  command  of  the  armies  of  the  United 
States,  as  Lieutenant-General,  and  immediately  the  man  who 
was  thus  thrust  into  a  position  once  held  by  General  Wash- 
ington, hastened  to  inform  General  Thomas  that  General 


Siege  of  Chattanooga.  505 

Sherman  was  assigned  to  the  command  of  the  Military  Di- 
vision of  the  Mississippi.  Now,  by  date  of  commission, 
General  Thomas  ranked  General  Sherman,  and  the  rank  was 
made  positive  by  a  uniform  success  in  the  great  battles  of  the 
war,  and  a  success  that  really  brought  the  war  to  a  triumph- 
ant close  in  favor  of  the  Union.  General  Thomas  received 
this  startling  injustice  under  the  shadows  of  Lookout  Moun- 
tain and  Missionary  Ridge,  and  the  gigantic  fortification 
of  mountains  that  made  the  one  objective  of  the  war  on  our 
side.  He  was  gravely  informed  that  he  must  serve  under 
a  man  whose  career  had  been  marked  by  awful  disasters  as 
uniform  as  had  been  Thomas's  success.  His  incompetency 
was  written  in  the  blood  of  our  brave  men  at  Shiloh,  Chick- 
asaw  Blufl',  and  the  assaults  on  Vicksburg,  and  every  epitaph 
of  the  soldiers  there  killed  and  the  soldiers  who  subsequently 
died  of  their  wounds  in  these  heartless  and  heedless  butch- 
eries, make  a  condemnation  of  a  man  who  owed  his  promo- 
tion to  the  nakedest  favoritism  that  ever  disgraced  a  service. 

The  grim,  silent,  solitary  man  received  this  rebuke  with- 
out a  word  of  remonstrance.  He  had  registered  a  vow  that 
let  any  injustice  be  done  him  thereafter,  he  would  submit 
without  a  word.  He  was  too  great  a  man  not  to  be  aware, 
by  this  time,  of  the  cause  of  this  injustice.  He  had  seen 
Buell  insolently  displaced  of  his  command  and  returned  to 
private  life,  he  had  seen  Rosecrans,  in  the  very  hour  of  his 
triumph,  stricken  down  and  sent  from  camp  in  disgrace,  and 
he  knew  the  motives  and  power  at  Washington  that  accom- 
plished these  wrongs,  and  he  was  painfully  alive  to  the  fact 
that  he  had  no  friends  among  the  politicians  at  the  National 
Capital. 

We  have  written  these  pages  in  the  continued  praise  of 
a  man  who  seemed  to  have  no  fault  in  his  character,  no 
blemish  in  his  career.  We  must  confess,  however,  to  a  defect. 
General  Thomas  was  a  man  of  violent  temper,  that  through 
long  restraint  lie  had  brought  under  complete  control.  The 
dull  military  minds  about  him,  in  this  mistook  the  man. 
His  silent  acquiescence  in  this  wrong  was  taken  as  the 
shrinking  from  the  responsibility  of  an  independent  com- 
mand. He  should  have  given  some  of  these  conceited  supe- 


506  Life  of  Thomas. 

riors  some  of  the  wrath  that  lay  smoldering  in  him.  It 
would  have  gone  far  toward  forcing  a  change  of  condition, 
and  would  certainly  have  saved  the  confiding  public  from  the 
mistaken  twaddle  of  loose  memoirs.  However,  the  events 
that  followed  justified  General  Thomas  so  far  as  the  govern- 
ment and  our  cause  is  concerned  in  the  course  he  pursued. 
This  we  will  see  further  on. 

In  preparing  for  the  move  against  Dalton,  the  Army  of 
the  Cumberland,  sixty  thousand  strong,  well  drilled  and 
disciplined  veterans,  had  regained  their  lost  renown  that  for 
a  brief  period  was  under  a  cloud,  and  confident  in  them- 
selves and  proud  of  their  general,  they  were  ready  to  march 
and  again  conquer  where  their  beloved  commander  led. 

It  was  at  this  time  that  General  Thomas  inaugurated  at 
Chattanooga  the  system  of  military  cemeteries  that  grew  to 
be  so  popular.  The  general  who  loved  his  men  so  heartily 
when  alive  had  a  religious  and  patriotic  respect  for  their  re- 
mains when  called  to  their  burial.  They  had  given  their 
courage,  endurance  and  lives  to  their  country,  and  it  was 
fitting  and  seemly  that  their  last  resting  places  should  be 
monuments  to  their  sacrifice.  We  have  seen  how  this  love 
of  his  men  dominated  the  mind  of  Thomas.  He  had  no 
life  to  live  from  them  and  no  higher  duty  than  to  care  for 
their  comfort.  In  this  connection  we  give  the  testimony  of 
General  Gates  P.  Thruston,  a  gallant  and  most  accomplished 
officer  whose  acquaintance  our  readers  made  in  the  second 
day  upon  the  battle  field  of  Chickamauga  when  he  carried  Gen- 
eral Thomas's  orders  over  the  space  General  Sheridan  re- 
ported to  be  occupied  by  the  enemy.  We  acknowledge  our 
indebtedness  to  Van  Home's  Life  of  Thomas  for  the  state- 
ment given  by  General  Thruston: 

"  When  I  became  a  member  of  his  staff  as  judge  advocate 
it  was  a  matter  of  surprise  *to  me  to  find  how  remarkably 
familiar  and  accomplished  he  was  in  all  matters  of  military 
law  and  precedent,  and  other  officers  of  his  staff  in  the 
various  departments  often  remarked  to  me  that  he  seemed 
to  know  the  usage,  details  and  system  of  each  department 
of  service  as  thoroughly  as  though  he  had  passed  his  entire 
military  service  in  it.  During  two  years  in  the  judge  ad- 


Siege  of  Chattanooga.  507 

vocate's  department  I  devoted  almost  my  entire  time  in  fit- 
ting myself  to  the  duties  of  the  position.  I  sent  to  Europe 
for  books,  and  read  every  thing  pertaining  to  military  law 
and  that  branch  of  the  service;  yet  in  the  preparation  of 
court-martial  orders,  or  in  the  consideration  of  questions  of 
law  or  precedent  relating  to  that  department,  the  general  was 
always  ready  with  useful  suggestions  and  counsel,  and  seemed 
to  have  given  more  consideration  to  these  subjects  than  any 
other  officer  in  the  army.  He  also  always  gave  a  willing 
and  patient  consideration  to  every  case  or  question  brought 
before  him. 

"  During  his  earlier  days  he  made  a  careful  study  of 
military  and  court-martial  law,  and  had  prepared  notes  of 
decisions  from  various  works  on  the  subject,  showing  how 
painstaking  and  systematic  he  was  in  making  himself  mas- 
ter of  all  departments  of  his  profession.  .  .  . 

"  I  mention  the  foregoing  merely  to  add  my  testimony 
to  the  completeness  of  his  character.  What  was  true  of 
my  department  was  true  as  to  all  the  other  branches  of  the 
service,  as  far  as  I  could  judge.  He  was  master  of  them  all." 

Our  general  was  not  only  fortunate  in  his  men  under 
muskets,  but  also  lucky  in  his  subordinate  officers.  The  corps 
commanders  were:  Major-General  Oliver  O.  Howard, Fourth 
Corps ;  Major-General  John  M.  Palmer,  Fourteenth  Corps, 
and  Major-General  Joseph  Hooker,  Twentieth  Corps.  The 
division  commanders  of  the  Fourth  Corps  were:  Major- 
Generals  David  S.  Stanley  and  John  Newton  and  Brigadier- 
General  Thomas  J.  Wood;  of  the  Fourteenth  Corps,  Briga- 
dier-Generals Richard  W.  Johnson,  Jefferson  C.  Davis  and 
Absolom  Baird ;  of  the  Twentieth  Corps,  Brigadier-Generals 
Alpheus  S.  Williams,  John  W.  Geary  and  Major-General 
Daniel  Butterfield.  Brigadier-General  Washington  L.  Elliott 
was  chief  of  cavalry,  and  Major-Generals  Kenner  Garrard, 
Judson  Kilpatrick  and  Edwin  M.  McCook,  division  com- 
manders. 

The  deadly  conflict  was  drawing  rapidly  to  a  close.  The 
South  began  to  show  signs  of  weakness.  There  was  no 
sturdy  population  to  draw  upon  to  fill  again  the  thinned 
ranks  of  victorious  veterans.  Desertions,  up  to  that  time 


508  Life  of  Thomas. 

unknown,  became  frequent,  while  the  earnest  call  for  volun- 
teers had  a  silent  echo  in  the  desolated  homes.  The  fierce 
fanaticism  which  pervaded  the  South  when  the  war  began, 
that  made  "  the  rebel  yell  "  the  signal  of  a  charge  in  which 
the  assailants  had  to  be  killed  to  insure  victory,  had  gradually 
died  down,  while  giving  place  to  a  sullen  despair  almost  as 
potent  as  the  fanaticism.  The  Confederacy  fell,  but  it  fell 
fighting,  and  strange  as  it  may  seem  we  were  in  more  danger 
of  defeat  toward  the  end  than  in  the  beginning.  We  will 
treat  of  this  hereafter,  as  in  the  events  that  follow  the  luster 
of  our  hero  brightens  as  the  hour  grows  darker ;  and  the 
deadly  peril  that  encompassed  the  great  Republic  but  for 
him  would  have  prevailed  and  the  war  ended  in  a  nation  so 
torn  asunder  as  to  leave  in  history  nothing  but  the  story  of  a 
gigantic  ruin. 


The  Ignorance  at  Washington  Enlightened  by  Grant.     509 


CHAPTER   XIX. 

The  Ignorance  at  Washington  Enlightened  by  General  Grant — The  War  of 
Attrition — Both  Sides  in  the  Conflict  Running  to  Exhaustion,  Neck 
and  Neck — Failure  of  the  Draft — Thomas's  Plan  of  Prosecuting  the 
War  to  a  Speedy  and  Successful  Close. 

Said  Jeflerson  Davis  after  the  war,  "  Chattanooga  was 
the  key  to  the  situation,  and  its  loss  was  terrible  to  the  Con- 
federacy. Our  only  comfort  was,  that  the  people,  at  Wash- 
ington did  not  know  what  to  do  with  it." 

Nor  did  General  Grant.  Made  lieutenant-general,  and 
as  such  put  in  command  of  all  our  armies  in  the  field,  he  put 
Sherman  in  command  of  the  Mississippi  Department,  and 
hastened  to  Washington.  What  his  views  were,  and  subse- 
quent plan  of  campaign,  we  have  his  words  at  the  time  for 
the  better  information  of  President  Lincoln.  It  reads  as 
follows : 

"  From  an  early  period  in  the  Rebellion,  I  had  been  im- 
pressed with  the  idea  that  active  and  continuous  operations 
of  all  the  troops  that  could  be  brought  into  the  field,  regard- 
less of  season  and  weather,  were  necessary  to  a  speedy  ter- 
mination of  the  war.  The  resources  of  the  enemy,  and  his 
numerical  strength,  were  far  inferior  to  ours;  but,  as  an  oft- 
set  to  this,  we  had  a  vast  territory,  with  a  population  hos- 
tile to  the  government,  to  garrison,  and  long  lines  of  river 
and  railroad  communications  to  protect,  to  enable  us  to  sup- 
ply the  operating  armies. 

"  The  armies  in  the  East  and  West  acted  independently 
and  without  concert,  like  a  balky  team,  no  two  ever  pulling 
together,  enabling  the  enemy  to  use  to  great  advantage  his 
interior  lines  of  communication  for  transporting  troops  from 
East  to  West,  reinforcing  the  army  most  vigorously  pressed, 
and  to  furlough  large  numbers  during  seasons  of  inactivity  on 
our  part,  to  go  to  their  homes  and  do  the  work  of  producing 
for  the  support  of  their  armies.  It  was  a  question  whether 


510  Life  of  Thomas. 

our  numerical  strength  and  resources  were  not  more  than 
balanced  by  these  disadvantages  and  the  enemy's  superior 
position. 

"From  the  first  I  was  firm  in  the  conviction  that  no 
peace  could  be  had  that  would  be  stable  and  conducive  to  the 
happiness  of  the  people,  North  and  South,  until  the  military 
power  of  the  rebellion  was  entirely  broken. 

"  I  therefore  determined,  first,  to  use  the  greatest  num- 
ber of  troops  practicable  against  the  armed  force  of  the 
enemy,  preventing  him  from  using  the  same  force  at  different 
seasons  against  first  one  and  then  another  of  our  armies,  and 
the  possibility  of  repose  at  all  for  refitting  and  producing 
necessary  supplies  for  carrying  on  resistance.  Second,  to 
hammer  continuously  against  the  armed  force  of  the  enemy 
and  his  resources,  until,  by  mere  attrition,  if  in  no  other  way, 
there  should  be  nothing  left  to  him  but  an  equal  submission 
with  the  loyal  section  of  our  common  country  to  the  Consti- 
tution and  laws  of  the  land. 

"  These  views  have  been  kept  constantly  in  mind,  and 
orders  given  and  campaigns  made  to  carry  them  out. 
Whether  they  might  have  been  better  in  conception  and 
execution  is  for  the  people,  who  mourn  the  loss  of  friends 
fallen,  and  who  have  to  pay  the  pecuniary  cost,  to  say.  All 
I  can  say  is,  that  what  I  have  done  has  been  done  conscien- 
tiously, to  the  best  of  my  ability,  and  in  what  I  conceived  to 
be  for  the  best  intersts  of  the  whole  country." 

A  plan  of  warfare  based  on  mutual  slaughter,  to  be  con- 
tinued until  one  side  or  the  other  is  killed — for  that  is  what 
attrition  means — is  somewhat  new  in  war.  We  have  seen 
that,  with  the  exception  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  no 
other  system  was  thought  of  or  practiced.  President  Lincoln, 
in  discussing  a  campaign  with  General  McClellan,  said  very 
truly  that  the  enemy  could  be  fought  under  more  favorable 
circumstances  before  Washington  than  at  Richmond.  But 
McClellan  had  accepted  the  popular  cry  of  "  on  to  Rich- 
mond" as  the  outline  and  objective  point  of  a  campaign,  and 
seeking  to  use  the  water  ways  for  transportation,  carried  his 
anaconda  to  a  point  in  sight  of  Richmond  before  the  mutual 
slaughter  began.  From  that  time  until  General  Grant  was 


The  War  of  Attrition.  511 

given  command  of  all  our  forces  this  brutal  slaughter  had 
continued,  except,  as  we  have  said,  in  the  army  that  was 
moving  in  Tennessee  to.  the  only  true  objective  point  given 
us  in  the  war. 

The  brutal  wording  of  the  proposition  shocks  one.  "  To 
hammer  continuously  against  the  armed  force  of  the  enemy  and 
his  resources  until,  by  mere  attrition,  if  in  no  other  way,  there 
should  be  nothing  left  of  him,"  etc.,  is  what  General  U.  S.  Grant 
deliberately  puts  in  writing  and  submits  to  the  President. 
We  are  grieved  to  confess  that  the  proposition  was  not  origi- 
nal with  the  lieutenant-general.  It  came  from  a  really  great 
man,  but  one  strangely  ignorant  of  how  to  conduct  an  armed 
conflict,  although  Secretary  of  "War.  Mr.  Edwin  M.  Stanton 
had  said,  "  "We  have  no  generals,  but  we  have  men,  and  I  will 
crowd  them  on  until  this  rebellion  is  stamped  out.  We  can 
lose  three  men  to  the  rebels'  one  and  win." 

This  system  of  warfare,  if  we  may  term  it  such,  called 
for  no  campaign  beyond  one  that  found  the  enemy  and 
fought  him.  All  strategem  was  dispensed  with  and  defeats 
were  as  effective  as  victories.  We  had  only  to  calculate  the 
number  of  dead  we  could  exchange  for  the  killed  on  the 
other  side  and  continue  the  killing.  The  newly-made  lieu- 
tenant-general took  up  the  "  On  to  Richmond  "  project  that 
McClellan,  Burnside,  Hooker  and  Meade  had  all  failed  to  ac- 
complish, which  common  sense  taught  us  that  if  accomplished 
would  yet  leave  us  in  a  worse  condition  than  we  were  in  at 
the  beginning.  There  are  few  who  recognize  the  fact  that 
we  were  about  as  near  exhaustion  as  the  Confederacy. 
Financially  our  credit  was  such  that  a  dollar  in  the  shape  of 
a  government  note  had  but  the  purchasing  power  of  forty 
cents.  The  volunteer  element  had  been  exhausted  and  the 
administration  dared  not  enforce  the  draft.  To  avoid  this, 
and  yet  reinforce  our  armies,  resort  was  had  to  the  abomina- 
ble system  of  substitutes.  By  the  law  itself  the  payment 
of  $300  allowed  a  citizen  to  escape  service  in  the  army,  a 
monstrous  proposition  for  a  Republic  where  all  men  were 
supposed  to  be  on  an  equality,  especially  in  defending  a  gov- 
ernment that  gave  a  like  protection  to  all.  In  the  summer 
previous,  draft  riots  developed  in  Boston,  Jersey  City,  Troy 


S12  Life  of  Thomas. 

and  Jamaica,  but  assuming  alarming  proportions  at  the  city 
of  New  York,  where  the  mob  had  virtually  possession  of  the 
place,  when  Governor  Seymour  gave  his  adhesion  to  the 
rioters  and  by  a  promise  to  appeal  to  the  President  to  sus- 
pend the  draft  for  a  time  stayed  the  hand  of  violence. 

There  was  nothing  saved  us  from  a  collapse  in  the  sum- 
mer and  fall  of  1863  but  the  earnest  patriotism  of  a  great 
people.  This  was  shown  in  the  elections  of  that  year  and 
in  the  re-enlistment  of  veterans  whose  term  of  service  had 
expired.  The  patriotic  student  of  history  looks  back  to  that 
dark  hour  of.  peril  with  a  glow  of  pride  no  words  can  ex- 
press. Not  only  did  overwhelming  majorities  at  the  polls 
express  the  firm  purpose  of  sustaining  our  able  administra- 
tion, but  the  veterans  re-enlisted  and  from  the  house  of  mourn- 
ing over  all  the  land  the  young  and  old,  before  exempted, 
shouldered  their  muskets  to  fill  the  places  made  vacant  by 
death.  Nevertheless  there  was  a  limit  to  heroic  endeavor. 
The  fighting  element  that  gave  us  volunteers  was  nearly 
exhausted.  That  which  took  its  place  under  the  infamous 
system  of  substitute  by  purchase  had  no  qualities  in  it  of 
the  soldier.  When  this  system  passed  from  individual  pur- 
chase to  townships  and  counties  the  evil  grew  to  monstrous 
proportions.  The  business  of  "  bounty -j umping  "  became 
universal.  That  is,  a  man  selling  himself  in  one  state  would 
desert  at  the  first  opportunity  and  again  sell  himself  in  another. 
If  the  man  was  watched  and  guarded  until  he  could  be 
got  to  the  field  he  made  an  insubordinate  grumbler  on  the 
march  and  a  cowardly  straggler  at  the  rear  in  the  hour  of 
battle.  This  evil  increased  until  it  became  necessary  to  im- 
prison these  substitutes  until  a  sufficient  number  to  make  a 
regiment  were  collected  and  then  march  them  to  the  field  as 
so  many  convicts. 

The  east  suffered  more  from  this  evil  than  the  West; 
while  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  receiving  the  worst  pos- 
sible element  spawned  upon  our  shores  from  Europe,  the 
Army  of  the  Cumberland  remained  mainly  native  American 
and  in  the  large  showing  of  volunteers  from  naturalized  citi- 
zens we  had  the  better  class  of  sturdy  emigrants  who  had 
struggled  through  to  the  lands  of  the  West.  But  the  evil 


Conflict  Running  to  Exhaustion,  Neck  and  Neck.       513 

grew  apace.  The  South  could  draw  upon  its  entire  popnla- 
lation  of  men  and  even  boys.  This,  in  comparison  with  the 
North,  was  limited,  and  the  Confederacy  had  reached  the 
limit.  It,  too,  had  its  draft,  but  no  riots.  The  few  who  re- 
sponded reluctantly  to  the  call  were  hurried  forward  and  in 
this  the  South  differed  from  the  North.  The  long  pursuits 
of  a  peaceful  sort  had  developed  a  peaceful  nation  in  the 
many  classes  of  the  free  states  that  remained  loyal  to  the 
Union.  There  was  no  such  absorbing  pursuit  of  gain  in  the 
slave  states,  where  merchandise  was  considered  less  precious 
than  a  personal  sense  of  honor.  Every  man  was  his  own 
policeman  and  the  whole  were  better  prepared  for  war. 
Added  to  this  was  the  fact  that  slavery  was  ever  a  menace 
to  social  order  and  every  slave-holder  was  trained  from  neces- 
sity in  the  ways  of  the  soldier. 

Let  the  causes  have  been  what  they  may,  when  the 
lieutenant-general  was  complacently  talking  of"  hammering* 
continuously  against  the  armed  forces  of  the  enemy  and  his 
resources,"  etc.,  the  North  and  South  were  running  to  ex- 
haustion neck  and  neck.  While  our  material  resources  were 
greater  than  those  of  the  South  our  expenditures  were 
much  heavier,  and  while  we  had  a  greater  population  to 
draw  upon  for  men  our  slaughter  of  Union  soldiers  nearly 
again  equalized  the  difference.  Both  Mr.  Stanton  and  Gen- 
eral Grant  were  in  error  as  to  this  although  they  were  unan- 
imous in  their  confession  that  we  had  to  rely,  however 
humiliating  the  fact,  on  the  number  of  our  men  and  not  on 
the  superior  ability  of  our  generals.  It  will  be  seen  as  we 
develop  the  true  story  of  this  war  how  near  utter  ruin  we 
were  while  trying  Messrs.  Stanton's  and  Grant's  war  of 
attrition. 

Had  General  Thomas  been  intrusted  with  the  command 
given  Grant  he  would  have  placed  Rosecrans  or  Buell  in  com- 
mand of  a  force  large  enough  to  cover  Washington,  and 
transported  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  to  Tennessee.  This 
would  have  forced  Lee  to  evacuate  Virginia  and  concentrate 
his  forces  in  the  cotton  states.  We  would  then  have  had 
the  immense  advantage  of  but  one  army  of  invasion  and  that 
33 


514  Life  of  Thomas. 

with  its  base  in  the  very  heart  of  tne  Confederacy  where  our 
fleet  could  have  co-operated  in  not  only  keeping  open  the 
Mississippi,  but  menacing  the  coast  of  both  the  Atlantic 
and  the  Gulf.  This  would  have  been  the  intelligent  warfare 
on  our  part  that  General  Thomas  saw  in  the  beginning  and 
kept  in  view  until  the  end.  The  authors  of  "  attrition  " 
who  sought  success  over  the  dead  of  our  own  armies  died 
without  knowing  that  brain  could  have  saved  us  blood,  and 
that  intellect  is  rather  more  necessary  to  the  proper  conduct 
of  a  war  than  it  is  in  the  purchase  of  hides  and  sale  of  leather 
at  Galena. 


NOTE. — Soon  after  completing  his  Life  of  Thomas  to  this  point,  Colonel 
Piatt's  labors  were  suspended  by  an  attack  of  sickness,  which  resulted  in 
his  death.  The  concluding  chapters  were  furnished  by  General  H.  V. 
Boynton. 


BOYXTON'S  PREFACE. 

At  the  time  of  Colonel  Piatt's  death  he  had  brought  his 
Life  of  Thomas  down  to  the  Atlanta  campaign.  This  por- 
tion of  the  volume  remains  as  he  left  it. 

At  the  request  of  Mrs.  Piatt,  and  with  the  understand- 
ing that  I  did  not  adopt  all  the  views  of  Colonel  Piatt,  or 
concur  in  every  case  with  his  forms  of  criticism,  I  agreed  to 
add  a  few  chapters  to  carry  the  narrative  through  General 
Thomas's  subsequent  career  and  complete  the  volume. 

While  these  concluding  chapters  are  by  no  means  ex- 
haustive, they  present  the  salient  points  of  General  Thomas's 
notable  services  during  the  Atlanta  and  Nashville  campaigns, 
and  up  to  the  time  of  his  death  in  San  Francisco. 

The  chapters  relating  to  the  wonderful  cavalry  campaign 
following  the  destruction  of  Hood's  army,  which  was  pro- 
jected by  General  Thomas  and  General  James  H.  Wilson, 
and  executed  by  the  latter,  have  been  given  space  out  of  pro- 
portion to  the  other  concluding  chapters  for  the  reason  that 
this  most  remarkable  cavalry  campaign  in  modern  war  has 
not,  as  yet,  received  the  attention  it  so  richly  deserves. 

The  prompt  and  full  assistance  rendered  by  General  Wil- 
son in  connection  with  this  portion  of  the  work  has  placed 
the  writer  under  the  deepest  obligations. 

H.  V.  BOYNTON. 
Washington,  D.  C.,  1893. 

(515) 


516  Life  of  Thomas. 


CHAPTER  XX. 

THE   ATLANTA    CAMPAIGN. 

General  Thomas  Preparing  for  a  Spring  Campaign— Notified  by  Grant  that 
he  Contemplated  Marching  through  to  the  Sea— Reconnoiters  John- 
son's Position  at  Dalton — Finds  it  Impregnable,  but  Discovers  Snake 
Creek  Gap  to  the  Right  of  it  Undefended — Proposes  an  Atlanta  Cam- 
paign with  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland — Sherman,  his  Junior,  As- 
signed to  Command — Thomas's  Proposition  to  Turn  Dalton  by  Way  of 
Snake  Creek  Gap  Rejected — A  Direct  Attack  on  Dalton  Decided  on — 
After  some  Days  of  Assaulting  Precipices,  Plan  Abandoned,  and 
Thomas's  Adopted — Too  Late,  as  Johnson,  fully  Warned,  was  able  to 
Withdraw  to  his  Works  at  Resaca,  and  After  Battle  to  Safely  Cross  the 
Oostenaula. 

At  the  opening  of  the  winter  following  the  battles  about 
Chattanooga,  General  Thomas  and  his  Army  of  the  Cumber- 
land were  at  the  height  of  their  fame.  The  country  grew 
more  and  more  enthusiastic  over  Snodgrass  Hill  and  the 
"  Rock  of  Chickamauga,"  over  the  storming  of  Lookout 
Mountain,  and  the  miracle  of  Missionary  Ridge,  as  it  came 
to  know  them  better.  "While  Grant  and  Sherman  loomed  up 
in  the  official  reports  in  overshadowing  proportions,  the 
country  discerned  both  the  merit  and  the  military  stature  of 
Thomas. 

The  entire  winter  under  this  new  commander  was  a  sea- 
son of  intense  activity.  The  lengthening  lines  of  supplies 
were  worn  and  inadequate.  Longstreet  was  in  East  Tennes- 
see, and  there  was  necessity  to  be  always  ready  to  march  to 
the  assistance  of  the  forces  confronting  him.  The  army  was 
to  be  refitted  throughout.  Chattanooga  was  to  be  stocked 
with  supplies,  and  their  accumulation  was  a  task  of  no  small 
proportions.  A  new  plan  was  devised  of  defending  the  rail- 
roads which  would  reduce  their  guards  to  a  minimum,  and 
enable  fresh  troops  to  protect  and  hold  them.  The  central 
feature  of  this  was  a  system  of  block-houses  and  supporting 
earthworks.  During  the  winter  the  whole  line  from  Chatta- 


The  Atlanta  Campaign.  517 

nooga  to  Nashville,  and  from  that  city  to  Decatur,  was  re- 
paired and  thus  protected.  Enormous  quantities  of  supplies 
were  collected  at  Nashville,  and  Chattanooga  was  stocked 
-with  a  like  amount  of  stores.  The  morale  of  the  army  was 
all  that  could  be  desired.  Its  spirits  steadily  rose.  Its  pride 
in  General  Thomas,  and  its  love  for  him,  were  never  exceeded 
by  the  satisfaction  of  any  army  with  its  leader.  A  very  lib- 
•eral  system  of  furloughing  was  adopted,  and  the  men,  as  they 
returned  from  their  homes,  where  they  had  been  received 
with  every  honor,  came  with  new  purpose  and  still  greater 
devotion  to  Thomas. 

On  the  19th  of  January,  General  Grant,  then  in  com- 
mand of  the  military  division  of  the  Mississippi,  with  head- 
quarters at  Nashville,  wrote  General  Thomas,  notifying  him 
that  a  campaign  through  to  the  gulf  at  Mobile  was  contem- 
plated, with  Atlanta  and  Montgomery  as  intermediate  points. 
The  start  was  to  be  at  the  earliest  possible  moment  in  the 
spring.  This  campaign  had  been  fully  explained  by  General 
Grant  to  General  Halleck  a  few  days  before.  General  Thomas 
at  once  began  preparations  for  the  movement. 

While  these  were  in  active  progress  he  was  ordered  by 
General  Grant  to  make  a  reconnoissance  in  force  toward 
General  Johnston's  position  at  Dalton,  and  if  possible  to 
capture  the  place.  The  real  object  of  this  move  was  to  pre- 
vent Bragg  from  detaching  against  Sherman,  then  out  of 
sight  in  the  depths  of  the  Meridian  raid. 

After  the  defeat  of  General  Bragg,  at  Chattanooga,  the 
Confederate  army  took  position  at  Dalton,  forty  miles  south- 
east of  Chattanooga,  on  the  railroad  leading  to  Atlanta. 
Soon  after,  General  Bragg  was  relieved  by  General  Joseph  E. 
Johnston. 

The  position  at  Dalton  was  one  of  great  strength.  Rocky 
Face  Ridge,  a  bold  range,  with  steep  slopes,  covered  with 
tangled  timber  and  loose  stone,  terminated  toward  the  crest 
in  palisades  of  rock,  which  could  not  be  scaled.  The  only 
practicable  approach  to  Dalton  from  the  front  was  through 
Buzzard  Roost  Gap,  a  narrow  valley,  dominated  throughout 
by  precipitous  heights,  and  further  commanded  by  detached 
ridgei  of  great  natural  strength.  These  advantages  were 


518  Life  of  Thomas. 

multiplied  by  intricate  fortifications,  and  by  providing  for 
flooding  the  whole  gorge  in  case  of  an  attempted  movement 
through  it.  The  Confederate  force  holding  this  position  at 
the  time  General  Thomas  was  ordered  to  examine  it  by  a 
movement  in  force  was  over  thirty  thousand. 

He  moved  with  four  divisions  of  infantry — Cruft's, 
Baird's,  Johnson's  and  Davis',  with  cavalry  on  each  flank. 
He  carried  Tunnel  Hill,  a  strong  range  next  west  of  Rocky 
Face  E-idge,  and  penetrating  through  several  deep  valleys, 
forced  his  heads  of  columns  into  Buzzard  Roost,  and,  after 
most  thorough  examination,  with  his  lines  close  to  the  enemy's 
works,  pronounced  the  place  impregnable,  reported  to  Gen- 
eral Grant  that  it  was  not  possible  to  carry  it  by  assault,  and 
withdrew  to  Ringgold. 

During  his  movement,  General  Thomas  not  only  recon- 
noitered  the  roads  and  passes  to  Dalton  from  the  front,  but 
gathered  full  knowledge  of  the  gaps  on  the  flanks  of  the 
enemy's  position,  and  studied  them  with  a  view  to  turning 
movements  when  the  real  campaign  should  open.  Among 
these  he  discovered  that  Snake  Creek  Gap,  which  penetrated 
the  ranges  to  the  south  of  Dalton,  and  opened  opposite  Re- 
saca,  not  only  afforded  a  practical  and  completely  hidden 
way  to  the  enemy's  rear,  but  that  it  was  entirely  unguarded. 
This  was  a  discovery  of  vast  importance,  and  had  proper  ad- 
vantage been  taken  of  it  when  General  Sherman  began  the 
movement  of  his  army  two  months  later,  it  would  have  been 
easy  to  have  ended  the  Atlanta  campaign  between  Resaca 
and  Dalton. 

While  the  main  object  with  General  Grant  in  ordering 
the  move  on  Dalton  was  to  prevent  General  Johnston  from 
detaching  against  General  Sherman,  who  was  then  on  his 
raid  from  Vicksburg  toward  Selma,  it  gave  General  Thomas 
the  information  he  needed  to  guide  him  in  the  plans  he  was, 
perfecting  for  a  campaign  which  should  enable  him  to  oc- 
cupy the  railroad  at  least  as  far  as  Atlanta. 

The  demonstration  against  Dalton  detained  all  of  John- 
ston's force.  But,  General  Sherman  having  penetrated  to 
Meridian,  turned  back  without  attempting  to  move  on  Selmav 


The  Atlanta  Campaign.  519 

as  had  been  contemplated,  or  toward  Mobile,  as  it  had  been 
hoped  he  could. 

General  Thomas,  having  Completed  his  studies  of  the 
situation,  including  the  proper  guarding  of  both  lines  of  rail- 
road between  Nashville  and  Stevenson,  and  the  natural  diffi- 
culties between  Ringgold  and  Atlanta,  on  the  28th  of  Feb- 
ruary telegraphed  his  proposition  to  General  Grant  to  enter 
upon  a  campaign  for  Atlanta  with  the  Army  of  the  Cum- 
berland, as  set  forth  by  Colonel  Piatt  in  the  preceding 
chapter. 

Four  days  after  receiving  General  Thomas's  plan,  which 
had  been  thoroughly  worked  out  by  that  careful  officer,  Gen- 
eral Grant,  who  had  been  confirmed  as  lieutenant-general 
under  the  law  reviving  that  grade,  started  for  Washington, 
whither  he  was  ordered,  to  the  command  of  all  the  armies. 
In  ten  days  he  returned  to  Nashville,  summoned  Sherman 
from  Memphis,  and  informed  him  that  it  had  been  arranged 
to  assign  him  to  the  command  of  the  Military  Division  of 
the  Mississippi,  with  head-quarters  at  Nashville.  On  the  17th 
of  March  General  Sherman  took  command,  and  General 
Grant  informed  General  Thomas  of  the  change. 

As  has  been  seen,  for  the  second  time,  General  Thomas 
found  himself  assigned  to  duty  under  a  junior.  He  ranked 
General  Sherman  as  a  major-general,  as  he  had  ranked  Gen- 
eral Rosecrans.  In  speaking  to  one  of  his  brother  officers 
of  this  treatment,  he  simply  said:  "I  have  made  my  last 
protest  against  serving  under  juniors.  I  have  made  up  my 
mind  to  go  on  with  this  work  without  a  word,  and  do  my 
best  to  help  get  through  with  this  business  as  soon  as  pos- 
sible." 

But  in  spite  of  the  patriotic,  dignified,  and  self-sacrificing 
manner  in  which  General  Thomas  acquiesced,  it  was,  never- 
theless, a  great  outrage  upon  him.  He  had  not,  at  any  time, 
lost  a  movement  or  a  battle  from  Mill  Springs  to  Chatta- 
nooga. The  laurels  of  Snodgrass  Hill,  and  Lookout  Moun- 
tain, and  Missionary  Ridge,  were  fresh  on  his  brow.  The 
country  spoke  his  name  with  universal  acclaim.  He  was  at 
the  head  of  a  great  army  which  idolized  him.  He  had  per- 
sonally reconnoitered  the  enemy's  stronghold  at  Dalton;  had 


520  Life  of  Tliomas. 

made  careful  examination  of  all  questions  involved  in  a  cam- 
paign, and  had  perfected  a  plan  for  moving  forward  to 
Atlanta,  and  its  preliminaries  were  in  course  of  vigorous  exe- 
cution. He  was  fairly  and  honorably  entitled  to  the  com- 
mand. Instead,  a  junior  was  placed  over  him,  by  virtue  of 
the  fact  that  this  officer  was,  at  the  same  time,  named  as  the 
commander  of  a  military  division. 

The  slight  thus  put  upon  General  Thomas  would  have 
been  less  if  the  junior  placed  over  him  had  been  equally,  or 
even  approximately,  successful.  But  General  Sherman  had 
been  surprised  at  Shiloh  ;  had  signally  failed  at  Chickasaw 
Bayou;  had  protested  against  Grant's  plan  by  which  Vicks- 
burg  had  been  captured ;  had  failed  in  his  assaults  on 
Vicksburg;  of  the  three  armies  operating  at  Chattanooga 
had  stood  alone  in  failure  to  execute  his  part  of  the  plan,  and 
he  was  just  fresh  from  the  Meridian  campaign,  which  had 
fallen  short.  At  all  these  points  and  every- where  his  troops 
and  subordinate  officers  had  fought  with  splendid  pluck,  and 
they  were  not  in  any  case  responsible  for  the  want  of  suc- 
cess which  attended  the  plans  and  orders  which  they  had  un- 
flinchingly risked  life  to  execute. 

It  was  the  idea  of  "  getting  through  with  this  business 
as  soon  as  possible  "  that  held  Thomas  steady  after  each  dis- 
regard of  his  merits.  There  was  no  failure  on  his  part,  but, 
on  the  contrary,  unvarying  and  brilliant  success  from  Mill 
Springs  to  Nashville.  At  the  same  time  there  was  as  con- 
stant and  uniform  failure  to  reward  him  by  promotion. 

When  General  Rosecrans  was  assigned  to  the  command 
of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland',  after  Perryville,  his  com- 
mission was  dated  back  in  order  that  he  might  rank  General 
Thomas.  The  latter  did  not  learn  this  fact  until  long  after 
the  change  was  made.  At  the  time  General  Rosecrans  came 
Thomas  made  the  point  to  Halleck  that  he  had  been 
placed  under  a  junior,  and  he  was  not  conscious  of  having 
done  any  thing  to  merit  or  excuse  it.  Halleck  replied  that 
Rosecrans'  commission  was  the  oldest.  To  this  Thomas  an- 
swered that,  knowing  this,  he  had  no  objections  to  serv- 
ing under  General  Rosecrans.  Had  he  known  that 
Rosecrans  had  been  reappointed,  and  the  date  of  his  com- 


The  Atlanta  Campaign.  521 

mission  carried  back  to  meet  this  case,  the  reply  would  have 
been  of  a  very  different  character.  The  three  letters  on  this 
subject  heretofore  given  in  this  volume  throw  strong  light 
on  General  Thomas's  character.  He  had  promptly,  and 
twice,  protested  against  relieving  General  Buell  on  the 
eve  of  Perryville,  because  he  thought  the  order  was  unjust 
to  that  general.  After  the  battle  this  magnanimity  on  his 
his  part  was  taken  advantage  of  and  made  an  excuse  for 
ignoring  him. 

On  24th  of  October  it  was  decided  to  send  Rosecrans  to  re- 
lieve General  Buell.  General  Thomas's  commission  as  major- 
general  of  volunteers  dated  from  April  25, 1862.  On  the  25th 
of  October,  a  new  letter  of  appointment  for  General  Rosecrans 
was  made  out,  which  gave  him  rank  from  March  21,  1862, 
and  made  him  senior  to  General  Thomas  by  a  month. 
Measured  by  his  success,  there  was  ground  for  defending 
Rosecrans'  assignment,  if  rank  was  to  be  ignored.  West 
Virginia,  luka  and  Corinth  had  all  testified  to  his  ability 
and  worth.  But  when  it  came  to  assigning  Sherman  over 
Thomas  on  the  threshold  of  the  Atlanta  campaign  it  was 
establishing  uniform  and  unbroken  failure  over  uniform  and 
unbroken  success.  As  Sherman  was  assigned  to  the  com- 
mand of  the  Division  of  the  Mississippi,  by  the  rulings  he 
commanded  every  thing  in  it,  and  so  commanded  Thomas 
his  superior  in  rank.  But  no  such  assignment  could  change 
the  relative  military  ability  of  these  two  officers,  or  dis- 
turb their  previous  records,  the  one  of  success,  the  other  of 
failure,  or  even  modify  the  injustice  done  to  Thomas. 

At  the  time  of  General  Sherman's  assignment,  not  only 
had  General  Thomas's  plan  of  campaign  as  far  as  Atlanta, 
to  be  executed  with  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  alone, 
been  perfected  and  submitted  to  General  Grant,  but  even 
its  details,  such  as  the  number  of  guards  needed  at  each 
bridge  and  minor  post  had  been  determined.  His  army 
was  well  supplied,  and  it  would  have  been  ready  to  advance 
upon  the  receipt  of  orders.  It  was,  in  round  numbers,  60,000 
strong,  well  equipped,  in  splendid  spirit,  and  devoted  to  its 
leader.  The  Confederate  force  at  that  time  was,  in  round 
numbers,  40,000  of  all  arms. 


522  Life  of  Thomas. 

General  Sherman,  after  reaching  Nashville,  accompanied 
General  Grant  as  far  as  Cincinnati  on  the  way  to  Wash- 
ington, and  received  full  knowledge  of  the  plans  of  the  com- 
manding general  for  the  spring  campaign,  which  was  to 
open  about  the  first  of  May  with  a  simultaneous  movement 
of  all  the  armies.  The  purpose  of  General  Grant  to  push 
Sherman's  army  after  Johnston  and  by  way  of  Atlanta 
through  to  the  Gulf,  or  toward  Savannah,  was  also  made 
known  to  Sherman  for  his  guidance. 

The  force  for  the  campaign  was  to  consist  of  the  Army 
of  the  Cumberland,  General  Thomas ;  the  Army  of  the  Ten- 
nessee, General  McPherson ;  and  the  Army  of  the  Ohio, 
General  Schofield. 

The  Army  of  the  Cumberland  was  composed  of  the 
Fourth,  Fourteenth,  and  Twentieth  Corps  of  Infantry  and  a 
corps  of  cavalry.  Each  corps  consisted  of  three  divisions,  and 
each  division  was  made  up  of  three  brigades.  There  were 
also  three  brigades  of  artillery.  Its  total,  therefore,  was  4 
corps,  12  divisions,  36  brigades,  and  three  artillery  brigades 
of  42  batteries. 

The  Army  of  the  Tennessee  was  made  up  of  the  Fif- 
teenth, Sixteenth,  and  Seventeenth  Corps.  Tfte  first  con- 
tained four  divisions  and  the  others  two  divisions  each.  Its 
composition  was  3  corps,  8  divisions,  24  brigades,  and  23 
batteries. 

The  Army  of  the  Ohio  consisted  of  the  Twenty-third 
corps  of  3  infantry  divisions  and  1  division  of  cavalry.  It 
had  4  divisions,  10  brigades,  and  8  batteries. 

General  Sherman's  combined  forces,  therefore,  were  made 
up  of  8  corps,  24  divisions,  70  brigades,  and  73  batteries. 

The  opposing  Confederate  army  consisted  of  Hood's  and 
Hardee's  corps  of  infantry,  and  "Wheeler's  corps  of  cavalry. 
Hardee  had  4  divisions,  and  Hood  and  "Wheeler  each  3.  Gen-1 
eral  Johnston's  army,  therefore,  was  composed  of  3  corps,  10 
divisions,  34  brigades,  and  10  batteries — a  force  considerably 
less  than  half  that  under  General  Sherman.  Early  in  the 
campaign  the  latter  brought  forward  General  F.  P.  Blair 
with  two  divisions  and  one  brigade  of  cavalry.  General 
Johnston  was  also  re-enforced  by  Folk's  corps  of  three  divis- 


The  Atlanta  Campaign.  523 

ions  of  infantry,  one  of  them  of  only  two  brigades,  and  three 
brigades  of  cavalry.  The  relative  strength  of  the  opposing 
forces,  however,  remained  throughout  the  campaign  as 
quite  two  to  one  in  favor  of  General  Sherman. 

When  the  campaign  actually  opened  General  Sherman 
reported  the  following  force  as  present  for  battle : 

Infantry.  Cavalry.  Artillery.  Gun*. 

Army  of  the  Cumberland 54,568  3,828  2,377  130 

Army  of  the  Tennessee i'i',4:;7  624  1,404  96 

Army  of  the  Ohio 11,183  1,697  679  28 

Total 88,188  5,149  4,460  254 

Aggregate  for  battle,  98,797,  and  254  guns. 

At  the  same  date  General  Johnston  reported  his  effective 
force  as  infantry,  34,500;  cavalry,  2,085;  artillery,  2,811 — 
total,  39,396.  The  returns  of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee 
showed  the  number  of  "  effectives "  at  this  date,  43,887. 
Some  thousands,  however,  especially  of  the  cavalry,  were  re- 
fitting, and  not  then  available. 

No  general  in  command  at  any  time  during  the  war  had 
as  effective  an  army  put  into  his  hands  for  offensive  use  as 
General  Sherman.  The  men  were  veterans  and  devoted  to 
their  officers.  There  was  no  more  competent  commander  than 
General  Thomas  on  either  side  during  the  war.  General  Mc- 
Pherson  was  rapidly  rising  in  al  1  that  pertained  to  a  soldier  and 
general  of  first  rank.  General  Schofield  was  much  like  Thomas 
in  his  methods  and  bearing,  and  both  McPherson  and  Scho- 
field were,  like  Thomas,  held  in  the  highest  esteem  by  their 
soldiers.  The  corps  and  division  commanders  of  these  three 
armies  were  men  of  military  note  and  skill,  and  full  of  en- 
thusiasm, and  the  brigade  commanders,  were  as  a  body,  un- 
surpassed at  any  time  during  the  war. 

Seven  weeks  after  General  Sherman  assumed  command 
of  his  hardy  veterans  his  army  was  reported  ready  to  move. 
The  lines  of  communication  behind  him  had  been  opened  and 
effectively  guarded  by  Thomas.  They  were  not  interrupted 
while  preparations  for  moving  went  forward,  and  yet,  when 
the  advance  began,  there  was  much  lacking  in  the  way  of 
supplies  among  those  soldiers  which  General  Sherman  brought 


524  Life  of  Thomas. 

up  for  the  campaign.  But  the  authorities  at  Washington 
did  not  cry  out  over  these  lacks,  or  this  use  of  time,  as  when 
the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  was  being  prepared  by  Rose- 
crans  for  the  forward  movement  on  Chattanooga.  That  army 
rebuilt  the  railroads  to  its  rear,  and  in  six  weeks  supplied 
itself  with  every  thing  needed  for  a  month's  campaign  away 
from  its  base,  and  separated  from  it  by  three  mountain 
ranges  and  a  wide  river.  Its  commander  barely  escaped  re- 
moval because  he  was  six  weeks  in  preparation.  General 
Sherman  took  seven  weeks,  with  lines  of  supply  fully  estab- 
lished and  undisturbed,  and  the  former  critics  of  the  Army 
of  the  Cumberland  were  as  silent  as  if  they  had  been  dumb. 
This  is  not  a  comparison  to  show  that  Sherman  had  been 
tardy,  for  he  had  acted  with  vigor,  but  it  serves  to  illustrate 
Rosecrans'  experiences.  When  Sherman's  army  did  move 
under  orders  from  General  Grant,  fixing  the  day  of  general 
advance  for  all  the  armies,  it  was  not  better  supplied  either 
with  clothing  or  food  than  was  General  Rosecrans'  for  his 
much  criticised  campaign.  As  a  whole,  however,  and  speak- 
ing of  the  campaign  as  a  whole,  the  army  was  well  supplied 
and  equipped  and  in  prime  spirits. 

When  General  Sherman  moved,  it  was  his  intention  to 
attack  General  Johnston's  intrenched  position  at  Dalton. 
This  purpose  he  announced  to -General  Grant  on  April  24th, 
after  he  had  visited  General  Thomas,  at  Chattanooga,  and 
heard  and  rejected  his  plan  of  turning  the  enemy's  position 
by  a  flank  movement  through  Snake  Creek  Gap.  General 
Thomas,  in  his  testimony  before  the  Committee  on  the  Con- 
duct of  the  War,  made  this  statement  of  the  rejection  of  his 
plan  by  General  Sherman,  and  its  subsequent  adoption,  after 
the  failure  of  the  attack  in  front,  and  when  it  was  too  late  : 

"  Shortly  after  his  assignment  to  the  military  division  of 
the  Mississippi,  General  Sherman  came  to  see  me  at  Chatta- 
nooga to  consult  as  to  the  position  of  affairs  and  adopt  a  plan 
for  a  spring  campaign.  At  that  interview  I  proposed  to 
General  Sherman  that  if  he  would  use  McPherson's  and 
Schofield's  armies  to  demonstrate  on  the  enemy's  position  at 
Dalton  by  the  direct  roads  through  Buzzard  Roost  Gap,  and 
from,  the  direction  of  Cleveland,  I  would  throw  my  whole 


Tke.  Atlanta  Campaign.  525 

force  through  Snake  Creek  Gap,  which  I  knew  to  be  un- 
guarded, fall  upon  the  enemy's  communications  between 
Dalton  and  Resaca,  thereby  turning  his  position  completely, 
and  force  him  either  to  retreat  toward  the  east,  through  a 
difficult  country,  poorly  supplied  with  provisions  and  forage, 
with  a  strong  probability  of  total  disorganization  of  his  force, 
or  attack  me,  in  which  latter  event  I  felt  confident  that  my 
army  was  sufficiently  strong  to  beat  him,  especially  as  I  hoped 
to  gain  a  position  on  his  communications  before  he  could  be 
made  aware  of  my  movement.  General  Sherman  objected 
to  this  plan  for  the  reason  that  he  desired  my  army  to  form 
the  reserve  of  the  united  armies,  and  to  serve  as  a  rallying 
point  for  the  two  wings,  the  Army  of  the  Ohio  and  that  of 
the  Tennessee,  to  operate  from.  Later,  when  the  campaign 
in  Georgia  was  commenced,  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  was 
sent  through  Snake  Creek  Gap  to  accomplish  what  I  had 
proposed  doing  with  my  army,  but  not  reaching  Snake  Creek 
Gap  before  the  enemy  had  informed  himself  of  the  move- 
ment, McPherson  was  unable  to  get  upon  his  communications 
before  Johnston  had  withdrawn  part  of  his  forces  from  Dal- 
ton, and  had  made  dispositions  to  defend  Resaca." 

The  opening  of  the  Atlanta  campaign,  from  this  failure 
of  General  Sherman  to  promptly  accept  General  Thomas's 
views  and  plans,  proved  one  of  the  most  decided  and  mo- 
mentous failures  of  the  war.  The  three  armies  and  their 
commanders,  and  the  subordinate  officers  and  men,  did  their 
full  duty.  Every  order  of  General  Sherman  was  executed 
whenever  it  was  possible  for  iron  veterans,  who  hesitated  at 
no  exposure  in  battle,  to  carry  it  out.'  There  was  no  failure 
anywhere,  except  with  the  commanding  general. 

The  position  was  a  very  simple  one.  General  Thomas, 
during  a  prolonged  and  careful  reconnoissance,  as  already 
related,  had  clearly  ascertained  all  of  its  elements.  General 
Sherman,  with  100,000  men,  had  pushed  up  to  the  front  of 
Rocky  Face  Ridge  and  into  the  passes  which  led  through 
and  over  it  to  Dalton,  where  General  Johnston  was  strongly 
intrenched.  The  passes  had  been  rendered  impregnable. 
They  had  been  so  reported  by  General  Thomas  to  General 
Grant,  before  the  assignment  of  General  Sherman.  The  situ- 


526  Life  of  Thomas. 

ation  in  front  had  been  fully  explained  to  Sherman.  He  had 
also  been  informed  that  Snake  Creek  Gap,  ten  miles  to  the 
south,  which  opened  east  of  Rocky  Face,  fifteen  miles  in  the 
rear  of  Dalton,  was  practical  for  artillery  and  trains,  was 
hidden  from  the  view  of  the  enemy,  and,  most  important  of 
all,' that  it  had  been  left  wholly  undefended,  evidently  upon 
the  belief  that  it  was  impracticable  for  an  army.  From  the 
advanced  position  of  the  Union  troops  there  was  no  forward 
movement  possible,  except  to  attempt  the  assault  of  preci- 
pices and  inaccessible  slopes.  It  is  perfectly  clear  to  the 
most  casual  student  of  the  situation  now,  as  it  was  clear  to 
all  who  knew  the  elements  of  the  position  at  the  time,  that, 
had  General  Thomas's  plan  been  adopted,  General  Johnston 
would,  have  been  cut  off  from  retreat  along  the  line  of  the 
railroad,  and  obliged  either  to  give  battle  against  twice  his 
numbers,  which  must  have  settled  the  Atlanta  campaign 
then  and  there,  or  to  retreat  eastward  through  a  broken  and 
barren  country,  where  his  army  would  have  been  at  once 
short  of  all  supplies,  and  wholly  cut  off  from  any  practical 
line  for  obtaining  them. 

The  attack  began  on  the  7th  of  May,  being  made  by 
the  Armies  of  the  Cumberland  and  the  Ohio.  It  was  a  move 
against  precipices  and  into  impassable  gorges.  On  the  9th 
it  was  still  in  progress  and  lasted  through  that  day.  At 
night  General  Sherman  telegraphed  to  Nashville  and  the  East 
that  he  had  "been  fighting  all  day  against  rocks  and  defiles." 
That  day,  while  Schofield,  on  the  north,  and  Thomas  in 
front  of  Buzzard  Roost,  with  a  combined  force  of  74,000 
men  were  pushing  vigorously  but  vainly  and  hopelessly 
against  barriers  which  could  not  be  passed.  McPherson  with 
23,000  men  was  sent  through  Snake  Creek  Gap  with  orders 
to  push  out  to  the  railroad  near  Resaca,  break  it,  and  return 
in  his  discretion  to  the  Gap. 

This  movement  McPherson  accomplished  with  the  great- 
est promptness.  He  did  not  even  wait  for  provisions.  He 
gained  the  road,  but  the  delay  in  the  movement  for  one 
thing,  which  had  warned  Johnston ;  the  finding  of  several 
good  roads  in  front  of  the  Gap  leading  to  Dalton,  and  by 
which  Johnston  could  gain  his  rear;  and,  above  all,  the  fact 


The  Atlanta  Campaign.  527 

that  the  corps  of  General  Dodge  was  entirely  out  of  pro- 
visions for  men  or  horses,  and  had  been  for  more  than  a 
day,  caused  General  McPherson  to  take  advantages  of  the 
discretionary  orders  given  him  and  withdraw  at  night  to  the 
eastern  entrance  to  Snake  Creek  Gap. 

Although  the  fact  was  known  to  General  Sherman  that 
General  Dodge  had  sent  a  force  through  Snake  Creek  Gap 
on  the  8th,  and  that  it  had  moved  out  that  night  to  the 
vicinity  of  the  railroad  and  found  the  country  in  front  of 
Resaca  clear  of  the  enemy,  the  orders  for  the  movement  of 
the  armies  through  the  Gap  was  not  given  until  the  llth 
and  Thomas  and  Schofield  who  had  been  kept  at  the  work 
of  fighting  precipices  did  not  pass  through  until  the  12th  and 
13th.  Johnston,  then  fully  informed  of  the  movement, 
abandoned  Dalton,  retired  on  Resaca,  put  down  his  bridges 
over  the  Oostenaula  to  give  a  safe  line  of  retreat,  and 
awaited  Sherman  at  Resaca.  There,  in  a  position  of  his 
own  choosing,  he  received  Sherman,  accepted  battle,'  and 
after  it  safely  withdrew  his  army  to  the  south  of  the  river. 
It  is  a  mortifying  story  of  failure  for  which  General  Sherman 
alone  was  responsible.  Generals  McPherson  and  Dodge  had 
moved  promptly  though  their  men  and  animals  were  hungry 
and  the  trains  to  supply  them  had  not  arrived.  They  did 
everything  that  willing  and  seasoned  veterans  could  do.  The 
movement  failed  solely  because  it  was  ordered  too  late.  Had 
it  been  in  season,  it  is  by  no  means  certain  that  the  lack  of 
supplies  for  men  and  horses  would  not  have  seriously  crip- 
pled it. 

This  was  a  failure  of  such  vast  importance  and  moment- 
ous consequences  that  every  means  was  taken  then  in  offi- 
cial dispatches,  and  every  effort  was  put  forth  after  the  war 
in  Sherman's  Memoirs  to  conceal  the  real  facts.  In  the 
official  dispatches  of  the  time  it  was  insisted  that  the  move- 
ment in  front  of  Rocky  Face  and  adjacent  ridges  was  only  a 
feint,  and  that  the  move  through  Snake  Creek  Gap,  which  had 
been  persistently  resisted  by  Sherman  until  it  was  too  late  to 
succeed,  was  the  real  move  for  battle.  Next,  its  failure  was 
cruelly  and  most  unjustly  attributed  to  McPherson's  timidity. 
General  McPherson  "timid"!  Never  was  a  grosser  blow 


528  Life  of  Thomas. 

aimed  at  a  faithful  officer.  It  was  even  carried  to  the  extent 
of  suppressing  his  own  full  explanation  of  the  movements 
on  Resaca  when  the  Memoirs  came  to  be  written,  in  cold 
blood  ten  years  later.  Then,  General  Sherman,  while  giving 
his  own  letters  to  McPherson,  said  of  those  from  the  latter 
that  they  "  were  mere  notes  in  pencil  not  retained."  They 
were,  however,  all  in  the  files,  then  accessible  in  the  War  De- 
partment at  General  Sherman's  hand.  They  were  letters  of 
length  and  of  great  moment  to  General  McPherson.  Here 
is  the  one  which  shows  why  he  failed,  and  further  brings  out 
the  astonishing  fact  that  while  it  was  only  the  second  day 
of  the  campaign  General  Sherman's  own  army  of  the  Ten- 
nessee, both  infantry  and  cavalry,  could  not  obtain  supplies , 
for  either  men  or  animals,  and  had  actually  moved  without 
food  or  forage,  and  yet  in  this  condition  had  made  a  most 
vigorous  attempt  to  execute  orders  which  came  too  late  to  ad- 
mit of  success : 

HEADQUARTERS  DEPARTMENT  AND  ARMY  OF  THE  TENNESSEE, 

CAMP  AT  SUGAR  VALLEY,  May  9,  1864,  10:30  P.  M. 

General : — General  Dodge's  command  moved  up  and  skirmished  with 
the  enemy  at  Resaca  this  afternoon.  While  that  was  going  on  one  com- 
pany of  mounted  infantry,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Phillips'  regiment,  succeeded 
in  reaching  the  railroad  near  Tilton's  Station,  but  was  forced  to  leave  with- 
out damaging  the  track.  They  tore  down  a  small  portion  of  the  telegraph 
wire.  The  enemy  have  a  strong  position  at  Resaca  naturally,  and,  as  far 
as  we  could  see,  have  it  pretty  well  fortified.  They  displayed  considerable 
force,  and  opened  on  us  with  artillery.  After  skirmishing  till  nearly  dark, 
and  finding  that  I  could  not*succeed  in  cutting  the  railroad  before  dark, 
or  getting  to  it,  I  decided  to  withdraw  the  command  and  take  up  a  po- 
sition for  the  night  between  Sugar  Valley  and  the  entrance  to^the  Gap  for 
the  following  reasons :  First.  Between  this  point  and  Resaca  there  are  a 
half  dozen  good  roads  leading  north  toward  Dal  ton  down  which  a  column 
of  the  enemy  could  march,  making  our  advanced  position  a  very  exposed 
one.  Second.  General  Dodge's  men  are  all  out  of  provisions,  and  some 
regiments  have  had  nothing  to-day.  His  wagon  train  is  between  here  and 
Villanow,  and  possibly  some  of  them  are  coming  through  the  Gap  now, 
but  they  could  not  have  reached  him  near  Resaca ;  besides,  I  did  not  wish 
to  block  up  the  road  with  a  train.  It  is  very  narrow,  and  the  country 
on  either  side  is  heavily  wooded.  I  had  no  cavalry  except  Phillips'  mounted 
men  to  feel  out  on  the  flanks.  If  I  could  have  had  a  division  of  good  cav- 
alry I  could  have  broken  the  railroad  at  some  point.  I  shall  be  compelled 
to  rest  my  men  to-morrow  forenoon,  at  least,  to  enable  them  to  draw  pro- 
visions. We  have  lost  some  6  men  killed  and  30  odd  wounded,  but  have 
inflicted  a  greater  amount  of  damage  to  the  enemy,  and  captured  abcut 


The  Atlanta  Campaign.  529 

25  prisoners.  General  Kilpatriok  is  very  anxious  to  make  the  attempt  to 
cut  the  railroad.  General  Garrard  is  in  Lafayette  to-night;  says  his  horses 
are  very  much  fatigued  and  short  of  forage ;  desires  to  remain  there  un- 
til his  forage  train  comes  down  from  Chattanooga.  When  I  move  for- 
ward again  I  would  like  a  division  of  Hooker's  command  to  hold  the  en- 
trance to  the  Gap  and  the  roads  at  Sugar  Valley,  thereby  enabling  me  to 
move  forward  with  my  entire  command,  except  train  guards.  The  news 
from  Grant  is  glorious. 

sincerely  yours, 

JAMES  B.  MCPHBRSON,  Major-General  Commanding. 
MAJOR-GENERAL,  W.  T.  SHERMAN, 

Commanding  Military  Division  of  the  Mississippi. 

How  energetically  Generals  McPherson  and  Dodge  and 
their  hardened  and  splendid  soldiers  strove  to  execute  their 
orders  is  further  shown  hy  this  extract  from  General  Dodge's 
report : 

During  the  entire  day  the  command  acted  under  the  personal  di- 
rection of  Major-General  McPherson,  and  promptly  obeyed  and  executed 
all  his  orders.  My  transportation  had  not  yet  reached  me.  I  had  with  the 
entire  corps,  since  leaving  Chattanooga,  only  seventeen  wagons,  and  I  had 
marched  out  in  the  morning  without  rations,  most  of  the  command  having 
been  without  food  since  the  day  before  at  noon ;  thus  a  march  of  sixteen 
miles  was  made  by  the  command,  the  men  and  animals  whereof  had  had 
nothing  to  eat  for  a  day  and  a  half. 

After  assaulting  precipices  for  three  days  in  direct  op- 
position to  General  Thomas's  advice,  and  in  the  face  of  the 
abundant  information  he  had  gathered  as  to  the  impossibility 
of  carrying  the  position  from  the  front,  and  the  ease  with 
which  the  enemy's  rear  could  be  reached  through  unguarded 
Snake  Creek  Gap,  General  Sherman  addressed  General 
Thomas  the  following  annoying  communication,  from  which 
the  uninformed  reader  might  readily  suppose  that  Thomas  had 
been  persisting  in  the  front  attack,  and  that  Sherman  had 
suddenly  conceived  a  flank  movement  by  Snake  Creek  Gap : 

I  think  you  are  satisfied  that  your  troops  can  not  take  Rocky  Face 
Ridge,  and  also  the  attempt  to  put  our  columns  into  the  jaws  of  Buzzard  , 
Roost  would  be  fatal  to  us.  Two  plans  of  action  suggest  themselves :  First. 
By  night,  to  replace  Schofield's  present  command  by  Stoneman's  cavalry, 
which  should  be  near  at  hand,  and  to  rapidly  move  your  entire  army,  the 
men  along  the  base  of  John's  Mountain,  by  the  Mill  Creek  road  to  Snake 
Creek  Gap,  and  join  McPherson  whilst  the  wagons  are  moved  to  Villanow. 
When  we  are  joined  to  McPherson  to  move  from  Sugar  Valley  on  Resaca, 
interposing  ourselves  between  that  place  and  Dalton.  Could  your  anny 
34 


530  Life  of  Thomas. 

and  McPherson's  surely  whip  Joe  Johnston  ?  Second.  To  cut  loose  from 
the  railroad  altogether  and  move  the  whole  army  on  the  same  objective 
point,  leaving  Johnston  to  choose  his  course. 

And  on  the  night  of  the  10th,  Sherman  thus  telegraphed 
General  Halleck : 

General  McPherson  reached  Resaca,  but  found  the  place  strongly  for- 
tified and  guarded,  and  did  not  break  the  road.  According  to  his  instruc- 
tions, he  drew  back  to  the  debouches  of  the  gorge,  where  he  has  a  strong 
defensive  position,  and  guards  the  only  pass  into  the  valley  of  the  Ooste- 
naula  available  to  us.  Buzzard  Roost  Gap,  through  which  the  railroad 
passes,  is  naturally  and  artificially  too  strong  to  be  attempted.  I  must 
feign  on  Buzzard  Roost,  but  pass  through  Snake  Creek  Gap,  and  place  my- 
self between  Johnston  and  Resaca,  when  we  will  have  to  fight  it  out.  I 
am  making  the  preliminary  move.  Certain  that  Johnston  can  make  no 
detachments,  I  will  be  in  no  hurry.  My  cavalry  is  just  approaching  from 
Kentucky  and  Tennessee  (detained  by  the  difficulty  of  getting  horses), 
and  even  now  it  is  less  than  my  minimum. 

And  yet  the  dispatches  show  that  General  Thomas,  after 
reconnoitering  the  position  in  force  in  February,  with  four 
divisions,  had  reported  to  General  Grant  as  early  as  the  26th 
of  that  month,  and  explained  to  General  Sherman  upon  his 
taking  command  later,  that  it  was  "not  possible  to  carry 
the  place  (Buzzard  Roost  Gap)  by  assault."  Still  three  days 
had  been  consumed  in  preparing  to  carry  it,  and  then  when 
it  became  necessary  to  adopt  General  Thomas's  plan,  dispatch 
after  dispatch  was  written  to  create  the  impression  that  Sher- 
man originated  it,  and  had  been  working  upon  it  from  the 
first. 

As  a  result  of  all  this  bungling  business,  now  so  easily 
seen  to  be  so,  Johnston  was  enabled  to  plant  himself  upon 
the  railroad  between  Sherman  and  Atlanta,  and  the  long  and 
costly  campaign  which  followed  became  a  necessity.  Had 
Thomas's  plans  and  advice  been  followed,  the  decisive  battle 
of  the  campaign  could  have  been  fought  about  Resaca,  or 
Johnston's  army  have  been  driven  to  retreat  eastward,  which, 
because  of  the  broken  and  barren  character  of  the  country 
must  have  been  well  nigh  as  disastrous  as  a  battle.  Thus,  an 
army  100,000  strong  for  battle,  made  up  of  three  armies,  each 
under  a  commander  of  unquestioned  ability,  and  composed 
of  enthusiastic  veterans,  failed  against  a  force  of  less  than 
half  its  strength,  through  the  grave  mistake  of  the  general 


The  Atlanta  Campaign.  581 

in  command.  It  is  plain  to  see  that  had  General  Thomas 
been  in  command,  or  even  if  his  advice  had  been  followed, 
the  campaign  would  have  opened  successfully  and  not  in 
grave  failure. 

When  General  Sherman  did  decide  to  adopt  the  Thomas 
plan,  he  found  the  enemy  in  the  fortifications  of  Resaca,  to 
which  point  General  Johnston  had  withdrawn  from  Dalton, 
upon  the  discovery  of  the  belated  flank  movement  through 
Snake  Creek  Gap..  General  Sherman  contended,  in  his 
official  report,  that  "  nothing  saved  Johnston's  army  at 
Resaca  but  the  impracticable  nature  of  the  country,  which 
made  the  passage  of  the  troops  across  the  valley  almost  im- 
possible." And  yet,  a  few  days  later,  the  Army  o£the  Cum- 
berland and  the  Army  of  the  Ohio,  moved  through  this  very 
country  in  line  of  battle,  without  trouble  and  with  brilliant 
success. 


532  Life  of  Thomas. 


CHAPTER  XXI. 

From  Resaca  to  the  Etowah— Thomas's  Boldness  Causes  Johnston  to  Retire 
to  Allatoona — The  Enemy  Flanked  out  of  Allatoona — Union  Advance 
to  Kenesaw— Sherman's  Secret  Attack  upon  his  Commanders — Its 
Gross  Injustice  shown  by  his  own  Dispatches. 

The  campaign  from  Resaca  to  Etowah  River  was  rapid. 
Resaca  was  occupied  on  the  morning  of  May  16th,  and  Gen- 
eral Sherman  ordered  instant  pursuit.  The  failure  of  the 
prompt  movement  through  Snake  Creek  Gap,  suggested  and 
urged  by  General  Thomas,  had,  however,  enabled  the  enemy 
to  put  down  his  bridges  and  retire  in  order.  General  John- 
ston fell  back  to  Cassville,  north  of  the  Etowah,  where  he  pre- 
pared for  battle,  and  expected  to  deliver  it  before  the  Union 
army  could  be  concentrated.  He  was  ready  to  fall  upon  the 
Army  of  the  Cumberland,  when  the  vigorous  assembling 
and  bold  display  of  his  forces  by  General  Thomas  the  mo- 
ment the  latter  found  the  enemy  concentrated,  determined 
General  Johnston  to  retire  to  Allatoona,  south  of  the  river, 
without  a  fight. 

After  a  three  days'  rest  for  the  general  repair  of  equip- 
ment and  the  accumulation  of  supplies,  General  Sherman 
decided  to  leave  the  railroad  and  make  a  wide  detour  to  the 
west  for  the  purpose  of  turning  the  strong  position  of  the 
Allatoona  Pass  and  mountains.  On  the  23d  of  May  the  col- 
umns started  with  twenty  days'  rations  in  the  trains,  moving 
on  Dallas.  From  this  point  the  army  was  to  turn  again 
toward  the  railroad,  when  Johnston,  by  the  turning  move- 
ment, should  be  drawn  out  of  Allatoona. 

General  Johnston  was  quick  to  move,  and  arrived  in 
force  at  New  Hope  Church,  and  had  his  advance  at  Dallas  as 
soon  as  Sherman  appeared  before  the  latter  place.  From  the 
25th  of  May  until  the  4th  of  June  there  was  almost  continu- 
ous fighting  along  a  Confederate  line  of  works  from  six  to 


The  Atlanta  Campaign.  533 

ten  miles  in  extent,  reaching  from  about  Dallas  north-east- 
ward to  a  point  some  three  miles  in  front  of  Lost  Mountain. 
This  fighting  was  generally  by  strong  skirmish  lines  ap- 
proaching lines  of  battle  in  strength,  and  each  protected  by 
hastily  constructed  but  most  effective  field-works.  There 
were  innumerable  charges  and  assaults  along  the  lines  in 
which  all  the  armies  participated  with  the  greatest  vigor  and 
enthusiasm.  As  a  result,  General  Sherman,  constantly  press- 
ing toward  the  railroad  on  his  left,  finally  secured  it  from 
Allatoona  to  Ackworth.  Thereupon  General  Johnston,  on 
the  night  of  June  4th,  withdrew  toward  the  strong  line  of 
the  Kenesaw  and  Lost  Mountain  ranges,  north  and  west 
of  Marietta.  The  losses  of  the  Union  army  for  the  month  of 
May  were  9,299 ;  of  these  6,856  were  in  the  three  corps  of  the 
Army  of  the  Cumberland,  1,271  in  the  two  corps  of  the  Army 
of  the  Tennessee,  and  1,172  in  the  one  corps  and  the  cavalry 
of  the  Army  of  the  Ohio.  General  Sherman's  own  estimate 
of  the  relative  strength  of  the  contending  armies  was  two  to 
one  in  favor  of  his  own  forces. 

The  next  epoch  of  the  Atlanta  campaign  involved  the  ad- 
vance upon  the  formidable  Kenesaw  Mountain  line.  About 
a  week  was  occupied  in  opening  the  railroad  to  Ackworth 
and  establishing  a  secondary  base  of  supplies  upon  the  road, 
and  within  the  natural  fortifications  of  Allatoona  Pass.  On 
the  8th  of  June,  General  Frank  Blair  arrived  with  two  divis- 
ions of  the  Seventeenth  corps,  adding  an  effective  strength  of 
9,000  men  to  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee.  This  reinforce- 
ment about  covered  the  loss  of  the  campaign,  so  that  for  the 
move  upon  the  Kenesaw  line  General  Sherman  reported  the 
strength  of  his  three  armies  as  still  aggregating  about  100,000 
effective  men.  On  the  10th  of  June  the  whole  army  moved 
forward  to  Big  Shanty,  six  miles  south  of  Ackworth,  from 
which  point  the  enemy's  lines  upon  Kenesaw,  Pine,  and  Lost 
Mountains  could  be  seen.  Heavy  rains  set  in  on  June  1st, 
and  continued  with  slight  cessations  until  the  22d.  The 
country  was  rendered  almost  impassable  in  any  direction, 
and  General  Sherman  declared  the  roads  to  be  "  infamous." 

While,  under  these  conditions,  General  Sherman's  three 
army  commanders,  Thomas,  McPherson,  and  Schofield,  were 


534  Life  of  Thomas. 

steadily  advancing  their  lines  through  a  country  crowded 
with  natural  and  artificial  obstacles,  and  bravely  defended, 
performing  all  duties  with  signal  ability,  and  failing  in 
nothing,  General  Sherman  was  rewarding  them  by  such 
secret  attacks  in  private  communications  as  were  contained 
in  the  following  amazing  letter  to  General  Grant : 

IN  THE  FIELD,  June  18,  1864. 
GENERAL  U.  S.  GRANT  : 

DEAR  GENERAL:  I  have  no  doubt  you  want  me  to  write  you  occa- 
sionally letters  not  purely  official,  but  which  will  admit  of  a  little  more 
latitude  than  such  documents  possess.  I  have  daily  sent  to  Halleck  tele- 
graphs which  I  asked  him  to  report  to  you,  and  which  he  says  he  has  done. 
You,  therefore,  know  where  we  are  and  what  we  have  done.  If  our  move- 
ment has  been  slower  than  you  calculated  I  can  explain  the  reason,  though 
I  know  you  believe  me  too  earnest  and  impatient  to  be  behind  time.  My 
first  movement  against  Johnston  was  really  fine,  and  now  I  believe  I  would 
have  disposed  of  him  at  one  blow  if  McPherson  had  crushed  Resaca,  as  he 
might  have  done,  for  then  it  was  garrisoned  only  by  a  small  brigade,  but 
Me.  was  a  little  over  cautious  lest  Johnston,  still  at  Dalton,  might  move 
against  him  alone ;  but  the  truth  was  I  got  all  of  McPherson's  army,  23,000, 
eighteen  miles  to  Johnston's  rear  before  he  knew  they  had  left  Huutsville. 
With  that  single  exception  McPherson  has  done  very  well.  Schofield  also 
does  as  well  as  I  could  ask  with  his  small  force.  Our  cavalry  is  dwindling 
away.  We  can  not  get  full  forage  and  have  to  graze,  so  that  the  cavalry  is 
always  unable  to  attempt  any  thing.  Garrard  is  over-cautious,  and  I  think 
Stoneman  is  lazy.  The  former  has  4,500  and  the  latter  about  2,500.  Each 
has  had  fine  chances  of  cutting  in,  but  were  easily  checked  by  the  appear- 
ance of  the  enemy.  My  chief  source  of  trouble  is  with  the  Army  of  the 
Cumberland,  which  is  dreadfully  slow.  A  fresh  furrow  in  a  plowed  field 
will  stop  the  whole  column,  and  all  begin  to  intrench.  I  have  again  and 
again  tried  to  impress  on  Thomas  that  we  must  assail  and  not  defend  ;  we 
are  the  offensive,  and  yet  it  seems  the  whole  Army  of  the  Cumberland  is 
so  habituated  to  be  on  the  defensive  that,  from  its  commander  down  to  the 
lowest  private,  I  can  not  get  it  out  of  their  heads.  I  came  out  without 
tents  and  ordered  all  to  do  likewise,  yet  Thomas  has  a  head-quarters  camp 
on  the  style  of  Halleck  at  Corinth ;  every  aide  and  orderly  with  a  wall- 
tent,  and  a  baggage-train  big  enough  for  a  division.  He  promised  to  send 
it  all  back,  but  the  truth  is,  every  body  there  is  allowed  to  do  as  he  pleases, 
and  they  still  think  and  act  as  though  the  railroad  and  all  its  facilities  were 
theirs.  This  slowness  has  cost  me  the  loss  of  two  splendid  opportunities 
which  never  recur  in  war.  At  Dallas  there  was  a  delay  of  four  hours  to  get 
ready  to  advance,  when  we  first  met  Johnston's  head  of  column,  and  that 
four  hours  enabled  him  to  throw  up  works  to  cover  the  head  of  his  column, 
and  he  extended  the  works  about  as  fast  as  we  deployed.  Also  here  I 
broke  one  of  his  lines,  and  had  we  followed  it  up  as  I  ordered  at  daylight, 
there  was  nothing  between  us  and  the  railroad  back  of  Marietta.  I  ordered 
Thomas  to  move  at  daylight,  and  when  I  got  to  the  point  at  9.30,  I  found 


The  Atlanta  Campaign.  535 

Stanley  and  Wood  quarreling  which  should  not  lead.  I'm  afraid  I  swore, 
and  said  what  I  should  not,  but  I  got  them  started ;  but,  instead  of  reach- 
ing the  Atlanta  road  back  of  Marietta,  which  is  Johnston's  center,  we  only 
got  to  a  creek  to  the  south  of  it  by  night,  and  now  a  heavy  rain  stops  us 
and  gives  time  to  fortify  a  new  line.  Still  I  have  all  the  high  and  com- 
manding ground,  but  the  one  peak  near  Marietta,  which  I  can  turn.  We 
have  had  an  immense  quantity  of  rain,  from  June  2d  to  14th,  and  now  it  is 
raining  as  though  it  had  no  intention  ever  to  stop.  The  enemy's  cavalry 
sweeps  all  around  us,  and  is  now  to  my  rear  somewhere.  The  wires  are 
broken  very  often,  but  I  have  strong  guards  along  the  road  which  make 
prompt  repairs.  Thus  far  our  supplies  of  food  have  been  good,  and  forage 
moderate,  and  we  have  found  growing  wheat,  rye,  oats,  etc.  You  may  go 
on  with  the  full  assurance  that  I  will  continue  to  press  Johnston  as  fast  as 
I  can  overcome  the  natural  obstacles  and  inspire  motion  into  a  large,  pon- 
derous, and  slow  (by  habit)  army.  Of  course  it  can  not  keep  up  with  my 
thoughts  and  wishes,  but  no  impulse  can  be  given  it  that  I  will  not  guide. 
As  ever,  your  friend,  W.  T.  SHERMAN. 

The  coloring  of  this  letter  grows  darker  still  when  the 
surroundings,  as  shown  by  the  official  dispatches,  are  ex- 
amined. On  the  night  of  the  13th  of  June,  only  five  days 
before  it  was  written,  Sherman  had  telegraphed  Halleck  from 
Big  Shanty : 

We  have  had  hard  and  cold  rains  for  about  ten  days.  A  gleam  of  sun- 
shine this  evening  gives  hopes  of  a  change.  The  roads  are  insufficient 
here,  and  the  fields  and  new  ground  are  simply  impassable  to  wheels.  As 
soon  as  possible  I  will  study  Johnston's  position  on  the  Kenesaw  and  Lost 
Mountains,  and  adopt  some  plan  to  dislodge  him  or  draw  him  out  of  his 
position.  We  can  not  risk  the  heavy  losses  of  an  assault  at  this  distance 
from  our  base. 

Thus  at  this  time,  as  a  result  of  the  storm,  the  condition 
of  the  country  was  such  as  to  make  it  impossible  for  General 
Sherman  himself  to  even  study  the  enemy's  position. 

The  same  night,  Captain  Van  Duzer,  in  charge  of  mil- 
itary telegraphs  at  General  Thomas's  head-quarters,  tele- 
graphed General  Eckert,  at  Washington,  that  rain  had  fallen 
steadily  all  night,  and  until  4  p.  M. ;  that  all  movements  were 
out  of  the  question,  and  concluding:  "It  will  require  three 
clear  days  to  make  it  possible  to  move  artillery  and  wagons." 

On  the  night  of  the  14th,  Van  Duzer  telegraphs : 

Weather  cleared  up,  cool  winds  drying  roads  fast.  Some  advance  to- 
day, and  Thomas  has  gained  ground,  and  has  one  rebel  brigade  nearly 
surrounded. 

On  the  night  of  the  15th  General  Sherman    reported  to 


536  Life  of  Thomas. 

Ilalleck  that  he  had  been  able  after  the  long  storm  to  examine 
the  enemy's  position.  Thomas  had  been  "perfectly  success- 
ful," and  had  captured  a  line  of  strong  fortifications.  Schotield 
and  McPherson  had  carried  the  works  in  their  front.  Thomas 
when  he  (Sherman)  left  him  had  "  pushed  the  enemy  back  a 
mile  and  a  half  and  is  still  moving." 

On  the  21st  of  June,  Sherrqan  sent  a  dispatch  to  Halleck 
covering  this  very  period  and  its  conditions,  saying : 

This  is  the  nineteenth  day  of  rain,  and  the  prospect  of  clear  weather 
as  far  off  as  ever.  The  roads  are  impassable,  and  fields  and  woods  become 
quagmires  after  a  few  wagons  have  crossed,  yet  we  are  at  work  all  the 
time.  The  left  flank  is  across  Noonday  and  the  right  across  Noyes'  Creek. 
The  enemy  holds  Kenesaw,  a  conical  Mountain,  with  Marietta  behind  it, 
and  has  retired  his  flank  to  cover  that  town  and  his  railroad.  I  am  all 
ready  to  attack  the  moment  weather  and  roads  will  permit  troops  and 
artillery  to  move  with  any  thing  like  life. 

The  night  of  the  17th  Sherman  telegraphed  Hallecl^.: 

By  last  night  we  had  worked  so  close  to  Johnston's  center  that  he  saw 
that  the  assault  must  follow.  He  declined  it,  and  abandoned  Lost  Mount- 
ain, and  some  six  miles  of  as  good  field-works  as  I  ever  saw.  My  right  and 
center  are,  in  consequence,  swung  forward  so  that  my  right  now  threatens 
his  railroad  to  Atlanta.  I  worked  hard  to-day  to  get  over  to  that  road,  but 
the  troops  seemed  timid  in  these  dense  forests  of  stumbling  on  a  hidden 
breast- work. 

This  attack  on  the  courage  of  his  veterans  must  have 
been  somewhat  confusing  to  those  at  the  War  Department 
in  the  light  of  the  following  dispatch  from  Captain  Van 
Duzer  which  had  been  received  half  an  hour  before,  show- 
ing extended  advance  by  Thomas  and  Schofield,  and  heavy 

fighting  by  McPherson : 

CAMP  NEAR  NOYES'  CREEK,  June  17,  1864. 
MAJOR-GENERAL  THOMAS  T.  ECKERT:  (Rec'd  10:35  P.  M.) 

To-day  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  advanced  its  right  about  three 
miles,  swinging  upon  its  left  as  pivot,  and  Schofield's  command  on  extreme 
right  has  moved  not  less  than  four  miles  during  the  night  from  two  strong 
lines  of  earth-works  and  across  the  stream  named  in  the  date,  on  the  left 
bank  of  which  is  enemy's  near  line.  McPherson  made  heavy  demonstra- 
tion on  enemy's  right  to  assist  the  advance.  Johnston  has  lost  hold  of 
Lost  Mountain  and  the  broken  ground  between  it  and  Kenesaw,  and  Sher- 
man's lines  now  envelop  that  mountain  from  north-east  to  south.  A  very 
few  days  must  give  us  possession  of  all  this  side  of  Chattahoocb.ee.  Can 
make  no  estimate  of  loss,  but  it  is  slight.  Artillery  doing  nearly  all  the 
work,  and  doing  it  splendidly. 

This  immediate  record  of  energetic  and  successful  work 


The  Atlanta  Campaign.  537 

performed  in  the  face  of  storm,  and  every  species  of  natural 
obstacles  strengthened  by  fortified  lines,  preceded  by  equally 
creditable  work  throughout  the  entire  campaign  from  each 
of  his  armies  stamp  this  letter  written  the  day  after  the 
events  and  the  brilliant  work  recorded  in  the  above  dis- 
patches as  one  of  the  most  unjust  to  be  found  in  the  records 
of  the  war. 

The  casualty  list  for  the  month  in  which  this  secret 
attack  on  Thomas  and  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  was 
made,  affords  a  grim  answer,  such  as  powder-stained  veterans 
might  make,  to  a  commander  who  was  thus  stigmatizing 
them. 

From  the  opening  of  the  campaign  to  the  llth  of  June, 
a  few  days  before  the  date  of  this  letter,  and  up  to  the  open- 
ing of  the  storm  which  stopped  operations  until  its  date,  the 
Army  of  the  Cumberland  had  lost  in  wounded  taken  to  the 
hospitals  5,069.  In  the  same  time  the  wounded  in  the  Army 
of  the  Tennessee  numbered  562,  and  those  of  the  Army  of 
the  Ohio  330.  These  are  the  figures  as  reported  to  General 
Sherman  by  his  medical  inspector,  Dr.  Kittoe. 

In  May  this  was  the  casualty  record  of  killed,  wounded, 
and  missing: 

Army  of  the  Cumberland 5,747 

Army  of  the  Tennessee 1,271 

Army  of  the  Ohio,  exclusive  of  cavalry 983 

One  division  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland, 

1st  of  the  20th  Corps  lost 1,262 

For  June  the  record  stood  : 

Army  of  the  Cumberland 5,531 

Army  of  the  Tennessee 1,334 

Army  of  the  Ohio 467 

Of  these  Hooker's  corps  (20th),  Army  of  the  Cumber- 
land, lost  1,568,  or  nearly  as  much  as  both  the  other  armies. 
The  Army  of  the  Cumberland  was  the  predominating 
army  in  numbers,  the  ratio  of  effective  strength  at  the 
opening  of  the  campaign  being  60,000  to  24,000  for  the 
Army  of  the  Tennessee,  and  13,000  for  the  Army  of  the 
Ohio.  These  figures  are  not  introduced  to  show  that  the 
other  commands  did  not  do  their  full  duty,  for  in  pluck,  en- 


538  Life  of  Thomas. 

durance,  and  splendid  fighting  each  did  all  that  iron  soldiers, 
under  officers  worthy  of  such  men,  could  dare  or  do.  But 
the  figures  do  show  that  while  General  Sherman  was  secretly 
stabbing  General  Thomas  and  his  army,  it  was  bearing  its 
full  share  of  the  blows  of  the  campaign,  and  doing  its  full 
proportion  of  the  work. 

While  these  facts  demonstrate  the  unworthy  and  unsol- 
dierly  character  of  this  secret  letter,  it  deserves  still  further 
attention.  The  repetition  of  the  charge  of  timidity  against 
McPherson,  who,  as  all  his  soldiers  knew,  was  the  embodiment 
of  dash  and  courage,  is  indefensible.  It  was  uttered  to  bol- 
ster up  the  unsubstantial  claim  in  General  Sherman's  tele- 
grams to  "Washington  that  the  "first  movement  against 
Johnston  was  really  fine,"  and  that  it  failed  because  McPher- 
son was  timid.  This  part  of  the  letter  had  its  origin  in  the 
fact  that  Sherman  was  smarting  under  the  knowledge  that 
his  assaults  in  front  of  Dalton,  and  neglect  of  the  open  and 
undefended  Snake  Creelj:  Gap  until  it  was  too  late  to  take 
advantage  of  it,  was  a  blunder  which  called  for  energetic 
attempts  at  concealment.  All  that  he  could  say  of  the  mag- 
nificent McPherson  was,  that,  with  the  exception  of  failing 
at  Resaca,  he  had  "  done  very  well."  Of  the  able,  energetic, 
and  effective  Schofield  he  had  only  this  faint  praise :  "  He  does 
as  well  as  I  could  ask  with  his  small  force."  Of  the  cavalry 
one  was  "  overcautious,"  and  one  "  lazy,"  and  both  "  easily 
checked  by  the  appearance  of  an  enemy."  The  cavalry  was 
*'  dwindling  away "  because  "we  can  not  get  full  forage." 
Well,  whose  fault  was  it,  if  not  that  of  the  commander  of 
the  army,  if  there  were  not  sufficient  supplies  ?  And  then 
comes  the  climax  of  slander  in  the  statement  that  a  fresh 
furrow  in  a  plowed  field  would  stop  the  whole  Army  of  the 
Cumberland  and  set  it, to  intrenching — the  army  that  stood 
at  Suodgrass  Hill  and  the  Kelley  Field  till  nearly  every  other 
man  was  killed  or  wounded  ;  that  scaled  Lookout  Mountain, 
and  formed  that  immortal  storming  army  at  Missionary 
Ridge,  and  whose  commander  had  offered  before  Sherman 
came  to  make  the  Atlanta  campaign  albne  without  help  from 
any  quarter !  Every  body  among  his  subordinates  was  wrong, 
or  slow,  or  at  fault  somehow,  and  in  this  long  letter  there 


The  Atlanta  Campaign.  539 

was  not  a  friendly  word  for  any  one,  or  praise  for  any  one 
but  himself.  He  felt  that  Grant  knew  he  was  earnest  ancl 
impatient  to  do,  and  in  proportion  as  he  could  inspire  the 
slow  commanders  and  armies  under  him  he  would  press  on, 
and  try  to  come  up  to  Grant's  expectation.  The  body  of  the 
letter  is  directed  at  General  Thomas,  and  it  is  only  a  fair 
illustration  of  the  methods  used  often  in  various  official  quar- 
ters to  undermine  him  and  keep  him  from  reaping  the  honors 
and  rewards  which  were  his  due. 

A  sufficient  commentary  on  that  part  of  the  letter  criti- 
cising General  Thomas  for  having  tents  at  his  head-quarters 
is  found  in  Van  Home's  Life  of  Thomas:  "One  evening  he 
observed  that  General  Sherman,  who  had  stopped  forthe  night, 
was  seemingly  in  destitution  of  the  usual  comforts  of  a  com- 
manding general,  and  almost  without  attendants.  He  there- 
upon sent  a  company  of  sharpshooters  from  %his  own  head- 
quarters, to  pitch  tents,  and  devote  themselves  in  other  ways 
to  the  comfort  of  the  commander-in-chief.  This  company 
and  their  services  were  accepted  by  General  Sherman  forthe 
remainder  of  the  campaign,  and  the  shelter  tents  and  other 
self-imposed  privations  were  thrown  aside." 


540  Life  of  Thomas. 


CHAPTER  XXII. 

The  Advance  on  Kenesaw  Mountain — A  Needless  Assault  and  Inexcusable 
Butchery — General  Logan's  Story  of  the  Reasons  for  It — The  Way 
Open  for  a  Movement  on  Either  Flank — A  Final  Flanking  Movement 
Dislodges  the  Enemy  without  a  Battle. 

,  » 

From  the  llth  of  June  to  the  24th,  through  rain  con- 
tinuing until  the  22d,  and  a  constantly  -almost  impassable 
country,  as  heretofore  described,  Sherman's  three  armies, 
each  by  magnificent  fighting  and  almost  superhuman  work 
of  marching  and  intrenching,  had  pushed  their  lines  close  to 
Kenesaw.  McPherson  was  on  the  left,  enveloping  the  north 
end  of  the  mountain  and  threatening  Marietta  behind  it. 
Thomas  faced  its  central  front,  while  Schofield,  on  the  right, 
by  the  most  vigorous  work,  had  pushed  to  the  enemy's  ex- 
treme left  and  rear,  and  was  ready  to  strike  there.  It  was 
while  this  work,  involving  the  most  serious  difficulties  which 
continued  fighting  in  the  face  of  formidable  field-works 
through  a  country  of  almost  impracticable  difficulties  could 
present  was  being  crowned  day  after  day  with  hard-earned 
and  brilliant  success,  that  the  letter  of  the  18th  of  June, 
heretofore  quoted,  was  dispatched  to  General  Grant  reeking 
with  its  poison. 

When  the  Union  lines  were  thus  established  in  front  of 
Kenesaw,  the  situation  presented  no  new  difficulties,  and  the 
same  method  of  treatment  which  had  brought  the  army  suc- 
cessfully from  Tunnel  Hill  would  have  produced  the  same  re- 
sults. Having  two  men  to  Johnston's  one,  it  was  always 
practical  to  push  a  force  against  his  lines,  confront  them 
throughout  their  length,  and  then  throw  the  surplus  Union 
strength  around  one  or  the  other  flank  and  force  Johnston 
to  retreat.  The  solution,  therefore,  of  the  situation  before 
Kenesaw  was  plain  to  all  his  army  commanders,  as  it  will  be 
perfectly  plain  even  to  the  unprofessional  reader  who  studies 
it.  If  Schofield  had  been  strengthened  on  the  right,  or  Me- 


The  Atlanta  Campaign.  541 

Pherson  on  the  left,  Johnston  would  have  been  obliged  to 
abandon  the  mountain.  After  the  butchery  of  a  needless  as- 
sault by  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  this  was  proved  true 
by  sending  McPherson  toward  Schofield,  when,  at  scarcely 
no  cost  of  life  to  the  Union  army,  Johnston  immediately 
withdrew. 

The  needless  assault,  made,  as  is  now  known,  against 
general  and  earnest  protest  from  the  leading  officers  of  two 
of  his  armies,  had  cost  over  two  thousand  men.  These  pru- 
dent, yet  able  and  vigorous  commanders,  were  both  sickened 
and  enraged  at  this  useless  sacrifice  of  brave  men.  But, 
strong  as  such  feelings  were  at  the  time  with  those  who  un- 
derstood the  situation,  they  must  be  intensified  with  all  who 
learn  the  real  reasons  which  led  to  the  orders  for  this  assault 
on  impregnable  Kenesaw.  These  were  given  to  the  writer 
by  General  Logan,  something  more  than  two  years  before 
his  death,  under  the  obligation  not  to  make  them  public  at 
that  time.  A  year  later,  he  went  over  the  details  again  with 
care,  in  order  that  they  might  be  accurately  stated,  and  later 
still  agreed,  after  a  third  statement  of  the  facts  as  he  knew 
them,  that  they  might  be  used  as  from  a  corps  commander, 
but  without  his  name,  lest  General  Sherman  should  suppose 
that  he  had  told  the  story  by  way  of  revenge  for  the  failure 
to  make  him  the  commander  of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee 
after  the  death  of  McPherson. 

As  the  story  turns  upon  the  results  of  General  Grant's 
campaign  at  the  East,  it  becomes  necessary  to  pass  that  rap- 
idly in  review. 

The  Army  of  the  Potomac,  under  General  Meade,  in 
accordance  with  the  plan  for  a  simultaneous  movement  of 
all  the  armies,  had  crossed  the  Rapidan,  May  4th,  and  moved 
into  the  Wilderness  toward  Lee's  flank.  On  the  5th,  he  was 
attacked  by  Lee,  and  the  bloody  battles  of  the  Wilderness 
and  Spottsylvania  inaugurated  the  campaign  of  attrition. 
These  battles,  with  their  tremendous  losses,  had  forced  Grant 
to  move  by  his  left  and  seek  in  that  direction  a  junction  with 
the  Army  of  the  James.  This  was  accomplished  after  the 
terrible  and  needless  slaughter  of  Cold  Harbor,  whose  story 
of  killed  and  wounded,  and  of  wounded  in  great  numbers 


542  Life  of  Thomas. 

lying  unsuccored  for  three  days  between  the  lines  until,  as 
General  Grant  himself  writes,  all  but  two  had  died,  forms 
one  of  the  most  sickening  chapters  of  the  war's  butcheries. 
It  had  been  a  repetition  of  the  Vicksburg  assault,  with  its 
failure,  and  the  subsequent  horrible  sufferings  of  the  wounded 
left  helpless  between  the  lines.  But  through  these  horrors, 
at  the  cost  of  forty  thousand  men,  General  Grant  had  reached 
the  James,  crossed  it,  and  pressed  on  into  the  rear  of  Peters- 
burg, and  the  country  was  ringing  with  applause  at  the  sight 
of  the  combined  eastern  armies  working  vigorously  toward 
the  Confederate  capital. 

"  It  was  the  glowing  accounts  which  the  newspapers 
brought  of-  these  operations  south  of  the  James,"  said  Gen- 
eral Logan,  "  which  determined  Sherman  to  order  an  assault 
upon  Kenesaw  Mountain."  "  For  this  reason,"  continued 
the  General,  "  it  was  worse  than  a  blunder  or  a  butchery. 
Let  me  tell  you  the  story  as  I  know  it."  General  Logan 
then  went  on  to  say,  that,  being  with  General  McPherson 
in  General  Sherman's  tent,  the  night  before  the  orders  for 
the  assault  on  the  mountain  were  given,  General  Sherman 
became  absorbed  in  an  examination  of  the  newspapers  which 
had  arrived  filled  with  the  details  of  the  great  movements 
south  of  the  James,  and  in  the  rear  of  and  beyond  Peters- 
burg. Suddenly,  General  Sherman  said  that  his  army  had 
got  to  do%  some  fighting,  that  the  whole  attention  of  the 
country  was  fixed  on  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  and  his 
army  seemed  to  be  entirely  forgotten.  Now  it  should  fight. 
He  would  to-morrow  give  orders  for  an  assault  on  the  moun- 
tain. At  this  General  McPherson  said  quietly  that  there  was 
no  necessity  for  such  a  step,  and  he  could  not  really  be  enter- 
taining the  plan,  since  Johnston  could  be  easily  flanked  out 
of  the  position,  while  to  assault  it  would  cost  dearly  in  men. 
General  Sherman  replied  to  this  by  repeating  his  first  declara- , 
tion  in  more  emphatic  form,  saying  that  he  could  not  fail 
to  take  notice  of  the  fact  that  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  was 
overshadowing  him,  and  that  all  the  applause  of  the  coun- 
try was  lavished  on  the  Eastern  armies.  General  Logan, 
seeing  that  General  Sherman  was  in  earnest,  then  said  in 
most  decided  terms  that  to  assault  would  be  to  sacrifice 


The  Atlanta  Campaign.  543 

brave  men  without  need,  and  he  had  no  right  to  order  it. 
General  McPherson  joined  in  with  the  most  vigorous  pro- 
test supporting  General  Logan  in,  the  position  that  the 
order  would  involve  needless  slaughter,  and  be  in  its  essence 
the  butchery  and  murder  of  his  soldiers.  Neither  could 
move  him,  though  both  continued  to  protest,  and  to  restate 
their  reasons.  General  Sherman,  however,  persisted,  saying 
that  it  was  necessary  to  show  the  country  that  his  troops 
could  fight  as  well  as  Grant's,  and  he  would  order  the  as- 
sault, and  he  did. 

On  the  24th  of  June,  the  order  was  issued  directing  the 
attack  on  the  mountain  to  be  made  on  the  27th.  General 
Thomas  opposed  it.  General  Schofield  was  against  it,  and 
the  position  of  General  McPherson  is  related  above.  / 

To  make  this  murderous  order  worse,  three  days  before 
it  was  issued,  Hood's  corps,  which  had  confronted  the  Army 
of  the  Tennessee  and  blocked  its  way  to  Marietta  on  the 
the  Confederate  right,  was  withdrawn  to  the  extreme  left  to 
oppose  Schofield's  vigorous  flank  movement  in  that  quarter, 
leaving  cavalry  only  in  McPherson's  front.  It  was  a  move 
of  great  hazard  for  Johnston,  but  he  was  often  compelled  to 
such  risks  because-  he  was  continually  operating  in  the  face 
of  double  his  numbers.  Had  McPherson  at  this  juncture, 
or  at  any  time  for  the  week  preceding  the  bloody  attack  on 
the  mountain,  been  allowed  to  move  directly  on  Marietta,  a 
battle  under  most  unfavorable  conditions  for  Johnston,  or  a 
hasty  and  disordered  retreat  would  have  followed.  This  Mc- 
Pherson clearly  saw,  and  General  Thomas  favored  such  a 
retreat. 

But,  the  third  day  after  Johnston  had  left  the  line  of 
easy  advance  on  Marietta  open,  came  the  order  for  preparing 
to  assault  Kenesaw  three  days  later.  Nor  was  this  situation 
a  matter  of  ignorance  on  the  part  of  General  Sherman.  The 
day  after  Hardee  had  been  withdrawn  from  in  front  of  Mc- 
Pherson, General  Thomas  urged  a  movement  on  Marietta  by 
the  Army  of  the  Tennessee,  supported  by  a  sufficient  force 
from  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland.  But  nothing  could 
move  the  commanding  general,  and.  instead  of  a  movement 
presenting  only  very  ordinary  difficulties,  with  an  assured 
success  which  would  have  easily  thrown  Johnston  back  of 


544  Life  of  Thomas. 

Marietta,  the  order  for  an  attack  upon  a  mountain,  strong 
by  nature,  and  rendered  impregnable  by  a  veteran  army 
skilled  in  field  fortification,  was  persisted  in.  There  were  no 
military  reasons  for  it.  On  the  contrary,  every  sound  con- 
sideration was  against  it,  and  all  his  leading  officers  were  op- 
posed to  it.  Only  such  reasons  as  General  Logan  discovers 
could  explain  it. 

From  the  24th  to  the  morning  of  the  27th  of  June,  the 
army  was  busy  preparing  for  the  assault.  The  brunt  of  it 
was  to  fall  on  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  supported  by  a 
demonstration  to  its  left  by  troops  from  the  Army  of  the 
Tennessee.  The  mountain  range  was  rocky,  precipitous, 
and  thickly  timbered.  The  enemy's  line  of  works  was 
screened  by  the  forests,  and  when  reached,  was  found,  as 
was  to  be  certainly  expected,  protected  by  slashings  of  timber 
and  many  forms  of  rude  entanglements.  Both  the  assault- 
ing columns  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  and  the  Army 
of  the  Tennessee  ihoved  to  their  work  as  testified  by  General 
Thomas,  and  as  illustrated  by  General  McPherson's  move- 
ments, "with  the  greatest  coolness  and  gallantry."  A  few 
official  dispatches  will  sufficiently  tell  the  story.  Thomas  to 
Sherman,  June  27th,  10:45  A.  M.: 

Yours  received.  General  Harker's  brigade  advanced  to  within  twenty 
paces  of  the  enemy's  breastworks,  and  was  repulsed  with  canister  at  that 
range,  General  Harker  losing  an  arm.  General  Wagner's  brigade,  of  New- 
ton's division,  supporting  General  Harker,  was  so  severely  handled  that  it 
is  compelled  to  reorganize.  Colonel  Mitchell's  brigade,  of  Davis'  division, 
captured  one  line  of  rebel  breastworks,  which  they  still  hold.  McCook's 
brigade  was  also  very  severely  handled,  nearly  every  colonel  being  killed 
or  wounded.  Colonel  McCook  wounded.  It  is  compelled  to  fall  back  and 
reorganize.  The  troops  are  all  too  much  exhausted  to  advance,  but  we 
hold  all  we  have  gained. 

Sherman  to  Thomas,  11:45  A.  M.: 

McPhereon's  column  reached  near  the  top  of  the  hill  through  very 
tangled  brush,  but  was  repulsed.  It  is  found  almost  impossible  to  deploy, 
but  they  still  hold  the  ground.  I  wish  you  to  study  well  the  position, 
and  if  it  be  possible  to  break  the  line,  do  it ;  it  is  easier  now  than  it  will  be 
hereafter.  Hold  fast  all  you  make,  I  hear  Leggett's  guns  well  behind  the 
mountain. 

This  was  a  conditional  order  for  a  second  assault. 
Then  at  1:30  came  another  dispatch  showing  a  decision  to 


T7ie  Atlanta  Campaign.  545 

order  McPherson  to  make  an  assault  if  Thomas  gave  any 
encouragement : 

McPherson  and  Schofield  are  at  a  dead-lock.  Do  you  think  you  can 
carry  any  part  of  the  enemy's  line  to-day  ?  McPherson's  men  are  up  to 
the  abatis  and  can 't  move  without  the  direct  assault.  I  will  order  the  as- 
sault if  you  think  you  can  succeed  at  any  point.  Schofield  has  one  division 
close  up  on  the  Powder  Springs  road,  and  the  other  across  Olley's  Creek, 
about  two  miles  to  his  right  and  rear. 

Thomas  to  Sherman,  1:40  P.  M.: 

Davis'  two  brigades  are  now  within  sixty  yards  of  the  enemy's  intrench- 
ments.  Davis  reports  that  he  does  not  think  he  can  carry  the  works  by 
assault  on  account  of  the  steepness  of  the  hill,  but  he  can  hold  his  position, 
put  in  one  or  two  batteries,  to-night,  and  probably  drive  them  out  to-mor- 
row morning.  General  Howard  reports  the  same.  Their  works  are  from 
six  to  seven  feet  high  and  nine  feet  thick.  In  front  of  Howard  they  have 
a  very  strong  abatis.  Davis'  loss  in  officers  has  been  very  heavy.  Nearly 
all  the  field  officers  in  McCook's  brigade,  with  McCook,  have  been  killed 
or  wounded.  From  what  the  officers  tell  me,  I  do  not  think  we  can  carry 
the  works  by  assault  at  this  point  to-day,  but  they  can  be  approached  by 
saps  and  the  enemy  driven  out. 

Sherman  to  Thomas,  2:25  p.  M.: 

Secure  what  advantageous  ground  you  have  gained.  But  is  there  any 
thing  in  the  enemy's  present  position  that  if  we  should  approach  by  regu- 
lar saps  he  could  not  make  a  dozen  new  parapets  before  one  sap  is  com- 
pleted ?  Does  the  nature  of  the  ground  warrant  the  time  necessary  for 
regular  approaches  ? 

— still  suggesting  another  assault. 

After  two  attempts  to  carry  the  line  with  moat  fatal  re- 
sults, a  third  attack  for  5  o'clock  was  under  consideration  by 
General  Sherman.  Upon  receiving  notice  of  this,  General 
Thomas  dictated  a  note  to  General  Sherman  which  is  thus 
repeated  by  the  staff  officer  who  took  it : 

The  Army  of  the  Cumberland  has  already  made  two  desperate,  bloody, 
and  unsuccessful  assaults  on  this  mountain.  If  a  third  is  ordered,  it  will, 
in  my  opinion,  result  in  demoralizing  this  army,  and  will,  if  made,  be 
against  my  best  judgment,  and  most  earnest  protest. 

It  was  not  persisted  in. 

At  6  P.  M.  General  Thomas  reported  to  Sherman : 

General: — The  assault  of  the  enemy's  works  in  my  front  was  well  ar- 
ranged, and  the  officers  and  men  went  to  their  work  with  the  greatest  cool- 
ness and  gallantry.    The  failure  to  carry  them  is  due  only  to  the  strength 
of  the  works,  and  to  the  fact  that  they  were  well  manned,  thereby  enabling 
35 


546  Life  of  Thomas. 

the  enemy  to  hold  them  securely  against  the  assault.  We  have  lost  nearly 
2,000  officers  and  men,  among  them  two  brigade  commanders,  General 
Barker,  commanding  a  brigade  in  Newton's  division,  and  Colonel  Dan  Mc- 
Cook,  commanding  a  brigade  in  Jeff.  Davis'  division,  both  reported  to  be 
mortally  wounded,  besides  some  6  or  8  field  officers  killed.  Both  General 
Harker  and  Colonel  McCook  were  wounded  on  the  enemy's  breastworks, 
and  all  say  had  they  not  been  wounded,  we  would  have  driven  the  enemy 
from  his  works.  Both  Generals  Howard  and  Palmer  think  that  they  can 
find. favorable  positions  on  their  lines  for  placing  batteries  for  enfilading 
the  enemy's  works.  We  took  between  90  and  100  prisoners. 

Sherman  to  Thomas  in  reply : 

General  Thermos : — Let  your  troops  fortify  as  close  up  to  the  enemy  as 
possible.  Get  good  positions  for  artillery,  and  group  your  command  as 
conveniently  as  you  can  by  corps  and  divisions,  keeping  reserves.  Scho- 
field  has  the  Sandtown  road  within  eleven  miles  of  the  Chattahoochee,  and 
we  could  move  by  that  flank.  The  question  of  supplies  will  be  the  only 
one.  I  regret  beyond  measure  the  loss  of  two  such  young  and  dashing 
officers  as  Harker  and  Dan  McCook.  McPherson  lost  two  or  three  of  his 
young  and  dashing  officers,  which  is  apt  to  be  the  case  in  unsuccessful  as- 
saults. Had  we  broken  the  line  to-day,  it  would  have  been  most  decisive, 
but  as  it  is  our  loss  is  small  compared  with  some  of  those  East.  It  should 
not  in  the  least  discourage  us.  At  times  assaults  are  necessary  and  inevit- 
able. At  Arkansas  Post  we  succeeded ;  at  Vicksburg  we  failed.  I  do  not 
think  our  loss  to-day  greater  than  Johnston's  when  he  attacked  Hooker 
and  Schofield  the  first  day  we  occupied  our  present  ground. 

Even  before  the  wounded  were  gathered  from  the  field, 
as  the  dispatch  shows,  General  Sherman  discovered  what  all 
the  other  commanders  had  insisted  on,  that  the  way  for 
flanking  Johnston  out  of  position  was  fully  open. 

At  9  P.  M.  Sherman  asked  Thomas : 

Are  you  willing  to  risk  the  move  on  Fulton,  cutting  loose  from  our 
railroad  ?  It  would  bring  matters  to  a  crisis,  and  Schofield  has  secured 
the  way. 

General  Thomas's  condition  of  mind  ever  the  murder  of 
his  troops  may  be  seen  from  his  reply  : 

What  force  do  you  think  of  moving  with  ?  If  with  the  greater  part  of 
the  army,  I  think  it  decidedly  better  than  butting  against  breastworks 
twelve  feet  thick  and  strongly  abatised. 

That  General  Schofield  was  perfectly  aware  that  the 
proper  line  of  movement  was  to  turn  the  enemy's  position 
by  his  flank  is  clear  from  this  dispatch  to  Stoneman,  sent  at 
5  o'clock : 

General: — Thomas  and  McPherson  have  failed  in  their  attack,  and  have 
suffered  heavy  losses.  Our  little  success  on  the  right  is  all  that  has  been 


The  Atlanta  Campaign.  547 

gained  anywhere.  This  may  be  very  important  to  UB  as  the  first  step  to- 
ward the  next  important  movement.  We  must  make  what  we  have  gained 
as  secure  as  possible. 

The  character  of  the  mountain  and  the  lines  before  the 
Army  of  the  Tennessee  clearly  appears  from  a  paragraph  in 
a  dispatch  from  that  cool  and  able  officer  and  excellent  en- 
gineer, General  Grenville  M.  Dodge  : 

At  8  A.  M.  I  advanced  my  skirmish  line,  consisting  of  three  regiments, 
and  extending  along  the  front  of  two  brigades,  up  the  mountain.  They 
met  with  very  little  opposition  for  half  the  distance,  and  until  the  fire  of 
the  enemy  on  iny  left  and  right  checked  the  advance  of  the  connecting 
lines.  My  loss  was  very  small.  During  the  afternoon,  the  skirmishers  met 
with  more  determined  opposition,  and  up  to  this  time  (8.20  P.  M.)  there  are 
in  hospital  27  wounded  and  several  yet  on  the  field.  The  farther  we  ad- 
vanced, the  mountain  became  more  difficult  of  ascent.  It  is  evident  that 
no  line  could  readily  ascend  it,  and  I  judge  from  the  action  of  the  enemy 
filling  their  rifle  pits,  that  they  have  no  fear  of  our  taking  it.  There  is 
no  doubt  but  that  they  have  a  line  of  battle  extending  along  our  en- 
tire' front. 

The  Kenesaw  affair  caused  universal  dissatisfaction 
among  all  who  understood  it.  General  Sherman  became 
very  restive  under  this,  but  in  a  few  days  he  had  worked  out 
a  most  characteristic  excuse,  and  the  more  so  because  it  at- 
tempted to  load  the  responsibility  for  failure  on  General 
Thomas.  He  had  not  moved  with  vigor  enough. 

Sherman  to  Halleck,  July  9th  : 

The  assault  I  made  was  no  mistake ;  I  had  to  do  it.  The  enemy  and 
our  own  army  and  officers  had  settled  down  into  the  conviction  that  the 
assault  of  lines  formed  no  part  of  my  game,  and  the  moment  the  enemy 
was  found  behind  any  thing  like  a  parapet,  why  every  body  would  deploy, 
throw  up  counter-works,  and  take  it  easy,  leaving  it  to  the  "  old  man  "  to 
turn  the  position.  Had  the  assault  been  made  with  one-fourth  more  vigor, 
mathematically,  I  would  have  put  the  head  of  George  Thomas's  whole 
army  right  through  Johnston's  deployed  lines  on  the  best  ground  for  go- 
ahead,  while  my  entire  forces  were  well  in  hand  on  roads  converging  to 
my  then  object,  Marietta.  Had  Harker  and  McCook  not  been  struck  down 
so  early,  the  assault  would  have  succeeded,  and  then  the  battle  would  have 
all  been  in  our  favor  on  account  of  our  superiority  of  numbers,  position, 
and  initiative. 

But,  even  then,  the  line  "  for  go  ahead  "  would  have 
been  over  a  rugged  and  impracticable  mountain. 
Sherman  to  Grant,  July  12th  : 

I  regarded  an  assault  on  the  27th  of  June  necessary  for  two  good  rea- 
sons :  first,  because  the  enemy  as  well  as  my  own  army  had  settled  down 


548  Life,  of  Thomas. 

into  the  belief  that  flanking  alone  was  my  game  ;  and,  second,  that  on  that 
day  and  ground,  had  the  assault  succeeded,  I  could  have  broken  Johnston's 
center  and  pushed  his  army  back  in  confusion,  and  with  great  loss  to  his 
bridges  over  the  Chattahoochee.  We  lost  nothing  in  morale  by  the  assault, 
for  I  followed  it  up  on  the  extreme  right,  and  compelled  him  to  quit  the 
very  strong  lines  of  Kenesaw,  Smyrna  Camp,  and  the  Chattahoochee,  in 
quick  successsion. 

And  this  of  the  veterans  of  McPherson  and  Thomas ! 
This  of  the  men  who,  without  flinching,  had,  under  Sher- 
man's orders,  attacked  the  impossible  position  of  Chickasaw 
Bayou,  and  the  frowning  works  of  Vicksburg;  who  had 
stormed  Lookout  Mountain  and  carried  Missionary  Ridge ; 
who  had  assaulted  precipices  at  Rocky  Face,  assaulted  at 
Resaca,  and  day  after  day  moved  on-  the  enemy's  parapets, 
wherever  found,  over  the  long  and  bloody  path  from  Tunnel 
Hill  to  the  front  of  Kenesaw !  Considering  the  history  of 
these  veterans  and  their  deeds  of  valor  which  illuminated  all 
the  years  of  conflict,  it  is  not  too  much  to  say  that  such  un- 
just criticism  of  a  noble  soldiery  can  not  be  elsewhere  found 
from  any  commander  in  the  history  of  war.  It  is  only  nec- 
essary to  give  full  force  to  the  condemnation  which  these 
facts  supply  to  say  that,  when,  following  the  failure  of  the 
assault  on  Kenesaw,  McPherson  was  sent  to  the  right  to  op- 
erate with  Schofield  on  Johnston's  left,  the  latter,  without 
waiting,  withdrew  rapidly,  and  without  further  general  re- 
sistance, to  the  fortifications  about  Atlanta.  He  first  de- 
ployed his  lines  at  Smyrna  Station  to  check  the  Union  pur- 
suit, but  the  center  of  the  position  was  brilliantly  stormed 
and  carried  by  Dodge's  corps  of  'the  Army  of  the  Tennessee. 
Johnston  then  retreated  to  the  strong  works  which  he  had 
constructed  some  months  before  to  cover  the  crossing  of  the 
Chattahoochee  in  case  it  became  necessary  to  fall  back  be- 
yond it.  Thence  Johnston  retired  to  the  south  bank  of 
Peach  Tree  Creek,  along  which  stretched  the  outer  fortifica- 
tions of  Atlanta.  It  will  be  remembered  of  Thomas  that  he 
prevented  a  third  assault  on  Kenesaw. 


The  Atlanta  Campaign.  549 


CHAPTER   XXIII. 

Hood  Relieves  Johnston — Put  in  to  Fight  instead  of  to  Continue  John- 
ston's More  Prudent  Course — Two  Bloody  Battles  Follow  at  Once— 
Peach  Tree  Creek  and  the  Battle  of  Atlanta  of  July  22d— General 
Thomas's  Troops  Carry  the  Works  at  Jonesboro — Consequent  Surren- 
der of  Atlanta — General  Thomas  Proposes  with  His  Army  to  March 
through  to  Savannah,  Releasing  the  Union  Prisoners  at  A ndersonville 
and  Other  Prisons  on  the  Way. 

At  this  critical  time  for  the  Confederacy,  General  John- 
ston was  relieved  by  General  Hood,  to  the  great  satisfaction 
of  the  Union  commanders.  These  always  rated  General 
Johnston  as  a  soldier  of  the  first  rank,  able,  prudent,  and 
brave.  He  had  incurred  the  prejudice  of  President  Davis, 
and  advantage  was  taken  of  the  popular  outcry  which  was 
roused  by  Sherman's  steady  advance  to  relieve  him.  But  he 
understood  and  fully  appreciated  the  rapidly  decreasing  re- 
sources of  the  Confederacy  in  men,  and  was  careful  of 
sending  them  into  battle  where  they  must  fight  uncov- 
ered against  double  their  numbers.  His  policy  of  fighting 
behind  works  reduced  the  Union  army  much  faster  than  his 
own,  and  it  was  the  only  wise  course.  Hood,  however,  was 
put  in  to  fight,  and  he  immediately  began  to  carry  the  new- 
policy  into  effect. 

As  a  result,  two  battles  followed  in  four  days  after  his 
assignment  to  command — both  bloody,  and  both  disastrous 
to  the  Confederate  army.  One  was  the  battle  of  Peach  Tree 
Creek,  fought  by  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  under  General 
Thomas's  personal  direction,  and  the  other  was  the  battle  of 
July  22d,  known  as  the  battle  of  Atlanta,  fought  by  the 
Army  of  the  Tennessee  under  the  direct  command  of  General 
Logan,  General  McPherson  having  been  killed  at  the  very 
opening  of  the  attack. 

General  Hood  took  command  on  the  18th  of  July,  on 
the  19th  he  posted  his  columns  in  front  of  the  Union  right, 
and  on  the  morning  of  the  20th  attacked  General  Thomas. 


550  Life  of  Thomas. 

The  latter  then  had  only  seven  of  his  nine  divisions  in  hand, 
wo  having  been  dispatched  to  the  left  to  connect  with  the 
other  armies  operating  from  the  direction  of  Decatur.  Hood 
had  massed  his  columns,  withdrawn  his  outposts,  and  with 
lines  well  concealed  awaited  the  approach  of  the  Union 
forces.  The  Confederate  divisions  in  mass  suddenly  burst 
upon  the  heads  of  the  Union  columns,  and  the  battle  at  once 
became  desperate.  General  Thomas  commanded  in  person 
within  close  range  of  the  enemy,  and  exposed  himself  on 
every  portion  of  the  field.  At  one  of  the  most  critical  points 
he  rode  himself  to  bring  up  a  battery  to  repulse  a  flank  and 
rear  attack,  assisted  in  urging  the  horses  forward,  and  sat  on 
his  horse  among  the  guns  the  moment  they  were  in  position, 
and  helped  direct  their  fire.  It  was  the  turning  point  of  the 
contest,  and  the  resulting  repulse  of  the  Confederate  line  was 
followed  by  an  abandonment  of  the  field.  At  the  height  of 
the  fighting,  General  Thomas  received  a  dispatch  from  General 
Sherman,  then  some  distance  from  the  field,  saying,  "All 
your  troops  should  push  hard  for  Atlanta,  sweeping  every 
thing  before  them." 

This  was  a  battle  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  less 
two  of  its  divisions,  under  the  direct  eye  and  sole  manage- 
ment of  General  Thomas,  and  Hood's  army  was  defeated 
after  most  desperate  and  courageous  fighting.  The  result 
naturally  recalls  the  offer  which  General  Thomas  made  be- 
fore the  opening  of  the  spring  campaign,  to  undertake  a 
movement  to  Atlanta  with  his  own  army  alone. 

On  the  22d  of  July,  Hood,  having  failed  in  his  attack 
on  the  Union  right,  fell  unexpectedly  upon  the  Army  of  the 
Tennessee,  which  held  the  left.  That  army,  in  turn,  under 
the  eye  and  sole  direction  of  General  Logan,  again  defeated 
Hood. 

The  latter  had  withdrawn  from  the  outer  works  along 
his  left  and  center,  and  thoroughly  deceived  General  Sherman 
into  the  belief  that  Atlanta  was  evacuated.  Orders  announc- 
ing the  evacuation  of  the  city  and  directing  immediate  and 
vigorous  pursuit  were  sent  by  General  Sherman  to  each  of 
his  armies. 

It  was  while  this  moving  by  the  flank  under  General 


The  Atlanta  Campaign.  551 

Sherman's  orders  to  pass  to  the  east  of  Atlanta  in  rapid  pur- 
suit of  Hood  was  in  progress  that  General  McPherson,  riding 
toward  the  head  of  his  columns,  was  killed  by  Hood's  troops 
advancing  directly  from  the  rear.  The  Confederate  general 
had  marched  east  from  Atlanta,  made  a  wide  detour  during 
the  night  around  the  Union  left,  and  without  the  least  warn- 
ing had  fallen  on  its  flank  and  rear.  General  Dodge,  march- 
ing by  the  flank,  halted  and  faced  where  his  Jines  stood  and 
checked  Hood's  further  advance  in  the  rear.  General  Logan 
received  a  message  from  General  Sherman  notifying  him  of 
McFherson's  death  and  directing  him  to  take  command. 
General  Sherman  did  not  appear  on  the  field  during  the  day, 
and  those  three  brilliant  corps  commanders,  Logan,  Dodge, 
and  Blair,  whom  General  Sherman,  writing  fifteen  years 
after  in  his  Memoirs,  sneered  at  as  political  generals,  were 
left  alone  to  fight  Hood  unaided  throughout  that  long  sum- 
mer day.  And,  when  framing  an,  excuse  for  this  neglect, 
General  Sherman  declared  that  he  sent  no  help  because,  "  if 
any  assistance  were  rendered  by  either  of  the  other  armies, 
the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  would  be  jealous." 

This  battle  of  the  22d  of  July  was  the  most  desperate 
and  bloody  of  the  campaign.  General  Logan  and  the  offi- 
cers and  men  under  him  were  put  to  supreme  test,  and  won 
crowning  laurels  for  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee,  a  fitting 
climax  for  its  long  years  of  fighting — and  a  fighting  which 
at  all  times,  and  in  spite  of  the  mistakes  of  commanding 
generals,  had  reflected  the  greatest  credit  upon  subordinate 
officers  and  the  men.  Here,  after  a  battle  extending  into  the 
night,  Hood  was  sorely  defeated.  General  Logan,  riding 
back  three  miles  at  the  close  of  the  fight,  to  General  Sher- 
man's head-quarters,  found  it  impossible  to  convince  him  that 
the  engagement  had  risen  to  the  dignity  of  a  battle.  The 
reward  to  General  Logan  for  his  able  and  brilliant  general- 
ship in  this  fight,  by  which  he  furnished  the  supreme  proof 
of  his  fitness  to  command  an  army  in  the  field,  and  to  the 
officers  of  rank  who  with  him  largely  contributed  to  the 
victory,  was  the  assignment  of  General  Howard,  from  an- 
other army,  to  command  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  as  it 
emerged  victorious  from  the  smoke  of  this  great  battle.  No 


552  Life  of  Thomas. 

wonder  that  the  officers  and  soldiers  of  that  army  resented 
this  action  as  both  unjust  and  cruel. 

After  his  defeat  by  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee,  Hood 
withdrew  to  the  inner  works  of  Atlanta,  and  the  siege  of 
the  place  began. 

At  the  end  of  a  month  of  vigorous  operations  in  front 
of  the  city,  and  much  hard  fighting,  General  Sherman  de- 
decided  upon  a  turning  movement,  and  after  securing  his 
line  of  supplies,  and  establishing  and  protecting  new  depots, 
he  began  to  extend  his  army  to  the  right  toward  Jonesboro. 
Hood  moved  parallel  with  him,  and  his  parapets  sprung  up 
rapidly  and  even  in  advance  of  the  Union  movement.  But, 
finally,  at  Jonesboro,  on  the  first  of  September,  the  Four- 
teenth Corps  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  again  under 
General  Thomas's  personal  directions  and  orders,  assaulted 
Hood's  works  at  Jonesboro,  and  carried  them  in  brilliant 
style.  It  was  the  most  complete  and  successful  assault  upon 
formidable  works  of  the  whole  campaign,  and  led  to  the 
surrender  of  Atlanta  the  following  day. 

Hood's  army,  in  withdrawing  from  the  city  and  from 
Jonesboro  was  widely  separated,  and  General  Thomas,  dis- 
covering this,  explained  it  to  General  Sherman  and  asked 
for  such  disposition  of  the  forces  as  would  enable  him  to 
overthrow  these  divided  columns  in  detail.  General  Sher- 
man, for  reasons  never  understood,  did  not  see  fit  to  allow 
General  Thomas  to  undertake  the  movement.  General 
Schofield,  also  discovering  the  situation  from  his  position, 
had  made  a  similar  request  with  a  like  result.  This  mistake, 
which  closed  the  campaign,  was  as  glaring  and  needless  as 
that  attending  the  escape  of  Johnston  at  Resaca. 

Atlanta  was  occupied  by  General  Slocum's  Corps — the 
20th — on  the  2d  of  September,  and  that  portion  of  the 
army  about  Jonesboro,  after  pursuing  Hood  to  the  lines  about 
Lovejoy's  station,  was  withdrawn  to  Atlanta.  During  the 
ensuing  three  weeks  the  railroad  was  repaired  to  the  city 
and  abundant  supplies  of  all  kinds  were  accumulated.  An 
inner  and  short  line  of  works  was  constructed  so  that  a  small 
force  might  hold  the  place,  the  citizens — men,  women  and 
children,  old  and  young,  sick  and  well — many  thousands  in 


The  Atlanta  Campaign.  553 

number — were  expelled  from  the  city  by  General  Sherman, 
and  the  place  was  turned  into  a  military  camp. 

General  Thomas's  great  heart  was  always  warming 
toward  his  soldiers.  lie  had  a  father's  love  for  them,  and  al- 
ways exercised  a  father's  care.  This,  more  than  any  other  ele- 
ment, controlled  what  unfriendly  critics  continually  harped 
upon  as  his  slowness.  He  keenly  felt  the  responsibility  of 
having  the  lives  of  men  in  his  hands.  He,  therefore,  always 
perfected  his  plans  with  extreme  care,  so  that  when  he  struck, 
there  might  be  no  mistake  which  his  foresight  could  avoid. 
This  ever  present  and  deep  sympathy  with  his  men  was  well 
illustrated  while  he  was  watching  from  Fort  Wood,  in  Chat- 
tanooga, the  advance  of  his  troops  on  Orchard  Knob.  Turn- 
ing to  Colonel  Kellogg,  one  of  his  aides,  and  pointing  to  a 
knoll  over  which  the  lines  were  advancing,  and  where  men 
could  be  seen  falling,  he  said,  "  Kellogg,  what  a  beautiful 
spot  that  knoll  will  make  for  the  burial  of  our  dead."  And 
after  the  battle  he  ordered  it  set  aside  for  that  purpose.  Un- 
der his  subsequent  orders  it  became  the  present  National  Cem- 
etery, one  of  the  most  beautiful  in  the  land. 

So,  when  the  army  reached  Atlanta,'  he  was  deeply 
moved  over  the  stories  which  escaped  prisoners  brought 
from  Andersonville  and  other  prisons  in  Georgia,  and  as 
soon  as  the  troops  were  rested,  he  submitted  a  proposition  to 
General  Sherman  which  involved  the  release  of  the  Union 
prisoners  at  Andersonville,  Americus  and  Millen.  He  urged 
General  Sherman  to  let  him  take  his  own  army,  strength- 
ened with  one  division  of  cavalry,  and  march  for  these  places 
ill  succession,  securing  all  the  prisoners  and  taking  them 
through  either  to  Savannah  or  Mobile.  He  had  demon- 
strated, by  the  battle  of  July  20th,  that  seven  of  his  nine  divi- 
sions were  able  to  defeat  Hood  in  battle,  and  so  the  move- 
ment was  an  entirely  safe  one,  and  at  the  same  time  one 
demanded  by  every  consideration  of  humanity,  and  by  every 
claim  which  our  prisoners  and  their  friends  had  upon  the 
country  and  the  army.  General  Thomas,  however,  could 
not  move  General  Sherman,  and,  instead,  he  was  soon  sent 
to  the  rear,  without  his  own  army,  to  look  after  Forrest's 
cavalrv  raid. 


554  Life  of  Thomas. 


CHAPTER  XXIV. 

Hood  Moves  on  Sherman's  Communications — Sherman  proposes  Leaving 
Thomas  with  Two  Divisions  in  Tennessee  and  Marching  Himself  to  the 
Sea — Sherman's  Anxiety  to  get  away  from  Hood — The  Underlying 
Motive  of  the  March  to  the  Sea — The  Part  of  the  Plan  which  Sherman 
Originated — Grant  Misled  as  to  the  Force  left  with  Thomas. 

The  third  week  after  the  occupation  of  Atlanta  by  the 
Ujiion  army,  Hood,  moving  north-westwardly,  transferred 
his  forces  from  Lovejoy's  to  Palmetto  Station.  There  Jeffer- 
son Davis  visited  the  army,  and,  in  a  speech,  promised  the 
Tennessee  and  Kentucky  soldiers  that  they  would  soon, 
through  the  destruction  of  Sherman's  line  of  supplies,  which 
would  compel  him  to  retreat,  tread  the  soil  of  their  native 
states.  A  report  of  these  points  reached  the  Union  lines 
and  gave  a  full  key  to  Hood's  movements,  and  to  those  of 
the  co-operating  column  of  Forrest  which  had  then  appeared 
in  the  Valley  of  the  Tennessee. 

On  the  26th  of  September,  General  Grant  telegraphed 
General  Sherman  that  as  a  first  step,  it  would  be  better  to 
drive  Forrest  out  of  Tennessee.  General  Thomas  was  sent 
back  by  General  Sherman  to  execute  this  order,  and  given 
two  divisions — Newton's,  of  the  Fourth  Corps,  and  J.  D. 
Morgan's,  of  the  Fourteenth. 

A  week  later,  General  Sherman  found  that  Hood  had 
crossed  the  Chattahoochee,  sixteen  miles  south-west  of  At- 
lanta, and  that  his  cavalry  was  moving  toward  the  railroad. 
General  Sherman  at  once  telegraphed  General  Grant  sug- 
gesting that,  in  case  Hood  moved  toward  Tennessee,  Thomas 
should  be  left  with  the  forces  which  he  had  to  take  cafe  of 
Hood,  while  he,  Sherman,  with  the  rest  of  the  army,  should 
march  across  Georgia  to  Savannah  or  Charleston  "breaking 
roads  and  doing  irreparable  damage." 

At  that  time  only  two  divisions  had  been  sent  to  Gen- 
eral Thomas,  and  this  fact  sufficiently  illuminates  a  proposi- 


The  Atlanta  Campaign.  555 

tiou  which  involved  leaving  Thomas,  with  this  small  force, 
to  be  increased  from  garrisons  and  every  species  of  odds 
and  ends  of  organizations,  to  meet  the  army,  which,  for  four 
months,  had  fully  occupied  the  attention  of  Sherman's  en- 
tire army. 

Hood  moved  rapidly  on  Sherman's  railroad  communica- 
tions, Sherman  following  from  Atlanta. 

On  the  5th  of  October,  Allatoona  was  unsuccessfully  at- 
tacked by  French's  division  of  Hood's  army,  being  relieved 
in  time  by  General  John  M.  Corse  with  his  division  from 
Rome,  and  the  enemy  driven  off  after  one  of  the  most 
brilliant  and  gallant  defenses  of  the  campaign.  Hood  then 
moved  rapidly  to  Resaca,  thence  to  Dalton  and  Tunnel  Hill 
destroying  the  railroad,  and  then  withdrawing  to  Gadsden. 
Sherman  followed  to  Gaylesville. 

On  the  20th  of  October,  Hood  moved  from  Gadsden  for 
Guntersville  on  the  Tennessee.  As  soon  as  General  Sher- 
man ascertained  that  Hood  had  started  north  from  the  former 
point,  he  prepared  to  move  his  own  army  in  the  opposite  di- 
rection, although  constantly  urged  by  General  Grant  to  first 
destroy  Hood  before  undertaking  a  move  toward  the  coast. 
It  was  one  of  the  strangest  and  most  incomprehensible  sit- 
uations of  the  war,  this  movement  away  from  each  other  of 
two  veteran  armies  marching  from  the  same  vicinity,  in  ex- 
actly opposite  directions — Hood's  army,  which  had  been 
able  to  hold  its  own  for  months  against  the  combined  armies 
of  Sherman,  starting  toward  a  collection  of  fragments  largely 
unorganized  which  had  been  hastily  assigned  to  Thomas 
with  the  general  order  to  take  care  of  Hood  and  Tennessee — 
and  Sherman,  with  nearly  the  wjiole  force  of  his  combined 
armies  intact  marching  away  from  the  forces  which  had 
stubbornly  opposed  him  from  May  till  October  into  a  coun-. 
try  where  no  considerable  veteran  forces  were  either  estab- 
lished or  likely  to  come. 

The  strong  anxiety  of  General  Sherman  to  leave  Hood 
to  Thomas  shines  through  all  his  correspondence  with  Grant 
from  the  day  Hood  crossed  the  Chattahoochee  and  threat- 
ened the  communications  with  Atlanta.  At  every  step  of 
Hood's  northward  advance  along  the  railroad,  Sherman  in- 


556  Life  of  Thomas. 

sisted  upon  turning  him  over  to  Thomas  and  marching  for 
Savannah.  Grant  as  steadily  insisted  that  Hood  should  first 
be  destroyed.  The  official  dispatches  give  no  sufficient 
reason  for  this  anxiety,  nor  do  they  indicate  the  underlying 
motive.  But  the  Memoirs  of  General  Sherman  give  strong 
color  to  the  idea  that  his  controlling  motive  was  a  desire  to 
reach  General  Grant  and  have  equal  share  with  him  and  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  in  ending  the  war.  Upon  hearing  that 
Hood  had  marched  toward  Decatur,  in  Alabama,  General 
Sherman  writes: 

I  then  finally  resolved  on  my  future  course,  which  was  to  leave  Hood 
to  he  encountered  hy  General  Thomas,  while  I  should  carry  into  full  effect 
the  long  contemplated  project  of  marching  to  the  sea  coast  and  thence  to 
operate  toward  Richmond. 

Again,  as  the  column  started  toward  the  sea : 

—and  I  was  strongly  inspired  with  the  feeling  that  the  movement  on  our 
part  was  a  direct  attack  on  the  rebel  army  and  the  rebel  capitol  at  Rich- 
mond, though  a  full  thousand  miles  of  hostile  country  intervened,  and 
that,  for  better  or  worse,  it  would  end  the  war. 

As  Atlanta  was  left  behind,  he  wrote  again : 

Even  the  common  soldiers  caught  the  inspiration,  and  many  a  group 
called  out  to  me  as  I  worked  my  way  past  them,  "  Uncle  Billy,  I  guess 
Grant  is  waiting  for  us  at  Richmond."  Indeed  the  general  sentiment  was 
that  we  were  marching  for  Richmond,  and  that  there  we  should  end  the 
war.  ...  I  had  no  purpose  to  march  direct  forJRichmond  by  way  of 
Augusta  and  Charlotte,  but  always  designed  to  reach  the  sea-coast  first  at 
Savannah  or  Port  Royal,  South  Carolina,  and  even  kept  in  mind  the  al- 
ternative of  Pensacola. 

There  is  no  longer  any  room  for  historical  dispute  over 
the  origin  of  this  march  to  the  sea.  General  Grant's  let- 
ters and  orders  make  the  whole  subject  plain.  In  March, 
before  the  opening  of  the  Atlanta  campaign,  General  Grant 
sent  General  Sherman  a  map  showing  the  territory  it  was  ex- 
pected he  would  occupy,  and  his  line  of  advance.  This 
was  marked  in  blue  pencil  on  the  map.  These  blue  lines 
extended  from  Chattanooga  to  Atlanta,  from  Atlanta  via 
Milledgeville  to  Savannah,  and  from  Atlanta  to  Mobile. 
Before  Atlanta  was  reached  the  control  of  Mobile  harbor 
had  been  secured,  and  General  Grant  considered  the  move 
toward  Savannah  the  proper  one.  But  he  insisted  at  first, 
and  continued  to  insist,  that  Hood's  army  should  be  taken 


The  Atlanta  Campaign.  557 

care  of  first  and  destroyed.  Finally  "he  yielded  to  Sherman's 
importunities  to  be  allowed  to  leave  Thomas  to  take  care 
of  Hood  and  Tennessee,  while  he  himself  marched  through 
Georgia  with  no  organized  force  in  his  front  or  near  him, 
making  the  state  "  howl  "  and  "  smashing  things  "  to  the 
sea.  This  yielding  was  secured  by  the  representations  of 
General  Sherman  that  he  had  left  ample  forces  with  Thomas, 
to  wit,  82,000,  either  present  with  him  or  available,  when  in 
fact  the  force  left  by  Sherman  was  nearly  30,000  less  than 
that,  and  the  great  mass  of  it  was  either  unorganized  or 
widely  scattered.  Grant,  being  thus  misled  as  to  the  force  left 
with  Thomas,  and  saying  to  Sherman  that  it  seemed  sufficient 
to  enable  Thomas  to  "  take  care  of  Hood  and  destroy  him," 
gave  permission  for  the  march  to  the  sea.  There  was  one 
feature  of  this  march,  and  but  one,  which  General  Sherman 
originated  and  that  was  leaving  Thomas  with  the  fragments 
of  an  army  to  take  care  of  Hood,  and  marching  away  from 
the  theater  of  war  himself  before  Hood  was  first  destroyed. 
From  the  moment  that  Sherman  turned  his  back  on  Hood's 
army,  the  defense  of  Tennessee  and  the  blocking  of  Hood's 
way  to  the  Ohio  was  committed  to  General  Thomas. 


558  Life  of  Thomas. 


CHAPTER   XXII. 

THE    NASHVILLE    CAMPAIGN. 

i 

The  Armies  of  Sherman  and  Thomas  compared— Thomas  left  with  Fragments 
and  Invalids— Sherman  Marches  to  the  Sea  with  no  Enemy  in  his 
Front— Schofield's  Good  Work— The  Disastrous  Defeat,  of  Hood  at 
Franklin — Grant  Misled  as  to  the  Number  of  Troops  left  with  Thomas. 

The  conditions  which  marked  the  opening  of  the  At- 
lanta campaign  were  exactly  reversed  for  the  Union  army 
on  the  threshold  of  the  Nashville  campaign.  General  Sher- 
man, when  he  moved  on  General  Johnston  in  the  spring  had 
an  effective  force — more  than  double  that  of  the  enemy; 
from  the  first,  and  until  after  the  battle  of  Franklin,  Gen- 
eral Thomas  was  outnumbered  two  to  one.  General  Sher- 
man had  had  abundant  opportunity  to  refit,  supply  his  army, 
and  deliberately  prepare  his  plans,  and  his  immense  force 
was  thoroughly  equipped ;  General  Thomas  had  two  small 
veteran  corps  which  were  not  acting  together,  and  many 
fragments  scattered  over  a  territory  greater  than  France,  and 
he  was  obliged  to  form  his  plans,  organize,  supply,  and  concen- 
trate his  forces  in  the  face  of  the  confident  and  vigorous  advance 
of  a  veteran  enemy.  Every  condition  which  seemed  necessary 
to  certain  military  success  was  present  when  General  Sherman 
began  the  Atlanta  campaign,  namely,  overwhelming  numbers, 
veteran  soldiers,  complete  equipment,  unlimited  supplies, 
perfect  organization,  a  concentrated  army.  Above  all,  and 
stranger  than  all,  when  Hood  was  confronting  Thomas  with 
superior  numbers  Sherman  had  no  enemy  in  his  front. 
Thomas  was  largely  outnumbered,  the  terms  of  his  veterans 
were  rapidly  expiring,  and  their  places  were  to  be  chiefly 
supplied  by  raw  troops  and  civilian  employees.  It  was  well 
for  the  country  that  Thomas  was  in  command.  His  own 
army,  which  had  grown  up  under  his  eye,  which  he  had 
finally  come  to  command,  which  was  enthusiastically  devoted 


The  Nashville  Campaign.  559 

to  him,  and  which  he  had  asked  for,  had  been  denied  him. 
by  General  Sherman,  and  he  had  been  sent  to  the  rear  to 
command  two  small  corps  and  fragments  and  with  them  con- 
front an  enemy  which  had  sorely  tried  the  metal  of  General 
Sherman's  three  armies  for  half  a  year.  The  prospect  was 
dark  enough  ;  hut  in  six  weeks  from  the  time  Hood  crossed 
the  Tennessee  moving  toward  Nashville,  Thomas  had  organ- 
ized a  new  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  which,  striking  a  blow 
with  the  old  ring,  from  the  hand  of  the  one  general  who  never 
lost  a  movement  or  a  battle,  so  crushed  Hood  that  his  army, 
in  organized  form,  never  anywhere  reappeared  in  battle. 

Sherman  had  abandoned  his  objective,  which  Grant  had 
notified  him  was  Johnston's  army  and  the  breaking  it  up, 
and  had  marched  off  to  the  sea,  leaving  his  enemy  seventy 
miles  nearer  Nashville  than  when  the  campaign  opened  in 
front  of  Dalton.  Thomas  took  up  the  uncompleted  task  and 
finished  it  by  destroying  Sherman's  objective,  and  causing  it 
to  disappear  from  the  theater  of  war. 

Besides  abandoning  this  objective,  when  Hood  appeared 
on  the  Tennessee  before  Thomas,  and  Sherman  was  retiring 
toward  Rome  as  preliminary  to  starting  for  the  sea,  he  twice 
telegraphed  Thomas  most  urgently:  "  If  necessary,  break  up 
all  minor  posts  and  get  about  Columbia  as  big  an  army  as 
you  can,  and  go  at  him/'  This,  with  subsequent  instructions 
of  the  same  character,  taken  in  connection  with  the  march 
to  the  sea,  was  equivalent  to  abandoning  the  country  from 
Atlanta  to  Nashville,  which  it  had  required  two  years'  cam- 
paigning and  great  battles  to  secure  as  far  as  Chattanooga, 
and  a  spring  and  summer  to  gain  as  far  as  Atlanta. 

At  first,  General  Sherman  intended  to  leave  Thomas 
only  the  Fourth  Corps,  General  Stanley,  having  an  effective 
strength  of  13,907.  But,  upon  representations  from  General 
Thomas  that  a  stronger  force  was  needed,  he  sent  back  the 
Twenty-third  corps,  General  Schofield,  with  10,358  effectives. 
A  comparison  between  the  preparations  General  Sherman 
was  making  to  perfect  and  strengthen  the  force  with  which 
he  was  to  move  away  from  Hood,  and  the  provision  he  was 
making  to  enable  General  Thomas  to  meet  the  army  which 
had  held  their  combined  forces  back  from  Atlanta  for  four 


560  Life  of  Thomas. 

months,  is  both.strikiug  and  startling.  For  himself,  Sherman 
was  having  his  army  carefully  inspected.  "Weak  and  foot- 
sore men,  those  partially  equipped,  those  whom  the  surgeons 
did  not  regard  as  in  every  sense  sound  and  vigorous,  were 
sent  to  Thomas.  Old  equipments  were  replaced  with  new. 
All  the  "  trash,"  as  Sherman  characterized  it,  was  sent  to  the 
rear — that  is,  to  Thomas.  Sherman  himself  thus  presents 
this  matter  in  his  Memoirs  : 

The  most  extraordinary  efforts  had  been  made  to  purge  this  army  of  non- 
combatants  and  of  sick  men,  for  we  knew  well  that  there  was  to  be  no  place 
of  safety  save  with  the  army  itself.  Our  wagons  were  loaded  with  ammu- 
nition, provisions,  and  forage,  and  we  could  ill  afford  to  haul  even  sick  men 
in  the  ambulances,  so  that  all  on  this  exhibit  may  be  assumed  to  have  been 
able-bodied,  experienced  soldiers,  well  armed,  well  equipped,  and  provided, 
as  far  as  human  foresight  could,  with  all  the  essentials  of  life,  strength,  and 
vigorous  action. 

As  a  result,  Sherman  started  to  the  sea  with  62,000  iron 
veterans,  with  complete  field  equipment  and  supplies  of  every 
needed  sort. 

The  force  he  was  providing  Thomas,  and  the  odds  and 
ends  from  which  an  army  to  meet  Hood's  veterans  and  block 
the  way  to  the  Ohio  River  was  to  be  created,  is  sufficiently 
shown  by  the  following  dispatches  to  Thomas  : 

Stanley  should  reach  Wauhatchie  to-day.  Schofield  will  be  here  to- 
night, and  I  will  push  him  right  away  for  Resaca,  to  go  to  Chattanooga,  if 
events  call  for  it.  Order  all  recruits  and  drafted  men  accordingly,  viz., 
those  for  the  Fourteenth,  Fifteenth,  Seventeenth,  and  Twentieth  Corps,  to 
come  to  the  front.  Appoint  some  good  man  to  organize  and  arm  the  con- 
valescents I  send  back.  I  repeat ;  should  the  enemy  cross  the  Tennessee 
River  in  force,  abandon  all  minor  points  and  concentrate  your  forces  at 
some  point  where  you  can  cover  the  road  from  Murfreesboro  to  Stevenson. 
Engraft  on  Stanley  and  Schofield  all  the  new  troops.  Give  Schofield  a  di- 
vision of  new  troops.  Give  General  Tower  all  the  men  you  can  to  finish 
the  forts  at  Nashville,  and  urge  on  the  navy  to  pile  up  gun-boats  in  the 
Tennessee  River. 

Again : 

I  have  sent  Stanley  oack.  Give  him  as  many  conscripts  as  possible 
and  use  him  as  the  nucleus.  I  will  also  send  Schofield  back,  who  will  re- 
lieve you  of  all  that  Knoxville  branch,  but,  if  necessary,  break  up  all 
minor  posts  and  get  about  Columbia  as  big  an  army  as  you  can,  and  go  at 
him.  You  may  hold  all  the  cavalry  and  new  troops,  except  the  men 
actually  assigned  to  the  corps  with  me.  I  would  like  Dalton  held,  but 
leave  that  to  you ;  Chattanooga,  of  course,  and  Decatur,  in  connection  with 


The  Nashville  Campaign.  561 

the  boats.  If,  to  make  up  a  force  adequate,  it  be  necessary,  abandon  Hunts- 
ville  and  that  line,  and  the  Huntsville  and  Decatur  road,  except  as  far  as 
it  facilitates  an  army  operating  toward  Florence.  Already  the  papers  in 
Georgia  begin  to  howl  at  being  abandoned,  and  will  howl  still  more  before 
they  are  done.  Get,  if  you  can,  A.  J.  Smith's  and  Mower's  divisions,  be- 
longing to  my  army,  from  Missouri,  and  let  them  come  to  you  via  Clifton. 
Get  the  gun-boats  to  fill  the  Tennessee  River,  and  that  will  bother  him 
much. 

Sherman  to  Steedman,  at  Chattanooga,  same  date  : 

You  must  organize  and  systematize  the  hospitals  and  men  sent  back  to 
Chattanooga.  You  could  use  some  of  them  for  your  forts. 

At  the  same  time  Sherman  was  calling  for  the  recruits 
and  drafted  men  belonging  to  the  regiments  with  him  to  be 
sent  up,  and  Thomas  telegraphed  that  he  had  directed  them, 
all  to  be  pushed  forward. 

November  2d,  General  Thomas  thus  stated  his  situation 
at  that  date,  and  prospective  situation  for  November  12,  the 
day  Sherman  had  fixed  for  "  cutting  loose." 

T  have  just  heard  from  General  Croxton,  who  dispatched  to  me  at  7  p. 
M.  yesterday,  who  says  he  has  been  within  two  miles  of  Florence  on 
the  1 1  untsville  side,  and  three  miles  on  the  Lawrence  burg  side.  The  en- 
emy is  there  with  a  large  force,  intrenching.  They  have  laid  pontoons  at 
Florence,  and  are  reported  still  crossing.  He  finds  no  cavalry,  but  Forrest 
is  reported  crossing  below  Florence.  T  think  he  must  be  mistaken  about 
Forrest  crossing  below  Florence ;  it  may  be  Wheeler's  force.  General 
Hatch  should  be  with  Croxton  before  this  time,  and  although  the  rain  may 
have  made  the  roads  bad,  I  am  in  hopes  that  the  balance-  of  Stanley's 
troops  will  reach  Pulaski  to-day.  It  will  not  be  possible  for  me  to  raise 
within  the  next  ten  days  more  than  Stanley's  and  Schofield's  corps,  and 
Croxton's  and  Hatch's  cavalry,  unless  I  should  withdraw  railroad  guards 
immediately,  which  should  not  be  done  as  long  as  we  must  operate  the 
road.  The  convalescents  will  only  be  fit  to  garrison  Chattanooga,  White- 
side's,  and  Bridgeport.  It  will  need  all  the  troops  Granger  has  to  hold  De- 
catur;  and  Steedman's  troops,  belonging  to  my  army,  are  almost  dwindled 
away  by  expiration  of  service.  Eventually,  General  Wilson  can  organize 
12,000  cavalry  from  the  dismounted  men  now  in  Tennessee  and  coming 
from  the  front,  but  he  can  not  do  this  in  ten  days.  We  will  all  do  the 
best  we  can,  and  Beauregard  halts  to  fortify.  I  hope  we  shall  be  ready 
for  him. 

At  this  time  Thomas  had  a  force  of  24,000  infantry,  and 
5,500  equipped  cavalry.     Sherman's  force,  headed  away  from 
the  enemy,  was  62,000.     Replying  to  Thomas  the  same  day, 
Sherman  telegraphed  among  other  things  : 
36 


Life  of  Thomas. 

To  make  things  sure,  you  can  call  on  the  Governors  of  Kentucky  and 
Indiana  for  some  militia,  cautioning  them  against  a  stampede. 

General  Thomas  at  this  date  was  exerting  himself  to  the 
utmost  to  form  garrisons  for  posts  and  bridges  which,  in  the 
preliminary  movements,  and  until  Hood's  designs  became  ap- 
parent, it  was  necessary  to  hold.  How  he  fared  at  this  bus- 
iness, and  what  he  had  to  work  with,  clearly  appears  from 
the  following  dispatches : 

Thomas  to  Steedman,  November  2d : 

If  you  are  still  required  to  make  up  the  garrison  of  Eesaca  you  might 
send  a  force  from  the  organization  of  convalescents  now  being  made  up  by 
General  Cruft,  at  Chattanooga. 

Steedman  to  Thomas,  same  date : 

As  regards  forming  garrisons  from  detachments  of  the  Fourteenth,  Fif- 
teenth, Seventeenth,  and  Twentieth  Corps,  I  have  the  honor  to  report  that 
sc  far  all  such  detachments  reported  from  the  front  (Sherman's)  are  with 
furloughs,  and  are  waiting  transportation  home. 

All  that  seemed  lacking  to  complete  the  assortment  of 
feeble  odds  and  ends  with  which  Sherman  was  equipping 
Thomas  was  an  order  to  stuff  a  few  thousand  uniforms  with 
straw,  and  use  them  vigorously  and  judicially  along  Hood's 
front. 

Sherman  to  Halleck,  November  3d  : 

I  therefore  feel  no  uneasiness  as  to  Tennessee,  ana  nave  ordered 
Thomas  to  assume  the  offensive  in  the  direction  of  Selma,  Alabama." 

Grant  to  Sherman,  November  2d  : 

With  the  force,  however,  you  have  left  with  Thomas,  he  must  be  able 
to  take  care  of  Hood  and  destroy  him. 

Sherman  to  Halleck,  November  llth,  from  Kingston, 
Georgia  : 

My  arrangements  are  now  all  complete,  and  the  railroad  cars  are  being 
sent  to  the  rear.  Last  night  we  burned  all  foundries,  mills,  and  shops  of 
every  kind  in  Rome,  and  to-morrow  I  leave  Kingston  with  the  rear  guard 
for  Atlanta,  which  I  propose  to  dispose  of  in  a  similar  manner,  and  to  start 
on  the  16th  on  the  projected  grand  raid.  All  appearances  still  indicate 
that  Beauregard  has  got  back  to  his  old  hole  at  Corinth,  and  I  hope  he  will  en- 
joy it.  My  army  prefers  to  enjoy  the  fresh  sweet-potato  fields  of  the  Ocmul- 
gee.  I  have  balanced  all  the  figures  well,  and  am  satisfied  that  General 
Thomas  has  in  Tennessee  a  force  sufficient  for  all  probabilities,  and  I  have 
urged  him  the  moment  Beauregard  turns  south  to  cross  the  Tennessee  at 
Decatur,  and  push  straight  for  Selma.  To-morrow  our  wires  will  be  broken, 
and  this  is  probably  my  last  dispatch.  I  would  like  to  have  General 


The  Nashville  Campaign.  563 

Foster  to  break  the  Savannah  and  Charleston  road  about  Pocotaligo  about 
December  1.     All  other  preparations  are  to  my  entire  satisfaction. 

The  situation  in  which  General  Thomas  found  himself, 
differed  materially  from  the  representations  made  to  Grant 
tind  the  authorities  at  Washington,  which,  as  has  been  seen, 
gave  him  82,000  men,  and  was  thus  set  forth  by  General 
Thomas  himself  in  an  official  report : 

At  this  time  I  found  myself  confronted  by  the  army  which,  under 
•General  J.  E.  Johnston,  had  so  skillfully  resisted  the  advance  of  the  whole 
active  army  of  the  Military  Division  of  the  Mississippi  from  Dalton  to  the 
Chattahoochee,  reinforced  by  a  well-equipped  and  enthusiastic  cavalry 
command  of  over  12,000,  led  by  one  of  the  boldest  and  most  successful 
-commanders  in  the  rebel  army.  My  information  from  all  sources  confirmed 
the  reported  strength  of  Hood's  army  to  be  from  40,000  to  45,000  in- 
fantry, and  from  12,000  to  15,000  cavalry.  My  effective  force  at  this  time 
consisted  of  the  Fourth  Corps,  about  12,000  under  Major-General  D.  S. 
Stanley;  the  Twenty -third  Corps,  about  10,000,  under  Major-General  J.  M. 
Schofield;  Hatch's  division  of  cavalry,  about  4,000;  Croxton's  brigade, 
L'. IDS),  and  Capron's  brigade  of  about  1,200.  The  balance  of  my  force  was 
distributed  along  the  railroad,  and  posted  at  Murfreesborough,  Stevenson, 
Bridgeport,  Huntsville,  Decatur,  and  Chattanooga,  to  keep  open  our  com- 
munications, and  hold  the  posts  above  named  if  attacked,  until  they  could 
IK-  reinforced,  as  up  to  this  time  it  was  impossible  to  determine  which 
course  Hood  would  take— advance  on  Nashville  or  turn  toward  Huntsville. 
Under  these  circumstances  it  was  manifestly  best  to  act  on  the  defensive 
until  sufficiently  reinforced  to  justify  taking  the  offensive.  My  plans  and 
wishes  were  fully  explained  to  General  Schofield,  and,  as  subsequent 
-events  will  show,  properly  appreciated  and  executed  by  him. .... 

On  the  12th  of  November  communication  with  General  Sherman  was 
•severed,  the  last  dispatch  from  him  leaving  Cartersville,  Ga.,  at  2:25  P.  M. 
on  that  date.  He  had  started  on  his  great  expedition  from  Atlanta  to  the 
sea-board,  leaving  me  to  guard  Tennessee  or  to  pursue  the  enemy  if  he  fol- 
lowed the  commanding  general's  column.  It  was,  therefore,  with  consid- 
erable anxiety  that  we  watched  the  forces  at  Florence,  to  discover  what 
course  they  would  pursue  with  regard  to  General  Sherman's  movements, 
determining  thereby  whether  the  troops  under  my  command,  numbering 
less  than  half  those  under  Hood,  were  to  act  on  the  defensive  in  Tennes- 
see, or  take  the  offensive  in  Alabama. 

Hood  completed  his  crossing  of  the  Tennessee,  Novem- 
ber 19th,  and  moved  vigorously  against  the  Union  forces. 
The  invasion  of  Tennessee  was  under  full  headway,  and  be- 
yond it  lay  a  campaign  to  the  Ohio  formally  suggested  by 
President  Davis.  In  six  days  after  Hood's  movement  de- 
veloped General  Thomas  had  lost  from  the  time  he  reached 
Nashville  15,000  veteran  troops  by  expiration  of  terms  of 


564  Life  of  Thomas. 

service  or  absence  on  leave  to  vote.     He  had  received  during- 
the   same   time    12,000    newly  enlisted   and   perfectly  fresh 

men. 

At  the  same  time,  the  cavalry  furnished  General  Thomas 
to  confront  the  12,000  under  Forrest  suffered  in  the  same 
way  as  his  infantry.  To  begin  with,  the  whole  of  it  had 
been  dismounted  to  furnish  horses  for  Kilpatrick's  divis- 
ion, which  went  with  Sherman.  It  was  left  largely  with- 
out transportation,  and  to  a  great  extent  its  most  serviceable 
arms  had  been  taken,  and  those  ordered  from  the  East  to 
replace  them  were  delayed  more  than  a  month  on  the  way. 
By  characteristic  and  almost  superhuman  activity  and  well 
directed  effort,  the  cavalry  commander,  General  James  H. 
"Wilson,  had  been  able  to  equip  something  over  5,000  effect- 
ive mounted  men  in  time  to  take  part  in  resisting  Hood's 
advance. 

General  Thomas  remained  in  Nashville  superintending 
the  organization  and  concentration  there,  and  preparing  for 
a  final  struggle  to  check  Hood  in  his  northward  march  at 
the  Cumberland.  He  put  General  Schofield  in  command  at 
the  front  with  general  orders  for  the  retrograde  movement 
and  for  delaying  Hood  as  long  as  possible,  leaving  the  de- 
tails of  the  campaign  to  this  able  officer. 

General  Sc'hofield's  force,  for  various  reasons  which  pre- 
viously described  conditions  make  clear,  was  considerably 
less  than  his  paper  force,  as  shown  by  the  returns,  and,  as  a 
result,  he  found  himself  about  Pulaski  with  18,000  effective 
infantry  and  four  brigades  of  cavalry,  confronted  by  the 
vigorous  advance  of  Hood  with  more  than  double  this  force. 
Colonel  D.  S.  Stanley  commanded  the  Fourth  Corps,  and 
General  J.  D.  Cox  the  Twenty-third,  and  General  James  H. 
Wilson  the  cavalry 

In  pursuance  of  the  policy  agreed  upon,  Schofield  held 
hard  against  Hood,  and  at  the  last  moment,  by  a  forced  night 
march,  he  gained  the  line  of  Duck  River  at  Columbia  before 
the  enemy  secured  it.  Here,  by  a  bold  and  courageous  front, 
he  checked  Hood,  and  delayed  his  crossing  as  long  as  it  was 
possible  considering  the  great  disparity  of  numbers.  "Wil- 
son's cavalry  on  the  flanks  operated  with  vigor  and  effect, 


The  Nashville  Campaign. 

discovering  every  move  of  Forrest  and  keeping  General 
Schofield  informed.  The  latter,  fully  comprehending  the 
vital  necessity  of  delaying  Hood  while  Nashville  was  being 
]iiit  in  condition  to  meet  him  by  General  Thomas,  held  firmly 
and  tenaciously  to  Columbia  till  Hood  had  crossed  on  his 
Hank,  when  by  a  rapid  night  March  he  passed  his  army  along 
Hood's  front,  his  rear  divisions  and  trains  moving  within 
rifle  shot  of  the  enemy  so  close  was  the  contact,  and  before 
morning  Schofield  was  fairly  between  Hood  and  Nashville 
at  Spring  Hill.  Hood  had  failed  where  success  seemed 
surely  in  his  grasp,  and  Schofield  had  succeeded  where  he  has 
been  criticised  for  risking  far  too  much.  But  the  answer  is 
that  he  felt  the  essential  element  of  his  campaign  to  be  the 
delay  of  Hood,  and  to  accomplish  that  his  plain  duty  to  be 
to  take  risks  and  act  boldly.  It  was  one  of  the  closest  and 
most  desperate  situations  of  the  war,  but  it  is  success  which 
vindicates,  and  he  came  out  of  this  strait  with  his  army 
and  its  whole  equipment  intact,  and  the  next  afternoon  he 
was  found  in  line  of  battle  before  Franklin,  not  only  able  to 
meet  Hood,  but  to  sorely  defeat  him.  General  Scohfi eld  reached 
Franklin  before  day-break  November  30th.  Orderinghis  forces 
to  take  position  in  front  of  the  town  as  they  arrived,  he  be- 
gan preparations  to  cross  his  army  to  the  north  bank  of  the 
Ilarpeth.  General  A.  J.  Smith,  with  the  Sixteenth  Corps,  so 
long  expected  from  Missouri,  and  which  at  the  first  Sherman 
repeatedly  assured  Grant  could  reach  Thomas  within  ten 
days,  had  not  arrived  at  Nashville  until  the  day  Schofield 
was  being  pressed  by  the  enemy  at  Franklin. 

While  preparations  were  being  hastened  for  crossing  the 
the  river  at  the  latter  place  General  Hood  suddenly  appeared 
before  the  town  and  threw  his  massed  lines  upon  the  Union 
position.  In  its  completeness  it  was  an  unexpected  blow  and 
one  of  the  most  vigorous  and  desperate  delivered  by  any 
Confederate  army  during  the  war.  For  the  Confederate  sol- 
diers of  Tennessee  and  Kentucky  the  return  to  their  homes 
hung  upon  the  result,  and  thus  prompted  they  fought,  and 
with  them  their  comrades  fought  as  they  had  seldom,  if  ever, 
fought  before.  That  they  were  worthily  led,  the  death  of 
five  general  officers  and  the  wounding  of  six  on  the  Union 


566  Life  of  Thomas. 

breastworks  attest.  The  Union  army  also  excelled  itselfr 
and  the  furious  onset  of  Hood  which  broke  its  lines  was  first 
checked  by  brilliant  charges,  and  then,  after  prolonged  and 
bitter  fighting,  repulsed.  From  the  moment  the  Union  lines 
were  restored  the  Confederates  assaulted  persistently  and 
continuously  from-4  o'clock  till  dark.  They  fought  at  short 
range  long  after  night-fall,  but  failed  to  again  break  the  lines. 
The  firing  was  terrific,  and  was  still  severe  at  midnight.  Soon 
after,  Hood  withdrew.  His  loss  was  .considerably  in  excess 
of  6,000,  while  Schofield's,  his  troops  being  much  of  the  time 
protected  by  their  field-works,  fell  below  2,500.  Afterward,, 
in  North  Calonina,  at  the  surrender  of  Johnston's  army,  the 
talk  turning  at  a  gathering  of  Union  and  Confederate  gen- 
eral officers  upon  the  various  battles  of  the  war,  there  was 
general  agreement  among  those  who  had  served  at  the  West 
with  Hood  that  Franklin  was  by  far  the  most  disheartening 
of  all  their  battles. 

During  the  night  Schofield  safely  withdrew  his  army  and 
trains  and  pressed  on  to  the  Brentwood  Hills,  and  at  noon  the 
next  day  he  reached  the  fortifications  of  Nashville.  Hood 
followed  closely  and  established  his  lines  in  front  of  the  city. 
General  Thomas's  high  appreciation  of  General  Schofield'a 
management  was  strongly  expressed  in  his  final  report. 


The  Nashville  Campaign.  567 


CHAPTER  XXVI. 

General  Thomas's  Energy  at  Nashville — The  Completeness  of  his  Prepara- 
tions— An  Effective  Army  Organized  from  two  small  Veteran  Corps, 
Invalids,  Raw  Recruits,  and  Citizens — Crushing  Defeat  of  Hood — De- 
stoyed  by  a  Vigorous  Pursuit — Impatience  of  General  Grant — He 
twice  orders  Thomas's  Removal — Persistent  Ill-Treatment  of  Thomas — 
Completeness  of  Thomas's  Victory — Sherman  and  Grant  Saved  from 
Themselves— Hood's  Army  as  an  Army  Disappears  from  the  Theater 
of  War. 

The  energy  with  which  General  Thomas  had  pushed 
the  work  of  organization  and  preparation  at  Nashville  was 
not  exceeded  by  the  work  of  any  commander  during  the  war, 
if,  indeed,  it  was  equaled  by  any.  No  other  general  had  been 
left  with  such  disorganized  and  widely  scattered  fragments 
to  face  a  veteran  army.  When  it  is  remembered  that  this 
was  done  with  full  knowledge,  and  with  deliberation,  the 
case  becomes  amazing.  Of  course  the  Fourth,  Twenty-third 
and  Sixteenth  Corps  were  well  equipped  and  well  organized 
veterans,  and  their  officers  were  able  and  noted  soldiers. 
But  General  Schofield  had  fought  the  battle  of  Franklin  with 
a  force  less  than  half  that  of  Hood,  and  General  A.  J.  Smith's 
corps,  which  was  promised,  for  the  early  part  of  November 
had  not  become  available  at  Nashville  till  Schofield,  by 
desperate  fighting,  had  won  his  victory  at  Franklin.  Aside 
from  these  excellent  troops,  General  Thomas  had  been  busy 
organizing  an  army  from  clerks,  citizens,  convalescents,  un- 
equipped detachments  without  officers,  and  perfectly  raw 
troops  numbering  some  12,000,  who  had  taken  the  place, 
though  very  far  from  filling  it,  of  15,000  veterans  whose 
terms  of  service  had  expired,  or  who  had  been  furloughed 
for  various  reasons.  This  latter  cause  had  greatly  depleted 
both  the  Fourth  and  the  Twenty-third  Corps. 

During  the  2d  and  3d  of  December,  Smith's  and  Schofield's 
troops  and  5,000  men  who  had  arrived  with  Steedman  from 
Chattanooga,  were  firmly  established  along  the  lines  around 


568  Life  of  Thomas. 

Nashville.  Wilson  was  working  with  an  energy  which  had 
no  rest  to  remount  the  force  which  had  been  deprived  of 
•horses  to  equip  Sherman's  expedition.  The  enemy's  cavalry 
numbered  nearly  12,000.  Wilson  had  thus  far  operated 
against  him  with  less  than  half  that  number.  But,  while 
such  disproportion  would  enable  a  rear  guard  to  be  effective 
in  compelling  delay,  he  was  now  not  only  to  assume  the 
offensive,  but,  in  General  Thomas's  plan,  was  to  open  the 
fight  by  turning  the  enemy's  left.  As  the  result  of  un- 
ceasing activity  in  all  parts  of  the  army,  General  Thomas, 
on  the  5th  of  December,  felt  justified  in  notifying  General 
Halleck  that  if  he  could  perfect  his  arrangements,  then 
nearly  completed,  but  depending  on  the  progress  of  Wilson's 
remount,  he  would  attack  Hood  on  the  7th. 

Meantime,  before  Schofield  and  Smith  were  fairly  in 
position,  and  before  Steedmuu  had  arrived  from  Chattanooga, 
General  Grant,  December  2d,  telegraphed  Thomas  to  attack, 
and  added  that  he  thought,  instead  of  falling  back  from 
Franklin,  the  offensive  should  have  there  been  taken  against 
the  enemy.  But,  in  fact,  Smith's  corps,  which  seemed  to 
have  been  counted  as  present  by  Grant — which,  perhaps, 
is  not  strange,  since  Sherman  had  so  emphatically  assured  its 
early  presence  before  he  marched  off  from  Hood — had  not 
arrived,  and  Thomas  had  no  forces  sufficient  to  justify  Scho- 
field in  attempting  to  stand  at  Franklin.  Indeed,  his  suc- 
cessful withdrawal  was  a  notable  triumph.  To  assume  the 
offensive  was  an  impossibility. 

But  it  was  not  strange  that  Grant  should  have  been 
filled  with  anxiety  and  apprehension.  The  real  meaning  of 
the  march  to  the  sea  for  the  country,  and  its  momentous 
possibilities,  were  just  beginning  to  be  understood  at  City 
Point.  For  the  first  and  only  time  in  the  war,  Grant's  mind 
bordered  closely  on  panic.  So  conditioned,  he  grew  restive 
to  the  last  degree  under  Thomas's  cool  and  deliberate,  but 
still,  as  all  on  the  ground  knew,  most  effective  preparations. 
Grant  pictured  Hood  crossing  the  Cumberland  and  pushing 
toward  the  Ohio.  But  Thomas  was  in  active  co-operation 
with  Admiral  Lee,  and  the  river  was  so  effectively  patrolled 
by  gunboats  that  crossing  was  impossible.  Early  on  the  7th, 


The  Nashville  Campaign.  o69 

Thomas,  in  obedience  to  a  peremptory  order  from  Grant  to 
attack  received  late  the  night  before,  issued  instructions  for 
battle,  and  preparations  were  at  once  made  in  all  parts  of  the 
command.  These  were  completed,  and  the  lines  were  in 
position  and  supplied  and  the  hour  for  attack  was  fixed  for 
daylight  of  December  10th.  With  almost  superhuman  en- 
ergy on  the  part  of  General  Thomas  and  his  able  subordi- 
nates, it  had  been  impossible  to  prepare  an  attack  which 
should  insure  success  an  hour  earlier.  To  have  moved  when 
any  thing  remained  to  be  done  to  render  success  certain, 
would  have  been  criminal.  For  failure  involved  a  campaign 
by  Hood  to  the  Ohio  River,  and  possibly  beyond  it.  Thomas 
was  not  only  preparing  to  prevent  such  a  result,  but,  upon 
his  success  or  failure,  hung  the  question  whether  or  not 
those  who  planned  and  those  who  permitted  the  march  to 
the  sea  should  incur  the  dire  condemnation  of  the  people. 
By  his  careful  preparations,  he  was  saving  Sherman  and 
Grant  from  themselves.  On  the  9th,  there  came  on  a  severe 
storm  of  freezing  sleet.  The  country  was  covered  with  a 
sheet  of  ice.  Its  character  may  be  judged  by  the  fact  that 
General  Elliott,  the  chief  of  cavalry,  was  obliged  to  send 
word  that  he  could  not  reach  head-quarters  because  his 
horses  could  not  travel  on  the  ice.  The  following  note  was 
dispatched  by  General  Thomas  to  all  commanders : 

Dec.  9th.  Owing  to  the  severity  of  the  storm  raging  to-day,  it  is  found 
necessary  to  postpone  the  operations  designed  for  to-morrow  morning  until 
the  breaking  up  of  the  storm.  I  desire,  however,  that  every  thing  be  put 
in  condition  to  carry  out  the  plan  contemplated  as  soon  as  the  weather  will 
permit  it  to  be  done— so  that  we  can  advance  immediately  the  moment  the 
storm  clears  away.  Acknowledge  receipt. 

On  the  morning  of  December  10th,  General  Thomas  sent 
this  note  to  General  T.  J.  Wood,  commanding  the  Fourth, 
the  strongest  corps: 

What  is  the  condition  of  the  ground  between  the  enemy's  lines  and 
your  own  ?  Is  it  practicable  for  men  to  move  about  on  it  with  facility.  I 
would  like  your  opinions  about  it. 

To  this,  General  Wood  replied : 

The  ground  between  the  enemy's  lines  and  my  own  is  covered  with  a 
heavy  sleet  which  would  make  the  handling  of  troops  very  difficult,  if  not 
impracticable.  I  am  confident  that  troops  can  not  move  with  facility. 


570  Life  of  Thomas. 

From  the  condition  of  the  ground,  an  offensive  movement  would  necessa- 
rilv  be  feeble — and  feebleness  of  movement  would  almost  certainly  result 
in  failure. 

As  late  as  December  12th,  the  sleet  storm  still  continu- 
ing, General  Schofield  wrote  Thomas: 

It  seems  hardly  possible  that  we  can  attempt  any  movement  at  this 
time. 

It  should  be  remembered  that  to  attack  Hood  the  Union 
line  was  obliged  to  ascend  .the  hills  on  which  he  was  in- 
trenched. 

After  General  Thomas  had  notified  General  Grant,  on 
the  morning  of  the  7th,  that,  in  accordance  with  his  direc- 
tions of  the  previous  night,  orders  for  attack  had  been  given, 
and,  after  the  imperative  reasons  for  delay  had  been  ex- 
plained to  him,  Grant  telegraphed  Halleck,  the  8th,  that, 
"  if  Thomas  has  not  struck  yet,  he  ought  to  be  ordered  to 
hand  over  his  command  to  Schotield." 

Halleck  instantly  replied  that,  if  he  wanted  Thomas  re- 
lieved, he  must  give  the  order,  and  the  responsibility  would 
be  his,  as  no  one  in  Washington  wished  General  Thomas 
removed.  The  next  day  Grant  gave  the  order. 

In  compliance  with  it,  the  following  was  prepared  for 
issue  at  the  War  Department : 

The  following  dispatch  having  been  received  from  Lieutenant-General 
Grant,  viz.:  "Please  telegraph  orders  relieving  him  (General  Thomas)  at 
once,  and  placing  (General)  Schofield  in  command,  the  President  orders : 

1.  That  Major-General  J.  M.  Schofield  relieve,  at  once,  Major-General 
G.  H.  Thomas,  in  command  of  the  Department  and  Army  of  the  Cumber- 
land. 

2.  General  Thomas  will  turn  over  to  General  Schofield  all  orders  and 
instructions  received  by  him  since  the  battle  of  Franklin. 

E.  D.  TOWXSEXD,  A.  A.  G. 

Meantime,  General  Thomas  had  received  the  following 
from  General  Grant: 

Your  dispatch  of  yesterday  received.  It  looks  to  me  evident  the  en- 
emy are  trying  to  cross  the  Cumberland,  and  are  scattered.  Why  not  at- 
tack at  once?  By  all  means  avoid  the  contingency  of  a  foot-race  to  see 
which,  you  or  Hood,  can  beat  to  the  Ohio.  If  you  think  necessary,  call  on 
the  governors  of  states  to  send  a  force  into  Louisville  to  meet  the  enemy, 
if  he  should  cross  the  river.  You  surely  never  should  cross  except  in  rear 
of  the  enemy.  Now  is  one  of  the  fairest  opportunities  ever  presented  of 
destroying  one  of  the  three  armies  of  the  enemy.  If  destroyed,  he  can 


The  Nashville  Campaign.  571 

never  replace  it.    Use  the  means  at  your  command,  and  you  can  do  this 
and  cause  a  rejoicing  from  one  end  of  the  land  to  the  other. 

To  which  General  Thomas  replied  : 

Your  dispatch  of  8:30  P.  M.  of  the  8th  is  just  received.  I  had  nearly 
completed  my  preparations  to  attack  the  enemy  to-morrow  morning,  but  a 
terrible  storm  of  freezing  rain  has  come  on  to-day,  which  will  make  it  im- 
possible for  our  men  to  fight  to  any  advantage.  I  am,  therefore,  compelled 
to  wait  for  the  storm  to  break  and  make  the  attack  immediately  after. 
Admiral  Lee  is  patrolling  the  river  above  and  below  the  city,  and  I  believe 
will  be  able  to  prevent  the  enemy  from  crossing.  There  is  no  doubt  but 
Hood's  forces  are  considerably  scattered  along  the  river,  with  the  view  of 
attempting  a  crossing,  but  it  has  been  impossible  for  me  to  organize  and 
equip  the  troops  for  an  attack  at  an  earlier  tune.  Major-General  Halleck 
informs  me  that  you  are  very  much  dissatisfied  with  my  delay  in  attacking. 
I  can  only  say  I  have  done  all  in  my  power  to  prepare,  and  if  you  should 
deem  it  necessary  to  relieve  me,  I  shall  submit  without  a  murmur. 

General  Halleck,  however,  had  held  the  order  of  relief 
throughout  the  day  without  issuing  it,  and  thus  delayed  it 
further  by  calling  attention  to  the  above  dispatch  of  General 
Thomas,  in  which  the  impossibility  of  attack  was  made 
clear. 

Orders  relieving  General  Thomas  had  been  made  out  when  his  tele- 
gram of  this  P.  M.  was  received.  If  you  still  wish  these  orders  telegraphed 
to  Nashville,  they  will  be  forwarded.  H.  W.  HALLECK,  Chief  of  Staff. 

This  led  to  the  suspension  of  the  order,  and  the  follow- 
ing telegrams  passed  regarding  the  matter : 

CITY  POINT,  VA.,  December  9,  1864,  5:30  P.  M. 
Major-General  Halleck,  Washington. 

General  Thomas  has  been  urged  in  every  possible  way  to  attack  the 
enemy;  even  to  giving  the  positive  order.  He  did  say  he  thought  he 
should  be  able  to  attack  on  the  7th,  but  he  did  not  do  so,  nor  has  he  given 
a  reason  for  not  doing  it.  I  am  very  unwilling  to  do  injustice  to  an  officer 
who  has  done  so  much  good  service  as  General  Thomas  has,  however,  and 
will  therefore  suspend  the  order  relieving  him  until  it  is  seen  whether  he 
will  do  any  thing.  U.  S.  GRANT,  Lieutenant-General. 

CITY  POINT,  VA.,  December  9,  1864,  7:30  P.  M. 
Major-General  Thomas,  NashviUe. 

Your  dispatch  of  1  P.  M.  to-day  is  received.  I  have  as  much  confidence 
in  your  conducting  the  battle  rightly  as  I  have  in  any  other  officer,  but  it 
has  seemed  to  me  you  have  been  slow,  and  I  have  had  no  explanation  of 
affairs  to  convince  me  otherwise.  Receiving  your  dispatch  to  Major- 
General  Halleck  of  2  p.  M.  before  I  did  the  first  to  me,  I  telegraphed  to  sus- 
pend the  order  relieving  you  until  we  should  hear  further.  I  hope  most 


572  Life  of  Thomas. 

sincerely  that  there  will  be  no  necessity  of  repeating  the  order,  and  that 
the  facts  will  show  that  you  have  been  right  all  the  time. 

U.  S.  GRANT,  lAeutenant-General. 

But  while  the  sleet  storm  was  still  at  its  height,  and  when 
every  one  of  General  Thomas's  officers  was  agreed  that  it 
would  be  madness  to  attack,  General  Grant,  though  fully  in- 
formed of  the  situation,  thus  again  directed  an  attack : 

If  you  delay  attacking  longer,  the  mortifying  spectacle  will  b<-  witnessed 
of  a  rebel  army  moving  for  the  Ohio,  and  you  will  be  forced  to  act.  accept- 
ing such  weather  as  you  find.  Let  there  be  no  further  delay.  Hood  can  not 
stand  even  a  drawn  battle  so  far  from  his  supplies  of  ordnance  stores.  If 
he  retreats  and  you  follow,  he  must  lose  his  material  and  most  of  his  army. 
I  am  in  hopes  of  receiving  a  dispatch  from  you  to-day  announcing  that  you 
have  moved.  Delay  no  longer  for  weather  or  reinforcements. 

To  which  General  Thomas  again  replied : 

Your  dispatch  of  4  p.  M.  this  day  is  just  received.  I  will  obey  the  order 
as  promptly  as  possible,  however  much  I  may  regret  it,  as  the  attack  will 
have  to  be  made  uuder  every  disadvantage.  The  whole  country  is  covered 
with  a  perfect  sheet  of  ice  and  sleet,  and  it  is  with  difficulty  the  troops 
are  able  to  move  about  on  level  ground.  It  was  my  intention  to  attack 
Hood  as  soon  as  the  ice  melted,  and  would  have  done  so  yesterday  had  it 
not  been  for  the  storm. 

On  the  12th,  General  Thomas  still  further  reported  to 
Halleck,  and  it  must  be  remembered  that  all  dispatches  went 
to  Grant : 

I  have  the  troops  ready  to  make  the.  attack  on  the  enemy  as  soon  as  the 
sleet,  which  now  covers  the  ground,  has  melted  sufficiently  to  enable  the 
men  to  march.  The  whole  country  is  now  covered  with  a  sheet  of  ice  so 
hard  and  slippery  it  is  utterly  impossible  for  troops  to  ascend  the  slopes, 
or  even  move  over  level  ground  in  any  thing  like  order.  It  has  taken  the 
entire  day  to  place  my  cavalry  in  position,  and  it  has  only  been  finally 
effected  with  imminent  risk  and  many  serious  accidents,  resulting  from  the 
numbers  of  horses  falling  with  their  riders  on  the  road.  Under  these  cir- 
cumstances, I  believe  that  an  attack  at  this  time  would  only  result  in  a  use- 
less sacrifice  of  life. 

On  the  13th,  the  sleet  storm  still  raging  at  Nashville, 
General  Logan,  then  at  City  Point,  was  ordered  to  Nashville 
to  relieve  General  Thomas,  and  on  the  next  day  General 
Grant  followed  him  to  assume  general  command  himself. 
This  was  the  order  to  Logan  : 

I.  Major-General  John  A.  Logan,  United  States  volunteers,  will  proceed 
immediately  to  Nashville,  Tennessee,  reporting  by  telegraph  to  the  lieu- 
tenant-general his  arrival  at  Louisville,  Kentucky,  and  also  his  arrival  at 
Nashville,  Tennessee.  .  .  . 


The  Nashville  Campaign.  573 

The  same  day  came  this  from  Thomas  to  Ilallack: 

Your  telegram  of  12:30  M.  to-day  is  received.  The  ice  having  melted 
away  to-day,  the  enemy  will  be  attacked  to-morrow  morning.  Much  as  I 
regret  the  apparent  delay  in  attacking  the  enemy,  it  could  not  have  been 
done  before  with  any  reasonable  prospect  of  success. 

And  the  next  day  this: 

Attacked  enemy's  left  this  morning,  drove  it  from  the  river,  below  city, 
very  nearly  to  Franklin  pike,  distance  about  eight  miles.  .  .  . 

These  were  followed  fast  by  details  of  the  magnificent 
victory  which  grew  into  completeness  with  every  hour.  Grant 
abandoned  his  trip  to  Nashville,  Logan  stopped  at  Louisville 
where  he  had  met  news  of  the  victory  and  returned  to  City 
Point. 

At  eight  o'clock,  December  15th,  General  Thomas's  bat- 
tle began.  There  was  preparation  and  understanding  at 
every  point  of  the  lines.  A  feint  on  the  Confederate  right 
was  entirely  successful  in  attracting  Hood's  attention  from 
the  left  where  the  real  blow  was  to  fall.  Wilson's  cavalry, 
making  a  wide  detour  beyond  the  enemy's  left,  dismounted 
and  advanced  upon  his  flank  and  full  in  his  rear,  capturing 
both  works  and  guns.  At  this,  according  to  plan,  the  Union 
lines  assaulted.  There  was  success  at  all  points  from  the  first. 
The  left  was  doubled  back  and  driven  eight  miles  before 
night  fell.  The  center  was  forced  from  both  outer  and  inner 
works  and  pushed  to  new  ground  far  in  the  rear  where  an 
attempt  was  made  by  Hood  during  the  night  to  establish  new 
lines.  At  daylight  Thomas  moved  to  attack  the  enemy's 
new  position.  At  noon  it  was  fully  developed  upon  Overton's 
Hill  and  adjacent  elevations.  At  3  o'clock  it  was  assaulted 
in  front,  Wilson's  cavalry  having  already  successfully  gained 
the  rear.  In  an  hour  Hood  was  routed  and  his  army  was 
every-where  in  confused  retreat.  The  next  day  Hood  con- 
tinued his  flight,  and  was  vigorously  pursued  by  the  whole 
army.  The  country  was  soaked  with  slush  and  rain,  and  it 
was  almost  impossible  for  troops,  artillery,  or  trains  to  move. 
However,  the  pursuit  was  continued  by  the  cavalry,  closely 
followed  by  the  infantry,  with  all  the  vigor  that  untiring  and 
able  officers  and  enthusiastic  troops  could  exhibit. 

But,  in  spite  of  the  great  victory,  over  which  a  nation 


574  Life  of  Thomas. 

was  wildly  rejoicing,  and  of  a  pursuit  unparalled  for  its  diffi- 
culties and  unequaled  in  its  results,  since  it  completed  the 
destruction  of  an  army,  the  pnly  thing  of  the  kind  in  the 
war  'previous  to  the  final  surrenders — General  Thomas's 
opening  victory  at  Mill  Springs  excepted — in  spite  of  all 
these  things,  the  nagging  and  unjust  prodding  of  General 
Thomas  from  City  Point  and  "Washington  were  unceasing. 
The  character  of  his  victory,  and  the  knowledge  that  he  was 
energetically  pursuing,  did  not  save  him. 

In  response  to  Thomas's  dispatch  to  Grant  announcing 
the  victory  of  the  first  day  Grant  replied : 

I  was  just  on  my  way  to  Nashville,  but  receiving  a  dispatch  from.  Van 
Duzen,  detailing  your  splendid  success  of  to-day,  I  shall  go  no  further.  Push 
the  enemy  now,  and  give  him  no  rest  until  he  is  entirely  destroyed.  Your 
army  will  cheerfully  suffer  many  privations  to  break  up  Hood's  army,  and 
make  it  useless  for  future  operations.  Do  not  stop  for  trains  or  supplies,  but 
take  them  from  the  country,  as  the  enemy  has  done.  Much  is  now  ex- 
pected. 

The  Union  army  had  just  foraged  once,  and  Hood's  army 
twice,  over  the  country  upon  which  Grant  thus  ordered 
Thomas  to  depend  for  supplies.  Besides,  Hood  had  been 
subsisting  from  it  for  six  weeks.  Later,  a  dispatch  of  simi- 
lar tone  reached  Thomas  from  Grant.  Meanwhile  the  pur- 
suit was  being  prosecuted  with  the  utmost  vigor.  But  in 
spite  of  this  fact,  which  was  well  known  at  "Washington, 
Hallack,  on  the  21st,  thus  repeated  the  burden  of  the  dis- 
patches from  City  Point : 

Permit  me,  general,  to  urge  the  vast  importance  of  a  hot  pursuit  of  Hood's 
army.  Every  possible  sacrifice  should  be  made,  and  your  men  for  a  few  days 
will  submit  to  any  hardships  and  privations  to  accomplish  the  great  result. 
if  you  can  capture  or  destroy  Hood's  army  General  Sherman  can  entirely 
crush  out  the  rebel  military  force  in  all  the  Southern  States.  He  begins  a 
new  campaign  about  the  first  of  January,  which  will  have  the  most  important 
results  if  Hood's  army  can  now  be  used  up.  A  most  vigorous  pursuit  on 
your  part  is,  therefore,  of  vital  importance  to  General  Sherman's  plans.  No 
sacrifice  must  be  spared  to  obtain  so  important  a  result. 

To  this  General  Thomas,  now  indignant  beyond  further 
endurance,  replied: 

Your  dispatch  of  12  M.,  this  day,  is  received.  General  Hood's  army  is 
being  pursued  as  rapidly  and  as  vigorously  as  it  is  possible  for  one  army  to 
pursue  another.  We  can  not  control  the  elements,  and  you  must  remember 
that,  to  resist  Hood's  advance  into  Tennessee,  I  had  to  reorganize  and  almost 


The  Nashville  Campaign.  575 

thoroughly  equip  the  force  now  under  my  command.  I  fonght  the  battle  of 
the  15th  and  16th  instants  with  the  troops  but  partially  equipped ;  and, 
notwithstanding  the  inclemency  of  the  weather  and  the  partial  equipment, 
have  been  enabled  to  drive  the  enemy  beyond  Duck  River,  crossing  two 
streams  with  my  troops,  and  driving  the  enemy  from  position  to  position, 
without  the  aid  of  pontoons,  and  with  but  little  transportation  to  bring  up 
supplies  of  provisions  and  ammunition.  I  am  doing  all  in  my  power  to 
crush  Hood's  army,  and,  if  it  be  possible,  will  destroy  it.  But  pursuing  an 
enemy  through  an  exhausted  country,  over  mud  roads  completely  sogged 
with  heavy  rains,  is  no  child's  play,  and  can  not  be  accomplished  as  quickly 
as  thought  of.  I  hope,  in  urging  me  to  push  the  enemy,  the  department 
remembers  that  General  Sherman  took  with  him  the  complete  organization 
of  the  Military  Division  of  the  Mississippi,  well  equipped  in  every  respect,  as 
regards  ammunition,  supplies,  and  transportation,  leaving  me  only  two  corps, 
partially  stripped  of  their  transportation  to  accommodate  the  force  taken 
with  him,  to  oppose  the  advance  into  Tennessee  of  that  army  which  had 
resisted  the  advance  of  the  army  of  the  Military  Division  of  the  Mississippi 
on  Atlanta,  from  the  commencement  of  the  campaign  till  its  close,  and  which 
is  now,  in  addition,  aided  by  Forrest's  cavalry.  Although  my  progress  may 
appear  slow,  I  feel  assured  that  Hood's  army  can  be  driven  from  Tennessee, 
and  eventually  driven  to  the  wall  by  the  force  under  my  command.  But  too 
much  must  not  be  expected  of  troops  which  have  to  be  reorganized,  especially 
when  they  have  the  task  of  destroying  a  force,  in  a  winter's  campaign,  which 
was  able  to  make  an  obstinate  resistance  to  twice  its  numbers  in  spring  and 
summer.  In  conclusion,  I  can  safely  state  that  this  army  is  willing  to  submit 
to  any  sacrifice  to  oust  Hood's  army,  or  to  strike  any  other  blow  which  may 
contribute  to  the  destruction  of  the  rebellion. 

Upon  seeing  these  dispatches  Secretary  Stanton  tele- 
graphed the  first  whole-souled  message  which  General  Thomas 
had  received  : 

I  have  seen  to-day  General  Halleck's  dispatch  of  yesterday,  and  your  re- 
ply. It  is  proper  for  me  to  assure  you  that  this  department  has  the  most  un- 
bounded confidence  in  your  skill,  vigor,  and  determination  to  employ  to 
the  best  advantage  all  the  means  in  your  power  to  pursue  and  destroy  the 
enemy.  No  department  could  be  inspired  with  more  profound  admiration 
and  thankfulness  for  the  great  deeds  which  you  have  already  performed,  or 
more  confiding  faith  that  human  effort  could  do  no  more,  and  no  more  than 
will  be  done  by  you  and  the  accomplished  and  gallant  officers  and  soldiers 
of  your  command. 

The  day  before  Stautou  had  suggested  to  Grant  that 
Thomas  should  be  nominated  to  the  vacant  major-generalship 
in  the  regular  army,  and  Grant  had  immediately  and  coldly 
replied  : 

I  think  Thomas  has  won  the  major-generalship,  but  I  would  wait  a  few 
days  before  giving  it  to  see  the  extent  of  damage  done. 


576  Life  of  Thomas. 

Defeating  Hood  in  battle  on  two  successive  days,  putting 
him  to  flight,  pursuing  him  fifty  miles,  recovering  the  vast 
country  for  which  previous  great  battles  had  been  fought, 
preventing  Hood  from  making  a  campaign  to  the  Ohio,  sav- 
ing Sherman  from  everlasting  ridicule,  and  Grant  from  never- 
ending  criticism  for  letting  him  leave  Hood  in.  his  rear — all 
these  were  seemingly  too  small  things  to  merit  promotion. 
There  must  be  a  pause  to  see  whether  in  the  end  there  would 
be  any  thing  whatever  left  of  Hood. 

Here  it  is  in  place  to  turn  aside  a  moment  to  contrast 
these  affairs  with  the  situation  at  Savannah,  which  point 
Sherman,  unopposed,  with  his  magnificent  aitny  of  60,000 
had  reached  while  the  sleet  storm  was  at  its  height  at  Nash- 
ville. To  a  letter  announcing  the  arrival  at  Savannah,  Grant 
thus  wrote  Sherman  : 

I  congratulate  you  and  the  brave  officers  and  men  under  your  com- 
mand on  the  successful  termination  of  your  most  brilliant  campaign.  I 
never  had  a  doubt  of  the  result.  When  apprehensions  for  your  safety  were 
expressed  by  the  President,  I  assured  him  with  the  army  you  had,  and  you 
in  command  of  it,  there  was  no  danger  but  you  would  strike  bottom  on 
salt-water  some  place ;  that  I  would  not  feel  the  same  security,  in  fact 
would  not  have  intrusted  the  expedition  to  any  other  living  commander. 
It  has  been  very  hard  work  to  get  Thomas  to  attack  Hood.  I  gave  him  the 
most  peremptory  order,  and  had  started  to  go  there  myself  before  he  got 
off.  He  has  done  magnificently,  however,  since  he  started.  Up  to  last 
night,  five  thousand  prisoners  and  forty-nine  pieces  of  captured  artillery, 
besides  many  wagons  and  innumberable  small-arms,  had  been  received  in 
Nashville.  This  is  exclusive  of  the  enemy's  loss  at  Franklin ,  which  amounted 
to  thirteen  general  officers  killed,  wounded,  and  captured.  The  enemy 
probably  lost  five  thousand  men  at  Franklin,  and  ten  thousand  in  the  last 
three  days'  operations.  .  .  .  Congratulating  you  and  the  army  again 
upon  the  splendid  results  of  your  campaign,  the  like  of  which  is  not  read 
in  past  history,  I  subscribe  myself,  more  than  ever,  if  possible,  your  friend. 

It  certainly  differed  from  any  thing  in  past  history  in 
the  absence  of  an  enemy  from  its  front  after  it  turned  its 
back  on  Hood. 

Within  a  week  Hardee  with  his  garrison,  claimed  to  be 
15,000  men,  but  really,  as  official  reports  now  show,  falling 
slightly  below  10,000,  had  escaped  from  Sherman's  60,000,  a 
result  for  which  no  possible  military  excuse  can  be  given,  and 
which  caused  Secretary  Stanton  to  telegraph  Grant: 

It  was  a  sore  disappointment  that  Hardee  was  able  to  get  off  his  15,000 


The  Nashville  Campaign.  577 

from  Sherman's  00,000.  It  looks  like  protracting  the  war  while  their  armies 
continue  to  escape. 

But  while  Grant  had  persistently  persecuted  Thomas  with 
groundless  complaints,  the  records  do  not  disclose  a  murmur 
from  him  over  the  inexcusable  escape  of  Hardee  from  Sherman. 

Nothing  more  was  needed,  in  fact  nothing  more  would 
have  been  possible,  unless  Sherman  had  surrendered  to  Hardee, 
to  make  the  contrast  between  Nashville  and  Savannah  strik- 
ing beyond  any  comparisons  which  the  story  of  the  war  had 
furnished.  Finally,  on  the  24th,  while  Thomas  was  still  in 
the  field  vigorously  pursuing  Hood,  this  pleasant  and  satis- 
factory dispatch  reached  him  at  Pulaski : 

MAJOR-GENERAL  THOMAS,  Nashville: 

With  great  pleasure  I  inform  you  that  for  your  skill,  courage,  and  con- 
duct in  the  recent  brilliant  military  operations  under  your  command,  the 
President  has  directed  your  nomination  to  be  sent  to  the  Senate  as  a  major- 
general  in  the  United  States  Army,  to  fill  the  only  vacancy  existing  in  that 
grade.  No  official  duty  has  been  performed  by  me  with  more  satisfaction, 
and  no  commander  has  more  justly  earned  promotion  by  devoted,  disin- 
terested, and  valuable  services  to  his  country. 

EDWIN  M.  STANTON,  Secretary  of  War. 
HON.  E.  M.  STANTON,  Secretary  of  War: 

I  am  profoundly  sensible  of  the  kind  expressions  of  your  telegram  of 
December  24th,  informing  me  that  the  President  had  directed  my  name  to 
be  sent  to  the  Senate  for  confirmation  as  major-general  United  States  Army, 
and  beg  to  assure  the  President  and  yourself,  that  your  approval  of  my 
services  is  of  more  value  to  me  than  the  commission  itself. 

GEO.  H.  THOMAS,  Major-General  Commanding. 

Simultaneously  with  the  ending  of  the  pursuit  of  Hood, 
Stoneman  closed  his  brilliant,  most  destructive,  and  success- 
ful campaign  against  Breckinridge  and  his  supports,  which 
at  the  same  time  that  Hood  appeared  on  the  Tennessee  had 
invaded  East  Tennessee  from  Virginia  and  advanced  in  co- 
operation toward  Knoxville.  Under  full  instructions  from 
General  Thomas,  General  Stoneman,  whom  he  had  sent  to 
command,  advanced  December  9th,  the  day  when  general 
attack  was  ordered  in  front  of  Nashville.  In  a  continuing 
campaign  he  pushed  the  enemy  back  into  Virginia,  captured 
Wytheville  with  its  stores,  destroyed  the  main  salt-works  of 
the  enemy  at  Saltville,  the  lead-works  in  the  same  region, 
scores  of  railroad  bridges,  and  many  miles  of  track,  extensive 
37 


578  Life  of  Thomas. 

iron-works,  and  a  great  variety  and  quantity  o'f  stores.  The 
destruction  of  locomotives  and  rolling-stock  was  at  that 
period  a  sore  loss  to  the  Confederacy.  Breckinridge  was 
driven  into  North  Carolina  just  as  the  pursuit  of  Hood  ended, 
and  East  Tennessee  was  as  clear  of  the  enemy  as  the  country 
invaded  by  Hood. 

The  brilliancy  and  completeness  of  General  Thomas's 
victory  over  Hood  did  not  save  him  from  the  continued 
criticisms  of  Grant  and  Sherman.  The  latter  who  had  just 
allowed  Hardee  with  10,000  men  to  escape  from  Savannah 
while  he  was  resting  quietly  around  it  with  60,000,  was  ex- 
pressing his  astonishment  to  Grant  that  Thomas  had  even 
withdrawn  from  the  line  of  the  Tennessee  River,  and  his 
amazement  that  he  had  not  turned  on  him  at  Franklin,  and 
explaining  it  all  by  the  stock  expression  between  them  that 
Thomas  was  slow.  Grant  was  replying  that  it  had  "  been 
very  hard  work  to  get  Thomas  to  attack  Hood,"  that 
Thomas  was  "  too  ponderous  in  his  preparations  and  equip- 
ments to  move  through  a  country  rapidly  enough  to  live  off 
it,"  and  that  he  did  not  believe  Thomas  would  ever  get  to 
Selma  or  Montgomery.  Finally,  after  his  forces,  had  been 
reduced  by  sending  Schofield  east,  and  A.  J.  Smith's  infantry 
and  5,000  cavalry  to  New  Orleans  for  a  movement  against 
Mobile,  General  Thomas  was  left  in  comparative  peace,  so 
far  as  carping  interference  was  concerned,  to  prepare  for  a 
cavalry  movement  against  Selma,  Montgomery,  and  Central 
Georgia,  which,  in  conference  with  General  James  H.  Wilson, 
he  had  determined  upon,  in  case  he  could  obtain  permission 
to  make  it,  weeks  before  it  had  been  suggested  by  Grant. 
At  the  same  time,  under  directions  from  the  latter,  he  pre- 
pared tov  send  Stoneman  again  into  Virginia  and  upon  the 
left  flank  of  Sherman's  northward  advance  from  Savannah. 

This  movement  into  Alabama  and  Georgia  was  the 
greatest  cavalry  movement  of  the  war  on  the  Union  side, 
and  it  well  deserves  detailed  attention.  As  yet,  it  has  never 
received  the  consideration  in  the  histories  of  the  war  which 
it  so  richly  merits.  For  brilliancy  of  conception  and  execu- 
tion, for  solid  fighting  both  in  the  field  and  against  fortified 
places,  and  for  momentous  results,  no  other  cavalry  opera- 


The  Nashville  Campaign.  579 

tions  approached  these.  Stoneman'e  expedition,  which  Gen- 
eral Thomas  started  from  East  Tennessee  at  the  same  time 
that  Wilson  marched  South,  was  both  brilliant  and  exceed- 
ingly effective.  It  swept  through  South-west  Virginia 
blocking  Lee's  communication  with  that  region  and  dimin- 
ishing his  already  scant  supplies,  and,  turning  into  North 
Carolina,  it  captured  the  prison-pen  of  Salisbury,  and  inter- 
rupted Lee's  railroads  through  that  fertile  region.  It  was 
a  large  factor  in  the  pinching  situation  which  was  fast  forc- 
ing the  abandonment  of  Richmond.  But  Wilson's  move- 
ment was  rather  like  that  of  an  army  than  a  cavalry  raid. 
It  was  in  fact  the  campaign  of  a  mounted  army.  It  was,  too, 
although  executed  by  General  Wilson  at  his  discretion  as  to 
details,  and,  after  the  capture  of  Selma,  as  to  movements 
also,  the  closing  campaign  of  General  Thomas.  It  is  there- 
fore fitting  that  its  history  should  be  presented  at  length  as 
part  of  his  towering  and  enduring  monument. 


Life  of  Thomas. 


CHAPTER  XXVII. 

The  Cavalry  Corps  of  the  Military  Division  of  the  Mississippi  in  the  Nash- 
ville Campaign. 

So  far,  the  military  operations  in  the  West  had  been  car- 
ried on  without  the  efficient  assistance  of  cavalry.  In  October, 
1864,  the  returns  for  the  three  departments  constituting  the 
Military  Division  of  the  Mississippi  showed  a  nominal  strength 
of  nearly  80,000,  cavalry  and  mounted  infantry,  only  about 
14,000  of  whom  were  provided  with  horses  and  were  with 
the  colors  for  duty.  To  make  matters  worse  this  large  force 
was  scattered  widely  over  the  States  of  Kentucky,  Tennessee, 
Missouri,  Alabama,  and  Georgia,  in  detachments  of  various 
strength,  without  unity  of  organization,  equipment,  or  com- 
mand. Each  army  had  its  separate  cavalry  organization.  The 
Army  of  the  Cumberland  had  three  divisions  which  nomi- 
nally constituted  a  corps,  General  "Washington  L.  Elliott, 
chief^of  cavalry,  commanding.  The  Army  of  the  Tennessee 
had  two  divisions,  General  Benjamin  H.  Grierson,  chief  of 
cavalry,  commanding,  and  the  Army  of  the  Ohio  one  divis- 
ion and  several  detached  regiments,  General  George  Stone- 
man,  chief  of  cavalry,  commanding.  Besides  this  every 
army  and  corps  commander  had  a  cavalry  escort,  and  a  large 
number  of  mounted  orderlies,  while  the  dismounted  men 
were  on  detached  service  or  in  the  hospitals,  widely  scat- 
tered throughout  the  Western  and  North-western  States.  As 
a  consequence  this  branch  of  the  service  had  failed  to  make 
itself  properly  felt,  and  while  a  spirit  of  independence  and 
self-reliance  had  been  developed  in  both  men  and  officers,  it 
had  become  quite  evident  to  Thomas,  Sherman,  and  Grant, 
that  the  time  had  come  for  a  radical  change  in  organization 
and  administration.  They  believed  that  with  a  proper  or- 
ganization and  a  competent  leader  the  Western  cavalry  would 
attain  a  standard  of  excellence  quite  equal  to  that  of  the 


The  Cavalry  Corps  in  the  Nashville  Campaign.         581 

Army  of  the  Potomac,  and  that  this  would  make  it  a  most 
potent  factor  in  their  final  efforts  to  crush  the  power  of  the 
Confederacy. 

Of  course  the  first  thing  to  be  done  toward  securing  an 
effective  reorganization  was  to  find  an  officer  competent  not 
only  to  direct  the  work,  but  to  lead  the  troops  in  the  field, 
and  in  response  to  a  request  from  Sherman,  General  Grant 
selected  and  ordered  west  for  that  purpose  General  James  H. 
Wilson,  formerly  of  his  staff,  but  then  commandiugthe  Third 
Cavalry  Division  under  Sheridan  in  the  Valley  of  Virginia. 
The  next  step  was  to  give  him  full  authority  and  the  assistance 
of  a  few  brigade  and  division  commanders  from  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac. 

Although  General  Sherman  expressed  no  great  faith  in 
the  views  and  plans  which  General  Wilson  submitted  to  him, 
he  cordially  consented  to  their  adoption  and  frankly  declared 
that  he  would  not  undertake  to  divide  the  honors  which  the 
reorganized  cavalry  might  gain  for  its  new  commander.  Ac- 
cordingly, on  the  9th  day  of  November,  1864,  at  Gaylesville, 
Alabama,  he  issued  the  order  constituting  the  entire  cavalry 
and  mounted  infantry  of  his  three  departments  as  the  Cav- 
alry Corps  Military  Division  of  the  Mississippi,  under  the 
command  of  Brevet  Major-General  Wilson.  As  this  Order 
put  the  entire  cavalry  force  under  the  command  of  General 
"Wilson,  and  took  its  administration  from  the  control  of  the 
army  commanders,  the  chiefs  of  cavalry  were  at  once  re- 
lieved, and  all  the  details  of  cavalry  administration  were 
centered  at  the  head-quarters  of  the  new  corps.  As  far  as 
practicable,  the  old  division  and  brigade  organizations  were 
retained,  but  several  of  the  older  commanders  were  replaced 
by  younger  men,  among  the  latter  was  General  Upton,  a 
distinguished  graduate  of  "West  Point,  who  had  already  be- 
come famous  as  a  commander  of  artillery  and  infantry  in  tfie 
Army  of  the  Potomac.  The  new  corps  consisted  of  seven 
divisions,  commanded  respectively  by  Generals  E.  M.  McCook, 
Eli  Long,  Judson  Kilpatrick,  Emory  Upton,  Edward  Hatch, 
Richard  W.  Johnson,  and  Joseph  F.  Knipe.  Croxton, 
La  Grange,  Minty,  Miller,  Atkins,  Murray,  Alexander, 
"Winslow,  Coon,  Stewart,  Hammond,  Harrison,  and  Palmer, 


582  Life  of  Thomas. 

all  old  well  tried  soldiers,  but  young  in  years,  commanded  brig- 
ades, while  many  distinguished  colonels  commanded  regiments. 
The  horse  artillery  was  limited  to  six  guns  to  each  division,- 
and  consisted  of  Beebe's  18th  Indiana,  Robinson's  Chicago 
Board  of  Trade,  the  10th  Wisconsin,  Smith's,  afterward  Rod- 
ney's, Battery  I  of  the  4th  U.  S.  Artillery,  1st  Illinois  Artil- ' 
ery,  and  14th  Ohio  Battery. 

Kilpatrick's  Third  Division,  having  been  selected  to  ac- 
company General  Sherman  in  his  march  to  the  sea,  was  fully 
mounted  by  taking  horses  from  other  divisions,  and  strength- 
ened by  bringing  forward  the  detached  and  extra  duty  men. 
The  second  division,  now  wholly  dismounted,  was  sent  to 
Louisville  for  remounts  and  the  remainder  of  the  widely 
scattered  corps  was  concentrated  in  Tennessee  as  rapidly  as 
possible,  for  the  purpose  of  watching  and  resisting  the  ad- 
vance of  Hood.  Hatch,  Croxton,  and  Capron  kept  watch 
and  ward  in  the  country  south  of  Pulaski,  while  Winslow 
was  hurried  from  South-western  Missouri  to  join  Upton's 
new  division  at  Louisville.  Every  effort  that  a  large  and 
efficient  staff  could  make  was  made  to  collect  and  remount 
the  cavalry  forces,  and  to  bring  them  into  the  field  in  front 
of  Hood's  advancing  columns.  But  withal,  when  General 
Wilson  took  command,  in  November,  near  Pulaski,  Tennes- 
see, he  found  only  about  six  thousand  well  mounted  and  effi- 
cient cavalry,  with  which  to  make  head  against  a  much 
larger  body  under  Forrest.  Concentrating  the  available 
parts  of  his  force  for  the  first  time  at  Columbia,  it  was 
handled  henceforth  as  a  unit,  and  notwithstanding  it  was 
then  falling  back  in  front  of  Hood's  advance,  it  grew 
steadily  in  strength  and  efficiency  till  the  time  came  for  it 
to  assume  the  offensive  with  Thomas's  hastily  organized 
army  at  the  battle  of  Nashville.  It  participated  actively  in 
all  the  battles  and  marches  which  took  place  during  Hood's 
invasion  of  Tennessee,  giving  timely  and  accurate  informa- 
tion of  the  enemy's  movements,  and  especially  of  his  cross- 
ing Duck  River  and  his  march  on  Spring  Hill  and  Frank- 
lin. At  the  latter  place,  simultaneously  with  the  terrible 
assault  made  by  the  Confederate  infantry  on  the  fortified 
position  held  by  the  infantry  under  Schofield,  the  cavalry  en- 
gaged and  defeated  Forrest's  cavalry  under  Chalmers  after 


The  Cavalry  Corps  in  the  Nashville  Campaign.         583 

it  had  crossed  Duck  River  above  the  town  and  was  threaten- 
ing to  throw  itself  upon  the  line  of  Federal  retreat.  This 
\vas  the  first  fruit  of  the  new  organization  and  the  policy  of 
concentration,  and  was  worth  all  they  had  cost.  It  was  also 
the  first  time  the  cavalry  had  played  an  important  part  in 
co-operation  with  the  infantry  in  any  important  battle  of  the 
West.  A  casual  examination  of  the  circumstances  of  that 
battle,  with  a  good  map  of  the  theater  of  operations,  will 
show  that  had  the  rebel  cavalry  succeeded  in  forcing  its  way 
to  Schofield's  rear,  as  it  could  easily  have  done,  but  for  the 
interposition  of  Wilson's  cavalry,  it  would  have  been  difficult 
to  withdraw  the  infantry  from  its  position  in  the  works  of 
Franklin,  and  impossible  to  save  its  trains  and  artillery.  This 
was  the  view  taken  of  it  by  Schofield  on  that  important  day, 
and  it  is  fully  justified  by  all  the  subsequent  developments. 

As  soon  as  Thomas  had  assembled  all  his  forces  at 
Nashville,  which  was  rendered  necessary  by  the  failure  of  the 
16th  Corps,  under  A.  J.  Smith,  to  arrive  from  Missouri  in 
time  to  permit  the  concentration  to  take  place  at  any  point 
further  south,  every  effort  was  made  to  render  victory  cer- 
tain. The  cavalry  corps  was  permitted  to  cross  to  the  north 
side  of  the  Cumberland  River,  and  go  into  camp  at  Edgetield. 
Detachments  were  of  course  sent  at  once  to  watch  all  the 
possible  crossings  of  the  Cumberland  River,  both  above  and 
below  that  place,  but  the  main  body  was  held  massed,  well 
in  hand,  ready  to  strike  in  any  direction.  Thomas,  himself 
a  selected  cavalry  officer  of  great  distinction,  and  one  of  the 
few  generals  in  the  army  understanding  the  value  of  that 
arm,  gave  his  active  support  and  assistance  to  General  Wil- 
son in  all  his  efforts  to  collect  and  remount  his  dismounted 
men,  and  to  prepare  them  for  the  field.  In  the  absence  of  a 
proper  supply  of  cavalry  horses  in  the  government  corrals, 
and  in  answer  to  his  urgent  request,  the  Secretary  of  War 
authorized  General  Wilson  to  impress  all  the  suitable  horses 
he  could  find  in  Kentucky  and  Tennessee.  This  was  an  un- 
usual measure,  but  was  employed  with  great  vigor  and  effi- 
ciency. Street  railroads,  stage  lines,  livery  stables,  farmers, 
private  owners,  and  even  circuses,  were  despoiled  of  all  their 
horses  suitable  for  cavalry  service,  and  by  the  10th  of  De- 


584  .  Life  of  Thomas. 

cember  over  12,000  cavalry,  2,000  of  which  were  absent  in 
pursuit  of  Lyon,  were  in  the  saddle,  and  less  than  2,000  of 
those  who  had  reached  Nashville  were  yet  unprovided  with 
remounts.  Secretary  Stanton  had  railed  against  the  delay, 
and  General  Grant  had  ordered  Thomas  to  march  out  and 
light,  whether  his  cavalry  was  mounted  or  not,  but  that 
sturdy  chieftain,  confident  that  he  was  right  in  his  deter- 
mination, would  not  permit  himself  to  be  driven  into  action 
so  long  as  his  preparations  were  incomplete  and  Hood  was 
willing  to  maintain  his  defensive  attitude. 

As  the  decisive  part  which  the  cavalry  played  in  this 
battle  is  seldom  given  due  prominence  its  general  features  are 
here  presented,  notwithstanding  the  necessity  of  repeating 
some  of  the  incidents  of  the  engagement. 

When  positive  orders,  as  heretofore  related,  came  from 
Grant,  on  the  10th  of  December,  to  march  out  and  give  bat- 
tle, Thomas  called  his  corps  commanders  together,  not  to 
ask  their  advice,  but  to  tell  them  about  the  orders,  and  of 
the  reply  he  had  already  made  to  them.  That  terrible  winter 
sleet  storm  had  set  in,  and  all  the  country  was  covered  with  a 
glare  of  ice  upon  which  it  was  impossible  for  either  infantry 
or  cavalry  to  march  or  maneuver.  To  fight  was,  therefore,, 
impossible,  and  when  the  commanders  were  assembled  this 
was  the  sentiment  of  all.  Wilson,  the  junior,  was  the  first 
to  speak.  He  declared  that  efficient  operations  were,  under 
the  circumstances,  out  of  the  question,  unless  his  horses  were 
rough-shod,  and  this  was  an  operation  which  for  10,000 
horses  would  require  several  days  to  carry  out.  He  said 
that  victory  could  not  be  made  complete,  even  under  the 
most  favorable  conditions,  unless  there  should  be  perfect  co- 
operation between  cavalry  and  infantry,  and  while  he  spoke 
only  for  the  mounted  troops  and  understood  perfectly  that 
the  horses  on  the  field  where  the  battle  must  be  fought  would 
be  used  merely  for  transporting  the  men  rapidly  to  the  front 
assigned  them  for  delivering  their  attack,  he  strenuously 
urged  that  no  movement  should  be  begun  till  a  favorable 
change  of  the  weather  had  set  in.  So  confident  was  he  of 
the  futility  of  an  attack  at  that  time,  that  he  declared,  if  he 
occupied  Hood's  works,  with  his  cavalry  dismounted  and 


The  Cavalry  Corps  in  the  Nashville  Campaign.          585 

each  armed  with  a  basket  of  brickbats,  he  would  undertake 
to  repulse  the  whole  of  Thomas's  infantry,  if  it  should  ad- 
vance against  his  position  over  the  ice-covered  hillsides  in 
front  of  it.  This  remark  caused  a  smile  to  pass  over  the 
faces  of  Thomas  and  his  companions,  and  seemed  so  reason- 
able that  it  received  general  assent.  General  Thomas  J. 
Wood,  commanding  the  Fourth  Corps,  also  an  old  cavalry 
officer,  spoke  next,  and  gave  his  unqualified  approval  to 
the  opinion  expressed  by  "Wilson.  General  Steedman  con- 
curred. Indeed,  there  was  no  dissent  expressed  or  even  im- 
plied from  any  one.  The  opinion  of  all,  so  far  as  it  was  ex- 
pressed, was  against  fighting  then  or  doing  any  thing  else 
to  jeopard  the  victory  which  all  seemed  certain  of  gaining 
when  the  weather  became  favorable.  Thomas  himself  sat 
impassive  and  silent  during  the  discussion,  which  lasted  b'ut 
a  few  minutes,  and  when  it  was  over,  after  expressing  his 
gratification,  remarked  that  he  had  not  called  his  generals 
together  for  the  purpose  of  getting  their  advice,  but  merely 
to  tell  them  of  the  orders  he  had  received,  and  of  his  reply, 
which  had  been  already  sent,  and  which  he  now  knew  that 
they  would  approve.  That  reply,  now  known  to  all  the 
world,  was,  in  substance,  as  has  been  seen,  that  the  conditions 
were  not  favorable,  on  account  of  the  sleet,  to  rn  advance,  and 
that  he  would  not  fight  against  his  judgment,  but  that  his 
commission  and  command  were  at  the  disposal  of  the  author- 
ities above  him.  "When  the  meeting  broke  up  General 
Thomas  asked  General  Wilson  to  remain  after  the  others 
had  gone.  Knowing  that  the  latter  was  intimate  with  Grant 
and  the  atmosphere  of  his  head-quarters,  where  he  had  served 
two  years  as  a  staff-officer,  and  had  come  recently  from  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac,  Thomas  said  to  him,  in  a  tone  of  in- 
tense earnestness :  "  Wilson,  they  treat  me  at  Washington 
and  at  Grant's  head-quarters  as  though  I  were  a  boy  !  They 
do  not  seem  to  think  that  I  have  sense  enough  to  plan  a 
campaign  or  fight  a  battle,  but  if  they  will  only  let  me  alone 
a  few  days,  I  will  show  them  that  they  are  mistaken.  I  am 
sure  we  shall  whip  Hood  and  destroy  his  army,  if  we  go  at 
them  under  favorable  instead  of  unfavorable  conditions."  A 
pleasant  and  reassuring  conversation  followed,  when  the 


586  Life  of  Thomas. 

two  separated  for  the  night,  each  to  continue  his  preprations 
for  victory.  On  the  14th  the  weather  h.ad  moderated,  and 
on  the  evening  of  that  day  the  various  parts  of  the  army 
marched  quietly  to  the  position  that  had  been  assigned  to  it. 
The  action  was  begun  three  hours  later  on  the  15th  than  was 
expected,  because  of  a  dense  fog,  which  hung  over  the  city 
and  its  surroundings,  and  rendered  it  impossible  for  the 
generals  to  see  the  points  upon  which  they  were  to  direct 
their  preliminary  movements.  The  delay  was  imperative, 
and  most  probably  prevented  the  defeat  of  the  Confederates 
on  the  first  day  of  the  battle.  The  plan  of  Thomas  contem- 
plated an  advance  on  the  Charlotte  and  Harding  Turnpikes, 
and  after  breaking  through  the  enemy's  line,  a  turning 
movement  of  both  infantry  and  cavalry  against  his  left  cen- 
ter. Of  course  the  cavalry  had  the  extreme  right,  and  was 
compelled  to  swing  on  a  much  longer  radius  than  the  in- 
fantry. The  thaw,  which  had  been  followed  by  lowering 
weather,  had  made  the  roads  and  fields  extremely  muddy, 
and  hence  the  swinging  movement  began  later  and  was  made 
less  rapidly  than  it  was  hoped  it  would  be.  Fortunately, 
however,  it  was  exceedingly  successful,  and  gave  to  the  vic- 
torious cavalry,  notwithstanding  the  shortness  of  the  winter's 
day,  several  redoubts  on  the  left  center  of  Hood's  position, 
and  also  a  large  number  of  guns  and  many  prisoners  by  night- 
fall of  the  first  day.  But  what  was  better  and  of  even  greater 
importance,  was  the  fact  that  it  placed  the  Federal  cavalry 
on  the  flank  and  rear  of  Hood's  main  line  in  a  position  from 
which  it  was  easy  the  next  day  to  advance  still  further 
and  to  make  victory  certain.  The  fortunate  absence  of  For- 
rest with  a  large  part  of  his  cavalry  relieved  the  operations 
of  the  Federal  cavalry  from  the  great  peril  it  would  have 
otherwise  incurred;  but  this  favoring  circumstances  was 
neither  known  nor  heeded  at  that  time  by  "Wilson  or  his  sub- 
ordinates. 

Beginning  as  soon  as  it  was  light  they  pushed  their  dis- 
mounted troopers  to,  and  across,  the  Granny  White  turn  pike, 
and  over  the  heavily  wooded  slopes  of  the  Brentwood  hills, 
steadily  driving  back  the  rebel  skirmishers  and  pressing 
closer  and  closer  upon  the  rebel  rear  in  spite  of  their  stub- 


The  Cavalry  Corps  in  the  Nashville  Campaign.          587 

born  resistance.  The  great  swinging  movement  was  con- 
tinued, slowly  it  is  true,  but  irresistibly.  Hatch,  Croxton 
and  Hammond  handled  their  dismounted  men  with  skill  and 
persistency,  while  Alexander,  Wilson's  chief  of  staff,  with 
Johnson's  division,  was  hurrying  toward  the  Harpeth  river 
by  the  Harding  pike,  for  the  purpose  of  crossing  it  and 
swinging  into  Franklin  on  the  road  by  which  the  enemy 
must  retreat.  By  two  o'clock  it  was  apparent  that  the  dis- 
mounted'cavalry  skirmishers  had  reached  a  position  entirely 
in  the  rear  of  Hood's  left  center,  close  to  his  works  and 
facing  JSTashville.  A  courier  with  a  dispatch  from  Hood  to 
Chalmers,  directing  the  latter  "for  God's  sake  to  drive  the 
yaukee  cavalry  from  our  left  and  rear  or  all  is  lost,"  had  been 
sent  to  Thomas  along  with  the  suggestion  that  the  time  had 
come  for  the  infantry  to  advance.  Staff  officer  after  staff 
officer  followed  with  similar  messages,  but  as  the  infantry  did 
not  move,  Wilson,  impatient  at  the  delay,  galloped  himself 
from  behind  the  rebel  lines  and  around  their  left  flank,  to  the 
position  occupied  by  Thomas,  with  Schofielcl,  near  the  right 
of  our  infantry  line.  Just  as  he  arrived  and  was  explaining 
the  necessity  for  an  immediate  advance  of  the  whole  line,  he 
perceived  and  pointed  out  the  dismounted  cavalrymen 
swarming  into  the  rebel  intrenchments  from  the  rear,  and 
one  of  his  batteries  still  farther  to  the  rear,  firing  rapidly 
into  the  rebel  lines.  At  this  inspiring  sight,  Thomas,  like 
Wellington  at  Waterloo,  closed  his  glass,  and  turning  to  his 
subordinate  said,  "  let  the  whole  line  advance."  It  was  then 
about  half  past  three  o'clock,  and  the  whole  line  from  right 
to  left  did  advance,  sweeping  every  thing  before  it.  The 
enemy,  already  harassed  beyond  endurance  by  Wilson's 
dismounted  cavalry,  now  entering  their  works  from  the  rear, 
fired  wildly  and  then  broke  and  fled  in  disorder,  as  rapidly 
as  possible  across  the  broken  country  between  the  Granny 
White  and  the  Franklin  turnpikes.  The  Union  infantry  en- 
gaged in  the  final  charge  met  with  but  little  resistance  and 
sufiered  no  loss  worth  mentioning.  Several  charges  had 
been  made  by  it  at  various  times  and  places  earlier  in  the  day, 
but  they  had  all  been  bloodily  repulsed ;  now  the  whole  line 
was  victorious,  and  the  loss  was  insignificant.  The  reason 


588  Life  of  Thomas. 

for  this  is  not  far  to  seek.  The  turning  movement  of  Wil- 
son's cavalry,  enveloping  and  taking  in  reverse  the  rebel  line 
for  a  mile  and  a  half  as  it  did,  rendered  it  impossible  for 
Hood  to  hold  his  position  longer  or  to  make  an  effective  re- 
sistance to  the  assault  which  Thomas  ordered,  and  which  put 
an  end  to  the  battle.  Had  it  not  been  for  this  turning  move- 
ment and  the  persistency  with  which  it  was  pushed  home, 
Jlood  could  and  doubtless  would  have  held  his  intrenchments 
stubbornly  against  the  direct  assaults  of  the  infantry.  The 
simple  truth  is  the  great  victory  was  gained  by  the  proper 
and  efficient  cooperation  of  cavalry,  infantry  and  artillery, 
all  working  in  harmony  to  carry  out  the  plans  of  Thomas. 
It  was  the  first  and  only  occasion  where  the  three  arms  of 
service  were  properly  employed,  each  according  to  its  own 
rules  and  requirements  in  a  great  battle,  in  the  west,  and  the 
only  instance  in  the  country  except  that  of  Sheridan's  victory 
over  Early,  at  Winchester.  The  result  amply  vindicated 
Thomas  in  deciding  to  wait  for  the  remount  of  his  cavalry, 
as  advised  by  its  commander.  The  victory  was  as  complete 
as  it  could  be  made,  in  a  short  December  day.  The  pursuit 
was  begun  at  once,  but  it  must  not  be  forgotten  that  the  en- 
tire cavalry  force  on  the  field  had  been  dismounted  and  en- 
gaged in  the  attack  against  the  rear  of  Hood's  intrench- 
ments. There  was  absolutely  no  reserve,  and  the  horses  of 
the  entire  force  were  from  a  half  to  three-quarters  of  a  mile 
in  rear,  and  with  all  the  officers  could  do,  aided  by  the  cheer- 
ful alacrity  of  the  men,  over  a  half  an  hour  was  consumed  in 
getting  to  the  horses,  and  mounting  for  the  pursuit.  There 
was  no  warning  of  the  rebel  intention  to  break,  except  that 
contained  in  Hood's  despairing  cry  to  Chalmers;  they  fought 
on  doggedly  and  steadily,  every  man  in  his  place,  till  the  in- 
fantry advance  began,  and  then  seeing  that  further  resistance 
would  be  in  vain,  they  broke  all  at  once  and  hastened  to  the 
rear  as  rapidly  as  possible.  They  had  evidently  held  on  till 
the  last  minute,  hoping  for  night,  in  which  to  escape  from 
capture  or  destruction.  The  break  occurred  at  about  four 
o'clock.  The  dismounted  cavalry  picked  up  all  the  prison- 
ers they  could  intercept,  and  after  turning  them  over  to  the 
infantry,  hastened  to  find  their  horses  and  mount.  The  pur- 


The  Cavalry  Corps  in  the  Nashville  Campaign.          589 

suit  began  by  the  first  mounted  troops  at,  or  a  few  minutes 
after  half  past  four.  The  clouds  hung  low  and  were  dense 
and  black.  It  had  already  begun  to  rain  and  this  hastened 
the  oncoming  of  night.  By  five  o'clock  or  a  few  minutes 
later  it  was  dark,  and  by  six  a  cavalryman  could  scarcely  see 
his  horse's  ears,  but  there  was  no  hesitation  or  delay.  Using 
the  Granny  White  turnpike  as  a  directrix,  the  gallant  horse- 
men of  Hatch's  division,  pushed  onward  into  the  darkness, 
picking  up  prisoners  and  ruthlessly  charging  every  semblance 
of  a  rear  guard.  Hammond  and  Croxton  followed  close 
upon  their  heels,  and  no  one  in  the  entire  cavalry  force 
thought  of  halting  or  going  into  camp,  although  the  day 
had  been  a  hard  and  toilsome  one  with  but  little  cessation 
from  marching  and  fighting.  The  pursuit  had  not  been  car- 
ried more  than  two  or  three  miles  before  the  advanced 
squadrons  found  a  part  of  Chalmers'  division  of  Forrest's 
cavalry  formed  across  the  road  behind  a  fence-rail  "lay  out." 
It  was  too  dark  to  discern  any  thing  except  the  flash  of  the 
rebel  fire-arms,  but  Colonel  George  Spalding,  commanding 
the  leading  regiment,  ordered  it  to  follow  him  in  a  headlong 
charge,  which  scattered  the  fence-rail  barricade,  and  its  de- 
fenders, like  chaff  before  the  wind.  A  running  fight  took 
place,  charge  and  counter-charge  following  in  quick  succes- 
sion, and  in  which  the  shout  of  the  combatants,  the  clang 
of  sabers,  and  the  rattle  of  pistols  and  rifles,  made  the 
night  one  never  to  be  forgotten. 

During  this  demoniac  scene,  Colonel  Spalding  encoun- 
tered the  Confederate  general,  Rucker,  and  a  conflict,  as 
between  two  knights  of  old,  took  place.  They  were  men 
of  great  personal  strength  and  skill,  and  yet  it  was  so 
dark  that  both  were  at  a  disadvantage.  Grappling  at 
each  other  blindly,  as  it  were,  each  wrested  the  saber  from 
his  antagonist's  hand,  and  each  renewed  the  fight  with 
the  other's  weapon.  They  were  both  well  mounted  and 
both  good  horsemen,  but  the  issue  was  a  doubtful  one 
till  a  stray  shot  broke  Rucker's  sword  arm,  when  he 
was  compelled  to  surrender.  Of  course,  Rucker's  sword 
was  Spalding's  trophy,  gallantly  won.  It  remained  in 
his  possession,  at  Monroe,  Michigan,  for  a  quarter  of  a  cen- 


590  Life  of  Thomas. 

tury,  when  it  was  returned  to  its  original  owner,  now  a  suc- 
cessful business  man  at  Birmingham,  Alabama. 

General  Wilson's  staff  captured  three  rebel  guns  shortly 
afterward.  The  rebels  continued  their  flight  toward  Frank- 
lin in  disorder,  but  the  Union  cavalry  had  also  become  so  scat- 
tered, and  it  was  so  dark  that  the  pursuit  was  discontinued 
at  eleven  o'clock. 

It  was  renewed  at  dawn  the  next  day,  Hammond's  bri- 
gade in  advance,  and  a  sharp  conflict  took  place  at  Hollow 
Tree  Gap,  in  which  the  semblance  of  rebel  rear  guard  was 
again  scattered.  All  day  long,  and  again  into  the  night,  the 
pursuit  was  continued.  The  hospitals  and  many  prisoners 
were  captured  at  Franklin,  but  the  flying  Confederates  could 
not  be  brought  to  bay  long  enough  to  permit  a  vital  blow  to 
be  struck.  Many  brilliant  combats  took  place  between  the 
rebel  rear  guard  under  Forrest  and  the  pursuing  cavalry. 
Many  prisoners  and  trophies  of  war  fell  into  the  hands  of 
the  latter,  but  Hood  finally  succeeded  in  withdrawing  the 
broken  and  disheartened  fragments  of  his  army  to  the  south 
of  the  Tennessee  River  by  a  bridge  at  Muscle  Shoals.  It  was 
hoped  that  the  gun-boats  under  Admiral  Lee  would  reach 
and  destroy  this;  and,  although  they  got  within  sight  and 
range  of  it,  they  did  not  succeed  in  breaking  it. 

A  detachment  of  Union  cavalry  under  General  Palmer 
succeeded  in  crossing  the  river  at  Decatur,  and  continued 
the  pursuit  till  it  had  captured  the  last  of  Hood's  trains. 

The  question  has  been  asked,  why  Thomas  did  not  over- 
take Hood,  or  cut  off  his  retreat  and  compel  him  to  sur- 
render, as  Grant  did  Lee,  at  Appomattox,  a  few  months  later. 
The  reply  is  simple.  Thomas's  operations  were  in  mid- 
winter, when  the  days  were  shortest,  and  the  weather  exe- 
crable. It  will  be  remembered,  that  before  the  battle  at 
Nashville,  it  had  sleeted  and  frozen ;  then  it  thawed ;  on 
the  second  day  of  the  battle  it  began  to  rain,  and  that  it 
rained,  snowed,  froze,  and  thawed,  alternately,  from  that  day 
on  till  Christmas.  The  roads,  with  the  exception  of  the  sin- 
gle turnpike  ending  at  Pulaski,  on  which  Hood  retreated, 
were  of  mud,  and  became  almost  impassable  quagmires.  The 
creeks  and  rivers  were  full  and  overflowing;  the  bridges  were 


The  Cavalry  Corps  in  the  Nashville  Campaign.          591 

swept  away  and  destroyed ;  the  forests,  fields,  and  swamps 
were  impassable,  or  so  nearly  so  that  cavalry  could  traverse 
them  with  the  greatest  difficulty,  and  with  only  such  speed 
as  easily  enabled  the  rebels  moving  on  the  turnpike  to  out- 
strip it.  Besides,  the  country  had  been  swept  clean  of  corn, 
forage,  and  provisions,  and  both  the  pursuing  cavalry  and  in- 
fantry were  forced  to  draw  their  supplies  largely  from  the 
rear.  The  destroyed  bridges  had  to  be  rebuilt  and  the  roads 
had  to  be  corduroyed  in  many  places  before  the  trains  could 
go  forward.  So  toilsome  was  the  struggle  of  the  pursuers  to 
get  on,  that  over  6,000  cavalry  horses  were  disabled,  and 
many  of  them  had  to  be  abandoned  or  destroyed,  because 
their  legs  were  so  frozen  and  diseased  that  their  hoofs 
dropped  off.  Notwithstanding  all  this,  Hood's  army,  which 
invaded  Tennessee  over  55,000  strong,  was  practically  de- 
stroyed. It  lost  nearly  all  its  guns  and  field  transportation, 
besides  about  15,000  killed  and  wounded,  and  15,000  prison- 
ers. From  the  best  information  that  can  be  gathered,  not  to 
exceed  10,000  men,  counting  both  cavalry  and  infantry,  re- 
mained with  the  colors  when  they  crossed  the  Tennessee 
River,  though  a  few  thousand  more  gathered  later  at  Tupelo. 
It  is  difficult  to  see  how  the  work  of  destruction  could  have 
been  more  efficiently  performed ;  and  when  it  is  remembered 
that  the  rebel  army  of  Tennessee,  as  an  army,  never  again  ap- 
peared in  the  field,  it  must  be  conceded  that  there  is  absolutely 
no  ground  left  upon  which  to  found  a  censure  or  base  a  criti- 
cism of  Thomas  or  his  subordinate  commanders.  They  had 
annihilated  the  army  of  veterans  which  had  fought  and 
eluded  Sherman  for  six  months,  and  they  had  done  it  while 
that  erratic  leader  was  engaged  in  a  holiday  march  which  led 
him  from  Atlanta  to  the  sea-coast,  but  which  had  also  taken 
him  from  the  field  of  useful  military  operations  almost  as 
completely  as  if  he  had  marched  toward  the  coast  of  Lake 
Michigan. 

It  is  also  to  be  remembered,  in  contrasting  Thomas's  de- 
feat and  pursuit  of  Hood  with  Grant's  defeat  and  pursuit  of 
Lee,  that  the  latter  took  place  in  April,  over  muddy  roads  at 
times,  it  is  true,  but  in  spring  weather,  and  through  a  coun- 
try not  hitherto  devastated  by  war.  It  should  also  be  re- 


592  Life  of  Thomas. 

membered  that,  generally  speaking,  Lee  moved  first  north, 
and  then  over  an  arc  of  a  circle,  trying  to  pass  around  Grant's 
left,  while  the  latter  inarched  on  the  chord.  In  military 
phrase,  Lee  moved  on  an  eccentric  line,  while  Grant  moved 
on  an  interior  line.  In  the  other  case,  Hood  had  a  run 
straight  away,  first  on  a  turnpike,  two-thirds  of  the  distance 
to  the  Tennessee  River,  with  all  the  circumstances  in  his 
favor.  In  the  first  case,  the  chances  were  all  in  favor  of 
Grant;  in  the  second,  they -were  all  against  Thomas. 


The  Cavalry  Corps  in  Alabama  and  Georgia.  593 

CHAPTER  XXVIII. 

The  Operations  of  the  Cavalry  Corps  in  Alabama  and  Georgia. 

After  the  campaign  in  Tennessee  was  closed,  the  cavalry 
corps  was  assembled  first  at  Huntsville,  in  Northern  Alabama, 
but  owing  to  the  impoverished  condition  of  the  surrounding 
country  and  the  difficulty  of  completing  the  supply  of  so 
large  a  force  by  railroad,  it  was  shortly  removed  to  the  north 
bank  of  the  Tennessee  River,  and  placed  in  cantonments 
extending  about  twelve  miles  from  Gravelly  Springs  to  Wat- 
erloo Landing,  to  which  place  the  Tennessee  was  navigable 
all  the  year  round  for  light  draught  steamboats.  Supplies 
were  drawn  in  abundance  by  that  means  from  the  states 
traversed  by  the  Ohio  and  Mississippi  Rivers.  The  country 
being  covered  with  timber,  broken  here  and  there  by  fields, 
and  having  a  high,  rolling  surface  and  a  gravelly  soil,  with 
an  abundance  of  beautiful  springs  and  wholesome  water,  was 
admirably  adapted  to  a  cavalry  encampment  at  any  time, 
and  especially  so  in  winter. 

Every  effort  was  made  to  collect  the  entire  cavalry  corps 
and  to  put  it  into  efficient  condition  for  a  campaign  at  the 
earliest  possible  day.  During  January  and  February  six 
divisions  were  assembled  there,  only  one,  that  of  Kilpatrick, 
which  had  accompanied  Sherman  in  his  march  to  the  sea 
being  absent,  while  a  few  detached  regiments  were  serving 
in  East  Tennessee,  and  along  the  river  between  Decatur  and 
Chattanooga,  and  could  not  be  drawn  in. 

The  campaign  ending  with  the  defeat  of  Hood  had  been 
an  exceedingly  severe  one  on  both  men  and  horses.  The 
movements  had  been  so  constant  and  so  rapid  that  the  com- 
mand not  only  ran  down  in  strength  and  efficiency,  but  a 
large  percentage  of  it  had  been,  as  before  stated,  dismounted 
and  somewhat  scattered.  In  addition,  Long's  division  had 
38 


594  Life  of  Thomas. 

been  sent  to  Louisville  for  a  remount,  Upton's,  one  brigade 
in  Missouri  and  one  in  West  Tennessee,  had  not  been  as- 
sembled, and  La  Grange's  brigade  of  McCook's  division  had 
been  detached  to  drive  Lyon  and  Crossland  from  Kentucky, 
so  that  none  of  these  organizations  was  at  the  battle  of  Nash- 
ville or  engaged  in  the  pursuit  of  Hood.  The  pause  in  the 
campaign,  however,  gave  time  to  draw  them  all  into  the 
cantonments  on  the  Tennessee,  and  to  weld  them,  with  those 
already  there,  into  a  homogeneous,  coherent,  and  irresistible 
body  of  horse.  The  men  were  hardy  veterans,  inured  to 
all  the  trials  and  vicissitudes  of  war.  They  needed  but  little 
primary  instruction.  They  understood  perfectly  how  to 
march  and  fight,  and  wanted  merely  the  larger  knowledge 
and  confidence  which  comes  only  with  the  formal  organiza- 
tion and  discipline  of  the  army  corps.  It  can  not  be  denied 
that  the  endurance  of  the  command  had  been  pushed  to  its 
ultimate  limit,  and  though  the  spirits  of  ofiicers  and  men  had 
been  raised  by  success  in  battle  and  pursuit,  the  orderly  per- 
formance of  routine  duty  was  for  the  most  part  out  of  the 
question.  Roll  calls  were  frequently  omitted,  and  many  es- 
sential military  details  and  formalities  had  been  suspended. 
Notwithstanding  all  this,  which  was  inevitable  in  the  rush 
and  excitement  of  such  a  campaign  as  the  one  which  had 
just  ended,  General  Grant  and  the  authorities  in  "Washing- 
ton seem  to  have  entertained  the  idea  that  military  opera- 
tions were  to  be  continued  in  the  west  without  intermission, 
or  winter  quarters,  for  rest  and  repair,  for  any  one.  Although 
this  rule  was  not  applied  to  the  thoroughly  organized  and 
disciplined  armies,  and  army  corps  of  both  infantry  and 
cavalry  which  were  operating  in  Virginia,  and  especially 
about  Petersburg,  and  which  had  first  choice  and  an  abun- 
dant supply  of  whatever  the  country  could  afford,  it  was 
plainly  intimated  to  General  Thomas  that  there  was  to  be  no 
rest  for  him  or  any  part  of  the  heterogeneous,  widely  scat- 
tered, and  badly  supplied  force  which  had  just  gained  such  a 
signal  victory  over  the  public  enemy. 

Hitherto,  the  custom  in  the  west  had  been  to  scatter 
the  cavalry,  and  to  treat  it  as  though  neither  man  nor  horses 
ever  required  rest.  Remounts  were  inadequately  if  not 


The  Cavalry  Corps  in  Alabama  and  Georgia.           595 

grudgingly  furnished,  and  the  force  was  scattered  in  detach- 
ments without  purpose  or  power  to  inflict  serious  injury  upon 
the  enemy,  and  this,  doubtless,  would  have  been  the  policy 
now,  but  for  the  fact  that  Thomas  and  Wilson  insisted  upon 
concentration,  remounts,  and  repairs  as  essentials  to  success. 
Fortunately  for  them  and  for  the  cavalry  corps,  a  rainy 
winter,  together  with  unusual  floods  in  the  rivers  and  creeks, 
made  it  impossible  to  continue  operations,  or  to  traverse  the 
impoverished  region  that  separated  them  from  the  enemy's 
inner  strongholds  and  depots.  Fortunately  for  the  country 
they  improved  the  time  which  they  were  thus  enabled  to  se- 
cure in  correcting  the  shortcomings  and  repairing  the  defi- 
ciencies of  the  command.  Wilson  called  to  his  assistance  a 
large  and  efficient  staff,  with  a  sufficient  number  of  West 
Point  officers  in  it  to  give  personal  supervision  to  all  the 
details  of  organization.  Carling,  the  chief  quartermaster, 
Beaumont,  the  adjutant-general,  Andrews  and  Noyes,  aids- 
de-camps  and  inspectors,  were  officers  of  great  merit  and  ex- 
perience, and  set  a  willing  example  to  their  associates  in  the 
multifarious  duties  imposed  upon  them.  The  organization 
and  especially  the  size  of  this  staff  had  arrested  the  attention 
of  Europe'an  soldiers  and  writers.  Colonel  Chesney,  the  En- 
glish military  critic,  realizing  that  cavalry  requires  more 
looking  after  than  any  other  arm  of  service,  specially  com- 
mends it  as  the  best  cavalry  staff  ever  organized,  and  as  in 
every  way  worthy  of  imitation.  Through  its  agency  and 
the  intelligent  and  cheerful  co-operation  of  the  division, 
brigade,  and  regimental  commanders,  order  soon  reigned 
supreme  throughout  the  cantonments.  The  strictest  dis- 
cipline was  every-where  enforced.  The  regulations  were 
strictly  obeyed,  and  all  the  wants  of  men  and  horses  were 
liberally  supplied.  Comfortable  cabins  and  shelters  were 
constructed,  and  at  every  opportune  moment  the  command 
was  exercised  in  drills,  parades,  and  reviews.  All  deficiency 
in  clothing  and  equipments  was  supplied,  and  what  is  of 
more  importance,  about  15,000  of  the  men  were  armed  with 
the  Spencer  magazine  rifle,  at  that  time  altogether  the  best 
military  fire-arm  in  the  world. 

The  assembly  of  so  large  a  command  of  cavalry  in  one 


596  Life  of  Thomas. 

place,  soon  demonstrated  that  whatever  might  be  the  merit 
of  the  single  rank  formation  for  cavalry  when  dismounted,, 
it  would  not  do  for  regimental,  brigade,  and  division  forma- 
tions while  mounted,  in  a  heavily  wooded  country.  Inas- 
much as  a  single  trooper  requires  about  one  yard,  it  is  easy 
to  see  that  a  regiment  of  500  men  in  line  would  without 
intervals  require  500  yards,  while  a  division  of  5,000  would 
require  over  5.000  yards.  In  view  of  the  fact  that  the  coun- 
try was  generally  heavily  timbered,  with  but  few  fields  over 
1,000  yards  across,  the  single  rank  tactics  were  abolished 
for  all  mounted  movements,  while  it  was  retained  for  all  dis- 
mounted operations.  As  most  of  the  fighting  afterward 
was  done  on  foot,  the  change  in  tactics  led  to  no  confusion,. 
but  was  productive  of  much  good. 

By  the  first  week  of  March,  27,000  cavalrymen  were- 
assembled  in  the  camps  between  Gravelly  Springs  and. 
Waterloo.  The  absolute  control  which  had  been  given  to 
the  corps  commander  had  enabled  him  to  gather  in  this 
enormous  force  from  every  quarter,  and  the  knowledge  that 
the  cavalry  had  at  last  secured  an  organization  and  a  com- 
mander to  look  after  it,  encouraged  both  men  and  ofiicers  to 
make  extra  exertions  to  return  to  their  colors.  With  another 
month  of  this  work  at  least  10,000  more  troopers  could  have 
been  brought  forward  and  added  to  the  effective  force  of  the 
corps.  Men  were  abundant,  but  the  great  difficulty  was  to 
find  remounts  for  them.  Of  course  every  effort  was  made 
to  gather  in  and  build  up  the  horses  which  had  been  ex- 
hausted and  left  behind.  The  Cavalry  Bureau  was  urged  to 
put  forth  its  utmost  efforts  to  buy  and  send  forward  new 
horses,  and  there  is  reason  to  believe  that  it  did  its  best,  but 
withal,  when  the  winter  was  so  far  broken,  and  the  spring 
rains  so  far  at  an  end  as  to  permit  operations  to  begin,  there 
were  horses  enough  for  only  17,000  men,  leaving  10,000  still 
dismounted.  Hatch's  entire  division,  composed  of  veterans 
of  the  highest  quality  from  Illinois,  Indiana,  Iowa,  Missouri^ 
and  Tennessee,  voluntarily  gave  up  their  horses  and  arms  in 
order  that  they  might  be  used  to  eke  out  the  supply  of  other 
divisions.  Arrangements  were  made  to  remount  and  re- 
arm this  splendid  division,  but  there  was  no  chance  of  get- 


The  ^Cavalry  Corps  in  Alabama  and  Georgia.          597 

ting  this  done  in  time  to  enable  it  to  participate  in  the  earlier 
stages  of  the  final  campaign,  but  orders  were  left  for  it  to 
take  the  field  and  join  the  corps  at  the  earliest  possible  day 
wherever  it  might  be.  Meanwhile  it  was  to  continue  in 
<;arap  at  Chickasaw  and  keep  watch  and  ward  as  best  it 
might  over  Northern  Mississippi  and  West  Tennessee. 

While  these  arrangements  for  the  complete  organization 
and  equipment  of  an  overwhelming  cavalry  force  were  in 
progress,  the  anxiety  of  General  Grant  and  the  military  au- 
thorities at  Washington  for  an  advance  movement,  broke  out 
in  the  usual  style  of  impatient  orders  to  Thomas.  It  should 
be  remembered  that  the  entire  time  consumed  in  these 
preparations  did  not  exceed  nine  weeks  of  midwinter,  from 
the  first  of  January  to  the  first  of  March,  and  that  none  of 
the  other  national  armies  was  engaged  in  active  operations. 
It  is  not  to  be  denied  that  the  Lieutenant-general,  with  all 
his  good  sense,  and  the  long  years  of  costly  experience  he  had 
had,  followed  by  the  brilliant  results  of  uniting  the  eastern 
cavalry  under  Sheridan,  had  only  partially  learned  the  im- 
portant lesson  that  cavalry,  in  order  to  produce  great  re- 
sults, must  not  only  be  thoroughly  organized  and  equipped, 
but  must  operate  in  masses.  The  disposition  to  break  up 
and  scatter  this  arm  into  detachments  operating  in  widely 
separated  regions,  was  still  irresistible,  and  accordingly,  about 
the  middle  of  February,  he  ordered  Thomas  to  send  one 
division  from  Wilson's  corps  to  Canby,  operating  against 
Mobile.  Knipe's  Seventh  Division,  fully  5,000  strong,  and 
completely  horsed,  was  detached  and  sent  by  steamboat  to 
the  Lo wer  Mississippi.  Of  course  its  future  operations  pro- 
duced but  little  effect  in  the  closing  operations  of  the  war. 
Shortly  afterward  Thomas  was  ordered  to  send  Wilson,  with 
a  force  of  "  say  5,000  men  to  make  a  demonstration  on 
Tuscaloosa  and  Selma,"  but  fortunately  before  putting  this 
order  into  effect,  he  took  steamer  and  went  to  Waterloo  for 
a  conference  with  the  cavalry  commander.  Immediately 
after  his  arrival  a  meeting  took  place  on  board  the  steamer, 
in  which  Wilson  represented  that  a  "  demonstration  "  would 
be  of  no  particular  or  lasting  advantage,  and  that  it  would  be 
only  a  piece  of  military  folly  to  make  a  demonstration  with 


598  Life  of  Thomas. 

a  part  of  his  force  when  he  might  go  with  the  whole  of  it 
and  not  only  capture  both  Tuscaloosa  and  Selma,  but  march 
whithersoever  the  exigencies  of  the  campaign  might  demand, 
sweeping  every  thing  before  him.  Besides,  it  was  known  that 
the  hitherto  invincible  Forrest  had  been  put  in  command  of 
all  the  Confederate  cavalry  in  Alabama,  Mississippi,  and  East- 
ern Louisiana,  and  after  the  retreat  of  Middle  Tennessee  had 
taken  post  at  Corinth,  where,  in  imitation  of  the  lesson  set 
him  by  the  Federal  commander,  he  had  devoted  himself  to 
the  concentration,  discipline,  and  reorganization  of  his  com- 
mand. 

The  remnants  of  Hood's  infantry,  having  been  concen- 
trated at  Tupelo,  in  Northern  Mississippi,  Forrest  left  one 
brigade  of  cavalry  under  Roddy  in  the  vicinity  of  Tuscum- 
bia,  to  watch  the  crossings  of  the  Tennessee.  He  furloughed 
Bell's  and  Rucker's  brigades,  of  Tennessee,  to  go  home  for 
horses  and  clothing,  and  gathered  the  rest  of  his  command 
at  Okolona,  in  the  midst  of  a  country  rich  in  forage.  For- 
rest was  an  active  and  resourceful  commander,  who  did  not 
fail  to  patrol  all  the  country  of  Northern  Alabama,  Missis- 
sippi, and  Tennessee,  beyond  the  lines  of  Federal  occupa- 
tion. He  not  only  gathered  in  all  absentees  that  he  could 
find,  but  mercilessly  conscripted  all  the  able-bodied  men  that 
were  fit  for  service,  while  his  picked  and  trusty  scouts, 
familiar  with  the  country,  were  sent  into  the  Federal  lines 
to  gather  all  the  information  they  could  in  reference  to  the 
strength  and  future  movements  of  the  Federal  forces. 

General  Wilson  had  not  been  idle,  but  had  been  quite  as 
actively  engaged  as  his  wily  opponent  in  gathering  informa- 
tion. His  spies  and  scouts  had  accurately  located  the  Con- 
federate forces,  but  not  content  with  that,  he  had  sent  a 
clever  staff'  officer  with  a  flag  of  truce  to  Forrest,  not  only 
to  negotiate  an  exchange  of  prisoners,  but  incidentally  to 
gather  what  he  could  as  to  the  frame  of  mind  and  plans  of 
that  commander.  Forrest  was  found  at  West  Point,  Missis- 
sippi, and  was  quite  outspoken  as  to  his  hopes.  He  was 
curious  to  learn  what  he  could  of  General  Wilson,  who  had 
so  recently  appeared  in  the  West,  and  seemed  with  unusual 
temerity  about  to  bring  on  a  conflict  with  him.  On  learning 


The  Cavalry  Corps  in  Alabama  and  Georgia.  599 

that  he  was  a  West  Point  man,  with  some  knowledge  of  tac- 
tics and  strategy,  and  had  recently  been  commanding  a  divis- 
ion of  Sheridan's  cavalry,  Forrest  reflectively  declared  that 
he  had  not  had  the  advantages  of  a  military  education,  and 
knew  but  little  as  to  the  art  of  war,  but  he  always  made  it 
his  rule  "to  get  there  first  with  the  most  men."  He  added, 
somewhat  contemptuously,  that  in  a  cavalry  fight  he  would 
"give  more  for  fifteen  minutes  of  the  bulge  on  his  enemy 
than  for  three  days  of  tactics."  During  the  conversation 
with  the  Federal  staff  oflicer  the  Confederate  chieftain  said : 
"  Captain,  tell  your  general  that  I  have  picked  out  a  first-rate 
place  for  a  cavalry  battle,  and  if  he  '11  come  down  here  with 
any  force  he  pleases  to  select,  I  '11  meet  him  with  the  same 
number,  and  agree  to  win  the  fight." 

Of  course  the  conclusion  was,  that  Forrest,  with  the 
three  divisions  composing  the  nucleus  of  his  corps,  com- 
manded respectively  by  Chalmers,  Buford,  and  Jackson,  and 
mustering  about  10,000  men  for  duty,  was  ready  for  action 
and  on  the  alert,  and  that  it  would  be  fatal  to  send  so  small 
a  force  as  5,000  men  against  any  important  point  in  the  in- 
terior of  the  confederacy  within  the  reach  of  that  enterprising 
and  able  commander.  All  this  was  explained  to  Thomas, 
with  the  result,  that  he  adopted  Wilson's  idea,  that  the 
whole  available  cavalry  force  should  go,  not  merely  to  make 
a  demonstration,  but  with  the  purpose  of  capturing  both  Tus- 
caloosa  and  Selma,  destroying  the  furnaces,  foundries,  fac- 
tories, and  depots,  and  breaking  up  the  Confederacy's  inte- 
rior lines  of  supply  and  communication.  Heartily  approving 
the  policy  of  concentration,  and  operating  in  mass,  instead 
of  by  widely  scattered  detachments,  he  fully  recommended 
Wilson's  plan,  and  promised  that  he  should  start  as  soon  as 
the  weather  would  permit. 

Fortunately  Grant  also  concurred,  and  gave  the  neces- 
sary instructions,  accompanied  by  the  injunction  that  Wilson 
should  have  all  the  latitude  of  an  independent  commander. 
The  result  of  this  was  to  relieve  him  in  a  measure  from  di- 
rect responsibility  to  both  Sherman  and  Thomas,  the  former 
of  whom,  as  commander  of  the  military  division,  had  in- 
structed Wilson,  when  Hood  should  be  defeated  and  disposed 


600  Life  of  Thomas. 

of,  to  gather  all  of  the  cavalry  he  could  get  his  hands  on  and 
mount;  to  sweep  down  through  central  Alabama  and  Geor- 
gia, and  join  him,  wherever  he  might  be,  in  the  Carolinas  or 
on  the  march  for  Virginia,  to  take  part  in  the  final  struggle 
between  Grant  and  Lee.  Thomas,  it  will  be  remembered, 
had  fallen  heir  to  the  geographical  military  division,  and  see- 
ing that  there  was  no  great  force  to  withstand  him  in  any 
part  of  the  Mississippi  Valley,  gave  ready  consent  to  this 
comprehensive  suggestion,  and  in  turning  Wilson  loose,  per- 
ceived that  he  might  pass  entirely  beyond  his  control.  He 
knew,  however,  that  the  cavalry  would  be  strong  enough  to 
go  where  it  pleased,  and  always  able  to  take  care  of  itself. 

In  anticipation  of  Wilson's  movement,  Forrest,  on  the 
17th  of  March,  directed  Armstrong's  and  Stark's  brigades, 
of  Chalmers'  division,  to  take  post  at  Pickensville,  Alabama. 
Wirt  Adams's  brigade,  of  the  same  division,  was  at  the  same 
time  moved  from  Jackson  to  Columbus,  Mississippi,  to  cover 
the  line  of  the  Mobile  and  Ohio  Railroad.  Two  brigades  of 
Jackson's  divisions  were  at  West  Point,  Mississippi,  while 
Buford's  division  was  in  the  vicinity  of  Montevallo,  Alabama, 
with  Roddy's  brigade  well  to  the  front,  watching  the  roads 
upon  which  the  Federal  cavalry  might  advance.  Ross's 
Texans  had  been  left  at  Corinth  to  garrison  that  place,  while 
Armistead  and  Clanton's  brigades  were  in  the  vicinity  of  Mo- 
bile, watching  the  roads  from  the  Lower  Mississippi. 

It  will  be  seen  that  the  Confederate  leader,  notwith- 
standing his  great  experience  and  ability,  had  committed  the 
serious  mistake  of  scattering  his  forces  over  a  wide  extent 
of  country,  while  the  Federal  commander  had  his  entire 
command,  except  the  division  with  Sherman  and  the  one 
he  had  been  compelled  to  send  to  Canby,  well  in  hand.  He 
had  three  excellent  divisions,  all  mounted,  except  1,500  men, 
and  all  armed  with  magazine  rifles  or  carbines,  ready  to  move 
in  any  direction. 

It  is  now  quite  evident  that  great  uncertainty  existed  in 
the  mind  of  Lieutenant-General  Taylor,  the  supreme  com- 
mander of  the  Confederate  forces  in  that  theater  of  opera- 
tions, as  well  as  in  that  of  his  cavalry  leader,  as  to  the  plan 
and  importance  of  General  Wilson's  impending  movement. 


The  Cavalry  Corps  in  Alabama  and  Georgia.  601 

As  late  as  March  27th,  or  five  days  after  it  had  commenced, 
Taylor  notified  Lee  in  Virginia  that  it  was  only  a  raid,  and 
that  it  was  his  intention  to  meet  and  defeat  it  before  it  could 
advance  far  into  the  country.  A  movement  from  Pensacola 
toward  Pollard  and  Montgomery,  begun  by  General  Steele  on 
the  20th  of  March,  was  regarded  as  of  greater  importance. 
In  order  to  meet  this  danger,  Taylor  directed  Buford,  on  the 
23d  of  March,  to  move  at  once  from  Montevallo  through 
Selma  to  Greenville,  and  Forrest  to  send  both  Chalmers  and 
Jackson  to  the  former  place,  with  a  view  to  a  concentration 
at  the  latter.  It  is  worthy  of  note,  however,  that  the  execu- 
tion of  these  orders  had  hardly  begun  when  they  were  counter- 
manded. On  the  24th,  in  obedience  to  instructions  received 
by  telegraph,  Forrest  ordered  his  forces  from  Mississippi, 
with  the  evident  design  of  concentrating  them  at  Selma,  and 
this  resolution  was  taken  before  it  was  definitely  known  that 
that  place  was  Wilson's  objective.  As  will  be  seen,  however, 
it  was  taken  too  late  to  avert  the  disaster  which  was  soon  to 
overtake  the  Confederate  cause  in  that  region. 

General  Wilson,  having  ferried  his  command  across  the 
Tennessee,  began  his  march  from  Chickasaw  and  Waterloo 
through  Northern  Alabama  on  the  22d.  His  force  consisted 
of  the  First,  Second,  and  Fourth  Cavalry  Divisions,  aggre- 
gating 12,500  men  mounted  and  1,500  dismounted,  to  act  as 
train  escorts  till  they  could  be  mounted  from  captured  horses. 
They  were  all  veterans  in  excellent  discipline  and  condition, 
and  full  of  enterprise  and  zeal.  The  division  and  brigade 
commanders  were  mostly  young  men,  but  they  had  been  in 
the  war  from  the  beginning,  had  had  plenty  of  experience, 
and  knew  both  how  to  inspire  and  command  the  confidence 
necessary  to  success.  It  may  be  doubted  if  a  better  cavalry 
command  had  ever  been  organized  in  any  country  in  so 
short  a  time,  and  yet  it  must  always  remain  a  matter  of  re- 
gret that  Hatch's  splendid  division  could  not  have  been  sup- 
plied with  horses  and  arms  in  time  to  permit  it  to  take  part 
in  the  campaign,  and  that  Johnson's  was  compelled  to  remain 
in  Middle  Tennessee.  As  it  turned  out,  the  marching  force 
was  strong  enough  to  perform  the  task  assigned  it  with  ex- 
traordinary celerity  and  completeness,  but  that  could  not  be 


602  Life  of  Thomas. 

known  beforehand,  and  besides,  it  is  a  good  rule  in  war,  to 
go  always  with  your  entire  force,  for  nothing  is  more  certain 
than  that  if  you  can  not  beat  the  enemy  with  all  your  troops 
you  can  not  fairly  hope  to  do  so  with  a  part  of  them.  Each 
trooper  was  directed  to  carry  five  days'  light  rations,  one  pair 
of  extra  horseshoes,  and  one  hundred  rounds  of  ammunition. 
Five  days'  rations  of  hard  bread  and  ten  of  sugar  and  salt 
were  taken  on  pack-animals.  A  light  wagon-train  carried 
forty-five  days'  rations  of  coffee,  twenty  of  sugar,  fifteen 
of  salt,  and  eighty  rounds  of  ammunition.  This  allowance 
was  calculated  for  a  sixty  days'  campaign,  including  five 
days'  supply  for  the  men  and  horses  while  traversing  the 
sterile  region  of  Itforth  Alabama.  The  expectation  was  that 
the  rich  country  beyond  that  region  would  be  reached  with- 
out material  delay,  and  would  furnish  the  invading  force 
with  everything  else  necessary  for  its  subsistence.  The  sup- 
ply train  consisted  of  250  wagons,  which  were  sent  back  to 
the  Tennessee  as  fast  as  they  were  unloaded.  There  was  be- 
sides a  small  canvas  pontoon  train  of  30  boats,  hauled  by  50 
six-mule  teams,  escorted  by  a  battalion  of  the  12th  Missouri 
Cavalry,  Major  Hubbard  commanding.  Clear  and  explicit 
instructions  had  been  given  to  the  division  commanders, 
looking  to  the  successive  steps  of  the  campaign  as  far  as  the 
capture  of  Selma,  180  miles  distant  in  a  straight  line,  but 
requiring  an  average  march  of  nearly  250  miles  for  the 
various  divisions  to  reach  it.  In  all  matters  of  detail  as  to 
marching  and  maneuvering  the  division  commanders  were 
allowed  the  fullest  latitude.  The  roads  by  which  the  columns 
marched  were  divergent  at  the  start,  and  at  that  time  they 
were  every-where  exceedingly  muddy,  owing  to  recent  and 
long-continued  rains,  which  in  time  swelled  the  numerous 
streams  forming  the  head-waters  of  the  Black  Warrior  and 
Cahawba  Rivers.  The  face  of  the  country  is  hilly  and  bar- 
ren covered  with  dense  forests  broken  only  here  and  there 
by  small  farms  and  clearings.  The  creek  valleys  are  narrow 
and  deep,  and  were  often  made  almost  impassable  by  the  ab- 
sence of  bridges  and  the  presence  of  quicksands  and  quagmires. 
It  is  hard  to  imagine  a  more  uninviting  and  difficult  country 


The  Cavalry  Corps  in  Alabama  and  Georgia.  603 

than  this  for  military  operations,  or  one  affording  less  sub- 
sistence and  shelter  for  men  and  horses. 

The  initial  movements  were  on  divergent  routes.  Upton's 
division  on  the  left,  marched  through  Russellville,  Mt.  Hope, 
and  Jasper,  to  Sander's  Ferry  on  the  west  or  Mulberry  Fork 
of  the  Black  "Warrior  River ;  Long's  in  the  center,  by  Chero- 
kee Station  ancl  Frankfort  to  Russellville,  and  thence  south 
by  the  Tuscaloosa  road  to  Upper  Bear  Creek,  where  it  turned 
to  the  east  by  Thorn  Hill,  crossing  the  forks  of  the  Butta- 
hatchie  through  Jasper  to  the  Ford  on  the  Mulberry  Fork  of 
the  Black  W  arrior  River.  McCook's  division  followed  Long's 
to  Bear  Creek,  thence  toward  Tuscaloosa  as  far  as  Eldridge, 
where  it  also  turned  eastward,  by  the  road  passing  through 
Jasper.  Upton,  with  the  advance  division,  crossed  the  Mul- 
berry Fork  at  a  dangerous  and  difficult  ford  on  the  27th. 
A  rain-storm  setting  in  on  that  day  threatened  to  swell  the 
broad  and  rapid  stream,  so  that  it  could  not  be  forded  by  the 
other  two  divisions,  but  with  great  skill  and  trouble  the 
hardy  cavalrymen  forced  their  way  through  the  rising  waters, 
and  united  the  whole  corps  on  the  farther  bank.  Had  the 
enemy  been  forehanded  and  ready  he  would  have  had,  at  that 
place,  an  admirable  opportunity,  with  a  single  division,  to 
frustrate  the  plans  of  his  adversary.  At  Jasper,  on  the 
same  day,  Wilson  had  the  good  fortune  to  learn  from  scouts, 
who  had  been  captured  by  his  own  patrols,  that  Armstrong's 
brigade  of  Chalmers'  division  was  marching  on  Tuscaloosa 
by  Bridgeville.  Fearing  that  this  indicated  an  intention  on 
the  part  of  Forrest  to  throw  himself  across  the  route  of  the 
Union  advance,  Wilson  stripped  his  divisions  to  the  lightest 
possible  inarching  condition,  leaving  his  wagons  and  their 
escort  between  the  forks  of  the  Black  Warrior,  and  taking 
his  pack  train  and  artillery,  he  pushed  on  with  the  greatest 
possible  speed  to  the  crossing  of  the  Locust  Fork  of  the 
Black  Warrior,  thence  through  Elyton,  at  that  time  an  in- 
digent hamlet,  but  now  the  site  of  the  flourishing  city  of 
Birmingham,  across  the  Cahawba  River  to^Montevallo,  situ- 
ated in  the  comparatively  fertile  country,  on  the  direct  road 
to  Selma.  As  it  was  raining  hard  Upton's  division  marched 
all  night  to  reach  the  Locust  Fork  before  it  should  become 


604  Life  of  Thomas. 

impassable,  and  after  crossing  the  leading  brigade,  under  Alex- 
ander, continued  its  hurrying  march  to  the  Cahawba  which  it 
also  found  rising  rapidly  and  difficult  to  cross  without  a  bridge. 
The  following  bdgade,under  "Winslow,  marched  down  the  river 
a  few  miles  to  Hillsborough,  where  it  came  to  a  wooden  lattice 
railroad  bridge,  with  a  long  trestle-work  at  each  end,  which 
the  enemy  had  failed  to  destroy.  Winslow  lost  no  time  in 
flooring  this  over  with  railroad  ties  and  crossing  to  the  other 
side.  The  other  divisions  followed  by  the  same  means.  The 
passage  of  these  three  rising  rivers,  without  the  use  of  the 
pontoon  bridge,  and  without  delay  or  opposition,  was  a  nota- 
ble performance,  and  brought  the  cavalry  corps  into  the  coal 
and  iron  region  of  Alabama,  abounding  in  corn  and  bacon, 
and  traversed  from  north  to  south  by  a  straight  road  leading 
to  Selina. 

Wilson's  divisions  were  somewhat  widely  scattered  in 
the  earlier  days  of  the  campaign,  but  it  will  be  observed  that 
they  were  concentrated  at  Jasper,  and  thenceforward  marched 
in  close  supporting  distance  of  each  other.  Could  Forrest 
have  foreseen  his  opponent's  line  of  operations  and  concen- 
trated his  force  at  any  of  the  river  crossings  or  even  at  Ely- 
ton,  he  might  have  made  an  effective  resistance,  but  it  has 
been  shown  that  his  command  had  been  so  widely  distributed 
that  concentration  in  time  was  out  of  the  question.  The 
Union  commander,  in  order  to  cover  his  trains  and  attract  the 
attention  and  develop  the  movements  of  the  Confederate  cav- 
alry, had  detached  Croxton's  brigade  of  McCook's  division 
at  Jasper,  with  orders  to  move  directly  on  Tuscaloosa,  and 
after  capturing  that  place  to  burn  all  the  public  stores,  fac- 
tories, and  bridges,  and  then  rejoin  the  column  east  of  the 
Cahawba,  which  it  was  hoped  he  could  cross  at  Centerville 
on  the  road  to  Selma.  The  first  part  of  these  orders  was 
successfully  executed,  but  resulted  in  an  encounter  near 
Trion  with  Jackson's  division  and  Wirt  Adams's  brigade, 
both  marching  rapidly  toward  the  east  for  the  purpose  of 
covering  or  throwing  themselves  into  Selma.  They  inter- 
posed, without  intending  or  knowing  it,  between  Croxton 
and  Centerville,  and  prevented  his  reaching  there,  although 
McCook,  with  La  Grange's  brigade,  leaving  the  main  column 


The  Cavalry  Corps  in  Alabama  and  Georgia.  605 

two  days  later  at  Randolph,  had  reached  Centerville  ahead 
of  the  enemy,  and  after  seizing  the  bridge,  had  pushed  out  and 
attacked  him  sharply.  The  latter  was,  of  course,  greatly  con- 
fused by  finding  himself  assailed,  both  front  and  rear,  at  or 
about  the  same  time,  and  might  have  been  broken  up  and 
scattered  had  McCook  and  La  Grange  succeeded  in  com- 
municating with  Croxton  and  managed  to  act  in  concert 
with  him  against  the  enemy.  It  is  to  be  observed,  however, 
that  these  two  brigades  had  been  detached  on  different  days 
and  had  marched  on  widely  divergent  and  circuitous  routes, 
separated  by  the  Cahawba  River,  and  even  if  Croxton  had 
not  been  ignorant  of  La  Grange's  position  it  would  have 
been  almost  impossible  to  send  couriers  from  one  column  to 
the  other,  except  by  way  of  Centerville.  That  McCook  and 
La  Grange,  after  capturing  the  bridge  at  that  place,  did  not 
succeed  in  communicating  with  Croxton  was  a  sore  disap- 
pointment to  Wilson.  It  led  to  Croxton's  permanent  de- 
tachment, and  compelled  him  to  make  a  wide  detour  to  the 
west  and  south  of  Tuscaloosa,  and  then  northward  and  east- 
ward across  Alabama  into  Georgia  before  rejoining  the  corps. 

From  Ely  ton  other  detachments  were  sent  off  to  destroy 
the  collieries  and  iron  works  of  Central  Alabama,  while  the 
main  body  of  the  corps  hurried  forward  to  Montevallo  where 
it  was  believed  that  Chalmers  and  Buford  would  form  a  junc- 
tion and  make  a  stand  for  the  purpose  of  checking  the  ad- 
vance. 

During  this  march  an  officer  of  the  Fourth  Iowa  Cav- 
alry, of  Upton's  division,  arrested  an  Englishman  named 
Millington,  a  civil  engineer,  who  had .  been  employed  in 
planning  and  constructing  the  fortifications  of  Selma,  and 
who  made  an  accurate  topographical  sketch  and  description 
of  the  works  and  their  armament,  and  also  of  the  country 
surrounding  the  city,  all  of  which  were  forwarded  at  once  to 
Wilson.  The  information  thus  obtained  was  of  great  value, 
as  it  enabled  the  latter  to  arrange  a  definite  plan  of  attack 
before  his  command  had  invested  the  place.  The  advance, 
having  reached  Montevallo  with  but  slight  resistance  from 
Buford's  skirmishers,  halted  here  over  night  and  long  enough 
the  next  day  to  permit  the  following  divisions  to  close  up. 


606  /      Life  of  Thomas. 

Large  quantities  of  corn  and  provisions  were  found  in  the 
town,  and  after  the  wants  of  the  command  were  supplied 
the  remainder  was  destroyed.  It  was  a  virgin  country,  rich 
in  every  thing  required  by  cavalry.  Foraging  was  easily 
conducted,  and  this  relieved  the  commander  of  the  corps 
from  all  anxiety,  except  that  which  was  inseparable  from 
the  hazard  of  battle  with  his  redoubtable  antagonist. 

About  noon  on  the  31st  of  March,  while  the  first  and 
second  divisions  were  arriving  in  Montevallo,  the  enemy  at- 
tacked Upton's  pickets,  posted  on  the  Selma  road  about  a 
mile  south  of  the  town,  and  this  was  a  challenge  which  was 
promptly  accepted.  Gen.  Wilson,whohad  arrived  at  the  town, 
and  was  conferring  with  Upton,  ordered  the  latter  to  move  out 
at  once.  This  was  done  with  alacrity.  Alexander's  brigade, 
Colonel  Benteen,  with  the  Tenth  Missouri,  leading,  found 
the  enemy  well  posted  on  the  crest  of  a  hill  beyond  a  creek 
running  athwart  the  road.  With  a  rapid  dash  Benteen  swept 
over  the  bridge,  and  swinging  into  a  thicket  bordering  the 
creek,  dismounted  his  men.  Without  any  greater  delay  than 
was  necessary  to  deploy  in  single  rank  he  advanced  with  a 
yell  against  the  enemy's  position,  which  Rodney's  guns  were 
already  searching  with  a  close  and  rapid  fire.  Noble,  with 
the  Third  Iowa,  followed  in  a  gallant  charge  with  the  saber, 
and  in  an  incredibly  short  time  the  enemy's  line  was  over- 
whelmed and  in  full  retreat,  with  the  loss  of  about  100  men, 
and  many  arms  and  equipments. 

While  Alexander  was  mounting  and  re-arranging  his 
squadrons,Upton,  who  was,  as  was  his  habit,  close  up  to  the 
front,  directed  Winslow's  brigade  to  take  the  lead,  and  give 
the  enemy  no  time  to  rally  or  reform.  A  running  fight  of 
six  miles  took  place,  in  which  Forrest,  in  person,  exerted  all 
his  powers  to  stay  the  retreat.  He  seized  every  advantage 
.of  ground  and  position,  and  tried  countercharge  and  ambus- 
cade, but  in  vain.  Nothing  could  withstand  the  impetuosity 
of  the  National  horse,  now  thoroughly  aroused  by  success. 
The  pursuit  was  continued  as  far  as  Randolph,  and  even 
then  was  arrested  only  by  darkness.  It  had  been  an  event- 
ful and  encouraging  day  to  the  cavalry  corps,  only  one  divi- 
sion of  which  had  been  engaged.  It  was  evident,  too,  that 


The  Cavalry  Corps  in  Alabama  and  Georgia.  607 

the  Confederate  leader  had  not  yet  succeeded  in  concentrat- 
ing his  forces,  while  the  invading  column  was  absolutely 
closed  up  and  ready  for  any  emergency  that  might  arise. 
Selma  was  only  forty-five  miles  away,  supplies  were  abun- 
dant, and  a  feeling  of  great  confidence  inspired  both  officers 
and  men. 

Early  the  next  morning,  April  1st,  the  corps  resumed  its 
operations,  Upton  taking  the  left  hand  or  Maplesville  road, 
while  Long,  followed  by  La  Grange,  marched  upon  the  main 
road  to  Selma.  As  the  two  roads  are  nearly  parallel,  and 
nowhere  more  than  three  miles  apart,  the  columns  were  in  close 
supporting  distance  of  each  other.  Early  in  the  day  Upton 
captured  a  rebel  courier  with  dispatches  from  Forrest,  show- 
ing that  his  forces  were  still  scattered,  and  that  Jackson  was 
coming  from  Tuscaloosa  via  Centerville.  On  this  informa- 
tion, which  gave  still  greater  confidence  to  "Wilson,  he  de- 
tached McCook  with  La  Grange's  brigade  to  move  rapidly 
to  Centerville,  only  about  forty  miles  away,  to  seize  and  hold 
the  bridge  over  the  Cahawba,  and  to  throw  himself  boldly 
upon  Jackson.  It  was  hoped  that  this  movement  would  re- 
sult in  reuniting  the  two  brigades  of  McCook's  division,  and 
that  together  they  would  destroy  Jackson's  forces,  or  at  least 
keep  them  out  of  the  fight  for  Selma.  As  already  shown, 
this  hope  was  only  partially  realized  although  McCook  ad- 
vanced beyond  the  bridge  and  engaged  the  enemy  at  Scotts- 
boro,  from  which  place,  after  learning  that  Croxton  had 
withdrawn  toward  Ely  ton,  he  fell  back  to  Centerville,  and 
after  crossing  to  the  left  bank  of  the  river,  burnt  the  bridge. 
This  compelled  Jackson  to  continue  his  march  down  the 
right  bank  of  the  Cahawba,  and  delayed  him  so  much  that 
he  reached  the  vicinity  of  Selma  too  late  to  make  any  effect- 
ive diversion  in  its  favor.  McCook  rejoined  the  corps  on  the 
6th  of  April.  The  game  was  an  exciting  one  and  skillfully 
played.  Indeed,  there  is  nothing  finer  in  the  history  of  war- 
fare than  the  rapid  advance  and  admirable  disposition 
of  the  national  cavalry  as  it  approached  the  objective  at 
which  it  was  aiming.  Both  columns  were  confronted  by 
rebel  detachments,  which  kept  up  a  running  fight  all  the  way 
back  to  Ebenezer  Church,  situated  at  the  junction  of  the 


608  Life  of  Thomas. 

two  roads  on  which  the  Union  columns  were  moving.  At 
this  place  Forrest  had  taken  up  an  advantageous  position, 
and  had  disposed  of  all  the  force  he  could  collect,  including 
cavalry,  artillery,  and  a  detachment  of  infantry  from  Selma. 
It  was  evidently  his  intention  to  hold  on  here  as  long  as 
possible,  and  to  make  the  best  fight  he  could,  so  as  to  gain 
time  for  the  concentration  of  the  rest  of  his  force.  He  was, 
besides,  a  resolute  and  resourceful  commander  of  whom  it 
was  well  for  even  the  most  confident  antagonist  to  beware. 

Long's  division  was  the  first  to  approach  the  enemy's 
position.  Fortunately  his  leading  regiment,  the  17th  Indiana 
Mounted  Infantry,  was  commanded  by  Lieutenant-Colonel 
Frank  "White,  a  most  gallant  and  capable  officer,  who, 
without  a  moment's  hesitation,  rode  straight  at  the  rebel  line, 
followed  by  a  battalion  of  two  hundred  sabers.  The  shock 
was  terrific,  and  resulted  in  breaking  through  the  rebel  lines, 
crushing  down  the  carriage  of  one  gun,  and  scattering  Rod- 
dey's  brigade.  It  was  followed  by  a  hand-to-hand  conflict, 
in  which  the  greatest  spirit  was  displayed  by  both  sides. 
"White  and  his  men  were  completely  surrounded,  but  nothing 
daunted,  they  lay  about  them  so  fiercely  as  to  convince  the 
Confederates  that  the  whole  Yankee  force  had  fallen  upon 
them.  White,  in  person,  led  his  followers  into  the  battery 
at  the  junction  of  the  roads,  but  its  defenders  were  too  many 
for  him.  Rallying  gallantly  they  gathered  about  him  in 
such  numbers  as  to  leave  him  no  choice  but  to  turn  and 
cut  his  way  out,  which  he  did  with  heavy  loss.  Captain 
Taylor,  a  gallant  boy  of  not  over  twenty  years,  commanding 
one  of  White's  companies,  threw  himself  fiercely  upon  For- 
rest, and  assailed  that  chieftain  with  such  a  shower  of  saber 
strokes,  about  his  head  and  shoulders,  as  to  force  him  in.  a 
running  fight  to  turn  in  his  seat  and  shoot  his  gallant 
pursuer  from  his  saddle.  In  speaking  of  it  afterward,  with 
his  arm  in  a  sling,  Forrest  said :  "  If  that  boy  had  known 
enough  when  he  was  pressing  me  so  hard  to  give  me  the 
point  of  the  saber,  instead  of  striking  me  with  its  edge,  it 
would  have  been  all  up  with  me."  Before  Long  could  de- 
ploy the  rest  of  his  division  to  support  "White,  Alexander, 
hearing  the  firing,  pushed  forward  rapidly  on  the  Maples- 


The  Cavalry  Corps  in  Alabama  and  Georgia.  609 

ville  road,  till  he  struck  the  right  of  Forrest's  line,  which 
he  found  extending  from  the  mouth  of  Mulberry  creek, 
iK-tir  the  south  hank  of  Bogler's  creek,  to  the  Selraa  road. 
The  line  occupied  a  wooded  ridge  for  about  a  mile,  its  left 
crossing  the  road  and  resting  on  a  bend  of  the  creek. 
It  was  strengthened  by  a  fence-rail  barricade,  and  a  slashing 
of  trees,  with  a  battery  of  six  guns  at  the  forks  of  the  road, 
four  sweeping  the  road  on  which  Long's  division  was  ad- 
vancing, and  two  bearing  upon  that  occupied  by  Upton. 
The  men  were  dismounted,  with  horses  well  to  the  rear, 
and  every  thiug  indicated  that  a  desperate  stand  was  to  be 
made.  It  was  afterward  ascertained  that  Forrest's  force  con- 
sisted of  three  brigades  of  cavalry,  commanded  respectively 
by  Roddey,  Crossland,  and  Dan  Adams,  besides  the  detach- 
ment of  infantry  already  mentioned.  The  Confederate  his- 
torians claim  that  Forrest's  entire  force  did  not  exceed  1,500 
men  all  told,  but  as  the  cavalry  brigades  could  hardly  have 
mustered  less  than  a  thousand  men  each,  it  is  probable  that 
his  entire  force  on  the  field  was  between  three  and  four 
thousand  men.  But  be  this  as  it  may,  Alexander,  finding 
the  enemy  in  strength,  did  not  delay  to  ascertain  his  num- 
bers, but  dismounted  two  of  his  regiments,  holding  the  third 
in  reserve,  and  advanced  at  once  to  the  assault,  on  the  left 
of  Long's  dismounted  line.  The  fight  was  a  sharp  and 
desperate  one,  and  Forrest  held  his  men,  as  only  he  could, 
tenaciously  to  their  work.  Upton,  as  soon  as  Winslow's 
brigade  made  its  appearance,  threw  two  mounted  regiments 
forward  on  Alexander's  left,  which  caught  the  rebel  line  in 
the  flank  just  as  it  was  breaking  to  the  rear.  Nothing  could 
withstand  the  impetuosity  of  the  Union  cavalry.  Mounted 
and  dismounted  men,  vieing  with  each  other,  swept  irre- 
sistibly onward,  driving  the  enemy  from  the  field  in  confusion. 
Three  guns  and  four  hundred  prisoners  were  the  trophies  of 
victory. 

The  pursuit  was  continued,  with  another  running  fight, 

till  night  put  an   end   to  it,  less  than  twenty  miles  from 

Selma.     The  corps  had  advanced  twenty-five  miles  that  day, 

and  fought  one  battle.     It  had  got  "the  bulge"  on  Forrest, 

39 


610  Life  of  Thomas. 

and,  without  neglecting  tactics,  had  kept  him  moving  rapidly 
from  dawn  till  dark,  except  for  the  brief  space  during  which 
he  held  his  position  at  Ebenezer  Church.  Withal,  the  day 
was  a  tiresome  one,  and  both  men  and  officers  were  glad  to 
find  rest  and  food  at  the  bivouac  fires,  which  were  blazing  by 
nightfall  in  almost  countless  numbers  about  the  little  village 
of  Plantersville. 

On  Sunday,  April  2d,  the  reveille  was  sounded  before  day- 
break ;  horses,  arms,  and  equipments  were  looked  to  care- 
fully, and  all  arrangements  were  made  for  a  rapid  movement 
and  a  desperate  fight:  Long's  division,  in  the  advance,  was  on 
the  road  before  sunrise.  It  was  followed  by  Upton  at  nine 
o'clock.  All  servants  and  impediments  were  left  behind. 
Mile  after  mile  was  covered  without  a  sign  of  the  enemy,  but 
this  was  not  surprising,  for  Forrest,  having  been  beaten  in 
every  encounter  for  two  days,  had  wisely  made  up  his  mind 
not  to  fight  again  till  he  could  shelter  himself  and  his  com- 
mand behind  the  fortifications  of  Selma,  which  it  was  now 
their  duty  to  defend  at  every  cost.  It  was  an  important  place 
often  thousand  inhabitants,  situated  almost  at  the  very  heart 
of  the  Confederacy.  It  contained  a  gun-foundry,  an  armory, 
and  several  factories,  engaged  in  turning  out  military  muni- 
tions for  the  Southern  government,  and  had  been  covered  by 
a  well  constructed  line  of  earthworks,  sweeping  in  a  semi- 
circle from  the  Alabama  River,  above  the  town,  to  the  river 
below  it.  The  Confederate  authorities  and  the  engineer,  who 
had  assisted  in  laying  them  out,  believed  them  to  be  impreg- 
nable to  any  force  of  cavalry  which  could  be  brought  against 
them. 

All  day  long  the  Union  commander  rode  with  the  leading 
division,  conversing  with  Long  and  his  brigade  commanders 
as  to  the  plan  of  attack  and  the  necessity  for  success  in  the 
coming  assault.  The  Englishman's  sketch  showed  all  the 
necessary  details  as  to  the  cross-section  of  the  works  and 
their  ditches,  the  palisades  covering  them,  the  open  ground, 
tfye  small  creeks,  the  woods,  and  the  marsh  outside.  This 
was  shown  to  Minty  and  Miller,  commanding  brigades. 
Nothing  was  concealed  from  those  gallant  soldiers.  All  the 
difficulties,  so  far  as  known  or  foreseen,  were  pointed  out  and 


The  Cavalry  Corps  in  Alabama  and  Georgia.  611 

considered.  Even  the  results  of  failure  and  disaster  were 
discussed,  till  there  was  nothing  further  to  be  said,  except 
that  the  works  had  to  be  carried,  no  matter  what  the  cost. 
And  they  promised  to  carry  them  if  it  was  possible  for 
soldiers  to  do  it. 

As  the  Federal  column  approached  the  city,  Long's  di- 
vision was  turned  to  the  right  and  crossed  over  to  Summer- 
field  road,  while  Upton  continued  his  advance  on  the  road 
from  Plantersville.  Shortly  after  three  o'clock  the  advanced 
guards  caught  sight  of  the  city  from  the  plateau  overlooking 
it;  and  then  the  lines  were  developed,  the  assaulting  regi- 
.ments  and  their  supports  dismounted  and  told  off,  and  the 
led  horses  sent  to  the  rear.  Meanwhile,  General  Wilson  and 
his  staff  made  a  sufficient  reconnoissance  to  verify  the  plan 
they  had  of  the  town  and  its  surroundings.  Upton  and 
Long  each  did  likewise  in  his  own  front.  The  sketch  was 
found  to  be  surprisingly  accurate;  and  in  a  short  time  all 
tin-  dispositions  were  completed  for  the  attack.  Long,  hav- 
ing posted  one  regiment,  at  the  creek  in  his  rear,  to  look  out 
for  Jackson  and  protect  the  led  horses  and  the  pack-train, 
formed  the  rest  of  his  division  dismounted  across  the  Sum- 
merfield  road,  with  his  right  extended  toward  Mill  Creek, 
and  his  whole  line  about  a  half  a  mile  outside  of  the  rebel 
works,  and  parallel  with  them.  It  was  entirely  concealed 
from  the  enemy  by  a  low  intervening  ridge.  There  were 
only  1,550  men  and  officers  in  the  fighting  line;  but  they 
were  all  veterans  of  the  finest  quality,  and  admirably  armed 
with  Spencer  carbines  or  rifles.  The  rest  of  his  available 
men  were  in  close  supporting  distance. 

Upton's  division  was  halted  about  a  mile  from  the  works, 
Winslow's  brigade  dismounted  and  deployed,  Alexander's 
mounted  and  ready  to  move  in  any  direction  at  a  minute's 
notice.  Robinson's  battery  was  on  the  Summerfield  road, 
Rodney's  on  the  main  line,  both  within  effective  range. 

It  had  been  decided  that  the  main  assault  should  be 
made  by  Long,  while  Upton,  with  300  picked  men,  under 
cover  of  growing  trees  and  underbrush,  should  push  out  by 
his  left  and  penetrate  the  marsh  of  Bench  Creek  so  as  to 
strike  the  enemy's  works  where  they  were  weakest,  and  most 


612  Life  of  Thomas. 

likely  to  be  badly  defended.  The  attack  was  not  to  be  made 
till  every  body  had  reached  the  ground  assigned  to  him.  The 
signal  for  the  advance  was  to  be  a  single  gun  from  Rodney's 
battery,  but  this  arrangement  was  interfered  with  and  could 
not  be  carried  out.  About  five  o'clock  Chalmers'  advance  at- 
tacked Long's  regiment  at  the  creek;  another  regiment  was 
promptly  sent  back  to  support  it,  but  foreseeing  that  further 
delay  in  the  main  attack  might  result  in  confusion,  and  possibly 
in  defeat,  Long,  without  even  taking  time  to  refer  the  matter  to 
Wilson,  ordered  his  line  to  advance.  Led  by  the  general,  on 
foot,  assisted  by  two  brigade  and  four  regimental  com- 
manders, the  gallant  cavalrymen  in  a  single  line,  and  elbow 
to  elbow,  rushed  straight  at  the  works  in  the  face  of  a  galling 
fire  of  musketry  and  a  storm  of  shot  and  shell  from  twenty 
guns  sweeping  the  ground  over  which  they  were  advancing. 
In  less  time  than  it  takes  to  tell  it,  over  three  hundred  of 
Long's  men  were  killed  or  wounded.  Long  himself  was 
stricken  down,  together  with  three  out  of  the  two  brigade 
commanders  and  four  colonels,  but  nothing  could  daunt  or 
stop  the  rush  of  that  gallant  line.  Pausing  not  to  count  the 
cost,  the  gallant  soldiers  of  the  Union  scaled  the  palisades, 
scrambled  through  the  ditch  and  over  the  parapet  into  the 
works,  where  a  desperate  hand-to-hand  fight  soon  gave  it 
the  victory. 

Wilson,  hearing  the  roar  of  the  enemy's  guns,  and  the 
rattle  of  musketry  on  Long's  front,  divined  that  an  important 
emergency  had  arisen,  and  rode  at  once  toward  that  part  of 
the  field.  The  truth  was  soon  discovered,  whereupon,  orders 
were  sent  to  Upton  to  advance  also  to  the  charge,  without  wait- 
ing for  further  orders  or  the  agreed  signal.  Every  body  was  at 
his  post,  and  like  a  hound  straining  at  the  leash,  eager  to  dash 
forward  at  the  word.  The  whole  plain  was  instantaneously 
covered  with  a  whirlwind  of  battle.  Wilson  himself,  seeing 
his  orders  had  been  obeyed,  and  his  whole  command  either 
advancing  or  supporting  the  advancing  lines,  dismounted 
from  the  horse  he  had  ridden  all  day,  sprang  into  the  saddle 
of  a  splendid  gray  gelding,  and  turning  to  the  officer  com- 
manding his  escort — the  invincible  Fourth  Regular  Cavalry 
—bade  them  follow  at  the  charge!  Straight  down  the 
Plantersville  highway,  directly  for  the  works,  the  general 


The  Cavalry  Corps  in  Georgia  and  Alabama.          613 

and  his  gallant  escort  rode,  every  man,  from  highest  to  lowest, 
with  nerves  strained  to  the  utmost,  and  every  man  acting  as 
though  his  example  was  essential  to  the  certainty  of  victory. 
Long  had  swept  over  the  works  in  his  front  like  a  tornado, 
but  Forrest  and  Armstrong  rallied  with  their  men  behind 
an  inner  but  only  partly  constructed  line,  and  continued 
to  fight  like  stags  at  bay.  Upton,  moving  a  few  minutes 
later,  but  with  no  less  determination,  carried  the  works  in 
his  front,  and  this  made  it  possible  for  the  commanding 
general,  whose  gallant  gray  had  been  knocked  down,  close 
up  to  the  works,  by  a  rifle  shot  full  in  the  chest,  to  rally  the 
shaken  and  disappointed  squadrons  of  the  Fourth  regulars, 
and  lead  them  through  the  break  left  in  the  outer  line  of  in- 
trenchments  for  the  accommodation  of  the  highway  travel. 
The  gallant  commanders  of  the  horse  artiller}7,  seeing  the 
tide  of  battle  setting  strongly  toward  the  doomed  city,  lim- 
bered up  and  galloped  to  the  front,  going  into  battery  again 
under  the  very  muzzles  of  the  enemy's  guns,  and  pouring  a 
storm  of  canister  and  grape  into  them  that  added  to  the  rout 
and  confusion.  Forrest  and  his  lieutenants  did  their  best  to 
stem  the  tide  of  the  victorious  northeners,  but  further  resist- 
ance was  futile.  Darkness  had  already  set  in,  but  the  vic- 
tory was  complete  all  along  the  line.  The  closing  scene  of 
that  action  was  one  never  to  be  forgotten  by  those  who  par- 
ticipated in  it.  The  clatter  of  sabers,  the  thunder  of  the 
horses'  feet,  the  booming  of  the  guns,  the  flash  and  rattle  of 
pistols  and  carbines,,  the  blare  of  the  trumpets  sounding  the 
charge,  and  the  "  noise  of  the  captains  and  the  shouting," 
were  as  music  to  the  victors,  though  they  sent  a  thrill  of 
horror  through  the  hearts  of  the  vanquished,  and  made  a 
pandemonium  for  the  innocent  women  and  children  of  that 
devoted  city.  Seeing  that  all  was  over,  Forrest,  followed  by 
Armstrong  and  a  few  hundred  devoted  horsemen,  under  cover 
of  darkness,  pushed  through  the  streets  to  the  Burnsville 
road  and  made  their  escape  to  the  open  country.  Buford 
and  Adams  succeeded  in  finding  a  boat,  which  carried  them 
in  safety  to  the  south  side  of  the  Alabama  River,  while  a 
number  of  their  men,  in  endeavoring  to  swim  the  great 
stream,  were  swept  away  aud  drowned.  Taylor,  .the  depart- 


614  Life  of  Thomas. 

ment  commander,  left  early  by  a  special  train  to  the  west- 
ward, narrowly  escaping  capture.  Although  it  was  now  dark, 
it  is  not  to  be  imagined  that  the  victors  drew  rein  or  were  idle 
for  a  moment.  Rapidly  forming  columns,  they  rode  down 
the  streets  of  the  town,  sweeping  every  thing  before  them, 
charging  the  retreating  enemy  as  opportunity  offered,  taking 
prisoners  and  horses,  and  picking  up  the  spoils  of  war.  An 
hour  or  more  passed  before  the  streets  were  cleared,  and 
another  before  order  was  restored  and  the  scattered  cavalry- 
men could  be  collected  into  camps  and  bivouacs. 

A  few  stores  were  gutted  by  marauders  and  drunken 
negroes,  and  here  and  there  a  fire  broke  out,  but  the  mau- 
rauders  and  negroes  were  soon  cleared  from  the  streets,  and 
the  fires  were  suppressed  by  the  provost  guards.  By  mid- 
night quiet  and  order  were  restored,  but  it  was  not  till  late 
the  next  day  that  the  full  extent  of  the  national  victory  was 
understood. 

Forrest,  who  had  fled  by  the  Burnsville  road,  turned 
across  the  country  to  Plantersville,  and  thence  west  to  Marion, 
beyond  the  Cahawba,  where  he  found  several  of  his  brigades 
and  the  remainder  of  his  artillery,  all  of  which  should  have 
reached  Selma  two  days  before.  On  his  way  during  the  night 
he  discovered  a  scouting  party  of  the  Fourth  regulars,  under 
Lieutenant  Royce,  who  had  gone  into  camp  after  night  a  few 
miles  from  Selma,  and  feeling  that  he  was  within  the  Union 
lines,  had  failed  to  post  sentinels.  Forrest  fell  upon  the 
party  with  the  ferocity  of  a  wild  Indian,  and  killed  every 
man  of  it. 

The  capture  of  Selma,  surrounded  by  a  continuous  line 
of  earthworks  well  and  fiercely  defended  by  infantry,  cavalry 
and  artillery,  was  one  of  the  most  notable  feats  ever  accom- 
plished by  cavalry.  The  intrenchments  contained  twenty- 
four  bastions  and  a  number  of  redans  from  eight  to  twelve 
feet  high  and  from  ten  to  fifteen  thick,  with  ditches  of  the 
same  width  and  depth,  filled  with  water  at  places,  and  cov- 
ered on  the  glacis  with  a  stockade  of  pine  logs  firmly  planted 
in  the  ground.  The  curtains  on  that  part  of  the  line,  fronted 
by  Mill  and  Bench  creeks,  were  generally  stockaded  rifle 
pits,  but  every  foot  of  the  four  miles  of  intrenchment  was 


The  Cavalry  Corps  in  Georgia  and  Alabama.          615 

sufficiently  strong  to  justify  the  belief  that  no  cavalry  could 
break  through  it.  But  in  order  to  ^make  assurance  doubly 
sure,  an  interior  line  of  four  detached  forts  had  been  con- 
structed from  the  Marion  to  the  Plantersville  road,  about 
three-quarters  of  a  mile  inside  the  outer  line,  and  a  curtain 
had  been  laid  out  but  not  finished  to  make  this  line  continu- 
ous. At  the  time  of  the  assault  Forrest  had  inside  the  works 
a  force  which,  his  biographer  claims,  did  not  exceed  3,100 
men,  but  which  really  consisted  of  about  4,400  veteran  cav- 
alry, besides  detachments  of  infantry  and  all  the  militia  and 
home  guards  that  Forrest  could  force  into  the  ranks.  How 
many  there  were  of  these  there  is  no  record  to  show,  but 
with  a  city  of  ten  thousand  inhabitants  to  draw  from,  and 
the  relentless  Forrest  insisting  that  every  man,  including  the 
preachers  and  lawyers,  "  should  go  into  the  works  or  into 
the  river,"  it  is  fair  to  assume  that  there  could  not  have  been 
less  than  2,500  of  these,  or  enough  to  bring  the  fighting  force 
for  the  defense  of  the  place  quite  up  to  7,000  men.  Forrest, 
a  few  days  afterward,  admitted  that  Armstrong's  brigade 
alone,  which  filled  the  works  assaulted  by  Long,  had  as 
many  men  defending  the  parapets  as  were  engaged  in 
attacking  them.* 

When  it  is  remembered  that,  in  addition  to  the  men  with 
small  arms  in  their  hands,  these  works  contained  for  their 
defense  30  field  guns  and  two  30-pounder  Parrott's,  so  mounted 
as  to  sweep  all  the  approaches,  and  to  concentrate  their  fire 
on  either,  and  that  all  of  them  were  manned  and  engaged  in 
the  effort  to  drive  back  the  assaulting  lines,  it  will  be  still 
more  difficult  to  understand  why  they  did  not  succeed. 

Wilson's  entire  force  consisted  of  only  two  divisions 
and  two  batteries,  amounting  in  all  to  about  8,000  men  pres- 
ent for  duty.  His  losses  were  44  killed,  277  wounded,  and 
7  missing,  a  total  of  328. 

No  list  of  Confederate  killed  and  wounded  was  ever  made, 
but  the  aggregate  could  hardly  have  been  so  great  as  that  of 
the  Union  cavalry. 

*  For  a  fuller  account  of  this  campaign  and  the  strength  of  the  oppos- 
ing forces,  see  "  The  Story  of  a  Cavalry  Regiment,"  by  Wm.  Forse  Scott. 
Putnam's,  1893. 


616  Life,  of  Thomas. 

The  trophies  of  victory  were  enormous.  They  included 
2,700  prisoners  with  their  officers  and  colors,  about  2,000 
horses,  32  guns  in  use,  26  field  guns  with  carriages  and  cais- 
sons in  the  arsenal,  44  siege  guns  in  the  foundry,  66,000 
rounds  of  ammunition  for  artillery,  and  over  100,000  rounds 
for  small  arms.  But  what  was  of  still  greater  importance, 
the  capture  of  the  city  enabled  the  victors  to  destroy  the 
Selma  arsenal,  consisting  of  44  buildings,  covering  13  acres 
of  ground,  and  filled  with  machinery  and  munitions;  the 
the  powder  works  and  magazine,  with  7  buildings  con- 
taining the  necessary  machinery,  14,000  pounds  of  powder, 
and  a  large  number  of  cartridges ;  the  niter  works,  with  18 
buildings  fully  equipped  and  in  operation ;  3  foundries  and 
their  equipment  for  casting  military  and  naval  guns;  3 
rolling  mills  in  operation ;  and  a  number  of  machine  shops 
and  factories  making  tools  and  military  equipments,  besides 
the  central  quartermaster  and  commissary  depots  and  accu- 
mulated supplies  for  a  great  department.  As  far  as  needed, 
the  captured  horses  were  used  to  remount  the  train  guards 
who  arrived  with  LaGrange's  brigade  on  the  6th ;  the  re- 
mainder were  killed  to  prevent  their  being  used  again  by  the 
enemy. 

The  blow  was  a  fatal  one  to  the  Confederacy,  for  no 
matter  what  might  be  the  result  of  the  contest  in  Virginia, 
this  city,  with  its  government  establishments  and  manu- 
facturing plants,  and  the  resources  of  the  rich  country  sur- 
rounding it,  was  essential  to  the  further  continuance  of  or- 
ganized resistance.  Fully  realizing  all  this,  the  Federal 
commander  took  every  precaution  to  make  the  work  of  de- 
struction complete.  The  machinery  was  broken  and  dis- 
mantled, the  round  shot  were  rolled  into  the  river,  and  all 
the  buildings  and  establishments,  used  or  patronized  by  the 
government,  were  burned,  but  this  was  done  at  night  during 
a  heavy  rain-storm,  when  it  was  comparatively  easy  to  pre- 
vent the  fire  from  spreading  to  private  property. 

Immediately  after  the  occupancy  of  the  place,  Upton 
was  sent  out  to  scour  the  country,  pick  up  prisoners  and 
property,  and  bring  in  the  detachments  and  trains,  all  of 
which  was  accomplished  without  further  fighting  or  loss. 


The  Cavalry  Corps  in  Alabama  and  Georgia.          617 

The  first  step  in  the  campaign  had  been  taken  with  rapidity 
and  success,  but  nothing  had  been  heard  from  Grant,  Sher- 
man, Thomas,  or  Canby,  and  hence  it  was  not  known  at 
Selma  that  the  Confederacy  was  tottering  on  the  very  verge 
of  ruin.  General  Wilson  knew,  of  course,  that  the  heart  had 
been  torn  out  of  the  rebellion  in  Alabama,  and  that  Canby 
was  simply  wasting  time  in  operating  against  Mobile  instead 
of  marching  boldly  into  the  interior  of  the  state.  Feeling 
assured  that  the  cavalry  corps  could  do  no  good  by  going 
further  south,  aud  that  his  true  theater  of  operations  lay  to 
the  eastward,  Wilson  sent  a  trusty  colored  man,  who  volun- 
teered for  the  service,  in  a  skiff  down  the  Alabama  River, 
with  which  he  was  well  acquainted,  to  deliver  a  letter  to 
Canby,  informing  him  of  the  fall  of  Selma,  and  advising  him 
to  march  inland  at  once.  The  letter  also  contained  the  in- 
formation that  Wilson  would  cross  the  river  and  move  by 
the  way  of  Montgomery  into  Central  Georgia. 

Before  starting  on  the  new  campaign,  he  felt  that  he 
ought  to  know  what  had  become  of  Croxton,  and  as  he  had 
a  large  number  of  prisoners,  he  sought  and  obtained  an  in- 
terview with  Forrest  under  a  flag  of  truce.  The  meeting 
took  place  in  the  house  of  Colonel  Matthews,  at  Cahawba, 
near  the  mouth  of  the  Cahawba  River.  Its  ostensible  object 
was  to  arrange  for  an  exchange  or  parol  of  prisoners,  but 
this  was  declined  by  Forrest,  who  had  but  few  to  release,  and 
felt  that  it  would  embarrass  the  Union  commander  to  retain 
and  care  for  the  large  number  in  his  possession.  The  con- 
versation and  exchange  of  courtesies  was  continued,  how- 
ever, till  Wilson  had  drawn  out  the  fact  that  Croxton  and 
his  command  were  still  at  large  and  going  where  they 
pleased  in  the  country  west  of  the  Cahawba  River.  With 
this  information,  all  anxiety  for  Croxton's  safety  disappeared, 
and  Wilson  galloped  back  to  Selma,  resolved  to  hasten  his 
preparations  for  continuing  the  campaign  to  the  eastward, 
with  the  purpose  of  breaking  up  the  rest  of  the  enemy's 
depots  and  factories,  destroying  his  interior  line  of  railway 
communication  and  supply,  and  ultimately  taking  part  with 
Sherman  in  North  Carolina  and  Grant  in  Virginia,  in  the 
destruction  of  the  last  armies  of  the  Confederacy. 


618  Life  of  Thomas. 


CHAPTER  XXIX. 

The  Capture  of  Montgomery,  Columbus,  West  Point  and  Macon. 

The  first  new  objective  point  was  Montgomery,  the 
capital  of  Alabama,  and  also  the  first  capital  of  the  Con- 
federacy, but  as  it  lay  on  the  south  or  east  side  of  the 
Alabama  River,  it  was  necessary  for  the  cavalry  corps  to 
cross  as  the  first  step  in  its  further  operations. 

Foreseeing  this  necessity,  and  finding  that  all  the  steam- 
boats had  been  run  beyond  his  reach,  Wilson,  on  the  first 
day  after  his  occupation  of  Selma,  had  set  his  staff  officers 
at  the  task  of  constructing  a  sufficient  number  of  wooden 
pontoons  with  the  canvas  boats  in  his  bridge  train,  to  span 
the  Alabama  River,  which  was  found  to  be  nearly  900  feet 
wide  at  the  place  selected  for  the  crossing.  By  the  use  of 
lumber  found  near  by,  and  the  help  of  colored  carpenters, 
the  boats  were  finished  and  the  bridge  laid  by  the  9th  of 
April,  immediately  after  which  the  command  began  crossing. 
But  as  the  river  was  rising  rapidly,  and  carried  by  a  large  lot 
of  drift  logs,  it  was  with  the  greatest  difficulty  that  the 
bridge  could  be  maintained  in  a  condition  of  safety.  It  was 
broken  several  times,  but  repaired  each  time  without  material 
delay  or  loss  of  life.  General  Alexander,  who  was  using  a 
small  boat  for  the  purpose  of  warding  off  the  floating  logs, 
was  overturned  by  an  anchor  line  and  nearly  crushed  to 
death  between  a  floating  tree  and  the  bow  of  one  of  the  pon- 
toons. Three  of  his  ribs  were  broken,  but  he  was  rescued 
without  further  injury,  and  although  compelled  to  travel  for 
a  few  days  in  an  ambulance,  continued  in  command  of  his 
brigade.  General  Winslow,  who  had  been  made  military 
governor  of  Selma,  and  had  superintended  the  destruction 
of  the  public  property  with  marked  ability,  brought  off  the 
rear  guard,  and  destroyed  the  wooden  boats  after  the  last 


The  Capture  of  Montgomery,  Columbus,  etc.  619 

mau  had  crossed.  The  passage  of  this  great  river  was  an 
important  aud  interesting  event,  and  characterized  by  many 
romantic  incidents  and  adventures.  After  the  movement 
began  it  was  kept  up  constantly  except  while  the  bridge  was 
broken.  During  the  last  night  the  scene  was  lighted  by  the 
blaze  of  burning  frame  buildings,  which  had  been  selected 
and  set  on  fire  for  that  purpose. 

The  corps,  after  a  week's  comparative  rest  and  repair, 
had  now  successfully  commenced  its  new  campaign,  but  after 
deducting  Croxton's  brigade,  and  the  total  of  killed  and 
wounded,  its  effective  strength  was  reduced  to  about  11,000 
men,  all  of  whom  were  now  mounted  and  in  better  condition 
for  service  than  ever  before.  Harness,  equipments,  and  shoe- 
ing had  been  carefully  looked  after;  wagons,  pontoon  train, 
and  pack-animals  had  been  reduced  to  the  lowest  limit,  and 
all  camp-followers  had  been  rigidly  cut  off.  A  large  number 
of  able-bodied  negroes  had  come  in,  but  they  were  enlisted 
and  formed  into  regiments,  one  for  each  division,  under  the 
command  of  white  officers  detailed  for  that  purpose.  This 
force  was  armed  with  captured  rebel  guns,  and  after  a  few 
days  was  mounted  on  horses  and  mules  impressed  from  the 
country.  It  subsisted  by  foraging  and  made  itself  exceed- 
ingly useful  by  helping  with  the  heavy  work  of  the  command 
during  the  closing  days  of  the  campaign.  These  regiments 
were  afterward  regularly  mustered  into  the  Army  of  the 
United  States  as  infantry,  and  served  in  Georgia  with  credit 
for  several  months  after  the  war  was  at  an  end. 

The  facility  with  which  this  organization  was  made,  and 
the  readiness  with  which  it,  as  well  as  the  mounted  men  of 
the  train  guard  were  mounted,  make  it  certain  that  Hatch's 
splendid  division,  over  5,000  strong,  left  on  the  Tennessee, 
for  lack  of  horses,  might  also  have  accompanied  the  cavalry 
army,  and  remounted  itself  with  horses  captured  or  impressed 
from  the  enemy.  The  lesson  is  of  value,  and  should  not 
be  lost  sight  of  by  military  men  dealing  with  such  subjects 
hereafter. 

The  line  of  march  from  Selma  lay  to  the  eastward 
through  the  planting  villages  of  Benton  Church  Hill  and 
Lowndesborough,  and  brought  the  corps  with  but  slight  re- 


620  Life  of  Thomas. 

sistance  from  Clanton's  brigade,  of  Buford's  division,  to 
Montgomery,  on  the  12th  of  April.  The  authorities  of  that 
city  wisely  decided  that  no  effective  defense  of  it  could  be 
made  although  an  elaborate  series  of  earthworks  had  been 
built  around  it.  They  therefore  resolved  to  take  time  by 
the  forelock  and  place  themselves  and  the  town,  without  de- 
lay, under  the  protection  of  General  Wilson.  For  this  pur- 
pose the  mayor,  accompanied  by  some  of  the  principal  citi- 
zens, rode  out  beyond  the  fortifications  and  surrendered  their 
charge,  without  conditions.  This  was  an  unexpected  event, 
and  somewhat  of  a  disappointment  to  both  officers  and  men 
of  the  Union  cavalry,  for  they  had  approached  the  city  ex- 
pecting, and  prepared  for  a  battle,  but  there  was  nothing  to 
be  done  but  accept  the  surrender,  and  show  the  good  people 
of  the  first  Confederate  capital  how  perfect  was  the  discipline 
of  the  invading  army. 

In  perfect  order  the  column  closed  in  platoon  front,  with 
every  man  in  his  place,  flags  unfurled,  guidons  flying,  sabers 
and  spurs  jingling,  bands  playing,  and  the  bugles  sounding, 
that  war-begrimed  host  of  Union  troopers  traversed  the  city, 
setting  the  brave  but  misguided  people  of  that  capital  an 
example  of  discipline  far  more  impressive  than  a  bloody  vic- 
tory would  have  been.  The  Union  flag  had  been  promptly 
hoisted  over  the  State  House,  and  as  regiment  after  regiment 
filed  beneath  its  starry  folds,  they  made  the  welkin  ring  with 
their  exultant  hurrahs.  It  was  a  great  day  for  the  country 
and  for  the  cavalry  corps,  the  men  of  which  seemed  instinct- 
ively to  understand  that  the  city,  having  surrendered  without 
a  fight,  belonged  to  the  commanding  general,  and  they  were 
bound  in  honor  to  respect  his  truce.  Not  a  marauder  showed 
himself;  not  a  house  was  entered,  except  by  invitation;  and 
not  a  word  was  uttered  to  offend  the  most  refined  suscepti- 
bilities. The  flag  had  made  its  appearance  in  the  first  Con- 
federate capital,  not  only  as  the  emblem  of  national  unity,  but 
as  the  emblem  of  order  and  justice  under  the  law.  While  the 
larger  part  of  the  corps  camped  in  the  vicinity  of  the  city, 
and  Wilson  made  his  head-quarters  there  for  the  night,  La 
Grange  pushed  on  to  the  eastward,  skirmishing  with  Buford. 
During  the  afternoon  he  drove  that  leader  to  Mt.  Meigs,  ten 


The  Capture  of  Montgomery,  Columbus,  etc.  621 

miles  from  Columbus,  and  ended  the  day's  work  by  capturing 
his  battle-Hag  and  thirty  of  his  men. 

Detachments  were  sent  out  from  Montgomery  to  destroy 
all  the  vessels  and  military  supplies  within  reach.  Five  steam- 
boats, laden  with  subsistence  stores,  were  captured  and  burned, 
and  five  field-guns,  with  their  carriages,  were  taken  and  dis- 
abled for  further  service.  At  both  Selma  and  Montgomery 
the  Confederate  leaders  had  destroyed  immense  quantities 
of  cotton,  under  the  mistaken  notion  that  the  cavalry  corps 
was  hunting  for  it,  and  would  take  possession  of  it  for  the 
Federal  government.  So  long  as  the  insensate  policy  of 
burning  the  only  surplus  product  of  the  South  which  could 
be  sold  for  gold  was  persisted  in  by  the  rebels,  General  Wil- 
son ordered  his  subordinate  commanders  to  help  them  in  it 
with  all  their  might.  And  so  it  came  about  that  what  the 
rebels  missed  or  spared  the  national  soldiery  sought  out  and 
gave  to  the  torch.  The  consequence  was,  that  many  million 
dollars'  worth  of  this  valuable  staple  went  up  in  smoke  at 
Columbus,  as  well  as  at  Montgomery  and  Selma,  and  many 
planters,  merchants,  and  warehousemen  of  Central  Alabama 
and  Georgia  were  impoverished  even  after  they  must  have 
known  that  peace  was  near  at  hand.  It  should  be  stated  in 
fairness,  however,  that  all  the  loss  did  not  fall  upon  private 
individuals,  for  such  was  not  the  case.  It  was  well  known 

that  much  of  the  cotton  had  been  taken  by  the  Confederate 

I  • 

government  and  sold  to  foreigners  in  exchange  for  supplies, 
which  were  to  be  brought  in  by  blockade  runners,  whose  re- 
turn cargoes  were  to  be  the  cotton  in  question.  Until  it  was 
known  beyond  question  that  the  war  was  ended,  and  the  re- 
volted regions  brought  under  sway  of  the  national  government, 
to  leave  this  cotton  behind  would  have  been  like  leaving  its 
value  in  gold  for  the  purpose  of  carrying  on  the  rebellion. 

While  at  Montgomery,  Wilson  got  the  first  intimation 
that  Lee  had  evacuated  Richmond,  but  there  was  no  sugges- 
tion that  he  had  met  with  disaster  or  surrendered  at  Appo- 
mattox  Court  House.  If  any  citizen  knew  it,  he  studiously 
concealed  it  from  the  Union  commander,  and  left  him  to 
learn  it  as  beat  he  might  farther  east.  The  evacuation  of 
Richmond  was  of  itself  no  insignificant  event,  for,  although 


622  Life  of  Thomas. 

it  might  presage  an  immediate  collapse  of  the  Confederate 
cause,  it  might  also  indicate  a  voluntary  movement  for  the 
union  of  Lee's  and  Johnston's  armies,  and  a  combined  and 
overwhelming  attack  against  Grant  or  Sherman.  Until  it 
was  certainly  known  what  had  actually  occurred  in  Virginia, 
and  what  the  occurrence  portended,  it  served  only  to  arouse 
the  anxiety  and  quicken  the  movements  of  the  cavalry  com- 
mander. Tarrying  in  Montgomery,  only  one  night,  he  pushed 
eastward  on  the  13th,  with  celerity,  his  next  great  object  be- 
ing to  cross  the  Chattahoochee  at  Columbus  on  the  direct 
road  to  Macon,  if  possible,  or  at  West  Point,  farther  to  the 
north,  if  he  must.  It  was  known  that  the  river  was  spanned 
by  bridges  at  each  of  those  places,  and  it  was  hoped  that  a  bold 
and  rapid  movement  of  the  main  column  on  the  former,  with 
a  strong  demonstration  on  the  latter,  would  prove  successful 
at  one  or  both  of  those  places. 

Explaining  his  views  to  Upton,  Wilson  ordered  that 
most  capable  soldier  to  take  the  advance  with  his  own  di- 
vision, and  to  detach  McCook  with  LaGrange's  brigade  for 
the  side  operation.  Inasmuch  as  Long  had  been  compelled 
by  the  force  of  circumstances,  to  forestall  Upton  in  the  at- 
tack on  Selma,  and  had  not  only  been  severely  wounded,  but 
had  done  most  of  the  fighting  and  gained  most  of  the  glory, 
it  was  now  fairly  Upton's  turn  to  have  the  lead,  and  to  man- 
age the  details  of  the  movement.  The  sequel  shows  that  he 
was  most  worthy  of  the  honor  conferred  upon  him.  One  of 
the  most  brilliant  and  distinguished  commanders  of  artillery 
and  infantry  in  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  Upton  had  already 
shown  himself  to  be  one  of  the  best  division  commanders  of 
cavalry  in  the  west,  and  was  now  about  to  crown  his  career 
with  his  most  brilliant  performance. 

The  march  of  the  two  columns  lay  directly  east  by  the 
same  route  until  they  reached  Tuskegee,  at  which  point  La- 
Grange  left  the  Columbus  road  and  pushed  northeastward 
toward  West  Point,  near  which  place  he  arrived  on  the  16th. 
He  found  a  strong  bridgehead,  the  key-point  of  which  was  a 
square  redoubt  called  Fort  Tyler,  surrounded  by  a  deep  ditch 
and  mounting  three  guns,  one  of  which  was  a  32-pounder 
siege  piece.  The  garrison  consisted,  as  was  afterward  as- 


The  Capture  of  Montgomery,  Columbus^  etc.  623 

t 

certained,  of  265  men,  all  the  redoubt  would  hold,  com- 
manded by  General  Robert  C.  Tyler  and  Colonel  James  C. 
Fannin,  both  officers  of  extraordinary  gallantry.  Quickly 
informing  himself  of  the  situation  and  surroundings  of  the 
town,  LaG range  led  the  attack,  in  person,  through  the  street 
directly  to  the  bridge,  dashed  across  it,  leaping  a  chasm  in 
the  flooring,  closely  followed  by  a  battalion  of  his  command, 
beat  out  the  fire  which  had  already  been  started  with  lighted 
turpentine  balls,  and  then  wheeled  about,  recrossed  the  bridge, 
and  gave  his  attention  to  the  capture  of  the  fort.  His  dis- 
mounted men  had  already  driven  the  rebel  skirmishers  back 
to  the  redoubt,  and  discovered  the  ditch  by  which  it  was  sur- 
rounded. In  an  incredibly  short  time  a  detachment,  without 
arms,  detailed  for  that  purpose,  had  prepared  the  materials 
consisting  of  the  panels  of  a  picket  fence  with  the  necessary 
flooring  boards,  for  three  bridges,  and  a  section  of  parrot  rifles 
had  been  put  in  position  to  sweep  the  parapet  of  the  fort. 
Under  the  fire  of  these  guns  which  quickly  dismounted  or 
silenced  those  in  the  redoubt,  the  way  was  soon  cleared  for 
the  bridging  parties,  and  the  assaulting  detachments  to  charge 
upon  the  enemy's  position.  The  bridges  were  successfully 
laid,  but  the  first  assault  was  repulsed.  A  number  of  the 
men  fell  back,  while  others  leapt  into  the  ditch  for  shelter. 
Encouraged  by  this  result,  the  enemy  threw  lighted  shells 
over  the  parapet  on  to  the  heads  of  those  below.  A  part  of 
these  shells  were  extinguished  by  water  in  the  ditch,  a  part 
were  stamped  out,  and  a  part  were  hurled  back  into  fort  still 
blazing. 

A  second  and  more  determined  attack  followed  at  once, 
and  this  time  resulted  in  complete  victory.  The  bridges 
which  had  been  laid  before  were  reached  and  safely  crossed, 
the  parapet  was  scaled,  and  the  gallant  soldiers  of  Wisconsin, 
led  by  Lieutenant-Colonel  Harden,  raced  with  those  of  In- 
diana, under  Captain  Hill,  to  see  who  should  have  the  honor 
of  hauling  down  the  rebel  flag.  The  garrison  fought  des- 
perately, and  yielded  only  when  overpowered.  General  Tyler, 
three  of  his  officers,  and  14  enlisted  men  were  killed,  28  were 
wounded,  and  219  surrendered.  La  Grange  had  one  horse 
killed  under  him,  and  lost  7  men  killed,  and  29  wounded. 


624  •  Life  of  Thomas. 

He  captured  3  guns,  500  stands  of  small  arms,  19  locomotive 
engines,  and  240  cars  loaded  with  army  supplies,  all  of  which 
were  disabled  or  burned.  Several  large  buildings,  also  filled 
with  army  supplies,  were  taken  possession  of  and  devoted  to 
the  same  fate. 

But  what  was  of  still  greater  importance,  La  Grange  had 
secured  a  safe  passage  into  Central  Georgia,  not  only  for  his 
own  column,  but  for  the  whole  corps  should  it  become  nec- 
essary for  the  latter  to  use  it.  His  operations,  although 
he  had  throughout  the  advantage  of  a  superior  force,  were 
conducted  with  rare  skill  and  judgment,  and  showed  him 
to  be  a  commander  of  extraordinary  ability  and  promise. 
The  main  column  continued  its  movement  with  rapidity  on 
the  direct  road  for  Columbus,  making  forty  and  fifty  miles 
per  day.  Small  parties  of  Confederate  cavalry  were  encoun- 
tered from  time  to  time,  but  they  were  too  light  to  seriously 
delay  the  progress  of  the  invading  force. 

At  Tuskegee,  a  beautiful  country  town,  the  seat  of  a 
number  of  schools  for  girls,  the  corps  added  to  its  renown 
by  passing  through  the  principal  street  as  it  passed  through 
Montgomery,  with  every  man  in  his  place,  guidons  unfurled, 
and  the  bauds  playing  patriotic  airs.  General  Wilson's  horse 
was  decked  out  with  garlands,  and  so  far  as  external  polite- 
ness could  show  it,  the  national  troopers  were  regarded  as 
friends  rather  than  enemies. 

At  this  place  the  provost-marshal  of  the  corps  discovered 
a  printing  office  from  which  a  disloyal  local  newspaper  had 
been  published,  and  of  course  he  ordered  it  to  be  destroyed^ 
but  it  so  turned  out  that  a  lady  claimed  to  be  its  owner,  and 
loudly  protested  against  this  arbitrary  measure.  The  officer, 
although  firm,  was  not  altogether  without  sympathy  for  the 
sincere  distress  of  the  lady,  who  begged  for  a  respite  till  she 
could  see  the  commanding  general.  As  this  was  readily  al- 
lowed she  was  soon  making  decided  inroads  into  his  sympa- 
thies. "When  she  declared  that  all  the  school  books  and 
Bibles  used  in  that  region  had  also  been  printed  on  her  press, 
and  pleaded,  with  a  flood  of  tears,  that  it  might  be  spared  to 
continue  that  good  work,  her  case  was  almost  won.  The 
general  suggested  that  if  she  would  enter  into  contract 


The  Capture  of  Montgomery,  Columbus,  etc.  625 

never  to  print  another  number  of  a  rebel  newspaper,  and  to 
devote  her  press  henceforth  and  forever  to  the  printing  of 
Bibles  and  school  books,  and  would  give  a  bond  signed  by 
the  mayor  and  two  good  citizens  for  the  faithful  perform- 
ance of  her  undertaking,  he  would  suspend  his  order  in- 
definitely. To  this  she  eagerly  assented.  '  The  agreement 
was  at  once  drawn  up,  and  duly  signed,  sealed,  and  deliv- 
ered, and  the  good  woman  went  home  rejoicing.  The 
general  and  his  staff  mounted  and  rode  away,  feeling  that 
they  were  leaving  behind  at  least  one  loyal  woman,  but 
whether  she  faithfully  kept  her  contract  is  unknown.  The 
official  records  of  the  War  of  the  Rebellion,  so  far  as  pub- 
lished, throw  no  light  upon  that  question.  This  episode, 
however,  did  not  for  a  moment  suspend  the  movement  of 
the  column  toward  its  goal  on  the  Chattahoochee.  The 
remnant  of  Buford's  division  did  its  best,  by  skirmish  and 
ambuscade,  to  retard  the  swift  march  of  the  advanced  guard, 
but  with  no  other  effect  than  to  keep  it  on  the  alert  and 
full  of  determination.  General  Wilson  and  his  staff  twice 
passed  within  a  few  yards  of  a  party  of  bushwhackers,  one 
of  whom  took  aim  and  tried  to  pull  his  trigger,  but  failed 
for  lack  of  courage  or  because  his  conscience  would  not 
permit  him,  like  an  assassin  from  a  place  of  concealment,  to 
shoot  even  a  general. 

By  night  of  March  16th  the  advance  of  the  column  had 
got  within  a  half-day's  inarch  of  Columbus,  when  it  went 
into  camp.  Before  moving  out  the  next  morning  men  and 
horses  were  carefully  inspected,  and  every  precaution  was 
taken  to  prepare  them  for  the  battle  which  was  expected  to 
take  place.  Columbus  was  known  to  be  a  city  of  from  ten 
to  twelve  thousand  people,  containing  work-shops,  gun, 
sword,  and  pistol  factories,  clothing  and  equipment  depots, 
mills,  and  supplies  of  every  kind  in  greater  numbers  and 
abundance  than  any  other  city  left  in  the  Confederacy.  It 
was  the  most  remote  city  in  the  South,  both  from  the  borders 
of  the  loyal  states  and  from  the  sea-coast,  and  the  idea  of  its 
capture  seems  never  to  have  been  seriously  considered  by 
the  Confederate  leaders.  It  had  even  been  suggested  in  the 
40 


626  Life  of  Thomas. 

Confederate  Congress  to  make  it  the  capital  instead  of  Rich- 
mond, and  a  navy-yard  had  been  located  there.  It  was 
known  that  the  three  bridges  spanning  the  river  at  that 
place  had  been  covered  by  a  strong  ttte-de-pont,  in  which 
many  guns  had  been  mounted,  but  nothing  definite  could  be 
learned  as  to  the  trace  or  profile  of  the  intrenchments.  No 
itinerant  engineer  was  found,  as  in  the  case  of  Selma,  to 
give  the  invaders  a  plan,  or  a  statement  of  the  guns  in  posi- 
tion. They  were  forced  to  depend  upon  their  own  observa- 
tion, and  were  confronted  by  a  necessity  for  victory  even 
greater,  if  possible,  than  at  the  Alabama  River.  But  Upton, 
although  young  in  years,  was  an  old  and  experienced  hand 
at  finding  the  weak  spots  and  assaulting  fortifications.  He 
had  the  advance,  and  was  urged  to  reach  the  ground,  and 
after  a  careful  reconnoissance,  to  make  his  plan  of  attack  as 
soon  as  possible,  so  that  the  troops  might  be  brought  directly 
to  the  positions  from  which  they  were  to  move  to  the  assault. 
He  arrived  in  sight  of  Girard,  a  small  suburb  situated  on 
the  right  or  western  bank  of  the  river,  with  Columbus  itself 
on  the  left  or  eastern  bank,  at  about  one  o'clock,  and  found 
such  a  formidable  and  extended  line  of  fortifications  as  to 
demand  a  most  careful  examination,  which  he  at  once  began. 
Girard  appeared  to  be  about  equally  divided  by  Mill  Creek 
flowing  from  the  north-west  and  entering  the  Chattahoochie 
opposite  the  center  of  the  city.  It  also  became  known  that 
two  wooden  bridges,  about  1,000  feet  long,  and  a  half  a  mile 
apart,  connected  the  suburb  with  the  city,  and  that  a  railroad 
bridge  was  situated  about  a  quarter  of  a  mile  above  the  up- 
per wagon  bridge.  The  lower  bridge  was  used  by  the  city 
road  to  Eufaula  and  Crawford,  and  the  middle  one  by  the 
road  to  Summerville,  Opelika,  and  Salem,  while  the  upper 
bridge  belonged  to  the  Columbus  and  Western  Railroad. 
The  country  on  which  the  line  of  works  was  traced,  as  well 
as  that  which  surrounds  it,  is  hilly,  and  at  that  time  was 
generally  covered  with  a  thick  growth  of  scrub-oak.  The 
hills  are  from  one  hundred  to  four  hundred  feet  higher  than 
the  river  and  separated  by  deep,  narrow  ravines,  which  made 
the  country  an  exceedingly  difficult  one  to  define  or  under- 
stand. By  the  time  Upton  had  mastered  it  and  got  ready 


The  Capture  of  Montgomery,  Columbus,  etc.  627 

to  submit  his  plan,  the  whole  command  had  arrived,  but  it 
was  getting  quite  late,  and  Upton  was  disconcerted  by  the 
fear  that  he  could  not  place  the  troops  in  time  for  them  to 
make  their  attack  before  dark.  After  reporting  fully  lo 
General  "Wilson,  he  therefore  advised  that  the  troops  should 
be  moved  to  the  positions  selected  for  them,  and  then  sleep 
on  their  arms  till  early  dawn.  Fully  approving  Upton's  plan 
of  attack,  the  proposed  disposition  of  the  troops  and  their 
formation,  all  of  which  were  found  to  be  admirable,  and  also 
concurring  in  the  suggestion  that  the  various  brigades  should 
be  sent  at  once  to  the  positions  selected  for  them,  Wilson  de- 
cided that,  instead  of  delaying  till  morning  the  attack  should 
be  made  at  9  o'clock  that  night.  He  pointed  out  that  the 
troops  were  all  veterans  under  perfect  discipline,  with  full 
confidence  in  their  officers  and  accustomed  to  night  fighting, 
and  hence  could  be  depended  upon  to  carry  out  their  instruc- 
tions at  one  time  as  well  as  another.  Upton,  realizing  the 
force  of  these  suggestions,  almost  before  they  were  completed, 
promptly  set  about  carrying  them  into  eft'ect. 

Alexander's  brigade,  having  skirmished  sharply  with  the 
enemy  for  ten  miles,  was  the  first  to  catch  sight  of  Girard. 
Upton,  seeing  that  the  situation  was  a  complicated  one,  di- 
rected him  to  make  a  dash  at  the  lower  bridge  in  the  hope 
of  carrying  it  before  the  rebels  could  rally  to  its  defense. 
Fortunately,  the  intrenchments  were  not  continuous  in  front 
of  it,  and  although  the  road  was  swept  by  the  fire  of  four 
redoubts  and  two  batteries,  the  gallant  column  led  by  Eggles- 
ton  with  the  First  Ohio,  had  reached  the  very  heart  of  the 
village,  within  full  sight  of  the  bridge,  not  a  quarter  of  a 
mile  away,  when  it  was  seen  to  burst  into  flames.  It  had 
been  prepared  with  cotton  and  turpentine,  and  the  enemy, 
now  thoroughly  alarmed,  saw  that  nothing  but  fire  could 
save  it  from  the  invaders.  Egglestou,  discovering  that  it 
was  also  swept  by  three  guns,  and  that  his  column  was  under 
a  cross-fire  from  six  more,  wheeled  about  and  took  position 
with  the  rest  of  the  brigade,  on  the  Sand  Fort  road,  out  of 
range. 

Winslow's  brigade,  after  the  plan  of  attack  had  been 
decided  upon,  was  directed  across  the  country  out  of  sight  of 


t>28  Life  of  Thomas. 

the  enemy,  to  a  position  on  the  Summerville  or  Opelika  road, 
upon  which  the  main  attack  was  to  be  made.  It  was  fully 
dark  by  the  time  he  got  there  and  completed  his  dispositions. 
Coble's  Third  Iowa  Cavalry,  numbering  three  hundred  fight- 
ing men,  was  dismounted  and  formed  in  single  line,  about 
one  man  to  the  yard,  with  its  left  resting  on  the  broad  Sum- 
raerville  road,  which  shone  white  and  dusty  in  the  uncertain 
light  of  the  cloudy  April  evening.  This  made  it  a  good  di- 
rectrix, and  as  it  necessarily  led  directly  to  the  middle  bridge, 
every  man  was  expected  to  keep  it  in  sight  or  to  guide  himself 
by  it.  Benteen's  Tenth  Missouri  Cavalry,  three  hundred  and 
and  fifty  strong,  not  counting  an  absent  detachment,  was 
formed  in  column,  mounted  on  the  road  a  few  hundred  yards 
in  rear  of  Noble,  ready  to  charge  when  the  latter  had  cap- 
tured the  works  in  his  front.  The  Fourth  Iowa  was  halted 
in  column  in  the  rear  of  Noble's  right.  It  was  now  between 
8  and  9  o'clock,  and  not  a  gun  had  been  fired  to  show  that 
the  presence  of  this  brigade,  or  the  point  from  which  its  at- 
tack would  fall,  had  been  discovered.  Wilson,  Upton,  and 
Winslow  were  all  on  the  ground  and  had  just  completed 
their  final  conference  and  given  the  final  orders,  when  firing 
began  in  front.  The  charge  was  ordered,  Upton  and  "Wins- 
low  riding  along  the  road  encouraging  the  dismounted  men, 
led  by  Noble  in  person.  The  line  sprang  forward  with  alac- 
rity, breaking  its  way  through  a  slashing  or  rough  abattis, 
and  carrying  two  detached  redoubts  and  a  line  of  rifle  pits 
of  greater  length  than  its  own  front.  The  astonished  rebels 
opened  fire  all  along  their  intrenchments,  the  main  and  con- 
tinuous line  of  which  lay  inside  and  to  the  left  of  the  works 
already  captured.  The  whole  landscape  was  lit  up  with  the 
flashing  of  the  enemy's  guns,  27  of  which  were  firing  into 
the  darkness  without  aim,  and  without  any  other  effect  than 
to  guide  their  assailants  to  their  goal.  Wilson  ordered  Ben- 
teen  to  advance  as  soon  as  the  cheering  of  Nobte's  men  made 
it  known  that  they  were  driving  the  enemy,  and  Upton,  with- 
out knowing  that  he  had  not  yet  penetrated  the  main  line  of 
defense — it  was  too  dark  to  see  any  thing  but  the  road  and 
the  flash  of  the  artillery  and  musketry — ordered  Benteen  to 
halt  his  column  and  send  forward  two  companies  to  follow 


The  Capture  of  Montgomery,  Columbus,  etc.  629 

the  road  to  the  bridge  and  secure  it  at  all  hazards.  This 
work  fell,  of  course,  to  the  leading  two  companies,  the  senior 
captain  of  which  was  Captain  McGlasson.  Without  a  mo- 
ment's hesitation  he  advanced  into  the  darkness,  but  had  not 
gone  far  before  he  encountered  the  inner  line  and  real  de- 
fense of  the  town  and  bridges,  yet  he  did  not  draw  rein,  but 
with  coolness  and  self-possession,  pushed  on  through  the 
opening  at  which  the  road  entered,  just  as  though  he  be- 
longed to  the  defending  rather  than  to  the  attacking  force. 
Once  through,  he  galloped  to  the  bridge,  sending  a  party 
over  it  to  sieze  the  battery  ready  to  sweep  it,  but  he  was  soon 
surrounded  by  the  enemy  who  had  discovered  that  he  was 
not  of  their  side,  and  were  crowding  fiercely  upon  him. 
Fearing  that  he  and  his  whole  command  would  be  captured, 
he  wheeled  about  and  made  his  way  back  through  the  hos- 
tile lines  to  his  point  of  departure.  Meanwhile,  the  fact  had 
become  apparent  that  the  main  line  had  not  been  carried  and 
that  there  was  more  work  to  be  done.  The  Third  Iowa  was 
again  hurried  forward,  wheeling  to  the  left,  facing  what  was 
shortly  afterward  discovered  to  be  the  strongest  part  of  the 
intrenchments.  It  was  covered  by  a  slashing,  a  marshy 
brook,  and  a  deep  ravine  grown  up  with  trees  and  scrub, 
through  which  Noble  again  led  his  gallant  dismounted 
cavalrymen,  with  much  confusion  and  hard  work,  to 
victory.  In  the  very  midst  of  the  racket  Winslow  dis- 
mounted two  battalions  of  the  Fourth  Iowa  and  brought 
them  hurriedly  into  action  on  the  right  of  Noble.  The  whole 
line,  now  under  the  lead  of  Upton,  Winslow,  and  Noble, 
now  rushed  through  the  trees  and  slashings,  across  the  ra- 
vine, up  the  slope,  and  over  the  intrenchments,  carrying 
every  thing  before  them  and  scattering  their  dismayed  oppo- 
nents like  chaff.  No  time  was  wasted  on  taking  prisoners, 
but  the  victors  swept  along  the  intrenchments,  capturing  guns 
and  clearing  the  way  to  the  bridge.  The  third  battalion  of 
the  Fourth  Iowa,  mounted,  was  led  rapidly  by  Winslow  to 
and  across  the  bridge,  which  was  crowded  at  the  same  time 
by  fleeing  rebels.  The  night  was  so  dark  that  it  was  im- 
possible to  distinguish  friend  from  foe,  and  to  this  circum- 
stance is  due  the  fact  that  the  list  of  casualties  was  not 


630  Life  of  Thomas. 

much  greater.  The  lattice  work  of  the  bridge  was  stuffed 
with  raw  cotton,  saturated  with  turpentine,  and  an  effort 
was  made  by  a  confederate  to  light  it  with  a  match,  but 
he  was  stricken  down  by  the  swing  of  a  clubbed  carbine 
in  the  hands  of  a  Union  soldier.  Two  guns  were  stationed 
at  the  east  end,  and  so  pointed  as  to  sweep  the  bridge, 
'but  the  men  in  charge  of  them  were  restrained  from  firing 
by  the  fear  of  killing  more  of  their  friends  than  their  foes. 
A  fierce  fight  for  the  possession  of  these  guns  resulted,  but 
it  was  soon  decided  in  favor  of  the  Iowa  men,  and  this 
ended  the  struggle  for  both  Girard  and  Columbus.  The 
victory  was  complete.  The  towns  were  soon  in  full  posses- 
sion of  the  conquerors,  and  order  was  promptly  restored. 

Of  course  it  was  not  known  till  the  next  day,  who  had 
conducted  the  defense  of  the  place,  nor  what  the  trophies  of 
victory  were.  It  was  then  ascertained  that  Major-General 
Howell  Cobb,  assisted  by  General  Tombs  and  Colonels  Van- 
Zinken  and  Lamar,  with  about  3,000  men  of  the  "  Georgia 
Line,"  had  occupied  the  works  and  done  what  they  could  to 
defend  them. 

The  enemy's  loss  amounted  to  about  1,500  killed, 
wounded  and  captured,  while  the  national  loss,  thanks  to  the 
broken  ground  and  the  night  fighting,  was,  altogether,  only 
24  killed  and  wounded.  Amongst  the  trophies  were  27 
guns,  mounted  and  used  in  the  defense,  36  in  the  arsenal,  10 
battle-flags,  the  ram  Jackson,  mounting  6  guns  and  about 
ready  to  go  to  sea,  and  a  large  number  of  small  arms 
and  military  stores.  General  "Winslow,  who  was  placed  in 
command  of  the  city,  with  Colonel  Noble  as  Provost  Mar- 
shal, destroyed  7  warehouses  containing  125,000  bales  of 
cotton,  15  locomotives,  250  cars,  2  bridges  across  the 
Chattahoochee,  one  navy  yard  and  armory,  2  rolling  mills, 
1  arsenal  and  niter  works,  2  powder  magazines,  2  iron 
works,  3  foundries,  10  mills  and  factories,  making  cotton 
cloth,  paper,  swords,  guns,  pistols,  shoes,  wagons  and  other 
military  and  naval  supplies,  besides  100,000  rounds  of  ar- 
tillery ammunition,  and  great  quantities  of  machinery,  ac- 
couterments,  equipments  and  army  clothing,  of  which  no 
account  was  taken. 


The  Capture  of  Montgomery,  Columbus,  etc.  631 

This  was  the  last  great  manufacturing  center  of  the  Con- 
federacy, arid  the  destruction  of  its  establishments,  both 
public  and  private,  was  made  so  complete,  that  no  matter 
when  the  war  might  end,  they  could  contribute  nothing  to  its 
continuance.  In  fact,  the  war  was  then  over,  but  General 
Wilson  and  his  command,  cut  off'  as  they  were,  from  all 
communication  with  the  North,  and  hearing  nothing  from 
Confederate  sources,  were  still  in  ignorance  of  the  great 
events  which  had  happened  in  Virginia.  Pausing,  there- 
fore, only  long  enough  to  make  good  the  work  of  destruction, 
"Wilson  pushed  forward  Long's  division,  now  commanded  by 
Minty,  in  the  direction  of  Macon.  It  should  »be  noted  that 
this  division  had  not  arrived  in  time  to  take  any  part  in  the 
capture  of  Girard  and  Columbus,  and  was,  therefore,  fresh 
and  eager  to  take  the  advance.  About  half  of  Cobb's  force 
had  crossed  the  river  by  the  railroad  bridge,  and  made  haste 
to  escape  into  the  open  country.  Being  mostly  militia  the 
men  scattered  as  rapidly  as  they  could  to  their  homes,  and 
left  the  roads  to  the  Double  bridges  on  the  Flint  River  but 
slightly  guarded.  Minty's  advance,  riding  all  night,  cap- 
tured them  the  next  day,  and  thus  overcame  the  last  im- 
portant obstacle  on  the  road  to  Macon,  toward  which  he  was 
moving  at  the  rate  of  fifty  miles  a  day. 

Two  notable  incidents,  presaging  the  absolute  collapse  of 
the  Confederacy  quite  as  much  as  the  destruction  of  its  phys- 
ical resources,  occurred  at  Columbus.  The  first  was  the 
death  of  Colonel  C.  A.  L.  Lamar,  the  las4  commander  of  the 
American  slave  ship,  the  "  "Wanderer,"  formerly  the  famous 
sailing  yacht  "  America,"  who  was  struck  by  a  stray  shot  in 
the  street  fight  near  the  bridge,  and  instantly  killed.  The 
second  was  the  capture  and  absolute  destruction  of  the 
noted  secession  newspaper,  known  successively  as  the  "Mem- 
phis-Appeal," the  "  Memphis-Grenada  Appeal,"  and  the 
u  Memphis-Grenada-Jackson  Appeal."  It  had  been  pub- 
lished in  and  removed  by  turn  from  each  of  the  places  men- 
tioned in  its  title,  besides  Atlanta  and  Montgomery,  but  had 
now  brought  up  in  Columbus,  though  the  owner  had  not 
had  time  to  set  up  his  presses  and  issue  his  peripatetic  paper. 
The  proprietor,  a  fierce  rebel  named  Dill,  was  arrested  and 


632  Life  of  Thomas. 

put  under  a  strenuous  oath,  and  bond  prepared  by  Colonel 
Noble.  If  it  did  not  secure  the  government  against  every 
imaginable  form  of  disloyalty  that  one  man  could  commit  it 
was  because  the  ingenuity  of  the  provost-marshal  was  at 
fault. 

The  new  objective  points  of  the  cavalry  corps  were  first 
Macon,  and  then  Augusta,  on  the  direct  road  to  the  Carolinas. 
La  Grange,  moving  from  West  Point,  and  the  main  column 
on  the  road  by  the  Double  bridges,  through  Thomaston,  met 
with  no  serious  opposition.  They  easily  and  rapidly  brushed 
all  show  of  resistance  out  of  the  way,  preventing  the  destruc- 
tion of  every  bridge,  and  arriving  at  Macon  only  a  few  hours 
apart.  Minty's  advance,  under  Colonel  Frank  White,  en- 
countered about  300  men  at  the  Tobesofkee  bridge  fifteen 
miles  out  from  Macon.  They  had  set  fire  to  the  bridge  and 
taken  up  a  position  beyond  it  for  the  purpose  of  disputing 
its  passage,  but  this  was  a  futile  display  of  resolution. 
White  galloped  to  the  bridge,  but  seeing  that  the  planking 
had  been  torn  up,  he  dismounted  his  men,  and  clambering 
over  the  stringers  in  a  few  minutes  put  the  enemy  again  to 
flight.  The  road  to  Macon  was  now  clear,  and  in  less  than 
two  hours  more  the  gallant  White  had  closed  in  upon  it  and 
received  its  surrender. 

During  the  day  he  had  been  met  by  a  flag  of  truce  borne 
by  a  young  Confederate  brigadier-general  named  Robertson, 
carrying  a  letter  from  General  Beauregard  to  the  commander 
of  the  Union  forces,  advancing  on  that  road.  It  announced 
that  a  truce  had  been  entered  into  by  Generals  Sherman  and 
Johnston,  "  for  the  purpose  of  final  settlement,"  and  declared 
that  "  the  contending  forces  were  to  occupy  their  present  po- 
sition," till  48  hours'  notice  had  been  given  in  the  event  of 
the  resumption  of  hostilities.  White  was,  however,  a  man 
resources,  accustomed  to  meeting  the  emergencies  of  war. 
Observing  that  the  letter  was  addressed  to  the  "  commander 
of  the  forces,"  and  that  he  had  nothing  to  do  with  "  truces," 
but  had  been  ordered  to  go  into  Macon,  he  pulled  out  his 
watch,  remarking  that  he  would  send  the  letter  back  to 
General  Wilson  and  give  the  flag  of  truce  just  five  minutes 
to  get  out  of  the  way.  At  the  end  of  the  time  he  moved 


The  Capture  of  Montgomery,  Columbus,  etc.  633 

forward  again,  and  continued  his  march  till  Macon  was  in 
his  possession. 

General  Wilson,  who  was  eight  or  ten  miles  in  rear,  con- 
tinued his  march  with  his  whole  command,  stopping  nowhere 
till  he  reached  the  city  hall,  long  after  dark.  White  had 
collected  here  Generals  Cobb,  Mackall,  Mercer,  and  Gustavus 
W.  Smith,  and  conducted  General  Wilson  into  their  presence. 
General  Cobb  received  him  with  hauteur  and  reserve,  and 
demanded  that  he  and  his  command  should  be  released,  and 
that  General  Wilson  should  retire  with  his  forces  to  the 
point  at  which  the  flag  of  truce  had  met  his  advanced  guard. 
This  demand  was  promptly  denied  on  the  broad  and  sufficient 
ground  that  the  Confederate  authorities  were  not  a  proper 
channel  of  communication  from  Sherman  to  any  other  com- 
mander, and  certainly  not  to  one  who  was  acting  far  beyond  his 
reach,  and  in  a  measure  independent  of  him.  Besides,  General 
Wilson  declared  that  he  had  lost  no  time  in  going  to  the 
head  of  his  column,  which  he  found  in  Macon,  and  which  he 
could  not  on  any  condition  order  to  retire  from  .that  place. 
White  had  done  only  his  duty  in  going  there,  and  in  not  per- 
mitting himself  to  be  stopped  by  any  one.  The  argument 
was  ended  by  a  distinct  refusal  on  the  part  of  Wilson  to 
acknowledge  the  existence  of  an  armistice,  to  retire  from  the 
town,  or  to  release  his  prisoners.  Before  announcing  this 
conclusion,  however,  he  remarked  to  General  Cobb  that  he 
could  imagine  but  one  adequate  justification  for  the  existence 
of  the  truce,  which  he  did  not  deny,  and  thereupon  asked 
if  Lee  and  his  army  had  surrendered.  Cobb  declined  to  an- 
swer, adding,  he  was  not  there  to  give  information,  but  to 
ask  for  his  rights  under  the  truce.  Turning  to  General 
Smith,  Wilson  asked  him  the  same  question.  With  some 
hesitation, bat  frankly  and  fairly,  he  replied  that  Lee  had  sur- 
rendered, and  that  peace  would  probably  follow  soon. 
Whereupon  the  Union  commander  announced  his  purpose  to 
remain  for  the  present  in  Macon,  and  that  while  he  could  not 
admit  the  application  of  the  truce  to  him  or  his  command, 
he  should  conduct  his  future  operations  on  the  principle  that 
every  man  killed  in  action  thereafter  was  a  man  murdered. 
He  then  authorized  Cobb  and  his  officers  to  retire  to  their 


634  Life  of  Thomas. 

quarters  on  parol,  it  being  understood  that  they  were  to  re- 
port at  the  city  hall  at  9  o'clock  the  next  morning. 

The  information  obtained  at  this  interview,  held  April 
20th,  between  10  and  11  P.  M.,  was  the  first  definite  knowl- 
edge which  Wilson  and  his  victorious  troopers  had  received 
of  what  had  happened  in  Virginia.  No  details  were  given, 
but  the  fact  of  the  surrender  became  known,  and  it  was 
justly  considered  as  ending  the  great  rebellion.  There  might 
be  delays ,  the  details  might  be  difficult  to  manage,  and  the 
individual  commanders  would  have  delicate  duties  to  per- 
form, but  the  end  was  at  hand. 

The  surrender  of  Macon  included  four  generals,  3,500 
men,  5  colors,  60  guns,  3,000  stands  of  small  arms,  and  large 
quantities  of  military  stores  and  supplies,  besides  many 
millions  of  Confederate  paper  money.  Communication  was 
opened  the  next  day,  by  the  courtesy  of  the  Confederate  au- 
thorities, over  the  Southern  telegraph  lines,  between  Wilson 
and  Sherman.  The  news  of  the  truce  was  confirmed,  and 
Wilson  was  instructed  to  desist  from  farther  acts  of  war 
until  he  should  hear  that  hostilities  had  been  renewed.  A 
few  days  later,  orders  were  sent  through  Thomas  from  the 
Secretary  of  War  to  Wilson,  directing  him  to  disregard  Sher- 
man's armistice,  and  to  resume  operations  against  the  public 
enemy,  but  before  this  order  reached  Wilson  it  had  become 
known  to  him  that  Johnson  had  surrendered  all  the  Confed- 
erate forces  east  of  the  Mississippi,  and  that  peace  was  abso- 
lutely assured.  Under  the  authority  allowed  him  by  General 
Grant  as  an  independent  commander,  Wilson  had  governed 
himself  rather  by  his  knowledge  of  the  facts  than  by  orders 
from  Sherman.  He  had  moved  his  troops  where  he  pleased, 
had  taken  possession  of  the  railroads  and  telegraph  lines, 
and  while  preserving  order,  and  encouraging  the  people  and 
disbanded  soldiers  to  return  to  their  homes  and  resume  their 
peaceful  pursuits,  he  had  made  arrangements  for  the  arrest 
of  the  fleeing  confederate  chieftains,  and  the  disbandment  of 
all  armed  bodies  of  men  within  the  limits  of  his  command, 
no  matter  in  what  direction  they  might  be  moving. 

On  the  1st  of  May,  Croxton's  brigade  of  McCook's  divi- 
sion rejoined  the  corps.  He  had  been  detached  since  the  27th 


The  Capture  of  Montgomery,  Columbus,  etc.  G35 

of  March,  operating  in  the  enemy's  country  without  commu- 
nication with  the  corps  or  with  any  other  Union  authority. 
He  had  lost  172  men,  mostly  captured,  but  had  taken  300 
prisoners  and  4  guns,  and  had  captured  Tuscaloosa,  and  de- 
stroyed the  military  academy  there.  He  had  destroyed  5 
iron  works,  3  factories,  2  niter  works,  and  large  quantities  of 
supplies.  His  line  of  march  was  a  hundred  miles  north  of 
that  pursued  by  the  corps,  but  as  directly  toward  Macon  as 
if  he  had  known  that  it  was  the  chief  objective  of  the  cam- 
paign. On  the  way  through  Alabama,  be  encountered  a 
force  of  several  hundred  rebels  under  Hill  at  Blue  Mountain, 
near  Talladega.  This  affair,  which  was  sharp  and  bloody, 
took  place  on  the  23d  of  April,  and  constituted  the  last  real 
engagement  of  the  war.  Croxton  had  marched,  between  the 
27th  of  March  and  the  1st  of  May,  something  over  650  miles, 
had  crossed  many  rivers  by  fording  and  swimming,  and  had 
brought  hia  command  into  camp  in  excellent  condition. 


636  Life  of  Thomas. 


CHAPTER  XXX. 


The  Capture  of  Jefferson  Davis — The  Summary  of  Wilson's  Operations  and 
their  Influence  upon  the  Collapse  of  Rebellion. 


Immediately  after  reaching  Macon  and  learning  that 
Richmond  had  certainly  fallen  and  Lee  had  surrendered, 
Wilson  knew  that  Jefferson  Davis,  his  cabinet,  and  perhaps 
some  of  his  leading  generals,  would  endeavor  to  escape  from 
the  country.  He,  therefore,  set  quietly  about  seeking  in- 
formation as  to  their  movements,  and  fortunately  was  not  long 
in  learning  that  they  had  lately  been  seen  in  North  Carolina, 
making  their  way  southward.  Upton's  division  was  sent  to 
Atlanta,  from  which  place  detachments  were  sent  out,  north- 
ward and  eastward.  McCook  was  sent  with  a  part  of  his 
division  to  Southern  Georgia  and  Florida.  Meanwhile, 
Davis  had  been  joined  by  a  party  of  Union  soldiers  disguised 
as  rebels,  and  commanded  by  Lieutenant  George  O.  Yoeman 
of  Ohio,  of  Alexander's  staff,  a  most  gallant  and  capable 
officer,  who  sent  couriers  to  the  nearest  telegraph  station 
every  night  with  information  as  to  the  movements  of  the 
Confederate  chief  and  his  party.  By  these  means  he  was 
reported  as  having  crossed  the  Savannah  river  and  gone  to 
Washington,  Georgia,  and  also  shortly  afterward  as  having 
disappeared  from  there  traveling  still  southward,  as  it  was 
supposed. 

On  this  information,  coupled  with  the  supposition  that 
the  country  was  so  well  watched  toward  Dalton  and  along 
the  lines  of  the  Chattahoochee,  the  Flint,  and  the  Ocmulgee 
rivers,  to  all  of  which  strong  detachments  had  been  sent, 
with  instructions  to  guard  all  the  crossings,  that  it  would  be 
impossible  for  any  considerable  party  to  pass  through  the  state 
athwart  these  rivers  to  the  westward,  either  north  or  south 
of  Atlanta,  Wilson  jconcluded  that  Davis  and  his  party  must 
continue  their  flight  southward  toward  the  Florida  coast. 


The  Capture  of  Jefferson  Davis.  637 

On  arriving  at  this  conclusion  he  directed  La  Grange  to  de- 
tach his  best  regiment  and  order  it  to  march  eastward  to 
Dublin  on  the  Oconee  River,  leaving  detachments  at  all  the 
cross-roads  and  patrolling  the  country  in  all  directions.  The 
First  Wisconsin  Cavalry,  under  the  command  of  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  Harden,  was  selected  for  this  service,  and  made  a 
forced  march  by  night  and  day  till  it  had  reached  Oconee, 
where,  after  several  hours'  delay,  he  got  information  which 
led  him  to  believe  that  he  had  struck  the  trail  he  was  in  search 
of.  Meanwhile,  Wilson  had  received  additional  intelligence 
which  increased  his  confidence  that  Davis  was  certainly  trying 
to  work  his  way  southward  through  the  piney  country  between 
Macon  and  the  Atlantic  coast,  and  in  order  to  increase  the 
chance  of  capturing  him,  he  directed  Minty,  the  next  day,  to 
select  his  best  regiment  and  send  it  down  the  right  or  south 
bank  of  the  Altamaha,  with  orders  to  destroy  the  ferry-boats 
and  leave  detachments  at  all  important  points.  Minty  de- 
tached the  Fourth  Michigan  Cavalry,  Lieutenant-Colonel 
Pritchard  commanding,  and  ordered  him  to  continue  the 
march  till  he  intersected  the  route  of  the  fugitives,  after 
which  he  was  to  follow  them  till  they  were  taken.  Both 
Harden  and  Pritchard  were  officers  of  the  highest  quality, 
and  both  were  notified  that  Davis  was  attended  by  a  party, 
variously  estimated  at  from  ten  to  fifty  men,  who  would 
doubtless  make  a  desperate  fight  before  surrendering. 

As  before  stated,  Harden  was  the  first  to  strike  the 
trail  at  Dublin.  After  a  futile  effort  to  learn  any  thing  con- 
cerning the  party  he  was  seeking  for  from  the  white  people 
of  the  town,  the  ferryman's  negro  assistant  came  to  him  after 
night  and  gave  him  such  details  of  a  party  of  men,  women, 
and  children,  which  had  crossed  the  river  at  that  place  that 
morning,  with  wagons  and  ambulances,  as  to  leave  him  but 
little  room  to  doubt  that  it  was  the  party  he  was  searching 
for.  The  negro  man  had  specially  noticed  one  fine-looking 
elderly  gentleman,  riding  a  fine  bay  horse,  whom  he  had 
heard  spoken  to  as  "Mr.  Davis,"  and  as  "the  President." 
This  persdn  had  not  crossed  the  river  with  the  party,  but 
had  gone  down  the  river  several  miles  further  to  another 
ferry,  and  after  crossing,  had  rejoined  the  party  in  the  edge 


638  Life  of  Thomas. 

of  the  village,  after  which  they  had  all  gone  south  together. 
Harden,  on  hearing  this,  was  certain  that  Davis  could  not 
be  many  miles  away,  although  he  had  more  than  12  hours 
the  start.  Hastily  selecting  75  of  his  best  men  and  stoutest 
horses,  the  grim  old  cavalryman  took  the  road  which  had 
been  pointed  out  to  him,  and  had  not  gone  many  miles  be- 
fore he  discovered  fresh  wagon  tracks  and  the  broad  trail  of 
a  considerable  party.  It  soon  began  raining,  the  creeks  be- 
came swollen,  and  the  swamps  filled  with  water,  but  the 
hardy  cavalrymen  pushed  on  day  and  night,  sometimes  losing 
the  trail  but  speedily  finding  it  again,  and  all  the  time  be- 
coming more  and  more  certain  that  they  should  not  fail  to 
overtake  the  party.  They  reached  the  Ocmulgee  River  at 
Bowen's  ferry  on  the  10th  of  April  and  learned  there  that  they 
were  only  a  few  hours  behind  the  fugitives,  but  in  hurrying  his 
command  across  the  river  the  ferry-boat  sprung  a  leak,  which 
made  it  necessary  to  reduce  the  number  that  the  rickety 
scow  could  take  each  trip,  so  that  some  time  was  lost  before 
the  command  got  on  its  way  again. 

Meanwhile,  the  head  of  Pritchard's  column,  marching 
down  the  south  side  of  the  river,  had  reached  this  point,  and 
the  two  commanders  met  and  exchanged  information  and 
compared  orders.  Harden  told  Pritchard  that  he  was  sure 
he  was  on  the  trail  and  should  continue  the  pursuit  as  long 
as  he  could  see  the  road  that  night.  Pritchard  agreed  that 
that  was  right,  adding  that  he  would  continue  his  march  down 
the  river,  and  be  guided  by  such  additional  information  as 
he  might  obtain. 

The  two  officers  parted,  each  joining  his  command  and 
pushing  on  rapidly  as  he  had  indicated.  Harden  traveled 
through  the  dark  shadows  of  the  pine  forest  through  which 
his  road  lay,  till  he  could  no  longer  see  the  trail.  Feeling 
assured  that  the  party  could  not  be  more  than  three  or  four 
miles  further  on,  he  went  into  bivouac  to  feed  his  horses  and 
allow  his  weary  men  to  make  coffee  and  catch  a  few  hours' 
rest. 

Pritchard  had  gone  only  a  few  miles  further  down  the 
river  when  he  got  information  also,  it  is  said,  of  a  negro 
ferryman,  that  it  was  certainly  Davis  and  his  party  which 


The  Capture  of  Jefferson  Dnris. 

had  crossed  that  afternoon  at  Bovvcn's  ferry,  and  that  it,  wan 
his  duty  to  join  in  the  pursuit.  Accordingly,  lie  Holoeted  1M) 
men,  and  arriving  at  Abbeville,  a  few  miles  further  down 
the  river,  took  the  road  from  that  place  to  IrwiiiHville, 
where  it  is  joined  by  the  one  on  which  Harden  wan  march- 
ing. The  rest  of  the  regiment  continued  its  march  down 
the  river,  while  Pritchard  and  his  detachment  hurried  along 
the  forest  road  to  the  little  country  town  twenty  mil<;n  away. 
It  was  after  midnight  when  they  arrived,  and  an  hour  or 
more  later  before  they  had  located  the  camp  of  the  fugi- 
tives, and  found  a  negro  guide  to  show  them  to  it.  It,  VVUK 
pitched  about  two  miles  north  of  the  hamlet  near  a  little 
stream  in  the  edge  of  the  pine  forest.  Pritchard  m* 
his  command  noiselessly  to  the  immediate  neighborhood  '>f 
it,  and  thereafter  detaching  a  party  of  twenty-five  m<-n 
with  orders  to  make  their  way  through  the  wood  to  the 
road  on  the  north  side  of  the  little  camp,  waited  till  dawn 
should  bring  enough  light  to  enable  him  to  make  hiH  <Je 
scent  upon  it  certain. 

Harden,  after  resting  and  sleeping  a  few  hour*,  called 
his  men  early  to  the  saddle,  and  took  the  road  again,  hoping 
to  strike  the  camp  before  its  occupant*  were  astir.  He  hud 
gone  only  a  few  miles  when  his  advanced  guard  was  h; 
by  a  challenge  and  a  shot  from  the  road  ahead.  Hastily  dis- 
mounting a  part  of  his  men  and  sending  a  part  through  the 
woods,  he  charged  boldly  upon  the  party  in  his  front.  A 
sharp  skirmish  ensued,  in  which  one  man  was  killed,  several 
wounded,  and  one  prisoner  was  taken,  from  whom  it  was 
learned  that  the  Wisconsin  men  were  fighting  fellow  Cavalry- 
men instead  of  rebels. 

The  firing  aroused  both  the  sleeping  camp  and  Pritcbard'* 
detachments,  and  served  as  a  signal  for  the  latter  to  advance 
and  secure  their  prisoners.  This  wa§  done  joft  a*  day  was 
breaking.  Davis  himself  was  caught,  wearing  a  soft  hat  and 
a  fuD  suit  of  Confederate  gray,  but  covered  by  bin  wife** 
water-proof  with  a  little  narrow  shawl  wrapped  about  hU 
head  and  neck.  He  was  endeavoring  to  make  bi*  way,  es- 
corted by  bis  wife  and  sister-in-law,  from  his  tent  through 
the  cordon  of  soldiers  which  anrronnded  the  camp  to  the 


Life  of  Thomas. 

rivulet,  ostensibly  to  get  water,  but  really  to  reach  the  cover 
of  the  forest  where  an  excellent  bay  horse,  saddled  and 
bridled,  was  ready  for  him  to  mount  and  gallop  away.  Be- 
fore the  prisoner  had  been  sent  back  into  his  tent,  Colonels 
Pritchard  and  Harden,  having  stopped  the  unfortunate 
skirmish,  rode  up  to  the  group  surrounding  him  and  made 
sure  of  their  prize.  They  found  that  they  had  not  only 
caught  the  Confederate  President,  but  Mr.  Reagan,  his  Post- 
master-General ;  Colonels  Harrison  and  Lubbock,  his  private 
secretaries;  Lieutenant  Howell,  an  aide-de-camp,  and  his  en- 
tire family,  servants,  and  followers,  numbering  twenty-one 
persons  altogether. 

There  has  been  much  controversy  as  to  the  disguise, 
and  what  took  place  at  the  time  of  the  arrest,  and  during 
the  march  to  Macon,  but  one  and  another  of  the  persons 
captured,  including  Mr.  Davis  himself,  has  admitted  the  sub- 
stantial accuracy  of  all  General  "Wilson  ever  said  about  it.* 
Of  course  these  reports  were  based  on  the  reports  of  his 
subordinates,  all  of  whom  appear  to  have  been  both  good 
soldiers  and  truthful  men.  There  seems  to  be  no  doubt  that 
he  was  treated  by  his  captors  with  all  the  courtesy  and  con- 
sideration consistent  with  a  due  regard  to  his  safety.  He 
was  received  by  General  Wilson  at  Macon  with  a  soldier's 
hospitality,  and  after  he  had  rested  and  refreshed  himself, 
was  sent  forward,  under  escort,  via  Atlanta  and  Augusta  to 
Savannah,  where  he  was  transferred  to  a  gunboat,  which 
landed  him  a  few  days  later  at  Fortress  Monroe. 

Mr.  Benjamin  and  General  Breckinridge,  also  members 
of  Davis'  cabinet,  had  been  traveling  with  him,  but  on  the 
night  of  the  capture,  fortunately  for  them,  they  had  slept 
away  from  the  party  and  thereby  escaped  the  fate  which 
had  overtaken  it.  The  advanced  guard  of  McCook*s  divis- 
ion rode  down  to  the  beach  at  St.  Marks  just  as  they  were 
disappearing  in  the  offing  in  an  open  boat  which  landed 
them  safely  in  Cuba. 

Mr.  Alexander  H.  Stephens,  the  Vice-President  of  the 

*  See  A  Short  History  of  the  Confederate  States,  by  Jefferson  Davis, 
pp.  494. 


The  Capture  of  Jefferson  Davis.  641 

Confederate  States,  was  found  at  his  house  at  Crawfords- 
ville,  and  sent  under  the  same  escort  with  Mr.  Davis  to  the 
North.  A  few  days  later  Mr.  Mallory,  Secretary  of  the  Con- 
federate Navy,  was  also  arrested,  and  about  the  same  time 
Clement  C.  Clay,  a  Senator  from  Alabama  for  whom  the  gov- 
ernment had  offered  a  reward  of  $25,000,  voluntarily  gave 
himself  up  to  General  Wilson. 

It  is  worthy  of  note  that,  although  the  government  had 
also  offered  a  reward  of  $100,000  for  the  arrest  of  Davis,  as 
an  accomplice  in  the  assassination  of  Mr.  Lincoln,  not  an 
officer  or  a  man  of  either  regiment  engaged  in  the  pursuit 
or  capture  knew  it,  or  was  in  any  way  influenced  in  the 
performance  of  his  duty  by  the  hope  of  gain,  or  by  the  ex- 
pectation of  any  other  reward  than  praise  and  promotion, 
which  are  ever  dear  to  a  soldier's  heart  for  duty  well  and 
faithfully  performed.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  reward  was 
duly  paid  a  few  years  later  to  Wilson  and  the  officers  and 
men  of  the  two  regiments  actually  present  at  the  time  of  the 
capture. 

The  importance  of  this  event,  coming  as  it  did,  at  the 
close  of  the  most  remarkable  cavalry  campaign  of  modern 
warfare,  can  not  be  overestimated.  The  news  of  it  burst 
upon  the  country  only  a  few  weeks  after  the  rejoicing  over  a 
restored  Union  had  been  converted  into  universal  sorrow  by 
the  assassination  of  the  President  whose  wisdom  had  guided 
the  nation  safely  through  the  rebellion.  It  is  now  well  known 
from  Davis'  own  declaration  that  it  was  his  fixed  and  un- 
alterable purpose  to  continue  the  war  in  the  Trans-Missis- 
sippi Department  if  he  could  reach  there.*  His  capture,  to- 
gether with  that  of  Vice-President  Stephens  and  most  of  the 
cabinet,  put  an  end  for  good  and  all  to  every  possibility 
of  further  organized  resistance,  inasmuch  as  it  annihilated 
the  entire  official  fabric  of  the  Confederate  government  by  a 
single  blow. 

In  the  general  rejoicing  which  took  place  throughout 

*  See  "A  Short  History  of  the  Confederate  States  of  America,  by  Jeffer- 
son Davis,"  also  Pollard's  "  Southern  History  of  the  war,"  and  his  "  Life  of 
Jefferson  Davis." 
41 


642  Life  of  Thomas. 

the  Northern  states  on  the  receipt  of  this  unexpected  news, 
but  little  credit  or  consideration  was  given  to  General  Wil- 
son, or  to  the  deeds  of  his  magnificent  cavalry  army.  It  is 
true  that  the  government  promoted  its  commander  to  the  full 
rank  of  Major-General,  and  advanced  his  subordinate  com- 
manders to  the  grades  recommended  by  him,  but  no  one  took 
time  to  study  the  great  campaign  which  had  been  closed  in 
such  a  signal  manner,  or  to  weigh  the  influence  of  its  vic- 
tories upon  the  final  surrender  of  Johnston's  army,  and  the 
collapse  of  the  Confederate  cause  east  of  the  Mississippi 
river.  It  would  take  a  volume  to  properly  describe  the  or- 
ganization of  the  cavalry  corps  of  the  Military  Division  of 
the  Mississippi,  and  to  set  forth  the  details  of  its  perform- 
ances from  the  beginning  of  Hood's  invasion,  of  middle  Ten- 
nessee to  the  end  of  its  great  march  at  Macon.  As  has  been 
shown,  it  was  potential  while  still  in  an  inchoate  condition 
in  holding  open  the  door  for  Schofield's  retreat  from  Frank- 
lin to  Nashville,  and  in  thus  preventing  a  great  disaster  to 
the  Union  arms  before  Thomas  could  unite  his  forces  for  the 
offensive  return  which  he  delivered  with  such  overwhelming 
effect  at  Nashville  two  weeks  later. 

It  should  be  remembered  forever  in  the  annals  of  war, 
that  Thomas  insisted  upon  waiting  to  remount  a  portion  of 
the  corps  before  he  would  consent  to  deliver  battle,  and  that 
when  he  did  march  forth,  against  the  veteran  and  almost  in- 
vincible infantry  of  Hood,  strongly  intrenched  in  his  front, 
it  was  the  cavalry  corps  which  broke  through  his  left,  and 
wheeling  grandly  in  the  same  direction,  captured  27  guns 
from  their  redoubts  on  the  first  day,  and  which,  continuing 
its  movement  on  the  second  day,  enveloped  and  took  in  re- 
verse the  left  and  left-center  of  the  Confederate  intrench- 
ments,  and  so  shook  their  entire  line  as  to  make  it  a  walk- 
over for  the  infantry  which  Thomas  finally  hurled  against 
them.  It  was  the  harassing  pursuit  of  Hood  by  the  cavalry 
corps  which,  notwithstanding  the  rains  and  sleet  and  the 
swollen  rivers,  broke  up  and  scattered  the  host  which  had  so 
confidently  invaded  Middle  Tennessee  only  a  month  before. 
Pausing  on  the  banks  of  the  Tennessee  till  the  rough  edge 


Efficiency  of  Cavalry  Forces.  643 

of  winter  had  passed,  to  gather  in  the  distant  detachments, 
to  procure  remounts,  clothing,  and  equipments,  and  to  weld 
the  growing  force  into  a  compact  and  irresistible  army  corps 
of  horsemen,  the  cavalry  commander,  with  the  full  concur- 
rence of  Thomas,  the  beau  ideal  of  American  soldiers,  began 
his  final  and  most  glorious  campaign.  No  historian  or  mili- 
tary critic  can  read  the  story  of  the  campaign  which  followed 
without  coming  to  the  conclusion  that  it  was  characterized 
by  the  most  remarkable  series  of  successes  ever  gained  by 
cavalry  in  modern  warfare.  They  illustrate  first,  the  import- 
ance of  concentrating  and  using  that  arm  in  compact  masses 
under  one  competent  commander,  and  in  operations  of  the 
first  importance ;  second,  the  tremendous  advantage  of  celer- 
ity of  movement,  especially  in  modern  warfare  where  im- 
proved fire-arms  play  such  a  decisive  part ;  third,  that  the 
chief  use  of  horses,  notwithstanding  that  they  may  in  excep- 
tional cases  add  to  the  shock  of  the  charge,  is  to  transport 
fighting  men  rapidly  to  the  vital  point  of  a  battle  field,  and 
especially  to  the  flank  and  rear  of  the  enemy's  position,  or 
deeply  into  the  interior  of  the  enemy's  country  against  his 
lines  of  supply  and  communication,  and  also  his  arsenals, 
armories,  and  factories;  fourth,  that  the  best  infantry  armed 
with  the  best  magazine  carbines  or  rifles  make  the  best 
mounted  troops,  irrespective  of  whether  they  be  called  cav- 
alry, dragoons,  or  mounted  infantry. 

When  the  fact  is  recalled  that  the  seven  divisions  of  this 
corps  at  the  close  of  the  war  mustered  about  thirty-five 
thousand  men  for  duty  with  the  colors,  and  that,  had  the 
war  lasted  sixty  days  longer  they  could  and  probably  would 
have  been  concentrated  in  Virginia,  it  will  be  seen  to  what  a 
high  degree  of  perfection  the  organization  had  been  brought, 
and  that  it  fully  justified  Sherman's  declaration  that  it  was 
by  far  the  largest,  most  efficient,  and  most  powerful  body  of 
horse  that  had  ever  come  under  his  command.  But  when  the 
capture  of  the  strongly  fortified  towns  of  Selma,  West  Point, 
and  Columbus,  with  all  the  romantic  incidents  of  night  fight- 
ing, together  with  the  surrender  of  the  no  less  strongly  forti- 
fied cities  of  Montgomery  and  Macon,  carrying  with  them 


644  Life  of  Thomas. 

the  destruction  of  the  last  and  only  remaining  arsenals,  arm- 
ories, factories,  storehouses,  and  military  munitions  and  sup- 
plies, and  also  the  destructio'n  of  the  railways  connecting 
those  places,  with  their  bridges  ahd  rolling  stock,  are  consid- 
ered, it  will  be  seen  that  Johnston  and  his  generals  had 
nothing  else  left  them  but  to  lay  down  their  arms  and  sur- 
render. It  was  no  longer  possible  for  them  to  concentrate 
an  army,  or  to  supply  it  with  food,  or  to  keep  it  armed  and 
equipped.  With  those  places,  and  the  manufacturing  plants 
which  they  contained,  still  in  their  possession,  and  with  the 
railways  connecting  them  still  unbroken,  they  might  have 
collected  together  in  the  Carolinas  a  force  amply  able  to  cope 
with  Sherman,  and  possibly  to  overwhelm  him  before  re- 
inforcements could  reach  him.  That  brilliant,  but  erratic 
leader,  with  his  splendid  army,  it  will  be  remembered,  had 
avoided  Macon  on  the  one  hand  and  Augusta  on  the  other, 
both  the  seats  of  important  military  industries,  and  by  an 
eccentric  and  unnecessary  movement  from  his  true  line  of 
operations,  had  gone  to  Savannah,  leaving  the  direct  rail- 
roads and  highways  behind  him  open  and  free  for  the  use 
of  the  remnants  of  Hood's  army,  and  of  the  other  scattered 
detachments  which  were  hastening  to  form  a  junction  with 
Johnston,  now  the  sole  hope  of  the  Confederacy. 

Had  it  not  been  for  Wilson's  wide  swath  of  victory 
and  destruction  through  and  not  around  the  important  cities 
in  his  way,  during  which  he  captured  over  8,500  prisoners, 
and  280  guns,  and  afterward  paroled  59,000  rebel  soldiers 
belonging  to  the  armies  of  Lee,  Johnston,  and  Beauregard, 
it  would  have  been  easy  for  Johnston  and  Beauregard,  had 
they  been  so  minded,  to  continue  the  war  indefinitely.  As 
it  was,  to  continue  it  was  simply  impossible,  and  for  this  the 
country  is  indebted  first,  to  Wilson  and  his  gallant  troopers, 
and  second,  to  Thomas,  who  insisted  that  they  should  have 
time  to  remount  and  prepare  for  the  work  before  them. 
Neither  the  army  nor  the  country  ever  appreciated  that  in- 
vincible body  of  horsemen,  or  their  division,  brigade,  regi- 
mental, and  company  commanders,  or  the  high  character  of 
the  enlisted  men,  or  the  performances  of  the  whole  at  their 


Efficiency  of  the  Cavalry  Corps.  645 

real  worth.  There  were  officers  among  them  tit  for  any  com- 
mand that  could  have  been  given  them,  and  as  a  body  they 
were  as  gallant  and  capable  soldiers  as  ever  drew  saber  or 
wore  uniform.  Had  the  war  lasted  a  few  months  longer 
their  fame  would  have  been  a  household  word.  The  leaders, 
though  young  in  years,  were  old  in  war.  Wilson  himself  was 
at  the  close,  not  yet  28.  Kilpatrick  was  about  the  same  age. 
Upton  was  several  months  younger.  Winslow,  Alexander, 
Croxton,  La  Grange,  Watkins,  Murray,  Palmer,  Noble,  Kit- 
chell,  Benteen,  Cooper,  Young,  Bacon,  and  Weston,  were  of 
the  younger  set,  while  McCook,  Minty,  Long,  Hatch,  R.  "W. 
Johnson,  Knipe,  Hammond,  Coon,  G.  M.  L.  Johnson,  Atkins, 
Spalding,  Pritchard,  Miller,  Harrison,  Biggs,  Vail,  Israel 
Garrard,  McCormick,  Hammond,  Pierce,  and  Frank  "White 
were  somewhat  older,  though- none  of  them  had  reached 
middle  life.  Harden,  as  sturdy  as  Burleigh  of  Balfour,  and 
Eggleston,  the  type  of  those  who  rode  with  Cromwell  at 
Marston  Moor,  were  gray-beards,  but  were  full  of  activity 
and  courage.  Ross  Hill  and  Taylor,  although  only  captains, 
were  mere  boys,  but  full  of  experienced  valor. 

The  men  in  the  ranks  were  mostly  from  the  western  and 
north-western,  and  upper  slave  states,  and  of  them  it  may  be 
truthfully  averred  that  their  superiors  for  endurance,  self- 
reliance  and  pluck,  could  nowhere  be  found.  After  they 
were  massed  at  Nashville  they  believed  themselves  to  be  in- 
vincible, and  it  was  their  boast  that  they  had  never  come  in 
sight  of  a  hostile  gun  or  fortification  that  they  did  not  cap- 
ture. Armed  with  Spencers,  it  was  their  conviction  that, 
elbow  to  elbow,  dismounted,  in  single  line,  nothing  could 
withstand  their  charge.  "  Only  cover  our  flanks,"  said  Mil- 
ler to  Wilson,  as  they  were  approaching  Selma,  "  and  nothing 
can  stop  us !"  In  conclusion,  it  may  be  safely  said,  that  no 
man  ever  saw  one  of  them  in  the  closing  campaign  of  the 
war  skulking  before  battle  or  sneaking  to  the  rear  after  the 
action  began.  They  seemed  to  know  by  instinct  when  and 
where  the  enemy  might  be  encountered,  and  then  the  only 
strife  amongst  them  was  to  see  who  should  be  first  in  the 
onset.  With  a  corps  of  such  men,  properly  mounted  and 


646  Life  of  Thomas. 

armed,  and  with  such  organization  and  discipline  as  pre- 
vailed amongst  them  during  their  last  great  campaign,  no 
hazard  of  war  can  be  regarded  as  too  great  for  them  to  under- 
take, and  nothing  should  be  counted  as  impossible  except 
defeat. 

When  the  "  records "  are  all  published  and  the  story 
properly  written,  it  will  show  that  no  corps  in  the  army, 
whether  of  cavalry  or  infantry,  ever  inflicted  greater  injury 
upon  the  "  Lost  Cause,"  or  did  more  useful  service  toward 
the  re-establishment  of  the  Union  under  the  Constitution 
and  the  laws,  than  was  done  by  the  cavalry  corps  of  the 
Military  Division  of  the  Mississippi. 


Thomas  after  War.  647 


CHAPTER  XXXI. 

Thomas  after  War — His  Rank  Ignored  in  Assignments — Persistently  Pur- 
sued— Offered  Grant's  Place  at  the  Head  of  the  Army  but  Declines — 
Refuses  to  have  his  Name  Used  in  Connection  with  the  Presidency — 
The  Story  of  his  Death — It  is  little  less  than  the  History  of  an  Assas- 
sination. 

The  close  of  the  war  brought  no  relief  from  a  pursuit 
which  fell  little  short  of  persecution  for  General  Thomas. 
The  efforts  to  ignore  him,  or  worse,  to  disregard  his  rank  in 
assignments  to  command,  were  persisted  in.  "When  the 
country,  immediately  after  the  war,  was  divided  into  Military 
Divisions,  it  was  planned  to  make  only  five,  and  leave 
Thomas,  the  sixth  major-general,  in  command  of  a  depart- 
ment only.  Hearing  of  this  he  sent  a  friend  to  President 
Andrew  Johnson  to  protest.  He  had  submitted  during  the 
war  to  promoting  juniors  over  him,  and  kept  quiet  under 
the  wrong  rather  than  to  hesitate  a  moment  while  the  con- 
flict was  on,  but  he  saw  no  reason  for  such  course  in  time  of 
peace.  The  matter  was  instantly  rectified,  Mr.  Johnson  him- 
self carving  out  the  states  of  Kentucky,  Tennessee,  Missis- 
sippi, Alabama  and  Georgia — the  country  which  had  been 
the  scene  of  his  military  operations  and  his  victories — and 
establishing  his  head-quarters  at  Nashville,  the  city  of  his 
recent  renown.  But  the  great  soldier  was  never  forgiven 
for  thus  asserting  himself.  There  were  two  reasons ;  first, 
he  had  openly  defeated  those  who  were  attempting  to  wrong 
him,  and  next,  it  made  it  necessary  to  assign  favorite  officers 
elsewhere  than  where  it  had  been  determined  to  place  them. 

His  arrangement  of  his  extensive  department  during  the 
early  years  of  reconstruction,  was  marked  with  great  ability 
in  grasping  the  difficult  questions  which  constantly  arose  in 
the  peculiar  condition  of  civil  affairs,  and  by  moderation  which 
commanded  respect  from  the  conquered,  but,  at  the  same 
time,  by  a  vigor  and  justice  in  his  rule  in  which  there  was 


648  Life  of  Thomas. 

no  "variableness  or  shadow  of  turning."  He  remained  at 
Nashville  until  November,  1866,  and  thereafter  his  head- 
quarters were  at  Louisville,  until  May,  1869. 

During  this  period  he  declined  a  nomination  which  would 
undoubtedly  have  resulted  in  making  him  general  of  the  army 
in  place  of  General  Grant.  Mr.  Johnson,  in  February,  1868, 
when  his  troubles  with  the  Republican  party  were  in  progress, 
and  when  he  was  not  satisfied  with  the  course  of  General 
Grant,  nominated  General  Thomas  as  brevet  lieutenant-gen- 
eral, and  brevet  general.  Had  he  been  confirmed,  the  next 
step  undoubtedly  would  have  been  to  assign  him  to  duty  as 
general  of  the  army  under  his  brevet  rank.  General  Thomas 
understanding  this  at  once  protested  and  declined,  thanking 
the  President  for  the  honor  intended,  but  saying:  "I  have 
done  no  service  since  the  war  to  deserve  so  high  a  compli- 
ment, and  it  is  now  too  late  to  be  regarded  as  a  compliment 
if  conferred  for  services  during  the  war." 

The  five  years  of  his  administration  of  civil  affairs  are 
full  of  interest,  and  as  successful  in  their  peculiar  field  as  his 
great  work  with  the  armies  had  been.  But  it  can  not  be 
treated  at  length  within  the  limits  of  this  volume. 

Following  the  move  which,  if  he  had  not  frustrated  it, 
would  have  led  to  his  command  of  the  army,  a  strong  de- 
sire to  nominate  him  for  the  Presidency  began  to  develop  in 
quarters  which  would  soon  have  given  him  great  strength. 
This  he  resisted  with  such  uncompromising  refusals  that 
those  who  had  set  their  hearts  upon  work  in  that  direction 
were  obliged  to  abandon  it.  But  it  went  far  enough  to  ex- 
cite keen  jealousy  and  alarm  in  other  quarters. 

After  the  inauguration  of  General  Grant  as  President, 
General  Thomas  was  decided  upon  to  command  on  the 
Pacific  coast.  Finding  that  this  was  against  his  wishes,  a 
characteristic  way  of  rebuking  him  was  found  by  arranging 
that  he  should  remain  in  Kentucky  in  command  of  a  depart- 
ment, when  all  others  of  his  rank  received  divisions.  There- 
upon, rather  than  submit  to  the  overslaughing  of  his  rank, 
he  asserted  his  claims  and  took  the  Military  Division  of  the 
Pacific.  To  still  further  illustrate  the  nature  of  the  treat- 
ment he  continually  received,  as  soon  as  he  reached  San  Fran- 


The  Story  of  His  Death.  649 

cisco,  the  Department  of  Kentucky,  where  General  Thomas 
would  have  been  glad  to  stay  if  he  could  have  remained 
without  sinking  his  rank,  was  at  once  elevated  to  a  military 
division. 

He  had  just  completed  a  year  of  service  on  the  Pacific 
coast  when  he  suddenly  died  under  the  most  tragic  circum- 
stances, and  such  as  formed  a  fitting  climax  to  the  long 
series  of  wrongs  with  which  his  magnificent  and  unparalleled 
services  had  been  clouded.  The  story  of  his  death  is  little 
less  than  a  tale  of  assassination. 

When  he  arrived  on  the  Pacific  coast  to  relieve  Gen- 
eral Halleck  this  officer  gave  him  a  reception.  During  the 
evening  General  Halleck  related  the  details  of  the  attempt 
to  relieve  him  at  Nashville,  first  with  General  Schofield, 
next  with  General  Logan.  General  Thomas  had  never 
known  the  names  of  those  with  whom  it  was  determined  to 
supersede  him,  in  fact,  he  did  not  know  of  the  second  at- 
tempt with  Logan  at  all.  General  Halleck  further  explained, 
what  is  now  known,  that  it  was  through  delay  secured  by 
him  that  the  removal  was  not  consummated  when  first  or- 
dered. During  the  delay  came  a  telegram  from  General 
Thomas  in  regard  to  the  situation  which  postponed  immedi- 
ate action.  Before  the  second  plan  for  superseding  him  by 
Logan  had  been  worked  out,  the  ice-storm  which  had  de- 
layed the  attack  broke,  and  the  notable  victory  was  won. 

One  of  those  who  heard  General  Halleck's  recital  to 
General  Thomas  gave  the  facts  to  an  eastern  correspondent 
and  he  printed  it  in  a  form  that  gave  General  Logan  great 
concern,  since  he  thought  it  open  to  the  false  construction 
that  he  had  intrigued  to  secure  General  Thomas's  place. 
General  Logan  thereupon  made  an  arrangement  with  Gen- 
eral Grant,  then  President,  to  tell  the  complete  story  of  Nash- 
ville to  the  Washington  correspondent  of  the  Cincinnati  Ga- 
zette. This  the  President  did,  the  present  writer  being  then 
that  correspondent. 

When  the  story,  as  related  by  General  Grant,  was  writ- 
ten out,  it  was  submitted  to  him  for  revision.  He  said  that 
it  was  in  exact  accordance  with  his  statement,  but  that  upon 
having  his  mind  refreshed  by  the  consideration  of  the  sub- 


650  Life  of  Thomas. 

ject  he  had  concluded  that  the  best  thing  to  do  would  be 
to  give  the  correspondent  all  the  dispatches  relating  to  the 
Nashville  affair.  He,  thereupon,  ordered  General  Badeau, 
then  his  military  secretary,  to  furnish  the  whole  of  them. 

General  Badeau  pretended  to  comply  with  the  order, 
and  gave  the  Gazette  correspondent  what  he  assured  him  was 
the  complete  official  history  of  the  contemplated  removal, 
and  all  the  dispatches  relating  to  it.  Its  publication  at- 
tracted wide  attention,  since  up  to  that  time  the  war  records 
had  remained,  in  large  degree,  a  sealed  book.  The  story,  as 
furnished,  was  creditable  in  high  degree  to  General  Thomas, 
and  his  admirers  were  delighted  with  it.  Two  weeks  later, 
however,  the  correspondent  who  had  published  it  received  a 
letter  from  a  friend  at  General  Thomas's  head-quarters  in 
San  Francisco,  asking  whether  every  thing  supplied  from  the 
White  House  had  been  printed,  and  intimating  that  there 
had  been  some  very  serious  omissions.  Immediate  inquiry 
was  made  of  General  Badeau.  He  insisted  that  he  had  given 
every  thing  needed  to  make  the  story  complete,  and  that 
nothing  had  been  suppressed. 

A  letter  quoting  this  emphatic  assurance  was  started  for 
San  Francisco,  but  before  there  was  time  for  a  reply,  the 
press  dispatches  announced  General  Thomas's  sudden  death. 

The  story  of  what  had  happened  is  a  startling  one.  See- 
ing that  there  had  been  deliberate  suppression  at  the  White 
House  of  the  strongest  dispatches  in  his  favor,  and  the  great 
number  of  such  proving  that  it  could  not  have  been  by  ac- 
cident, he  became  indignant  to  a  degree  that  he  had  never 
shown  before,  and  his  system  was  wrought  up  by  the  feeling 
of  deep  wrong  to  a  state  of  high  tension.  This  condition 
was  still  further  intensified  by  the  appearance  of  some  public 
criticisms  called  out  by  the  published  dispatches,  which  he 
deemed  flagrantly  unjust.  Thus  aroused,  and  thus  stirred  by 
violent  emotions,  he  sat  down  to  write  the  full  story  of  Nash- 
ville. An  officer  of  his  staff  had  gathered  the  necessary  of- 
ficial papers  and  left  him  in  his  private  room  at  work.  An 
hour  later  he  had  fallen  in  the  midst  of  his  work.  He  did 
not  regain  consciousness,  and  a  few  hours  later  assassination 
had  done  its  work,  and  General  Thomas  was  dead. 


The  Story  of  His  Death.  651 

• 

His  friends,  soon  after  his  burial,  went  earnestly  to  work 
to  try  to  obtain  the  suppressed  dispatches.  Every  attempt 
made  at  Washington  was  blocked.  Finally,  nearly  a  year 
afterward,  they  were  secured,  in  spite  of  continuing  refusals 
at  the  White  House,  and  as  persistent  declarations  that  the 
whole  official  story  had  been  told. 

A  sufficient  outline  of  affairs  about  Nashville  before, 
and  following  the  battle,  has  appeared  in  a  previous  chapter 
to  clearly  show  the  keen  injustice  done  General  Thomas  by 
the  suppressions  now  to  be  indicated. 

The  official  history  of  Nashville,  as  furnished  for  publi- 
cation upon  President  Grant's  order,  by  his  military  secretary, 
General  Badeau,  opened  with  the  three  dispatches  which 

follow : 

WAR  DEPARTMENT,  1 

WASHINGTON,  Dec.  2—10:30  A.  M.  / 
Lieut.-Gen.  Grant,  City  Point  : 

The  President  feels  solicitous  about  the  disposition  of  Thomas  to  lay  in 
fortifications  for  an  indefinite  period,  "  until  Wilson  gets  equipments." 
This  looks  like  the  McClelland  and  Rosecrans  strategy  of  do  nothing,  and 
let  the  enemy  raid  the  country.  The  President  wishes  you  to  consider  the 
matter.  EDWIN  M.  STANTON,  Secretary  of  War. 

CITY  POINT,  Dec.  2,  1864—11  AM. 
Maj.-Gen.  George  H.  Thomas,  Nashville: 

If  Hood  is  permitted  to  remain  quietly  about  Nashville,  we  will  lose  all 
the  roads  back  to  Chattanooga,  and  possibly  have  to  abandon  the  line  of 
the  Tennessee  river.  Should  he  attack  you  it  is  all  well,  but  if  he  does  not, 
you  should  attack  him  before  he  fortifies.  Arm.  and  put  in  the  trenches, 
your  Quartermaster's  employes,  citizens,  etc. 

[Signed,]  U.  S.  GRANT,  Lieut.-Gcn. 

CITY  POINT,  VA.,  Dec.  2,  1864—1:30  p.  M. 
Maj.-Gen.  George  H.  Thomas,  Nashville: 

With  your  citizen  employes  armed,  you  can  move  out  of  Nashville  with 
all  your  army,  and  force  the  enemy  to  retire  or  fight  upon  ground  of  your 
own  choosing.  After  the  repulse  of  Hood  at  Franklin,  it  looks  to  me  that 
instead  of  falling  back  to  Nashville,  we  should  have  taken  the  offensive 
against  the  enemy,  but  at  this  distance  may  err  as  to  the  method  of  deal- 
ing with  the  enemy.  You  will  suffer  incalculable  injury  upon  your  rail- 
roads, if  Hood  is  not  speedily  disposed  of.  Put  forth,  therefore,  every  pos- 
sible exertion  to  attain  this  end.  Should  you  get  him  to  retreating,  give 
him  no  peace. 

[Signed,]  U.  S.  GRANT,  Lieut.-Gen. 


652  Life  of  Thomas. 

The  situation  had,  however,  at  this  time  been  fully  made 
known  to  General  Grant  in  dispatches  which  Badeau  sup- 
pressed. First  in  order  came  these,  which,  in  view  of  the 
fact  that  Forrest  had  12,000  excellent  cavalry,  while  Thomas 
had  been  able  to  mount  less  than  half  that  number,  it  is,  per- 
haps, not  surprising  that  they  were  suppressed. 

[Suppressed.] 

CITY  POINT,  VA.,  Nov.  24,  1864—4  p.  M. 
Maj.-Gen.  George  H.  Thomas,  Nashville,  Tenn.: 

.     .    .    Do  not  let  Forrest  get  off  without  punishment. 

[Signed,]  U.  S.  GRANT,  Lieutenant-General. 

The  rest  of  this  dispatch  was  not  relevant  to  the  subject 
in  hand.  General  Thomas's  reply  was  to  the  above  extract. 

[Suppressed.] 

HEADQUARTERS  DEPARTMENT  CUMBERLAND,! 
NASHVILLE,  TENN.,  Xoi:  25,  1864 — 11  A.  M.  ) 
Lieut.  Gen.  Grant,  City  Point,  Va.: 

Your  dispatch  of  4  P.  M.  yesterday  just  received.  Hood's  entire  army 
is  in  front  of  Columbia,  and  so  greatly  outnumbers  mine  at  this  time  that 
I  am  compelled  to  act  on  the  defensive.  None  of  Gen.  Smith's  troops  have 
arrived  yet,  although  they  embarked  at  St.  Louis  on  Tuesday  last.  The 
transportation  of  Gens.  Hatch's  and  Grierson's  cavalry  was  ordered  by  Gen. 
Wash  burn,  I  am  told,  to  be  turned  in  at  Memphis,  which  has  crippled  the 
only  cavalry  I  had  at  this  time.  All  of  my  cavalry  was  dismounted  to  fur- 
nish horses  to  Kilpatrick's  division,  which  went  with  Gen.  Sherman.  My 
dismounted  cavalry  is  now  detained  at  Louisville,  awaiting  arms  and  horses. 
Horses  are  arriving  slowly,  and  arms  have  been  detained  somewhere 
en  route  for  more  than  a  month.  Gen.  Grierson  has  been  delayed  by  con- 
flicting orders  in  Kansas  and  from  Memphis,  and  it  is  impossible  to  say 
when  he  will  reach  here.  Since  being  placed  in  charge  of  affairs  in  Ten- 
nessee, I  have  lost  nearly  15,000  men,  discharged  by  expiration  of  service 
and  permitted  to  go  home  to  vote.  My  gain  is  probably  12,000  perfectly 
raw  troops.  Therefore,  as  the  enemy  so  greatly  outnumbers  me,  both  in 
infantry  and  cavalry,  I  am  compelled  for  the  present  to  act  on  the  de- 
fensive. The  moment  I  can  get  my  cavalry  I  will  march  against  Hood,  and 
if  Forrest  can  be  reached,  he  shall  be  punished. 

[Signed,]  GEO.  H.  THOMAS,  Maj.-Gen.  Vols.,  Com'cFg. 

[Suppressed.] 

NASHVILLE,  Dec.  1,  1864 — 9:30  P.  M. 
Maj.-Gen.  Halleck,  Washington,  D.  C.: 

After  Gen.  Schofield's  fight  of  yesterday,  feeling  convinced  that  the 
enemy  very  far  outnumbered  him,  both  in  infantry  and  cavalry,  I  deter- 
mined to  retire  to  the  fortifications  around  Nashville,  until  Gen.  Wilson 


Suppressed  Dispatches.  653 


can  get  his  cavalry  equipped.  He  has  now  but  about  one-fourth  the 
ber  of  the  enemy,  and,  consequently  is  no  match  for  him.  I  have  two 
ironclads  here,  with  several  gunboats,  and  Commodore  Fitch  assures  me 
that  Hood  can  neither  cross  the  Cumberland,  nor  blockade  it.  I  therefore 
think  it  best  to  wait  here  until  Wilson  can  equip  all  his  cavalry.  If  Hood 
attacks  me  here,  he  will  be  more  seriously  damaged  than  he  was  yesterday. 
If  he  remains  until  Wilson  gets  equipped,  I  can  whip  him,  and  will  move 
against  him  at  once.  I  have  Murfreesboro  strongly  held,  and  therefore  feel 
easy  in  regard  to  its  safety.  Chattanooga,  Bridgeport,  Stevenson,  and  Elk 
River  bridges  have  strong  garrisons. 

[Signed,]  GBO.  H.  THOMAS, 

Major-General  U.  S.  Volunteers,  Commanding. 

Then  came  the  three  dispatches  first  given  above,  with 
which  the  White  House  history  began,  followed  by  these: 

[Suppressed.] 

HEAD-QUARTERS  DEPARTMENT  CUMBERLAND,) 
NASHVILLE,  TENN.,  Dec.  2,  1864—10  p.  M.    ) 
Gen.  U.  S.  Grant,  City  Paint,  Va.: 

Your  two  telegrams  of  11  A.  M.  and  1:30  P.  M.,  to-day,  are  received.  At 
the  time  Hood  was  whipped  at  Franklin  I  had  at  this  place  but  about  five 
thousand  (5,000)  men  of  Gen.  Smith's  command,  which,  added  to  the  force 
under  Gen.  Schofield,  would  not  have  given  me  more  than  twenty-five 
thousand  (25,000)  men.  Besides,  Gen.  Schofield  felt  convinced  that  he 
could  not  hold  the  enemy  at  Franklin  until  the  5,000  could  reach  him.  As 
Gen.  Wilson's  cavalry  force,  also,  numbered  only  about  one-fourth  that  of 
Forrest,  I  thought  it  best  to  draw  the  troops  back  to  Nashville,  and  await 
the  arrival  of  the  remainder  of  Gen.  Smith's  force,  and  also  a  force  of  about 
five  thousand  (5,000)  commanded  by  Gen.  Steedman,  which  I  had  ordered 
up  from  Chattanooga.  The  division  of  Gen.  Smith  arrived  yesterday  morn- 
ing, and  Gen.  Steedman's  troops  arrived  last  night.  I  now  have  infantry 
enough  to  assume  the  offensive,  if  I  had  more  cavalry  ;  and  will  take  the 
field  any  how  as  soon  as  the  remainder  of  Gen.  McCook's  division  of  cav- 
alry reaches  here,  which  I  hope  it  will  in  two  or  three  days. 

We  can  neither  get  re-enforcements  nor  equipments  at  this  great  dis- 
tance from  the  North  very  easily,  and  it  must  be  remembered  that  my  com- 
mand was  made  up  of  the  two  weakest  corps  of  Gen.  Sherman's  army,  and 
all  the  dismounted  cavalry  except  one  brigade,  and  the  task  of  re-organizing 
and  equipping  has  met  with  many  delays,  which  have  enabled  Hood  to 
take  advantage  of  my  crippled  condition.  I  earnestly  hope,  however,  in  a 
few  more  days  I  shall  be  able  to  give  him  a  fight. 

[Signed,]  GEO.  H.  THOMAS, 

Major-General  U.  S.  Vols.,  Commanding. 

[Suppressed.] 

CITY  POINT,  VA.,  Dec.  5,  1864—6:30  P.  M. 
Maj.-Gen.  George  H.  Thomas,  Nashville,  Tenn.: 

Is  there  not  danger  of  Forrest's  moving  down  the  Tennessee  River 


654  Life  of  Thomas. 

where  he  can  cross  it  ?  It  seems  to  me,  while  you  should  be  getting  up 
your  cavalry  as  rapidly  as  possible  to  look  after  Forrest,  Hood  should  be 
attacked  where  is. 

Time  strengthens  him,  in  all  probability,  as  much  as  it  does  you. 

[Signed,]  U.  S.  GBANT,  Lieut.-Gen. 

[Suppressed.] 

NASHVILLE,  Dec.  6,  1864. 
Lieui.-Gtn.  U.  S.  Grant,  City  Point: 

Your  telegram  of  6:30  p.  M.,  December  5,  is  just  received.  As  soon  as 
I  get  up  a  respectable  force  of  cavalry  I  will  march  against  Hood.  Gen. 
Wilson  has  parties  out  now  pressing  horses,  and  I  hope  to  have  some  6,000 
or  8,000  cavalry  mounted  in  three  days  from  this  time.  Gen.  Wilson  has 
just  left  me,  having  received  instructions  to  hurry  the  cavalry  remount  as 
rapidly  as  possible.  I  do  not  think  it  prudent  to  attack  Hood  with  less 
than  six  thousand  (6,000)  cavalry  to  cover  my  flanks,  because  he  has  under 
Forrest  at  least  twelve  thousand  (12,000).  I  have  no  doubt  Forrest  will  at- 
tempt to  cross  the  river,  but  I  am  in  hopes  the  gunboats  will  be  able  to 
prevent  him.  The  enemy  has  made  no  new  developments  to-day.  Breck- 
inridge  is  reported  at  Lebanon  with  six  thousand  (6,000)  men,  but  I  can 
not  believe  it  possible. 

[Signed,]  GEO.  H.  THOMAS, 

Maj.-Gen.  U.  S.  Vols.,  Commanding. 

[Suppressed.] 

CITY  POINT,  VA.  December  6,  1864 — 4  p.  M. 
Maj.  Gen.  Geo.  H.  Thomas,  Nashville  : 

Attack  Hood  at  once,  and  wait  no  longer  for  a  remount  for  your  cavalry. 
There  is  great  danger  in  delay  resulting  in  a  campaign  back  to  the  Ohio. 
[Signed,]  U.  S.  GRANT,  Lieut.-Gen. 

What  passed  between  the  arrival  of  this  dispatch,  upon 
receiving  which,  Thomas,  while  dissenting  from  its  wisdom, 
gave  immediate  orders  to  prepare  for  attack,  and  the  one 
next  below,  appears  in  a  preceding  chapter : 

[Suppressed.] 

NASHVILLE,  TENN.,  Dec.  12,  1864—10:30  P.  M. 
Maj.-Gen.  Halleck,  Washington,  D.  C.: 

I  have  the  troops  ready  to  make  the  attack  on  the  enemy  as  soon  as 
the  sleet  which  now  covers  the  ground  has  melted  sufficiently  to  enable  the 
men  to  march.  The  whole  country  is  now  covered  with  a  sheet  of  ice 
so  hard  and  slippery  it  is  utterly  impossible  for  troops  to  ascend  the  slopes, 
or  even  move  over  level  ground  with  any  thing  like  order.  It  has  taken 
the  entire  day  to  place  my  cavalry  in  position,  and  it  has  only  been  finally 
effected  with  imminent  risk  and  many  serious  accidents,  resulting  from  the 
numbers  of  horses  falling  with  their  riders  on  the  road.  Under  these  cir- 


Suppressed  Dispatches.  655 

cumstances,  I  believe  an  attack  at  this  time  would  only  result  in  a  useless 
sacrifice  of  life. 

[Signed,]  GEO.  H.  THOMAS, 

Maj.-Gcn.  U.  S.  VoU.,  Com'd'g. 

The  next  day  came  the  order  directing  the  relief  of 
Thomas  by  Logan,  and  then,  before  this  order  could  be  exe- 
cuted, the  overwhelming  victory. 

After  the  suppressions  already  set  forth  there  can  be  no 
further  surprise  that  the  following  were  withheld  from  this 
pretended  history,  although  it  was  being  furnished  under 
the  orders  of  President  Grant,  and  upon  the  President's  as- 
surance that  it  should  be  complete : 

[Suppressed.] 

WASHINGTON,  Dec.  21,  1864—12  M. 
Maj.-Gen.  Geo.  H.  Thomas: 

Permit  me,  general,  to  urge  the  vast  importance  of  a  hot  pursuit  of  Hood's 
army.  Every  possible  sacrifice  should  be  made,  and  your  men  for  a  few  days 
will  submit  to  any  hardships  and  privations  to  accomplish  the  great  result.  • 
If  you  can  capture  or  destroy  Hood's  army  General  Sherman  can  entirely 
crush  out  the  rebel  military  force  in  all  the  Southern  States.  He  begins  a 
new  campaign  about  the  first  of  January,  which  will  have  the  most  important 
results  if  Hood's  army  can  now  be  used  up.  A  most  vigorous  pursuit  on 
your  part  is,  therefore,  of  vital  importance  to  General  Sherman's  plans.  No 
sacrifice  must  be  spared  to  obtain  so  important  a  result. 

[Signed,]  H.  W.  HALLECK, 

Major-General  and  Chief  of  Staff. 

[Suppressed.] 

IN  THE  FIELD,  Dec.  21,  1864. 
Maj.-Gen.  Halltck,  Washington,  D.  C.: 

Your  dispatch  of  12  M.,  this  day,  is  received.  General  Hood's  army  is 
being  pursued  as  rapidly  and  as  vigorously  as  it  is  possible  for  one  army  to 
pursue  another.  We  can  not  control  the  elements,  and  you  must  remember 
that-,  to  resist  Hood's  advance  into  Tennessee,  I  had  to  reorganize  and  almost 
thoroughly  equip  the  force  now  under  my  command.  I  fought  the  battle  of 
the  15th  and  16th  instants  with  the  troops  but  partially  equipped ;  and, 
notwithstanding  the  inclemency  of  the  weather  and  the  partial  equipment, 
have  been  enabled  to  drive  the  enemy  beyond  Duck  River,  crossing  two 
streams  with  my  troops,  and  driving  the  enemy  from  position  to  position, 
without  the  aid  of  pontoons,  and  with  but  little  transportation  to  bring  up 
supplies  of  provisions  and  ammunition.  I  am  doing  all  in  my  power  to 
crush  Hood's  army,  and,  if  it  be  possible,  will  destroy  it.  But  pursuing  an 
enemy  through  an  exhausted  country,  over  mud  roads  completely  sogged 
with  heavy  rains,  is  no  child's  play,  and  can  not  be  accomplished  as  quickly 


„. 

656  Life  of  Thomas. 

as  thought  of.  I  hope,  in  urging  me  to  push  the  enemy,  the  department 
remembers  that  General  Sherman  took  with  him  the  complete  organization 
of  the  Military  Division  of  the  Mississippi,  well  equipped  in  every  respect,  as 
regards  ammunition,  supplies,  and  transportation ,  leaving  me  only  two  corps, 
partially  stripped  of  their  transportation  to  accommodate  the  force  taken 
with  him,  to  oppose  the  advance  into  Tennessee  of  that  army  which  had 
resisted  the  advance  of  the  army  of  the  Military  Division  of  the  Mississippi 
on  Atlanta  from  the  commencement  of  the  campaign  till  its  close,  and  which 
is  now,  in  addition,  aided  by  Forrest's  cavalry.  Although  my  progress  may 
appear  slow,  I  feel  assured  that  Hood's  army  can  be  driven  from  Tennessee, 
and  eventually  driven  to  the  wall  by  the  force  under  my  command.  But  too 
much  must  not  be  expected  of  troops  which  have  to  be  reorganized,  especially 
when  they  have  the  task  of  destroying  a  force,  in  a  winter's  campaign,  which 
was  able  to  make  an  obstinate  resistance  to  twice  its  numbers  in  spring  and 
summer.  In  conclusion,  I  can  safely  state  that  this  army  is  willing  to  submit 
to  any  sacrifice  to  oust  Hood's  army,  or  to  strike  any  other  blow  which  may 
contribute  to  the  destruction  of  the  rebellion. 

[Signed,  G.  H.  THOMAS,  Major-General. 

[Suppressed.] 

WASHINGTON,  Dec.  22,  1864—9  P.  M. 
Maj.-Gen.  Geo.  H.  Thomas: 

I  have  seen  to-day  General  Halleck's  dispatch  of  yesterday,  and  your  re- 
ply. It  is  proper  for  me  to  assure  you  that  this  department  has  the  most  un- 
bounded confidence  in  your  skill,  vigor,  and  determination  to  employ  to 
the  best  advantage  all  the  means  in  your  power  to  pursue  and  destroy  the 
enemy.  No  department  could  be  inspired  with  more  profound  admiration 
and  thankfulness  for  the  great  deeds  which  you  have  already  performed,  or 
more  confiding  faith  that  human  effort  could  do  no  more,  and  no  more  than 
will  be  done  by  you  and  the  accomplished  and  gallant  officers  and  soldiers 
of  your  command. 

[Signed,]  E.  M.  STANTON,  Secretary  of  War. 

[Suppressed.] 

CITY  POINT,  Dec.  22,  1864. 
Maj.-Gen.  Geo.  H.  Thomas : 

You  have  the  congratulations  of  the  public  for  the  energy  with  which 
you  are  pushing  Hood.  I  hope  you  will  succeed  in  reaching  his  pontoon 
bridge  at  Tuscumbia^efore  he  gets  there.  Should  you  do  so,  it  looks  to 
me  that  Hood  is  cut  off.  If  you  succeed  in  destroying  Hood's  army,  there 
will  be  but  one  army  left  to  the  so-called  Confederacy  capable  of  doing  us 
harm.  I  will  take  care  of  that,  and  try  to  draw  the  sting  from  it,  so  that 
in  the  spring  we  shall  have  easy  sailing.  You  have  now  a  big  opportunity, 
which  I  know  you  are  availing  yourself  of.  Let  us  push  and  do  all  we  can 
before  the  enemy  can  derive  benefit  either  from  the  raising  of  negro  troops 
on  the  plantations  or  white  troops  now  in  the  field. 

[Signed,]  U.  S.  GRANT,  Lieutenant-General. 


Suppressed  Dispatches.  657 

[Suppressed.] 

WAR  DEPARTMENT,  Dec.  24, 1864. 
MAJOR-GENERAL  THOMAS,  Nashville: 

With  great  pleasure  I  inform  you  that  for  your  skill,  courage,  and  con- 
duct in  the  recent  brilliant  military  operations  under  your  command,  the 
President  has  directed  your  nomination  to  be  sent  to  the  Senate  as  a  major- 
general  in  the  United  States  Army,  to  fill  the  only  vacancy  existing  in  that 
grade.  No  official  duty  has  been  performed  by  me  with  more  satisfaction, 
and  no  commander  has  more  justly  earned  promotion  by  devoted,  disin- 
terested, and  valuable  services  to  his  country. 

EDWIN  M.  STANTON,  Secretary  of  War. 

[Suppressed.] 

HEAD-QUARTERS  DEPARTMENT  OP  THE  CUMBERLAND,) 
MC-KANE'S  CHURCH,  TENN.  f 

HON.  E.  M.  STANTON,  Secretary  of  War: 

I  am  profoundly  sensible  of  the  kind  expressions  of  your  telegram  of 
December  24th,  informing  me  that  the  President  had  directed  my  name  to 
be  sent  to  the  Senate  for  confirmation  as  major-general  United  States  Army, 
and  beg  to  assure  the  President  and  yourself,  that  your  approval  of  my 
services  is  of  more  value  to  me  than  the  commission  itself. 

GEO.  H.  THOMAS,  Major-General  Commanding. 

There  were  other  congratulatory  dispatches,  which,  if 
there  had  been  the  least  friendliness  toward  General  Thomas, 
would  have  been  published,  among  them,  these : 

WASHINGTON,  D.  C.,  Dec.  15,  1864— 11:30  p.  M. 
Atajor-General  Bawlins,  Chief  of  Staff: 

I  send  yoil  a  dispatch  just  received  from  Nashville.  I  shall  not  now 
go  there.  Will  remain  absent,  however,  until  about  Monday. 

U.  S.  GRANT,  Lieutenant-General. 

This  was  the  dispatch  from  Nashville  announcing  the 
victory  of  the  first  day.  Its  enthusiastically  congratulatory 
character  will  be  readily  detected: 

CITY  POINT,  VA.,  Dec.  16,  18C4. 
Lieut.-Gen.  U.  S.  Grant,  Washington.  D.  C.: 

It  you  have  any  further  news  of  General  Thomas's  success  will  you 
please  send  it,  as  it  inspires  the  army  here  with  great  enthusiasm. 

JNO.  A.  RAWLINS,  Brig.-Gen.  and  Chief  of  Staff. 

HEAD-QUARTERS  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC,^ 
December  16,  1864.  ) 

Brigadier-General  Rawlins,  Chief  of  Staff: 

Your  dispatch  announcing  General  Thomas's  success  has  been  received 
with  great  satisfaction,  as  the  situation  of  affairs  at  Nashville  were  such  as 


658  Life,  of  Thomas. 

to  afford  cause  for  anxiety.  I  had  every  confidence  in  the  judgment  and 
high  soldierly  qualities  of  General  Thomas,  and  am  truly  rejoiced  to  hear 
of  his  brilliant  success.  GEORGE  G.  MEADE,  Major-General. 

It  is  not  strange  that  this  culmination  of  long  continued 
and  varied  injustice  aroused  an  indignation  which  over- 
whelmed even  the  great  physical  powers  of  General  Thomas. 
He  had  waited  silently  and  patiently  through  the  years  for 
the  official  record  to  make  his  services  fully  known,  and  set 
forth  the  continuing  slights  and  the  many  indignities  which 
had  been  either  openly  or  covertly  put  upon  him  from  the 
time  when  his  name  was  left  out  of  the  President's  order 
thanking  his  army  for  Mill  Springs,  the  first  western  victory, 
down  to  his  deportation  to  the  Pacific  coast  against  his  will. 
And  now,  after  all  this  waiting,  he  saw  the  country  deliber- 
ately misled  as  to  the  real  history  of  Nashville,  his  greatest 
victory,  and  the  credit  due  him  deliberately  concealed,  and 
apparently  by  the  authority  of  General  Grant.  No  wonder 
that,  as  he  roused  himself  to  smite  this  unexpected  and  ma- 
licious wronging,  nature  gave  way,  and  the  great  heart  of 
Thomas  failed. 

So  died  the  only  uniformly  successful  commander  in  the 
Union  armies  during  our  civil  war. 

Others  were  great,  even  with  the  shadows  of  their  grave 
mistakes  upon  them ;  but  his  military  statur^  surpassed 
theirs,  and,  as  the  result  of  his  uniform  deliberation  in  prep- 
arations, which  more  reckless  and  perhaps  jealous  ones  called 
slowness,  his  record  is  not  burdened  with  that  fearful  load 
which  the  wasted  lives  of  men  imposes. 

When  the  official  record  is  unfolded  and  studied  till  its 
truths  clearly  appear  to  the  people,  there  will  be  many  sharp 
revisions  of  present  popular  judgments  and  misconceptions, 
and,  thereafter,  the  name  of  Thomas  will  head  the  list  of  our 
greatest  captains. 


THE  END. 


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